tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/naledi-pandor-49551/articlesNaledi Pandor – The Conversation2024-03-25T15:09:17Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262402024-03-25T15:09:17Z2024-03-25T15:09:17ZSouth Africans fighting for Israel in Gaza: what does the law say?<p><em>South Africa’s foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, said the country’s citizens fighting for the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza faced <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/14/naledi-pandor-south-africans-fighting-for-israel-will-be-arrested/">prosecution upon their return</a>. This statement followed <a href="https://theconversation.com/un-genocide-ruling-wont-change-israels-behaviour-three-reasons-why-222128">tension</a> between South Africa and Israel amid the <a href="https://www.rescue.org/topic/gaza-crisis">“humanitarian catastrophe”</a> resulting from Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza.</em></p>
<p><em>There is a history of South African citizens of Jewish descent fighting for Israel, but the number fighting for Israel in the current war on Gaza is unknown. The Conversation Africa asked Michelle Nel, an expert in international law and military law, for her legal insights.</em></p>
<h2>Which South African law bars its citizens from fighting in foreign wars or armies?</h2>
<p>South Africa explicitly prohibits citizens from rendering any foreign military assistance without the permission of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/national-conventional-arms-control-committee-ncacc-statement-south-african">National Conventional Arms Control Committee</a>. The committee is appointed by the president and controls all issues related to conventional arms. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-11.pdf">Section 198(b)</a> of the constitution precludes South African citizens from participating in any foreign armed conflict. The <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, 1998</a> effectively criminalises such actions. </p>
<p>In an apparent hardening of the South African government’s position against Israel, Pandor has <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/14/naledi-pandor-south-africans-fighting-for-israel-will-be-arrested/">not only threatened</a> to have South African citizens fighting in the Israel Defence Forces prosecuted. The government also <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/joining-foreign-armed-forces-could-lead-prosecution-government-warns">warned in December 2023</a> that naturalised South Africans could have their citizenship revoked for joining foreign armed forces engaged in wars the country didn’t agree with. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-genocide-ruling-wont-change-israels-behaviour-three-reasons-why-222128">UN genocide ruling won't change Israel's behaviour: three reasons why</a>
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<p>Citizenship is governed by the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act88of1995.pdf">South African Citizenship Act of 1995</a>. It can revoke South African citizenship where a citizen</p>
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<p>engages, under the flag of another country, in a war that the Republic does not support.</p>
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<p>However, section 20 of the constitution also determines that</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#20">No citizen may be deprived of citizenship</a>.</p>
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<h2>What does the law prohibit?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/pdf.html">constitution</a> creates a wide framework for prohibiting participation by citizens in armed conflict. </p>
<p>South Africans <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">are prohibited</a> from engaging in any kind of mercenary activity, or taking part in any military action on behalf of a foreign country, without the express authorisation of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. Legal entities (such as a company), permanent residents and foreign nationals <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">are also</a> prohibited from rendering such assistance within the borders of the country.</p>
<p>“Foreign military assistance” is widely defined. It includes not only the actual rendering of such assistance, but any attempt to render assistance, any encouragement, incitement or <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/Law/SouthAfrica6.pdf">solicitation thereof</a>.</p>
<p>It criminalises:</p>
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<li><p>providing advice or training any personnel or operational support</p></li>
<li><p>recruitment</p></li>
<li><p>medical services</p></li>
<li><p>procurement of equipment</p></li>
<li><p>security services such as those rendered by private military companies in areas of conflict</p></li>
<li><p>assisting in coups or furthering the military interests of parties to a conflict.</p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-is-the-countrys-proudest-foreign-policy-moment-in-three-decades-221512">South Africa’s genocide case against Israel is the country's proudest foreign policy moment in three decades</a>
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<p>The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act is set to be repealed by the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulations of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a27-06.pdf">Act, 2006</a>, which is yet to be promulgated. This new act goes as far as prohibiting the rendering of humanitarian assistance in a country of armed conflict, unless the organisation involved is duly registered with the arms control committee.</p>
<h2>How has the law been applied in the past?</h2>
<p>In 2009, the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">Palestinian Solidarity Alliance</a> handed a list of <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">73 South Africans</a> of Jewish descent who had fought for the Israeli military in 2008 and 2009 to the National Prosecuting Authority. <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-08-07-gaza-conflict-for-some-war-is-where-the-heart-is/">The authority declined to prosecute</a>. This was followed by a case brought against another South African citizen <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">serving in the Israel military in 2014</a>. A <a href="https://sacsis.org.za/s/story.php?s=2355">docket was opened in the Western Cape</a>, but no information could be found as to whether he was in fact prosecuted.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/arrest-sa-mercenaries-on-boko-haram-mission-mapisa-nqakula-20150128">2015</a>, about 100 former South African soldiers reportedly left to train the Nigerian military to combat Boko Haram. The then defence minister, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/arrest-sa-mercenaries-on-boko-haram-mission-mapisa-nqakula-20150128">Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, reportedly</a> said that they should be arrested upon their return to South Africa. Information on whether these arrests and prosecutions in fact took place is not readily accessible. </p>
<p>Many South Africans continue to serve in foreign <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v21n1/23.pdf">armed forces and private military companies</a>. Yet, the prosecuting authority has not succeeded in prosecuting any. Some cases have been settled by way of plea bargain, with <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2018/4.html">fines and suspended prison sentences</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately the efficacy of the legislation depends on its consistent enforcement. The history of inconsistent prosecution and accountability in terms of the mercenary activities act raises questions about the prosecuting authority’s ability to successfully prosecute the South Africans fighting for Israel. </p>
<h2>Do other countries have similar laws? Why are they good to have?</h2>
<p>Very few countries have legislation prohibiting their nationals from joining foreign armed forces. The UK prohibits its citizens from joining foreign armed forces. In the US they <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/02/is-it-legal-for-americans-to-fight-in-another-countrys-army/">may forfeit their citizenship</a>. Joining a foreign force fighting against the US is seen as treason.</p>
<p>The Netherlands does not prohibit citizens from joining a foreign armed force as long as the country is not at war with the country concerned. Canadians are prohibited from joining any foreign armed force <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/foreign-fighters-foreign-volunteers-and-mercenaries-ukrainian-armed-conflict">that is at war with a friendly nation</a>. </p>
<p>There are more countries prohibiting mercenaries. They include <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006418746/2024-03-22">France</a>, <a href="https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__109h.html">Germany</a> and the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/soldiers-of-fortune-why-u-s-mercenaries-should-not-be-legal/">UK</a>. South Africa is among the few that prohibit any form of engagement in the service of a foreign force.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Since the war between Russia and Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-third-year-3-issues-could-decide-its-outcome-supplies-information-and-politics-220581">in February 2022</a>, questions have been raised about the legal status of foreigner volunteers fighting in support of Ukraine <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896">within the wider ambit of international law</a>. </p>
<p>Some of them have been <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/russia-says-it-has-killed-more-than-a-dozen-south-african-mercenaries-in-ukraine-20240315#:%7E:text=Russia%20says%20its%20invasion%20of,Africa%2C%20it%20has%20killed%20103.">killed</a>. What would happen to those captured by the enemy? </p>
<p>The treatment of these foreign nationals could complicate diplomatic relations. It is therefore in the interest of any country to control its citizens’ ability to participate in foreign conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Nel is affiliated with the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) from Stellenbosch University.</span></em></p>South Africa is among a few countries that completely prohibit the involvement of citizens in foreign armed conflict.Michelle Nel, Lecturer in Criminal and Military law and the Law of Armed Conflict at the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881742022-08-04T14:28:19Z2022-08-04T14:28:19ZUS secretary of state Antony Blinken’s visit aims to reset relations with South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477460/original/file-20220803-11072-ek8jmv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US secretary of state Antony Blinken.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US secretary of state Antony Blinken has embarked on a <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-south-africa-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-rwanda/">five nation tour</a> of Cambodia, the Philippines, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. </p>
<p>This is Blinken’s second trip to Africa; he visited <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/africa-reacts-secretary-blinkens-africa-tour">Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya</a> last November. The purpose of each national visit varies according to <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00080254.html">local and regional circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>In South Africa he has two primary objectives, <a href="https://www.state.gov/east-asian-and-pacific-affairs-assistant-secretary-daniel-j-kritenbrink-and-african-affairs-assistant-secretary-molly-phee-on-the-secretarys-upcoming-travel-to-cambodia-the-philippines-sou/">according to assistant secretary Molly Phee</a>. One is to engage in a high-level “strategic dialogue” with his counterpart, international relations minister Naledi Pandor. And in Phee’s words:</p>
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<p>Given South Africa’s leadership role, it’s an ideal location for the Secretary to deliver a speech announcing and describing the US strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
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<p>South Africa has a long, complex, deep and vital history of relations with the US and its people. A series of dialogues at this level started <a href="https://www.gov.za/south-africa-united-states-america-strategic-dialogue">in 2010</a>, during the administrations of presidents Barack Obama and Jacob Zuma. They were suspended during the Donald Trump administration. </p>
<p>The Blinken-Pandor dialogue will include topics that have been vital to both nations since before the series began in 2010. Today, they are even more important: trade and investment, public health, agriculture, education, climate, water, science and technology, among others. </p>
<p>More Americans than ever visit South Africa. The US recently surpassed the UK and Germany as the source of South Africa’s <a href="https://www.getaway.co.za/travel-news/usa-overtakes-germany-and-uk-to-become-sas-biggest-overseas-tourists/">largest overseas tourism numbers</a>. </p>
<p>Reaffirming priorities now is important, considering domestic and international developments since the last high-level dialogue <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-nkoana-mashabane-arrives-washington-us-sa-strategic-dialogue-meeting-15-sep-2015">in 2015</a>.</p>
<h2>A rocky road</h2>
<p>Relations between the US and South Africa were of little interest to <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Donald-Trumps-Presidency-International-Perspectives/dp/1633916650">Trump</a>. He immediately cancelled Obama’s large financial commitment to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/06/02/trump-will-stop-paying-into-the-green-climate-fund-he-has-no-idea-what-it-is/">Green Climate Fund</a>. The fund was designed to assist African and other nations seriously affected by climate change. This caused consternation in South Africa. </p>
<p>So did his quick announcement that the US would <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html">withdraw</a> from the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement">Paris climate change accord</a>, vital to Africa’s well-being, and to which South African scientists have been essential. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden has reversed many of Trump’s actions. But such shifts have raised questions regarding America’s reliability.</p>
<p>In South Africa, financial scandals and <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">state capture</a> – the re-purposing and use of state organs for private gain – resulted in former president Zuma’s fall. </p>
<p>As COVID became a global pandemic, vaccine nationalism and travel bans further strained relations, even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-impose-travel-curbs-eight-southern-african-countries-over-new-covid-19-2021-11-26/">into the Biden administration</a>.</p>
<p>Currently both nations face existential political crises, made worse by violence, xenophobia, extreme inequality, and rising voter frustration and apathy. </p>
<p>A question facing Blinken and Pandor is whether their efforts can deepen cooperation on issues of obvious practical importance to both nations, including those on the announced agenda. Reviving the high-level dialogues offers renewed opportunities to set priorities and guidelines favouring greater attention to overcoming inequalities and legacies of racial discrimination in both countries. </p>
<p>The shared goal would be to benefit national integration and support for institutions of democratic governance among <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-06-21/hierarchies-weakness-social-divisions">chronically disadvantaged groups of Americans and South Africans</a>. </p>
<p>On the margins of the meetings informal exchanges about priorities and commitments can be linked to their common goals to sustain nonracial, nonsexist and more equal and secure democracies. According to American University professor <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/aacharya.cfm">Amitav Acharya</a>, progress on reconciling social divisions in the US can also yield a firmer national foundation for more effective and extensive foreign relations. </p>
<h2>Global tensions</h2>
<p>Deputy secretary of state Wendy Sherman visited South Africa in May to prepare for Blinken’s visit and resumption of the strategic dialogue. She specifically downplayed any differences between the two governments over <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-05-04-us-and-sa-agree-on-negotiated-peace-says-visiting-us-deputy-secretary-of-state/">the war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The US and South Africa had hoped to hold the dialogue in the first quarter of this year. The invasion of Ukraine temporarily derailed planning on the US side, according to officials with whom I have spoken. One hopes that next week’s high-level discussions can also mitigate persistent tensions that may exist between the two countries. The talks may also help ensure that Africa does not become the victim of a new <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/05/19/africa-and-the-new-cold-war-africas-development-depends-on-regional-ownership-of-its-security/">Cold War</a> in the wake of the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>South Africa has resisted taking sides in the dangerous and costly <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/govt-urges-south-africans-not-to-pick-sides-in-russias-bloody-invasion-of-ukraine-20220315">war in Ukraine</a>. Likewise, it has consistently resisted being drawn into taking sides on the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-06-17-ramaphosa-demonstrates-shrewd-statesmanship-as-he-performs-a-delicate-g7-balancing-act/">China-US global competition for influence</a>. </p>
<p>And when Biden invited 16 African leaders to his virtual <a href="https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/">“Summit for Democracy”</a> in December 2021, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-12-10-ramaphosa-gives-us-presidents-democracy-summit-the-cold-shoulder/">the only one to decline</a>. </p>
<p>On the US side, the House of Representatives recently passed by a large bi-partisan majority, <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57995#:%7E:text=Summary-,H.R.,undermine%20democratic%20institutions%20in%20Africa">“The Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act”</a>. It’s aimed at </p>
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<p>countering Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions in Africa.</p>
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<p>I was told by South African officials that they will appeal to the Biden administration to kill this initiative in step with other African governments. Minister Pandor recently <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-08-02-south-africas-engagements-with-the-world-are-informed-by-our-national-interest">publicly described the bill</a> as </p>
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<p>intended to punish countries in Africa that have not toed the line on the Russia-Ukraine war.</p>
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<p>Perhaps in their meetings Blinken, Pandor and their advisers could ensure there are no misunderstandings about the nature and intent of the act. They also need to ensure that any remaining differences will not negatively affect progress on any of the agreed priorities in their strategic dialogue. </p>
<h2>Resetting US-SA relations</h2>
<p>The process to reset US-SA relations should begin with a few home truths. Prominent Americans have described their nation as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/is-america-still-the-shining-city-on-a-hill/617474/">“The Shining City on a Hill”</a> or the world’s <a href="http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/idps/article/view/22430">“sole super-power”</a>. This seems to many other nations, especially in South Africa with a similar history of racial oppression, as arrogant and ignorant of the US’s own history.</p>
<p>But there are large numbers of progressive Americans willing to listen and learn from others. They are eager for a reset of relations with South Africa. To cite one pertinent example: in the influential journal <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/">Foreign Affairs</a>, scholar-diplomat Reuben Brigety II argues that Americans should begin by heeding their own advice to other countries and upgrade their own democracy.</p>
<p>He was recently confirmed to become America’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/new-us-ambassador-to-sa-pledges-to-promote-ubuntu-diplomacy-20220723">next ambassador to South Africa</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The meetings between Blinken and his South African counterpart Naledi Pandor could help iron out misunderstandings about the intent of the US targeting Russian ‘malign’ activities in Africa.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1198532019-07-04T15:01:10Z2019-07-04T15:01:10ZDisrupted world order brings urgency to South Africa’s seat on the Security Council<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282658/original/file-20190704-51268-1hnzce5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa with United Nations Secretary General António Guterres. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is six months into its <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/unsc/index.html">third elected term</a> on the United Nations Security Council. Its conduct in its previous two terms has been criticised for the country’s controversial voting record. During its first term, South Africa was accused of supporting rogue states when it voted against resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Sudan. In its second term, it was accused of voting for Western-sponsored regime change in Libya. </p>
<p>Despite these criticisms, the African Union (AU) has endorsed South Africa’s candidature three times and it has received over two-thirds of the vote in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This shows that the world views it as a constructive contributor to an organisation charged with maintaining international peace and security. </p>
<p>Being a member of the Security Council matters. This is because it is the most powerful body within the UN.</p>
<p>The UN, founded in 1945, has 193 member states. Its powers are vested in its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html">Charter</a>, which provides for <a href="https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html">six main bodies</a> in the organisation. The General Assembly is the main forum for deliberation and policymaking. All member states are represented and every September the full membership of the UN meets in New York for the General Assembly session. </p>
<p>Then there’s the Security Council. Its primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. Its decisions are binding on all member states and it’s the only body that can authorise the use of force to maintain international peace and security. This makes it arguably the most powerful international forum in the world. </p>
<p>The membership of the Council reflects global power dynamics at the end of the Second World War. It has 15 members – five permanent and ten that are elected by the general assembly for rotating two year terms. All have one vote in the Council. But the permanent members – the US, UK, France, Russia and the People’s Republic of China – have the power to veto resolutions. This makes the permanent members of the Security Council – known as the P5 – the governing elite of the UN. </p>
<p>The day-to-day work of the UN is done by the Secretariat, which is headed by the Secretary-General – curently Antonio Guterres – who is the de facto chief executive officer of the UN. </p>
<p>Election to the Security Council is prestigious for member states because it gives them a seat at the highest table of global decision-making.</p>
<h2>What’s a stake</h2>
<p>South Africa’s re-election to the Security Council under President Cyril Ramaphosa raised hopes of a <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/unsc0101.htm">return to the foreign policy</a> of President Nelson Mandela and a stronger commitment to human rights. Though admirable, the fact is that the world has changed dramatically since the Mandela presidency <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">which ended in 1999</a>. </p>
<p>Pretoria needs to update its approach to the Security Council to suit the pressures of a changing world order. This is illustrated by a number of events that have contributed to a decline in the currency of democracy and set back debates about global human rights. </p>
<p>These include the presidency of Donald Trump which has led to the US all but abandoning its role as guarantor of the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/long-term-disaster-trump-foreign-policy">liberal international world order</a>. In addition, China is entrenching its position as the new superpower while Vladimir Putin’s Russia has put great power rivalry back on the international agenda. </p>
<p>The shifts in global power dynamics are starkly shown by the fractures in Security Council. In 2018, there were fewer consensus resolutions passed and an increased use of the veto. This trend appears to be continuing in 2019. Earlier this year two draft resolutions on the situation in Venezuela failed while so far six resolutions have passed without consensus. </p>
<p>This matters because for 20 years after the end of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>, there was a shift towards consensus decision-making in the Council. The drafters and supporters of a resolution tried to get broad agreement on the text before submitting it for discussion. Consensus decisions gave the Security Council the appearance of legitimacy because the individual five permanent members cooperated with the majority instead of using their structural power to enforce their particular perspective or interests. </p>
<p>The increased use of the veto and failure to get consensus decisions reflects the return of superpower rivalry and division in the Council since the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24585876?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">2011 NATO intervention in Libya</a> and the ongoing stalemate in addressing the intractable <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229">war in Syria</a>. </p>
<p>But tensions among the permanent members provide an opportunity for the ten elected non-permanent elected members to exert greater influence over Council operations. </p>
<p>The highlight of South Africa’s tenure will be in October 2019 when it holds the rotating presidency of the Security Council. This is one of the highlights for elected Security Council members. They generally use their presidencies to present themes that are not officially on the Council agenda or to keep issues that would otherwise be neglected on the agenda.</p>
<p>South Africa’s Permanent Representative Jerry Matjila has been in the position for three years and has built good relationships with his counterparts. He appears to be able to balance South Africa’s interests and interaction with partners from the global north and the global south. </p>
<h2>Difficult decisions</h2>
<p>As in its previous two terms, Pretoria’s focus for its tenure in the Security Council is the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. This was tested earlier this year when election results in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were contested. </p>
<p>Western members of the Security Council, especially Belgium and France, unsuccessfully sought South Africa’s support to take a strong position against any possible fraud in the results. South Africa refused, and aligned itself with the Southern Africa Development Community that favoured the formation of a DRC government based on the results released by the electoral authorities. </p>
<p>China and Russia were aligned with South Africa in viewing this as an internal and sovereign issue that required no further involvement from the Security Council. In the event, Felix Tshisekedi was sworn in as President on 24 January 2019 and was recognised as the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/us-recognises-tshisekedi-after-controversial-drc-vote-20190124">legitimate head of state</a> by Council members. </p>
<p>Aside from challenges within Africa, the biggest controversy of South Africa’s tenure so far was the vote on two competing draft resolutions – one sponsored by Russia the other by the US – in response to the political situation in Venezuela. South Africa voted against a US-sponsored draft that <a href="https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/186">called into question</a> President Nicolás Maduro’s election in a poll in May last year. The <a href="https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8476">draft</a> failed because of vetoes from China and Russia. </p>
<p>South Africa’s voting decisions on the issue were consistent with its stated foreign policy. Pretoria has long opposed regime change and international intervention except in very particular circumstances. The debacle over its vote for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12782972">resolution 1973</a> in March 2011 authorising military intervention in Libya still leaves an embarrassing aftertaste. </p>
<p>So far, South Africa has managed its tenure in the Security Council by taking cautious and calculated decisions. The appointment of a new minister, Naledi Pandor, to the international relations ministry bodes well for the rest of South Africa’s term. She is a seasoned politician with the necessary gravitas to restore respect in South Africa’s foreign policy. She also has the trust of President Cyril Ramaphosa, which is important for giving the Department of International Relations and Cooperation the authority to make tough decisions on the Council.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sithembile Mbete does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Election to the Security Council is prestigious for member states because it gives them a seat at the highest table of global decision-making.Sithembile Mbete, Lecturer, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064582018-11-14T13:58:05Z2018-11-14T13:58:05ZSurvivors of sexual violence in South Africa are finally finding their voices<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244804/original/file-20181109-34102-1tzl9m9.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cheryl Zondi bucked the trend of rape accusers staying anonymous in South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">African News Agency (ANA)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The story of Cheryl Zondi, the brave young woman who took the stand in a South African court to testify against Nigerian pastor and rape accused Timothy Omotoso has recently <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/2020717/court-hears-how-omotoso-sexually-assaulted-14-year-old-zondi/">dominated news headlines</a>. The televangelist and senior pastor of the Jesus Dominion International Church faces multiple charges. These include rape, human trafficking and racketeering. </p>
<p>Under harsh, degrading, <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/omotoso-trial-cheryl-zondis-cross-examination-brutally-inhumane-dlamini-memela-20181018">cross examination</a>, Zondi, a 22-year old university student, courageously faced her alleged abuser and his jeering congregants to tell her story of alleged sexual assault that started when she was 14. In coming forward to testify in open court – despite death threats and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/omotoso-trial-cheryl-zondi-received-god-will-kill-you-threat-before-testifying-20181021">attempts to silence her</a> – she was not just another faceless victim of sexual violence.</p>
<p>There are many such faceless victims. According to the Crime against Women in South Africa <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-40-05/Report-03-40-05June2018.pdf">2018 report</a>, there has been a 53% increase in sexual offences against women in a short period - from 31 665 in 2015/16 to 70 813 in 2016/17. And the real numbers are probably higher; as is the case across the globe, many incidents of sexual assault go unreported. So the statistics don’t paint a full picture. </p>
<p>Based on the available data, the number of women raped in South Africa is 138 for 100 000 women. These numbers are among the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-40-05/Report-03-40-05June2018.pdf">highest</a> in the world.</p>
<p>So, why don’t girls and women come forward to tell their stories of sexual assault? <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14725840701253894?journalCode=cafi20">Research</a> shows that the reasons are complex and influenced by a web of inter-related, <a href="https://rapecrisis.org.za/rape-in-south-africa/#prevalence">social-psychological factors</a>. These include feelings of shame and humiliation, self-blame, fear and even denial. These are influenced by the prevailing patriarchal and cultural norms of societies and communities that suppress, silence and shame these girls and women.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1186/1758-2652-13-6">highly gender unequal</a> and patriarchal country like South Africa, violent and entrenched masculinities legitimise men’s power over women. This exacerbates sexual violence. Naturally, women have severe anxieties about the repercussions and backlash if they speak out. </p>
<p>Another factor is that South Africa’s intractable history of political and gender-based violence has resulted in deep distrust of the justice system. According to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-11-crime-is-increasing-and-were-more-fearful/">Statistics SA</a>, satisfaction in the police and the courts has continued to fall since 2013/14. </p>
<p>But there are indications that the tide is turning in South Africa: not only in the way women are coming forward but how people rallied around Cheryl Zondi.</p>
<h2>The tide is turning</h2>
<p>Zondi’s courage garnered the respect and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/cheryl-zondi-expresses-gratitude-for-fierce-and-unwavering-support-17558016">overwhelming support</a> of ordinary South Africans, the government, civil society and women’s groups. The Minister for Women in the Presidency supported her during the trial, as did the Women’s League of the governing African National Congress (ANC), among others. </p>
<p>Contrast this with another high profile sexual assault trial in 2006, which took a very different turn. A young woman named Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo, then known only as <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-14-zuma-took-me-to-his-bedroom/">Khwezi</a> accused ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma of rape. </p>
<p>She was vilified, marginalised and threatened by Zuma’s supporters and the ANC Women’s League turned their back on her. She was denigrated and <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/Voices/Time-to-shut-slut-shaming-factory-down-20150918">slut-shamed</a> by the patriarchal court system, shunned, and fled the country after the trial. Zuma was <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2006-05-08-zuma-found-not-guilty">acquitted</a> and went on to become the country’s president. </p>
<p>A great deal has changed in the ensuing 12 years.</p>
<p>Women at the country’s universities have been at the forefront of speaking out about a culture of rape on campuses, <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-south-african-defamation-law-stands-on-naming-and-shaming-58246">“naming and shaming”</a> the perpetrators. This has gained momentum in the wake of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/feesmustfall-the-poster-child-for-new-forms-of-struggle-in-south-africa-68773">#FeesMustFall</a> mass student movement that swept the country in 2015, demanding deep change at universities.</p>
<p>Survivors of campus rape want to tell their stories on their own terms. One such event was the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/PE-Express/play-focuses-on-attacks-on-women-20181022">Rape Textile</a>, which used performance art, monologues, dance and poetry to narrate the trauma of a violent campus rape of two Nelson Mandela University students.</p>
<p>Higher Education and Training Minister, Naledi Pandor recently informed Parliament that <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20181009130251203">47 students</a> had been raped on campuses in 2017 and named the institutions involved. There is an urgent need for universities to discuss the ways in which to address sexual assault and rape on campuses.</p>
<h2>Fighting gender-based violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-deadly-month-for-domestic-violence-the-message-doesnt-appear-to-be-getting-through-105568">Strategies</a> to fight gender-based violence must educate society about why and in what ways sexual violence affects everyone. Men’s voices are critical in the fight and, here, role models are especially important. South African campaigns should also look at holding the public accountable for preventing gender-based violence.</p>
<p>Technology is a game changer in fighting gender-based violence in the 21st century – think of the powerful <a href="https://theconversation.com/metoo-a-year-on-media-troll-women-when-journalists-should-be-tackling-causes-of-sexual-abuse-104804">#MetToo</a> and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/survivors-explain-not-reporting-sexual-assaults/">#WhyIDidn’tReport</a> and other social media campaigns. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/metoo-has-arrived-in-india-and-its-changing-how-technology-is-used-to-fight-injustice-105755">technologies</a> like safety apps and global hashtags that include shared text messages, pictures and videos in private groups must be made more accessible to all South African women.</p>
<p>The availability of economical, lightweight <a href="https://theconversation.com/metoo-has-arrived-in-india-and-its-changing-how-technology-is-used-to-fight-injustice-105755">mobile technologies</a> could empower South African girls and women to share their stories and name their perpetrators. It is not only prevention but prosecution that is pivotal in getting justice for the country’s women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lyn Snodgrass does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Prevailing patriarchal and cultural norms in some societies prevent women victims of sexual crimes from talking out by shaming them.Lyn Snodgrass, Professor and Head of Department of Political and Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/925382018-02-27T15:19:14Z2018-02-27T15:19:14ZRamaphosa has chosen a team that will help him assert his authority<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208119/original/file-20180227-36680-1x0i4mv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Cyril Ramaphosa during the late night announcement of his new cabinet. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elmond Jiyane, GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/graphic-all-the-changes-ramaphosa-made-to-cabinet-20180227">has announced</a> his cabinet. As widely expected, he either fired or demoted almost all cabinet ministers implicated in corruption or considered incompetent who served under Jacob Zuma. In their stead Ramaphosa appointed his dream team to key ministries, bringing back former finance ministers Nhlanhla Nene and Pravin Gordhan both of whom had been fired by Zuma. But, contrary to expectations, he kept some ministers widely believed to have made a hash of their jobs. Politics and Society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Keith Gottschalk for his perspective.</em></p>
<p><strong>Is the new Cabinet fit for purpose - is it better equipped to do what needs to be done?</strong></p>
<p>This was a major shuffle, affecting two-thirds of ministers, more than most analysts had expected. </p>
<p>The new cabinet is undoubtedly better than the one that served under Zuma. The ministers incriminated in subverting procurement procedures for the benefit of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-brothers">Guptas</a>, or at best, above their level of competence, have vanished. The Guptas’s were allied to Zuma and were at the heart of corruption and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/FULL-TEXT-Statement-by-Public-Protector-on-Nkandla-Report-20140319">state capture </a> in the country.</p>
<p>The independence and competence of Gordhan, who has come back to serve as minister of Public Enterprises, and Nene who returns to the finance minister post, are welcome and will be well received by the markets. The appointment of <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/grace-naledi-mandisa-pandor-ms">Naledi Pandor</a> to Higher Education and Training is a good fit. Her views and temperament match with the vice-chancellors of higher education institutions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa appointed two former ministers to their previous jobs: <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/derek-andre-hanekom/">Derek Hanekom</a>, who was fired by Zuma, is back running tourism and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f45af228-1a10-11e7-a266-12672483791a">Malusi Gagaba</a>, who relinquished the finance ministry, has been put back in charge of Home Affairs. An obvious posting for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who ran against Ramaphosa for the position of president of the African National Congress, would have been her former portfolio in international relations. Instead she has become a minister within the presidency.</p>
<p>The country is onto its eleventh minister responsible for energy since 1994. This time the post has gone to <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/jeffrey-thamsanqa-radebe-mr">Jeff Radebe</a>. Each of the previous incumbents lasted an average of 2.4 years. </p>
<p>In future the revolving door of ministers, directors-general and deputy directors general will need to end.</p>
<p>Before then, there will be at least one more shuffle and pruning when, as Ramaphosa has <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-02-16-ramaphosa-promises-to-cut-bloated-cabinet/">indicated</a>, the cabinet and the number of state departments are cut back. </p>
<p>It is a rule of thumb in political science that the poorer a country, the bigger its cabinet. The USA’s includes the Vice President and the heads of <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet/">15 executive departments</a>. South Africa’s is <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/leaders/profile/1083">35</a>, up from 30 <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1994-cabinet">under Nelson Mandela</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What does all this augur for the future, and Ramaphosa’s success?</strong></p>
<p>Politics, except under a dictatorship, involves negotiating trade-offs with those with whom you have to negotiate, not only with those you would like to have as your allies. A winner only wins because he or she has formed a coalition of factions which outnumbers the rival coalition of factions.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa had to do some fancy footwork. This is because there’s broad consensus that his narrow victory over Nkosazana for the presidency was solely due to the intervention of the premier of Mpumalanga David Mabuza who ordered his followers to switch their votes at the last minute. Ramaphosa squeaked through. And, notwithstanding Ramaphosa’s preference for Pandor as his deputy, Mabuza won the necessary backing. Ramaphosa announced Mabuza’s appointment as deputy president of the country as part of his cabinet announcement. (Convention has it that the president and deputy president of the ANC serve as president and deputy president of the country.)</p>
<p>Making Dlamini-Zuma a minister within the presidency is clearly also a gesture of inclusivity to the anti-Ramaphosa faction.</p>
<p>Overall, Ramaphosa has a cabinet that forms a team he can work with, and that will help him assert his authority. As he <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-announces-changes-national-executive">said</a> in announcing it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These changes are intended to ensure that national government is better equipped to implement the mandate of this administration and specifically the tasks identified in the State of the Nation Address.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92538/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>Overall South Africa’s new president has a cabinet that forms a team with whom he can work.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909552018-02-07T14:41:32Z2018-02-07T14:41:32ZSouth Africa’s future hinges on Ramaphosa’s strategic skills<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205323/original/file-20180207-74509-d1kson.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Deputy President of South Africa and leader of the country's governing party, the ANC.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s 2018 State of the Nation address by the president of South Africa has been <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/07/curiosity-confusion-and-comedy-after-sona-postponed">postponed</a>. This unprecedented step makes it clear that the country is seeing the final days of Jacob Zuma as president although it may take a day or a week or two before things are finalised.</p>
<p>What’s important is that Zuma isn’t allowed to detract from the momentum that newly elected ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa has started to build. This has included a successful trip to Davos where he unequivocally pulled the carpet from under the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/we-have-excess-power-and-no-money-ramaphosa-on-nuclear-plan-12934073">nuclear power programme</a> favoured by Zuma.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been working diligently to corral Zuma’s remaining freedom of action. Zuma was finally persuaded to establish a <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/state-capture-commission-must-investigate-all-state-corruption-focus-on-guptas-20180125">commission of enquiry into state capture</a> and Ramaphosa started restoring credibility to the management of <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1789190/new-eskom-ceo-and-board-chair-appointed-koko-and-singh-others-to-be-removed-says-presidency/">state owned enterprises</a>. </p>
<p>The momentum built by Ramaphosa seems sufficient to avoid the most pressing concern, the spectre of a <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/moodys-now-places-sa-inc-on-downgrade-review-20171129">downgrade</a> of South Africa’s long term local currency debt rating by the rating agency Moody’s. Such a step would trigger South Africa being excluded from <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">Citi’s World Governance Bond Index</a>. RMB Morgan Stanley projects a potential <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/sa-faces-many-economic-headwinds-12486144">outflow of US $5 billion</a> if this happened.</p>
<p>But his freedom of action is severely constrained by his narrow victory during the ANC’s leadership elections and the divisions within the party’s top leadership. The party has no choice but to design an early exit strategy for Zuma, or suffer significant political damage during the 2019 elections.</p>
<p>A downgrade would constrain growth and severely affect the ANC’s 2019 election prospects. Ramaphosa needs his own mandate, which only the 2019 national elections can deliver. </p>
<h2>Economic growth</h2>
<p>In November last year Ramaphosa outlined an economic plan aimed at <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">generating jobs and economic growth and tackling inequality</a>. The plan set a growth target of 3% for 2018, rising to 5% by 2023. </p>
<p>For its part the Reserve Bank has forecast the economy will grow by a measly 1.4% in 2018 and 1.6% in 2019. The International Monetary Fund is even more pessimistic, forecasting growth of 1.1% for this year. </p>
<p>Nothing is more important for South Africa – and Ramaphosa as the country’s incoming president – than growth and translating that growth into employment creation. That, in turn, requires foreign and domestic investment, which is only possible with policy certainty and rapid movement to a new leadership. It also requires a positive partnership with the private sector.</p>
<p>Assuming Zuma’s exit is imminent, serious consideration needs to be given to the team that Ramaphosa must put in place to help him achieve the economic turnaround he envisages. This brings us to the need for a cabinet reshuffle, including the appointment of a credible minister of finance. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>South Africa has a cabinet which is double the size required. A few ministers, such as Rob Davies at trade and industry and Naledi Pandor in science and technology, have established their credibility. But a large number of the current cabinet shouldn’t be considered for inclusion under a Ramaphosa administration. </p>
<p>The most important post is the minister of finance. Given the fact that former finance minister Nhlanhla Nene seems to have moved on, it is likely that either Pravin Gordhan or his then deputy Mcebesi Jonas will be invited back.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa needs to turns his narrow victory into a positive outcome. And he must convince non-voting ANC supporters who abandoned the ANC under Zuma to return to the fold of the governing party in 2019. </p>
<p>It will also depend on legal processes – such as the various probes into corruption and state capture – to strip out the internal contradictions within the top leadership of the ANC.</p>
<p>Long term voting trends indicate declining support for the ANC and as things stand, a divided ANC remains a plump target for opposition parties. It could see support decline from its current 62% nationally by around 10 percentage points in 2019 if that trend is not reversed. The impact of these developments were set out in a recent book <a href="http://www.jonathanball.co.za/component/virtuemart/fate-of-the-nation-detail?Itemid=6">Fate of the Nation</a> that included political and economic scenarios to 2034.</p>
<p>A more positive party future requires the ANC to rapidly rediscover its unity although this seems unlikely in the short term. And here is the nub – as much as the traditionalist faction is associated with corruption and state capture, it also represents a strong ideological current that could still derail the party and even lead to it splintering. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa has been dealt a weak hand but he has proven to be a consummate strategist. The next few days and weeks will be crucial and are likely to determine South Africa’s future for several years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jakkie Cilliers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Jacob Zuma shouldn’t be allowed to detract from the momentum that Cyril Ramaphosa, the new president of the ruling ANC, has started to build.Jakkie Cilliers, Chair of the Board of Trustees and Head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies. Extraordinary Professor in the Centre of Human Rights, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.