tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/pacific-step-up-66735/articlesPacific step-up – The Conversation2022-04-27T19:58:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820402022-04-27T19:58:23Z2022-04-27T19:58:23ZThis is where we live: has Australia been a good neighbour in the Pacific?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459970/original/file-20220427-18-v79wzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I was <a href="https://soundcloud.com/griffithasia/dr-tess-newton-cain-interviewed-by-abc-capricornia/sets">once asked</a> “why should Australians care about what happens in the Pacific? and my response was (or started with) "This is where you live”.</p>
<p>Being in the neighbourhood is a fact of geography. Being a good neighbour requires thought, care, activity, and participation. When it comes to being a good neighbour in the region, how has Australia’s statecraft rated in the past and how can it be improved for the future?</p>
<p>Two years ago <a href="https://www.whitlam.org/publications/2020/2/13/pacific-perspectives-on-the-world">I led a research team</a> that spent a good while listening to Pacific islanders (from Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu). I have distilled some of what we heard into what I describe as the “Australia paradox”. Essentially this means that for people in these countries, the relationship with Australia is far and away the most important one, the one they care the most about. And because they care so much about it, they want it to be better.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459977/original/file-20220427-16-f9iwn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pacific Islanders want the relationship with Australia to be better. Australians should want that too.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>The importance of ‘how’, not just ‘what’</h2>
<p>So how do we do it better? Is it more aid, better labour mobility, economic integration, more support for Pacific regionalism, all of the above? Everyone is looking for or putting forward an answer. But first, we need to look at the questions and what underpins them.</p>
<p>In the Pacific, the number one currency is relationships. Relationships need to be nurtured and built on solid foundations. The “how” of what Australia does has been given insufficient attention. The narrative of the Pacific step-up has been too much about the “what”. This has led to it being <a href="https://www.cairnsinstitute.jcu.edu.au/walking-the-talk-is-australia-s-engagement-with-the-pacific-a-step-up-or-a-stumble/">something that is perceived</a> as being done “to” or “for” the Pacific. It is only by addressing the “how” that it can be elevated to something Australia does “with” the Pacific.</p>
<p>There are four components to establishing the solid foundation that is needed to sustain and enrich Pacific relationships: listening, talking, Pacific literacy, and capacity building.</p>
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<p>When it comes to listening, there needs to be more of it, and it needs to be done better. Australian policymakers need to listen to a wider range of voices, and they need to be open to listening to things that may be uncomfortable to hear. </p>
<p>Most importantly, Pacific voices need to be the ones doing the talking. In particular, Pacific diaspora communities in Australia are key sources of knowledge and expertise who often feel that they are overlooked when it comes to critical conversations.</p>
<p>As for talking, a lot of what we have seen during this election campaign, particularly in regard to the pact between China and the Solomon Islands, indicates that there needs to be less bluster and more self-awareness and respect. The words that political leaders, commentators and journalists use matter. They can be offensive or even inflammatory. Solomon Islands is not a “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/australia-s-lifeline-to-the-us-the-stakes-in-solomon-islands-are-exceptionally-high-20220418-p5ae43.html">fly-speck country</a>” or a “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnrqiOyVFs8">little Cuba</a>” and neither is it in anyone’s “<a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2022/04/26/solomons-failure-reveals-incompetent-government-and-intelligence-service/">back yard</a>”. </p>
<p>Even without the hyped up political rhetoric of an election campaign, too often how the Pacific is discussed or reported on reveals some rusted on tropes and prejudices. It doesn’t require much scratching to see they are based on a toxic mix of racism and neo-colonialism. Not only is this unattractive, it is also counter-productive. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459979/original/file-20220427-15-ncf90b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Australians also need to improve their Pacific literacy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>Australians need to improve their Pacific literacy</h2>
<p>Pacific islanders know a lot about Australia, but the reverse is far from true. The Australian policy community and the wider society need to make a meaningful and sustained investment in building Pacific literacy. Too little is taught in schools and universities about the diversity and dynamism of the Pacific neighbourhood. </p>
<p>The mainstream media has paid too little attention to the Pacific, other than in a reactive, knee-jerk way. A major gap in the Australian consciousness relates to historical links. Fortunes were made by plantation owners in Queensland and New South Wales on the back of labour that was blackbirded from Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and Solomon Islands. This is part of a <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/2021/07/30/south-sea-islander-community-receive-first-formal-apology-slavery">shared history</a>, and it needs to be acknowledged and understood if there is to be shared prosperity in the region.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-the-caribbean-to-queensland-re-examining-australias-blackbirding-past-and-its-roots-in-the-global-slave-trade-158530">From the Caribbean to Queensland: re-examining Australia's 'blackbirding' past and its roots in the global slave trade</a>
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<p>“Capacity building” is possibly the most commonly and over-used phrase associated with Australian policy in the Pacific. But Australia’s leaders and officials have their own serious capacity deficits in the development and implementation of policies in our region. </p>
<p>Particular areas of focus are linguistic and cultural capacity. An unwillingness or refusal to engage with the cultural underpinnings of Pacific ways of thinking and being is more than just bad manners – it is intellectually lazy and strategically inept. </p>
<p>Other partners, including New Zealand and China, are able to develop stores of social and political capital by investing in cultural capacity, and Australian recalcitrance does not go unnoticed by Pacific counterparts.</p>
<p>These are the building blocks that can create a foundation for whatever strategy, policy, programme or project Australia seeks to develop with Pacific partners. They can <a href="https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/1093427/strengthening-australias-pacific-relationship-policy-brief.pdf">form the basis</a> of reinvigorated relationships that will be nurtured by trust, reciprocity, and respect.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182040/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tess Newton Cain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We talk about the Pacific ‘neighbourhood’, but too often Australia’s approach to the region has been of saying what we’re going to do, rather than how – and listening to the people it most affects.Tess Newton Cain, Adjunct Associate Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785342022-04-14T05:39:44Z2022-04-14T05:39:44ZHow should the next Australian government handle the Pacific?<p><em>This is part of a foreign policy election series looking at how Australia’s relations with the world have changed since the Morrison government came to power. You can read the first piece in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-handshakes-to-threats-can-the-election-bring-a-fresh-start-in-our-fractured-relationship-with-china-178415">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Successive Australian governments have lined up over recent decades to emphasise the importance of the Pacific region to Australian interests. While there are some differences in emphasis between the two major parties’ approach to the Pacific, we can expect considerable continuity in Australia’s approach to the region if there is a change of government in May. </p>
<p>Regional capitals will be early destinations for newly-elected ministers. The Pacific will remain the main focus of the Australian aid program, and the Australian Defence Force will continue to provide humanitarian support following natural disasters, as it has for decades. Economic integration with the region will remain a priority, as will labour market access.</p>
<p>But the stakes rose significantly for Australia last month, when a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-china-solomon-islands-security-deal-changes-everything/">leaked draft security agreement</a> between China and Solomon Islands confirmed Beijing’s intention to deploy military and police to the country, and to secure a potential supply base there for its warships. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pennywong.com.au/media-hub/media-statements/solomon-islands-security-arrangements/">Both sides</a> of politics consider this to be <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/statement-solomon-islands">an unwelcome development for Australian national security</a>. It also highlights that a “business as usual” Australian approach to the Pacific is no longer enough. </p>
<h2>Coalition’s record in the region</h2>
<p>The Coalition points to the <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific">Pacific Step-up program</a>, first announced by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in 2016, to illustrate how seriously it takes the region. As part of this, Australia has sustained its major aid effort in the Pacific, while pivoting over the past two years to <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/australia-stepping-up-to-address-covid-19-in-the-pacific#:%7E:text=In%20addition%2C%20Australia%20is%20establishing,region's%20stability%20and%20economic%20recovery.">respond to the challenges of COVID-19</a>. </p>
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<p>The government’s commitment also takes in a significant <a href="https://www.aiffp.gov.au/">new infrastructure financing initiative</a>. This invests in upgrades to Fiji’s airport and a new undersea internet cable between the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati and Nauru.</p>
<h2>A long history of bipartisan agreement</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/stepping-up-australias-pacific-engagement">the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade acknowledges</a>, the Pacific Step-up actually builds on over half a century of “sustained engagement” in the Pacific. </p>
<p>This bipartisan history takes in Labor government initiatives such as the 2008 <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-15802">Port Moresby Declaration</a>, a landmark Australian commitment to work with Pacific nations on economic development and climate change. It also includes the resulting <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/partnerships/default">Pacific Islands Partnerships for Development</a>, aimed at improving health, education and employment outcomes in the region.</p>
<p>Since 2013, we have seen fresh determination in Canberra to counter Chinese strategic inroads in the region, as well. </p>
<p>These initiatives include the <a href="https://coralseacablecompany.com/">Coral Sea cable</a>, which provides secure telecommunications to PNG and Solomon Islands, and Telstra’s government-backed investment in <a href="https://exchange.telstra.com.au/expanding-the-telstra-family-with-digicel-pacific/">regional telecom company Digicel</a>. While these are aimed at improving regional infrastructure, they are also clearly designed to deny Chinese firms such as Huawei <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-25/telstra-digicel-pacific-telecommunications-deal-finalised/100564976">access to the sensitive regional telecommunications sector</a>.</p>
<p>If these have been tactical wins for the current Australian government, China’s deal with Solomon Islands is undoubtedly a setback. It has prompted serious concern in Washington and other capitals.</p>
<p>Responding to China will require a collaborative response that draws on the voices of the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-31/federated-states-micronesia-solomon-islands-china-security/100955650">Pacific Island nations that share Australia’s concerns</a>. There are serious hazards for fragile Pacific nations in Beijing’s hunger for resources, its growing military engagement across the region and the scale of its lending patterns. </p>
<p>Australia will also need to work harder to avoid the impression that its focus on the region has been motivated <em>only</em> by an impulse to counter China’s reach. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">The AUKUS pact, born in secrecy, will have huge implications for Australia and the region</a>
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<h2>New focus on regional security threats</h2>
<p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison has won <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/imagining-australias-south-pacific-family/">praise from some for his personal tone and language</a> when engaging with regional audiences. This includes positioning Australia as a proud member of the Pacific “family”. </p>
<p>But his foreign policy address to the Lowy Institute in March struck a different tone. The prime minister depicted Australia’s neighbourhood as a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-prime-minister-scott-morrison">geo-strategic theatre brimming with threats</a>, rather than a place of collaboration or opportunity. He was speaking to a domestic audience against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine, but they will have been listening in the Pacific, too.</p>
<p>Last year, several Pacific leaders and senior community representatives <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/11/04/aukus-and-australias-relations-in-the-pacific/">expressed real disquiet</a> in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-leaders-statement-aukus">AUKUS announcement</a> about what they saw as a disrespectful lack of forewarning and the impact of growing strategic competition on a vulnerable region. </p>
<p>Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama <a href="https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/Speeches/English/PM-JVB-NATIONAL-STATEMENT-TO-UNGA76">told</a> the UN General Assembly that Australia and its AUKUS partners should shift their focus to what the Pacific sees as the highest priority. </p>
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<p>If we can spend trillions on missiles, drones, and nuclear submarines, we can fund climate action.</p>
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<h2>Opportunities for Labor</h2>
<p>This is where a Labor government would have a significant opportunity to differentiate itself in the eyes of the region. </p>
<p>Pacific countries have consistently <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/pacific-leaders-push-emissions-reduction-2030-net-zero-2050/100517846#:%7E:text=The%20Paris%20Agreement%20commits%20nations,from%202.0%20degrees%20of%20warming.">made it clear</a> they see climate change as an overriding, existential challenge. The current government’s <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/stepping-climate-resilience-pacific">measures</a> to support climate change resilience and renewable energy projects have generally been been drowned out by an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/01/pacific-leaders-condemn-australias-weak-climate-target-in-open-letter-to-scott-morrison">entrenched regional belief</a> that Australia has been a laggard on this issue. </p>
<p>Labor has signalled it will respond seriously to this concern. In his own <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/address-opposition-leader-anthony-albanese">address to the Lowy Institute</a> in March, Opposition leader Anthony Albanese said he would elevate climate change to a national security issue. He also highlighted Labor’s intention to join Pacific countries in hosting a special regional climate conference. </p>
<p>Simply holding a conference like this would undoubtedly have a positive symbolic impact across the region and help reset Australia’s global climate credentials. </p>
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<p>Foreign Affairs Shadow Minister Penny Wong has also said Labor would draw more strategically on Australia’s <a href="https://www.pennywong.com.au/media-hub/speeches/expanding-australia-s-power-and-influence-speech-to-the-national-security-college-australian-national-university-canberra-23-11-2021/">multicultural strengths</a>, including its Indigenous cultures, to improve engagement with the Pacific. </p>
<p>While DFAT has done solid work in developing an <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/indigenous-diplomacy-agenda">Indigenous diplomacy agenda</a>, it has yet to be folded into the foreign policy mainstream or applied deliberately in dealings with the region. These kinds of soft diplomacy strategies should not be underestimated for their symbolic importance.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-dutton-in-defence-the-morrison-government-risks-progress-on-climate-and-indigenous-affairs-158420">With Dutton in defence, the Morrison government risks progress on climate and Indigenous affairs</a>
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<h2>Major challenges ahead</h2>
<p>There is little sign the strategic competition in the region will lessen over the coming Australian term of government. And the Pacific Island nations will quickly throw up challenges to whoever is in power after the election. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/461473/puna-set-to-go-to-heal-pacific-rift">rift in the Pacific Islands Forum</a> remains a serious issue, and independence movements in <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bougainville-independence-recalling-promises-international-help">Bougainville</a> and <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/463761/new-caledonia-pro-independence-parties-divided-on-new-vote">New Caledonia</a> will likely pose fresh strategic challenges. </p>
<p>COVID also remains a pressing issue in the region. But Australia will need to lift its strategic gaze beyond the immediate health concerns to build partnerships to address the pandemic’s longer-term impact on Pacific societies. This is especially true in the education sector, where COVID has <a href="https://assets.globalpartnership.org/s3fs-public/document/file/2021-03-GPE-Australia-factsheet_0.pdf?VersionId=Zjw_FQN.7NIMdcy7GUhon0Mj_PT0MydY">reversed</a> decades of hard-won gains and removed millions of children – especially girls – from school.</p>
<p>Whoever wins in May, flexibility and a genuine commitment to partnership with the Pacific family will be the key factors in success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178534/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Kemish AM is a former Australian diplomat who served, among other roles, as Australian High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea. He chairs the Kokoda Track Foundation, which receives Australian Government support for its work in PNG, and is the Pacific representative for the Global Partnership for Education. He is a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute, and represents Bower Group Asia in the region.</span></em></p>The Pacific will remain a priority, no matter which party wins the election. But there could be subtle differences in tone and priorities.Ian Kemish AM, Adjunct Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1400732020-07-03T01:22:02Z2020-07-03T01:22:02ZChina’s push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/344930/original/file-20200701-54177-1244vxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Parks/Pool/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese activity in Papua New Guinea was not the only factor behind Australia’s <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-commitment-pacific">Pacific “Step-Up”</a>. As a former high commissioner to PNG, I know it followed serious deliberations about Australia’s overall strategic imperatives in the region. </p>
<p>But China’s engagement with our nearest neighbour was in the minds of many when Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced the foreign policy initiative in November 2018, pledging to </p>
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<p>take our engagement with the region to a new level. </p>
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<p>Chinese President Xi Jinping was about to make a state visit to Port Moresby, before joining other world leaders at the APEC Summit there. China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apec-summit-china-insight/chinas-boulevard-to-nowhere-the-battle-for-influence-in-apecs-pacific-host-idUSKCN1N900V">had been busy</a> repairing roads and constructing an international conference centre in the PNG capital ahead of the meeting, along with a six-lane highway leading to the parliament. </p>
<p>A Chinese hospital ship had just conducted a well-publicised “humanitarian mission” to PNG. And Prime Minister Peter O'Neill had <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/looking-north-png-signs-on-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-20180621-p4zmyv.html">recently signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative</a>, fuelling concern that PNG’s growing financial exposure to China might be converted to Beijing’s strategic advantage. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345404/original/file-20200702-111374-sw4sgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Xi Jinping was the first Chinese leader to visit PNG when he arrived for the APEC summit in November 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Xi then used the opportunity of his state visit to <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/world/xi-raises-the-influence-stakes-with-300m-png-deal/news-story/f3b9d326a10af58090453fc11a93892c">pledge an additional US$300 million</a> in concessional loans to the country.</p>
<p>Several Papua New Guinean friends commented then that none of this activity would be of lasting benefit to the struggling developing country. But it certainly captured public attention, and suggested a renewed strategic intent on China’s behalf to boost its influence in the region.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-pacific-step-up-australia-is-still-not-listening-to-the-region-new-research-shows-130539">Despite its Pacific 'step-up', Australia is still not listening to the region, new research shows</a>
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</em>
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<h2>Recent setbacks in China’s outreach</h2>
<p>Eighteen months later, China is still looking for ways to engage with PNG, motivated by interest in both its abundant natural resources and key strategic location. But these efforts sometimes seem uncoordinated, and Beijing has suffered some significant setbacks.</p>
<p>China has been surprisingly slow to respond at critical moments. For instance, PNG officials became frustrated with bureaucratic stalling in early 2019 as they sought to follow up on Xi’s promised loan, and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-25/australia-440-million-loan-to-png-completely-unrelated-to-china/11734146">Australia ultimately stepped in to supply the required A$440 million</a>. </p>
<p>Canberra also <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/australia-snubs-huawei-finishes-undersea-cables-for-pacific-islands-2019-8?r=US&IR=T">outmanoeuvred Huawei’s bid to lay undersea high-speed internet cables</a> to PNG and the neighbouring Solomon Islands. </p>
<p>And this year, China has not sent any meaningful signal of solidarity to PNG since the onset of COVID-19 – <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/12/c_139050511.htm">just proforma PPE donations</a>. Western institutions like the IMF are instead stepping in with emergency financial assistance but, so far at least, China has been nowhere to be seen.</p>
<h2>Anti-Chinese sentiment flares up</h2>
<p>The recent experience of China’s Zijin Mining Group points to another constraint – the anti-Chinese sentiment that sometimes lurks below the surface in PNG. </p>
<p>The PNG cabinet decided in April <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/12/politics-and-porgera-why-papua-new-guinea-cancelled-the-lease-on-one-of-its-biggest-mines">not to renew the gold mining lease</a> held jointly by Zijin and Canada’s Barrick Gold at Porgera in the Highlands region. Prime Minister James Marape announced Porgera would instead transition to national ownership. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-29/chinese-company-sends-letter-to-png-prime-minster-over-gold-mine/12196660">letter from Zijin Chairman Chen Jinghe to Marape</a> was then leaked. Chen warned if Zijin’s investment was not “properly protected”, he was </p>
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<p>afraid there will be significant negative impact on the bilateral relations between China and PNG. </p>
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<p>This provoked visceral anti-Chinese sentiment and praise for Marape’s stance on <a href="https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3536143299735348&id=2780834888599530&comment_id=3536865099663168">social media in PNG</a>. Speculation last week the government was looking to sell the mine to another Chinese group sparked <a href="https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=136901118021078&id=104887854555738">a further wave of anti-Chinese feeling</a> – this time critical of Marape. </p>
<p>The tone of some of these messages brought to mind the violent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8054924.stm">attacks against Chinese and other Asian small business owners</a> at past moments of economic hardship and local tensions in PNG. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/345405/original/file-20200702-111269-1v100cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Chinese store owner taking shelter during anti-Chinese protests in PNG in 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ILYA GRIDNEFF/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Zijin is not the first Chinese resource company to face difficulties in PNG. In 2004, China’s Metallurgical Construction Company (MCC) <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/business/china-metallurgical-to-develop-png-mine-20040211-gdxa93.html">secured the agreement</a> of then-Prime Minister Michael Somare to buy the Ramu nickel mine in Madang province. </p>
<p>The company learned quickly that an agreement with the head of government is not enough. MCC did not plan adequately for engagement with landowners, provincial authorities and environmentalists, and inflamed local tensions by using imported Chinese labour. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/papua-new-guinea-indigenous-group-opposes-china-metallurgicals-ramu-nickel-mine-in-court-concern-over-impacts-on-livelihoods">MCC spent almost two years in court</a> pitted against these groups, to its substantial cost.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/everything-but-china-is-on-the-table-during-png-prime-ministers-visit-120754">Everything but China is on the table during PNG prime minister's visit</a>
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<h2>China is not giving up</h2>
<p>PNG can be a hard place to operate. As the Australian government and many businesses and NGOs have found, success requires sustained effort with multiple stakeholders. </p>
<p>Chinese companies are not giving up. China Mobile reportedly <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/fears-over-a-chinese-digital-footprint-on-our-doorstep-20200513-p54snd">looked at taking over domestic mobile carrier Digicel</a> earlier this year, and <a href="https://postcourier.com.pg/us2b-ramu-2-hydro-power-project-stalled/">Shenzhen Energy is persevering with its stalled US$2 billion “Ramu 2” hydro power project</a>, given initial approval by the O'Neill government in 2015. </p>
<p>Industry sources report the current government, eager to announce employment-generating projects, is considering moving to implementation stage after some hesitation. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-the-post-apec-scramble-to-lavish-funds-on-png-heres-what-the-country-really-needs-107286">In the post-APEC scramble to lavish funds on PNG, here's what the country really needs</a>
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<p>A deal has also recently been signed allowing <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2020-06/16/c_139143728.htm">PNG seafood exports to China</a>.</p>
<p>China has every right to pursue investments in the region, and PNG is entitled to diversify its external links. Beijing will likely make further advances, but on current form these will likely be more opportunistic than strategic. </p>
<p>Australia should engage China positively in PNG, consistent with its bilateral interests in both Port Moresby and Beijing. It should also build confidently on the advantages that flow from geographic proximity and a long, overall positive relationship with its friends across the Torres Strait.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Kemish AM is a former Australian High Commissioner to Papua New Guinea. He chairs the Kokoda Track Foundation, which receives funding from the Australian Government. He is also a sustainability adviser to Newcrest Mining Limited. Ian is a Nonresident Fellow with the Lowy Institute of International Affairs and an Adjunct Associate Research Professor at the University of Queensland. </span></em></p>China made a huge splash in PNG in late 2018 with infrastructure investments and loan pledges. But since then, it has struggled to make inroads due, in part, to anti-Chinese sentiment.Ian Kemish AM, Former Ambassador and Adjunct Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1365172020-04-26T19:39:40Z2020-04-26T19:39:40ZHow might coronavirus change Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-up’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329623/original/file-20200422-82707-1ngasqy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scott Morrison attends the Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Across the globe, the coronavirus pandemic has prompted countries and governments to become increasingly inward-looking. Australia is not immune to this. One of the effects of this situation has been that the “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/Pages/the-pacific">Pacific Step-up</a>” appears to have dropped entirely off the political radar.</p>
<p>The step-up is – or was – the signature foreign policy of the Morrison government. Although it predates Scott Morrison becoming prime minister, under his leadership it had really <a href="https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/901911/W5-Newton-Cain-Ch4-WEB.pdf">come to the fore</a>. We saw an increase in ministerial visits to the region, a ramping up of labour mobility opportunities for Pacific islanders, and the establishment of a A$2 billion infrastructure financing facility.</p>
<p>So, how does the Pacific Step-up need to evolve to help respond to the challenges posed by coronavirus? </p>
<p>It’s important to acknowledge that Australia and the island members of the “Pacific family” share more than just an ocean. They have many common challenges. Addressing them requires sharing resources. The coronavirus response presents an opportunity to move the Pacific Step-Up from something that is done “to” or “for” the Pacific to something that Australia does <a href="https://www.whitlam.org/publications/2020/2/13/pacific-perspectives-on-the-world">“with” the Pacific</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-its-pacific-step-up-australia-is-still-not-listening-to-the-region-new-research-shows-130539">Despite its Pacific 'step-up', Australia is still not listening to the region, new research shows</a>
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</em>
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<p>It is too easy for the Australian media (and indeed the Australian public) to perpetuate the trope that Pacific people are helpless – chronic victims who need to be rescued from whatever calamity has most recently befallen them. Now is the time for Australian policymakers to step up and demonstrate real respect for their Pacific counterparts. </p>
<p>On top of the increasingly devastating effects of <a href="https://www.forumsec.org/covid-19-and-climate-change-we-must-rise-to-both-crises/">climate change</a>, Pacific island countries are now managing the twin challenges of a potential public health emergency and its severe economic ramifications. </p>
<p>When it comes to the former, the focus has been on prevention. Many countries took <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/coronavirus-in-the-pacific-weekly-briefing">swift and significant steps</a> to minimise the risk of the virus entering their communities. Borders have been closed, restrictions on movements enforced and health and medical systems enhanced.</p>
<p>Pacific island countries are also already feeling the economic impacts of the global shutdown. This is particularly evident in those countries that rely on tourism and remittances for revenue, livelihoods and employment. </p>
<p>Several countries have moved quickly and decisively to introduce economic support and stimulus packages to meet some of the most pressing needs of their populations. Maintaining these into the medium and longer term <a href="https://devpolicy.org/time-for-a-pacific-community-20200421/">will be a challenge</a>.</p>
<p>In Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga, the impacts of the recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2020/apr/09/cyclone-harold-aerial-footage-shows-destruction-across-vanuatu-video">Tropical Cyclone Harold</a> are presenting additional challenges. Reaching Category 5 strength, it caused more than 30 deaths and left large amounts of damage and destruction in its wake. Australia and other partners (particularly France and New Zealand) have provided assistance to government agencies in the region that are charged with responding to disasters of this type.</p>
<p>In the Pacific, and among many Australian commentators, it is widely acknowledged that the step-up is driven largely by geo-strategic anxiety about the growing influence of China in the Pacific islands region. Coronavirus has done little to <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/04/04/covid-19-and-geopolitics-in-the-pacific/">dilute this angst</a>. In some instances, it appears to have accentuated it. Certainly, China has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-pacific/china-and-australia-target-pacific-with-coronavirus-aid-idUSKBN21J4WG">made it abundantly clear</a> it is ready, willing and able to be a friend in need for Pacific island countries. </p>
<p>A more sophisticated and nuanced Pacific Step-up that addresses the challenges posed by coronavirus provides Australia with an opportunity to demonstrate to Pacific counterparts its ability and willingness to offer something that is different and more valuable than is available elsewhere.</p>
<p>This can take one or more of several forms. First of all, Australia should <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/extraordinary-g20-leaders-summit">continue to advocate</a> to the global community the need to provide tailored financial support to Pacific island countries. This must include lobbying for meaningful debt relief to underpin economic recovery. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/13/pr20151-imf-executive-board-approves-immediate-debt-relief-for-25-countries">IMF</a> has already made some moves in this regard. Australia has also moved quickly in relation to its <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-australian-parliament-house-act-15">most recent loan to PNG</a>. When the Pacific Islands Forum’s finance and economic ministers meet online in the near future, this will likely be on the agenda. Australia should look to have something concrete to put forward in support of this, including offers to lobby the G7 and G20.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-scott-morrison-deliver-on-climate-change-in-tuvalu-or-is-his-pacific-step-up-doomed-121501">Can Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific 'step up' doomed?</a>
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<p>Recently, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters raised the possibility of a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-16/nz-australia-border-could-reopen-jacinda-ardern-scott-morrison/12153752">New Zealand-Australia “bubble”</a> based on low numbers of infections in both countries. He saw this as a basis for reopening the borders to allow for freer movement of people and goods.</p>
<p>Pacific island countries that have no COVID-19 cases – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/22/coronavirus-in-the-pacific-weekly-briefing">there are several</a> – should look to be part of a “Pacific bubble” if this conversation goes forward. This would maintain Pacific islanders’ participation in labour mobility schemes. </p>
<p>Australia and New Zealand are also the key markets for Pacific tourism. The sooner tourists can be welcomed back to the resorts and beaches, the sooner island livelihoods can be restored.</p>
<p>The rhetoric of the Pacific Step-Up has been couched in terms such as “Pacific family”. We now need to know what this means for how Australia can and will support Pacific states and communities in the face of coronavirus.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tess Newton Cain is a member of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University</span></em></p>The crisis is a chance to change the Pacific Step-up from something Australia does “to” or “for” the region to something it does “with” it.Tess Newton Cain, Adjunct Associate Professor, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1305392020-02-10T19:11:00Z2020-02-10T19:11:00ZDespite its Pacific ‘step-up’, Australia is still not listening to the region, new research shows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314347/original/file-20200210-27533-1242xtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=694%2C101%2C4085%2C2371&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Australian government has spent the past year promoting its “Pacific step-up” as one of the country’s “<a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Documents/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf">highest foreign policy priorities</a>”. </p>
<p>Although there has been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-18/australia-pacific-step-up-in-review/11863150">some progress on the diplomatic front</a> in the past year – an increase in diplomatic visits, a boost in foreign aid and a new A$2 billion infrastructure financing initiative – there is some way to go to bring balance, mutual respect and a sense of long-term partnership and commitment to our relations with the region. </p>
<p>New research shows people in three of Australia’s closest Pacific neighbours – the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu – are concerned Australia does not know how to engage successfully as part of the Pacific community. </p>
<p>Three key messages came through: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the quality of our relationships matter more than the quantity of our aid or trade</p></li>
<li><p>our values, norms and ways of doing things are a vital part of how we conduct our engagement with the Pacific </p></li>
<li><p>Australia, and its historical relationship, is valued but we are one of many partners for Pacific islanders. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Late last year, the Whitlam Institute at Western Sydney University commissioned a policy research project led by the peacebuilding NGO <a href="https://www.peacifica.org/">Peacifica</a> and Pacific specialist Tess Newton Cain. It aimed to understand how people in the three island nations view Australians and the government’s policies in the Pacific. </p>
<p>We conducted focus groups and one-on-one interviews with 150 participants from varying backgrounds, including people from urban and rural settings, women, young people, business people and those engaged in civil society and government. These conversations were then followed by expert seminars in Canberra and Suva. </p>
<p>The full report will be released at the <a href="https://devpolicy.crawford.anu.edu.au/annual-australasian-aid-conference/2020">Australasian Aid Conference</a> on February 17. </p>
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<h2>‘Stifled by a degree of parochialism’</h2>
<p>The participants in our surveys praised Australia’s efforts to empower women, as well as our humanitarian assistance programs, for their effectiveness and impact. But beyond that, the picture was more bleak in terms of whether we have the right policy and diplomatic priorities.</p>
<p>Across the three countries, there was a similar concern of a lack of balance and equality in the Australia-Pacific relationship and a belief Australia doesn’t truly hear the perspectives of its neighbours. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-scott-morrison-deliver-on-climate-change-in-tuvalu-or-is-his-pacific-step-up-doomed-121501">Can Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific 'step up' doomed?</a>
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<p>There was also a perception of a certain level of racism and disrespect directed towards people from the Pacific. As one participant said, the relationship is</p>
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<p>layered over and stifled by a degree of parochialism that is not only unnecessary, it’s counter-productive.</p>
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<p>Our participants pointed to numerous examples of how Australians lack cultural sensitivity in their dealings with the Pacific, especially compared to people from New Zealand and even China. As one participant noted: </p>
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<p>China is listening and looking, observing.</p>
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<p>They also expressed major dissatisfaction with the contrast between the welcome Australians receive when they come to the Pacific compared to the welcome islanders receive when they come here. Visa conditions were a major part of this concern.</p>
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<p>Remove the visa requirement to allow South Sea countries to be able to have access to a region that they helped to develop.</p>
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<p>When discussing aid, our participants noted problems with the role of international NGOs working in the Pacific, many of which are based in Australia. Participants were concerned by the Pacific’s over-reliance on international NGOs, the crowding out of local partners and the failure of governments and international NGOs to appreciate and acknowledge the value of local knowledge.</p>
<h2>The importance of recognising Pacific sovereignty</h2>
<p>Historical memory runs deep and policy approaches to the region need to take into account colonial histories – including Australia’s own role. </p>
<p>For these nations, the late 19th century practice of “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-17/blackbirding-australias-history-of-kidnapping-pacific-islanders/8860754">blackbirding</a>” - the kidnapping of South Sea islanders as indentured labour for Australian plantations - is still very much part of the historical framing of the relationship with Australia. </p>
<p>Our participants also took very seriously issues of their own sovereignty, independence and the importance of national ownership of their futures. They reflected a desire for developing long-term and sustainable bilateral relations based on mutual respect and common interest.</p>
<p>One participant said, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>as a Pacific islander, these are our countries, this is our place. Whatever countries want to do to help us should be something that is beneficial for us but also creating relationships. That is what our culture is all about, creating lasting relationships, not just to fulfil their own agendas and leave us.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/314349/original/file-20200210-27529-y2ngcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Scott Morrison has stressed the importance of the ‘Pacific family’, but the message isn’t resonating completely in the region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The role of Indigenous Australians</h2>
<p>Interestingly, our research shows Australian domestic politics are important to our relations with the region. </p>
<p>It’s not surprising Australia’s climate policies impact how we are perceived in the region, but our policies toward Indigenous people are also significant. </p>
<p>Our participants felt Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders were almost invisible in Australia’s relations with the Pacific and this has limited our understanding of – and potential for engagement with – the region. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-island-nations-will-no-longer-stand-for-australias-inaction-on-climate-change-121976">Pacific Island nations will no longer stand for Australia's inaction on climate change</a>
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<p>Repeatedly, the point was made that Australia lacks a clear sense of identity and connection to place and this is hampering our relationships in the Pacific. As one participant said,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Although we are from the same region, the Pacific Islands and Australia rarely speak with one voice … When you see international meetings, Fiji and other Pacific countries are sitting on one side of the table, while Australia, New Zealand and the US are always sitting over there.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Ways to improve our understanding of the region</h2>
<p>While our research shows there is a genuine warmth in the Pacific toward Australia, it also makes clear we could be doing much better. </p>
<p>One perceived flaw of the “Pacific step-up” is that it’s a unilateral Australian initiative for the region, not a shared agenda. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">As Australia's soft power in the Pacific fades, China's voice gets louder</a>
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<p>We need to listen more to the national and international aspirations of Pacific islanders. We also need to expand our engagement beyond traditional diplomatic and government links. For many respondents, cultural and faith communities represent international linkages that are at least as important as nation-state relations. </p>
<p>Our report will make a number of recommendations for more effective Australian policy-making. One idea is co-hosting a regional cooperation summit, where a diverse range of regional policy-makers and communities can explore issues that are of utmost importance for Pacific peoples. </p>
<p>And as our research shows, strong Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leadership and participation in such a gathering would be essential. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: This article has been amended to correct the time period of blackbirding from the late 18th century to the late 19th century.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130539/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leanne Smith is affiliated with the Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University and is a member of the ALP.. </span></em></p>Interviews in three Pacific nations revealed concerns over a lack of balance in the Australia-Pacific relationship and a certain level of racism and disrespect directed towards islanders.Leanne Smith, Director - Whitlam Institute, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1282362019-12-12T23:17:51Z2019-12-12T23:17:51ZBougainville has voted to become a new country, but the journey to independence is not yet over<p>The Autonomous Region of Bougainville, a chain of islands that lie 959 kilometres northwest of Papua New Guinea’s capital, Port Moresby, has voted unequivocally for independence.</p>
<p>The referendum saw 85% voter turnout during three weeks of voting, with <a href="http://bougainville-referendum.org/">97.7%</a> of voters choosing independence from Papua New Guinea over the second option, which was remaining, but with greater autonomy from PNG. As the Bougainville Referendum Commission stated, the numbers told an important story, reflecting the support for independence across genders and age groups. </p>
<p>It’s a momentous event, not only because it could a new country, but also because the referendum marks an important part of a <a href="http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed almost 20 years ago. The 2001 <a href="http://www.abg.gov.pg/uploads/documents/BOUGAINVILLE_PEACE_AGREEMENT_2001.pdf">Bougainville Peace Agreement</a> ended the <a href="https://bougainville-referendum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/the_bougainville_referendum_low_res_1.pdf">deeply divisive nine year conflict</a> (1988-1997) that lead to the deaths of approximately 20,000 people, or about 10% of Bougainville’s population. </p>
<p>The referendum, however, is non-binding. The ultimate outcome will be determined by a vote in Papua New Guinea’s National Parliament following negotiations between the Papua New Guinean government and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. </p>
<p>But as former President James Tanis said to me hours after the result was announced: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>we survived the war, ended the war, delivered a successful referendum, what else can now stop us from becoming a successful independent nation?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>China’s interest in Bougainville</h2>
<p>For the broader region, an independent Bougainville has a number of implications. Firstly, it sends a strong signal for other self-determination movements across the Pacific, including in New Caledonia which will hold a second referendum for independence in 2020. </p>
<p>There are also geopolitical implications. The referendum has taken place during a period of heightened strategic anxiety among the Pacific’s so-called traditional partners – Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, France and Japan. </p>
<p>There have long been concerns China will seek to curry influence with an independent Bougainville. As one Bougainvillean leader informed me, Chinese efforts to build relationships with Bougainville’s political elite have increased over the past few years. </p>
<p>Beijing’s interest in Bougainville is two-fold: first, it is seeking to shore up diplomatic support in the Pacific Islands region, thereby reducing support for Taiwan which lost a further two Pacific allies this year. And second, to access to resources, namely fisheries and extractive minerals.</p>
<p>Although it will be tempting for many in Canberra, Washington and Wellington to view an independent Bougainville through the current strategic prism – adhering to narratives about debt-trap diplomacy – doing so undermines the importance of local dynamics and the resilience of Bougainville people. </p>
<p>An independent Bougainville navigating a more disordered and disruptive international environment will need nuanced grounded advice, rather than speculation. </p>
<p>The road ahead for Bougainville will be challenging and it will need its friends – particularly New Zealand and Australia. </p>
<p>The much vaunted respective “Pacific Reset” and “<a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/pages/the-pacific.aspx">Pacific Step Up</a>” policies provide entry points for the kind of genuine engagement and support that Bougainville will require in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Celebration with cautious anticipation</h2>
<p>Following the result’s announcement, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape said his government had heard the voice of Bougainvilleans, and the two governments must now <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/405344/next-stage-in-bougainville-peace-process-begins-png-pm">develop a road map</a> that leads to lasting political settlement. </p>
<p>And Bougainville Referendum Commission chairman Bertie Ahern urged all sides to recognise the result and said the vote was about “your peace, your history, and your future” and reflected “the power of the pen over weapons”. Acknowledging the result is non-binding, Ahern said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the referendum is one part of that ongoing journey.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And here lies the challenge. The post-referendum period was always going to be one of celebration, cautious anticipation and the management of expectations. </p>
<p>As one of Bougainville’s formidable women leaders told me, there are concerns about security in the post-referendum period as expectation turns to frustration if there are perceived delays in determining Bougainville’s future political status. </p>
<p>What’s more, the negotiations are likely to take a long time, since there’s no deadline they’re required to meet. </p>
<p>There are, however, critical milestones that still need to be hit first. This includes the Autonomous Bougainville Government elections, the first elections following the referendum, so will likely see intensified politicking as politicians jockey for a potential role in building an independent Bougainvillean state. </p>
<p>The Papua New Guinea’s national elections are also scheduled for 2022. The risk in both cases is that Bougainville’s future becomes a political pawn. </p>
<p>An independent Bougainville will face significant challenges and diverse choices. </p>
<p>Not least of which is Bougainville’s economic security and the choices that will need to be made about the Panguna Mine, the gold and copper mine at the heart of much of the conflict, and fisheries, once the new nation’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is created. </p>
<p>A young nation built on a past mired by the extremes of resource nationalism, Bougainville has difficult decisions to make about how it secures its economic self-reliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Powles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With an overwhelming referendum result, Bougainville has just taken an important step to becoming an independent nation.Anna Powles, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Massey UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1278282019-11-26T10:35:09Z2019-11-26T10:35:09ZKevin Rudd urges Australia to reduce its economic dependence on China<p>Kevin Rudd has warned Australia is too “China dependent” in economic terms, and must diversify its international economic engagement.</p>
<p>Setting out principles he believes should govern the way forward in dealing with China, the former prime minister said for too long Australia had been “complacent in anticipating and responding to the profound geo-political changes now washing over us with China’s rise, America’s ambivalence about its future regional and global role, and an Australia which may one day find itself on its own”.</p>
<p>Launching journalist Peter Hartcher’s Quarterly Essay, Red Flag: Waking up to China’s challenge, Rudd said Australia needed a regularly-updated “classified cabinet-level national China strategy”.</p>
<p>This should be based on three understandings. The first was that “China respects strength and consistency and is contemptuous of weakness and prevarication”.</p>
<p>The others went to awareness of China’s strengths and weaknesses, and of Australia’s own strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-keating-attacks-media-for-pious-belchings-over-china-127222">Paul Keating attacks media for 'pious belchings' over China</a>
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<p>Rudd, who was highly critical of the government, declared “Australia needs a more mature approach to managing the complexity of the relationship than having politicians out-competing one another on who can sound the most hairy-chested on China”. This might be great domestic politics but did not advance the country’s security and economic interests.</p>
<p>Australia should “maintain domestic vigilance against any substantive rather than imagined internal threats” to its political institutions and critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>He fully supported the foreign influence transparency act, but he warned about concern over foreign interference translating “into a form of racial profiling”.</p>
<p>“These new arrangements on foreign influence transparency should be given effect as a legal and administrative process, not as a populist witch-hunt” - a return to the “yellow peril” days.</p>
<p>Rudd said Australia must once again become the international champion of the South Pacific nations, arguing the government’s posture on climate change had undermined Australia’s standing with these countries and given China a further opening. “The so-called ‘Pacific step-up’ is hollow.”</p>
<p>Australia should join ASEAN, Rudd said; this would both help that body and assist Australia to manage its long term relationship with Indonesia.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-spy-case-may-be-the-greatest-challenge-to-australian-security-since-petrov-but-caution-is-needed-127790">Chinese 'spy' case may be the greatest challenge to Australian security since Petrov – but caution is needed</a>
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<p>On the need to diversify Australia’s international economic engagement, Rudd said: “We have become too China-dependent. We need to diversify further to Japan, India, Indonesia, Europe and Africa – the next continent with a rising middle class with more than a billion consumers. We must equally diversify our economy itself.”</p>
<p>Rudd argued strongly for Australia to continue to consolidate its alliance with the United States.</p>
<p>But “Australia must also look to mid-century when we may increasingly have to stand to our own two feet, with or without the support of a major external ally.</p>
<p>"Trumpist isolationism may only be short term. But how these sentiments in the American body politic translate into broader American politics with future Republican and Democrat administrations remains unclear.”</p>
<p>Rudd once again strongly urged a “big Australia” - “a big and sustainable Australia of the type I advocated while I was in office.</p>
<p>"That means comprehensive action on climate change and broader environmental sustainability,” he said.</p>
<p>“Only a country with a population of 50 million later this century would begin to have the capacity to fund the military, security and intelligence assets necessary to defend our territorial integrity and political sovereignty long term. This is not politically correct. But it’s yet another uncomfortable truth.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127828/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Launching journalist Peter Hartcher’s Quarterly Essay, Red Flag: Waking up to China’s challenge, Rudd said “we have become too China-dependent. We need to diversify further”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257222019-11-05T18:58:15Z2019-11-05T18:58:15ZAustralia is spending less on diplomacy than ever before – and its influence is suffering as a result<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299634/original/file-20191031-187894-uz84r3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scott Morrison has heavily promoted his government's 'Pacific Step Up', but it hasn't invested the requisite funds to support the initiative diplomatically.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren England/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ten years ago, the Lowy Institute <a href="https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-diplomatic-deficit">published a report</a> on the state of Australia’s diplomatic capacity that painted a “sobering picture” of overstretched foreign missions and declining resources. </p>
<p>In the words of then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who was quoted in the report: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Given the vast continent we occupy, the small population we have and our unique geo-strategic circumstances, our diplomacy must be the best in the world. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, since then we haven’t put enough resources into our diplomacy as we should. New research by Asialink at the University of Melbourne published in <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/essay/2019/10/china-dependence">Australian Foreign Affairs</a> shows continuing under-investment in Australia’s diplomatic capacity, with funding for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) now at a new low of <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">just 1.3% of the federal budget</a>.</p>
<h2>Still in deficit?</h2>
<p>According to Allan Gyngell, the founding director of the Lowy Institute, the reason for its 2009 report, Diplomatic Deficit, was simple. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>For Australia to do things in the world, it needs a number of assets. These include the instruments of foreign policy, including the overseas network of posts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The idea for the report was to go beyond the usual suspects and involve people like business leaders in making the case for diplomacy. It made 24 recommendations, many of which were not specifically about funding. These have mostly been met.</p>
<p>Sadly, the situation is less positive for recommendations that called for additional funding. Since 2013, Australia’s total diplomatic, trade and aid budgets have fallen from 1.5% of the federal budget to 1.3%. In pure dollar terms, this is a fall <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">from A$8.3 billion to A$6.7 billion</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, the budgets for defence, intelligence and security have ballooned. In the almost two decades since the September 11 terror attacks, the Department of Defence budget has increased by 291%, while the allocation for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has grown by 528% and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service by 578%.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/methodology-finding-the-numbers-on-australias-foreign-aid-spending-over-time-71470">Methodology: finding the numbers on Australia's foreign aid spending over time</a>
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<h2>Lost opportunities</h2>
<p>This systematic under-funding of DFAT has run down Australia’s diplomatic capacity to the point that it is under-resourced to confront current foreign policy challenges.</p>
<p>To give an idea of what this means, these are some examples of what Australia’s diplomats do on a day-to-day basis:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>consular work assisting Australians in trouble with law enforcement, such as visiting them in prison and advocating for fair treatment</p></li>
<li><p>counter-terrorism cooperation, working with overseas governments to build capacity and help keep Australian travellers safer</p></li>
<li><p>business promotion of Australian products and services and investment promotion for companies considering setting up operations in Australia</p></li>
<li><p>networking with influential politicians and business people to try to impact decisions that will affect Australians.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>When Australia’s diplomats are asked to accomplish more with fewer resources, they have to cut back what they can do. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">As Australia's soft power in the Pacific fades, China's voice gets louder</a>
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<p>Scaling back has a real effect on Australia’s influence. If Australia reduces the scholarships to bring future regional leaders to study in Australia, for instance, they’ll likely study and form bonds elsewhere. </p>
<p>If Australia reduces its investment in Indonesia’s education system, it will be dominated by the country’s other major funder, Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>When Australia pulls back on its diplomacy, other countries take up the slack. </p>
<p>One impetus for the Morrison government’s much-vaunted “<a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/stepping-up-australias-pacific-engagement.aspx">Pacific Step Up</a>” was the realisation that cuts in aid and diplomacy had led to lessened Australian influence in its neighbourhood. In the words of one diplomat I spoke to, “China had been eating our lunch”. </p>
<p>The problem is that the “step up” did not come with increased funding for diplomats, meaning that DFAT’s new <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/Pages/office-of-the-pacific.aspx">Office of the Pacific</a> is being formed by taking staff and resources from other parts of department.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"995799502635204608"}"></div></p>
<h2>Getting back in black</h2>
<p>We recommend an immediate increase in spending on diplomacy, trade and aid to 1.5% of the federal budget. This is closer to the spending of countries such as <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">Canada (1.9%) and the Netherlands (4.3%)</a>, though still much lower than the challenging era after the second world war, when Australia was <a href="https://www.australianforeignaffairs.com/articles/the-fix/2019/10/the-fix-melissa-conley-tyler-on-how-to-rebuild-australias-diplomatic">spending 9% of the federal budget</a> on diplomacy, trade and aid.</p>
<p>If nothing else, DFAT should be granted an exemption from the efficiency dividend – an annual funding reduction for government agencies – until its budget rises to a more normal, historical level. This measure, usually levied at 1% to 1.25% of the administrative budget, reached 4% in 2012–13. With DFAT cut to the bone, the focus should be on increasing its budget, not constant cuts.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/next-government-must-find-australias-place-in-a-turbulent-and-rapidly-changing-world-110794">Next government must find Australia's place in a turbulent and rapidly changing world</a>
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<p>The aspirations for our diplomacy must be upgraded beyond the bare minimum. Ten years on from <a href="https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-diplomatic-deficit">Diplomatic Deficit</a>, Australia must resist the magical thinking that foreign affairs and trade somehow happen by themselves. In the 2009 report, former DFAT Secretary Richard Woolcott is quoted as saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I do feel that the Department of Foreign Affairs … has been allowed to run down to a dangerously low level … we can’t go on doing more with less … these sorts of undertakings do need to be properly resourced.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If only this had changed in the last 10 years.</p>
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<p><em>Mitchell Vandewerdt-Holman, a Master of International Relations student at the University of Melbourne, contributed to this report.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asialink at the University of Melbourne receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade along with other federal and state government departments, philanthropists and fee-for-service programs. </span></em></p>New research shows that funding for DFAT has hit a new low of 1.3% of the federal budget. Scaling back has a real effect on Australia’s influence around the world.Melissa Conley Tyler, Director of Diplomacy at Asialink, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255532019-10-20T19:10:36Z2019-10-20T19:10:36ZMorrison says China knows ‘where Australia is coming from’, after meeting Chinese vice-president<p>Scott Morrison seized the opportunity of his Jakarta weekend visit for Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s inauguration to obtain a meeting with Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan.</p>
<p>Morrison told a news conference he had come out of the discussion “pleased that there is, I think, a very clear understanding of where Australia is coming from, our commitment to the relationship”.</p>
<p>“It was a chat that we had very much in the spirit of the partnership that we have, and very much inoculated from all of the assessments that are made about the relationship,” he said.</p>
<p>The meeting comes after Morrison’s description, while in the United States, of China as a “developed” economy, which China rejects. More generally, the relationship between the two countries has been very cool, with tensions on several fronts including Australia’s strong legislative stand against Chinese interference.</p>
<p>The discussion with Wang did not see an invitation for Morrison to visit China. The Prime Minister said Wang was an envoy of President Xi Jinping and not in a position to issue any invitation.</p>
<p>Wang, speaking at the start of their discussion, made it clear Australia had sought the meeting and Xi had given his approval for it. The discussion went for almost double the half hour scheduled.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/define-the-boundaries-in-new-phase-of-australia-china-relationship-wong-125210">Define the boundaries in new phase of Australia-China relationship: Wong</a>
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<p>Morrison told reporters he’d made the point “which was well received, that Australia is an independent, sovereign nation.</p>
<p>"Yes, we are very much proud of our Western liberal democratic tradition, our open economy and our engagement with the rest of the world and that gives us a set of eyes that look into the world very much from our perspective.”</p>
<p>But he had also stressed “that we will never feel corralled into any sort of binary assessment of these relationships” - assessments that said “pro-United States or pro-China”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile a Lowy Institute report, released Monday, warns that without an increase in its total aid budget Australia could be increasingly at a strategic disadvantage in the Pacific.</p>
<p>The research, which focuses on China’s expanding role there, concludes that so far “China has not been engaged in such problematic debt practices in the Pacific as to justify accusations of debt trap diplomacy”. But the scale of its lending and recipient countries’ lack of strong mechanisms to protect their debt sustainability mean there are clear risks, the paper says.</p>
<p>In contrast, Australia’s infrastructure lending plans contain rules to protect the sustainability of borrowing countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vital-signs-why-cant-australia-be-friends-with-both-us-and-china-124261">Vital Signs: Why can't Australia be friends with both US and China?</a>
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<p>Making a strong call for a rethink of the overall Australian aid budget, the paper argues: “Today, Australia’s strategic goal of doing more in the Pacific is boxed in by a limited aid budget, the desire to avoid cutting back on other important development priorities (such as health and education, or aid to countries outside the Pacific), and the need to avoid causing debt sustainability problems by relying too heavily on non-concessional lending.</p>
<p>"If Australia wants to do more, one of these constraints needs to be relaxed. Increasing the overall aid budget would be the most desirable option,” the paper says.</p>
<p>Also, “China might itself begin providing substantially more grant financing in the Pacific. In that case, a stagnant aid budget would increasingly place Australia at a geostrategic disadvantage”.</p>
<p>The paper, titled “Ocean of debt? Belt and Road and debt diplomacy in the Pacific”, has been prepared by Roland Rajah, the head of the Institute’s international economy program, Alexandre Dayant, and Jonathan Pryke, the head of Lowy’s Pacific Islands program.</p>
<p>The work draws on data from the Institute’s Pacific Aid Map, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank to examine China’s development finance in the Pacific. </p>
<p>It says China is the single largest creditor in Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, although only in Tonga does it account for more than half outstanding debt. “With the important exception of Tonga, China is currently not a dominant creditor in the Pacific.”</p>
<p>But the analysis finds: “there are significant risks of future debt sustainability problems under a business-as-usual scenario for bilateral Chinese lending”, pointing in particular to the situations of Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji and Papua New Guinea.</p>
<p>“China will therefore need to reconfigure its approach significantly if it wants to disprove the debt trap accusations made by its critics,” the paper says, while noting it has taken some steps in this direction.</p>
<p>“Protecting debt sustainability in Pacific countries will also require Australian loans to be as concessional as possible, given elevated debt risks and the often limited economic viability of many infrastructure projects in the Pacific,” the paper says.</p>
<p>The competition among major powers gives Pacific countries an opportunity to press for advantageous financing and better project management, it says.</p>
<p>For their part external players should avoid “geopolitically-driven” assistance aimed at “short-term wins” at the expense of the reforms and improved governance the countries need.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125553/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Morrison stressed “that we will never feel corralled into any sort of binary assessment of these relationships” - assessments that said “pro-United States or pro-China”.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1219762019-08-16T05:57:13Z2019-08-16T05:57:13ZPacific Island nations will no longer stand for Australia’s inaction on climate change<p>The <a href="https://www.forumsec.org/">Pacific Islands Forum</a> meeting in Tuvalu this week has ended in open division over climate change. Australia ensured its official communique <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/15/australia-waters-down-pacific-islands-plea-on-climate-crisis">watered down</a> commitments to respond to climate change, gaining a hollow victory. </p>
<p>Traditionally, communiques capture the consensus reached at the meeting. In this case, the division on display between Australia and the Pacific meant the only commitment is to commission yet another report into what action needs to be taken.</p>
<p>The cost of Australia’s victory is likely to be great, as it questions the sincerity of Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s commitment to “<a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-commitment-pacific">step up</a>” engagement in the Pacific. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-scott-morrison-deliver-on-climate-change-in-tuvalu-or-is-his-pacific-step-up-doomed-121501">Can Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific 'step up' doomed?</a>
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<p>Australia’s stance on climate change has become untenable in the Pacific. The inability to meet Pacific Island expectations will <a href="https://www.cairnsinstitute.jcu.edu.au/walking-the-talk/">erode Australia’s influence and leadership credentials</a> in the region, and provide opportunities for other countries to grow influence in the region. </p>
<h2>An unprecedented show of dissent</h2>
<p>When Morrison arrived in Tuvalu, he was met with an uncompromising mood. In fact, the text of an official communique was only finished after 12 hours of <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-splits-with-pacific-islands-to-water-down-urgent-climate-warning">pointed negotiations</a>. </p>
<p>While the “need for urgent, immediate actions on the threats and challenges of climate change”, is acknowledged, the Pacific was looking for action, not words. </p>
<p>What’s more, the document reaffirmed that “strong political leadership to advance climate change action” was needed, but leadership from Australia was sorely missing. It led Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-16/tuvalu-pm-admits-he-shouldve-done-more-after-pacific-meeting/11420252">note</a>: </p>
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<p>I think we can say we should’ve done more work for our people.</p>
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<p>Presumably, he would have hoped Australia could be convinced to take more climate action.</p>
<p>In an unprecedented show of dissent, smaller Pacific Island countries produced the alternative <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6280849-Kainaki-II-Declaration.html">Kainaki II Declaration</a>. It captures the mood of the Pacific in relation to the existential threat posed by climate change, and the need to act decisively now to ensure their survival. </p>
<p>And it details the commitments needed to effectively address the threat of climate change. It’s clear nothing short of transformational change is needed to ensure their survival, and there is rising frustration in Australia’s repeated delays to take effective action.</p>
<p>Australia hasn’t endorsed the alternative declaration and Canberra has signalled once and for all that compromise on climate change is not possible. This is not what Pacific leaders hoped for and will come at a diplomatic cost to Australia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/response-to-rumours-of-a-chinese-military-base-in-vanuatu-speaks-volumes-about-australian-foreign-policy-94813">Response to rumours of a Chinese military base in Vanuatu speaks volumes about Australian foreign policy</a>
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<h2>Canberra can’t buy off the Pacific</h2>
<p>Conflict had already begun brewing in the lead up to the Pacific Islands Forum. The Pacific Islands Development Forum – the brainchild of the Fijian government, which sought a forum to engage with Pacific Island Nations without the influence of Australia and New Zealand – released the the <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6226356-Nadi-Bay-Declaration-on-Climate-Crisis-2019.html">Nadi Bay Declaration</a> in July this year. </p>
<p>This declaration called on coal producing countries like Australia to cease all production within a decade. </p>
<p>But it’s clear Canberra believes compromise of this sort on climate change would undermine Australia’s economic growth and this is the key stumbling block to Australia answering its Pacific critics with action. </p>
<p>As Sopoaga said to Morrison: </p>
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<p>You are concerned about saving your economy in Australia […] I am concerned about saving my people in Tuvalu. </p>
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<p>And a day before the meeting, Canberra announced half a billion dollars to tackle climate change in the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-13/pif-pacific-islands-forum-tuvalu-morrison-fiji-climate-change/11406868">region</a>. But it received a lukewarm reception from the Pacific. </p>
<p>The message is clear: Canberra cannot buy off the Pacific. In part, this is because Pacific Island countries have new options, especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">from China</a>, which has offered Pacific island countries concessional loans.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">As Australia's soft power in the Pacific fades, China's voice gets louder</a>
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<h2>China is becoming an attractive alternate partner</h2>
<p>As tension built at the Pacific Island Forum meeting, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-15/nz-deputy-pm-defends-australia-climate-policies/11416102">argued</a> there was a double standard with respect to the treatment of China on climate change. </p>
<p>China is the world’s largest emitter of climate change gasses, but if there is a double standard it’s of Australia’s making. </p>
<p>Australia purports to be part of the Pacific family that can speak and act to protect the interests of Pacific Island countries in the face of China’s “insidious” attempts to gain influence through <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-debt-book-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-shouldnt-ring-alarm-bells-just-yet-96709">“debt trap” diplomacy</a>. This is where unsustainable loans are offered with the aim of gaining political advantage.</p>
<p>But countering Chinese influence in the Pacific is Australia’s prime security interest, and is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/for-pacific-island-nations-rising-sea-levels-are-a-bigger-security-concern-than-rising-chinese-influence-102403">secondary issue</a> for the Pacific.</p>
<p>But unlike Australia, China has never claimed the moral high ground and provides an attractive alternative partner, so it will likely gain ground in the battle for influence in the Pacific.</p>
<p>For the Pacific Island Forum itself, open dissent is a very un-Pacific outcome. Open dissent highlights the strains in the region’s premier intergovernmental organisation. </p>
<p>Australia and (to a lesser extent) New Zealand’s dominance has often been a source of criticism, but growing confidence among Pacific leaders has changed diplomatic dynamics forever. </p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-forced-these-fijian-communities-to-move-and-with-80-more-at-risk-heres-what-they-learned-116178">Climate change forced these Fijian communities to move – and with 80 more at risk, here's what they learned</a>
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<p>This <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/pacific/new-pacific-diplomacy">new pacific diplomacy</a> has led Pacific leaders to more steadfastly identify their security interests. And for them, the need to respond to climate change is non-negotiable. </p>
<p>If winning the geopolitical contest with China in Pacific is Canberra’s priority, then far greater creativity will be needed as meeting the Pacific half way on climate change is a prerequisite for success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121976/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> Michael O'Keefe has in the past worked for AusAID, The Pacific Leadership Program, the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) and The Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</span></em></p>Australia ensured its official communique watered down commitments to respond to climate change, gaining a hollow victory.Michael O'Keefe, Head of Department, Politics and Philosophy, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215012019-08-14T20:03:47Z2019-08-14T20:03:47ZCan Scott Morrison deliver on climate change in Tuvalu – or is his Pacific ‘step up’ doomed?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287967/original/file-20190814-136208-1ylor5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=536%2C272%2C4409%2C2775&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pacific leaders don't want to talk about China's rising influence – they want Scott Morrison to make a firm commitment to cut Australia's greenhouse gas emissions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week’s <a href="https://www.forumsec.org/">Pacific Islands Forum</a> comes at an important time in the overall trajectory of Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s very personal commitment to an <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-commitment-pacific">Australian “stepping up” in the Pacific</a>. </p>
<p>To paraphrase the PM, you have to show up to step up. And after <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/morrison-won-t-go-to-nauru-pacific-meeting">skipping last year’s Pacific Islands Forum</a>, Morrison has certainly been doing a fair amount of showing up around the region, with <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-14/scott-morrison-historic-vanuatu-fiji-state-visit/10712212">visits to Vanuatu and Fiji</a> at the beginning of the year and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-03/scott-morrison-pledges-$250-million-for-solomon-islands/11172062">the Solomon Islands</a> immediately after his election victory. </p>
<p>Add to this his <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-statement-prime-minister-papua-new-guinea">recent hosting</a> of the new PNG prime minister, James Marape, and it is clear there has been significant energy devoted to establishing personal relationships with some of the leaders he will sit down with this week.</p>
<h2>An ‘existential threat’ to the region</h2>
<p>Regional politics and diplomacy in the Pacific are not for the faint of heart. It’s clear from the tone of recent statements by <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-24/marise-payne-defends-australias-climate-change-policies/11343166">Foreign Minister Marise Payne</a> and the minister for international development and the Pacific, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-01/australia-rejects-climate-concerns-from-pacific-neighbours/11372240">Alex Hawke</a>, that there is some disquiet ahead of the Tuvalu get-together. </p>
<p>And with good reason. For some time, the leaders of the region have been becoming increasingly vocal about the lack of meaningful action from Canberra when it comes to climate change mitigation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-morrison-showed-up-in-the-pacific-but-what-did-he-actually-achieve-109792">Yes, Morrison 'showed up' in the Pacific, but what did he actually achieve?</a>
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<p>Most recently, ten of the <a href="http://pacificidf.org/">Pacifc Islands Development Forum</a> (PIDF) members signed the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-31/australian-climate-change-policies-criticised-pacific-leaders/11369086">Nadi Bay Declaration</a>, which advocated a complete move away from coal production and specifically criticised using “Kyoto carryover credits” as a means of achieving Paris targets on reducing emissions. </p>
<p>While this body does not have the regional clout of the Pacific Islands Forum, its membership includes key players, notably Fiji, Tuvalu, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, whose leaders have all spoken out strongly on the need for stronger action on climate change. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6rtr_w-LaE">In a speech</a> last month, Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama urged his fellow Pacific leaders to withstand any attempts to water down commitments on climate challenge in the region and globally. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Bainimarama’s warning: ‘Our region remains on the front line of humanity’s greatest challenges’</span></figcaption>
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<p>Bainimarama is attending this year’s Pacific Islands Forum for the first time since 2007, and has already made his presence felt. Earlier this week, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/12/australia-coal-use-is-existential-threat-to-pacific-islands-says-fiji-pm">urged</a> Australia to transition as quickly as possible from coal to renewable energy sources, because the Pacific faces</p>
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<p>an existential threat that you don’t face and challenges we expect your governments and people to more fully appreciate.</p>
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<h2>Losing credibility on its ‘step up’</h2>
<p>Given the state of Australia’s domestic politics when it comes to making climate change action more of a priority, it is hard to see how Morrison can deliver what the “<a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/morrisons-forrest-gump-moment/">Pacific family</a>” is asking for. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/12/australia-will-fund-a-500m-climate-change-package-for-the-pacific-pm-to-announce">recent announcement of A$500 million</a> to help Pacific nations invest in renewable energy and fund climate resilience programs is sure to be welcomed by Pacific leaders. As is the <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/morrison-to-ramp-up-push-against-plastic-20190807-p52eli">pledge for A$16m</a> to help tackle marine plastic pollution. </p>
<p>But none of this money is new money – it’s being redirected from the aid budget. And it does not answer the call of Pacific leaders for Australia to do better when it comes to cutting emissions.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/287966/original/file-20190814-136199-6rusko.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An aerial view of Funafuti, the most populous of Tuvalu’s country’s nine atolls.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Why does this matter? Because it’s becoming increasingly obvious that the inability – or refusal – to be part of the team when it comes to climate change is undermining Australia’s entire “Pacific step-up”. </p>
<p>If Morrison, and the Australian leadership more broadly, want to reassure Pacific leaders that Australia’s increased attention on the region is not just all about trying to counter Chinese influence, this is where the rubber hits the road.</p>
<p>This is not about whether China is doing better when it comes to climate change mitigation than Australia. The Pacific has greater expectations of Australia, not least because Australian leaders have been at pains to tell the region, and the world, that this is where they live - that Pacific islanders are their “<a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/morrisons-forrest-gump-moment/">family</a>”. </p>
<p>And for Pacific islanders, if you are family, then there are obligations. This week, as has been the case previously, Pacific leaders will make clear that <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3021355/china-not-priority-pacific-island-leaders-its-climate-change">addressing climate change is their top priority</a>, not <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-pacific-islands/">geopolitical anxieties</a> over China’s increasing role in the region.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/everything-but-china-is-on-the-table-during-png-prime-ministers-visit-120754">Everything but China is on the table during PNG prime minister's visit</a>
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<p>There is little doubt that Australia’s “Pacific step-up” is driven by concerns about the rising influence of China. But Morrison knows better than to voice concerns of that type – at least in public – while in Tuvalu. </p>
<p>Numerous Pacific leaders have made it clear that as far as they are concerned, partnerships with Beijing (for those that have them) <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-12/samoan-prime-minister-hits-back-at-insulting-china-aid-comments/9323420">provide for greater opportunity and choice</a>. </p>
<p>While they welcome renewed ties with traditional partners like Australia and New Zealand, they maintain a “friends to all and enemies to none” approach to foreign policy. That is unlikely to change any time soon.</p>
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<span class="caption">Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga has warned Australia that its Pacific ‘step up’ could be undermined by a refusal to act on climate change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mick Tsikas/AAP</span></span>
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<h2>Will Tuvalu prove a turning point?</h2>
<p>Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/pacific-islands-forum-tuvalu-children-welcome-leaders-with-a-climate-plea">may well be hoping</a> that when Morrison sees for himself how climate change is affecting his country, he will be so moved personally, he will shift Australia’s stance politically. </p>
<p>Indeed, on arrival in the capital of Funafuti this week, leaders are being met by children sitting in pools of seawater singing a specially written song “Save Tuvalu, Save the World”.</p>
<p>So what can Morrison realistically be expected to achieve during the summit? He will be able to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to other issues that are important to regional security, such as transnational and organised crime and illegal fishing. </p>
<p>He can also hope the personal relationships he has cultivated with Pacific leaders deliver returns by way of compromise around the wording of the final communique, if only to avoid a diplomatic stoush.</p>
<p>But if there is no real commitment to cutting greenhouse gas emissions, he will leave plenty of frustration behind when he returns to Australia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121501/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tess Newton Cain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s becoming increasingly obvious that Australia’s inability – or refusal – to take firmer action on climate change is undermining its entire ‘Pacific step-up’.Tess Newton Cain, Adjunct Associate Professor, School of Political Science & International Studies, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1118412019-02-20T18:46:19Z2019-02-20T18:46:19ZAs Australia’s soft power in the Pacific fades, China’s voice gets louder<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259892/original/file-20190220-148513-oqqk9j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China is broadcasting to more than 1 billion people in several different languages, while Australia sits on its soft power reviews.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twB_6GV5AM8">Screenshot/YouTube</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This week, Department of Communications and Arts secretary Mike Mrdak told a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-19/married-at-first-sight-pacific-strategy/10824566">Senate hearing</a> our Pacific neighbours will soon experience “the full suite of programs available on Australian networks”. This means the region will see some of our most highly rated reality shows such as Married at First Sight and The Bachelor.</p>
<p>This is all part of the government’s Pacific pivot and the A$17 million package to broadcast commercial television throughout the region announced by the prime minister last year. It’s also part of Australia’s “soft power” strategy, a branding that enables it to influence other countries and have its voice heard.</p>
<p>Australia’s soft power attraction in the Asia Pacific has been in free fall for the past few years. The government is sitting on two major reviews. First is the <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/soft-power-review/Pages/soft-power-review.aspx">Soft Power Review</a> – a strong recommendation of the 2017 <a href="https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au">Foreign Policy White Paper</a> – for which the consultation period ended in October 2018. Second is the <a href="https://www.communications.gov.au/have-your-say/review-australian-broadcasting-services-asia-pacific">Review of Australian Broadcasting in the Asia-Pacific</a>, the consultation period for which ended in August 2018. </p>
<p>The second review was established in 2017. This was the first time the government addressed the issue of soft power in the Pacific since axing the ABC’s Australia Network in 2014. The Australia Network broadcast to the region with redistribution partnerships to 30 countries.</p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018C00079">ABC charter</a> states it has responsibility “to transmit to countries outside Australia broadcasting programs of news, current affairs, entertainment and cultural enrichment” that will “encourage awareness of Australia and an international understanding of Australian attitudes on world affairs”. </p>
<p>In other words, the ABC is already enabled as Australia’s soft power tool. Despite this, the government is giving money to commercial televisions to do the work. At the Senate hearing this week, Mrdak denied this was in breach of the ABC charter because it did not involve broadcasting but purchasing content made by Australia’s commercial broadcasters for distribution to regional broadcasters. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lost-in-transmission-the-australia-network-soft-power-and-diplomacy-22580">Lost in transmission: the Australia Network, soft power and diplomacy</a>
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<p>The government must move quickly with its reviews and their recommendations, and articulate its policy responses before the next election, if Australia’s standing in the region is to be restored. Because other powers, especially China, are fast filling the gap we’re leaving behind.</p>
<h2>The importance of soft power</h2>
<p>Soft power is a term coined by <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-politics">Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye</a> in the late 1980s. He referred to soft power as the ability of a country to gain influence and power through attraction and without coercion. Soft power leads to nation branding or the reputation a nation enjoys in the world. </p>
<p>This is what business academic <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/336086.pdf">Yin Fang defines</a> as:</p>
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<p>… the total sum of all perceptions of a nation in the minds of international stakeholders, which may contain some of the following elements: people, place, culture/language, history, food, fashion, famous faces (celebrities), global brands and so on.</p>
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<p>The 2018 <a href="https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2018.pdf">Soft Power 30 Report</a> showed Australia had fallen four places in four years. The report is a measure of the influence of international nations. We are 10th in the overall soft power index but are marked as moving downward: 7th in culture, 6th in education, 9th in government and completely absent from the top ten in the areas of digital, enterprise and engagement.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soft-power-and-the-institutionalisation-of-influence-65208">Soft power and the institutionalisation of influence</a>
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<p>In the alternative, and hipper, <a href="https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2018-19/">Monocle Soft Power Index</a>, Australia sits at number 8. But the report also warns it “… is in need of a shakeup if it is to remain an attractive proposition”. </p>
<p>It praises the country for committing to an official review of its soft power but adds “it’s unclear if that will now be a priority”.</p>
<p>In addressing a seminar on the future of Australia’s broadcasting and soft power in the region, veteran broadcaster and former head of the Australia Network Bruce Dover said:</p>
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<p>Where once Australia was a brand in Asia, people knew what the Australia Network was, they knew what Radio Australia was, it’s lost - it’s gone…</p>
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<p>He then added that the axing of the Australia Network by the Coalition government “… was for more political reasons about whacking the ABC than a considered view on the worth of soft diplomacy or having a voice in the region”.</p>
<p>The ABC isn’t entirely free from blame. It abandoned the most needy of its audience in Asia and the Pacific by <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-22/china-takes-over-radio-australias-old-shortwave-frequencies/9898754">switching off its shortwave radio</a> service in 2017. Citing outdated technology, the ABC was trying to make the most of its severe funding cutbacks by prioritising digital services. And that’s when China moved in and took over the shortwave frequencies.</p>
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<h2>So, what’s China doing?</h2>
<p>The government’s Pacific pivot is about waking up and finding China has expanded into the region, and not just in infrastructure projects but in broadcasting. A recent ABC <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-08/chinas-foreign-media-push-a-major-threat-to-democracies/10733068">investigation reported</a> China’s Central Global Television Network (CGTN) is broadcasting to 1.2 billion people in Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic and is expanding to create 200 international bureaus by 2020. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soft-power-goes-hard-chinas-economic-interest-in-the-pacific-comes-with-strings-attached-103765">Soft power goes hard: China's economic interest in the Pacific comes with strings attached</a>
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<p>This may be, as the ABC suggests, “informational warfare”, where the soldiers may actually be Westerners working for the other side. This year alone, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/2019-media-layoffs-job-cuts-at-buzzfeed-huffpost-vice-details-2019-2?r=US&IR=T">more than 2,200 people</a> lost their jobs in the Australian media. </p>
<p>Edwin Maher was one of the first Australians to work for CCTV, as CGTN was then called. He was a weatherman when I worked in the ABC’s Melbourne newsroom in the late ’80s, but for over a decade he has been a presenter on China’s television. There will be more like him in future. </p>
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<p>China is actively <a href="http://english.cctv.com/special/jobs/index.shtml">recruiting Westerners</a> to front its programs. Australian faces will likely present news on on CGTN, while Australian voices broadcast in English to Pacific Islanders on shortwave. </p>
<p>In the competitive world of nation-branding and soft power, who will know the difference? The new Edwin Mahers will be telling the same stories as Australia, but with a China focus. In 2016 President Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/world/asia/china-media-policy-xi-jinping.html">announced</a> that the media must serve the party and directed them to tell China’s stories that reflect well on the ruling party and its policies. </p>
<p>This is the reality of informational warfare. The Morrison government must release its two crucial soft power reports and announce a policy framework that will determine our standing, influence and power in the region.</p>
<p>Vanuatu’s <a href="http://dailypost.vu/news/media-blong-yumi/article_d87b0243-71a8-5932-913d-8a238a279ed4.html?fbclid=IwAR1xBDJ2PZNaB1vW2eJw7IlS_u1UG9CBTZuVRXknHunKZUgYWnknwxnqTR0">Daily Post</a> has welcomed the news Australia will provide entertaining programs to the Pacific. But the opinion piece also says:</p>
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<p>Pacific islanders aren’t likely to be very fussy about how that comes about. But if the goal is helping Pacific islanders know more about Australia — and helping Australians know more about the Pacific – then a different approach is needed.</p>
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<p>Australia’s soft power is too important to be determined by vengeful payback to the ABC, or by currying favour with commercial television barons. It is about statecraft.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Vatsikopoulos is affiliated with ABC Alumni and worked for the Australia Network between 2001-2008. </span></em></p>Soft power is a country’s ability to gain influence through attraction. Australia’s soft power in the Pacific began waning when it axed the Australia Network in 2014. And China is filling the gap.Helen Vatsikopoulos, Lecturer in Journalism, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.