tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/pegida-15164/articlesPegida – The Conversation2019-10-16T17:00:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1228342019-10-16T17:00:48Z2019-10-16T17:00:48ZForms and outcomes of citizens’ mobilisations during Europe’s refugee reception crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292502/original/file-20190915-8678-1vquf13.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1790%2C1198&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mass mobilization of citizens and organizations around Brussels-North railway station.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=735478233328234&set=a.735474743328583&type=3&theater">FRANÇOIS DVORAK/fdvphotoreporter.wixsite.com/monsite</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had a profound impact on civil society throughout Europe. Whether countries were arrival points, on transit routes or were final destinations, and regardless of their geopolitical situations, a large and diversified set of attitudes and practices emerged.</p>
<p>The actions taken by citizens, whether they were negative or positive, intended to reject or welcome newcomers, made visible their dissatisfaction and criticism toward the way their political elites and institutions attempted to manage the situation. Over time they became systematic and structured, ultimately questioning the <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/socialinclusion/issue/view/107">relationship between citizens and political institutions</a>. They also give a sense of what political participation means today.</p>
<p>As shown in <a href="https://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1005529">our research</a>, while public opinions remained relatively stable throughout from 2015 to 2018, civil-society mobilisation rose and became polarised in all European countries. The profiles of those involved differed, as did their relationships with institutions and the outcomes. The range of motivations themselves showed to be relatively stable, and determined by sociocultural and political motivations.</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Positive mobilisations</strong>: Humanitarian solidarity is the strongest catalyst and has an important impact on support activities. Donations and emergency help such as the distribution of food and clothes are the most common practices among individual volunteers and civil society groups. This is also true in those contexts where public opinion is more critical of migration, where institutions take a more restrictive approach, or where civil society is generally less proactive.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Negative mobilisations</strong>: These are inspired by tropes about the demographic threat from the Global South, including conspiracy theories on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_genocide_conspiracy_theory">“ethnic substitution”</a>, opposition to “foreignisation”, the conception of the national territory as “private property”, and the depiction of nations as victims of an <a href="https://www.leganord.org/component/tags/tag/stop-invasione">“invasion”</a>. During the reception crisis, perceived cultural threats revolving around national identity, cultural norms and values have significantly increased, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Negative sociocultural beliefs are also embodied by political parties or movements. In Italy, far-right organisations as well as the anti-immigration mainstream party, the League and its leader Matteo Salvini, played this role. In Hungary, xenophobia is completely integrated into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/21/hungary-accused-of-fuelling-xenophobia-human-rights-violations">rhetoric of the Orbán government</a>.</p>
<h2>From the social to the political</h2>
<p>In a second phase of the reception crisis, groups motivated by solidarity shifted to politically driven mobilisation, showing that sociocultural and the political forms of mobilisation are not exclusive or conflictual, but <a href="http://www.uninomade.org/the-gaze-of-autonomy-capitalism-migration-and-social-struggles/">overlapping</a>.</p>
<p>Only in rare instances did citizens’ reactions align with the governments’ stance. Instead, initiatives often aimed to correct – or more precisely, to suggest corrections to – state policies. When politically driven, positive mobilisation embraced the issue of formal access to rights, including questions of citizenship and <a href="https://sanspapiers.be/qui-sommes-nous/">recognition of undocumented people</a>. It aimed to have a direct impact on national politics, the policymaking process and field practices, as well as in those contexts where institutions show relative tolerance toward asylum seekers. Similarly, mobilisation against asylum seekers sought to integrate the government’s restrictive field practices such as <a href="https://euobserver.com/justice/142739">border and access control</a>. This happened especially when the reception systems in transit countries were overwhelmed and clearly no longer effective.</p>
<p>Interestingly, while positive mobilisation rarely sprang directly from political organisations or got backing from formal political parties, the most evident cases of negative mobilisation were structured around political groups that existed before 2015 – <a href="https://www.pegida.de">Pegida</a> in Germany, the Greek far-right party <a href="http://www.xrisiavgi.com">Golden Dawn</a> or Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/hungarys-future-antiimmigration-antimulticulturalism-and-antiro/">Hungarian Guard</a>. Italy is a case where the connection between negative mobilisation and formal politics is particularly evident: opposition to asylum seekers <a href="http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/sindaco-non-vuole-i-profughi-e-prefetto-deve-arrendersi-1150548.html">came directly from local governments</a>, and saw the spontaneous mobilisation of citizens only in rare cases.</p>
<p>The reception crisis also allowed far-right groups to portray asylum seekers as a national threat, and to gain space in the public debate. Golden Dawn had a strong impact, shaping the widespread impression that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">Greece was a xenophobic country</a>. In Italy, the reception crisis was an opportunity for different segments of the right-wing and far-right spectrum to <a href="https://www.open.online/2019/05/02/matteo-salvini-e-casapound-un-rapporto-lungo-cinque-anni/">work together</a>. Even in Germany, where the concept of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/germany-refugee-crisis-syrian"><em>Willkommenskultur</em></a> shaped the mainstream debate and inspired the humanitarian response at the international level, a strong representation of anti-migration views and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-222-refugee-homes-burned-or-attacked-arrests-a6763506.html">extreme violence</a> against immigrants emerged in 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On December 17, 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders sought to establish a new border and coast guard force to slow the influx of migrants across the EU’s external frontiers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alain Jocard/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mobilisation outcomes</h2>
<p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had an impact on the relationship between civil society and the state. This happened in the way the former represents claims and takes actions within the public affairs, and how the latter interacts with – and reacts to – citizens’ sentiments and engagement.</p>
<p>There was an unprecedented wave of solidarity from Europeans who hadn’t previously been active supporters of asylum seekers or migration-related issues. Mobilisation was primarily in urban settings, with the exception of areas such as the Serbian/Croatian border in Hungary and the Greek islands that experienced mass arrivals. The crisis of reception structures led to the creation, consolidation, interaction and evolution of heterogeneous organisations, citizen initiatives and networks at the <a href="http://www.bxlrefugees.be">national</a> and <a href="https://www.refugees-welcome.net">international level</a>.</p>
<p>Mobilisation also occurred when dormant organisations reactivated and existing ones embraced the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. The nature of their activities and their principles adapted to the situation, the needs of newcomers and the policy structures surrounding them. European civil society reacted more or less explicitly to the problems, gaps and failures of political institutions and institutional policy measures. In doing so, citizen organisations and NGOs made visible the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=JSlWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT88&lpg=PT88&dq=organized+non-responsibility+pries&source=bl&ots=ji-emGEMoj&sig=ACfU3U13Zmyl6FAWnIR544gyhTlHK5runw&hl=it&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj628nI6bHkAhXKEVAKHU79DYAQ6AEwC3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=organiz&f=false">“organized non-responsibility”</a> that characterised the institutional approach of the European Union and the indifference of many countries during the emergency.</p>
<h2>The emergence of the local dimension</h2>
<p>As a consequence of the reception crisis, volunteer groups, citizen initiatives and civil-society organisations paved the way for inclusive approaches toward asylum seekers and migration in general. These approaches are specific to regions, municipalities and local areas. A new paradigm of integration established in these contexts, and marked a “local turn” in the management of the contemporary migration issue. Recent scientific articles published by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1368371">Younes Ahouga</a> or <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020852316688426">Zapata-Barrero, Caponio and Scholten</a> have observed this paradigm to be growing in Europe.</p>
<p>The crisis created opportunities for citizens to transform spontaneous mobilisation – negative and positive – into forms of political action and advocacy. In several instances at the local level, groups of citizens and volunteers working alongside the state-designated reception actors took on a formal organisational structure and became involved in the decision-making process.</p>
<p>While strong civil-society mobilisation provided an alternative to anti-migrant rhetoric and violence, it did not always have positive political repercussions. This is reflected in the strategies of anti-migrant governments to challenge the leadership of non-institutional actors, as well as in the attempts to criminalise NGOs and obstruct their support activities. Examples of such institutional strategies are Hungary’s so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/hungary-passes-anti-immigrant-stop-soros-laws">“Stop Soros” laws</a>, or Italy’s second <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/15/italy-adopts-decree-that-could-fine-migrant-rescue-ngo-aid-up-to-50000">“Security Decree”</a>.</p>
<p>A few years before than international migration was turned into a political problem and the EU sought to fortify its external borders, sociologist <a href="http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/la-double-absence-des-illusions-de-l-emigre-aux-souffrances-de-l-immigre-abdelmalek-sayad/9782020385961">Abdelmalek Sayad</a> reminded us that contemporary migration has a mirror function. It makes visible how governmental trends in the treatment of immigrants anticipate the way forms of social control and legal measures are designed to be directed toward native citizens. The 2015-2018 refugee reception crisis is no exception.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author does not work for, consults, owns shares in or receives funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2015 reception crisis had a profound impact on civil society in Europe. A significant set of attitudes and practices emerged that give a sense of what political participation means today.Alessandro Mazzola, Post-doc Research Fellow, Sociologist, Université de LiègeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1152202019-04-14T14:22:58Z2019-04-14T14:22:58ZStarving online trolls won’t stop far-right ideas from going mainstream<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268834/original/file-20190411-44818-lhdkul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Faith Goldy is shown outside Wilfrid Laurier University in March 2018. Facebook may have banned Goldy and other 'alt-right' figures, but their influence is greater than social media.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Hannah Yoon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/facebook-faith-goldy-ban-alt-right-1.5088827">Facebook recently announced it’s banning a number of Canadian far-right figures and groups from its platform</a>. Those expelled from Facebook include the “alt-right” activist Faith Goldy and the hate groups Soldiers of Odin, the Canadian Nationalist Front and the Aryan Strikeforce.</p>
<p>The decision comes on the heels of the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/new-zealand-prayers-public-ardern-1.5066778">terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand,</a> where a white supremacist killed 50 worshippers and injured 50 more at two mosques in the city. </p>
<p>In a manifesto released prior to the attacks, the perpetrator justified his actions using <a href="https://www.dirkmoses.com/uploads/7/3/8/2/7382125/moses___white_genocide_and_the_ethics_of_public_analysis.pdf">references to a white genocide conspiracy theory while aligning his cause with those of other far-right terrorists and leaders from around the world</a>.</p>
<p>The ban imposed by Facebook is a long overdue recognition of the role that social media has played in fostering the transnational diffusion of far-right ideologies.</p>
<p>While the barring of far-right figures and groups from social media is not an insignificant step in combating the spread of right-wing extremism, it’s important to recognize the various ways in which the politics championed by the far right have already entered the Canadian mainstream. </p>
<h2>Recruiting support, organizing and trolling</h2>
<p>Social media and other online forums have served as a Petri dish for the global growth of the far right in recent years. </p>
<p>Lacking the elite gatekeepers of traditional media, the internet has provided a forum for the far right to share their radical ideologies and recruit potential supporters. The non-hierarchal nature of social media has allowed the far right to frame their organizations as inherently populist, leaderless movements that represent the organic expressions of an authentic but suppressed popular will. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/The-Fringe-Insurgency-221017.pdf">study published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)</a> has provided insight into how the far right strategically uses social media to recruit supporters into their ranks. </p>
<p>The study found that far-right groups tend to tone down their rhetoric on social media sites like Facebook, deploying more moderate personalities and figureheads to serve as strategic mouthpieces to attract supporters to their causes. </p>
<p>This strategy has proven to be an effective way for far-right groups to attract interest to their causes and <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/59ypnn/the-extreme-right-is-increasingly-organized-globalized-and-winning-over-gen-z">create a gateway to radicalize individuals — particularly young people — toward accepting their more fundamental racist, xenophobic and illiberal ideals</a>. </p>
<p>Social media has also served as a key forum for the far right to organize offline protests and activities. The German far-right <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783319674940">PEGIDA — Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West — is one notable group that has used social media as a key organizing tool</a>. </p>
<p>Formed in 2014 in a closed Facebook group, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/leipzig-versus-dresden-and-the-battle-for-east-german-identity/540831/">PEGIDA staged a number of well-attended protests in Dresden and other large German cities during the Syrian refugee crisis</a>. Social media has and continues to play a key role in organizing and coordinating PEGIDA-related protests around the world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268836/original/file-20190411-44805-766m8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People hold balloons in the colours of the German national flag during a rally of PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) in Dresden, Germany, in October 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jens Meyer)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition to serving as a tool for recruitment and offline organizing, social media has also provided an outlet for the far right to get the attention of mainstream society. </p>
<p>Far-right figures have been extremely skillful at using social media platforms to stoke the outrage of the mainstream media through the online practice of trolling. Trolling generally refers to intentional behaviour aimed at offending or upsetting a person’s sensibilities through controversial statements or actions. </p>
<p>While the initial online culture around trolling often took the form of <a href="http://www.zero-books.net/books/kill-all-normies">absurdist and playful transgressions</a>, albeit of extremely poor taste, the evolution of this online behaviour has seen prominent Canadian far-right personalities like Goldy engage in troll tactics to provoke collective outrage and garner media coverage.</p>
<p>For example, in a recent video posted in the wake of the Christchurch shooting, Goldy mocked the outrage of those who accurately identified and expressed concern about the Islamophobic motivations of the shooter. In her video, Goldy appeared in a hijab while sarcastically proclaiming her support for the established of “Caliphatada” — a ficticious Canadian state governed by Islamic law and culture. </p>
<p>Figures like Goldy feed on the outrage they provoke from the mainstream. The response, while almost uniformly critical, has the unintended and undesirable effect of reinforcing the preferred messaging of the far right. </p>
<p>Public outrage and condemnation serves as supporting evidence of the far right’s crusade against political correctness and the ubiquity of left-wing bias. This is red meat for the far right’s base, helping to affirm the hateful and victimized world view of far-right activists.</p>
<h2>A war waged on many fronts</h2>
<p>Shutting out racists like Goldy from corporate-owned communication forums will surely help limit their capacity to engage in this type of strategic communication. However, it’s important that Canadians recognize that the hateful ideologies of the far right have expanded well beyond the fringes of the internet. </p>
<p>Increasingly, we are seeing evidence that the far right has already had success in reshaping the boundaries of acceptable political discourse in Canada. A number of different groups have latched onto the ideas of the far right, blending them into their political agendas and movements.</p>
<p>For example, the United We Roll protest movement, while ostensibly focused on criticizing the federal government’s alleged disregard for Alberta’s oil economy, <a href="https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/united-we-roll-returns-to-hill-for-last-protest-before-returning-home">has also featured critical rhetoric of illegal immigration and globalism</a>.</p>
<p>Canada’s newest federal political party is also rooting its appeal to Canadians in the language championed by the far right. The People’s Party has constructed the core of its policy agenda around <a href="https://www.peoplespartyofcanada.ca/platform">a commitment to reducing immigration, protecting borders and preserving Euro-Canadian heritage</a>. </p>
<p>It’s critical that we recognize and address the ways in which the far right’s culture war is diffusing more broadly within Canadian politics. </p>
<p>This is a phenomenon that has grown much larger than Goldy and a handful of far-right groups. It is clear that the far right’s ideology has made its way into the Canadian mainstream.</p>
<p>It is now a war that if being fought on multiple fronts. Any broader strategy aimed at containing the far right in Canada needs to recognize this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Budd receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>It’s all well and good for Facebook to shut down people like Faith Goldy, but it’s critical we recognize that the far right’s culture war is diffusing more broadly within Canadian politics.Brian Budd, Ph.D Candidate, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/843542017-09-26T11:49:41Z2017-09-26T11:49:41ZThe world needs a new generation of citizen lobbyists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187557/original/file-20170926-19571-jl2ly6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=77%2C73%2C2563%2C1695&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/many-hands-air-718475959?src=3feOIDsSyem3EKj33hEL1Q-4-33">pratilop prombud/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Elections aren’t sports events with winners and losers, despite how it is sometimes presented. As our nations grow increasingly polarised and political discourse more toxic, electoral victory – <a href="https://theconversation.com/angela-merkel-wins-a-fourth-term-in-office-but-it-wont-be-an-easy-one-84578">be it in Germany</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/britains-new-political-tribes-need-something-different-from-their-parties-84001">or the UK</a> – delivers no honeymoon period of societal acceptance.</p>
<p>Once upon a time, when communication and access to knowledge were limited, delegating the workings of democracy to elected representatives made sense. But things have changed. Today, a growing number of people not only demand, but also play, a more active role in political life through tiny participatory acts: likes, shares, petition signatures, donations. </p>
<p>Participation now happens with little cost or effort. And it means that a greater number of citizens – who have traditionally not participated – are becoming <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefffromm/2016/06/22/new-study-finds-social-media-shapes-millennial-political-involvement-and-engagement/#58add29e2618">more politically active</a>, or at least more open to persuasion by those that are. People have also become politically more promiscuous. Today’s digitally-empowered citizens express allegiances to multiple issues, without necessarily adhering to a political organisation. They may support causes that don’t traditionally fit, often without a political motivation.</p>
<p>If citizens are offering up a pluralistic, chaotic input into the political conversation, then there is an urgent need for new forms of participation that can make sense of it. People are disillusioned with traditional politics, but there is also a resurgence of interest in politics. The gap needs to be filled.</p>
<h2>Five Stars</h2>
<p>Mainstream parties are reluctant to innovate, and so this space has been left to two disparate forces which were the first to realise how the internet might affect political participation. On the one hand, we have self-proclaimed “direct democracy” movements from across the political spectrum. They include Italy’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Star_Movement">Five Star Movement</a>, Germany’s anti-Islam <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegida">Pegida</a> and the left-wing populist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podemos_(Spanish_political_party)">Podemos</a> in Spain. They aim to capitalise on popular discontent, challenging the structure of representative democracy with direct democracy which establishes new channels of communication with their membership. </p>
<p>On the other hand, we have a new generation of political advocacy groups, including online petition platforms such as <a href="https://front.moveon.org/">MoveOn</a> or <a href="https://secure.avaaz.org/page/en/">Avaaz</a>, as well as the more community-oriented UK-based <a href="https://home.38degrees.org.uk/">38degrees</a> and its European transnational version <a href="https://www.wemove.eu/">WeMove</a>. These have shaped the <a href="https://medium.com/obama-white-house/in-review-the-most-memorable-we-the-people-petitions-2f26797d00c">emerging political space</a> in between elections. In addition, there is a host of experimental initiatives across liberal democracies, including transnational movements like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulse_of_Europe">Pulse of Europe</a>. </p>
<p>These new players have novelty and potential aplenty, but they struggle to translate their mobilising capacity into meaningful forms of political participation. Technology-enabled experiences of direct democracy haven’t proven to be viable responses to many of society’s challenges. </p>
<p>Too often they distort popular input to match an agenda as you can argue <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/546be098-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b">is happening</a> with the Five Star Movement. Online petition platforms, meanwhile, are one-click wonders that may briefly make us feel better about ourselves but fall short on empowerment. They do not mobilise a citizen’s talents, expertise and desire to gain a voice in the policy process. Have you ever gone on to more direct action after signing a petition?</p>
<p>If there’s anything we have learned from recent political events, it is that citizens have a growing desire to contribute to the political debate, and that they deserve the means to do so. <a href="http://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/39261/frontmatter/9781107039261_frontmatter.pdf">Research</a> supports this claim by demonstrating that societies which enable citizens to be assertive and critical of public authorities tend to have governments that are more effective and accountable.</p>
<p>What better way then to render citizens assertive than to turn them into lobbyists? This is the provocative suggestion I make <a href="http://www.iconbooks.com/ib-title/lobbying-for-change/">in my new book</a>.</p>
<h2>Interest groups</h2>
<p>Now, while most people associate lobbying with “bad guys” such as Big Tobacco or powerful financial interests, lobbying can be a powerful force for good. This is illustrated by several successful instances of citizen lobbying in the UK, Europe and around the world. </p>
<p>Think of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Schrems">Max Schrems</a>, the Austrian student who challenged Facebook’s use of private data and won. My own students have got involved too. They petitioned the EU Commission to put to an end to mobile roaming charges in 2012, adding their voice to a growing clamour that eventually <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/news/agreement-end-roaming-charges-june-2017_en">forced a change in policy</a>. </p>
<p>A citizen lobbyist taps into the repertoire of techniques generally used by professional lobbyists to promote a cause they care about deeply. It is more than than merely voting, donating, or signing a petition. Here, citizens set the agenda and prompt policymakers to act, or react to a policymaker’s agenda with potential solutions.</p>
<p>A citizen concerned about fracking might go to a protest or campaign meeting, but to think like a lobbyist means filing requests for access to documents to learn government plans, identifying key decision-makers to lobby, and preparing an advocacy plan to counter lobbying from corporate interests. </p>
<p>Citizen lobbying might sound like an oxymoron. Surely lobbyists represent the interests of the few rather than the many? That needn’t be the case. Organised interests, notably corporations, have historically monopolised lobbying, but the same factors which have prompted the rise of direct democracy movements and online petitions mean lobbying itself can be democratised. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187564/original/file-20170926-32444-db7mng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Last straw?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/straw-glass-orange-drink-661415743?src=s2L3q0m8nOkulRksgwS91A-3-2">Sergey Granev/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Citizen lobbyists can take full advantage of opportunities for participation: public consultations; administrative complaints; and unconventional forms of campaigning. They can help level the playing field. By challenging the undue influence of special interests, they can help elected representatives to better identify the public interest of the many. We have seen this already on issues like whistle-blower protection or even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/16/sugar-tax-industry-opponents-launch-campaign-levy-soft-drinks-obesity">soda taxes</a>. Brexit, with its potential effect on millions of people around Europe, looks a prime target for citizen lobbyists of all political stripes.</p>
<p>At its heart, citizen lobbying is not really about giving everyone an equal voice but about delivering a plausible, legitimate form of civic participation that complements rather than antagonises representative democracy. Much of the political engagement we see is about rousing support or driving emotions; lobbying, by contrast, is rooted in practical efforts to meet achievable goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alberto Alemanno ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>At a time when our political future is uncertain, the only way to guarantee change is to do it yourself.Alberto Alemanno, Chair professor of European Union Law, HEC Paris; Global Professor, NYU School of Law; Founder The Good Lobby, HEC Paris Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/543512016-02-09T12:37:27Z2016-02-09T12:37:27ZOne peaceful march doesn’t change Pegida’s disturbing ideology<p>A series of marches took place across Europe on February 6 under the banner of Pegida – an ‘anti-Islamisation’ street movement. Events took place in Dresden, Dublin, Calais, Amsterdam and Prague.</p>
<p>In a rain-drenched Birmingham a group of a few hundred people travelled in near silence from the main train station to an anonymous industrial estate. The march was billed as an opportunity for people to show their peaceful opposition to the ‘Islamisation’ of Britain.</p>
<p>Respectability was a major theme. At a press launch, Pegida UK’s leaders encouraged protesters to bring their families and promised that there would be no chanting or alcohol and that attendees would not be covering their faces. Before the event a message was sent out urging members of the far-right BNP and National Front to <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/02/01/pegida-uk-tells-national-front-and-bnp-they-are-not-wanted-at-march/">stay away</a>.</p>
<p>This is part of a wider momentum away from the behaviour most readily associated with movements of this kind. The rhetoric and behaviour seen in Birmingham seemed a world away from stereotypical authoritarian fascism. But Pegida doesn’t necessarily represent anything new. Its UK activists claim to be anti-fascist but this is an organisation that sits comfortably on the extreme right. It seems to have drawn significant inspiration from the international counter jihad movement.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"695984061731491840"}"></div></p>
<p>The extreme right has attempted to reinvent itself before. It has scrubbed conspiracy theory and biological racism from its literature and focused on the idea of protecting cultures. Groups such as the British National Party and the French Front National, have previously attempted to reposition themselves as champions of human rights, for example the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00313220601118777">‘populist nationalism’</a> of the BNP.</p>
<p>Dropping explicit fascist tropes has given some groups an even greater freedom to carve out new territory. The counter-jihad movement has emerged as a loose international network of activists built around the narrative of Islam being at war with the West.</p>
<p>Key activists include the US-based bloggers <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/nyregion/10geller.html?pagewanted=all">Pamela Geller</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/25debate.html">Robert Spencer</a>, as well as the Norwegian blogger <a href="http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/08/05/fjordman-reveals-identity/">Fjordman</a> (infamous for his appearance in Anders Breivik’s manifesto) and Danish activist <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/world/danish-group-promises-to-show-muhammad-cartoons/27916">Anders Gravers</a>. All of them share the belief that Islam and the West are at war.</p>
<p>The movement also includes think-tanks, such as the <a href="http://www.horowitzfreedomcenter.org/">David Horowitz Freedom Centre</a>, and organisations such as <a href="https://sioeeu.wordpress.com/">Stop Islamisation of Europe</a>, <a href="http://freedomdefense.typepad.com/">The American Freedom Defence Initiative</a> and the <a href="http://www.libertiesalliance.org/">International Civil Liberties Alliance</a>.</p>
<h2>Fabricating war</h2>
<p>For the counter jihad movement, Islam is not a religion but a totalitarian political ideology that is completely incompatible with Western values. Muslim immigration, particularly to Europe, is framed as being part of a plot to impose Sharia law. European leaders are represented as either blind to, or complicit in the attempted take over.</p>
<p>The leadership of Pegida UK marching in Birmingham all have strong ties to this international counter jihad movement. Tommy Robinson, co-ordinator of Pegida UK and former leader of the far-right group the English Defence League, has enjoyed the support of various counter jihad figures and in 2013 invited both Spencer and Geller to <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/right-wing-american-speakers-planning-to-join-the-edls-woolwich-march-should-be-banned-from-entering-8668686.html">address an EDL rally</a> in the UK – although the government <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23064355">blocked them</a> from entering the country.</p>
<p>Deputy leader, Anne Marie Waters attempted to host a cartoon contest similar to one held in Garland, Texas in 2015 May, which had encouraged people to draw the prophet Muhammad. The Texas event was attacked by two American Muslims, who wounded a security guard before they were <a href="http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20150511-garland-police-say-they-had-no-tip-about-attack-at-culwell-center.ece">shot and killed</a>. The London contest was <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/london-draw-mohamed-exhibition-cancelled-due-to-real-possibility-people-could-be-killed-10464019.html">abandoned</a> over security concerns.</p>
<p>Pegida UK claims to have moved on from the disorder that characterised the EDL. That the UK march passed off peacefully seemingly strengthens this claim. It is also important to remember that Pegida UK is a broad church, not a monolith, and that many of those on Saturday’s Pegida UK demonstration were driven by genuine fears over immigration and violent Islamist extremism.</p>
<p>However, despite its claims to moderation, Pegida UK as an organisation is entirely consistent with emerging trends in an extreme right which is seeking to distance itself from explicitly fascist rhetoric.</p>
<p>The Pegida UK leadership is firmly connected to an international movement that believes the West is under existential threat from a homogenised and totalitarian Islam. Pegida UK can claim to be committed to human rights but those rights appear to be selective. They do not extend to Muslims, be they migrants or citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Lee is a Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University at the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, an independent ESRC centre with funding from the UK security and intelligence agencies.
</span></em></p>The anti-Islamisation group caused no trouble in Birmingham this weekend – but that’s part of a very deliberate strategy.Benjamin Lee, Senior Research Associate, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/540672016-02-03T13:48:11Z2016-02-03T13:48:11ZWhat rough beast slouches towards Birmingham? That’ll be Pegida<p>The far-right, anti-Islam protest movemement <a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-the-rise-of-germanys-anti-islamic-street-movement-35930">Pegida</a> has so far been largely based in Germany and has had limited success in the UK. But around 300 people are expected to attend a march in Birmingham on February 6.</p>
<p>Having been kept away from the city centre, the group, whose name is an abbreviation for Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident, will undertake a “silent march” near Birmingham International train station.</p>
<p>The march will be lead by Tommy Robinson, the former leader of the far-right group the <a href="https://theconversation.com/edl-uses-an-old-playbook-to-spread-message-of-hate-14611">English Defence League</a> (EDL). Its message, so Pegida claims, is “save our country, save our culture, save our future”.</p>
<p>But of course, what the group means by “our country” is hardly inclusive. As a far-right, counter-jihad movement, Pegida’s message on the day will undoubtedly be one that promotes division and hate.</p>
<h2>Growth of a movement</h2>
<p>Pegida was formed in Dresden in late 2014. At first it organised “evening strolls” for people concerned about the presence of Islam in Germany and the impact immigration was having on German culture. But the strolls rapidly grew into mass rallies. In January 2015, tens of thousands of people attended a <a href="http://example.com/">Pegida protest</a> held in Dresden the night after the Charlie Hebdo shootings. The <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/germanys-pegida-meets-charlie-hebdo">anger of French caricaturists</a> did not prevent attendees from carrying banners claiming <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/germanys-pegida-meets-charlie-hebdo">“PEGIDA=CHARLIE”</a>.</p>
<p>Katrin Oertel, one of the speakers at the rally <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2907167/Marching-against-Islamists-40-000-angry-Germans-streets-growing-backlash-Charlie-Hebdo-massacre.html#ixzz3ZSInik9S">announced</a>: “We aren’t radicals or fanatics, we are a citizens’ movement.” Interestingly, research undertaken in Germany supports this. People attending Pegida rallies were from the middle classes and had not been particularly politically active before joining. Many said they had joined because Pegida gave them the chance to express feelings and resentments they felt unable to articulate elsewhere.</p>
<p>It’s highly unlikely that Pegida’s Birmingham rally will attract anything similar in terms of numbers or indeed types of people. Indeed, its march in <a href="https://theconversation.com/anti-islam-group-pegida-makes-its-uk-debut-but-why-choose-newcastle-37785">Newcastle</a> in February 2015 was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/28/newcastle-pegida-unites-far-right-march-islam-protest">dwarfed</a> by the counter-protests organised on the same day. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the spread of Pegida suggests a new and potentially significant development. This seems to be becoming a pan-European brand behind which those who are against Islam, Muslims and immigration can unite.</p>
<p>Pegida has already held rallies in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Spain and Switzerland and various other locations. Functioning at the pan-European level could not only strengthen its mission but also has the potential to unite what were once disparate groups within the counter-jihad movement.</p>
<h2>Robinson returns</h2>
<p>Then there is the re-emergence of Robinson himself. Almost two years ago to the day, Robinson appeared to have undergone something of a Damascene conversion. He quit the EDL and suddenly presented himself as a victim of circumstance.</p>
<p>Despite years of aggressively ranting about Islam and Muslims in Britain, he claimed to simply be a misunderstood man. He appeared on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b03ghfyp/Quitting_the_English_Defence_League_When_Tommy_Met_Mo/">TV programmes</a> and at <a href="http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/press/quilliam-facilitates-tommy-robinson-leaving-the-english-defence-league/">press conferences</a>, rejecting street demonstrations and acknowledging the dangers of far-right extremism. </p>
<p>All of this was disingenuous nonsense. At no time did Robinson distance himself from the insidious ideology that underpinned the EDL nor did he refute the myths he perpetuated about Islam and Muslims, about mosques, shariah law, halal meat, Muslim women and grooming.</p>
<p>Robinson’s presence at the Birmingham Pegida rally would seem to prove that the events of two years ago were little more than a publicity stunt. If, as I wrote at the time, Robinson’s bad-boy-turned-good <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-chris-allen/tommy-robinson-resurrectio_b_4176385.html">saw him emerge as a new messiah</a> for the common and everyday man and woman, then his fronting of Pegida is surely his second coming.</p>
<h2>This is Brum, not Dresden</h2>
<p>A spirit of resisting divisive messages and actions has emerged in Birmingham in response to the arrival of Pegida. Shortly after the movement announced it was holding a rally in the city, more than 60 academics, community leaders, politicians and faith representatives (myself included) from across Birmingham came together to sign a <a href="http://action.hopenothate.org.uk/page/s/birmingham">statement of unity</a>.</p>
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<p>Recognising Birmingham’s proud tradition of being a place where different people live together harmoniously, others are being invited to <a href="http://action.hopenothate.org.uk/page/s/birmingham">sign the statement</a>: to choose hope rather than the hate propagated by Pegida and its supporters. There will also be a <a href="https://twitter.com/ItsOurBrum">unity celebration</a> after Friday prayers at Birmingham Central Mosque on February 5, the day before the Pegida march.</p>
<p>Like those before it – be that the National Front, the British National Party or the EDL – Pegida will fail to gain a foothold in Birmingham. Its insidious message of hate seeks to pit community against community but this is a city too strong and united for that to work. Pegida’s 300 or so supporters will see that on Saturday.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Allen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Germany’s far-right, anti-Islamic street movement is coming to the Midlands, and it has a familiar face at its helm.Chris Allen, Lecturer in Social Policy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/377852015-02-27T14:03:09Z2015-02-27T14:03:09ZAnti-Islam group Pegida makes its UK debut – but why choose Newcastle?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/73313/original/image-20150227-16188-31xoa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Newcastle has warmly hosted immigrants for a long time. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/biscuitsmlp/2358819515/in/photolist-zdAME-4VePRy-2o9x8p-gQXgQ-fNMKyg-cPcTEU-5AH39v-8AfcJA-4XfizY-dYPGD5-6KV5zq-2Lw9BB-p31jdk-4AryRZ-fEdkau-dYADdC-d6ZTTw-q18B4M-mAupED-knBMH8-ijQjuZ-fDjQgF-bpFWVF-8XQTKT-8wmuqX-ghhBx-qd41tG-efhQMs-8Bu1Ka-6LGjXa-5pC4yo-xrncF-cXhzwm-74SQdZ-4wpVMh-6EMez3-5Ty2gx-gdAR5-d2AG15-8TBC9A-qD2UJk-dvNyeV-5Wey4X-aNty5K-ggTRz-i99h2K-doromk-dvmjeF-98yDR8-8wkZsB">smlp.co.uk</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The German anti-Islam group, Pegida, is scheduled to march in Newcastle on February 28 in what will be its <a href="http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/hateful-here-german-anti-islam-extremists-4998372">British debut</a>. Since its first march in Dresden in October, this grassroots protest movement has caused widespread concern.</p>
<p>This concern is growing despite claims that the group <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/01/pegida-germanys-useful-idiots">lacks a clear message</a>, is struggling to maintain support, and has lost momentum after <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11374709/Pegida-Germany-Anti-Islam-group-loses-second-leader-in-a-week.html">two of its leaders stepped down in the same week</a>, the first after posing as Hitler and the second citing media pressure.</p>
<h2>Location, location, location</h2>
<p>Dresden and Newcastle may not initially seem like obvious places for anti-immigration and anti-Islam marches. Neither city is home to a large Muslim population, especially when compared to other German and British cities such as Berlin, Dusseldorf, Birmingham and Bradford.</p>
<p>Some attempt has been made to explain why Pegida grew out of Dresden, such as by looking at the city’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/04/dresden-pegida-far-right-protest-victim-of-history">history of conservatism</a> and provincialism. But it is harder to explain why Newcastle has been chosen for its first British march.</p>
<p>The organisers of the march initially said they chose Newcastle because there is little other <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/11426868/German-anti-Islam-group-Pegida-marches-in-Britain.html">far-right activity</a> in the city, making it a more neutral place to march.</p>
<p>But Newcastle has arguably experienced a rise in conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims of late. <a href="http://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/government-figures-reveal-race-hate-7949512">There has been an increase in racial hate crimes</a> and Islamic State-related graffiti has appeared in some areas. <a href="http://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/newcastle-pegida-racist-stickers-found-8673768">Anti-Muslim stickers</a> have also been spotted in pub and supermarket toilets on Tyneside and Wearside ahead of Saturday’s march. It is potentially this recent tension that has attracted Pegida.</p>
<h2>History of acceptance</h2>
<p>These recent instances of friction and hostility are mostly a recent problem. There is a long history of Muslim settlement and often positive race relations in the region. The coastal Tyneside town of South Shields was home to what was one of the first settled Muslim communities in Britain. This consisted of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/mar/31/uknews.mainsection">Arab seafarers who arrived at the turn of the 20th century</a>. And during a visit to the area in 1977, Muhammad Ali had his marriage blessed in the South Shields mosque – a moment celebrated in the history of the area.</p>
<p>Newcastle itself is often seen as a British city that is open and welcoming to minority groups. <a href="http://www.dkrenton.co.uk/newcastle.html">Irish and black migrants were well treated in the 1800s</a> and Newcastle University awarded Martin Luther King J. an <a href="http://www.ncl.ac.uk/congregations/ceremonies/honorary/martinlutherking.php">honorary doctorate</a> in 1967 – the only university in the UK to do so while he was alive.</p>
<p>The North East should by no means be considered a racial utopia, having experienced race riots and its fair share of racial tensions and discrimination, but there has long been a sense of pride in the tolerant and accepting nature of the local people.</p>
<p>Britain and Germany also each has its own particular immigration history. Due to the legacy of the British Empire, the Commonwealth immigrants who arrived to Britain during the post-1945 period had some pre-existing link with the “mother country”. In contrast, Germany’s economic miracle of the 1950s led to the creation of the guest-worker programme through which foreign workers arrived on what was expected to be a temporary basis. </p>
<p>While Britain was arguably more accepting of its position as a multi-racial country, Germany remained adamant that it was “<em>kein Einwanderungsland</em>” – not a country of immigration. This attitude held, even once some of its guests had decided to stay. It is the pioneers and descendants of these immigration waves, as well as more recent refugees and asylum seekers, who are feeling the full brunt of the Pegida movement.</p>
<h2>Bigger picture</h2>
<p>In truth, individual local and national histories seem almost irrelevant in this particular debate. Muslims in both the UK and Germany, and indeed across the Western world, are being pushed into centre stage in debates about multiculturalism, national identity, cultural tensions, the preservation of Western values, and extremism. It is from these fears and anxieties that Pegida has grown.</p>
<p>We can no longer tell ourselves that this movement is a “German problem”. There is no doubt that Pegida’s event in Newcastle will put race relations to the test. It may even result in an increase in Islamophobic sentiment and attacks, and reinforce the unfortunate and all too prevalent perception that Muslims are a “problem” for the integration agenda.</p>
<p>We can, however, take some small comfort from <a href="http://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/newcastle-unites-against-pegida-demonstration-8690732">the vast amount of support pledged to Newcastle Unites Against Pegida</a> ahead of its counter demonstration, and we can hope that the city’s local welcoming spirit prevails.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Hackett has previously received funding from the German Historical Institute London and the German Academic Exchange Service. She also held a Doctoral Fellowship at the University of Durham.</span></em></p>A march is planned for February 28 in a city with a long history of tolerance.Sarah Hackett, Senior Lecturer in Modern European History, Bath Spa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/362422015-01-16T09:24:50Z2015-01-16T09:24:50ZThe European Fear of Islam, from Paris to Dresden<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69090/original/image-20150115-3025-1pe8yq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Charlie Hebdo attack has another victim!</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carlos Latuff/MEMO</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the day I left for home after an extended research stay in Europe and the Persian Gulf, news broke of the terrible attack on the staff of Charlie Hebdo in Paris. I suddenly felt sickened and shaken, but I was not surprised. A violent media event of this kind - calculated, cold-blooded, daringly simple and staged in the heartlands of the secular West, for a global audience - has been on the cards for some time. </p>
<p>The Paris violence is part of a wider pattern, the latest phase in a longer string of attacks that were misinterpreted by French politicians and journalists as the work of ‘lone wolf’ and ‘disturbed’ individuals. It’s worth remembering that in late December, in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/21/france-dijon-driver-attacks-pedestrians">Dijon</a> and Nantes, more than 20 citizens were injured when men drove vehicles into crowds of pedestrians. In Joué-lès-Tours, a 20-year-old Muslim man armed with a knife and shouting praise to God entered a police station and wounded three officers before another shot and killed him. Then the violence hit Charlie Hebdo and the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30752239">Hypercacher supermarket</a> near Porte de Vincennes. More attacks are surely on the way. </p>
<p>Making sense of the violence is imperative for citizens who care about our world. At a minimum, this requires a measure of detachment from the language of outrage and disapprobation that has swept through France and the rest of Europe during the past week. What the world has witnessed is without doubt savage acts of criminal violence. Barbaric they are. But, contrary to the prevailing media narratives, the acts of violence are neither simply ‘inhuman’ (as if ‘humanity’ has a perfect track record in the field of non-violence) nor best understood as an ‘attack against France’, as <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2900259/Gunmen-kill-11-Charlie-Hebdo-attack.html">François Hollande</a> and many politicians have chanted in recent days. Contrary to the dominant media narratives, the violent incidents are also not ‘lone wolf’ events. Nor is the violence to be understood in the terms of clinical medicine, as ‘<a href="https://twitter.com/rupertmurdoch/status/553734788881076225">jihadist cancer</a>’, as Rupert Murdoch says, or as the work of mentally ‘<a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/man-shouting-allahu-akbar-drives-into-crowd-in-france-20141221-12bxhf.html">unstable</a>’ people, as the French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve has repeatedly claimed. </p>
<p><em>Revenge</em> </p>
<p>The barbarism of our times is different. It is <em>political</em>, and it must be understood as such, beginning with the chilling fact that what we are witnessing are acts of revenge by Muslim radicals angered by the rise of a new global bigotry: the fear and dread and despise of Islam. In many parts of the European Union, where more than 20 million Muslim people now dwell, Muslim baiting has become a popular sport. The cold truth is that organised suspicion and denigration of Islam is the new anti-Semitism. </p>
<p>Most of my European Muslim friends and colleagues are disturbed and upset by the trend. They point out that rapturous praise of the sacred principle of freedom of expression – fiercely defended by French intellectuals in recent days – is regarded by most peace-loving Muslims as an alibi for insult. They accuse the champions of free speech of muddling the difference between speech that unsettles the powerful and speech that vilifies the powerless. </p>
<p><em>Insult</em> </p>
<p>A careful genealogy of the principle shows that these Muslims are on to something. Think of John Milton’s insistence, in <a href="https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/milton/john/areopagitica/">Areopagitica</a> (1644) and other writings, that ‘the Turk upholds his Alcoran, by the prohibition of printing’, and therefore has no taste for liberty of the press. Then consider the Danish newspaper <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_Muhammad_cartoons_controversy">Jyllands-Posten</a>, which discovered, to its cost, that liberty of the press is not just liberty of the press. There is no such thing as free speech without social consequences and political effects. And cartoons are not just cartoons. Parading as ‘free speech’, they can easily function as weapons of prejudice and denigration of the powerless. </p>
<p>Little wonder then that in 2012 much upset was triggered among European Muslims when Charlie Hebdo published a series of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, including one showing him lying naked on a bed, being filmed from behind, saying ‘My ass? And you love it, my ass?’ Pornography and brickbats of that kind cast doubt on the claim made by Philippe Val, former director of Charlie Hebdo, who <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30726180">told the BBC</a> last week that the magazine was run by people ‘devoid of hate, of prejudice and was respectful of others’. That may be so - but many thinking European Muslims, for good reasons, don’t see things that way. For them, the <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-923X.71.s1.3/abstract">doctrine of secularism</a>, with its roots in the French Revolution, is an ideology of state power, just as it was throughout the period of European colonialism. For these same Muslims, the secularist insistence that ‘reasonable’ men and women must leave God not for other gods, but for no god, is a species of bigotry. It is a power move, an excuse to round on people of faith who refuse to let religiosity wither or be pushed away, into the obscurity of private life. </p>
<p>The Muslim rejection of secularism explains why French school officials who refuse to provide dinner alternatives to pork meat for Muslim pupils, or ‘kebabphobes’ who insist that ‘foreign’ grilled fast food is disappearing the baguette, are perceived by many Muslims as bigots: as hypocrites who pride themselves on ‘choice’ but dish out insult. Muslims in France and elsewhere in Europe similarly feel insulted by the whipped-up controversies centred on the burqa and niqab and hijab and chador. They are dishonoured when people (who usually don’t know the difference among them) say these garments are incompatible with the modern way of life because they oppress women, whose weakness (oddly) makes them potentially dangerous accomplices of ‘terrorism’. </p>
<p>For most Muslims in Europe, even the most free-thinking among them, such talk is more than absurd, or weirdly contradictory. To them it smacks of political prejudice, which itself is the carrier of discourtesy. The resulting denigration produces a sense of felt humiliation. From here, they point out, revenge is just a few steps away. They are surely right, for when pushed to the limits, intimidation and humiliation can turn murderous. That’s a standard axiom of psychoanalysis, championed by respected practitioners such as <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Reflections-Our-Deadliest-Epidemic/dp/1849850658">James Gilligan</a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Why-Hate-Women-Adam-Jukes/dp/1853431958">Adam Jukes</a>, who have shown convincingly that vilification and disgrace are always the fuel of murderous acts. Murder is a crime, but it is rarely straightforwardly the un-political doing of ‘madmen’ or ‘crazy loners’.</p>
<p><em>Civil Society</em></p>
<p>Last week’s murderous violence is political in yet another sense. It’s a reminder that civil society and its rules of peaceful civility and the public embrace of difference are highly fragile constructions that have no historical guarantees. The Je suis Charlie solidarity rallies that have sprung up in France and elsewhere show that these precious civil society values are alive and kicking. But they also show just how gossamer-thin they are, especially when confronted by the darker sides of European civil societies, which are less than civil, not only in their maltreatment and humiliation of Muslims, but also in the way, through unregulated black markets and freedom of movement of people, they facilitate access to Kalashnikov rifles and rocket launchers, for just a few hundred euros. </p>
<p><em>War and Terror</em></p>
<p>Armed men dressed in black balaclavas are the new symbols of a shameful fact: the global light arms trade is potentially the killer of civil societies everywhere, in Ottawa, Sydney, Mumbai and Peshawar, and now in Paris. There’s another political fact that shouldn’t be overlooked. It may be unpopular to put things this way, but the bitter truth is that barbarism of the Paris kind is the poisonous fruit of the so-called war on terror. Just a few hours after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, Bernard Cazeneuve, again quick off the blocks, said that the attacks confirmed the need for a widened ‘global war on terror’. A few days ago, at an ‘<a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-internet-and-border-monitoring-needed-to-thwart-further-attacks-2015-1?IR=T">international meeting against terrorism</a>’, he repeated the point: the ‘fight against terrorism’, he emphasised, requires a ‘global approach’. This way of thinking contains an inner flaw that is literally fatal. It stirs up feelings among many hundreds of millions of Muslims world-wide, for whom the war on terror includes American-led military violence of a frightening kind: drone attacks and B1-B strikes that kill innocent civilians, torture and humiliation at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, dragnet surveillance, support for brutal dictatorships in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Put bluntly, the terrorism we witness is the twin of the war on terrorism. That’s why talk of a global war against terror should be refused, countered by the brave remark scripted by Sasha Baron Cohen in Borat (2006), a comedy film that says it well in just <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tsnbrtd8vE8">a few biting words</a>: this permanent war on terror is more like a war of terror, drone-led hostilities that are experienced by many Muslims as an all-out war targeted at all Muslims, regardless of whether they live in Gaza or Cairo or Kabul, or Copenhagen, Hamburg or Paris. </p>
<p><em>Democracy</em></p>
<p>There’s a final and much more depressing reason why the Paris attacks matter politically. The violence we witness represents a black swan moment when democratic values and institutions are being challenged frontally by the spread of militia thinking and militarised politics, into the heartlands of what was once known as the secular West. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69220/original/image-20150116-5206-1jffxel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">French soldiers on patrol at the Eiffel Tower in Paris.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP/Joel Saget</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Cold War through which I lived my early years always felt strangely distant. Its gravest moment, the feverish Cuban nuclear missile crisis of October 1962, threatened planetary destruction, our way of life, but it did so from afar. Due to changes of weaponry and military tactics, and the advent of multi-media abundance, this new global war of terror is potentially everywhere. It feels as if it could swoop down onto any public space, any bus or train, or any business or public building, at any unexpected moment. The Paris events, we could say, confirm that wars of terror in faraway ‘foreign’ places are now coming home. </p>
<p>In responding to this trend, many French commentators have noted in recent days how the Paris murders are an assault on ‘democracy’. They are indeed, especially because the new barbarism robs innocent citizens of their lives and spreads fear and self-censorship throughout civil society. But the state antidote to violence is arguably just as threatening. Dawn police raids, red alerts and security checks are bad for democracy. So are helicopters hovering over our heads, troops on the streets, gun battles and, worst of all, the military siege mentality that is settling not just on Muslim minorities, but on the democratic rights of each and every citizen. </p>
<p>The way things are going, democracies in Europe and elsewhere will soon resemble garrison states. It must be noted that the trend sickens the stomachs of many European Muslims. From their point of view, the star of democracy no longer shines. Democracy means lying politicians like Tony Blair and double-standard hypocrisy (‘be kind to America’, reads one of my fridge magnets, a gift from a Muslim friend, ‘or else it will bring democracy to your country’). It stands for unemployment, job market discrimination, second-class citizenship, or no citizenship at all. Democracy is disappointment, a dismal affair, a codeword for Gaza, Libya, Syria and Iraq. At home, in Europe, it means hostile media coverage, street snubs, silence and suspicion, and growing state repression. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=573&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69222/original/image-20150116-5201-1l5zpgw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=720&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tweeted cartoon by Qatar-based Sudanese cartoonist Khalid Albaih.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is exactly this trend the hooded gunmen want to strengthen. Contrary to what has frequently been said during the past week, <em>jihadi</em> actions do not prove that ‘Islam’ is humourless or that Muslims have a genetic dislike of satire and frank speech. Equally misleading are the claims that the Paris attacks are symptoms of a ‘clash of civilisations’ or a regression to the ‘<a href="http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/satirists-respond-to-charlie-hebdo-shooting-876">Middle Ages</a>’ (Xavi Puig, co-founder of El Mundo Today). The substance and style of the new violence are thoroughly twenty-first century. Its key aim is strategic: it is designed to trigger tougher anti-terrorism laws, tighter surveillance, the militarisation of daily life, more Muslim baiting. </p>
<p>The point of the Muslim radicals is to accelerate the decline of democracy by demonstrating to their uncommitted sisters and brothers that democracy is a dying sham. We could say that the ultimate aim of the Muslim gunmen is to finish off European democracies that are already in a parlous state. In this aim, they are strangely succeeding, thanks to the perverse fact that they find themselves twinned with populist movements that opportunistically take advantage of Europe’s civil and political freedoms, so as to press home their bigoted claim that Europe is being swamped by Muslims.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69229/original/image-20150116-5206-fpfzsj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protester holding a Christian cross alongside a German flag at a Pegida ‘evening stroll’ in Dresden, 5 January 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jens Meyer/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We don’t yet know, but perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the Paris murders will be the way they fuel the growth of populist backlashes against Muslims throughout Europe. High on the opium of general discontent with the status quo, the new populism finds its multi-media voice in settings as dynamic and different as local newspapers and radio stations, Facebook and Twitter (where #KillAllMuslims is trending) through to quality television and high-brow literature. </p>
<p>Michel Houellebecq’s novel <em>Soumission</em> is a prime example of the new literary populism. Published just last week, it is the most talked about novel in Europe. Understandably so, since in literary form it captures the growing political disaffection with mainstream party democracy that is spreading throughout the continent. <em>Soumission</em> is a genre-bending dystopia, a middle class howl against Muslims, a literary anticipation of the year 2022, when a thumping majority of voters reject the French left and right. In a surprise move, in a second round of voting in the presidential elections, the good citizens of France throw their support behind Mohammed Ben Abbes, who becomes the first elected Muslim president of France. Ben Abbes legalizes polygamy, agrees trade deals with Turkey, and brings the veil and shariah law to secular France. The change of government triggers obeisance, toady submission like that of the principal character, a dreary academic who happily wins promotion at the rebranded Islamic University of Paris-Sorbonne and enjoys the pleasures of owning several wives.</p>
<p>Houellebecq has denied that he’s helping bellow the fires of anti-Muslim feeling yet, in the next breath, he confirms that the scenario sketched in the novel ‘<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11329625/Islamophobic-Michel-Houellebecq-book-featured-by-Charlie-Hebdo-published-today.html">is a real possibility</a>’. At the street level, in neighbouring Germany, it is exactly this anti-Muslim sentiment that fuels the rise of the Pegida movement. Led by Lutz Bachmann, a convicted criminal and son of a Dresden butcher, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) is much more than a Dresden or a German phenomenon. Pegida is many different things to many different people. Pegida is a rejection of the complacent post-politics symbolised by Angela Merkel. It speaks to the unsolved European political crisis and serves as a barometer of the <a href="http://en.qantara.de/content/the-sudden-rise-of-germanys-islamophobic-pegida-movement-the-product-of-a-nervous-society">growing public disaffection</a> with mainstream parliamentary democracy. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69219/original/image-20150116-5206-14yc2yq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lutz Bachmann, prominent figure in the Pegida movement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Arno Burgi/dpa</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet Pegida is much more than a protest against the dying party systems of Europe. It is also a Pied Piper of the new anti-Muslim bigotry, the feeling that Muslims are taking over Europe. Remarkable is the movement’s knack of plumbing the depths of civil society. The typical Islamophobe who attends Pegida rallies (‘evening strolls’ they’re called) each Monday evening is an ‘angry citizen’ (Wutbürger) drawn from many different walks of life. In the ranks of the movement are football fans, educated middle class people and opponents of factory farming. There are neo-Nazis, Christians, Putin sympathisers, street hooligans and the rich upper middle class. </p>
<p>Pegida supporters and sympathisers may seem a motley crew but they share important things in common. They are annoyed with politicians and the political establishment. They curse the ‘lying media’. They’re sure the prevailing party system doesn’t represent either their material interests or their gut feeling that their own nation is drowning in the rising tides of Islam. Pegida people see no need for a New Deal with Muslims, which is what the whole European region now so urgently needs. They don’t much like people of the Muslim faith. They say they’ve had enough of Muslim asylum seekers, including those who come from the war zones of Syria and Iraq. Pegida people like people like themselves: good, white, upright and hard-working citizens who now want their homeland back. </p>
<p>Surely the strangest political fact of all is that Pegida supporters consider themselves democrats. They think of themselves as people of The People, as champions of the shortest of short textbook definitions of democracy as self-government of the people, by the people, for the people. Pegida people seem wilfully ignorant of the historical fact that since 1945 the norms of democracy have been democratised. Democracy has come to mean much more than winning elections. It now stands for the refusal of grand ideologies (including the whole idea of the coming-to-be of the Sovereign People defended by Martin Heidegger in his <a href="http://www.bloomsbury.com/us/nature-history-state-9781441133250/">Freiburg lectures</a> of 1933/34) and opposition to arbitrary power, wherever it is exercised. Democracy nowadays ideally means the public accountability of power, political humility, respect for diversity and complexity, and the refusal of all forms of bossing, bullying and violence against flesh and blood people, wherever they live. </p>
<p>These democratic norms uniquely belong to our <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Life-Death-Democracy-John-Keane/dp/0393058352">age of monitory democracy</a>, but strange and striking is the way Pegida supporters and fellow travellers want to turn their backs on them, and to do so in the name of the old and discredited Sovereign People Principle. Never mind that their definition of democracy is exclusionary and potentially murderous, and that it has no room for Muslims. When these authoritarian populists speak of democracy, what they really mean is ‘you don’t belong here because you are not one of us’. </p>
<p>Pegida populists are in this sense recidivists. They want Europe to turn back the clock, to move forward by stepping back in time, into a world where The People supposedly once ruled. ‘Wir sind das Volk’ (We are the People), they shout at their Monday evening rallies. Just as bigoted people shouted on the streets in the years before 1933. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/69223/original/image-20150116-5194-13ue7n6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pegida Rescues the West, by Slovak-born cartoonist Marian Kamensky.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Earlier versions of this field note on the wider political significance of the Paris violence appeared at the ABC’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-13/keane-paris-attack-black-swan-moment/6011878">The Drum</a> and the London-based <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/europe/16354-europes-fear-of-islam-from-paris-to-dresden">Middle East Monitor</a> and <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/european-fear-islam-paris-dresden-2134651465">Middle East Eye</a>. An <a href="http://arabi21.com/Story/803236">Arabic translation</a> has been published by Arabi21 News. Readers may also be interested in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2015/s4162013.htm">The World Today</a> radio interview on the same subject.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
On the day I left for home after an extended research stay in Europe and the Persian Gulf, news broke of the terrible attack on the staff of Charlie Hebdo in Paris. I suddenly felt sickened and shaken…John Keane, Professor of Politics, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359802015-01-08T21:27:16Z2015-01-08T21:27:16ZCharlie Hebdo: Houellebecq novel feeds fantasies of France’s angry right<p>Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel, Soumission, was published just hours before the attacks on the office of Charlie Hebdo. It consolidates his reputation – for better or worse – as one of the few contemporary writers in France (or in Europe) addressing the question of Islam in Western society head-on. </p>
<p>Comfortable with his image as the enfant terrible of French literature, Houellebecq described Soumission as “political fiction”. Set in France in 2022, Soumission imagines the exhausted old left and right joining forces to back the leader of the Muslim Fraternity for president, accepting the imposition of Sharia law in France in order to halt the power of the Front National. </p>
<h2>Pathetic farce</h2>
<p>Everything about the book – promotion of which has now been suspended by the author – had appeared calculated for maximum provocation. Its title deliberately echoes that of the 2004 drama <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/slaughter-and-submission-11-03-2005/">Submission</a>, a controversial film on women in Islam whose director, Theo van Gogh, was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/07/terrorism.religion">murdered</a> after its release. </p>
<p>And the novel could scarcely be more politically relevant. France’s Muslim population is the highest in Western Europe, and is growing. Given that demographic swell, the continuing rise of the far-right <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-far-right-landed-in-the-french-senate-32297">Front National</a> under Marine Le Pen, and the prospect of radicalised young Muslims <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">returning from Syria</a>, the issue was an explosive one long before the shocking events at Charlie Hebdo’s Paris offices.</p>
<p>While the right-wing Le Point <a href="http://www.lepoint.fr/culture/houellebecq-va-faire-une-peur-bleue-a-la-france-29-12-2014-1892779_3.php">deemed</a> Soumission “an attack on the blindness, silence, passivity and complicity of centre-left media and intellectuals,” left-wing daily Libération <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/livres/2015/01/02/houellebecq-et-le-coran-ascendant_1173203">decried</a> it as a “pathetic and provocative farce” and a consecration of right-wing thought into French “high” culture, “warming up the seat of Marine le Pen at the <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/livres/2015/01/02/le-pen-au-flore_1173182">Café de Flore</a>” – the celebrated meeting place of Sartre, Camus and de Beauvoir.</p>
<p>For its part, Charlie Hebdo promoted the book with a <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/7/houellebecq-charliehebdofrontnational.html">cover</a> depicting Houellebecq as a cartoon sorcerer a bedraggled, louche figure spouting his “prediction” for 2022 that he would be observing Ramadan. </p>
<p>This highly provocative depiction should come as no surprise, since Houellebecq has been voicing highly caustic views on Islam for most of his career.</p>
<h2>On the stand</h2>
<p>While his 1998 novel <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/feb/24/fiction.michelhouellebecq">Atomised</a> was controversial for its rejection of cherished post-’68 ideals, it was his 2001 work Platform that <a href="http://www.thesocialcontract.com/artman2/publish/tsc1402/article_1196.shtml">landed him in court</a>, indicted for inciting religious and racial hatred. </p>
<p>Platform’s characters disparage Islam and Muslims in the starkest of terms: “Every time I heard that a Palestinian terrorist, or a Palestinian child or a pregnant Palestinian woman had been gunned down in the Gaza strip, I felt a quiver of enthusiasm…” </p>
<p>Words spoken by a character in a novel are one thing, but Houellebecq went on to elaborate upon these provocations himself in a <a href="http://www.rferl.mobi/a/1100847.html">magazine interview</a>: “It is more than contempt I have for Islam, it is hatred.” He also called it “the most stupid religion of all,” but also denied being a racist, saying that “I have never confused Arabs and Muslims.” </p>
<p>In court, the rector of the Paris mosque <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DSSSAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT49&lpg=PT49&dq=%22Freedom+of+expression+ends+where+it+can+hurt%22+houellebecq&source=bl&ots=MuewQfoKZB&sig=qtCvePexD9PxWDIerV9z-xN-694&hl=en&sa=X&ei=spmuVK_wK8zraPeFgKgG&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=%22Freedom%20of%20expression%20ends%20where%20it%20can%20hurt%22%20houellebecq&f=false">argued</a> that “Freedom of expression ends where it can hurt … I think that my community has been humiliated, my religion insulted, and I want justice to be done.”</p>
<p>Yet Houellebecq was acquitted of incitement to hatred. The judges agreed that while his remarks were neither “elegant nor subtle”, they were crucially “directed against the religion of Islam and not its adherents,” and that while the remarks were “characterised by neither a particularly noble outlook nor by the subtlety of their phrasing,” they were not punishable under French law. </p>
<p>The same might be very well said for the cartoons of Mohammed published by Charlie Hebdo (among others) in 2011, which equally fit into France’s long tradition of safeguarding freedom of speech and the republican principle of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/13/vivelalaicite">laïcité</a>.</p>
<h2>Decline and fall?</h2>
<p>What is arguably more pernicious about Houellebecq’s work is its embrace of the idea of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=xiqYNfOdKDsC&pg=PA66&lpg=PA66&dq=d%C3%A9clinisme+language:english&source=bl&ots=1BJxUhkrxd&sig=l-83-6qx7ttCnJMmCbv7XVTE0r4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=iJeuVJK0EOqj7AaJvoCABA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=d%C3%A9clinisme%20language%3Aenglish&f=false">déclinisme</a> – the notion that France, and even Europe, is in an unstoppable mode of cultural, intellectual political and economic failure. </p>
<p>Some figures on the right in France, such as Eric Zemmour in his scaremongering <em><a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/french-obsession-national-suicide">Le Suicide français</a></em>, have suggested that Houellebecq’s vision in Soumission might be a feasible future scenario – but others, such as the eminent political scientist <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2004/nov/13/highereducation.news">Olivier Roy</a>, have roundly discredited the theory, pointing instead to the increasing secularisation of European Muslims.</p>
<p>It is to this mood of political pessimism that the Front National, with its origins in the Catholic, monarchist right, is trying to appeal. Supposedly “detoxified” of its anti-Semitic past under Marine Le Pen, the FN <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-far-right-landed-in-the-french-senate-32297">won its first seats in the French Senate</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>Given the swing to the right taking place across Europe, represented by the rise of the FN, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukip-founder-a-genuine-debate-over-europe-has-been-hijacked-by-racism-and-stupidity-27307">UKIP</a> in Britain and groups such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/behind-the-rise-of-germanys-anti-islamic-street-movement-35930">PEGIDA</a> in Germany, the Charlie Hebdo massacre will have an impact far beyond France’s borders – and the French debate over Islam in society, stoked by figures such as Houellebecq, will rage on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carole-Anne Sweeney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel, Soumission, was published just hours before the attacks on the office of Charlie Hebdo. It consolidates his reputation – for better or worse – as one of the few contemporary…Carole-Anne Sweeney, Senior lecturer in Modern Literature , Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/359302015-01-07T11:04:59Z2015-01-07T11:04:59ZBehind the rise of Germany’s anti-Islamic street movement<p>A rally in Dresden has attracted some 18,000 people, all marching under the banner of Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident. The sudden appeal of this group, known as PEGIDA, has caused alarm in the country where Nazism remains in the public consciousness.</p>
<p>The group says it wants to halt what it sees as the dangerous rise in the influence of Islam in European countries and protect <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30685842">“Judeo-Christian culture”</a>. It denies being racist or xenophobic, but leaders from almost every main political party, as well as churches and civil society groups, have condemned the movement. German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has urged Germans not to join PEGIDA’s swelling ranks, describing the group as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/06/germany-pegida-protests-dresden-immigration">“full of prejudice, a chilliness, even hatred”</a>.</p>
<p>Many German’s are sympathetic to the cause though. <a href="http://www.dw.de/survey-finds-one-in-three-germans-supports-pegida-anti-islamization-marches/a-18166667">A December poll</a> saw one in three respondents agreeing that PEGIDA marches were justified because of the influence of Islam in Germany. </p>
<h2>What do they want?</h2>
<p>Beyond broad statements, pinpointing exactly what PEGIDA stands for has proved to be difficult, not least because it has grown so rapidly. An otherwise wide range of factions and concerns have effectively been merged into one group, blurring messages along the way.</p>
<p>It is certainly true that some of the elements of PEGIDA have a distinctly unsavoury agenda, even if the broader organisation rejects accusations of racism. Extreme right-wing gangs and the neo-Nazi NPD party are to be found among its members and primary instigator, Lutz Bachmann, is a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/15/dresden-police-pegida-germany-far-right">convicted petty criminal</a> having served time in prison for burglary and drug offences.</p>
<p>But given the size of PEGIDA’s most recent demonstrations, characterising it as marginal or simply neo-Nazi is clearly not wholly accurate.</p>
<p>Germany has struggled to come to terms with the political consequences of large-scale migration over several decades. Until 1998, it was <a href="http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415604390/">“not a country of immigration”</a>, according to government policy. It was only after 2005 that Angela Merkel’s party, the conservative CDU, began to slowly embrace the reality of migration in Germany’s towns and cities.</p>
<p>This process of adjustment has undoubtedly had to be accelerated now that it is accepted that Germany will need more migrants over the coming decades to mitigate the affects of an ageing population and to plug skills gaps. </p>
<p>Any feelings of unease around the level of migration have undoubtedly been exacerbated by the high number of asylum seekers that Germany has been receiving lately. More than 150,000 applications were made in the 11 months to November 2014, in large part due to the turmoil of the Arab Spring. This has perhaps persuaded Germans who were previously quietly concerned to express their discontent more vocally and more visibly.</p>
<h2>A national problem?</h2>
<p>But Germany’s migrants are not evenly spread around the country. Most major cities in the western part of the country, such as Frankfurt, Cologne and Munich, have large migrant populations. In some cases, around 20% of residents do not hold German citizenship. Once Germans with at least one foreign or immigrant parent are factored in, that share rises to between 40% and 50%.</p>
<p>In the states which made up East Germany, however, the situation is quite different. Outside Berlin, cities such as Dresden and Leipzig have only very <a href="http://www.dresden.de/en/02/foreigners.php">low levels of migrants</a>. As in other European countries, concern about migration is often most acute in those locations least affected by it.</p>
<p>And although smaller rallies have taken place elsewhere, PEGIDA is predominantly based in Dresden and in Saxony. This state is particularly conservative and is the most economically successful of the eastern states. The right-of-centre CDU has been in power there since 1990, and has traditionally taken a negative view of immigration.</p>
<p>Between 2004 and 2014, <a href="http://www.dw.de/the-npd-on-germanys-extreme-right/a-15572610">the extremist NPD</a> was also represented in Saxony state legislature. The far-right terrorist group National Socialist Underground (NSU), accused of conducting a campaign of murders over a decade that shook the nation, was also based there. The NSU’s only surviving member is <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/profile-of-neo-nazi-nsu-member-beate-zschaepe-ahead-of-trial-a-894491.html">accused of complicity</a> in the murder of eight men of Turkish origin, one man of Greek descent and a police officer.</p>
<p>Alongside the large number of asylum seekers in the country as a whole, the relatively low level of migration in Dresden and the CDU’s traditionally negative view of immigration, it is not difficult to see why there is considerable potential for mobilisation in Dresden. </p>
<p>But if PEGIDA is to gain nationwide momentum, it will have to spread beyond its epicentre. It will need to mobilise similar numbers in other key cities, including in the West – which is traditionally more accustomed to immigration and more open to it.</p>
<p>So far, the movement has not gained any meaningful traction beyond the region and indeed, counter demonstrations have been held across the country, with protesters wielding signs expressing sympathy for asylum seekers and proclaiming Germany open to migrants.</p>
<p>In Dresden, protesters chanted “Wir sind das Volk” (“We are the people”);
but there is little sign outside the city, so far, that they speak for the body of the German public.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This piece draws on research conducted by Simon Green on immigration policy in Germany and the UK, which was funded between 2012-13 by the 'Promoting German Studies in the UK' programme of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The DAAD's generous support is gratefully acknowledged.</span></em></p>A rally in Dresden has attracted some 18,000 people, all marching under the banner of Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident. The sudden appeal of this group, known as PEGIDA, has…Simon Green, Executive Dean, Professor of Politics, Co-Director of Aston Centre for Europe, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.