tag:theconversation.com,2011:/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045/articlesUkraine invasion 2022 – The Conversation2024-03-25T17:01:34Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2261582024-03-25T17:01:34Z2024-03-25T17:01:34ZVladimir Putin: why it’s time for democracies to denounce Russia’s leader as illegitimate<p>When Russians went to the polls on March 17 to 19, it was less an election than an acclamation. </p>
<p>Putin’s margin of victory – he claimed to have won 87.21% of votes cast – was the largest in the country’s history. It put the Russian president <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/putin-vote-share-outer-limits-russia-election">on a par</a> with other great post-Soviet “democrats” <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_Karimov">Ilam Karimov</a> of Uzbekistan and Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan whose vote shares rarely fell below 90% Aliyev ousted Azerbaijan’s democratically elected leader Abulfaz Elchibey in a 1993 military coup and subsequently won an election with 99% of the votes.</p>
<p>As the respected Russia-watcher J. Paul Goode said on X (formerly Twitter), Putin’s reelection was more of a <a href="https://twitter.com/jpaulgoode/status/1769490535624982567">“reality show”</a> than a real vote.</p>
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<p>Even before voting began in Russia’s 2024 presidential election, Putin had got rid of any real opposition with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/would-be-putin-challenger-duntsova-barred-running-election-campaign-team-2023-12-23/">Ekaterina Duntsova</a> and <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/02/22/liberal-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-banned-from-russian-presidential-election#:%7E:text=After%20a%20day%20of%20deliberations,aspects%20of%20the%20commission's%20move.">Boris Nadezhdin</a> refused entry to the ballot. The three remaining politicians nominally classed as being “opposition candidates” were there merely to provide a veneer of democratic choice. Interestingly, all said they support the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240315-russia-presidential-election-three-candidates-putin-slutsky-kharitonov-davankov-little-suspense">war in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oscepa.org/en/news-a-media/press-releases/press-2024/russian-federation-flouts-international-commitments-once-again-with-decision-not-to-invite-osce-observers-to-presidential-election">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</a> was denied the chance to send an international electoral observation mission. The head of Russia’s domestic election monitoring group Golos (Voice), Grigory Melkonyants, had been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-grigory-melkonyants-golos-election-watchdog/">arrested</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/head-russian-election-monitoring-group-be-kept-jail-until-vote-is-over-court-2023-12-06/">jailed</a> in 2023. The group put out the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/independent-russian-vote-monitor-says-election-was-mockery-2024-03-18/">following statement</a>: “Never before have we seen a presidential campaign that fell so far short of constitutional standards.”</p>
<h2>The fraud</h2>
<p>Polling stations opened in occupied areas of Ukraine on March 14, a day earlier than the rest of the country. Voters there <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-occupied-election-voting-arrests-eb0b0d872cf55e561dc221bbc53d63d4">reported being coerced</a> by government agents who visited them at home to pressure them into voting.</p>
<p>There was also widespread reported ballot stuffing, something that appears to be supported by (non-verified) <a href="https://twitter.com/colleaguespb/status/1770487133532201009">video evidence</a>. Mathematical analysis of the election by a respected Russian psephologist (an expert in how people vote) estimated that <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240320-shpilkin-method-statistical-analysis-gauges-voter-fraud-in-putin-landslide">up to half</a> of all votes were fraudulent.</p>
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<h2>Divergent views</h2>
<p>International reactions were mixed. <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-and-North-Korea-applaud-Putin-s-election-victory">China and North Korea</a> were quick to congratulate Putin, followed by <a href="https://www.belarus.by/en/government/events/lukashenko-calls-putin-to-congratulate-him-on-his-convincing-victory_i_0000169020.html">Belarus</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/19/russia-election-2024-vladimir-putin-victory-who-which-leders-congratulated-him">Venezuela and Cuba</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-modi-india-russia-relations-b2514757.html">India</a>, which has its own elections running from mid-April to the beginning of June, also congratulated Putin, as did <a href="https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1769778213926883753">Houthi rebels in Yemen</a> and <a href="https://tass.com/world/1762087">Hamas</a> in Gaza.</p>
<p>Other, mainly western countries, were not so fulsome in their reaction to Putin’s electoral triumph. The UK foreign secretary, David Cameron, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-following-outcome-of-russian-presidential-elections">said in a statement</a> that: “Putin removes his political opponents, controls the media, and then crowns himself the winner. This is not democracy.” </p>
<p>The French foreign ministry meanwhile <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240318-french-fm-western-leaders-denounce-putin-illegal-election-win-russia-allies-congratulations">said</a>: “The conditions for a free, pluralist and democratic election were not met.” Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-election-wasnt-real-election-germanys-baerbock-says-2024-03-18/">stated</a> that the vote “was not a real election”.</p>
<p>The diverse reactions to Putin’s win was to be expected. The global order is rapidly changing, with the rise of rival blocs such as the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) world is becoming <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/05/usa-china-multipolar-bipolar-unipolar/">multi-polar</a>. Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia, have been accepted as candidate members. </p>
<p>This is not to say that a complete realignment of global power structures is imminent. And Brics remains a talking shop of disparate states with a range of often <a href="https://unherd.com/newsroom/brics-is-an-alliance-in-name-only/">competing aspirations</a>. Groupings such as this aim to challenge US global hegemony rather than defeat or replace it. </p>
<h2>Declaring Putin illegitimate</h2>
<p>But Putin has regularly billed the invasion of Ukraine as a fight against “the west” and a defence against Nato. Many believe that the Russian president, who famously called the collapse of the Soviet Union as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">“greatest geopolitical catastrophe”</a> of the 20th century. Many believe he would use a victory in Ukraine as a launching pad for <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/russias-appetite-may-extend-beyond-ukraine.html">further imperial expansion</a>.</p>
<p>So the decision of so many leaders in the west to declare the recent election in Russia as fraudulent and Putin as an “illegitimate” leader is an important moment in international affairs. It shows these leaders are prepared to follow the lead of the <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/">Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Pace)</a>.</p>
<p>Declaring Putin illegitimate would be the final recognition that Putin is out to destroy the international order. Western states should follow Pace’s <a href="https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9254/pace-urges-the-international-community-no-longer-to-recognise-putin-s-legitimacy-as-president-beyond-2024">advice</a>. In October 2023, Pace called on member states “to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian contact and in the pursuit of peace”.</p>
<p>That western governments – and their intelligence agencies – are prepared to continue to reach out – as the US did via the CIA’s warning to Russia of a possible terrorist attack which materialised in the terrible events at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68642162">Crocus City Hall</a> in Moscow at the weekend, is an example of how they might keep channels of communication open while still declaring the Putin regime to be illegitimate. </p>
<p>In the event, the Kremlin chose to ignore American <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/gunmen-open-fire-in-moscow-concert-hall/">warnings</a>. It has even ignored claims by <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-blame-game-over-the-moscow-terror-attack-has-begun/">Isis-K</a> that it was behind the attack in order to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-ukraine-moscow-concert-hall-terrorist-attack-russia/">link it to Ukraine</a> .</p>
<p>A declaration of illegitimacy would end a clear <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/its-time-to-declare-putin-an-illegitimate-president/">signal</a> to Russian elites that Putin has taken Russia down a dark and dangerous path. It would also reassure those in the Russian population who are concerned about their country’s slide into dictatorship that they have not been abandoned. </p>
<p>As I <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/HJS-Declaring-Putin-Illegitimate-Report.pdf">set out in a report</a> for the Henry Jackson Society earlier this month, a declaration of illegitimacy would allow western states to increase its support for Ukraine, close loopholes in sanctions regimes, support Russia’s neighbours and provide a haven for Russian diaspora groups to develop a plan for a <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/HJS-Getting-a-Foot-in-the-Door-%E2%80%93-Creating-a-Future-Russia-Now-Report-web.pdf">democratic Russia</a> in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226158/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Many western governments have called Putin’s election ‘illegitimate’. Now they need to adjust their diplomatic relations accordingly.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259442024-03-22T10:15:51Z2024-03-22T10:15:51ZUkraine war: Russia’s Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato<p>With Donald Trump leading in <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">many of the polls</a> for the upcoming US presidential election, his comments about global security and foreign policy have to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>In February, Trump flippantly remarked that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted to Nato states that failed to pay their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html#:%7E:text=As%20president%2C%20Trump%20privately%20threatened,wants%20to%20weaken%20the%20alliance">bills</a>. In a follow-up interview on GB News this week he <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">warned allies</a> “not to take advantage” of the US. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this causing more concern than for the countries in the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.</p>
<p>Not only does Trump, sometimes, say he wants to halt all US military aid to Ukraine, but Trump wants to undercut article 5 of Nato’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-trump-spending-wesley-clark-treaty-article-5-2019-12?r=US&IR=T">treaty</a> – the principle of collective defence – something that has become increasingly important in the wake of Russia’s aggression. British military <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">sources are worried that</a> Trump’s remarks will strengthen Putin’s resolve over Ukraine, and could result in him advancing on even more territory.</p>
<p>Even before Trump emerged on the US political scene, the Baltic countries have been especially concerned about Russia’s growing ambitions. They have, after all, been <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Soviet-occupation">invaded and occupied by Russia before</a>, in 1940, and then forced to become part of <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004464896/BP000015.xml">the Soviet Union</a>. There’s plenty of people who can still remember life in the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic states have been the loudest voices sounding the alarm about the existential threat posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">Russia</a>, and all three countries increased their military spending to more than 2% of their GDP, and recently agreed to raise it to <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1841298/baltics-agree-on-need-to-raise-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp">3%</a>.</p>
<h2>Building shared defences</h2>
<p>Amid growing security concerns, the defence ministers in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also agreed in January to set up a common Baltic defence zone on their borders with Russia and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/19/baltic-nations-to-build-defense-network-along-borders-with-russia-belarus-a83786">Belarus</a>. This would consist of building physical defensive structures such as bunkers.</p>
<p>Estonia will begin construction of 600 bunkers in early <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/baltic-nations-prepare-600-strong-bunker-defensive-line-with-russian-threat-in-mind/">2025</a>. The nations will also cooperate in developing missile artillery, and ensuring that their equipment, ammunition and manpower is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-lithuania-estonia-common-defense-zone-russia-border-security-concerns/">updated</a>.</p>
<p>Estonia has also doubled the size of its territorial defence force to 20,000 <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">people</a>, while Latvia reintroduced conscription in 2023 after becoming the only Baltic state to stop mandatory military service in 2006.</p>
<p>Latvia also plans to double the size of its armed forces to 61,000 by the year <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">2032</a>. Meanwhile, Lithuania has made an agreement with Germany to allow a permanent brigade of 4,800 of its troops to be combat ready on the Russian border by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-brigade-be-combat-ready-lithuania-russian-border-2027-2023-12-18/">2027</a>.</p>
<h2>Putin’s pledge to Russian speakers</h2>
<p>But given that Russia borders 14 countries, why are the Baltic states especially concerned about their security? In addition to being geographically close, a notable number of ethnic Russians live in the Baltic countries (5% in Lithuania; 25% in Estonia and 36% in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight/disquiet-in-baltics-over-sympathies-of-russian-speakers-idUSBREA2K07S20140323/">Latvia</a>. In the eastern Estonian city of Narva, 95.7% of the population are native Russian speakers and 87.7% are ethnic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/22/always-looking-shoulder-anxiety-estonia-russians-tallinn">Russians</a>. </p>
<p>This matters as Putin has argued that having substantial numbers of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia, due to the “catastrophic” dissolution of the Soviet Union, represents a “humanitarian <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329">disaster</a> of epic proportions” as it left Russians cut off from “their motherland”. Putin has vowed to actively protect all “Russians” living <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/">abroad</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, Putin has said he was concerned about how ethnic Russians are being treated in the Baltics, remarking that the deportation of ethnic Russians (most notably in Latvia where there have been recent changes to its immigration laws), poses a threat to Russian national <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1733169?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">security</a>.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has also protested the demolition of Soviet monuments in the <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/russia-protests-dismantling-of-soviet-monument.a198914/">Baltics</a>, placing Estonia’s prime minster, Kaja Kallas, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1609251885/kallas-on-russia-s-wanted-list-this-is-a-familiar-scare-tactic">on its wanted list</a> for doing so. </p>
<p>But these claims about wanting to protect Russians abroad, are really just a pretext to justify escalation with the Baltics, which will test Nato’s alliance and destabilise the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024">organisation</a>. So it’s not just important that there are ethnic Russians living there – there are strategic reasons as well that make them an easy target.</p>
<p>Even with the Baltic countries strengthening their troop numbers, Russia currently has 1.32 million active military personnel, and two million active <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296573/russia-ukraine-military-comparison/">reserve</a>. Combined this is greater that Lithuania’s entire population of 2.8 million people, and far greater than Estonia and Latvia which have populations of 1.3 million and 1.8 million people, respectively.</p>
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<p>For Lithuania, which borders Belarus and Russian-run mini-state Kaliningrad, there are concerns that it could be taken over first by Russian forces, which would then physically isolate Lithuania from the rest of the Baltics. The Kaliningrad region has become increasingly militarised in recent years, with Iskander ballistic missiles and S-400 <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/2022-12-05-BalticRussia-FINALweb.pdf">systems</a> installed. With Trump suggesting he would weaken the US’s commitment to Nato if elected, there won’t be much of a deterrent for Putin to grab low-hanging fruit.</p>
<p>The current Nato response force consists of approximately <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-increase-high-readiness-force-300000/">40,000 troops</a>, with plans to upgrade to 300,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61954516">troops</a>. But quick-reaction units could still be too slow to protect the Baltics from Russian forces as, ironically, moving large units, vehicles and ammunition <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/is-baltic-sea-nato-lake-pub-91263">across borders is bureaucratic and takes time</a>. It would be important to have excellent intelligence and to move quickly, something that will be made more difficult with the US potentially opting out of its commitments.</p>
<p>Though Russia has plunged much of its resources into winning the Ukraine war, Putin still aims to expand Russian sovereignty across the post-Soviet states and to effectively dismantle Nato, something that Trump takes no issue with. As Russia has been ramping up its war machine, the Baltic states firmly believe that Russian aggression will not stop at Ukraine, and that they <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1717545/if-ukraine-falls-baltic-states-will-be-next-says-russia-s-former-pm#:%7E:text=In%20Kasyanov%2C%20view%2C%20the%20war,be%20next%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20said.&text=Kasyanov%2C%2064%2C%20was%20sacked%20by,People's%20Freedom%20party%2C%20or%20Parnas">could be next</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Baltic states have high numbers of Russian speakers, who Putin has vowed to ‘protect’.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256152024-03-20T13:59:05Z2024-03-20T13:59:05ZWhat do Russians talk about on social media? Vladimir Putin dominates, while political friends and foes trail in the far distance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581931/original/file-20240314-28-fufsy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4585%2C2570&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ubiquitous: Vladimir Putin is the dominant figure on social media platforms in Russia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-june-20-2019-president-1430366228">Zhenya Voevodina/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The sudden death of Russian opposition figurehead <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">Alexei Navalny</a> in a prison camp in Russia’s Arctic circle on February 16 marked a significant moment in Russian public discourse. Navalny’s demise led to a substantial increase in online discussion about someone other than Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>There was a 14-fold rise in mentions of Navalny on social media as he temporarily outdid Vladimir Putin – something very rare and an indication of the public shock and concern his death had caused.</p>
<p>I wanted to find out to what extent Putin’s presence on Russian social media compared to his dominance in broadcast media. I used a website called BrandAnalytics to collect daily data on the mentions of prominent public figures in Russia from February 15 to 27. </p>
<p>Since the Kremlin banned Meta from operating in Russia at the end of 2022, the social media landscape has been dominated by UAE-based platform <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)">Telegram</a> as well as local Russian platforms including <a href="https://vk.com/?lang=en">VKontakte</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odnoklassniki">Odnoklassniki</a>. Telegram’s surge as the primary digital platform follows the migration of users from platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter that are restricted in Russia.</p>
<p>The graph below – which is generated from that data – clearly illustrates the overwhelming dominance of Vladimir Putin in the social media landscape. This dominance is maintained through a combination of state-controlled media, numerous government officials who frequently post content featuring him, and the assistance of bots designed to amplify mentions of his persona. This ensures his pervasive presence in Russian public discourse, reflecting his extensive influence over the media landscape.</p>
<p><strong>Daily mentions of the top 15 people on Russian social media:“</strong></p>
<p>But if there could be said to be a challenger for attention on Russian social media platforms it would be Alexey Navalny. If you look at the table below, which examines social media mentions in April 2021 – when Navalny returned to Russia after recuperating from Novichok poisoning and was arrested at the airport, tried and imprisoned – you can see that there was a high level of interest. </p>
<p>That interest was sustained for several months as people followed the story of his arrest and trial. The president still dominated social media – but you’d expect that. But, unusually, Putin scored less than double the number of mentions that Navalny achieved. Given the factors that artificially inflate Putin’s numbers (government officials, bots, etc) it shows that Navalny remained a strong presence in people’s minds.</p>
<p><strong>Top five people mentioned on Russian social media, April 2021 and February 2024:</strong></p>
<p>If you dig deeper you can identify four primary groups of personalities that recur in Russia’s top 50. To make life easier, I’ve on the top 15 people being mentioned on social media. It immediately becomes clear that the top people being talked about on Russian social media platforms are world leaders – dominated by Putin, but other popular figures for discussion include Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron and Donald Trump. </p>
<p>Below that, but also popular figures for discussion in the framework of the daily news are senior Russian politicians such as former president Dmitry Medvedev, who is now the deputy head of Russia’s national security council, and defence minister Sergei Shoigu. Other popular categories for discussion are historical figures such as the Soviet leaders Josef Stalin and Vladimir Lenin as well as the Russian poet and playwright, Alexander Pushkin. </p>
<p>The next tier of personalities comprises contemporary cultural figures such as the Bulgarian-born Russian pop singer <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/02/13/russian-singer-who-apologized-after-attending-almost-naked-party-visits-wounded-russian-soldiers-in-annexed-ukrainian-territory">Philipp Kirkorov</a>, and singer songwriter Yaroslav Yuryevich Dronov – better known by his stage name <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/05/top-russian-shaman-blesses-army-fighting-in-ukraine-a82678">Shaman</a>) – both of whom are known for their support of Russia’s war on Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Politics to the fore</h2>
<p>While the primary group, led by Putin himself, features regular spikes for the likes of Biden, Trump and Macron, newsworthy Ukrainians including the president, Volodymyr Zelensky and the mayor of Kyiv, former boxer Vitali Klitschko, also feature regularly. </p>
<p>In the context of the war in Ukraine, Zelensky and Biden are often framed by users to support a narrative of external threat. This also helps legitimise Putin’s regime as he is presented as the person protecting Russians from the threats presented by these figures. </p>
<p>Biden’s meeting with Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, on February 22 – days after her husband’s death – also supported this notion in that many people posting saw this as proof that the west was ganging up with the regime’s enemies.</p>
<p>Among Russian politicians in the top-15 mentions, only Medvedev and Shoigu tend to get a look in. Their mentions tend to spike when they say something newsworthy – for example Medvedev’s speech on February 22 when he said Russia would <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/22/russia-signals-it-could-try-to-seize-kyiv-again-at-some-point.html">push to occupy large chunks of Ukraine</a> and possibly even Kyiv. Shoigu’s name spiked around the time he was getting credit for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-president-putin-congratulates-servicemen-capture-ukraines-avdiivka-2024-02-17/">Russia’s capture</a> of the key Ukrainian town of Avdiivka.</p>
<p>But even so, these figures achieve at most 8,000 to 9,000 mentions – 23 times fewer than the sorts of numbers achieved by Putin. It highlights the lack of visible political alternatives to Putin’s leadership – or even an accepted succession – in the eyes of the Russian people.</p>
<h2>An eye on history</h2>
<p>The regular presence of key figures from Russian history – Lenin, Stalin but also the bogeyman of the second world war, Adolf Hitler – is suggestive of Russia’s complex relationship with its past. Sentiments of nostalgia, national pride and critical reflection are intertwined and influence current political discourse.</p>
<p>Regular reminders of Hitler and the Nazis plays into one of the favourite themes of Putin’s speeches, which is that Nazism once again threatens the peace-loving people of Russia, particularly from Ukraine, whose leadership the Russian president regularly condemns as a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-invasion-putin-urges-ukraine-military-to-overthrow-countrys-leaders-12551317">"gang of Nazis”</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Daily mentions of top 13 people on Russian social media not including Putin and Navalny:</strong></p>
<p>It is, of course, very difficult to separate regular social media discussion from Kremlin-sponsored content. But even so, if social media mentions are any indication of political sentiment in Russia, it’s not hard to see how Putin has just manipulated his way to a fifth term of office. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olga Logunova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Putin and his cronies, as well as Biden and an array of Kremlin foes and the odd pop singer make up most discussion on Russia’s social media sites.Olga Logunova, Research Associate, King’s Russia Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2257482024-03-18T16:52:03Z2024-03-18T16:52:03ZVladimir Putin’s gold strategy explains why sanctions against Russia have failed<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">There are more than 16,000 sanctions imposed against Russia</a>. Yet the Russian economy and war machine grew by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-gdp-boost-military-spending-belies-wider-economic-woes-2024-02-07/">3.6 per cent in 2023 and is projected to grow another 2.6 per cent in 2024</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">Nearly six per cent of Russia’s gross domestic product goes towards military spending</a>. At a time when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is scrambling to acquire arms, funds and recruits, Vladimir Putin seems <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/putin-s-confidence-heading-2024">confident in his ambitions for the future</a>.</p>
<p>How have <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-sanctions-economy-1.7141305">16,000 strategic sanctions issued by some of the most powerful economies in the world</a> failed to derail Putin? </p>
<p>As I recently watched the news break on CBC about Russia’s robust economy, an advertisement from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZRGt5Mj4tU">the World Gold Council</a> popped onto the screen. And there was the answer, hiding in plain sight: Gold.</p>
<h2>The role of gold</h2>
<p>Sanctions against Russia needed to be strategic, targeting the environment it operates in.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/smart-sanctions-for-a-stupid-war-the-west-finally-gets-clever-about-russia-196105">Smart sanctions for a stupid war: The West finally gets clever about Russia</a>
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<p>Economic sanctions targeted shipping and trade into Russia, but the gold market is a massive environment left largely untouched. After Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cracks-down-on-gold-and-oil-networks-propping-up-russias-war-economy">the United Kingdom, a major gold broker with one of the world’s largest gold reserves, cut all Russian imports of gold into the U.K</a>. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.gold.org/what-we-do?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwqdqvBhCPARIsANrmZhMH6km3d7zz-Sx3e4A64LwKNb1Qa7l7mivRcH9Fa7UXsCgnSri8IvIaAu9PEALw_wcB">World Gold Council</a>, Russia is now the second largest producer of gold at <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/data-insights/gold-in-russia/">324.7 tonnes in 2023, behind China at 374 million tonnes. Russia is expected to increase production of gold by four per cent a year until 2026</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2013, Russia has been <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/11/why-russia-has-been-so-resilient-to-western-export-controls-pub-91894">preparing for western sanctions</a> and managed to isolate its economy from transactions requiring American dollars.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/russias-currency-bounces-back-after-moscow-mandates-payment-for-gas-in-gold-pegged-ruble">In early 2022, Russia pegged its currency, the ruble, to gold</a>, and 5,000 rubles will now buy an ounce of pure gold. The plan was to shift the currency away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself so the <a href="https://bullionexchanges.com/blog/russia-pegs-ruble-to-gold-what-does-that-mean-to-the-world-order">ruble would become a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate</a>. </p>
<p>Usually the rationale for holding on to gold reserves is to use them to settle foreign transactions at home and abroad. Gold holders can trade it on one of several bullion exchanges; it can be swapped for currencies to settle transactions and then swapped back into bullion.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/maduro-to-tap-sanctioned-dealmaker-to-ship-gold-to-iran-1.1433389">Venezuela, for example — a heavily sanctioned country — sent gold bullion to Iran in exchange for technical assistance with oil production.</a></p>
<p>Usually countries want gold <a href="https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400229947.001">as a safety backing to insulate against broader global financial shocks</a>. Many central banks are purchasing gold at breakneck pace, with about <a href="https://www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-demand-trends/gold-demand-trends-full-year-2023/central-banks">1,073 tonnes purchased in 2022</a>. A single tonne is about US$65 million, which means $110.6 billion in gold went into central banks globally in 2023.</p>
<h2>Gold prices fluctuate</h2>
<p>China is the world’s leading producer of gold, and also the world’s second largest buyer of it. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/gold/reporter/chn">China imported US$67.6 billion in gold in 2022</a>, whereas <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/che">Switzerland took top place by importing US$94.9 billion</a>. </p>
<p>China’s appetite for gold has a great deal to do with stabilizing its own currency. In 2022, if someone purchased a new condo in Shanghai, often the developer would throw in a few <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/12/gold-bars-used-to-lure-chinese-homebuyers-amid-market-slowdown">gold bars to sweeten the deal</a>. </p>
<p>The World Gold Council argues that gold is the safest place to invest in times of conflict. But if that were true, there would have been a permanent bull market for gold dating back to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">Tutankhamen, making the price today infinite</a>. </p>
<p>Its price rises and falls like anything else. Which is why Putin’s goal of turning the ruble into pure gold is not genius, it is desperate.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-has-put-the-rouble-on-a-gold-standard-but-its-unlikely-to-last-180632">Why Russia has put the rouble on a gold standard – but it's unlikely to last</a>
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<p>The U.K., the United States and Canada will not touch Russian gold. But others will. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) imported 96.4 tonnes (US$6.2 billion)</a> of Russian gold in 2022 following the British sanctions. That’s up 15 times from the 2021 imports of only 1.3 tonnes (US$84.5 million). </p>
<p>It’s no mystery why so many <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/private-jets-go-russia-dubai-after-putin-pledges-self-cleansing-2022-3">private jets left Russia for Dubai</a> following the war and ensuing sanctions. </p>
<p>The other big client of Russian gold is Switzerland. </p>
<p>In 2022, Switzerland imported 75 tonnes of Russian gold (US$4.87 billion). <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-20/swiss-imports-of-russian-gold-climb-to-highest-since-april-2020">In 2023, it imported about US$8.22 billion</a> in gold from the U.A.E., which doesn’t produce its own but buys enormous sums from Russia, and US$3.92 billion from Uzbekistan, Russia’s next-door neighbour. </p>
<p>Billions upon billions of dollars of Russian gold is being freely traded at top dollar while avoiding every one of those 16,000 sanctions. </p>
<p>That’s why global sanctions against Russia haven’t derailed a thing. In order for Putin’s plan for economic resilience through gold to work, however, gold needs to increase in value. His long-term goal is that gold, not the U.S. dollar, will be the global trading currency. </p>
<h2>Consumer activism</h2>
<p>Here’s where average citizens come in, and how they can help determine what’s to come.</p>
<p>Right now, if you’re a Costco member, <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-bar-pamp-suisse-lady-fortuna-veriscan-new-in-assay.product.4000201245.html">you can order an ounce of Swiss gold for CA$3,045</a> (limit two per member, and no refunds). This is not a speculative investment. Physical gold will not quadruple in value by Christmas. </p>
<p>Instead, buying gold is a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071414/when-and-why-do-gold-prices-plummet.asp">guard against inflation and currency devaluation</a> in times of uncertainty. It’s the doomsday currency, which is why the World Gold Council advertises gold on cable news networks in exactly that vein. </p>
<p>If North American consumers, central banks and investors are panicked enough to buy gold en masse, the price will go up, and Putin’s plan works. </p>
<p>In the last quarter of 2023, American consumers purchased more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/15/costco-sold-more-than-100-million-in-gold-bars-last-quarter.html">US$100 million in gold bars through Costco alone</a>. </p>
<p>Is there actual Russian gold in those bars? Between Switzerland’s 2022 gold purchases from Russia and the 2023 purchases from the U.A.E., it’s likely there is.</p>
<p>If people are worried about the ethics of purchasing Russian gold, they can always buy <a href="https://www.costco.ca/1-oz-gold-coin-2024-canadian-maple-leaf.product.4000258262.html">the single-source Canadian Maple Leaf gold coin</a>. It comes from Québec, and as demand for coins like this increases, so too does the price of gold overall. </p>
<p>Still, bars and coins cannot compete with the power of demand from the central banks, and currently it’s high.</p>
<h2>Tarnishing gold</h2>
<p>To thwart Putin’s plan, the lustre needs to be removed from gold. Increasing gold supply could lower the price. Australia, Canada and the U.S. have important roles to play as leading gold producers. </p>
<p>Rising interest rates also tend to lower gold prices. A mass sell-off of government holdings in gold could also cause a tailspin for the ruble, but likely for the U.S. and Canadian dollars as well.</p>
<p>No single policy can thwart Putin’s goals — it requires disrupting the supply of gold beyond Russia, and that might well mean involving the U.A.E.</p>
<p>But with 16,000 sanctions on the books against Russia, one more smart sanction against the Emirates might be the golden egg Zelenskyy needs right now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Huish received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>Russia has tied its currency to gold to evade sanctions. Shifting the ruble away from a pegged value and into the gold standard itself is aimed at making it a credible gold substitute at a fixed rate.Robert Huish, Associate Professor in International Development Studies, Dalhousie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258502024-03-15T15:01:05Z2024-03-15T15:01:05ZUkraine war: ten years after Putin annexed Crimea, Russia’s grip on the peninsula looks shaky<p>It is ten years since Russia illegally <a href="https://theconversation.com/now-crimeas-in-the-bag-where-next-for-putin-and-russia-24521">annexed</a> Crimea on March 18 2014. Subsequent efforts to firmly integrate the peninsula into the Russian Federation, however, have been far from the success story that the Kremlin often likes to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60793319">portray</a>. </p>
<p>In fact, comparing the increasingly shaky grip that Moscow has on the peninsula today with the situation before the annexation would suggest that Russia’s strategic position has actually worsened over the past decade.</p>
<p>The Kerch bridge between Crimea and Russia opened to much fanfare in 2018 with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgmJrvcKtVI&t=16s">driving</a> a truck across it. It has become a symbol not only of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66221252">Russian occupation</a> of Crimea, but also of Ukrainian resistance. Spectacular Ukrainian attacks in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63192757">October 2022</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/traffic-stopped-crimean-bridge-due-emergency-russian-backed-governor-2023-07-17/">July 2023</a> exposed the tenuousness of Russia’s connection to the peninsula. </p>
<p>Not only that, but <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66829826.amp">repeated missile and drone attacks</a> on Russian installations in Crimea and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/17/world/europe/ukraine-partisans-insurgency-russia.html">partisan activity</a> in Crimea have further heightened the sense of Russian vulnerability.</p>
<h2>Black Sea successes</h2>
<p>Most significant of all, Russia’s Black Sea fleet has suffered significant losses over the past two years. As a result of these Ukrainian successes, the Kremlin decided to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-attack-crimea-russia-ships-relocate/">relocate the Black Sea fleet</a> from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland. Compare that with the situation prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 when Russia had a secure lease on the naval base of Sevastopol until 2042. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Black Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582190/original/file-20240315-16-y9zu38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Since the invasion in February 2022, Russia and Ukraine have battled for supremacy in the Black Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/create/editor/CiRkZjY2ZjA5Yi1jM2RmLTRhM2MtYmUxZC1hZDFjZGQ4NTA5NmQ">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Moreover, the Turkish closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles shortly after the start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 means that Russia can no longer freely move war ships in and out of the Black Sea. This makes losses, like those of the Black Sea fleet’s flagship cruiser <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61103927">Moskva</a> in April 2022 and recently the patrol boat <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68477318">Sergey Kotov</a> and the amphibian landing ship <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68292602">Caesar Kunikov</a>, even more of a strategic blow to Russian capabilities.</p>
<p>These attacks also have a significant symbolic value for Ukraine and its allies. While the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive on the mainland failed to deliver on expectations, Kyiv’s deft deployment of air and sea drones and of longer-range missiles ensured a remarkable <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/2023-review-ukraine-scores-key-victories-in-the-battle-of-the-black-sea/">change of fortunes</a> in the Black Sea. This was underlined recently when the <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1759145815946195025">Kremlin removed</a> its second commander of the Black Sea Fleet since the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
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<p>Momentum around Crimea clearly seems to be on Ukraine’s side. Earlier this month, Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov signalled that a major operation aimed at further loosening Russia’s grip on Crimea <a href="https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/budanov-announces-major-operation-in-crimea-1710143680.html">was imminent</a>.</p>
<p>Apart from the strategic military and symbolic value of these Ukrainian successes, there is also a clear economic benefit. After Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain initiative brokered by Turkey and the United Nations, the fact that Moscow lost naval superiority in the Black Sea enabled Kyiv to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/16/world/europe/odesa-cargo-ship-black-sea-ukraine.html">establish</a> its own shipping corridor. </p>
<p>This now carries key Ukrainian agricultural exports to global markets at levels <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraines-dec-black-sea-food-exports-top-un-brokered-deal-its-peak-brokers-2024-01-10/">exceeding</a> those during the period when the grain deal was actually in operation.</p>
<h2>Russia nervous</h2>
<p>This is overall undeniably good news at a time when there are many grim assessments of Ukraine’s prospects in this illegal Russian war. The renewed and arguably more optimistic focus on Ukraine was also obvious in <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-must-reclaim-crimea-achieve-real-peace-macron-1879496">recent comments</a> by the French president, Emmanuel Macron. </p>
<p>Recognising the strategic importance of the peninsula, including for the security of EU members such as Romania and Bulgaria with their own Black Sea coastlines, Macron insisted that restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea was essential for lasting peace in the region.</p>
<p>This contrasts sharply with a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lawmakers-seek-nullify-soviet-transfer-crimea-ukraine-2024-03-11/">move by lawmakers in the Duma</a>, Russia’s parliament. Members introduced a draft bill on March 11 that seeks to annul the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev in 1954. </p>
<p>It is not clear what, if any, effect such a law would have on the international legal status of Crimea as part of sovereign Ukrainian territory. But it suggests a degree of nervousness in Moscow regarding its grip on the peninsula.</p>
<p>This does not mean, however, that Russia is in any imminent danger of losing Crimea, let alone of losing the war that it has illegally fought against Ukraine both overtly and covertly for a decade now. The importance of Crimea in this war <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/514abee5-c09b-34f6-9a3a-865a64540a65">was established</a> long before the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. </p>
<p>And Putin and his proxies have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-moscow-could-go-nuclear-over-kyivs-threats-to-crimea-187188">threatened</a> the use of nuclear weapons on more than one occasion if Russian were in danger of being forced out of Ukraine. These threats may been overblown, but they indicate the level of determination with which Moscow is committed to holding onto Crimea. </p>
<p>Ukrainian efforts have clearly demonstrated, however, that the Kremlin’s, and Putin’s personal, commitment may not be enough to secure Russia’s hold forever. Kyiv’s western partners would do well to remember that among the spreading gloom over the trajectory of the war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.</span></em></p>While Ukraine’s fortunes on the battlefield have been mixed, its operations in Crimea and the Black Sea have been rather more successful.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258352024-03-14T17:40:02Z2024-03-14T17:40:02ZUkraine recap: Russian election special – and the winner will be … Vladimir Putin<p>Russian voters have been heading to the polls this week. But it would be misleading to say they were voting to choose a president. That’s already been done for them – it’ll be Vladimir Putin. </p>
<p>If there had ever been any doubt that the president of 24 years would be returned for another six, Russia’s supreme court removed that earlier this month when it upheld a decision of the Central Election Commission to ban anti-war candidate Boris Nadezhdin from running. Not that he was going to win – the director of independent Russian pollster the Levada Center, Lev Gudkov, estimated that Nadezhdin would have won about 4% of the vote had he been on the ballot. Another anti-war candidate, television journalist Yekaterina Duntsova, was banned from running last December.</p>
<p>Anyone else who might be a focus for opposition is either in jail, dead or exiled. </p>
<p>This year votes will reportedly be cast using a new digital system, which many fear will allow voters to be monitored. But Natasha Lindstaedt, a Russian politics specialist at the University of Essex, believes that with Putin forecast to hoover up 75% of the votes cast, the Kremlin will be more concerned at the idea that people will indicate their opposition to the Russian president by <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">failing to vote at all</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with a similar lack of opposition talent to back, Iranian voters recently stayed at home in droves. Turnout for the parliamentary election was a lacklustre 41% – the lowest for a parliamentary election since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Lindstaedt says the Kremlin has spent a reported €1 billion (£850 million) on propaganda in the lead up to the poll. It’s also important for Putin to reinforce the image of his legitimacy in case he needs to call on more Russians to fight.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-elections-despite-fixing-the-opposition-vladimir-putin-wants-lots-of-people-to-vote-for-him-225626">Russian elections: despite fixing the opposition, Vladimir Putin wants lots of people to vote for him</a>
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<p>If you want to read more about this week’s election, Adam Lenton – a Russia expert at Wake Forest University in North Carolina – offers this analysis which identifies <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">three key issues</a> to look out for.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-to-watch-for-in-russias-presidential-election-other-than-putins-win-that-is-225013">3 things to watch for in Russia's presidential election – other than Putin's win, that is</a>
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<p>If you are thinking that Putin will never relinquish his grip on power, you are probably right. Robert Person, a professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy West Point, says Putin’s got every reason to want to die in office – not least because any successor would likely want him out of the way. So, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Person writes here</a>, there’s no succession plan and no public figures who – for the present at least – appear capable of mustering sufficient support to effect a seamless transfer of power. </p>
<p>Were Putin to die tomorrow, he’d be succeeded by the prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin. But Mishustin is a virtual nonentity, a former tax official with no base of his own and a trust rating of just 18%. It’s hard to see him having the momentum to take the reins on a permanent basis. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-has-no-successor-no-living-rivals-and-no-retirement-plan-why-his-eventual-death-will-set-off-a-vicious-power-struggle-224485">Putin has no successor, no living rivals and no retirement plan – why his eventual death will set off a vicious power struggle</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>One opposition group that is making its voice heard is made up of wives of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Previously, write Jennifer Mathers and Natasha Danilova, it had been soldiers’ mothers who were very vocal in their opposition to the war in Chechnya in the 1990s. This time round it’s the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">wives of men who are serving</a>, reflecting perhaps the relatively older age profile of combatants in Ukraine. Many soldiers are in their 30s and 40s, rather than their late teens and early 20s, as in Chechnya.</p>
<p>Mathers and Danilova, experts in international relations at the universities of Aberystwyth and Aberdeen respectively, say the women have gradually increased the public pressure on the Kremlin as the conflict has moved into a third year, moving from largely online opposition to regular protests. Rather than set themselves against the war in itself, they are focusing on securing concessions such as more regular leave for their loved ones.</p>
<p>But, Mathers and Danilova note, there are signs that the Kremlin is beginning to up the pressure on these women, visiting their homes and mounting increasingly strident media attacks on their group.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-wives-are-increasingly-outspoken-in-their-opposition-224325">Ukraine war: Russian soldiers' wives are increasingly outspoken in their opposition</a>
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<h2>British boots on the ground?</h2>
<p>Red faces among Germany’s political and military leadership recently when it emerged that an unencrypted phone call between senior Luftwaffe officers had revealed that British troops are in Ukraine helping with the deployment and targeting of Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The call had been intercepted and passed to Russian state broadcaster RT. </p>
<p>The Kremlin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said the call was “proof” that the west was orchestrating the war against Russia. Closer to home, one question being asked was whether this makes the UK a co-combatant.</p>
<p>Christoph Bluth, professor of international relations at the University of Bradford, <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896?notice=Article+has+been+updated.">examines the international law involved</a> and finds that under principles established since the second world war, helping Ukraine in this limited way does not violate the UK’s neutrality. But Moscow will no doubt use it as a political opportunity to escalate its anti-Nato rhetoric, Bluth writes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-troops-operating-on-the-ground-in-ukraine-what-international-law-says-224896">British troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says</a>
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<h2>Memory and culture</h2>
<p>There was some heartening news from Washington this week when it was revealed that Joe Biden had managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. But the west’s slow response to pleas from the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for more military aid remains a huge concern. As the map below shows, Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW Map showing the battle lines around Adviivka in eastern Ukraine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=842&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581993/original/file-20240314-23-w4pn6t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1058&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Russia continues to make gains west of the town of Avdiivka, which they captured in mid-February.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>Gervase Phillips, a historian at Manchester Metropolitan University, see parallels with the Polish uprising in November 1830. Initially, support for the Polish people against the oppressive rule of the autocratic Tsar Nicolas I was widespread, and early success on the battlefield made this seem a worthy cause in liberal salons across Europe. </p>
<p>But, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Phillips writes</a>, this was not to last. The Poles’ European allies failed to back their intentions with military aid, and the uprising developed into a war of attrition in 1831. Eventually Russian troops fought their way to Warsaw and the uprising failed. Will Ukraine suffer the same fate?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-warning-for-kyivs-western-allies-from-the-failed-polish-uprising-of-1830-31-225625">Ukraine war: a warning for Kyiv's western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31</a>
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<p>Pope Francis I certainly appears to think so. The Holy Father sparked outrage in Kyiv (and elsewhere) last weekend when in an interview with Swiss public broadcaster RSI, he said Ukraine should find the “the courage to raise the white flag”. “When you see that you are defeated … you need to have the courage to negotiate,” he added. This drew an immediate and caustic response from Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba: “Our flag is a yellow and blue one,” he said, adding: “This is the flag by which we live, die, and prevail. We shall never raise any other flags.”</p>
<p>Tim Luckhurst, a former BBC journalist now researching second world war newspaper history at the University of Durham, was reminded of the way Pope Pius XII <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">failed to openly criticise Nazi Germany</a> during the worst excesses of the Holocaust, preferring instead to safeguard the rights of German Catholics. Meanwhile round-ups of Italian Jews took place within sight of the Vatican.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-pope-francis-should-learn-from-his-wwii-predecessors-mistakes-in-appeasing-fascism-225491">Ukraine war: Pope Francis should learn from his WWII predecessor's mistakes in appeasing fascism</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, as admirers of the late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny gathered in Moscow for his funeral, the biggest festival of documentary film in the former Soviet countries opened in Latvia with a minute’s silence. Artdocfest was first held in Moscow in 2007 and showcased some of the best Russian and foreign-language documentaries. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin began to pressure its organisers and withdrew all state support. In March 2022, after Putin launched his invasion, the festival relocated permanently to Riga.</p>
<p>Jeremy Hicks, professor of Russian culture and film at Queen Mary University of London, gives us <a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">a taste</a> of the best films being showcased at the festival.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/artdocfest-is-a-crucial-outpost-of-free-expression-on-russias-doorstep-225515">Artdocfest is a crucial outpost of free expression on Russia’s doorstep</a>
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<h2>Podcast: Putin’s conspiracy theories</h2>
<p>Aptly enough, the subject of our podcast The Conversation Weekly is how Putin has managed to exert such a firm grip on power in Russia. Host Gemma Ware talks with Ilya Yablokov, a specialist in disinformation at the University of Sheffield.</p>
<p>Yabolokov, who has written regularly for us on the Russian media, has been researching the way Russia’s conspiracy culture has become a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conspiracy-theories-help-to-maintain-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-225703">key tool for Putin’s regime</a>: “Conspiracy theories are one of the few ways of keeping the society together and to prevent the change of the regime,” he says. </p>
<p>Incidentally, one of those theories is that shadowy western agencies orchestrated Navalny’s death to make Putin look bad. True or not, that mission has been well and truly accomplished.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conspiracy-theories-help-to-maintain-vladimir-putins-grip-on-power-in-russia-225703">How conspiracy theories help to maintain Vladimir Putin's grip on power in Russia</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256252024-03-14T16:25:45Z2024-03-14T16:25:45ZUkraine war: a warning for Kyiv’s western allies from the failed Polish uprising of 1830-31<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581600/original/file-20240313-26-eed233.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C1016%2C678&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Polish forces triumphed over a larger Russian force at the Battle of Stoczek, February 1831.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maciej Szczepańczyk/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-preparing-new-weapons-package-ukraine-officials-2024-03-12/">has been reported</a> that the US president, Joe Biden, has managed to scrape together US$300 million (£235 million) as an emergency measure to supply the Ukraine military with at least some ammunition as it struggles to hold the line against better-supplied Russian forces. </p>
<p>The news should stand as a reminder of just how urgent the situation is for Ukraine, which is begging its western allies to stand firm and maintain the levels of support that had given its army the edge over the invaders in the summer of 2022. After a few months of significant successes on the battlefield, growing shortages of weaponry stymied Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive in the late spring of 2023. The conflict has developed into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">war of attrition</a>, giving Russia – which has a far larger population from which to recruit – the advantage if things don’t change soon.</p>
<p>There are valuable parallels to be had by considering the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/November-Insurrection">November 19 1830</a>, Polish insurgents rose to free their nation from the sovereignty of the autocratic Russian tsar, Nicholas I. This was not simply a nationalist uprising. As with the current war in Ukraine, ideological principles were at stake with implications for all of Europe. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<p>The officer cadets who led the revolt had been outraged by the tsar’s suggestion that Polish troops might be used to suppress <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Revolutions-of-1830">liberal revolutions</a> in France and Belgium. Poland itself was partitioned between Russia, Austria and Prussia. </p>
<p>Russia’s share, the Congress Kingdom of Poland, was technically a constitutional monarchy, with a liberal constitution: the <a href="https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/the-napoleonic-code/#:%7E:text=The%201804%20Napoleonic%20Code%2C%20which,secular%20character%20of%20the%20state.">Napoleonic Code</a>, a free press and an elected assembly (the Sejm). </p>
<p>Yet the tsar held supreme power – he could dissolve the Sejm, veto legislation and send Polish troops to crush foreign revolutions. Nicholas’s own contempt for constitutional government manifested itself in the growth of an oppressive police state. The Poles rose in defence of their liberties.</p>
<p>As with Ukraine in 2022, liberal sentiment across Europe quickly rallied to their cause and <a href="https://www.porta-polonica.de/en/atlas-of-remembrance-places/german-polish-enthusiasm-1830">support for the Polish</a> was widespread. </p>
<p>The military history of the war also offers instructive parallels with the current war in Ukraine. The tsar’s determination to crush the insurrection and impose his will on the Poles in 1830 is a reminder of how deeply-rooted Russia’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/08/etched-in-stone-russian-strategic-culture-and-future-of-transatlantic-security-pub-82657">strategic goals</a> in eastern Europe are. </p>
<p>It is, therefore, most unlikely that the current autocrat in the Kremlin – who has often <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/">lamented the loss of empire</a> with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s – will be sated with minor territorial gains in Ukraine. The resistance offered by the Poles, on the other hand, was redolent of the early successes won by Ukrainian arms in 2022.</p>
<h2>David v Goliath</h2>
<p>The odds seemed stacked heavily in Russia’s favour. A Polish army of 40,000 faced an invading Russian force of 120,000. Yet, as accounts by participants such as the Polish cavalryman <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/History_of_the_Late_Polish_Revolution.html?id=QEQCAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y">Joseph Hordynski</a> reveal, the skill and professionalism of Polish soldiers was enough to stall the Russian advance. </p>
<p>At battles such as <a href="https://securityanddefence.pl/The-canon-provider-starts-his-career-General-Jozef-Dwernicki-and-the-cavalry-battle,103157,0,2.html">Stoczek</a>, (February 14 1831), <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Bia%C5%82o%C5%82%C4%99ka">Białołęka </a>(February 24-25 1831) and <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/60867/pg60867-images.html#CHAPTER_XIII">Debe-Wielke</a> (March 30 1831) the Poles either defeated the Russians or fought them to a standstill. </p>
<p>Hordynski describes effective use of <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA528264.pdf">combined arms tactics</a>, skilful use of terrain, feigned retreats and ambushes. Russian forces seemed ponderous and uncoordinated in comparison, again echoing the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">battlefields of 2022</a>. </p>
<p>In another parallel with the current conflict in Ukraine, widespread popular support fuelled Polish resistance. This extended even to areas outside Congress Poland, such as Lithuania, where <a href="http://museum.by/en/node/58511">Countess Emilia Plater</a> led insurgent forces against the Russians. Then, as now, the Russians faced attacks <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukrainian-attacks-within-russia-challenge-putins-war-narrative">in areas they had thought secure</a>. </p>
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<img alt="Painting of Emilia Plater in a skirmish at Šiauliai by Wojciech Kossak." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581610/original/file-20240313-20-aaibav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Lithuanian resistance fighter Countess Emilia Plater led a small military unit during the uprising – she is now a national heroine in Poland and Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
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<p>And yet the Polish uprising was crushed within a year. It is the circumstances of that defeat that perhaps demand the most scrutiny at this moment, as the war in Ukraine settles into a relentless attritional struggle, where Russia’s material advantages threaten to overwhelm Ukraine. </p>
<p>The Russian military performance improved in 1831, and they won an important victory at <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Battle_of_Ostro%C5%82%C4%99ka_(1831)">Ostrołęka</a>, (May 16 1831). The resolve of Polish leadership wavered; General Józef Chłopicki and his successor General Jan Skrzynecki favoured reaching a negotiated settlement with the tsar. </p>
<p>While Polish battlefield tactics were bold, their national strategy was defensive and conciliatory. The uprising lost its impetus. By September 1831, the Russians had closed on Warsaw. The defending army withdrew, finally crossing into Prussia in defeat. </p>
<h2>Waning support</h2>
<p>The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/zelenskyy-rejects-talks-with-putin-he-already-demonstrated-dialogue-format-in-port-of-odesa/ar-BB1jLaWb">showing no such inclination towards a negotiated peace</a> that would, as in 1831, effectively equate to a Russian victory.</p>
<p>Yet there is another aspect of Poland’s defeat that suggests troubling parallels. The widespread popular sentiment in support of the uprising across Europe did not result in any meaningful material aid for the Polish cause. The preoccupations of domestic politics and narrow national self-interest combined to deny the Poles the means of sustaining their struggle. </p>
<p>The British were distracted by the debates over the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/">reform bill</a>. In Vienna, the Austrian government was initially content to see Russia weakened but later, fearing the contagion of revolution, closed its border and handed over Polish refugees to the Russian authorities. </p>
<p>France’s government and new king, Louis-Philippe, presiding uneasily over a divided nation, settled on a policy of non-intervention. Prussia opted for pragmatism and opened its borders to Russian troops, allowed arms and provisions to cross its frontiers to alleviate Russian logistical weaknesses and arrested German volunteers travelling to join the Polish army. </p>
<p>Today, the wavering of international support for Ukraine echoes this situation. The Papacy <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pope-says-ukraine-should-have-courage-white-flag-negotiations-2024-03-09/">calls for capitulation</a> thinly veiled as negotiation, while in the US House of Representatives, Republicans <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20240214-us-house-speaker-johnson-blocks-vote-ukraine-israel-taiwan-aid-passed-senate-donald-trump-republicans">block further aid to Ukraine</a>. European nations are also struggling to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-to-ukraine-half-is-better-than-nothing-when-it-comes-to-ammunition/">deliver the munitions promised to Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Ukraine cannot prevail without international support. Will its allies provide it – or will they abandon them, as they did the Poles in 1831?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gervase Phillips does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Waning support from Poland’s allies meant the war descended to an attritional struggle, giving Russia the advantage it needed to win.Gervase Phillips, Principal Lecturer in History, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2256262024-03-13T17:00:44Z2024-03-13T17:00:44ZRussian elections: despite fixing the opposition, Vladimir Putin wants lots of people to vote for him<p>Russians head to the polls this week in a presidential election that will almost certainly result in Vladimir Putin decisively winning yet another six-year term. When he does, it will make him the longest-serving leader since Joseph Stalin. Advance polling indicates he will earn 75% of the vote and face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-is-off-ballot-russias-presidential-election-2024-03-11/">little or no meaningful opposition</a>. </p>
<p>His three main opponents are each polling at 5% or less, while any candidate thought likely to attract significant support – or who would use the campaign to robustly oppose the war in Ukraine – has been banned, imprisoned or killed.</p>
<p>Despite the clear path to victory for Putin, the Kremlin reportedly spent more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240227-kremlin-leaks-files-detail-putin-s-%E2%82%AC1-billion-propaganda-effort-ahead-of-presidential-vote">€1 billion (£850 million) on propaganda</a> in the lead up to the elections. Much of this budget was allocated to infotainment to promote nationalism, unity and traditional values. </p>
<p>But why would a regime in the midst of a war, that has <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/02/16/ukraine-war-has-cost-russia-up-to-211-billion-pentagon-says/">cost Russia more than US$200 billion</a> (£156 billion) feel the need to put so much effort into a sham election?</p>
<p>Putin may be trying to avoid the same pitfalls of other dictatorships such as Iran which saw <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/4/voter-turnout-hits-new-low-as-conservatives-dominate-irans-parliament">record low turnout</a> of 41% in its recent parliamentary elections, the lowest since its 1979 revolution, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the Islamic regime. </p>
<p>The same could be said for Venezuela, which registered a turnout of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/06/venezuela-goes-to-the-polls-nicolas-maduro-juan-guaido">31% for its 2020 parliamentary elections</a>. Putin is certainly trying to avoid any perceptions of illegitimacy, or a large protest vote in the wake of the death of his biggest opponent, Alexei Navalny. </p>
<p>Yet why bother to hold elections at all? Research <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/14/youd-think-dictators-would-avoid-elections-heres-why-they-dont/">has shown</a> that while elections can pose some risk to dictatorships in the short term, they can also help prolong autocracies. Despite all the questions over their validity, they are often presented in such as way as to lend the winner a degree of legitimacy – both at home and internationally – and it also helps the regime gather intelligence on its popularity. </p>
<p>But Putin seems to be going beyond the usual autocratic project of trying to project the popularity of his regime. Over the 24 years of his rule, elections have become an opportunity for Russians to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime. They are a spectacle, similar to a military parade, and indicative of Putin’s new totalitarian hold on Russia.</p>
<p>Though authoritarianism is on the rise, only a very few regimes are considered totalitarian today – among those that are, <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/totalitarian-countries">North Korea</a> stands out – with its one-party state run by the Kim family dynasty. Maintaining totalitarian rule requires a great deal of effort by the state to mobilise the public to be fervent supporters of the regime. Most totalitarian regimes also consume large amounts of resources to constantly spy on their people. </p>
<p>Authoritarian regimes may use propaganda and some degree of surveillance and repression but, for the most part, autocracies are willing to accept an apathetic and complacent public that is unwilling to rock the boat.</p>
<h2>How Putin deals with dissenting ‘scum’</h2>
<p>But things have changed in Russia, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Within a month of launching the invasion, Putin was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-warns-russia-against-pro-western-traitors-scum-2022-03-16/">issuing warnings against</a> those who didn’t support his war aims. </p>
<p>“Any people, and especially the Russian people, will always be able to distinguish the true patriots from the scum and the traitors, and just to spit them out like a midge that accidentally flew into their mouths,” Putin said.</p>
<p>As the war moves into a third year, Putin knows he may need to call on more Russians to fight. As a result, propaganda has been intensified throughout Russian society to reinforce parallels with the “great patriotic war” (the second world war) which, for Russia, was an existential crisis, and which every school pupil discovers as their country’s finest hour. </p>
<p>Patriotic education is also designed to <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-17/putins-neo-totalitarian-project-current-political-situation">instil contempt for Ukrainian statehood</a> and students and teachers have been encouraged <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/putin-russia-schools-ukraine/">to denounce</a> any opposition to the war. </p>
<p>Public employees who depend on the state, have been asked to take part in <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-17/putins-neo-totalitarian-project-current-political-situation#_ftn8">anti-Ukrainian rallies</a>. Citizens have also been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/27/russia-denunciations-arrests-informants-war/">encouraged to inform</a> on neighbours who oppose the war.</p>
<p>Russia used to tolerate a moderate degree of dissent, but this is no longer the case. And the punishments have also changed. Rather than face a fine for protesting or speaking critically of the regime, these “offenders” now attract prison time. </p>
<p>After Russian human rights activist Oleg Orlov claimed that Russia had become totalitarian in February, he was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68413372">sentenced to two and a half years in prison</a>. Prison sentences have not just become more common, they are longer, too. Activist and journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/17/1168667764/vladimir-kara-murza-prison-sentence">sentenced to 25 years in prison</a> for denouncing the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>Police raids have also <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/russia/">become more common</a>. In the past, it was only notable critics of the regime who could face arrest. Today, any citizen who expresses dissent can face retribution. </p>
<p>Weeks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Duma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">passed legislation</a> to make it a crime to refer to the war in Ukraine as anything other than a “special operation” – with a 15-year prison sentence levied at those convicted. </p>
<p>Undoubtedly, since the invasion, Russia has demanded active support from its citizens, not just acquiescence. With the upcoming elections taking place, abstaining and being uninterested in politics is no longer tolerated. Even the occupied parts of Ukraine are being <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68535301">strongly encouraged (by armed men) to vote</a>. Putin wants to win in a landslide, and these elections are designed to be a coordinated and absurd display of his “popularity”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Like a lot of authoritarian leaders, Putin is aware that a low turnout will make him look weak in the eyes of the world.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2254912024-03-12T12:36:06Z2024-03-12T12:36:06ZUkraine war: Pope Francis should learn from his WWII predecessor’s mistakes in appeasing fascism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581248/original/file-20240312-30-1hong4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C4%2C1497%2C835&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Appeasement: Adolph Hitler meeting Cesare Orsenigo, the papal nuncio to Germany, in 1935</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">US Holocaust Museum/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pope Francis has provoked fury by suggesting in a television interview that Ukraine should find “the courage to raise the white flag”. Speaking to the Italian-language Swiss public broadcaster RSI, he added: “When you see that you are defeated … you need to have the courage to negotiate.”</p>
<p>This injudicious comment reminded me instantly of the man once described as <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2000-03-01/hitlers-pope-secret-history-pius-xii">Hitler’s Pope</a>. As Pope Pius XII, Eugenio Pacelli led the Catholic Church throughout the second world war. However, while Hitler’s determination to eliminate the Jewish people was brought to his attention, he did not publicly condemn it. Freedom of practice for German Catholics mattered more.</p>
<p>As historian Richard J. Evans reminded us in his essay <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v45/n20/richard-j.-evans/why-did-he-not-speak-out">Why did he not speak out?</a>, when German forces occupied Rome in September 1943, Heinrich Himmler ordered that: “All Jews without regard to nationality, age, sex or condition, must be transferred to Germany and liquidated there.” The roundup took place within sight of the Vatican and Pius XII could not ignore it entirely. He summoned the German ambassador, Ernst von Weizsäcker, to a private meeting and made it plain that he was shocked. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Pope says Ukraine should ‘raise white flag’ and end war with Russia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To placate His Holiness, the SS released a few Jews who had converted to Catholicism and some who had married Catholics. Of the 1,259 Italian Jews incarcerated in a military college pending deportation, 1,007 were sent to Auschwitz. Pope Pius did not protest. Gratified by his diplomatic silence, Weizsäcker <a href="https://www.davidkertzer.com/books/pope-war">told his masters in Berlin</a> that the leader of Catholicism had “refrained from making any ostentatious remarks on the deportation of the Jews from Rome”. </p>
<p>Though he admired the authoritarian regimes of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal, Pius XII was not pro Nazi. However, he had served as a Papal Nuncio in Germany between 1917 and 1929 and took an interest in the country. He considered National Socialism to be anti Christian and, in 1935, <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/pope-pius-xii-and-the-holocaust">described the Nazis</a> as “miserable plagiarists who dress up old errors with new tinsel”. </p>
<h2>‘Catholics will be loyal’</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, at his first meeting with Hitler in May 1939, Pope Pius demonstrated that his real ambition was to protect the Catholic church in Germany. He told the German chancellor: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am certain that if peace between Church and state is restored, everyone will be pleased. The German people are united in their love for the Fatherland. Once we have peace, the Catholics will be loyal. More than anyone else.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Protecting Catholicism would remain Pius XII’s priority when Germany went to war. Historian David Kertzer <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/05/31/hitlers-pope-struck-dirty-deal-nazi-prince-stay-silent-persecution/">explains that</a> : “Hitler never intended to restore the prerogatives of the Church in Germany, but he knew how to dangle various enticements.” Nazi diplomats did not have to work too hard to <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/pope-pius-xii-and-the-holocaust">keep the Pope silent</a> on topics that might embarrass Hitler.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Pope Pius XII appears on the balcony at St Peters after his election on March 2 1939." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581249/original/file-20240312-16-3rbt6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pope Pius XII appears on the balcony at St Peters after his election on March 2 1939.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Correio da Manhã Fund, Arquivo Nacional</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 1941, Harold Tittman, an American diplomat at the Vatican, urged the Pope to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/18/archives/documents-explain-piussview-of-nazis.html">condemn Nazi atrocities</a>. Pius XII remained silent. He feared that criticism of Hitler’s regime would provoke harm to German Catholics. In August 1942 Pius XII received a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/vatican-archive-letter-shows-ukrainian-priest-tried-to-save-jews-in-holocaust/">letter from Andrej Septyckj</a>, a Ukrainian Cleric, bearing news of the massacre of 200,000 Jews in Ukraine. He invited Septyckj to “bear adversity with serene patience”. </p>
<p>Pius XII flirted with public criticism of Nazi inhumanity in his 1942 <a href="http://catholictradition.org/Encyclicals/1942.htm">Christmas Eve broadcast</a>. In this, he expressed concern for “thousands of persons who, without fault on their part, sometimes only because of their nationality or race, have been consigned to death or to a slow decline”. He did not identify the victims as Jews. His support for Jewish people was limited to discreet diplomacy. </p>
<h2>Evil then and now</h2>
<p>Documents in the Vatican archives show that Pius XII received information about the systematic murder of Jews in Poland in September 1942. As I discovered while researching my book, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/reporting-the-second-world-war-9781350149489/">Reporting the Second World War - The Press and the People 1939-1945</a>, he could have learned as much by reading British newspapers. In autumn 1942, titles including The Times and Daily Mail reported the World Jewish Congress’s belief that a million Jews had already died. The Manchester Guardian reported the existence of “a vast system of organised traffic in human beings” in which “the fit may survive for as long as they are useful: the aged and unfit may perish at will”. </p>
<p>Pius XII’s enthusiasm for fascist regimes was motivated by fear of communism. He recognised that national socialism was substantially more brutal. Indeed, he knew that it was murderously antisemitic on an colossal scale. When he could do so without compromising Catholic interests, he sometimes helped Jews. But Pius XII always prioritised defence of Church assets and prerogatives. </p>
<p>Today, his successor might contemplate the damage inflicted on his wartime predecessor’s reputation by his meek collusion with the wrong side. Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba <a href="https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1766819132878553269">responded caustically</a> to Pope Francis’s crass comments with: “Our flag is a yellow and blue one. This is the flag by which we live, die, and prevail. We shall never raise any other flags”.</p>
<p>In risking the impression that he considers Russia the likely winner of war in Ukraine, the pope might take care not to promote peace at the expense of justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225491/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Luckhurst has received funding from News UK and Ireland Ltd. He is a member of the Free Speech Union and the Society of Editors</span></em></p>Between 1939 and 1945, Pope Pius XII put the interests of the Catholic Church in Germany before the fate of European Jews.Tim Luckhurst, Principal of South College, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250132024-03-12T12:31:57Z2024-03-12T12:31:57Z3 things to watch for in Russia’s presidential election – other than Putin’s win, that is<p>Russians will <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-presidential-election-who-what-when-2024-03-11/">vote in a presidential election</a> from March 15-17, 2024, and are all but <a href="https://apnews.com/rusia-putin-election-2024">guaranteed to hand Vladimir Putin a comfortable victory</a>, paving the way for him to remain in power until at least 2030. </p>
<p>While the result may be a foregone conclusion, the election offers an important glimpse into the Kremlin’s domestic challenges as it continues a war against Ukraine that <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-third-year-3-issues-could-decide-its-outcome-supplies-information-and-politics-220581">recently entered its third year</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://politics.wfu.edu/faculty-and-staff/adam-lenton/">expert on Russian politics</a>, I have identified three key developments worth paying attention to during and after the upcoming election. Yes, we already know Putin will win. But nonetheless, this election is the largest public test of the Russian state’s ability to shape its desired result at home since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.</p>
<h2>1. Don’t mention the war (too much)</h2>
<p>The 2024 election is taking place during the largest interstate conflict to take place this century.</p>
<p>With Russian domestic media and politics all but gutted of dissenting voices, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/03/opinions/why-putin-wants-a-forever-war-galeotti/index.html">war has become</a> the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-war-ukraine-economy-policy-7428ef7b">organizing principle of post-2022 Russian politics</a>, shaping all major policies and decisions.</p>
<p>Yet, while the context of the war looms large, its role is largely implicit rather than occupying center stage. And for good reason: Banging the drums of war is not particularly popular.</p>
<p>In fact, the Kremlin’s strategy throughout the conflict has relied upon the general public’s acquiescence and disengagement from the war effort in exchange for <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alternate-reality-how-russian-society-learned-to-stop-worrying-about-war-pub-91118">a degree of normalcy</a> at home. </p>
<p>Officially, the war remains euphemistically termed a “special military operation,” yet it is also frequently framed by Moscow <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/3874880-putin-says-ukraine-war-poses-existential-threat-to-russian-people/">as an existential struggle</a> for Russia and a <a href="https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/zapad-vedet-rukami-ukraintsev-voynu-s-rossiey-i-nazyvaet-eto-prekrasnoy-investitsiey/">proxy war</a> between Russia and the West.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman walks past a billboard with Russian words on and another will a soldier's head in a helmet depicted." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581084/original/file-20240311-30-jap2gg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A billboard promotes the upcoming Russian presidential election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaElection/44d797eb397e446684e1d02a8d485433/photo?Query=Putin&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=now-30d&totalCount=604&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Russian public <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2023/10/31/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-otsenki-oktyabrya2023-goda/">still doesn’t agree</a> on what its aims are. There <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/wartime-putinism">are relatively few</a> ardent supporters of the war, outweighed by a <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/in-russia-clear-signs-of-war-fatigue/">more general sense of fatigue</a> among the public. This is supported by survey data that shows that <a href="https://www.levada.ru/2024/03/05/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-massovye-otsenki-fevralya-2024-goda/">consistent majorities</a> in Russia would prefer to start peace talks – though this of course does not tell us what type of peace they prefer.</p>
<p>Yet the war is putting pressure on the government’s ability to juggle ensuring a disengaged population and bolstering support for a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753">grinding war that demands unprecedented</a> resources.</p>
<p>Putin’s public communication in the buildup to the election reflects this tension. He announced his intention to run during an awkward, poorly staged interaction with an officer at a military award ceremony in December 2023. That choice <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91234">surprised some insiders</a>, who expected Putin to weave his announcement into a high-profile, choreographed event focusing on domestic achievements and not the ongoing war. </p>
<p>More recently, his state of the nation address on Feb. 29 <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91872">began and ended by lauding</a> the achievements of the war, yet the bulk of the address – the <a href="https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/65e069269a794724567533c5">longest of the 19</a> he has delivered since he first became president in 1999 – was devoted to a laundry list of achievements, programs and goals largely disconnected from the war itself.</p>
<h2>2. Pressure to deliver results for Putin</h2>
<p>While <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-autocrats-rig-elections-to-stay-in-power-and-get-away-with-it-95337">autocratic regimes like Russia’s have proved adept</a> at managing the electoral process to squeeze out rivals and mitigate against upsets, elections are still high-stakes events.</p>
<p>For officials, the election is a litmus test for their ability to muster administrative resources and deliver Putin an electoral windfall. Most <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">reports suggest the Kremlin is hoping to engineer</a> that the turnout is at least 70%, with around 80% of the vote for Putin – which would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/19/vladimir-putin-secures-record-win-in-russian-presidential-election">surpass his 76.7% share</a> from 2018.</p>
<p>For observers of Russian politics, what will be of interest is not the result itself, but how the result is produced during wartime conditions.</p>
<p>Take, for example, securing high turnout. One prominent tactic used by local officials in Russia is pressuring state employees and workers at state-owned corporations to turn up at the polls en masse.</p>
<p>But with the economy on a war footing, and with an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-short-around-48-million-workers-2023-crunch-persist-izvestia-2023-12-24/">acute labor shortage</a>, it is unclear whether this tried and tested approach will work. Moreover, political disengagement and the certainty of a Putin victory means that interest in voting is at an <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/people-don-t-want-to-vote">all-time low</a>. For local officials, the pressure is on.</p>
<p>At the head of efforts to engineer the election is Sergey Kiriyenko, Putin’s <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy">technocratic domestic policy czar dubbed</a> “viceroy of the Donbas” due to his role administering the occupied territories of Ukraine. Recent <a href="https://vsquare.org/kremlin-leaks-putin-elections-russia-propaganda-ukraine/">leaked documents</a> obtained by the Estonian website Delfi reveal how Kiriyenko’s team spent over US$1 billion in “pre-rigging” the election, sponsoring creative content such as films, TV series and video games replete with pro-government and anti-Western messaging.</p>
<p>Of course, it’s hard to say in advance whether such efforts will directly bear fruit. But the scale of the Kremlin’s investment in shaping the broader ideological environment indicates a degree of uneasiness with the public’s disengagement.</p>
<p>There are also new technical regulations that will boost Putin’s vote. The election will be held across three days instead of one. Together with this, the <a href="https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/03/07/the-digital-steal-en">rollout of electronic voting</a>, first used in Moscow elections in 2019, will make it easier to maximize turnout. These changes also make it difficult for observers to monitor the degree of fraud.</p>
<p>Beyond these subtler forms of manipulation, however, there are also overtly coercive ways to ensure vote targets are met. This is particularly the case for the millions of Ukrainians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/deportation-re-population-russia-occupied-ukraine-zaporizhzhia">currently under Russian occupation</a>, who are subject to intense pressure from the occupying authorities to acquire Russian citizenship and to vote.</p>
<h2>3. Silencing political opposition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">death of longtime Putin critic Alexei Navalny</a> in February 2024 was a huge blow to the opposition but is representative of the state of political repression in Russia.</p>
<p>Since 2018, some <a href="https://www.proekt.media/en/guide-en/repressions-in-russia-study/">116,000 Russians have faced</a> political repression. Under such circumstances, the presidential election will be the least pluralistic in post-Soviet Russia, with only four candidates on the ballot box and no openly anti-war figures featured among them.</p>
<p>In previous elections, there has usually been a candidate from the so-called “liberal opposition.” For a while it <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/01/26/the-situation-took-a-wrong-turn">looked as though this trend might</a> continue in the form of independent Boris Nadezhdin, whose explicit anti-war program saw him <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/world/europe/russia-putin-election-boris-nadezhdin.html">gain unexpected traction</a> compared to other would-be candidates.</p>
<p>But by barring Nadezhdin from running, the Kremlin likely wished to avoid a repeat of 2018, when the Communist Party’s Pavel Grudinin <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/01/26/grudinin-russia-communist-party-gets-capitalist-makeover-lenin-sovkhoz-a60185">unexpectedly struck a chord</a> with voters for his down-to-earth populism. This forced state media to go into overdrive, turning the election into a mudslinging contest. </p>
<p>Yet the scale of public mourning for Navalny and the enthusiasm for Nadezhdin reveal that despite draconian wartime censorship and repression, there remains a <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/03/04/said-without-enthusiasm">sizable bloc of Russians eager</a> for authentic political alternatives.</p>
<p>For now, the closest candidate to an alternative appears to be <a href="https://www.russian-election-monitor.org/who-is-vladislav-davankov-a-new-hope-for-opposition-in-the-presidential-election.html">Vladislav Davankov</a> from the liberal-leaning party “New People,” who will likely draw votes from some of this anti-war constituency.</p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://davankov2024.ru/program">first point on his manifesto</a> calls for “peace and negotiations,” though “on our own terms.” Fresh <a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6552544">polling data</a> from state-owned VTsIOM suggests that he might well take second place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lenton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Putin is all but guaranteed to win, war fatigue, electoral engineering and extreme risk-aversion suggest that the Kremlin is anxious to get these elections over and done with.Adam Lenton, Assistant Professor of Politics & International Affairs, Wake Forest UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245082024-03-11T19:13:32Z2024-03-11T19:13:32ZAs the air-raid sirens sound, I am studying Ukrainian culture with new fervour. I’m far from alone<p>I’m an Australian-Ukrainian researcher and I moved back to Kyiv from Sydney in 2022 after the full-scale Russian invasion. My life in a war zone has given me the chance to witness firsthand Russia’s brutality and Ukraine’s limitless bravery. </p>
<p>In late 2022, Russians began targeting critical infrastructure in major cities. Many residents were left without access to electricity, heat and water. My cousins spent most of their school days in shelters. </p>
<p>I spent many winter nights writing my dissertation by candlelight, while searching for Wi-Fi and mobile hotspots and hot meals for my grandma and mother. The sounds of air-raid sirens and missile explosions were as ubiquitous as the sounds of birds chirping in Australia.</p>
<p>In the past year, Russian attacks on large cities have intensified in frequency and volume. Last month, for example, my family woke to a massive explosion. The impact of the missile was so close that my bedroom walls were shaking.</p>
<p>I ran outside to witness the horrendous scene. An apartment building just next to ours was engulfed by flames. Shocked residents were covered in soot, clenching their cats and dogs while watching their homes burn. </p>
<p>Four people died in the strike. A few days later, Anastasiya Nosova, the godmother of a friend who lived in the building, died in intensive care. On March 6, Anastasiya’s father Yurii also died, becoming the sixth victim of the attack.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/an-inside-look-at-the-dangerous-painstaking-work-of-collecting-evidence-of-suspected-war-crimes-in-ukraine-214725">An inside look at the dangerous, painstaking work of collecting evidence of suspected war crimes in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Challenging Putin’s notions of Ukrainian identity</h2>
<p>Ukrainians are understandably fatigued by Russia’s war. According to a poll in September 2023, just 60% of respondents <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">believed</a> the country should continue fighting until it won – a 10% decrease from a year earlier – while 30% favoured negotiations with Russia. </p>
<p>Despite this exhaustion, Ukrainians remain deeply committed to safeguarding and fortifying their national identity in the face of Russian attempts to erase it. </p>
<p>I research the ways in which Ukraine’s various forms of identity, such as religion, collective memory, language and education, have changed during times of unrest. The study and conservation of Ukrainian identity matters now more than ever because it directly challenges Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chauvinistic and derogatory ideology of <em>Russkiy mir</em> (“Russian world”), which has fuelled his justification for the invasion. </p>
<p>In 2021, Putin published an essay on the “<a href="https://huri.harvard.edu/news/putin-historical-unity">historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians</a>”, foreshadowing his imperial ambitions for Ukraine. For example, he conveniently distorts language to challenge Ukrainian sovereignty by referring to it as a “periphery” state, from the Old Russian word <em>okraina</em>. </p>
<p>In reality, the name “Ukraine” means “country” or “piece of land” in Ukrainian, which clearly connotes sovereignty. </p>
<h2>Guardians of Ukrainian language</h2>
<p>In its attempts to erase Ukrainian identity, Russia is specifically targeting the use of the Ukrainian language in the regions it now illegally occupies. </p>
<p>Following the invasion, Russia’s Ministry of Enlightenment began developing and introducing “classic Ukrainian” textbooks in these regions. However, Russia has fabricated a language that is not Ukrainian in any shape or form. It is presented and taught as a Ukrainian dialect of the Russian language. </p>
<p>What this means is that Russia has actively rewritten the Ukrainian language in a way that mimics the Russian language, erasing the understanding of Ukrainian as a language of its own. As such, Russia is blatantly detaching Ukrainian children from their roots.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-russias-war-against-ukraine-one-of-the-battlegrounds-is-language-itself-201170">In Russia's war against Ukraine, one of the battlegrounds is language itself</a>
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<p>This is not a new effort. There is a long history of oppressive Russification policies, dating back to the Russian empire (1793-1917), that aimed to destroy Ukrainian nationalism. In 1876, for example, Tsar Alexander II banned book publications in the Ukrainian language. </p>
<p>When Ukraine became a part of the Soviet Union in 1922, the new government mandated the Russian language be used in administrative, educational and social spaces. While Ukrainian language was still taught in schools, Russian was the dominant language of instruction. </p>
<p>Since the invasion in 2022, I have observed everyday Ukrainians becoming new custodians of the Ukrainian language. My neighbours, friends and family who have spoken Russian their whole lives have made efforts to practise and relearn Ukrainian with great vigour. </p>
<p>Across the unoccupied regions of the country, around <a href="https://dif.org.ua/article/natsionalna-kultura-ta-mova-v-ukraini-zmini-v-gromadskiy-dumtsi-pislya-roku-viyni?fbclid=IwAR0ySTl6R3lONVANQ_ogCYNthYxjGCBwq7M9PAT_etg3ZMAOP44V2uZLH38#_Toc129302260">71% of Ukrainians</a> now report using Ukrainian in their daily lives, up from 64% in 2021. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Ukrainians have changed the way they value the Ukrainian language. Those who considered Ukrainian as their native language <a href="https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/language_issue_in_ukraine_march_19th_2022.html">grew from 57% in 2012 to 76% in 2022</a>. And 83% believe Ukrainian should be the only official language. </p>
<p>These efforts to speak the language in social and private spaces should not be overlooked because this is a conscious practice of reasserting Ukrainian identity to actively reverse some effects of Russian colonialism. </p>
<h2>A cultural rebirth</h2>
<p>Ukrainian perceptions of cultural self-worth have also changed, signalling a departure from a culture once dominated by Russian history, philosophy, literature and the arts. </p>
<p>For instance, Ukrainians have made changes in their home libraries. Since 2022, I have witnessed many Kyiv bookstore initiatives for customers to recycle Soviet-era and Russian literature. Last year, I recycled an entire dusty shelf of family-owned, Soviet-era literature that propagated Russian imperial rhetoric and misconceptions of history and Ukraine.</p>
<p>In 2023, two-thirds of Ukrainians <a href="https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/u-blyzko-polovyny-ukrayinciv-zris-interes-do-istoriyi-pislya-povnomasshtabnogo-vtorgnennya-socopytuvannya">reported being more interested in Ukrainian history</a> than before the war, <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/17NdN_pW0W1ulPVayEuzi48ASQgyyeNVD/view?pli=1">opting for books in Ukrainian instead of Russian</a>.</p>
<p>A revival of Ukrainian culture has also taken place in the arts. For instance, the patriotic 1875 song <a href="https://theworld.org/stories/2022-12-01/chervona-kalyna-ukrainian-song-has-become-symbol-freedom-and-resilience">Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow</a> has made a viral comeback thanks to a new variation by Ukrainian musician Andriy Khlyvnyuk. It has inspired Ukrainians to sing a song that was once banned under Soviet rule. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1F0JYS3S14M?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A Latvian film of people around the world singing Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And last year, a children’s animated film, <a href="https://www.primevideo.com/detail/Mavka-The-Forest-Song/0O4UTE7Z34JGANUELN550NHUOJ">Mavka: The Forest Song</a>, was released. It tells the story of Ukrainian forest mythology based on a 1918 play written by the poet <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/lesya-ukrainka-ukraines-beloved-writer-and-activist/">Lesya Ukrainka</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/GXaMT5pX12w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The official trailer for Mavka: The Forest Song.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Memorialising Ukrainian heroism</h2>
<p>Every morning at 9am sharp, I hear the Ukrainian national anthem echo through my neighbourhood. All Ukrainians share a minute of silence to remember and reflect on the loss of Ukrainian life in the war. </p>
<p>Military farewell and burial ceremonies also take place every single day in cities across Ukraine. Last month, my neighbours gathered to farewell Oleksiy Zahrebel’nyy, a Ukrainian soldier who died in battle. </p>
<p>There are many other ways in which the war and acts of bravery are being memorialised to reaffirm Ukrainian historical narratives and identity. For instance, Ukrainians have appealed to their local authorities to change the names of streets to commemorate fallen soldiers. Last year, my neighbourhood changed a street from “Marshal Yakubovsky” (marshal of the Soviet Union) to “Heroes of Mariupol”, commemorating the soldiers who died in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city">one of the bloodiest battles in the war</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly, the artist Volodymyr Manzhos (<a href="https://www.instagram.com/waone_interesnikazki/?hl=en">Waone Interesni Kazki</a>) has painted murals across Ukraine and Europe depicting acts of Ukrainian bravery and Russian aggression. Ukrainians have also become enthusiastic collectors of postage stamps illustrating Ukrainian heroism and events from the war. </p>
<p>Such examples demonstrate how Ukrainians are creating new national narratives that challenge the Soviet history that has long dominated society. This, in turn, is writing a new history for the country for future generations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastasiya Byesyedina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukrainians are safeguarding their language and cultural identity in the face of Russian attempts to erase it.Anastasiya Byesyedina, PhD Candidate, Department of Government and International Relations, Sessional Teacher and Student Writing Fellow, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165722024-03-11T12:39:48Z2024-03-11T12:39:48ZIn Kyrgyzstan, creeping authoritarianism rubs up against proud tradition of people power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580831/original/file-20240310-16-c1fdtm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C31%2C6995%2C4962&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan loom over the people of Bishkek.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kyrgyz-women-walk-past-to-an-electronic-panel-with-photo-of-news-photo/1719479860?adppopup=true">Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of Kyrgyzstan have a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/10/kyrgyzstan-its-easier-start-revolution-finish-it">well-earned reputation</a> for “street democracy.” </p>
<p>Since emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, citizens in the Central Asian republic have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">taken it upon themselves to oust presidents</a> who attempt to overstay their welcome or engage in corruption. </p>
<p>Indeed, between 2005 and 2020, the country experienced five presidential transitions – <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">three as a result of popular protests</a> and two through the peaceful democratic transfer of power.</p>
<p>But a new trend appears to be in the air of Bishkek, the country’s capital. In contrast to how he is viewed in some other former Soviet states, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/february_2019_kyrgyzstan_poll.pdf">is popular</a> <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-full-of-putin-fans-new-poll-says">among Kyrgyz</a>, and his strongman style appears to be <a href="https://rsf.org/en/kyrgyzstan-s-japarov-seeks-putin-style-media-legislation">influencing the country’s rulers</a>. In recent weeks, <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">legislation has been advanced</a> to extend their authority and crack down on dissent.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/3172586">scholar of democracy, civic activism and post-Soviet geopolitics</a>, I’ve long known about Kyrgyzstan’s distinctive trajectory – and wondered how this track record of people power squares with recent moves toward authoritarianism. I learned more during a visit to the country in the fall.</p>
<h2>Protest spaces</h2>
<p>The epicenter of Kyrgyz street politics is Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square and the adjacent White House, which historically served as the official presidential office building.</p>
<p>In 2005, Kyrgyz citizens gathered there to protest against their first post-Soviet president, Askar Akayev, when he tried to circumvent term limits and extend his power. The “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/world/asia/president-flees-from-protests-in-kyrgyzstan.html">Tulip” revolution</a> drove Akayev into exile in Moscow. </p>
<p>Five years later at the same location, people gathered for the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-opposition-riots/26942558.html">People’s April Revolution</a> against corruption-charged President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A monument shows two people pushing a structure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to ‘Those Who Died For Freedom’ in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bakiyev authorized <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/17/court-chaos-kyrgyzstan-trial">deadly force against protesters</a> before being toppled. About 90 protesters who were killed are commemorated to this day with a striking monument on Ala-Too Square. </p>
<p>The square became an epicenter of discontent again in 2020, when anti-government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-election-protests.html">protests overturned what many citizens saw as a stolen election</a> and forced President Sooronbai Jeenbekov from power. </p>
<h2>A new brand of politics</h2>
<p>Kyrgyzstan’s current president, Sadyr Japarov, knows this history well: He lived it. </p>
<p>After serving in Bakiyev’s administration, he helped lead <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/31/what-was-true-cause-of-kyrgyz-demonstrations-pub-49853">mass demonstrations in 2012</a> against newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev.</p>
<p>After participating in an <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-nationalist-mps-and-rioters-attempt-to-storm-parliament">armed attempt to storm Parliament</a>, Japarov fled the country. Upon his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/1/12/sadyr-japarov-from-a-prison-cell-to-the-presidency#:%7E:text=In%202017%2C%20Japarov%20returned%20to,victim%20of%20the%20corrupt%20elites.&text=While%20in%20prison%2C%20he%20wrote,and%20vision%20for%20the%20country.">return to Kyrgyzstan in 2017</a> he was jailed, but he established a new political party from prison. </p>
<p>In January 2021, Japarov won the presidential election with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kyrgyz-nationalist-wins-landslide-victory-presidential-poll-2021-01-10/">almost 80% of the vote</a>, having run on a populist platform that included pledges to crack down on corrupt elites and foreign corporations. </p>
<p>But Japarov also stressed the importance of Kyrgyzstan’s special relationship with Russia. And increasingly his style of leadership has taken a leaf out of Putin’s playbook. The presidential vote in 2021 was <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-referendum-on-the-constitution-of-the-kyrgyz-republic/">accompanied by a referendum</a> that increased the power of the office and reduced the importance of Parliament.</p>
<p>Japarov is making that shift concrete: He is constructing <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-the-builder">a new presidential building</a> about 5 miles south of the city center, reducing the potential for street politics to factor so largely in the country’s future.</p>
<p>During my October visit, other signs were apparent of Japarov’s determination to reshape Kyrgyz politics. On Oct. 4, 2023, security forces <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-infamous-underworld-figure-killed-in-security-services-operation">shot and killed leading crime boss Kolya Kolbaev</a> in a Bishkek pub he owned. State media represented this as a crackdown on organized crime, consistent with Japarov’s election promises. But to many Bishkek citizens, it was less of a crackdown and more a takeover of Kolbaev’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/voices-of-doubt-unraveling-the-ambiguities-surrounding-kolbaevs-killing/">lucrative criminal operations by the Kyrgyz state</a>.</p>
<p>A week later, there was another potential display of Kyrgyzstan’s drift away from people power. Bishkek’s kindergartens, schools and colleges were abruptly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/13/anti-drone-protection-internet-disruptions-in-bishkek-as-putin-seeks-to-restore-influence-among-allies-a82755">ordered to close or operate only</a> online on Oct. 12 and 13.</p>
<p>The measure coincided with Bishkek’s hosting the annual meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which Putin, making his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-visits-kyrgyzstan-first-foreign-trip-since-icc-arrest-warrant-2023-10-12/">first international trip</a> since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest, was due to attend.</p>
<p>Officially, the closures were simply to ease congestion. But I heard locals speculate that authorities acted to forestall any youth-led protests against the country’s prominent and potentially divisive guest. The authorities instituted a similar measure on Oct. 25 and 26 <a href="https://24.kg/english/278139_Educational_institutions_switch_to_online_classes_for_2_days_due_to_summits/">during a visit by China’s Premier Li Qiang</a>.</p>
<p>Also in October, Parliament discussed proposed laws that closely resemble legislation introduced by Putin in Russia. The bills would <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">curtail freedom of expression and empower the government to prosecute or shut down</a> any organization it identifies as being a “foreign representative.” </p>
<p>Despite protest from Kyrgyz and international media freedom groups, the <a href="https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/en/251211-un-special-rapporteur-expresses-concerns-draft-mass-media-law-kyrgyz-republic">United Nations</a> and the U.S. – which expressed its concerns in a letter, prompting Japarov to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-japarov-accuses-us-interfering-internal-affairs-blinken/32815575.html">accuse Washington of meddling</a> – the laws keep moving forward. In a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/in-farcical-vote-kyrgyz-foreign-representative-law-moves-ahead-again/">controversial Parliament vote in late February</a> 2024, 62 votes to advance the law were passed by the 50 members present, some of whom cast votes for their absent colleagues.</p>
<h2>The resilience of memory</h2>
<p>In intimidating Parliament, eliminating powerful rivals and cracking down on free media, Japarov is not only adopting many of Putin’s methods, he is taking a calculated bet against the country’s recent history of democratic activism. </p>
<p>On the surface, the odds are in the government’s favor. Compared with other post-Soviet states, Putin still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">commands high approval ratings in Kyrgyzstan</a>. After a decade and a half of political turbulence – as well as widespread corruption and organized crime – Japarov’s “strongman” persona is appealing for many.</p>
<p>But for many other Kyrgyz citizens, cozying up to Russia raises concerns. </p>
<p>After all, Georgia and Ukraine were also founder members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both have since been attacked by Putin’s Russia.</p>
<p>The 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">brutal invasion of Ukraine</a> has sparked direct parallels with Russian and Soviet attempts to eliminate Kyrgyz culture over two centuries.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A structure shows three pillars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to the 1916 Urkun rebellion at the Ata-Beyit memorial complex in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bishkek – then known as Pishpek – came under Russian rule in the 1850s as the czar conquered a patchwork of Central Asian city-states and nomadic tribes under the guise of a “civilizing mission.”</p>
<p>The Kyrgyz people continued to defend their distinctive nomadic way of life. But overt resistance against Russian rule was met with brutal force. In 1916, when imperial Russia began forcibly conscripting Kyrgyz men to fight in World War I, <a href="https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/the-central-asian-revolt-of-1916-%EF%BB%BFa-collapsing-empire-in-the-age-of-war-and-revolution/">Kyrgyz rebelled</a>. In the crackdown that followed, over <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-1916-russia-mass-killings-genocide/27926414.html">100,000 Kyrgyz were killed</a>. Many women and children died crossing the Tian Shan mountains to seek refuge in China from Russian repression. </p>
<p>Soviet rule ostensibly offered the promise of better relations with Moscow. And in 1926, the Kyrgyz gained autonomy; full republic status followed in 1936. </p>
<p>In common with much of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz citizens suffered from Stalin’s purges. In 1938, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/stalin-s-killing-of-kyrgyz-intellectuals-remains-vivid/2124089">138 Kyrgyz intellectuals were killed</a> and buried in a mass grave outside Bishkek, where Stalin’s victims are remembered, alongside other Kyrgyz patriots, at the <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/ata-beyit-memorial-complex-near-bishkek-safeguards-sorrowful-past-and-honors-repressed/">Ata-Beyit memorial</a> near Bishkek. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="TKTK" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A frieze at Ata-Beyit depicting Soviet police arresting Kyrgyz intellectuals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This commitment to preserving memory, combined with a deep distrust of authoritarian overreach, anchors Kyrgyz citizens. But it rubs up against where the country finds itself today: in a pivotal place amid shifting geopolitics.</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia are vying for influence in Central Asia, while China, Turkey and the Persian Gulf states are also making significant investments in the region.</p>
<p>As Kyrgyzstan’s leaders seek to maintain sovereignty, develop and diversify the economy and improve the country’s standing in the world, they face difficult choices. For now, they seem to be following Putin’s path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Brown is Director of the Melikian Center, which receives funding from the US Departments of Education, Defense and Education. He traveled to Bishkek as part of a research project that is supported by the U.S. Russia Foundation, a legacy organization of the U.S. Russia Investment Fund, founded by the U.S. Government.</span></em></p>Recent laws and pro-Putin sentiment by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov have sparked concern that the Central Asian country is backsliding on democracy.Keith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249132024-03-08T13:35:16Z2024-03-08T13:35:16ZState of the Union: Biden hits back at critics as he warns of threats to democracy at home and overseas<p>President Joe Biden delivered his third annual <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2024/">State of the Union</a> address to a joint session of Congress yesterday. Traditionally, the speech has outlined the state of the nation and announced the government’s policy agenda for the next 12 months. In a move away from tradition, Biden delivered a rousing partisan speech.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the message, delivered in an election year, and so recently after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/06/super-tuesday-key-takeaways">Super Tuesday</a>, when many key states hold presidential primaries, was a clear commencement of Biden’s campaign for re-election to the White House. It presented an ideal opportunity for Biden to promote his successes, address the concerns of American voters and to state his intentions for 2024.</p>
<p>Despite his latest job approval <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/">rating</a> standing at just 38.1%, Biden delivered an energetic speech to a packed House whose audience contained not just the members of Congress but also Biden’s cabinet, the Supreme Court justices and special guests.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2024/">opened</a> his speech stating that his purpose was “to both wake up this Congress, and alert the American people” at what he said was “an unprecedented moment” in the history of the United States.</p>
<p>Not since the civil war, he added, has “freedom and democracy been under assault here at home as they are today”. But he added that challenges to democracy and freedom were not just at home, but also overseas.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2024/">warned</a> Israel that “it had a fundamental responsibility to protect innocent victims in Gaza” and reiterated his call for six-week long ceasefire. He also formally announced that the US would be building a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/07/biden-us-port-gaza-aid-delivery">temporary pier</a> in Gaza to receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters. He did reassure Americans that “no US boots would be on the ground”.</p>
<p>This must surely have sat well with some of the dissenting voices within his own party. Democrats unhappy with his supportive policy toward Israel had expressed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/06/uncommitted-vote-israel-ceasefire-super-tuesday">protest vote</a> in the recent Super Tuesday primaries.</p>
<p>He also told Americans that if the US stepped away from supporting Ukraine, it would allow Russia to advance further into Europe. “But Ukraine can stop Putin if we stand with Ukraine and provide the weapons it needs to defend itself.”</p>
<p>The president also reassured Nato members that the alliance was stronger than ever and, referencing Sweden’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-68506223">recent joining</a> of the alliance, welcomed the Swedish prime minister in the audience.</p>
<p>Biden warned of the potential danger to American democratic institutions – a thinly veiled warning about the potential re-election of his likely opponent former president Donald Trump. Although he never mentioned Trump by name, there were numerous references to his predecessor.</p>
<p>Just as he did <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2023/">last year</a>, Biden offered his hand in partnership with his ideological rivals but railed against those who continued to challenge the legitimacy of his election as they “posed the gravest threat to our democracy since the Civil War” and that the insurrectionists of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-56004916">January 6</a> “placed a dagger at the throat of American democracy”.</p>
<p>“My predecessor and some of you here seek to bury the truth of January 6th.” In a further attack on Trump, Biden stated that Trump’s recent supportive comments on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was his predecessor “bowing down to a Russian leader. It’s outrageous. It’s dangerous. It’s unacceptable”.</p>
<p>Further criticism of Trump came in the shape of the former president’s intention to overturn the US Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/06/24/1102305878/supreme-court-abortion-roe-v-wade-decision-overturn">Roe v Wade</a> decision that had protected abortion rights for American women. Biden called on Congress to ensure that IVF treatment was guaranteed across the nation.</p>
<p>He warned Republicans that failing to do so could lead to a backlash at the next election. “Those bragging about overturning Roe v. Wade have no clue about the power of women in America. They found out though when reproductive freedom was on the ballot and won in 2022, 2023, and they will find out again, in 2024.”</p>
<p>The United States’ southern border, an area that has been the subject of much criticism from the Republican party, also featured significantly. He hailed November’s bipartisan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/07/us-senate-vote-bipartisan-border-bill">Senate bill</a> that would have allowed his administration to secure the border but criticised Donald Trump and Republicans for not supporting it.</p>
<h2>Biden counters criticism</h2>
<p>The Biden White House has been <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2023/11/joe-biden-2024-election-post-policy-era/676157/">criticised</a> for not publicising its successes loudly enough in the past. This State of the Union address offered an opportunity for the president to counter some of that criticism.</p>
<p>And he took that opportunity, citing his economic successes as “the greatest comeback story never told”. The US was, he said, “building an economy from the middle out and the bottom up, not the top down, investing in all of America, in all Americans to make sure everyone has a fair shot and we leave no one behind!”</p>
<p>For some inside the Biden administration the address was an opportunity for Biden to reset the campaign and push forward. Representative Robert Garcia of California <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/biden-trump-age-state-union-election">suggested</a> it was “important to remind folks what he’s done”.</p>
<p>Representative Annie Kuster of New Hampshire said that the address would affect not just Biden’s future but that of the entire Democratic party. It was, Kuster <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/02/19/biden-trump-age-state-union-election">said</a>: “The moment to show Democrats are leading and succeeding.”</p>
<p>Initial reactions were that Biden’s message was fiery, with one commentator asking where Sleepy Joe Biden had gone. It was, USA columnist Rex Huppke <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2024/03/07/biden-state-of-the-union-concerns-age-voters-election/72851433007/">said</a>: “One of the strongest election-year State of the Union speeches’ that he had witnessed.”</p>
<p>Jenna Ben-Yehuda, the executive vice president of the think tank the Atlantic Council, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-the-big-takeaways-from-bidens-no-ordinary-moment-state-of-the-union/#jenna-ben-yahuda">called</a> it “a pep talk for US global leadership — a reminder that freedom and democracy are American values and that the mantle of global leadership remains ours if we are bold enough to seize it”.</p>
<p>CNN’s Kevin Liptak <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/takeaways-joe-biden-state-of-the-union-address/index.html">said</a> that Biden had delivered “an energetic speech that was a far cry from some of his more subdued efforts that have concerned supporters”.</p>
<p>Has Biden been effective at conveying his message? Yes, but it depends on whether Americans want to listen to it. Only time and the polls in November will tell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden outlined a plan to build a temporary port to deliver aid to Gaza, and called on Israel to protect innocent victims in Gaza.Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243252024-03-07T13:03:47Z2024-03-07T13:03:47ZUkraine war: Russian soldiers’ wives are increasingly outspoken in their opposition<p>International Women’s Day is widely celebrated in Russia. But amid the bouquets of flowers and stilted speeches of congratulation <a href="https://tass.com/society/1586049">made by Vladimir Putin</a>, the state-controlled media will be doing its best to ignore one group of Russia’s women. These are the wives of some of its soldiers fighting in Ukraine, who have embarked on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/25/russia-military-wives-mothers-protest-against-putin-war-ukraine-troops-female">a series of regular, public demonstrations</a> that challenge the state and its narratives of societal unity around the war.</p>
<p>When Russia began its mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-no-collective-action-russian-mothers">it was widely expected</a> that soldiers’ mothers would participate in public protests against the war and demand the return of their sons, as they did in Russia’s war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s. But these mothers have <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-russian-soldiers-mothers-arent-demonstrating-the-strong-opposition-they-have-in-previous-conflicts-196605">all but disappeared from view</a> under increasingly harsh crackdowns on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-kremlins-ruthless-crackdown-stifles-independent-journalism-and-anti-war-movement/">opposition to the war</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, it is soldiers’ wives who have have emerged as one of the few sources of open criticism of the state’s handling of Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The prominence of wives rather than mothers of soldiers reflects the fact the war is not being fought by conscripts in their late teens and early twenties. Instead, many of the soldiers are married men in their 30s, 40s and even 50s. These men were mobilised, as reservists, on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/putin-announces-partial-mobilisation-in-russia-in-escalation-of-ukraine-war">Putin’s order in September 2022</a>, and are serving open-ended deployments to Ukraine. These are men who previously served in the army as conscripts, aged up to about 60.</p>
<p>These mobilised soldiers, along with those recruited from prisons, are regarded as expendable by their military commanders. They are sent into the most dangerous combat missions, and are more likely to be injured and killed than professional soldiers, according to a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-829ea0ba-5b42-499b-ad40-6990f2c4e5d0">BBC-Mediazona project</a> that is attempting to track Russian casualties.</p>
<p>Our ongoing research suggests the main strategy that women in Russia’s military families have adopted in dealing with the state is “patriotic dissent”. Avoiding direct criticism of the war, they emphasise they are the loyal wives of men who are doing their duty for their country. They focus on trying to gain specific concessions from the state, such as periods of leave for their husbands or more extensive welfare support for military families. They also use social media, and especially Telegram, to share information including strategies for lobbying Russia’s ministry of defence. </p>
<p>But among the many Telegram channels set up by wives of mobilised soldiers, one called The Way Home has become the focus of more confrontational forms of protest. Angered by <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/09/15/russian-lawmaker-says-draftees-won-t-be-rotated-out-of-ukraine-until-war-is-done">the announcement in autumn 2023</a> that mobilised soldiers would be deployed to Ukraine indefinitely, the women behind the channel decided to go beyond pleading with the state.</p>
<p>In November 2023, The Way Home wives issued <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/11/27/families-of-russian-draftees-release-manifesto-and-petition-against-indefinite-mobilization">a manifesto</a> calling for an end to the mobilisation of civilians to fight in the “special military operation”. They also started taking their complaints beyond social media. </p>
<p>Some actions are relatively modest, such as <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/11/28/relatives-of-mobilized-russian-soldiers-launch-cross-country-sticker-protest-a83235">putting stickers on cars</a> calling for the return of their husbands. Others are much more difficult for the state to ignore. </p>
<p>Since January, small groups have gathered every Saturday to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-families-mobilized-soldiers-complicate-putin-reelection/32788726.html">lay flowers at eternal flames</a> around Russia, including at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier by the Kremlin wall in Moscow. Wearing white headscarves and holding signs calling for an end to mobilisation, the wives have also urged widows of soldiers who have been killed in the war to join them.</p>
<p>So far, the state has ignored these demands for an end to mobilisation, and is attempting to placate the wives by expanding benefits for military families – including changing the rules to permit payments to be made to the unmarried partners of soldiers; a blatant contradiction of Putin’s emphasis on marriage and <a href="https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c20515fv">traditional family values</a>.</p>
<p>Protests are broken up but when the wives are detained, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/02/14/maria-andreeva-wife-of-a-russian-soldier-i-blame-myself-for-not-having-been-able-to-hold-him-back_6525029_4.html">they are released with a warning</a>. However, the women are clearly coming under pressure. Some have reported police visiting their homes to warn them against protesting. They have been verbally attacked by Russian <a href="https://en.zona.media/article/2023/12/07/putdomoi">media personality Vladimir Solovyov</a>, and Telegram has inserted a “fake” label on <a href="https://t.me/PYTY_DOMOY/452">The Way Home channel</a>.</p>
<p>Although The Way Home wives have demonstrated they are capable of holding public demonstrations that are critical of the state’s handling of the war, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-are-soldiers-protesting-wives-a-threat-to-kremlin/a-68280905">Russia’s political opposition</a> has so far dismissed their potential to become a political force. Instead, the wives are described as naive for failing to oppose the war itself, and complicit because they accept – and seek – money from the state in the form of welfare benefits. </p>
<h2>Long history of activism</h2>
<p>This dismissive attitude towards the activism of women in military families has a long history in Russia. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44582797">In 1917, women</a> – known as <em>soldatki</em> (soldiers’ wives and other female family members) – played an important role in the social unrest that overturned the monarchy and paved the way for the Bolshevik revolution.</p>
<p>But the soldatki were patronised by both Tsarist and Soviet political leaders. Described as ignorant because they couched their demands in terms of the welfare of their families rather than in the language of political ideology, they have also been left out of most historical accounts of the revolutions in 1917.</p>
<p>It is important to maintain a sense of perspective about these protests. The Way Home wives represent a small subsection of the hundreds of thousands of wives and mothers of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. They express strongly nationalistic views – their manifesto <a href="https://meduza.io/news/2023/11/27/nas-na-bali-i-vas-na-but-zheny-mobilizovannyh-opublikovali-manifest-i-petitsiyu-protiv-bessrochnoy-mobilizatsii">explicitly distances them from “migrants”</a> and other non-Russian soldiers deployed to fight in Ukraine, as well as from prisoners. They have not voiced sorrow or regret for the thousands of Ukrainians killed and injured by Russia’s attacks.</p>
<p>But it would also be a mistake to overlook the significance and the political nature of these soldiers’ wives’ actions. By calling for an end to mobilisation, The Way Home wives are challenging Putin’s strategy of waging “forever war” until Moscow achieves its aims.</p>
<p>These women are also exercising the fundamental right of citizens to hold their government accountable for its policies – there is no more political act than this. Ultimately, women’s “patriotic dissent” is a powerful form of resistance and it must be taken seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224325/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition from soldiers’ wives is an underestimated form of resistance against Vladimir Putin.Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth UniversityNatasha Danilova, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248962024-03-05T14:18:54Z2024-03-05T14:18:54ZBritish troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/03/03/germany-intelligence-leak-uk-troops-ground-ukraine-nato/">Leaked communications</a> involving high-level German government and military figures appear to confirm that British army personnel are engaged on the ground in Ukraine. An unencrypted telephone call intercepted and leaked to Russian broadcaster RT suggested British troops were helping the defending forces in the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/british-soldiers-in-ukraine-germany-b2504462.html">use of Storm Shadow cruise missiles</a> the UK has supplied to help Kyiv’s war effort. </p>
<p>In response, the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, confirmed that there are a “small number” of British army personnel “supporting the armed forces of Ukraine”. But he added that “we haven’t got any plans for large-scale deployment”. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/polish-minister-saw-uk-special-forces-operating-in-ukraine/">unconfirmed reports</a> that British special forces personnel were operating inside Ukraine shortly after the beginning of Russia’s invasion in the spring of 2022. Again, this has not been confirmed by the UK ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Russia has consistently maintained that any non-Ukrainian military personnel training troops to operate weapons systems in-country would be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-says-british-training-troops-ukraine-could-be-legitimate-2023-10-01/">legitimate military targets</a> for Russia – as would the factories producing those weapons systems in third-party countries.</p>
<p>The episode raises some important questions as to whether training Ukrainian troops on the battlefield comprises an act of war – and whether this means Britain risks being designated a co-combatant alongside Ukraine. </p>
<p>Konstantin Kosachev, the deputy speaker of Russia’s federation council, was reported by Russia’s state-run news agency Tass <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1752055">as saying</a> that by supplying weapons to Ukraine, Nato countries were progressing along a path towards direct confrontation. Sending troops to Ukraine, he said, “can be interpreted as the alliance’s direct involvement in hostilities, or even as a declaration of war”. </p>
<h2>What international law says</h2>
<p>The day after Russia invaded Ukraine, as Kyiv’s allies scrambled to find a response, it was reported that the US government was reviewing the legality of providing arms to help with the country’s defence.</p>
<p>Within days, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, had declared that even imposing economic sanctions would be an “act of war”. His defence ministry released a statement that if third-party countries allowed Ukraine to use their bases as a safe haven for Ukrainian aircraft, then “subsequent use against the Russian armed forces can be regarded as the involvement of these states in an armed conflict”.</p>
<p>Since the second world war, the laws of neutrality <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/supplying-arms-ukraine-not-act-war">have been interpreted</a> so that states can provide weapons and other support to a state unjustly attacked by a belligerent country, to enable it to defend itself. According to this definition, third-party countries would become co-combatants only if they resort to armed force against Russia.</p>
<p>Russia’s incursion into Ukraine has been ruled as a flagrant breach of Article 2(4) of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#">UN Charter</a>, which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Russia’s war in Ukraine has been denounced as an act of aggression by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_en#">UN general assembly</a> and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/91781/taking-stock-of-icj-decisions-in-ukraine-v-russia-cases-and-implications-for-south-africas-case-against-israel/#">International Court of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, it is claimed that Russia has been implicated in <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">breaches of international humanitarian law</a> through its apparent indiscriminate bombing and other violent attacks, and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">crimes against civilians</a>. This would mean that anyone supplying Russia – the belligerent in this conflict – with arms <em>is</em> in breach of international law.</p>
<p>But the question remains, if it is legal to supply Ukraine with weapons to help defend itself, would actually helping the Ukrainian military use them to hit Russian targets make the UK a co-combatant?</p>
<p>While the law is not settled, legal scholars believe supplying Ukraine with the means to defend itself against Russia does not in itself constitute a breach of international law – and nor does it make the UK a co-combatant. Any action by UK forces would only constitute a combat operation if these actions, carried out by UK personnel without any further action by Ukrainians, would launch a missile or any other kind of attack on Russian forces. </p>
<h2>Risk of escalation</h2>
<p>But there remains the question of escalation. Whatever the legal situation – and Russia has shown itself willing to ignore the rules of warfare by violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursions of 2014 and in the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – Putin and his senior ministers have regularly warned Kyiv’s western allies that their aid may constitute an escalation to which it would respond with all available means, including nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Accordingly, to prevent a direct confrontation with Russia, Nato countries have been wary about the kinds of weapon they will supply to Ukraine. The guiding principle has been that western-supplied weapons should not be used in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-general-jones-interview-long-range-weapons/32700251.html">attacks against Russian territory</a>. </p>
<p>But this may change. Germany has, up to now, been very reluctant to supply Ukraine with its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles</a>, which have a range of 500km and could be used against targets deep in Russian territory. However, recent reports suggest the German government is considering supplying these missiles to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, was quick, though, to insist that “German soldiers must at no point and in no place be linked to targets this system reaches”, making it absolutely clear that Germany would not risk its involvement being interpreted as a direct act of escalation.</p>
<p>And despite the Kremlin’s repeated threats, it is not eager to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/17/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-latest-updates-live?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-657eb9f88f08a684d3bd8a12">engage Nato militarily</a>. So, despite all the strong words being exchanged by both sides, there has been no sign that Nato and Russia will face each other on the battlefield in Ukraine – for the moment, at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Volkswagen Foundation and the British Council.</span></em></p>Helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression is not a violation of international law – but Russia might interpret it as escalation.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236962024-03-04T13:41:31Z2024-03-04T13:41:31ZSome nations have done well out of Russia being sanctioned – here’s why<p>Since the start of the Ukraine war, the US, EU, UK and other countries including Japan and Canada have increased sanctions on Russia. By late 2023, Russia became the <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27015/number-of-currently-active-sanctions-by-target-country/">most sanctioned country</a> in the world with over 18,000 restrictions on different items – more than the combined number of sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Syria. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659">Restrictions</a> include financial measures such as the freezing of the Russian central bank’s assets in the countries imposing the relevant sanctions, limiting Russia’s access to income from oil and gas exports, sanctions on technologies employed in military production such as microelectronic components, the ban on Russia’s diamond and gold exports, and other measures designed to affect Russian shoppers and business. Hundreds of international corporations have stopped working in Russia.</p>
<p>Restricting trade with a particular country, however, does not translate into lower demand for the products sanctioned. Sanctions on Russia resonate in the global economy and there are also <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">“surprising winners”</a> whose economies have benefited. </p>
<p>For instance, restrictions have diverted <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">trade routes</a> away from Russia to the neighbouring Caucasus and central Asia region leading to these economies, including Armenia and Kazakhstan, growing on average by 4.8% in 2022.</p>
<p>Once countries imposed bans on their exports to Russia, Putin <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">started sourcing</a> supplies from other states including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey. This enabled Russia to have continuous <a href="https://silverado.org/news/report-russia-shifting-import-sources-amid-u-s-and-allied-export-restrictions/">access</a> to foreign goods and technology, for instance, vehicles and semiconductors.</p>
<p>The imposition of sanctions is an alternative to military conflict, and its objective is to maximise <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574001306020278?casa_token=yLZ1fJzrHiAAAAAA:vD4t3N0oOGb3-51QcQiVttYaXsxq61_4g1ne0Od5iKHkcSav_wqiY6vLpAjAtXqpyu4iOpE589Q">economic damage</a>. They can be economic or financial imposed by governments or international institutions on states, companies and individuals, and are employed when a particular <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">state’s interests</a> are threatened or there are violations of international law.</p>
<h2>Russia looks for new partners</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Reports</a> indicate that bilateral trade between Russia and Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has increased since the war began. By September 2022, exports from <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Kyrgyzstan</a> to Russia rose to 34% of its total exports, up from 14% in 2021. </p>
<p>Similarly, restrictions to the Russian banking sector led to a significant increase in <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/economy-and-ecology/beyond-russia-the-impacts-of-sanctions-on-the-region-6959/">net money transfers</a> from Russia to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. For example, in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2023/04/13/regional-economic-outlook-mcd-april-2023">Armenia</a> transfers reached 17% of GDP, and in Georgia they reached 8% of GDP. Such transfers may be done, for example, by Russians moving to third countries, people purchasing properties in those countries or by people attempting to maintain access to their money via foreign banks.</p>
<p>Changing how it imports goods has also enabled Russia to sustain military production. Countries including China, Turkey and the UAE have become <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/09/russia-sanctions-weapons-technology-exports-evasion-arms-production-missiles-chips/">hubs</a> to channel critical technologies to Russia and <a href="https://insightnews.media/is-kyrgyzstan-a-hub-for-re-export-of-goods-to-russia-in-sanctions-evasion-schemes/">bypass sanctions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">Reports</a> indicate that Hong Kong has become a hub to transfer western-built microelectronics to Russia. It doubled its semiconductor exports to Russia to about US$400 million (£316 million) worth in 2022. In the same year, Russian’s imports of semiconductors from <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">China</a> steeply increased from about US$200 million to over US$500 million. Likewise, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/05/17/hong-kong-s-technology-lifeline-to-russia-pub-89775">UAE</a> increased its exports of microchips to Russia from US$1.6 million in 2021 to US$24.3 million in 2022.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, through a military <a href="https://theconversation.com/north-korea-ramps-up-military-rhetoric-as-kim-gives-up-on-reunification-with-south-213696">weapons deal</a>, Russia and North Korea have deepened their relationship with the increased military sales representing a new income source for the latter.</p>
<p>Other countries have gained from stepping into trade areas where Russia had dominated. In 2022, as sanctions affected the export of diamonds from Russia, there was a strong global demand leading to a <a href="https://businessweekly.co.bw/news/botswana-profits-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-report">20.4%</a> increase in Botswana’s diamond exports that year. Similarly, it has been reported that the UAE has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/russia-with-gold-uae-cashes-sanctions-bite-2023-05-25/">cashed in</a> as a thriving gold hub, increasing its gold imports from Russia from about 1.3 tonnes in 2021 to 75.7 tonnes, worth US$4.3 billion, between 2022 and 2023. In 2022, Russia became the UAE’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-20/russia-becomes-uae-s-top-gold-source-after-being-shut-out-of-west">main source</a> for gold imports.</p>
<p>As sanctions tighten on the Russian economy and the war continues, there’s a significant brain drain of highly skilled people from Russia. It’s estimated that <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">11.1%</a> of Russian software developers relocated between 2021 and 2022, for example. <a href="https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjds/s13688-023-00389-3">Armenia</a> saw a 42% increase in developers, Cyprus 60% and Georgia 94%. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-economy-brain-drain-labor-shortage-workforce-exodus-capital-flight-2023-9?r=US&IR=T">Evidence</a> suggests that of those who have emigrated from Russia since the war began, 80% are university graduates with 100,000 IT professionals relocating in 2022. In the “receiving economies”, such levels of “brain gain” can have a significant effect as an influx of highly skilled people <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26651/w26651.pdf">impacts innovation</a>, entrepreneurship and, ultimately, economic growth.</p>
<h2>US increases oil purchases elsewhere</h2>
<p>Asian and Middle Eastern countries are not the only places to benefit. The <a href="https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/">US</a> has money flowing into its economy as investors that might have put funds into Russia look for new opportunities. </p>
<p>In addition, since imposing restrictions on the imports of Russian crude oil and products in early 2022, the US has <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000186-9ef3-d045-afd6-bff35efd0000">increased</a> its imports from countries such as Brazil, Iraq, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm">Data</a> shows that in the period between 2021 and 2022, while Brazilian crude oil and products exports to the US increased from 143,000 to 193,000 barrels per day, Iraq’s grew from 157,000 to 311,000, Mexico’s from 711,000 to 808,000 and Saudi Arabia’s from 430,000 to 559,000.</p>
<p>So far, sanctions have yielded some of the expected outcomes. For instance, in 2022, the Russian economy contracted by 2.1% with such <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/sanctions-and-russias-war-limiting-putins-capabilities">growth</a> linked to a 14% reduction in exports and a 11% drop in imports, compared to 2021. </p>
<p>On the one hand, sanctioning countries have had to shift trade sources which have brought financial benefits to trade partners. On the other, Russia has circumvented some restrictions by shifting import sources via third parties. The benefits that third countries obtain from redirected trade may be temporary or positive in the short term, but not necessarily in the long term. This will depend on how the Russian economy is able to perform under continuous restrictions and the uncertainty that such conditions and war entail.</p>
<p>Whatever the result for Russia itself, the shifting patterns of Russia’s needs and imports have certainly boosted some other countries economies, perhaps unexpectedly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia has looked for new trading partners as sanctions bite, but also suffered a brain drain.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248002024-02-29T17:30:08Z2024-02-29T17:30:08ZUkraine recap: fresh nuclear threats from Putin as France talks of western boots on the ground<p>Another day, another bloodcurdling threat from Vladimir Putin. The Russian president used his annual televised address to warn the west that he was prepared to defend his country, if necessary, by using nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>“They should eventually realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory,” Putin said, clearly referring to plans by some of Ukraine’s allies to supply medium- and long-rage missiles that could strike targets within Russia. “Everything that the west comes up with creates the real threat of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilisation.”</p>
<p>There has been a discernible sense of urgency about western discussions of Ukraine over the past fortnight. The loss of the town of Avdiivka, a key strategic position close to Donetsk, after weeks of heavy fighting and massive losses on both sides, has set off something of a domino effect in the area. Russia has used the momentum to push the frontlines several miles to the west as part of its winter and spring offensive. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="ISW map showing the battle lines around Avdiivka and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine, February 2024." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578933/original/file-20240229-20-qhu2by.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1117&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The fall of Avdiivka has allowed Russian troops to shift the battle lines more than five miles to the west.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
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<p>In the previous Ukraine recap, we noted that Joe Biden has managed to get his US$95 billion (£75 billion) aid package through the US Senate. But the package still has to pass the House of Representatives, whose speaker, Mike Johnson, has yet to confirm it will even be given a vote. It’s clear from military reports emerging from Ukraine that the lack of ammunition is rapidly becoming an existential crisis.</p>
<p>Putin also probably had in mind the statement by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, at a security conference in Paris on February 26, that while there was as yet “no consensus” among Kyiv’s western allies about committing troops to the defence of Ukraine: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.”</p>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>This drew immediate pushback from most of the Nato leaders assembled at the conference, who raced to distance themselves from Macron’s position. Aside from anything else, there are major question marks about Nato’s ability to wage war in Europe against as formidable an adversary as Russia – which has, over the past two years, transformed into a war economy. </p>
<p>Kenton White, a Nato expert at the University of Reading, believes the increasingly ominous prospect of a confrontation between Nato and Russia will <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">require a major rethink</a> on the part of the western alliance. Hitherto, he writes, it has prepared to wage “come-as-you-are” wars, which would be fought with existing troops and weapons stocks. </p>
<p>Indeed, it appears such a rethink might already be happening. Nato is engaged in its largest exercises since the cold war – exercises designed specifically around the prospect of a war with a major power such as Russia. As Nato’s most senior military commander, Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, said last year: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.” </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-wont-rule-out-using-western-ground-troops-in-ukraine-but-is-nato-prepared-for-war-with-russia-224086">Macron won't rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, Stefan Wolff – a regular contributor to our coverage of the conflict over the past two years – struck a sobering note when he wrote that the west’s perceptions of the war had been <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">turned on their head</a> over the past 12-to-18 months by the lack of success of Ukraine’s counter-offensive. While Ukraine was scoring rapid successes on the battlefield in the summer and autumn of 2022, the talk was about finding an “off-ramp” to allow Putin a face-saving way out of an unwinnable war. But now, “increasingly, it’s the west that needs the off-ramp”.</p>
<p>Wolff, an expert in international security at the University of Birmingham, believes the west faces three choices. The preferable one in Ukraine’s eyes is for Nato to double down on its support, finding a way to ensure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs – not only to defend itself, but to inflict a comprehensive defeat on Russia. </p>
<p>However, talk is increasingly focusing on the second option – providing enough support to Ukraine to defend the territory it still has, which would involve making territorial concessions to Russia. The third, a comprehensive defeat of Ukraine, would have far-reaching consequences – none of them good.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-the-west-is-at-a-crossroads-double-down-on-aid-to-kyiv-accept-a-compromise-deal-or-face-humiliation-by-russia-223747">Ukraine war: the west is at a crossroads – double down on aid to Kyiv, accept a compromise deal, or face humiliation by Russia</a>
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<h2>Watching the war from space</h2>
<p>A feature of this war has been the way that thinktanks and analysts such as the Institute for the Study of War (whose maps we use in these regular updates) are able to pinpoint movements on the battlefield with such accuracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a pair of satellite views showing the same section of a city, one with intact buildings and green space and the other damaged or destroyed buildings and charred earth" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=757&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577455/original/file-20240222-26-fyycrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=952&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Satellite photography like these ‘before’ and ‘after’ images can provide a visceral sense of the destruction in the war in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-comparing-the-before-after-news-photo/1255499859">Satellite image (c) 2023 Maxar Technologies via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Sylvain Barbot and his team from USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences in the US, have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">using open-source data</a> in order to analyse the development of the war from space. It has enabled them to build accurate before-and-after images of cities where the fighting has been fiercest, highlighting just how destructive the conflict has been.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-at-2-years-destruction-seen-from-space-via-radar-223275">War in Ukraine at 2 years: Destruction seen from space – via radar</a>
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<h2>Russia’s economic transformation</h2>
<p>Considering the regime of sanctions imposed by the west, Russia’s successful retooling of its economy to put it firmly on a war footing is nothing short of remarkable. This echoes a similar transformation achieved by Soviet Russia during the second world war – something that changed the course of the conflict, swaying it in favour of the Allies. </p>
<p>Now Russia’s economy is completely dedicated to winning the war in Ukraine – and this is the main thing driving the country’s economic growth. Renaud Foucart, an economist at Lancaster University, says that while this has kept Russia in the war and is arguably giving it the upper hand at present, it also means Russia <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">can’t afford to win</a>, as any attempt to transform back would be too costly.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-economy-is-now-completely-driven-by-the-war-in-ukraine-it-cannot-afford-to-lose-but-nor-can-it-afford-to-win-221333">Russia's economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine – it cannot afford to lose, but nor can it afford to win</a>
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<h2>Alexei Navalny and the Russian opposition</h2>
<p>For those of us who had been following the fate of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny, the news of his death in a prison camp in the Russian Arctic had a certain sad inevitability to it. Navalny flew back to Russia in January 2021 after recovering from being poisoned with Novichok on a flight across Siberia the previous year. No sooner had he and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, disembarked from the flight to Moscow than he was detained, tried and sentenced.</p>
<p>Navalny spent the last three years being shunted to ever more unpleasant prisons across Russia, appearing every so often – usually via video link – to be sentenced to further prison time on spurious charge after spurious charge. Alexander Titov from Queen’s University Belfast <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">charts Navalny’s courageous career</a> – he was perhaps the biggest remaining thorn in Putin’s side.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">Alexei Navalny: reported death of Putin's most prominent opponent spells the end of politics in Russia</a>
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<p>So, where does Navalny’s death leave the opposition to Putin in Russia? According to Stephen Hall, who researches authoritarian regimes at the University of Bath, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">depressing answer</a> is that most opposition leaders are now either dead or in jail. Showing enormous strength, Yulia Navalnaya appeared at the Munich Security Conference hours after the news of her husband’s death had broken, to pledge to continue his work.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Other than Navalnaya, perhaps the most effective opposition to the Russian president and the war in Ukraine will be the wives and mothers of the troops. If casualties continue to mount – and especially if the Russian military starts to suffer the same sort of setbacks as it experienced in late 2022 – then their voices can only gain in resonance, Hall argues.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-putins-russia-the-death-of-navalny-has-left-the-opposition-demoralised-but-not-defeated-224303">In Putin's Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224800/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236322024-02-29T13:40:51Z2024-02-29T13:40:51ZHow Russia has managed to shake off the impact of sanctions – with a little help from its friends<p>Almost two years after the West <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/24/russia-economy-west-sanctions-00142713">responded to the Russian invasion in Ukraine with a blistering array of sanctions</a>, a fresh round of <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2117#:%7E:text=State%20is%20designating%20three%20Government,abuses%2C%20and%20aggression%20against%20Ukraine.">financial measures was announced by the Biden administration</a> on Feb. 23, 2024. The new sanctions, imposed following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/navalny-dies-in-prison-but-his-blueprint-for-anti-putin-activism-will-live-on-223774">death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny</a>, raised the number of individuals and entities now targeted by the U.S. to more than 2,000.</p>
<p>These measures <a href="https://www.state.gov/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions/">have run the gamut</a>, from targeted sanctions against President Vladimir Putin and other members of Moscow’s elites to broader restrictions on trade and investment.</p>
<p>Yet there are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/the-biggest-ever-sanctions-have-failed-to-halt-russias-war-machine-0986873f">few signs the sanctions have had a meaningful impact</a> on Putin’s ability to wage war.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://miamioh.edu/profiles/cas/keith-preble.html">experts on</a> <a href="https://www.skidmore.edu/political_science/faculty/willis.php">economic sanctions</a>, we believe the blunting of the sanctions’ impact can be attributed in large part to how Putin has been able to “sanction-proof” the Russian economy with help from friendly nations.</p>
<h2>Russian sanctions regime</h2>
<p>The sanctions regime put in place by the <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/what-sanctions-has-world-put-russia">U.S. and its partners</a> in the European Union, along with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Switzerland, has been both targeted and broad.</p>
<p>Restrictions have been placed on individuals and firms on an ever-growing blacklist – the U.S. calls it the <a href="https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-and-blocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists">Specially Designation Nationals and Blocked Persons List</a>. The list includes entities both in Russia and within Russia’s procurement network and supply chains operating in other countries. </p>
<p>Inclusion on the list results in a proscribed entity’s assets being blocked. Meanwhile, U.S. nations and businesses are barred from conducting business with entities on the list.</p>
<p>Economic sanctions have also <a href="https://www.state.gov/additional-sanctions-on-russias-technology-companies-and-cyber-actors/">focused on specific sectors</a>, such as the financial services sector. Banks have been barred from clearing payments and facilitating the flow of money in Russia’s key revenue generating sectors, such as the oil and energy industries. Such <a href="https://www.state.gov/countering-the-wagner-group-and-degrading-russias-war-efforts-in-ukraine/">sectoral sanctions</a> target all firms in the given sector and, theoretically, can have a devastating effect on an economy. </p>
<p>In addition, the U.S. has been both surgical and cautious in its <a href="https://www.state.gov/issuance-of-a-new-executive-order-to-expand-russia-sanctions-authorities/">use of secondary economic sanctions</a>. Secondary economic sanctions, which penalize individuals and firms in third-party countries that maintain trade and financial transactions with proscribed entities, can be politically and diplomatically challenging given that targeted firms often aren’t doing anything illegal in their home countries.</p>
<p>The United States’ <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/FinCEN%20and%20Bis%20Joint%20Alert%20FINAL.pdf">Bureau of Industry and Security in the Department of Commerce</a> and <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/">the EU</a> have also implemented export controls that restrict Russia’s military sector from accessing key technologies for the war effort. </p>
<h2>Dwindling effect</h2>
<p>These economic sanctions placed significant stress on the Russian economy in the first year of the war. Evidence of economic pain in 2022 can be seen in the jump in the rate of inflation <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/RUS?year=2022">from 6.7%</a> to <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/RUS?year=2023">13.8%</a>. Meanwhile, Russia’s gross domestic product fell <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88664">3% to 4% in the first nine months of the war</a>, although analysts had initially forecast a GDP decline of up to 10%.</p>
<p>But since then, the Russian economy has withstood the impact of sanctions. According to data from the International Monetary Fund, the rate of inflation is anticipated <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/RUS?year=2024">to drop to 6.3%</a> in 2024. Some analysts predict <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88664">Russia’s economy to recover further in 2024</a>, with the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/01/30/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2024">IMF forecasting a 2.6% growth in GDP</a> – up from earlier estimates of <a href="https://qz.com/russian-ukraine-invasion-sanctions-war-international-mo-1851208999">just 1.1% growth</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a suit stand sin front of a tank." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578804/original/file-20240229-30-f3hsoh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Putin visits a tank factory on Feb. 15, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-pool-photograph-distributed-by-russian-state-agency-news-photo/2006245916?adppopup=true">Alexander Kazakov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This dwindling impact on the Russian economy points to a general truth: Sanctions are hard to maintain. They are only effective when they are consistently enforced, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/5/sanctions-on-russia-may-not-be-working-we-now-know-why">few countries apart from the United States have had the stamina to enforce export controls</a> over a prolonged period.</p>
<h2>‘Sanctions-proofing’ Fortress Russia</h2>
<p>Russia has also been able to adapt to the sanctions by adopting several strategies, some of which began long before the 2022 invasion. By then, Russia had been coping for years with <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/">sanctions put in place</a> after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. The plan put in place by Moscow to fortify the economy has been named “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083804497/economic-warfare-vs-fortress-russia">Fortress Russia</a>” and consisted of building up <a href="https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1083804497">significant foreign exchange reserves</a> to maintain confidence in the Russia ruble. </p>
<p>Diversifying foreign exchange reserves, though, is just one part of the strategy.</p>
<p>The limited economic and financial sections imposed by the U.S. and others after the annexation of Crimea provided Russia with space and time to undertake a strategy of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188829">sanctions-proofing its wider economy</a>.</p>
<p>Sanctions experts such as <a href="https://caileighglenn.wixsite.com/home">Caileigh Glenn</a> have <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/can-you-sanctions-proof-a-government#:%7E:text=A%20fourth%20sanctions%2Dproofing%20strategy,%2C%20Chinese%20renminbi%2C%20and%20euros.">identified four strategies</a> that countries employ to sanctions-proof their economy: <a href="https://www.bofbulletin.fi/en/blogs/2022/russia-is-struggling-to-find-new-sources-of-imports/#:%7E:text=During%20the%20past%20decade%20and,been%20modest%20in%20most%20sectors.">import substitution</a>, strengthening foreign partnerships, <a href="https://www.shearman.com/en/perspectives/2023/05/russian-countersanctions--new-measures-targeting-foreign-investors-in-russia">retaliation through countersanctions</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-external-position-does-financial-autarky-protect-against-sanctions/">reducing dependency on any single reserve currency</a>. </p>
<p>While Russia has employed a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88664">combination of these strategies</a>, cultivating partnerships with countries that are willing to ignore Western sanctions – or willing to look the other way – appears to have been a particularly successful strategy.</p>
<h2>China: A crucial partner</h2>
<p>Fortunately for Russia, China has been a somewhat willing partner.</p>
<p>Throughout the Ukraine conflict, China has played a balancing act: eager to maintain both its relationship with Russia as well as <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/understanding-chinas-policy-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-implications-for-china-us-relations/">economic ties with the U.S., the EU and Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>In line with that policy, China has refrained from issuing its own economic sanctions against Moscow and has <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/china-moves-to-fill-the-void-left-by-russia-sanctions-on-its-own-terms/">filled, for Russia, the void</a> left by a reduction in trade with sanctioning countries.</p>
<p>In 2023, for example, Russian officials stated that around half of the country’s oil and petroleum exports <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-russia-2023-trade-value-hits-record-high-240-bln-chinese-customs-2024-01-12/#:%7E:text=Chinese%20shipments%20to%20Russia%20jumped,13%25%20last%20year%20from%202022.">were exported to China</a> – far higher than before the sanctions were imposed. Similarly, China’s exports to Russia, including smartphones, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/china-russia-2023-trade-value-hits-record-high-240-bln-chinese-customs-2024-01-12/#:%7E:text=Chinese%20shipments%20to%20Russia%20jumped,13%25%20last%20year%20from%202022.">rose astronomically from its pre-Ukraine war levels</a>, largely due to the U.S.’s and EU’s sanctions against Russia. </p>
<p>The China-Russia partnership was on the rise even before the 2022 invasion. Presidents Xi Jinping and Putin have <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12100">met several times since 2013</a>, a year before Russia’s invasion of Crimea. And since then, the two countries have conducted a <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12120">variety of bilateral agreements</a> in areas such as trade, energy, diplomacy and military cooperation. </p>
<p>As such, the increase in trade between China and Russia since 2022 is part of a longer trajectory of Moscow relying less on Western powers.</p>
<p>And this has made the Russian economy less vulnerable to sanctions from Western countries. China’s share of Russian <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12120">trade increased</a> from around 10% in 2013 to 18% in 2021. Over the same period, the EU’s share dropped from 47% to 36%, and the U.S.’s remained relatively stable – at around 3% to 4%.</p>
<p>However, Russia’s ability to insulate itself from sanctions through increased trade with China may be facing a setback. The EU recently issued <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3252736/eu-agrees-blacklist-chinese-firms-first-time-latest-russian-sanctions-package">secondary sanctions on 193 firms and individuals</a> who are doing business with Russia, including three firms in mainland China and one in Hong Kong. The U.S. is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/19/china-has-a-lot-more-to-lose-us-considering-sanctioning-chinese-firms-aiding-russias-war.html">considering similar sanctions</a> against Chinese firms as well. </p>
<p>This may be particularly problematic for Russia, as China is much less dependent on Russia economically. Russia <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12120">comprised only 2% of China’s trade share in 2021</a>, and although trade between the two <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/12/china-posts-higher-than-expected-exports-growth-in-december.html">increased in 2023</a>, <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn">trade with the U.S., the EU and other countries within Asia</a> remains more integral to the Chinese economy.</p>
<h2>Other sanction busters</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/policy-reports/mitigating-humanitarian-impact-complex-sanctions-environment-european-union-and-sanctions-regimes">Iran</a> – themselves targets of extensive sanctions – have also emerged as important partners in Russia’s strategy to sanctions-proof its wartime economy. Consistent with a trajectory of closer ties <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/the-highs-and-lows-of-russia-north-korea-relations">since Putin took office</a>, North Korea is now <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/us-imposes-sanctions-over-transfer-of-north-korean-missiles-to-russia">allegedly providing Russia with missiles and other arms</a>. Similarly, Iran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-has-received-hundreds-iranian-drones-attack-ukraine-white-house-2023-06-09/">has sold drones to Russia</a> for use in the Ukrainian conflict. </p>
<p>Western countries have been engaging in sanctions-busting, too. In December 2023, the U.S. Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1948?_gl=1*7sn7lq*_gcl_au*MTYyMjQ3ODI3OC4xNzA1MDgyMDky">unsealed indictments</a> relating to a Belgium-based network accused of coordinating the sale of electronics to Russian firms. Such networks undermine the export controls designed by the West to limit Russia’s acquisitions of critical technologies.</p>
<p>Also, spotty enforcement of sanctions has allowed Russia to circumvent restrictions. A report by Reuters on Russia’s wartime supply chain found that from February to October 2022, some US$2.6 billion in computer and electronic components <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-tech-middlemen/">made its way into Russia</a>, with at least $777 million of the products originating from Western firms such as Intel and Texas Instruments.</p>
<p>These exports to Russia also included chips that could be used in the manufacturing of high-tech weaponry. Recent <a href="https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Russian-import-of-critical-components.pdf">analysis from the KSE Institute</a> found that Russian imports of “high-priority battlefield items” have largely recovered since sanctions were imposed in 2022.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Key to improving the effectiveness of economic sanctions is the development of robust mechanisms of enforcement – both against firms and individuals. </p>
<p>Greater use of secondary sanctions along with stiffer penalties against sanctions violators should raise the costs of sanctions-busting and make such transactions less attractive. Research has shown that the longer economic sanctions persist, the <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=24154">less effective they become</a> – and two years into the Ukraine conflict, Russia has shown itself to be quite adept at avoiding the full force of the West’s attempts to squeeze its economy and derail its war effort.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has imposed another round of sanctions following the death of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny. But will it work?Keith A. Preble, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Miami UniversityCharmaine N. Willis, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Skidmore CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240862024-02-27T13:51:29Z2024-02-27T13:51:29ZMacron won’t rule out using western ground troops in Ukraine – but is Nato prepared for war with Russia?<p>The French president, Emmanuel Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">has said</a> sending western troops to fight in Ukraine “could not be ruled out”. After hosting a meeting of 25 European leaders in Paris on February 26, Macron said that there was “no consensus” on committing ground troops to the conflict in Ukraine but added: “Nothing should be excluded. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” </p>
<p>Until now, Nato has confined itself to training Ukrainian military forces and supplying them with defensive weapons. Member states fear that directly confronting Russian forces in Ukraine would risk a massive escalation. And Vladimir Putin and his senior ministers have regularly issued <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-are-the-risks-that-russia-will-turn-to-its-nuclear-arsenal-178139">threats that</a> Russia could resort to using its nuclear arsenal in the case of a larger conflict.</p>
<p>At present, Nato is also conducting its largest military exercise since the cold war. <a href="https://www.act.nato.int/article/steadfast-defender-2024-signals-alliance-unity-and-preparedness/">Steadfast Defender</a> runs from January until May and involves all 31 member states. Aimed at enhancing the alliance’s collective defence capabilities and readiness, it is the largest exercise since <a href="https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/165109/1/165109.pdf">Reforger in 1988</a>, which involved 125,000 troops from the US, Germany, Canada, France and Denmark.</p>
<p>General Christopher Cavoli, Nato’s supreme allied commander for Europe, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/222847.htm">said</a>: “Steadfast Defender 2024 will be a clear demonstration of our unity, strength and determination to protect each other, our values and the rules-based international order.”</p>
<p>Importantly, one aspect of the exercises is the involvement of US and Canadian forces, which is designed to demonstrate the speed and size of Nato’s reinforcement capabilities. It acts both as a reassurance to European Nato member states and as a demonstration to potential enemies of the ability Nato has to put large forces into the field. Exercises are part of the communication of deterrence.</p>
<p>The exercise is meant <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-kick-off-biggest-drills-decades-with-some-90000-troops-2024-01-18/">to simulate</a> an, “emerging conflict scenario with a near-peer adversary”. This is a thinly disguised reference to Russia, which shows that Nato is beginning to take the threat of direct conflict with that country seriously.</p>
<p>During the cold war, Nato undertook regular large-scale exercises. For example, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/18/world/british-start-war-games-on-continent.html">Exercise Lionheart, led by the UK in 1984</a>, involved nearly 58,000 British soldiers and airmen of a total force of 131,565, including troops from the US, the Netherlands and what was then West Germany.</p>
<p>Since the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Nato has searched for a new identity. Its <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/reportch1.pdf">focus shifted</a> in the 1990s from protecting common territory to protecting members’ common interests, as it did by intervening in the wars in <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm#">Bosnia in 1995</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.htm#">Kosovo in 1999</a>, when it officially approved this new <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27433.htm">strategic concept</a>.</p>
<h2>Need for unity</h2>
<p>A demonstration of Nato unity and military capacity is important, coming after two years of disunity over how to respond to the war in Ukraine and amid wrangling over supplies of arms by Ukraine’s western allies. It has become more significant following recent remarks <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html">by former president Donald Trump</a> that Nato members who did not meet the spending guidelines would no longer be protected by the US.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/a9SCscQipSk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘I would not protect you’: Donald Trump threatens Nato members over defence spending.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Members are supposed to spend at least 2% of their annual GDP on defence – but it’s more complicated than that. Some nations’ defence spending is wholly allocated to Nato. Others, meanwhile, might set their defence spending at less than 2%, but their spending per head is greater than that of those who meet the Nato guideline. </p>
<p>For example, Luxembourg <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country">falls short</a> of the 2%, spending only 0.72%. But in per head terms it spends US$921 (£726), which is more than Poland (3.9%) or France (1.9%). </p>
<p>The US may spend 3.5% GDP on defence, but not all of that is allocated to Nato. Much of the US’s strength is deployed in the Pacific and on its home territories. So it’s misleading to judge the value of Nato membership in these terms. </p>
<p>They key clause in the Nato treaty is article 5, which governs collective security and compels members to respond if a fellow member is attacked by a hostile third party. The US is the only Nato member state to have invoked article 5, following the 9/11 attacks. It received assistance from other Nato members in Afghanistan and more widely in the “war on terror”.</p>
<h2>Is Nato battle ready?</h2>
<p>A significant problem Nato faces however, is not in deploying the troops it has, but in supplying them. As has been demonstrated by the efforts to provide equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, Nato has neither the stockpiles nor the manufacturing capacity to supply a lengthy modern war. </p>
<p>This is because Nato has long planned on what’s known as a “come as you are” war, which means it has the capacity to fight for only as long as the equipment and supplies last. For this reason, Nato’s strategy has always been, in the event of a conflict, to bring it to a conclusion as quickly as possible. </p>
<p>Admiral Rob Bauer of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Nato’s most senior military commander and military adviser to its North Atlantic Council, spoke at the Warsaw Security Forum in October 2023. He <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66984944">said</a>: “We need large volumes. The just-in-time, just-enough economy we built together in 30 years in our liberal economies is fine for a lot of things – but not the armed forces when there is a war ongoing.”</p>
<p>A number of European countries have already distanced themselves from Macron’s remarks, including Poland, the Czech republic and Sweden, whose Nato membership has finally been approved by Hungary and which is set to become the alliance’s 32nd member.</p>
<p>But Russia has seized on Macron’s remarks, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/feb/27/russia-ukraine-war-live-france-macron-ground-troops-latest-news#top-of-blog">telling reporters</a> that even discussing the idea of western troops being sent to fight in Ukraine represents a “very important new element”. He added: “In that case, we would need to talk not about the probability, but about the inevitability (of a direct conflict).”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenton White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sending ground troops to Ukraine could provoke a wider and vastly more dangerous war with Russia,Kenton White, Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236012024-02-27T12:41:40Z2024-02-27T12:41:40ZRussia: Serbia’s history is key to understanding its close relationship with Moscow<p>Over the past few weeks, international attention has focused on Ukraine in the run-up to the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/world/europe/2024/02/21/russia-ukraine-war-latest/">second anniversary</a> of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. But Ukraine is not the only part of Europe where Russia is seeking to assert its influence and control. </p>
<p>Often overlooked by the international community in a world beset by international crises, Serbia, another aspiring <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">member of the European Union</a>, finds itself at a crossroads between pursuing its future within the bloc or staying within Moscow’s orbit. </p>
<p>Despite the promise of greater prosperity within the EU, <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-27/closer-to-west-serbias-foreign-policy-after-russian-invasion">many fear</a> that Serbia is moving closer to the Kremlin again. Indeed, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbias-vucic-presents-anti-drone-system-acquired-from-russia/">Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić </a> announced in February that he had purchased an anti-drone system, combat vehicles and infantry equipment from Russia. </p>
<p>The country has been historically <a href="https://www.natoassociation.ca/keys-to-understanding-russias-relationship-with-serbia/">close to Russia</a>. In modern times, this relationship was cemented by Russia backing Serbia’s opposition to Kosovan independence. The Kremlin was against the province becoming an independent nation and suggested this would be a breach of international law.</p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">remains popular</a> among many Serbs, and the country has refused to follow the rest of Europe in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why-192472">imposing sanctions </a> on its old ally over the Ukraine invasion.</p>
<p>Many non-Serbs in the western Balkans distrust Russia, particularly because of its long-term support for Serbia – and those fears were exacerbated by the full-scale <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/">invasion of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, before the invasion Russia showed whose side it was on in the Balkans when Moscow wielded its UN Security Council veto in 2015 to prevent a resolution that would have recognised the <a href="https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/bosnia/srebrenica/">Srebrenica massacres</a> as genocide on the 20th anniversary of those atrocities during the Balkan war. Around 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered in Srebrenica.</p>
<p>The narrative of genocide denial in the Russian media was even used to counter accusations of atrocities by Russian forces in Ukraine, notably Bucha. A report on Russian state-controlled <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bosnia-and-herzegovina/euvsdisinfo-russian-media-deny-srebrenica-genocide-deflect-responsibility-bucha_en?s=219">First TV said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Recall that [Srebrenica] has become synonymous with the genocide of the Muslim population, which, according to the west, was committed by the Bosnian Serbs in July 1995. But over time, many facts appeared confirming that a well-planned operation was carried out in Srebrenica, behind which stood western intelligence services.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Russia has long had a role in the western Balkans and sees its partnership with Serbia as a means of countering <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans">western influence in the region</a>. This means Russia pulling Serbia away from forging closer ties with the EU and as former US ambassador to Nato, Kurt Volker, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/09/why-did-russia-veto-recognizing-srebrenica-as-a-genocide-putin-bosnia/">said at the time</a>: “Moscow wants to make it clear that the Balkans won’t be part of mainstream Europe.”</p>
<p>Recent elections in Serbia, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17327/serbia-did-not-fulfil-its-commitments-to-free-and-fair-elections-say-meps%20European%20Parliament">condemned by EU observers</a> as being “below the expected standards for an EU candidate country”, added to concerns especially when demonstrators were condemned as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/serbia-opposition-doubles-down-on-election-claims-as-full-results-released">“thugs”</a> by Vučić , who thanked the Russians for tipping him off in advance that the protests were taking place.</p>
<p>Serbia also refuses to align with the rest of Europe in imposing sanctions on Russia with Vučić <a href="https://www.novinite.com/articles/224314/Serbia+Stands+Firm%3A+Refuses+to+Impose+Sanctions+on+Russia+Despite+Western+Pressure">recently telling Tass</a>, Russia’s state-run news agency: “You have many friends in Europe, but they all imposed sanctions against you. The only country that did not introduce sanctions is little Serbia.” </p>
<p>Vučić has also signed <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/serbia-receives-another-arms-delivery-from-russia-despite-international-sanctions-over-ukraine">cooperation agreements with Moscow</a>. Russia’s soft power remains strong in the country where the population regards Russia as its “greatest friend” and one survey found <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88828">63% blame the west</a> for Russia’s war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>EU and the Balkans</h2>
<p>The EU is at its heart a peace process, first formed from the carnage of the second world war. That peace was shattered by the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the genocide that took place during the conflict, notably during the war in Bosnia. That failure still haunts EU decision makers. </p>
<p>In June 2003 at the EU Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki in Greece, European leaders decided to identify the countries of the region, as potential candidates for membership, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163">including Serbia</a>. </p>
<p>In September 2013 a stabilisation and association agreement between Serbia and the EU came into force. A conference in January 2014 signalled the start of the formal <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/serbia_en">accession process</a>, setting out areas of reform Serbia needed to complete before being accepted as a member.</p>
<p>Serbia’s accession is particularly important for regional stability, given its size and role in past conflicts. If the EU is a project that wants to deliver peace and stability, it is difficult to see this as being successful in the western Balkans without including Serbia. </p>
<p>But talks have been far from smooth. Neighbouring Croatia which was earmarked by the EU as a future member at the same time as Serbia, in 2003, became a full EU member in 2013, but Serbian negotiations to become part of the EU have edged forward slowly. There is also a challenge with 40% of Serbs favouring an <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">end to membership talks</a>.</p>
<p>Vučić’s efforts to seek favour with Moscow will harm his country’s chances of EU memberships talks <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/01/19/hedging-its-bets-serbia-between-russia-and-eu-pub-88819#:%7E:text=Serbia%20is%20pursuing%20EU%20membership,its%20leverage%20in%20the%20region">progressing any further</a>. That could have profound regional consequences and weaken efforts to isolate Russia. </p>
<p>In recent years the EU has experienced an awkward partnership with Hungary, whose pro-Kremlin leader Viktor Orbán recently <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-threatens-silence-hungary-orban-if-blocks-ukrainian-aid-funds-article-7/">held up EU plans</a> to send aid to Ukraine. Disunity has caused Nato and the EU problems in the face of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/hungarys-ties-to-russia-make-europeans-increasingly-uncomfortable/">Russian aggression</a>. That leaves the EU concerned about having another partner with worryingly close links to Russia. </p>
<p>The looming US election, which could result in a Trump presidency that threatens a US <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html">withdrawal from Nato</a>, could exacerbate those concerns. Conversations are stepping up in European capitals over how to ensure that the EU and other European democracies can work together to ensure stability on the continent in the face of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/12/european-leaders-call-for-stronger-defence-ties-donald-trump-nato-remarks-russia">Russian aggression</a>. </p>
<p>That work will continue to focus, rightly, on Ukraine. However, as in the past, there are pitfalls in disregarding the challenges in the western Balkans and failing to pay attention to “little Serbia” could have far reaching consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Gethins is affiliated with.
I am a member of the SNP.
I am a founder and member of the Management Board of the Scottish Council on Global Affairs.
I am a Trustee of the John Smith Trust.</span></em></p>Europe should not ignore the importance of Serbia as a Russian ally.Stephen Gethins, Professor of Practice in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240332024-02-27T11:48:41Z2024-02-27T11:48:41ZMavka: The Forest Song – Ukrainian animation echoes the ecocide of wartime<p>As a child, I remember watching FernGully: The Last Rainforest (1992) with a sense of horror. I grew up in Ukraine, playing on construction sites, picking up dandelions and cigarette butts on city playgrounds and breathing in the smoke of nearby machine plants. So I felt tremendous sympathy for the forest fairies and was devastated by the scenes of mass tree felling by the evil humans. </p>
<p>I didn’t recognise the dissonance of watching the cartoon in a concrete nine-storey apartment block that had recently risen on the meadows devoured by my city. At the time, I even loved the polluted city more than my grandparents’ idyllic lakeside home. There was more to do on the littered sidewalks, glistening with the multicoloured film of oil byproducts. But a desire for nature to prevail took root.</p>
<p>On a family trip to the forest the weekend that followed, I refused to cut mushrooms and tried to catch a glimpse of magical life under the ferns and occasional pine trees of the Ukrainian steppe. FernGully’s ecological message had prevailed through my concrete-covered childhood.</p>
<p>Ukrainian nature has had its own eco-stories. In 1911 Lesya Ukrainka, a young Ukrainian woman who’d spent most of her short life in a sick bed, used her imagination to travel into the wilderness of folklore. She wrote a play, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674291874">The Forest Song</a>, about Mavka, an eternal forest nymph who falls in love with a young man from the village and finds herself torn between two worlds. Her lover’s family builds a house on the brink of the forest, slowly cultivating it into a field. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Lesya Ukrainka in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576842/original/file-20240220-26-viqi6e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1009&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lesya Ukrainka.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Lesya_Ukrainka_portrait.jpg">Wiki Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the early 20th century, happy endings were rare in Ukrainian (or, perhaps, any) fiction. Mavka ends up compromising her principles, paying with her blood for allowing humans to cut the ancient trees. She grows disillusioned with humans as her lover trades his musical talents for household comforts, marrying a local widow, who proves better at farming. </p>
<p>Mavka gives her body to “the one-who-sits-in-the-rock”, a spirit of natural vengeance and disasters, and pays her revenge. Her former lover becomes a werewolf and freezes to death under a tree.</p>
<p>Ukrainka depicted the forest as a safeguard of joy and primordial memory of the land. Nature grows increasingly fragile as the old agreements between humans and spirits break. </p>
<h2>Adapting The Forest Song</h2>
<p>As a child, I was sure that FernGully was an echo of The Forest Song. With one significant difference – in the cartoon the man becomes a positive influence on nature. </p>
<p>The new animated adaptation of Ukrainka’s play, Mavka: The Forest Song, took 10 years to produce. It faced multiple financing problems, not to mention the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. I feared that the filmmakers might reduce Ukrainka’s story to a Disney-style feel-good tale. I was right. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for Mavka: The Forest Song.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Spirits became cat-like animal side-kicks and Mavka’s lover became her slightly annoying assistant – and nobody dies in the end. </p>
<p>What surprised me most was the unexpected success of Mavka, both among Ukrainian and international audiences. Watching the animation in Paris, my Ukrainian friends reported roaring laughter and applause from the little French viewers. The animation was screened in 148 countries and dubbed in 32 languages.</p>
<h2>Ecocide in Ukraine</h2>
<p>The Russo-Ukrainian war has made Ukrainian law <a href="https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/ecocide-in-ukraine-won-t-go-unpunished-united-for-justice-united-for-nature/">recognise ecocide as a crime</a>, punishable by a prison term of up to 15 years. </p>
<p>It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Russian officers who <a href="https://theconversation.com/kakhovka-dam-breach-in-ukraine-caused-economic-agricultural-and-ecological-devastation-that-will-last-for-years-208629">blew up the Kakhovka dam</a> and caused the destruction of thousands of homes being prosecuted in the near future. But Ukrainian eco-activists, biologists and lawyers are determined to bring this question <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-war-kakhovka-dam-ecocide-international-law/">into the international law too</a>. </p>
<p>From the beginning of the invasion, Ukrainians have <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00471178231191297#fn10-00471178231191297">used animals and nature</a> to engage the world audience. Attention was drawn to the Kakhovka dam through <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edkP9zTC11M">videos of volunteers rescuing animals</a> from the water. <a href="https://www.eurobats.org/bat_news/donate_bat_rehabilitation_center_kharkiv">Fundraisers</a> organised by the Kharkiv bat activists who save bats affected by the war have <a href="https://undark.org/2022/10/31/amid-war-bat-rescue-continues-in-ukraine/">attracted international attention</a>.</p>
<p>Nature has become both one of the most painful and most visible reminders of the war. Mavka uses animals in similar fashion, converting “the one-one-who-breaks-dams” (one of Mavka’s love interests in the original play) into Swampy, a “kitty-frog” who follows her every step. It also features a lynx, an endangered species from Chornobyl that has <a href="https://www.travelwiseway.com/section-news/news-in-chornobyl-a-eurasian-lynx-has-been-spotted-which-was-last-documented-there-in-the-previous-century-photo-20-11-2023.html">become extremely rare</a>. </p>
<p>I sympathise with this innocent manipulation. The forests where I tried to find FernGully characters as a child have been heavily mined since the occupation of the Kharkiv region in 2022. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for FernGully: The Last Rainforest.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most recently in February 2024 oil byproducts spillage caused by a Russian-Iranian drone, leaked into two of the three Kharkiv city rivers, endangering the water and killing <a href="https://ecopolitic.com.ua/en/news/harkiv-yani-pochali-ryatuvati-otruienih-naftoproduktami-kachok-2/">wild ducks and other species</a>. </p>
<p>The same drone attack killed seven people. Yet, it feels almost impossible to interest a world audience with the alien images of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/10/deaths-reported-as-russian-drone-attack-on-kharkiv-petrol-station-in-ukraine-sparks-large-fire">Ukrainian family burnt alive</a>. Nature, however, is something that we all share.</p>
<p>Sometimes I feel that after <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/chernobyl/faqs">the Chornobyl disaster</a> our land is cursed by the ancient gods of nature (Mavkas and mermaids) to eternal suffering. Hearing about French children watching Ukrainian Mavka in a Parisian cinema, I felt hope. Perhaps someday they will recall Mavka, like I remembered FernGully, with an understanding that action needs to be taken to make our coexistence with nature more harmonious.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536131/original/file-20230706-17-460x2d.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viktoriia Grivina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sometimes I feel that after Chernobyl our land is cursed. Hearing about French children watching Mavka in a Parisian cinema, I felt hope.Viktoriia Grivina, PhD Candidate, School of Modern Languages and Social Anthropology, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2243032024-02-26T17:20:44Z2024-02-26T17:20:44ZIn Putin’s Russia, the death of Navalny has left the opposition demoralised but not defeated<p>The still mysterious death of Russian opposition figurehead Alexei Navalny was greeted by some Kremlin critics as proof that the era of democratic <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-reported-death-of-putins-most-prominent-opponent-spells-the-end-of-politics-in-russia-223766">politics was over</a> in Russia. That any change or reset back to democratic governance will henceforth not be due to the ballot box, but will depend on a wave of popular protest galvanising enough support to topple Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Navlany’s death comes a few short weeks before Russia holds presidential elections. If Putin wins, the result will confirm him in office for another six-year term. </p>
<p>There are no serious opposition candidates, and the only registered opposition candidate to voice criticism of the war in Ukraine, Boris Nadezhdin, was recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/08/russian-anti-war-candidate-boris-nadezhdin-says-he-is-barred-from-election">disqualified from running</a>. Thanks to a 2020 constitutional amendment which removed term limits, Putin can stay in office until 2036.</p>
<p>So what becomes of Russia’s opposition, and the country’s fast-disappearing (if not defunct) democracy in the meantime. Who dares pick up Navalny’s standard in the campaign against Russia’s autocratic leader?</p>
<p>The death of democracy in Russia has been proclaimed several times. Within five years of Putin coming to power, analysts were already pointing to the lack of <a href="https://eusp.org/sites/default/files/archive/pss_dep/gelman_Political_Opposition_in_Russia.pdf">authentic opposition parties</a>. Meanwhile surveys by the Levada Center – Russia’s best-known opinion pollsters – found that by mid-2004 only 42% of Russians believed that political opposition still existed in the country.</p>
<p>By that stage, they had already seen the death of veteran opposition politician <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/enemies-kremlin-deaths-prigozhin-list/32562583.html">Sergei Yushenkov</a>, leader of the anti-Kremlin party Liberal Russia, who was shot in front of his Moscow home in April 2003. Deaths of other prominent opposition figures, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and lawyer and activist Sergei Magnitsky, followed in fairly rapid succession. Critics who had left the country, such as Alexander Litvinenko and Boris Berezovsky, were targeted in exile.</p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/boris-nemtsov-russian-opposition-leader-murdered/">Boris Nemtsov</a>, a former Yeltsin-era deputy prime minister who had once been tipped to take over, was shot dead on a Moscow street the day before he was due to lead a march against Russia’s incursions in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>By the time Navalny was poisoned on a domestic flight over Siberia in August 2020, he had become the main focus of Russia’s opposition. His poisoning and then subsequent return to Russia in January 2021 and his rearrest and imprisonment on what were clearly questionable charges, sparked a degree of optimism that Putin had over-reached.</p>
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<h2>Putin tightens the screws</h2>
<p>But the invasion of Ukraine in February was accompanied by the introduction of harsh new laws aimed at stifling dissent. The arrest of other opposition figures in 2022 under these new laws was effectively a <a href="https://theconversation.com/stalin-style-show-trials-and-unexplained-deaths-of-opposition-figures-show-the-depth-of-repression-in-putins-russia-203893">decapitation</a> of the opposition in Russia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/stalin-style-show-trials-and-unexplained-deaths-of-opposition-figures-show-the-depth-of-repression-in-putins-russia-203893">'Stalin-style' show trials and unexplained deaths of opposition figures show the depth of repression in Putin's Russia</a>
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<p>Under the new laws, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/moscow-police-arrest-children-for-laying-flowers-at-ukrainian-embassy">children were arrested</a> for the first time. The legislation imposed sentences of up to 15 years for spreading <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-latest-russia-law-b2028440.html">“false information”</a> – that is, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-protests-more-than-1300-arrested-at-anti-war-demonstrations-ukraine">voicing opposition</a> to the war.</p>
<p>Sentences meted out to high-profile protesters – such as artist and writer Sasha Skochilenko, who was given a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-67437171">seven year jail term</a> for replacing supermarket labels with anti-war messages soon after the invasion in April 2022 – appear to have discouraged many from taking to the <a href="https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/0125/">streets in protest</a> at the war.</p>
<p>Now most well-known Russian opposition figures are either in exile or prison. Anglo-Russian journalist and activist <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65297003">Vladimir Kara-Murza</a> was sentenced in 2022 for 25 years for “treason”, having condemned the invasion of Ukraine, as was opposition politician <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/09/russian-opposition-figure-ilya-yashin-jailed-for-denouncing-ukraine-war">Ilya Yashin</a>. </p>
<p>Others, including former oligarch <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2022/05/03/exiled-former-russian-oligarch-mikhail-khodorkovsky-the-world-will-not-be-a-safe-place-as-long-as-putin-remains-in-power/">Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a>, Putin’s first prime minister <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/03/putin-critic-and-ex-pm-kasyanov-leaves-russia-a77892">Mikhail Kasyanov</a>, and former world chess champion <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/apr/30/garry-kasparov-interview-chess-vladimir-putin-russia">Garry Kasparov</a> fled abroad. While each is a vocal Putin critic, exile makes it difficult to shape change.</p>
<h2>Green shoots?</h2>
<p>Despite this, there are some green shoots that could rise to defy Russia’s political winter.</p>
<p>The day the news of Navalny’s death broke internationally, his widow – <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c501c5b-79c8-42ae-8190-94d7eeeeb9bb">Yulia Navalnaya</a> appeared in front of an audience of world leaders at the Munich Security conference.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Keep on fighting’: Yulia Navalnaya vows to carry on her husband’s work after his death in a Russian prison camp, February 2024.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Navalnaya vowed to carry on her husband’s work, saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The main thing we can do for Alexei and for ourselves is to keep on fighting. To unite into one powerful fist and hit this insane regime. Putin, his friends, the bandits in uniform, the thieves and murderers that have crippled our country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/20/europe/yulia-navalnaya-russian-opposition-challenges-intl/index.html">tenacity</a> could make her an effective force to revive opposition at home and abroad.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, another group of Russian women is making its voice heard across Russia, with a message that carries a significant amount of moral force due to their status in a country at war. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/putin-faces-growing-threat-wives-and-mothers-mobilized-soldiers">Council of Mothers and Wives</a> campaigned fiercely against Putin’s decision to call up reservists in the autumn of 2022, and the Russian president’s approval ratings (and that of his government in general) took a <a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">significant hit</a>. </p>
<p>The Kremlin tried to reach out to the group, but its leaders refused to meet with the president, so a stage-managed meeting was held with a group of women hand-picked from pro-government organisations. The council, meanwhile, was declared a “foreign agent” and officially <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/28/russian-soldiers-mothers-group-announces-closure-after-foreign-agent-designation-a81989">closed in July 2023</a>. </p>
<p>Its focus was to bring troops home from Ukraine, rather than opposing the war itself. But the longer the war continues, the more wives and mothers will lose loved ones – and there will be plenty of women who fear this may happen to their own family.</p>
<p>Perhaps the voice of Yulia Navalnaya – a woman who lost her own husband to Vladimir Putin’s megalomania – will resonate among those women who fear the same may happen to their men.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most of Vladimir Putin’s opponents are either dead, in jail or in exile. But it might just be ordinary people who can take over the battle for democracy in Russia.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205812024-02-26T13:39:02Z2024-02-26T13:39:02ZAs war in Ukraine enters third year, 3 issues could decide its outcome: Supplies, information and politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577714/original/file-20240224-28-7jc86z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C37%2C8281%2C5508&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will war fatigue be a factor?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/february-2024-ukraine-odessa-a-gepard-anti-aircraft-gun-news-photo/2022536165?adppopup=true">Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In retrospect, there was perhaps nothing surprising about Russia’s decision to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230214-february-24-2022-the-day-russia-invaded-ukraine">invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022</a>.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin’s intentions were, after all, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-ukraine-invasion/2021/12/03/98a3760e-546b-11ec-8769-2f4ecdf7a2ad_story.html">hiding in plain sight</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-western-military-backing-ukraine-threatens-russia-2021-10-21/">signaled in the months running up</a> to the incursion.</p>
<p>What could not be foreseen, however, is where the conflict finds itself now. Heading into its third year, the war has become bogged down: Neither is it a stalemate, nor does it look like either side could make dramatic advances any time soon.</p>
<p>Russia appears to be on the ascendancy, having secured the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68322527">latest major battlefield victory</a>, but Ukrainian fighters have exceeded military expectations with their doggedness in the past, and may do so again.</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/tara-sonenshine">foreign policy expert</a> and former journalist who spent many years covering Russia, I share the view of those who argue that the conflict is potentially at a pivotal point: If Washington does not continue to fully support President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his military, then Ukraine’s very survival could be at risk. I believe it would also jeopardize America’s leadership in the world and global security. </p>
<p>How the conflict develops during the rest of 2024 will depend on many factors, but three may be key: supplies, information and political will.</p>
<h2>The supplies race</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine are locked in a race to resupply its war resources – not just in terms of soldiers, but also ammunition and missiles. Both sides are desperately trying to shore up the number of soldiers it can deploy. </p>
<p>In December 2023, Putin <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-army-expansion-a2bf0b035aabab20c8b120a1c86c9e38">ordered his generals to increase troop numbers</a> by nearly 170,000, taking the total number of soldiers to 1.32 million. Meanwhile, Ukraine is said to be looking at plans to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-draft-b2ca1d0ecd72019be2217a653989fbc2">increase its military by 500,000 troops</a>.</p>
<p>Of course, here, Russia has the advantage of being able to draw on a population more than three times that of Ukraine. Also, whereas Putin can simply order up more troops, Zelenskyy must get measures approved through parliament.</p>
<p>Aside from personnel, there is also the need for a steady supply of weapons and ammunition – and there have been reports that both sides are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68364924">struggling to maintain</a> <a href="https://www.wbaltv.com/article/after-2-years-of-war-questions-abound-on-whether-kyiv-can-sustain-the-fight-against-russia/46940958">sufficient levels</a>.</p>
<p>Russia appears particularly eager to boost its number of ballistic missiles, as they are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-sourcing-ballistic-missiles-to-bypass-ukraine-air-defense-isw-2024-1">better equipped for countering Ukraine air defense systems</a> despite being slower than cruise missiles.</p>
<p>Increasingly, Moscow appears to be looking to North Korea and Iran as suppliers. After Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, visited Russia in 2023, the U.S. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67888793">accused Pyongyang of supplying Russia</a> with ballistic missiles. Iran, meanwhile, has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/arsenal-of-autocracy-north-korea-and-iran-are-arming-russia-in-ukraine/">delivered to Russia</a> a large number of powerful surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and drones.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men in suits talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577743/original/file-20240225-16-y23p92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Sept. 13, 2023, in Tsiolkovsky, Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-and-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1661841029?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ukraine, meanwhile, is <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220610-ukraine-dependent-on-arms-from-allies-after-exhausting-soviet-era-weaponry">dependent on foreign military equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Supplies were stronger at the beginning of the war, but since then, Ukraine’s military has suffered from the slow, bureaucratic nature of NATO and U.S. deliveries. It wasn’t, for example, until the summer of 2023 that the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/europe-and-eurasia/ukraine">U.S. approved Europe’s request</a> to provide F-16s to Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukraine needs more of everything, including air defense munitions, artillery shells, tanks and missile systems. It is also <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-ukraine-war-medical-care-frontlines/#:%7E:text=In%20an%20open%20letter%20recently,stabilization%20posts%20with%20supplies%20and">running short of medical supplies</a> and has seen hospital shortages of drugs at a time when <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/4371240-the-invisible-enemy-in-ukraine-superbugs/">rampant infections are proving resistant</a> to antibiotics.</p>
<p>Perhaps the biggest factor that remains in Russia’s favor when it comes to supplies is the onerous restrictions placed on Ukraine from the West, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-shouldnt-use-us-arms-inside-russia-us-general-says-2023-05-25/">limiting its ability</a> to attack Russian territory with U.S. or NATO equipment to avoid a wider war. For example, the Ukrainian military had a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System with a 50-mile range that could hit targets inside Russia, but it modified the range to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-altered-himars-rocket-launchers-to-keep-ukraine-from-firing-missiles-into-russia-11670214338">keep the U.S. military satisfied</a> that it would not cross a Russian red line.</p>
<p>If this policy could be relaxed, that might be a game changer for Ukraine, although it would raise the stakes for the U.S.</p>
<h2>The information war</h2>
<p>The Ukraine conflict is also a war of messaging.</p>
<p>To this end, Putin uses <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/putins-wartime-russia-propaganda-payouts-and-jail-151bb117">propaganda to bolster support</a> for the campaign at home, while undermining support for Ukraine elsewhere – for example, by planting stories in Europe that cause disenchantment with the war. One outrageous claim in the early weeks of the war was that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/politics/pro-russia-disinformation-report/index.html">Zelenskyy had taken his own life</a>. The rumor came from pro-Russia online operatives as part of an aggressive effort to harm Ukrainian morale, according to <a href="https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/information-operations-surrounding-ukraine">cybersecurity firm Mandiant</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, in France, stories appeared that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/30/france-russia-interference-far-right/">questioned the value of assistance to Ukraine</a> and reminded the public of the negative impact of Russian sanctions on the French. Stirring dissent in this way is a classic Putin play to raise doubts.</p>
<p>And investigative reporting points toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/16/russian-disinformation-zelensky-zaluzhny/">a disinformation network</a> being run out of the Kremlin, which includes social media bots deployed on Ukrainian sites spreading stories of Zelenskyy’s team being corrupt and warning that the war would go badly.</p>
<p>Given that Putin controls the Russian media and is quick to crack down on dissent, it is hard to really know what Russians think. But one reputable polling agency recently reported <a href="https://www.norc.org/research/projects/russian-public-opinion-wartime.html">strong support in Russia</a> for both Putin and the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Ukrainians, too, still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/512258/ukrainians-stand-behind-war-effort-despite-fatigue.aspx">support the fight against Russia</a>, polling shows. But some war fatigue has no doubt lowered morale.</p>
<p>There are other signs of domestic strain in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, tensions grew between Zelenskyy and his top military commander, General Valery Zaluzhny who had complained about weaponry. Zelenskyy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/08/world/europe/zelensky-general-valery-zaluzhny-ukraine-military.html">ended up firing the military chief</a>, risking political backlash and underscoring that not all is well in the top chain of command.</p>
<p>Should disunity and war fatigue continue into the war’s third year, it could serious impair Ukraine’s ability to fight back against a resurgent Russian offensive. </p>
<h2>The politics of conflict</h2>
<p>But it isn’t just domestic politics in Ukraine and Russia that will decide the outcome of the war. </p>
<p>U.S. politics and European unity could be a factor in 2024 in determining the future of this conflict.</p>
<p>In the U.S., Ukraine aid has become politicized – with aid to Ukraine <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/08/about-half-of-republicans-now-say-the-us-is-providing-too-much-aid-to-ukraine/">becoming an increasingly partisan issue</a>.</p>
<p>In early February, the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/12/politics/senate-foreign-aid-bill-ukraine/index.html">Senate finally passed an emergency aid bill</a> for Ukraine and Israel that would see US$60.1 billion go to Kyiv. But the bill’s fate in the House is unknown.</p>
<p>And the looming 2024 presidential elections could complicate matters further. Former president Donald Trump has made no secret of his aversion to aid packages over loans, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/14/us/politics/trump-ukraine-biden.html">calling them “stupid</a>,” and has long argued that Americans shouldn’t be footing the bill for the conflict. Recently, he has made bombastic statements about NATO and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2024/02/13/how-donald-trumps-re-election-would-threaten-natos-article-5">threatened not to adhere</a> to the alliance’s commitment to protect members if they were attacked by Russia.</p>
<p>And uncertainty about American assistance could leave Europe carrying more of the financial load.</p>
<p>European Union members have had to absorb the majority of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/max-boot?utm_source=twtw&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=TWTW2024Feb23&utm_term=TWTW%20and%20All%20Staff%20as%20of%207-9-20">6.3 million Ukrainians who have fled the country</a> since the beginning of the conflict. And that puts a strain on resources. European oil needs also suffer from the sanctions against Russian companies.</p>
<p>Whether these potential war determinants – supplies, information and politics – mean that the Ukraine war will not be entering a fourth year in 12 months time, however, is far from certain. In fact, one thing that does appear clear is that the war that some predicted would be over in weeks looks set to continue for some time still.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220581/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia appears to have seized the battleground initiative as the Ukraine war marks its second anniversary – but the conflict is far from over.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238882024-02-23T16:24:32Z2024-02-23T16:24:32ZVladimir Putin has never understood why Ukrainians want to control their own destiny<p>Ten years ago, Ukraine looked to the democratic world like a faraway place. But this was just before Ukraine’s “Euromaidan” protests toppled the country’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych, paving the way for the election of a pro-western president, Petro Poroshenko.</p>
<p>As scholar of east European studies Peter Vermeersch has put it, whereas Ukraine was once seen as “<a href="https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2023/01/12/interview-with-peter-vermeersch-in-the-eu-ukraine-is-perceived-as-the-eastern-edge-of-western-europe/">the western edge of eastern Europe</a>”, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 2022, the country has transformed in the eyes of the world into “the eastern edge of western Europe”. It was a transformation that had taken place not least because of the popular will of much of the Ukrainian people. </p>
<p>In 2003, Leonid Kuchma, who was then acting president of Ukraine, published a book called <a href="https://archive.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/kuchma-tome-insists-ukraine-is-different-18112.html">Ukraine is not Russia</a>. With his choice of title, Kuchma – a person with an exemplary Soviet background as a former member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine – sent a powerful message about the divergence between otherwise “brotherly” nations.</p>
<p>What Kuchma had in mind, among other things, was the different political culture among Ukraine’s people. This became especially clear during and after the Euromaidan. </p>
<p>When the Russians invaded Donbas in 2014 in response to the overturning of their puppet president, hundreds (if not thousands) of ordinary people voluntarily joined up to fight for their country – many before the armed forces were actually formally deployed. They formed combat units, appointed commanders from among themselves and even procured weapons independently.</p>
<p>This process has gone even further since 2022. <a href="https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2022/04/11/interview-with-mykola-bielieskov-ukrainians-have-crossed-the-threshold-of-fear-theyre-fighting-for-victory/">Mykola Bielieskov</a>, an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, told me: “In the last 150 years, it has been solely the state’s task to prepare and support armies on the battlefield. However, since the first day of this war, Ukrainians have willingly shifted much of this burden onto their shoulders.”</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s democratic ideals</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp">World Values Survey</a> (WVS) – a global research project conducted by social sciences in more than 90 countries which explores the social and political impact of people’s changing values and beliefs – in 2020, 42.8% of Ukrainians said the importance of democracy was absolute. The corresponding number in Russia was 23.5%. Meanwhile, only 17.4% of Ukrainians believed that obedience to their leaders was the essential characteristic of democracy. In Russia that figure was 27.1%.</p>
<p>Ukrainians tend to be more politically active than Russians. According to an earlier survey by WVS which measured attitudes between 2010 and 2014, only 14.8% of Ukrainians said they had never participated in any peaceful demonstrations (this figure was recorded in 2011, before the Euromaidan protests). By comparison this figure in Russia was 51.7%. </p>
<p>The WVS findings are indirectly confirmed by a survey conducted in 2019 by the <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/15/european-public-opinion-three-decades-after-the-fall-of-communism/">Pew Research Center</a>. Pew found that 51% of Ukrainians supported the post-Soviet switch to a multi-party system, while 47% approved of a market economy, compared with 43% and 38% respectively in Russia. </p>
<p>Ukrainians also thought that an independent judiciary (81%) and free media (63%) were essential for democracy. These findings were broadly in line with the western European median at 87% and 67% respectively. </p>
<p>But they were significantly different from attitudes in Russia where 63% supported the idea of an independent judiciary and 38% held a free media to be a key feature of democracy.</p>
<h2>Putin’s blind spot</h2>
<p>The Russian president’s insistence that Ukrainians and Russians are essentially the same people flies in the face of these differing values. According to Putin’s logic, the citizens of Ukraine should respect authority and respond to strong leadership. </p>
<p>He seems to argue that the Euromaidan would not have happened without interference from the west. This is borne out by his speech to the Russian people <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events,/president/news/67828">on February 21 2022</a>, on the eve of the invasion, when he characterised the Euromaidan protests as a “coup d'etat” engineered by the west and bankrolled by the US.</p>
<p>Putin seems unable to accept that Ukrainians can think and behave differently when it comes to how they want to be governed. Instead, he reiterates that Ukraine <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603">was usurped by western-backed Russophobe extremists</a>. In his reasoning their rule is temporary and should be regarded as illegitimate. </p>
<p>He insists that Russians, as representatives the “same people”, have a moral right to remove the “unnatural” regime connived at by the west and imposed on Ukraine and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-putins-desire-to-install-a-puppet-government-draws-from-the-bolshevik-playbook-178060">install a pro-Kremlin government</a>.</p>
<h2>Deluded invasion</h2>
<p>Putin’s original plan in February 2022 was for the Russian invasion to topple the Ukrainian government <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/80002564-33e8-48fb-b734-44810afb7a49">in a matter of days</a>. As Roman Solchanyk – an authority on Ukraine-Russia relations based at Harvard – has written, Putin <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-biggest-mistake-was-believing-ukrainians-were-really-russians/">did not anticipate fierce resistance</a> from alleged “compatriots” whom Russians arrived to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-vows-that-as-in-1945-ukraine-will-be-liberated-from-nazi-filth/">“liberate” from “Nazi filth”</a>.</p>
<p>In his 2022 eve-of-invasion speech, Putin declared that the “wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine” was “the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity … the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another”. It was clear he did not want to learn the lesson on divergences of Russian and Ukrainian identities <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/inside-putins-ukraine-obsession/">from the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan</a>. </p>
<p>Putin continues to deny that Ukrainians demonstrate a greater appreciation of liberty and democracy than Russians. Instead, he chooses to believe that the war “<a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-says-hostile-actions-of-west-kyiv-led-to-ukraine-war/2974471">was unleashed by the west</a> and its satellites” who <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-says-west-is-russia-s-enemy-not-ukraine-itself-/3097577">nurtured anti-Russian elites in Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Two years on, it is clear from the way they have fought that Ukrainians are motivated to fight because their political activism in 2014 had won them a chance for a different future. Russians, meanwhile, are fighting because they follow their leader in his flawed vision of restoring the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ostap Kushnir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Russian president still insists that Ukraine has been taken over by hostile pro-western elites over the past decade.Ostap Kushnir, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.