tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/african-national-congress-2018-48581/articlesAfrican National Congress 2018 – The Conversation2018-02-06T14:08:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911802018-02-06T14:08:39Z2018-02-06T14:08:39ZAxing ANN7 in South Africa may send wrong signal for media freedom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205031/original/file-20180206-14107-ndo9td.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mzwanele Manyi, the new owner of the Gupta-linked ANN7 television news channel and The New Age newspaper.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/ANN7tv/">Facebook/ANN7 </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At first glance the announcement by video entertainment and pay-television company Multichoice that it will be <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/multichoice-to-respond-to-impropriety-claims">dropping</a> controversial news channel ANN7 from its offering may be seen as another new “green shoot” in the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/01/opinion-judith-february-the-clear-signs-of-a-cyril-spring">“Cyril spring”</a> following Cyril Ramaphosa’s election to head the governing African National Congress. </p>
<p>ANN7 is funded by the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1334530/who-are-the-guptas-details-according-to-madonsela/">Gupta family</a> who are close to the country’s President Jacob Zuma and are accused of having undue influence over him, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/firing-of-south-africas-finance-minister-puts-the-public-purse-in-zumas-hands-75525">dictating cabinet appointments</a>. As newly elected <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">president of the ANC</a>, Ramaphosa will take over running the country when Zuma goes. He is currently also the deputy president of the country.</p>
<p>But there’s more to Multichoice’s decision than a change in the political landscape. The company is also in the middle of managing a reputational crisis.
The announcement to drop ANN7 was made on the same day that a report was released after an investigation into the company’s links with the Gupta family. </p>
<p>The probe looked at allegations that Multichoice had paid ANN7 <a href="http://themediaonline.co.za/2018/02/emedia-blasts-multichoice-ceo-over-revealing-confidential-information/">exorbitant fees</a> in return for airing a news channel on its satellite platform and <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Tech/Companies/carrim-bekker-at-odds-over-encryption-accusation-of-influence-20171201">allegations</a> that Multichoice may have paid the broadcaster for political influence. The report <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-multichoice-to-announce-investigation-outcome-20180131">found no evidence of wrongdoing</a>. Nevertheless Multichoice cut its ties with ANN7. </p>
<p>There is no doubt that ANN7’s journalism is shoddy, biased and poor to the point of ridicule. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-news-station-ann7-is-on-the-skids-why-it-wont-be-missed-91085">It won’t be missed</a> by anyone who values balanced or honest, truthful journalism. Its pro-Zuma stance often led to skewed reporting under the guise of transformation. </p>
<p>From a reputational management or branding perspective, Multichoice’s decision to drop ANN7 from its bouquet was probably the clever thing to do. But it does raise questions about media freedom, political pluralism and democratic debate. Perhaps more importantly, it prompts reflection on Multichoice’s concentration of power over the public sphere. These questions suggest that dropping ANN7 may send a bad signal for media freedom and democratic debate in South Africa.</p>
<h2>Freedom of expression</h2>
<p>The South African National Editor’s Forum has <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/01/sanef-raises-media-freedom-concerns-over-multichoice-s-move-to-axe-ann7">decried the decision</a>. Their concern is informed by idea that the free exchange in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marketplace_of_ideas">marketplace of ideas</a> is healthy for democracy.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy_of_communications">Political economists</a> might offer a different critique. They would point to the tendency of the power of commercial media to be concentrated in the hands of a few, and to align itself with political power. </p>
<p>From both these perspectives, the Multichoice decision would raise questions about media freedom. The first perspective would suggest that there should be many different voices in a democratic public sphere, including disagreeable ones. The second would question the dominance of one player in a democratic media landscape, which alone has the power to decide what gets heard. </p>
<p>In a media sphere where, aided by social media, we are increasingly able to withdraw into <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-facebook-has-become-the-worlds-largest-echo-chamber-91024">our own echo chambers</a> and “filter bubbles”, it is probably a better idea to listen to as wide a spectrum of political opinions and refute them with sound arguments. Closing them down and driving them underground, or into the hands of <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-07-09-twitterati-fight-back-against-fake-pro-gupta-twitter-bots/">Twitterbots</a>, is less strategic than just allowing the public to refute them on social media or vote with their remotes.</p>
<p>Then there is the question of consistency. Multichoice’s decision to drop ANN7 puts the broadcaster in a moral quandary. Audiences may laud what they see as a principled decision to push back at a news channel that defies ethical values such as balance, truthfulness and fairness. But they may then rightly assume that Multichoice approves of the content on all the other channels that it continues to carry.</p>
<p>What about the Chinese state-sponsored channel China Central Television (CCTV), recently rebranded as CGTN? Does it not also present <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-central-television-launches-global-television-network-propaganda-xi-jinping-a7503216.html">slanted news</a>? And what about <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/12/if-russia-today-is-moscows-propaganda-arm-its-not-very-good-at-its-job/?utm_term=.828fe207ba9b">Russia Today</a>, also carried on the DStv network? Once a provider starts making editorial judgement calls, where does it stop?</p>
<h2>Concentration and conglomeration</h2>
<p>Media freedom does not only mean the absence of restrictions (sometimes referred to as a <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/">negative freedom</a>, but also the presence of conditions that allow for the realisation of democratic ideals and purposes (positive freedom). In other words, it is not enough that <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2002/b16.pdf">South Africa’s Constitution</a> guarantees freedom of expression if there are not enough opportunities available to express that freedom. The fact that a single platform has the power to decide what gets said in the public sphere is therefore a problem. </p>
<p>South Africa has one of the <a href="http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/final_4.pdf">most concentrated media markets in the world</a>, dominated by only four companies (Naspers, Independent, Tiso Blackstar and Caxton). This concentration is <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-08-29-media-content-diversity-in-sa-why-is-government-still-asking-all-the-wrong-questions/#.WnjNepP1XZt">not conducive to democratic debate</a>.</p>
<p>For a young democracy, a wide variety of voices is vitally important. It’s true that ANN7 didn’t contribute anything of worth to this plurality. But it’s equally true that commercial companies such as Multichoice should not hold disproportionate power over the public sphere. </p>
<p>This would matter less if the country’s public broadcaster did its job. A functioning, transparent public broadcaster is an important counterbalance in a hyper-commercialised broadcasting environment. Especially in a highly unequal country where access to commercial media is reserved for the minority that can pay for it. The country needs not only to see and hear a variety of political points of view, but also a diversity of lived experiences. </p>
<p>South Africans have not been not well-served by the public broadcaster in recent years. But there are signs that the new board might be turning the corner. The <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/sabc-appoints-new-coo">appointment of a new COO</a> for the South African Broadcasting Corporation heralds a new management regime. The ongoing editorial policy review process is also a good sign. After all, if the media claims to play a role in democratic debate, listening to the public - rather than to politicians and their cronies - is a good place to start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Herman Wasserman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Multichoice’s dominant power over South Africa’s public sphere suggests that dropping ANN7 may send a bad signal for media freedom and democratic debate.Herman Wasserman, Professor of Media Studies and Director of the Centre for Film and Media Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/908612018-01-31T08:19:20Z2018-01-31T08:19:20ZCape Town water crisis: crossing state and party lines isn’t the answer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203808/original/file-20180129-41419-4x8vlt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mmusi Maimane is leading efforts to combat the water crisis. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Mark Wessels (Pool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mmusi Maimane, the leader of South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, that governs the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province, now leads the task team to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-25-analysis-mmusi-maimanes-war-cry-defeat-day-zero/#.Wm7k8pP1XPA">“defeat” Day Zero</a>, the day on which Cape Town’s water is predicted to run out. This is currently set for April 12.</p>
<p>The DA’s <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/defeat-day-zero-da-four-point-plan/">plan to keep the taps running</a> comes amid infighting within the Cape Town Metropolitan Council, where <a href="http://www.capetownetc.com/news/motion-no-confidence-de-lille-looms/">mayor Patricia De Lille</a> has been stripped of responsibility for <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-01-19-de-lille-loses-her-power-to-deal-with-cape-towns-water-crisis/">responding to the water crisis</a>. </p>
<p>While many were impressed to see Maimane, <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/your_gov/97">Helen Zille’s</a> provincial government and the city’s leadership presenting a united front <a href="http://therepublicmail.co.za/2018/01/24/maimane-intervene-in-cape-town-water-crisis/">against the water crisis</a>, others pointed out that this was not Maimane’s show to run, saying that it <a href="https://twitter.com/pierredevos/status/956136662362402816">crossed the “line”</a> between the DA as a political party, and the relevant organs of state.</p>
<p>This is correct. As a <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/1626">Member of Parliament</a>, Maimane has oversight powers that allow him to investigate how the city or province handle the water crisis. But for an MP to head a governmental task team pushes the boundaries of the <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/who-we-are">separation of powers</a>, in terms of which day-to-day running of government should be left to executive officials.</p>
<p>By swooping in from his position in national government to take control of the situation, Maimane also ignored a set of constitutional principles which allow higher-level governments to intervene in running a city only in limited circumstances, such as when a municipality <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/30097/08chapter8.pdf?sequence=9">fails to deliver</a> basic services based on national delivery standards.</p>
<p>The DA <a href="https://twitter.com/zilevandamme/status/956166188274454528?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">disagrees</a>. It argues that Maimane hasn’t taken over any governmental offices, but, as party leader, is merely <a href="https://twitter.com/zilevandamme/status/956166989092925441?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%22%3EJanuary%2024,%202018%3C/a%3E%3C/blockquote%3E%20%3Cscript%20async%20src=%22https:/platform.twitter.com/widgets.js%22%20charset=%22utf-8%22%3E%3C/script%3E">coordinating</a> the actions of the DA-run city and province. </p>
<h2>Tensions between party and State</h2>
<p>This brings into play the line between political parties and government which, in South Africa, appears to be crossed on a regular basis.</p>
<p>South Africans tend to associate government officials with the political parties to which they belong. For instance, many people simply think of the ANC <em>as being</em> the national government. They don’t distinguish between ANC officials acting in their capacity as party members, or when they’re acting as members of government.</p>
<p>This is problematic, since it undermines the perceived independence of state institutions and diminishes accountability of state officials. It creates the impression that government institutions can be accessed and influenced through party structures. This leads to potentially corrupt situations, such as where a political party’s donors expect to be rewarded with government business.</p>
<p>Some countries, such as the US, have legislation which places a <a href="https://hatchact.uslegal.com/">strict separation</a> between party and state to the point where civil servants are not allowed to campaign for political parties or run for election. And state officials are not allowed to wear party regalia or discuss party business in their government offices. This is not only meant to reduce opportunities for corruption, but also to ensure that people feel that government works for, and is accountable to, all citizens, regardless of which party they support.</p>
<p>Since winning the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC has often been accused of using state structures to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/anc-blind-to-dangers-of-conflating-party-and-state-2023793">further the party agenda</a>. And its MPs are further often accused of placing party loyalty <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/blog/party-loyalty-patronage-and-future-south-african-p">above the national interest</a>. </p>
<p>The most dramatic recent example of this was when the Constitutional Court was asked to direct the Speaker of Parliament to allow ANC members to vote in secret on a motion of no confidence <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/concourt-to-rule-on-secret-ballot-case">against President Jacob Zuma</a>. The fear was that the party might punish ANC MPs who voted in favour of the motion.</p>
<p>At the time, former President Thabo Mbeki wrote an <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/mps-have-a-responsibility-to-the-people-not-their-political-parties-mbeki/">open letter</a> in which he reminded ANC members of Parliament that they were accountable to the people of South Africa, not the ANC.</p>
<p>The principle of accountability is the most important reason for keeping political parties and the state separate. </p>
<p>While the state is held accountable through a range of institutions and laws, similar measures don’t exist to make political parties act in the public interest.</p>
<h2>Shadow governments</h2>
<p>The same applies on local government level.</p>
<p>South African cities are run by elected local governments, through legal structures, such as the ward committees established by the <a href="http://mfma.treasury.gov.za/MFMA/Legislation/Local%20Government%20-%20Municipal%20Structures%20Act/Local%20Government%20-%20Municipal%20Structures%20Act,%20No.%20117%20of%201998.pdf">Municipal Structures Act</a>. These structures don’t always function well. Where they break down, the provision of basic municipal services suffers and residents’ concerns are not addressed.</p>
<p>But instead of trying to strengthen, fix or change dysfunctional structures, people often bypass them. This weakens them even further. One way in which this happens is when people resort to having their grievances solved through political party structures, such as local party branches.</p>
<p>When party structures become the most efficient way to solve local government problems, shadow governments are created. These shadow governments are not directly accountable to residents.</p>
<p>This means that it becomes easier for internal party politics to infiltrate city affairs. It also creates opportunities for corruption. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2017/10/21/how-to-steal-a-city/">recent book</a>, ‘How to steal a city’ by Crispian Olver, about the last days of the former ANC local government in Nelson Mandela Bay, sets out <a href="https://theconversation.com/two-books-that-tell-the-unsettling-tale-of-south-africas-descent-87044">in detail</a> how this happens. Olver explains how the ANC sent in senior party members to “clean up” governance in the city. But the book also shows how provincial ANC structures tried to prevent the then mayor from acting against corrupt city council members.</p>
<h2>Sidelining structures</h2>
<p>By taking control of the water situation in Cape Town as leader of the DA Maimane has effectively sidelined the people and structures that are constitutionally supposed to be in charge.</p>
<p>However good his intentions may be, this is a blatant example of shadow governance. His actions have undermined accountability and participatory democracy and weakened the city’s ability to govern in the interests of all of its residents.</p>
<p>No political party should lead a response to an urban governance crisis. The city, provincial and national governments must cooperate <em>as government</em>, across party lines and through the relevant legal and constitutional structures and processes, to ensure effective and accountable service delivery.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marius Pieterse receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Opposition leader Mmusi Maimane’s takeover of responsibility for tackling the Western Cape water crisis blurs party and state lines.Marius Pieterse, Professor of Law, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/903952018-01-21T06:39:26Z2018-01-21T06:39:26ZIs the net about to close on Zuma and his Gupta patronage network?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202574/original/file-20180119-80171-70vnck.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa, the deputy president of South Africa and new president of the governing ANC, faces a dilemma in rooting out corruption. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It all started with a wedding. A 200 plus entourage of friends and family landed their private aircraft at the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/10030626/200-Indian-wedding-guests-allowed-to-land-at-South-Africas-main-military-air-base.html">Waterkloof Air Force Base</a> in April 2013. </p>
<p>What South Africans didn’t know was that the country had already entered a new era of corruption that was to have a myriad negative consequences. Now, after years of legal obfuscation, political manipulation of ‘captured’ state institutions and prosecutorial agencies, Cyril Ramaphosa’s victory to succeed Jacob Zuma as president of the ruling African National Congress has opened up the possibility that an age of impunity <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-01-18-ramaphosa-piles-pressure-on-zuma-with-anti-corruption-call/">will be replaced</a> with a new era of public accountability.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22513410">Gupta’s</a> extravagant family wedding at Sun City a slew of revelations have come out. These range from the <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1333758/10-key-findings-explosive-state-capture-report/">“State of Capture report”</a> of the former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, to the damning <a href="http://www.gupta-leaks.com/">Gupta-leaks</a> uncovered by investigative journalists AmaBhungane. All helped South Africans come to understand the shocking extent of the systemic corruption inextricably linked to the Gupta name.</p>
<p>Despite all these revelations, the country’s prosecutorial bodies have remained silent. So when the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) confirmed its <a href="https://protect-za.mimecast.com/s/itfIC1jp84SE0XYOiO4_KT">intention to serve summons</a> on members of the Gupta family and their cronies on January 15 this year ordering them to preserve assets to the tune of R1.6 billion, the first question that sprung to mind was “why now”?</p>
<p>The answer lies with Ramaphosa’s election on a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2017/11/14/ramaphosa-new-deal-for-sa/">“change” and “reform” ticket</a>. His victory in December has shifted the balance of power against the Zuma faction. </p>
<p>A second factor is that the ANC is concerned about its electoral future, with the 2019 national election on the horizon. Zuma has cost the ANC <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/election-wrap-a-bruised-anc-a-galvanised-da-20160807">almost 16% of its electoral</a> majority – some 3 million votes. With opposition parties scrambling to <a href="https://www.sapeople.com/2017/12/06/sas-future-coalition-anc-2019-say-opposition-leaders/">form coalitions</a>, and voting trends suggesting a further decline in the ANC’s share of the vote, there is now a very real prospect of the ANC being voted out of power in 2019. An ANC majority is no longer a foregone conclusion – unthinkable until recently.</p>
<p>It seems denial in the ANC has been replaced by a sense of fear. The party is trying to show the voting public that it can clear up the mess that it has made.</p>
<h2>Chickens come home to roost</h2>
<p>The NPA’s announcement suggests that the chickens seem finally to be on their way home to roost on the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/swift-sale-of-gupta-family-empire-in-south-africa-raises-eyebrows-10955847">Gupta empire</a>. The NPA’s Asset Forfeiture Unit has applied to the High Court for an order that the Gupta’s must “preserve” R1.6 billion worth of assets. This power is granted under Section 38 of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a121-98.pdf">Prevention of Organised Crime Act</a>. The provision empowers the NPA to make an ex parte application to the High Court to</p>
<blockquote>
<p>prohibit any person… from dealing in any manner with any property.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court must grant the order if there are reasonable grounds to believe that property is the “instrumentality of an offence” or “is the proceeds of unlawful activities”. This must be read in light of the rest of the Act which allows the state to confiscate property that is the proceeds of unlawful activities. </p>
<p>The rationale of the preservation order is, therefore, to prevent such a person or suspect from disposing of assets that are proceeds from unlawful activities which would render a confiscation order fruitless. </p>
<p>An analysis of the act makes it clear that, if a preservation order is requested, the intention of the NPA must be to arrest and charge the Guptas and their associates. A preservation order could only be made if a confiscation order is ultimately envisaged. In turn, a confiscation order can only be made after a criminal conviction. </p>
<p>The logical conclusion is that the NPA, assuming that they are acting in good faith, are intent on arresting and prosecuting the Guptas.</p>
<h2>Dilemma facing Ramaphosa and the ANC</h2>
<p>The problem for the ANC is this: if its intention is to make the Guptas the sole-scapegoats in the state-capture saga, they will be in a good deal of trouble. Of the published Gupta scandals, the evidence strongly suggests that they were not acting alone. The Guptas themselves may represent only the tip of the iceberg.</p>
<p>Top government officials are reported to have been involved in almost all instances. </p>
<p>For example, Mining Minister Mosebenzi Zwane, is heavily implicated in the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-07-18-estina-dairy-farm-a-corruption-crime-scene-in-vrede/#.WmCWaaiWbIU">Sun City wedding affair</a>, while whistle-blowers <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/117104/guptas-did-offer-me-the-job-of-finance-minister-jonas/">Mcebisi Jonas</a> and <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/guptas-offered-me-ministerial-role-vytjie-mentor">Vytjie Mentor</a> implicate Zuma as a participant in the Guptas offering them (for undue reward) the positions of ministerial positions.</p>
<p>Zuma’s son, Duduzane, is also heavily implicated in <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-08-29-since-you-asked-heres-the-case-against-duduzane-zuma/">corrupt activities</a> related to the state power utility Eskom, as well as the finance minister debacle.</p>
<p>The NPA will struggle to prove its case against the Guptas, at least the full extent of it, without implicating those that drove or condoned their misdemeanours. It seems clear therefore that the ANC cannot restore its reputation while letting its leaders who looted the country’s resources drift off into the wilderness. </p>
<p>This presents Ramaphosa with an acute political dilemma given that he’s pledged to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-09-ancs-106th-ramaphosas-push-for-unity-continues/#.WmG_Dq6WbIU">rebuild unity</a> in the ANC.</p>
<p>Hence, we are likely to see a very high level and multifaceted blame game. But any attempt to restore its credibility will probably prove counter productive unless the party accepts that some of its biggest fish must be prosecuted too.</p>
<p>And it goes without saying that private sector players such as <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/mckinsey-warned-eskom-of-risks-at-gupta-linked-trillian-capital/">Trillian</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/71c6f115-0c5c-33ed-bc00-812263f39d2f">KPMG</a> who were willing enablers of the abuse of state procurement processes must also be held to account. If necessary they must pay the ultimate price of corporate collapse as <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Advertising/breaking-bell-pottinger-expelled-from-pr-body-for-gupta-work-20170904">Bell Pottinger</a> did.</p>
<h2>Just the beginning</h2>
<p>The NPA’s announcement represents no more than a good start after years of prosecutorial negligence and incompetence – or dishonesty – and costly inaction. </p>
<p>In terms of accountability it’s indeed time to catch up and restore the legitimacy of important institutions. But the stakes are very high – for the implicated politicians and their business cronies, for Ramaphosa and the ANC’s electoral future, and for the credibility of South Africa as a trustworthy destination for much needed investment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90395/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Calland is a Founding Partner of the Paternoster Group: African Political Insight, a Member of the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) and a member of the Board of the Open Democracy Advice Centre. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Law receives funding from UCT is affiliated with UCT and CASAC </span></em></p>After doing nothing for a long time to bring the Gupta family to book in South Africa, the country’s prosecuting authority has finally started to act.Richard Calland, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownMike Law, Senior legal researcher in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/901162018-01-16T08:14:57Z2018-01-16T08:14:57ZRamaphosa should end the presidential merry-go-round in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201935/original/file-20180115-101502-16ruhkb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cyril Ramaphosa (left) has succeed South Africa's President Jacob Zuma to lead the African National Congress. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The large majority of South Africans, including members of the governing African National Congress (ANC), will be glad to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/70-of-south-africans-want-zuma-to-resign-survey-20170405">see the back of Jacob Zuma</a> as president. Many, if not most, will hope that Cyril Ramaphosa, the party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice-89248">newly-elected president</a>, will assume the state presidency immediately rather than entertaining the nonsense of the party electing an <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-12-00-jz-sets-if-hes-to-go">“interim president”</a>.</p>
<p>Zuma’s supporters are strongly supportive of the idea of an interim president. It has its roots in the previous succession drama that unfolded after the ANC forced Thabo Mbeki to resign as the country’s president in September 2008. <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/kgalema-petrus-motlanthe">Kgalema Motlanthe</a>, the ANC’s then deputy president, stepped up to the plate to <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-25-motlanthe-sworn-in-as-interim-president">serve in his place</a> until the party president – Zuma – <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/jacob-zuma-presidency-2009-2017-march">assumed office</a> following the general election in May 2009. It has never been revealed why Zuma did not become state president directly, although it’s clear that they intended Motlanthe to become a cypher, subject to Zuma’s control.</p>
<p>This precedent is now being bandied about as established practice that has to be followed. But there’s no getting round the fact that it’s being pursued by Zuma and his supporters for dubious reasons. In short, they want to put the brakes on the transition to a Ramaphosa presidency so that they can protect and further their personal interests. </p>
<p>Zuma, in particular, wants to place continuing political obstacles in the way of his being subject to prosecution through the courts on <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-zuma-loses-bid-to-dodge-783-charges-but-will-he-have-the-last-laugh-85703">783 criminal charges</a>. The charges go back to before he assumed office. And there are lingering hopes among his closest acolytes that they can push through a deal with the Russians on <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-12-00-jz-sets-if-hes-to-go">nuclear power</a> before their rule ends. </p>
<p>Fortunately, reports indicate that Ramaphosa <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-12-00-jz-sets-if-hes-to-go">has rejected</a> the idea of standing aside in favour of an interim president (and certainly, of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who has been proposed by the Zuma faction). Indeed, this opens the door to a reconsideration of how the ANC should handle the relationship between the two presidencies. </p>
<p>Presently, the ANC elects its own president at a National Congress which is held some year and a half before the country’s general election. Having won that election, the ANC MPs in parliament, who have up until now constituted a majority, fulfil their constitutional responsibility of electing one of their member as state President.</p>
<p>It is this sequential gap between the two elections which leads to unnecessary political speculation and uncertainty, and now stands in the way of the country putting itself back together again after the disaster of the Zuma presidency.</p>
<h2>Why Zuma should fall</h2>
<p>The idea of an interim appointment is irresponsible. No good reasons have been put forward for postponing Ramaphosa taking over the presidency of the country.</p>
<p>Those against such a proposition might argue that Zuma has every right to remain in office until his term expires. <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">Constitutionally</a>, he does. But politically he is ever more a lame duck, rapidly leaking support in the wake of Ramaphosa’s election to the party leadership. This is why there is an increasingly determined effort to oust him. </p>
<p>Zuma’s detractors inside and outside the party argue, correctly, that the more he hangs around the more damage he will be doing to the ANC and its <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/169785/what-zumas-power-play-could-mean-for-the-anc-in-2019/">prospects in any forthcoming election</a>. </p>
<p>In contrast, those still clinging to Zuma may argue that if Ramaphosa takes office immediately, with the possibility that he could serve as state president until the expiry of a second term in office in 2029 (ten years after an election in 2019), he would be doing nothing other than serving his self-interest.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa should ignore such arrant nonsense. There is everything to be gained from his assuming the presidential reins immediately. An extended presidential transition would lead to continuing political uncertainty, of tales of a Zuma push back, and of a divided government. </p>
<p>It would have far-reaching implications for the economy, all of them negative. Hopes that Ramaphosa is a magician and that, with a wave of his wand, he will turn the economy around and restore it to growth are wildly inflated. But the longer there is delay in his becoming president, the faster faith in his magic will recede. </p>
<p>So if Ramaphosa wants to convince onlookers of his abilities to bring about change, he needs to hang tough in his negotiations with Zuma. Quite simply, Zuma has to go on Ramaphosa’s terms if he wants to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>Yet there is more at stake than effecting an immediate transition. Concern has grown during the Zuma years about the way in which <a href="https://democracyworks.org.za/too-much-power-in-one-persons-hands/">power has become concentrated in the presidency</a> beyond what was intended by those who drew up the constitution (Ramaphosa among them). </p>
<p>So far the constitutional provision that no president should hold more than two terms has held. The constitution also lays down (para 88:2) that while a president may not hold office for more than two terms (of five years each)</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the period between that election and the next election of a President is not regarded as a term.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, there is no constitutional obstacle to Ramaphosa becoming president now. And there is certainly no suggestion in the constitution that South Africa must have an interim president between now and the next election. This is merely an ANC invention, plucked from the air after the party dismissed Mbeki for its own internal reasons.</p>
<h2>Avoiding future political uncertainty</h2>
<p>It’s not too dangerous to prophesy that, presuming the ANC wins the next two elections, Ramaphosa will – in his time – face pressure to stand down early in favour of his eventual successor. Perhaps, too, he might prove unwilling to go. South Africa would again be put through the quite unnecessary political uncertainty about the transition from one ANC president to another.</p>
<p>It follows that Ramaphosa should do more than simply ensure that he replaces Zuma immediately. As he does so, he should state unequivocally that the ANC will change the way things are currently done. That it will adopt as undisputed practice that the person elected as president of the party should immediately take on the post of president of the country. This would of course require him to resign following the election of his successor as party leader. </p>
<p>This is a normal democratic practice. It is common sense. It would be stabilising. And it would demonstrate that South Africa is no <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42685356">shithole democracy</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>President Jacob Zuma’s camp is pushing to have him replaced by an interim leader as an excuse to prolong his disastrous rule for their own benefit.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/900952018-01-14T15:19:09Z2018-01-14T15:19:09ZRamaphosa takes on ANC leadership role with alacrity: and clarity of intent<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201839/original/file-20180114-101518-lwtkib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa celebrates the party's 106th anniversary with its deputy general secretary Jesse Duarte and president of South Africa Jacob Zuma.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cyril Ramaphosa, the newly elected President of South Africa’s governing African National Congress, made his position clear when he delivered a much anticipated <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/anc-president-cyril-ramaphosas-january-8th-statement-20180113">speech</a> to mark the ANC’s 106th birthday over the weekend.</p>
<p>The statement has historically set the tone for government and informed the annual state of the nation address delivered by the president of the country at the opening of parliament in February. It also outlines the five-year mandate of the ANC’s decision making body, the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-21-anc54-these-are-the-80-members-elected-to-the-nec/">National Executive Committee</a>. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s speech had particular significance because even though he’s been elected as the new president of the ANC he won’t take over the reins of state until 2019 when President Jacob Zuma is due to step down after the next round of national elections. That’s if the normal pattern of succession unfolds. <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-12-18-the-anc-has-a-new-leader-but-south-africa-remains-on-a-political-precipice/">Rumours are rife</a> that Zuma will be forced to step down before then.</p>
<p>Given the controversies swirling around Zuma and the legacy of his presidency, South Africans wanted to gauge, among other things, what the ANC considers to be the main challenges facing the country. And how it plans to face them. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa didn’t disappoint. It was clear – as well as remarkable – that the ANC’s members and its leaders have begun to unite behind a man they now <a href="http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2018/01/12/ramaphosas-new-social-media-names-buffalo-silili/">affectionately call Silili</a> - a derivative of the name Cyril. This was clear from the welcome he was given by ordinary people as he did a walkabout in the Eastern Cape town of East London as well as the reception he got from the tens of thousands of ANC supporters who came to hear him in the stadium. <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/01/13/crowd-boos-zuma-4-times-at-anc106-celebrations-in-east-london_a_23332489/">The hostility</a> Zuma elicited from the crowd stood out in sharp contrast.</p>
<p>In addition, Ramaphosa is looking comfortable in his new role. It was evident from the speech he delivered that he feels confident enough to speak his mind on some of the big issues facing the country. Take this comment on state owned enterprises and corruption.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We need to act with urgency and purpose to restore state owned enterprises (SOEs) as drivers of economic growth and development. Several key SOEs are in financial distress, threatening not only their own operations, but the national fiscus. Many of these enterprises have experienced serious governance lapses and poor delivery of their mandate. These challenges have been exacerbated by state capture, through which billions of rands have been illegally diverted to individuals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But there’s no gainsaying that Ramaphosa faces a tough year ahead as he navigates what is essentially a transitional period for the ANC, and for the country. </p>
<h2>Ramaphosa’s trademark</h2>
<p>Ramaphosa clearly meant to get off to a strong start. As he began his speech, he sounded like a disciplinarian busy extolling the virtues of starting on time. He pointed out that both the gala dinner the evening before and his speech ran to schedule. This was no mean feat – it’s not uncommon for ANC events to start hours later than scheduled.</p>
<p>There was another sign of the kind of leadership he intends to impose on the ANC: he regularly went off script to emphasise a rules-based approach to transforming the economy. So the dismantling of monopolies and oligopolies in the private sector will be done through the expanded mandate of the Competition Commission to create a more competitive economy. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa also appeared to be able to straddle difficult discussions with ease. He addressed hot topics, staying true to the policy decisions taken by the ANC conference. </p>
<p>Take the issue of the Reserve Bank and a decision by the ANC conference that its ownership structure should be changed from private to public ownership. Ramaphosa affirmed the independence of the bank but also called on government to ensure its full public ownership. </p>
<p>But it isn’t going to be an easy five years. These policy decisions, as well as others, will be difficult to implement. It will be interesting to see how Ramaphosa and his national executive committee navigate these waters. </p>
<h2>Room for manoeuvre</h2>
<p>The difficult work begins now. </p>
<p>Ramaphosa’s rules-based logic is likely to provide him with political mileage. In particular, it’s likely to earn him the confidence of a divided national executive committee. </p>
<p>The other thing that’s likely to give him room for manoeuvre is his emphasis on unity and party cohesion. This should help him counter perceptions that he’s cut from money rather than from the ANC’s culture and traditions given his cosy relationship with South Africa’s captains of industry as a result of his long stint in the private sector.</p>
<p>The time between now and the 2019 national elections is, in effect, a transitional period that needs to be characterised by strong backroom negotiations on a range of difficult issues. These include the removal of Zuma, as well as some of his problematic cabinet members, and the recapitalisation of state owned institutions. </p>
<p>There is a lot of confidence-building that the ANC leadership has to do. Zuma has weakened the ANC – as well as the government. And the South African economy has been haemorrhaging for the past 10 years. Confidence has been hit by the weakening of state owned enterprises such as South African Airways and the country’s energy utility Eskom, <a href="https://theconversation.com/public-enterprises-played-a-big-part-in-south-africas-credit-ratings-downgrade-75745">downgrades</a> by international rating agencies, corruption in the private and public sectors, investigations into state capture and widespread incidences of racism. </p>
<p>If Ramaphosa fails to hold the party together while simultaneously digging the country out of the hole that it’s in, a big question mark will continue to loom over the ANC’s elective fortunes in 2019.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90095/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thapelo Tselapedi receives funding from the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Johannesburg.
</span></em></p>Cyril Ramaphosa seems to be on the way to uniting a fractious ANC. But he’s got a rough road to travel before he can claim any victories.Thapelo Tselapedi, Politics lecturer, Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.