tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/african-union-mission-in-somalia-amisom-32283/articlesAfrican Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) – The Conversation2023-01-18T14:50:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975542023-01-18T14:50:47Z2023-01-18T14:50:47ZAl-Shabaab is just a symptom of Somalia’s tragedy – the causes are still in place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504205/original/file-20230112-52283-w708x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abdurashid Abdulle Abikar/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For at least 14 years now, the militant group Al-Shabaab has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab">terrorised</a> the southern region of Somalia. Its ambition is to impose a tyrannical dictatorship over the entire country through fear and brutality. To achieve its aims, it has sought to oust the Somali government and its foreign military allies. </p>
<p>I have been a student of Somali political economy for over three decades. I <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/1690.htm">predicted the collapse</a> of the Somali state and political order 33 years ago. That analysis foretold the miserable conditions Somalis have endured since. The political and humanitarian catastrophe predates the terrorist group’s rise – thus, Al-Shabaab is a symptom rather than the cause of Somalia’s misfortune. </p>
<p>There are two main forces responsible for the catastrophe that is Somalia. The dominant faction of the Somali political class is the chief culprit. Their agenda has been to attain power and loot the country’s resources for private gain. </p>
<p>Second is the international community, who are the junior partners of the political class. Based on my observations, representatives of western and African governments fear that Somalia could become a base for “terrorists”, which might destabilise the strategic Horn of Africa. But they are unwilling to engage with civic and independent-minded Somalis. </p>
<p>Most of the expatriate people I have encountered in my research and interacted with in my civic activities see tribalism as a Somali’s defining political character. Such a view dates back to the colonial era when colonisers segmented African people into ethnic camps to divide and rule them. </p>
<p>Out of this has emerged a strange marriage of convenience between the Somali political class and the diplomatic community. Each pretends progress is being made. The truth is that little progress has been made in reforming the political disorder. And much less has been done to tackle the country’s urgent human and development needs.</p>
<p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is willing or capable of changing, short of a radical shift in international pressure or a determined public. As I argue in my recent <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/framing-somalia-beyond-africas-merchants-of-misery-by-abdi-ismail-samatar/">book</a>, unfortunately the tragedy might fester for decades, with or without Al-Shabaab. </p>
<h2>Al-Shabaab’s midwife</h2>
<p>In its first decade of independence, Somali leaders <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Africas-First-Democrats-Somalias-Abdirazak/dp/0253022304">stood out in Africa</a> for democratic rule by respecting the rule of law, the independence of public institutions and electoral terms. Nevertheless, Somalia’s first president, Aden Abdulle Osman, was deeply concerned about the behaviour of a segment of the political class. He registered his <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253022301/africas-first-democrats/">worries</a> in his diary on 5 July 1964: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>God save Somalis from the scavenging beasts in human form that are the so-called representative of the people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The democratic project ended when those who defeated President Osman in the 1967 election turned the country into a quasi single-party state. The mess they generated led to the murder of President Abdirashid Sharmarke by one of his bodyguards in 1969. The military quickly seized power, and foreclosed a return to a representative and accountable system of government for the next 21 years. </p>
<p>After half a decade in power, the dictatorship intensified the tribalisation of public power. The political opposition followed suit. Civil service and promotions in the military, and access to state resources, became based on an individual’s genealogical identity or loyalty to the regime. From the late 1970s to 1990, the military dictatorship confronted a fragmented and equally tribalised and armed political opposition. The state became the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia_1990.pdf">agent of terror</a>. Whole communities were punished and towns destroyed because of their cultural pedigree. This was long before Al-Shabaab’s rise. </p>
<p>The military regime <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161268">collapsed</a> in January 1991, but opposition groups failed to agree on a common civic agenda. The opposition group most active around Mogadishu, the United Somalia Congress, forced out the dictator. Among the consequences of the factional bloodletting that followed was the destruction of livelihoods and the making of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/31/world/somalia-1992-picking-up-pieces-as-famine-subsides.html">first famine</a> in the country since independence in 1960. This was long before Al-Shabaab appeared on the horizon.</p>
<p>Warlords and tribalistic political fiefdoms replaced the dictatorship, and much of the educated elite fled. The balkanisation of the country and society <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.2019.1612769?journalCode=rsag20">impoverished everyone</a> except the very few who controlled the means of violence. Illiteracy rose dramatically and the population’s state of health took a nosedive, depriving the young majority of a productive future. </p>
<p>Most of the country’s current population were born after the fall of the military; few therefore know what civic politics and leadership look like. That makes them easy pawns of the sectarian elite.</p>
<p>It took almost 16 years for a religious group known as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Union of the Islamic Courts</a> to defeat the warlords. This event gave hope to the population that a more inclusive and accountable system of authority would be restored. But America and its regional allies were alarmed by the possibility of an “Islamist” foothold in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/7/21/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia">invaded</a> Somalia and installed in Mogadishu the tribal-based Somali Federal Government, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-interim-government-relocate-nairobi">formed in Nairobi</a>. The Union of the Islamic Courts forces broke into smaller units, adopted guerrilla tactics and successfully resisted the invasion.</p>
<p>America and its allies recognised that the Ethiopian occupation was doomed and subsequently engineered a split among the Union of the Islamic Courts. This schism marked the birth of Al-Shabaab as an autonomous organisation dedicated to take revenge on their former allies, western supporters of the Somali governments, and anyone who opposed them.</p>
<h2>A devil’s pact</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab is only the latest manifestation of the consequences of 50 years of exclusivist political ideology and inept leadership. </p>
<p>It is estimated that the Somali defence force is about 20,000 strong. But several factors have prevented it from taking the challenge to Al-Shabaab’s militias. The lack of necessary resources and quality leadership is partly to blame. Another problem is the prominence given to tribal identity over patriotism and competence in the running of the national force. </p>
<p>In addition, tribalised provinces have their own armed forces because they mistrust the federal government and each other. Finally, Somalia has been under a UN <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Impact-of-the-Global-Arms-Trade-in-Somalia-A-%C3%87anci-Medugu/4df6f722153e1270753c89ec2809047d0d1aba53">arms embargo</a> since the civil war began nearly three decades ago. The embargo has limited the capacity of the Somali government to sustain the war against Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The current governing leadership has not learned any lesson from past failures. The regime is using the National Security Agency to demonise the business community, under the cover of the war with Al-Shabaab. And it has <a href="https://hornobserver.com/articles/1746/Somalias-president-plans-to-use-clan-militia-to-degrade-al-Shabaab-Sources">mobilised tribal militias</a> in the fight. These acts deepen divisions among Somalis at a time when when the regime should be unifying the population for a common cause. Finally, such strategy bodes ill for the establishment of a post Al-Shabaab inclusive civic dispensation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar is Extraordinary professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Pretoria, a professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota. He is also a senator in the Somali Parliament.</span></em></p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is capable of changing.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Extraordinary Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1942952022-11-20T06:29:48Z2022-11-20T06:29:48ZAl-Shabaab in Somalia has resisted military force: now is the time for a new strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495037/original/file-20221114-22-1j0dek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali soldier looks out from a military base where a US special operations soldier was killed by a mortar attack south of Mogadishu in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2022, Somalia’s capital Mogadishu suffered yet another <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/30/hundreds-killed-wounded-in-heinous-mogadishu-car-bombings">massive suicidal attack</a>. More than 100 people were killed. Hundreds more were wounded and thousands will have been traumatised by an attack claimed by the Somali insurgent group Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>The attack was carried out on the fifth anniversary of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia">most destructive suicide attack</a> in Somalia’s history, on 14 October 2017. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for that one too.</p>
<p>The devastation continues despite more than 15 years of effort by successive federal regimes in Mogadishu and the international community to end Al-Shabaab’s insurgent activities. These counter strategies included attacking them from the sky and sending Somali and African Union forces to fight them on the ground.</p>
<p>Some, such as Somalia’s recently elected president Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and his inner circle, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-will-eliminate-terrorism-president-tells-un-general-assembly-/6760778.html">argue</a> that the organisation is a spent force. They say Al-Shabaab has been <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-somalias-security-conversation-he-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud">enfeebled and is now on the run</a>.</p>
<p>But in my perspective, based on my extensive <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186">studies</a> of Al-Shabaab since the time when it was part of the Union of Islamic Courts which governed Somalia in the mid-2000s, this isn’t true.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab remains a strong regional actor and has proved itself to be a resilient force. It has so far defeated all attempts (both internal and external) at eradicating it on the battlefield. This includes the deployment of Somali, western and African Union troops. </p>
<p>As the eminent Cambridge Horn of Africa veteran scholar Christopher Clapham rightly <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Horn_of_Africa.html?id=_SYFMQAACAAJ&redir_esc=y">wrote</a> in 2017, Al-Shabaab </p>
<blockquote>
<p>remains better placed than the officially recognised regime to build up its authority from below, by acting as the most visible defender of Somali nationalism and identity against an international attempt to impose political order from above. It remains a strong regional actor and is able to inflict terrible damage on Somalia itself.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This suggests that pro-western local Somali actors should rethink the combative approach that has failed for the past 15 years. The federal regime in Mogadishu, which enjoys international support, should also change tack.</p>
<p>A non-war strategic option would aim at direct talks with Al-Shabaab leadership, just as the United States did with the Taliban in Afghanistan. This started with a series of talks in Qatar that culminated in the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-107386">withdrawal</a> from Kabul.</p>
<p>The image of Al-Shabaab described by Somalis living under their territories is that of a movement that is adaptable and incorruptible. This is in contrast to alternative centres of power built around clans and clan power dynamics in the periphery. This reveals that the organisation has remarkably disciplined leadership, despite the continuous elimination of its senior leaders by US drones. All in all, Al-Shabaab’s persistence is also due to its unique Islamic (though militant) leadership development, which promotes meritocracy in place of clannism.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/citizens-of-fragile-states-can-fund-public-services-directly-its-working-in-somalia-171541">Citizens of fragile states can fund public services directly – it's working in Somalia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Al-Shabaab’s strength and the government’s weakness</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab continues to show its might on the streets of Mogadishu. Following the October <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/twin-blasts-rock-mogadishu-as-somali-president-sheikh-mohamud-meets-security-officials-4001982">attack</a>, Al-Shabaab forces also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/">bombed</a> the busiest road during the day in Mogadishu. </p>
<p>A few days later, they shelled Maka Al-Mukarammah Road, the busiest road during the night in Mogadishu. This prompted a Somali security company to <a href="https://eagleranges.com/2022/10/15/eagle-ranges-services-security-bulletin-vol-2/">report</a> that Al-Shabaab had become more organised, dangerous and wealthy than it was before.</p>
<p>The armed group has gained informal control of Mogadishu. This is clear from its capture of the Laba-Buundaale settlement on the outskirts of Mogadishu in September.</p>
<p>This imperils a regime that is still standing only because of the continued presence of regional forces as well as the fact that the international community is sustaining it financially.</p>
<p>Somalia is profoundly fragmented, and the dysfunctionality of the state is unprecedented in the Africa. In my observation, Somalia has no functioning state and is no longer a state capable of protecting itself from Al-Shabaab, let alone protecting its people.</p>
<p>The federal government is both weak and without public legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy – developed from its lack of inclusiveness and unwillingness to share power – prevents the federal regime from consolidating its authority outside of Mogadishu. Since the ouster of the military regime in January 1991, no group or government has proved capable of restoring the once unified state, let alone controlling the entirety of Somalia.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab is now on the verge of capturing the capital, especially its concentration is geared towards seizing the presidential palace and the airport. They are back clandestinely to Mogadishu after many trained rank-and-file members were forced by the US airstrikes in recent months to flee to the southern port city of Kismayu for sanctuary.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-somali-clan-elders-could-hold-the-key-to-opening-dialogue-with-al-shabaab-152759">Why Somali clan elders could hold the key to opening dialogue with Al-Shabaab</a>
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</em>
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<h2>The case for power-sharing</h2>
<p>Successive Somali regimes, including the current one, have never attempted to officially negotiate with Al-Shabaab. Instead, all presidents wore military fatigues and insisted on the military approach. But they didn’t achieve a decisive victory.</p>
<p>The current regime has gone even further by <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/farmers-turned-fighters-in-somalias-grassroots-offensive-against-al-shabaab-12719627">declaring</a> a clan-based war on Al-Shabaab. To this end, various clans in central Somalia regions have been mobilising ragtag militia to fight Al-Shabaab alongside the federal regime forces. Hundreds of peripheral clan militias were involved in clashes that began in August.</p>
<p>While encouraging clans to fight against Al-Shabaab, the federal regime did not provide those clans with the necessary resources and equipment. Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the disorganised nature of these clans to seize more territory and to attack in the centre of Mogadishu in broad daylight.</p>
<p>The military strategy of dealing with Al-Shabaab through clan militias ignores the fact that it, in the first place, operates freely in areas run by clans that feel marginalised by the broader clan-dominated “federal” fiefdoms. The current “federal” state structure in Mogadishu, which is <a href="https://hiiraan.com/op4/2022/jun/186645/clan_federalism_in_somalia.aspx">clan-centric</a> in nature, is legitimate in the eyes of the international community that <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/political-representation-somalia-citizenship-clanism-and-territoriality">imposed</a> it. But it is not legitimate in the eyes of so many Somalis, both inside and outside Somalia.</p>
<h2>A political settlement</h2>
<p>The calls for clans to intensify the war against Al-Shabaab without the lead of the centre is the last desperate attempts to face Al-Shabaab militarily. American drones have failed to do that. So has more than 15 years of the African Union armed mission inside Somalia. The clan strategy appears to be ending up in failure after failure.</p>
<p>The military approach cannot continue to be the only one approach. What’s needed is support for a Somali-owned political settlement between the federal regime and Al-Shabaab. Without seeking domestic legitimacy through genuine power-sharing, it would be hard for the federal regime to win over Al-Shabaab. The only way left for dealing with Al-Shabaab is initiating a political settlement. This is the right time to seize such an opportunity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Haji Ingiriis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab remains a strong regional actor and has proved itself to be a resilient force. It’s time to weigh a non-war strategic optionMohamed Haji Ingiriis, Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913662022-10-11T14:02:01Z2022-10-11T14:02:01ZWhat drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486829/original/file-20220927-24-32z7kt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu where a 30-hour Al-Shabaab siege left 21 people dead in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hassan Elmi/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In response to external – and at times internal – pressure, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia has evolved over time. </p>
<p>Before 2008, Al-Shabaab was a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">small player</a> within the larger Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Union was an umbrella entity that emerged around 2003 to provide justice and security in Mogadishu in the absence of a formal state.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Ethiopia</a> – in support of the transitional Somali government – militarily defeated the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Over the next two years, Al-Shabaab broke away from the Union and rose to prominence in Somalia.</p>
<p>It transformed from a terrorist organisation, fighting Ethiopian occupation, to something of a de-facto state. It gained territory, eventually controlling most of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>Between 2010 and 2013, the group survived <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">military and territorial losses</a>, as well as a significant <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf">leadership crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab adapted and honed its ability to conduct attacks. It also established systems to tax businesses and the public, both inside and outside of the territory it controlled. The group began to provide an alternative justice structure based on a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strict and harsh interpretation</a> of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law">Sharia</a> (Islamic law) – though its understanding of Sharia was highly debatable even among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafi circles</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Al-Shabaab remains the most <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-us-counterterrorism-somalia-necessary-insufficient">formidable challenge</a> to the Somali government, and its regional and international partners. </p>
<p>Despite the shifts it has experienced over 15 years, some things have remained crucial to Al-Shabaab’s mission in Somalia. Scholars have noted <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299149628">three goals</a> that have been continually reasserted:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ridding the country of foreign troops</p></li>
<li><p>implementing Sharia </p></li>
<li><p>defeating the Somali federal government </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fully understanding these motivations, however, can be a challenge. This is because the organisation’s goals can change with time and the views of the leadership can be different from those of recruits. </p>
<p>Yet, examining these motivations offers important and actionable insights into the factors that perpetuate the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">conflict in Somalia</a> or block efforts to resolve it.</p>
<h2>Hostility to foreign troops</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s nationalist stance against foreign troops in Somalia has been a theme throughout its evolution.</p>
<p>Following the US backing of a warlord coalition during the Islamic Courts Union era and Ethiopia’s military intervention, Al-Shabaab began to <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-courts-union#text_block_19602">spread a message</a> in opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Somalia. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">“maximalist and violent pan-Islamist members”</a> within the group’s leadership ranks at the time. However, Al-Shabaab’s outspokenness against foreign forces resonated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">deep-rooted Somali hostility</a> against Ethiopia and broader nationalist narratives that existed, separate from Salafi and extremist trends. Ultimately, this served as an incredible recruitment tool.</p>
<p>After Ethiopia withdrew forces in 2009, Al-Shabaab shifted its focus to the expulsion of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission’s role included <a href="https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/">protecting federal institutions</a>. AMISOM has since been replaced by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-is-still-fragile-what-the-new-african-union-mission-can-do-to-help-stabilise-it-180430">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</a>, which Al-Shaaab continues to oppose. </p>
<p>The group also wants to <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">get rid of the US</a>. This is due to the country’s airstrikes and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61631439">special operations forces in Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey is another <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaabs-expanding-anti-turkish-campaign-in-somalia/">unwelcome foreign power</a> because it supports the Somali federal government. It also advises and trains the military. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab additionally opposes the <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">United Arab Emirates’ economic interests</a> in Somali ports and military bases.</p>
<h2>Implementing Sharia</h2>
<p>Implementing its own version of Sharia (Islamic law) has remained a pillar of Al-Shabaab’s agenda throughout its existence. </p>
<p>The group embraces a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafist interpretation</a> of Sharia. This includes the imposition of harsh punishments for infractions and the rejection of Sufi traditions that many Somalis follow. However, this goal has, as researchers have pointed out, taken “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">different forms according to the situation and the strength of the organisation</a>”. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2006, Al-Shabaab didn’t antagonise Sufi orders in the way it did between 2008 and 2009 because it wasn’t as powerful. As the group began to experience military pressure and territorial losses in the period after 2011-2012, the implementation of Sharia varied across Somalia, with some Al-Shabaab provincial (<em>wilayat</em>) governors operating more reasonably than others.</p>
<p>More recently, in 2019, Ahmed Diriye – Al-Shabaab’s current leader – expressed a tougher stance. He declared that Sharia ought to be implemented without “<a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">concession or compromise</a>”. </p>
<h2>Desire to govern</h2>
<p>Defeating the Somali federal government and federal member states is another important agenda item for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The group sees itself as an alternative to the Somali government. This is evident in its efforts to govern territory. It also provides security, justice and other services that the government <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">has failed</a> to effectively provide. </p>
<p>The organisation’s influence in the sphere of governance is notable in three areas: justice, taxation and dispute mediation. </p>
<p>First, Al-Shabaab’s shadow court system has offered pathways to justice for Somalis. It addresses the problems of the population it controls, including divorce, inheritance and land disputes. It then provides rulings it can actually enforce. </p>
<p>The government’s court and justice system are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">reportedly</a> less consistent. Its rulings aren’t always enforced and it faces issues of corruption.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s courts <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">attract residents</a> from areas outside the organisation’s immediate territorial control. This is because the courts help solve practical problems. </p>
<p>Second, the group maintains a taxation system that has spread beyond government-controlled territories. This <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">likely surpasses</a> the Somali government’s own taxation abilities. </p>
<p>Through its taxation of businesses, transportation, ports and other sectors, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://hiraalinstitute.org/a-losing-game-countering-al-shababs-financial-system/">some services</a>, such as regulating the production of certain export products. However, the main benefit of “taxation” is protection from the group. </p>
<p>The organisation also collects <em>zakat</em>, a charitable contribution required for Muslims. However, it uses much of this collection to bolster its own coffers rather than redistributing it to the community. </p>
<p>Third, Al-Shabaab has presented itself as capable of successfully intervening in clan disputes. In an <a href="https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/in-hearts-and-minds-effort-shabaab-boasts-of-settling-dispute-between-conflicting-tribes-in-southern-somalia.html">October 2020 press release</a>, the organisation claimed it’s “keen to solve the problems and differences that arise between the tribes, and it has shown remarkable success in settling decades-long disputes among them”. </p>
<p>Mediating clan disputes is central to Al-Shabaab’s ambitions to establish a unified Islamic state. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>After 15 years of conflict, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to stability in Somalia and its neighbours, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">like Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>Understanding its motives to expel foreign troops, implement its version of Sharia and defeat the government raises questions on how to end their insurgency. </p>
<p>With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-election-raises-more-questions-than-answers-183833">recent election</a> of Somali president Hassan Mohamud, there appears to be renewed government focus on not just weakening Al-Shabaab, but eliminating it. As part of this effort, the government has “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">hailed</a>” mobilisation efforts by local militia (called Ma'awisley) against the group. </p>
<p>The new administration has called for the expansion of these resistance efforts. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">sent government troops</a> to join local militia in an offensive against Al-Shabaab. Time will tell if this new strategy will strategically alter the course in the fight against the group. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-engagement-al-shabaab-somalia">Political engagement</a> with Al-Shabaab is another potential avenue that could complement military operations. </p>
<p>However, prospects for negotiation are poor. This is because of Al-Shabaab’s reluctance to engage in negotiations, its uncompromising position on foreign troop withdrawal and the government’s commitment to eliminating the group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daisy Muibu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab’s evolution over nearly two decades has been centred around three major goals.Daisy Muibu, Assistant Professor, University of AlabamaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1838402022-05-29T08:21:19Z2022-05-29T08:21:19ZUS will soon redeploy troops in Somalia: the mission and key goals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465276/original/file-20220525-17-f002gr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US troops in Djibouti in 2003 on a mission to watch terrorist groups in countries that include Somalia.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Biden administration in the US recently announced it would be providing a “persistent presence” in Somalia of up to “around 450” US soldiers, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html">reversing</a> a decision taken by US president Donald Trump in December 2020 to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/africa/trump-somalia-troop-withdrawal.html">withdraw</a> about 700 troops from the country. Security policy expert Paul D. Williams provides an insight into the change of tack.</em></p>
<h2>What prompted the US decision to redeploy in Somalia?</h2>
<p>Several factors probably prompted the Biden administration’s decision. First, in my view, this isn’t a change of policy, it’s about logistics. US troops will continue to perform the same tasks as before. But they will once again be based in Somalia rather than outside the country, which required them to ‘commute’ to work. Commuting was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/15/us-military-somalia-afghanistan/">far from ideal</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the security conditions in Somalia <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/15/us-military-somalia-afghanistan/">appear to be deteriorating</a> with al-Shabaab able to increase its attacks against civilians as well as Somali, African Union and other forces. Following the US withdrawal, one <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mig2022-01-surge-militant-islamist-violence-sahel-dominates-africa-fight-extremists/">estimate</a> suggested al-Shabaab attacks surged by 17% in 2021 compared to the previous year, including a 32% increase in battles against other security forces. </p>
<p>Third, the Biden administration has been conducting a review of its Somalia policy for well over a year. Perhaps it is now finally drawing conclusions, such as basing some troops inside Somalia is more sensible than having them continue to commute. </p>
<p>Finally, the new Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, is very <a href="https://twitter.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1526546816275255297?s=20&t=by7gPoc3Q4IRp6KfFv07Xw">receptive</a> to the move, calling the US “a reliable partner in our quest to (sic) stability and fight against terrorism.” A senior adviser to the new president <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/new-somali-president-welcomes-return-of-us-troops/6577228.html">agreed</a>, saying Trump’s decision to withdraw was “a wrong” and “hasty decision” which “disrupted counterterrorism operations.”</p>
<h2>Has the role of the US troops changed?</h2>
<p>US policy towards Somalia has not changed; it still includes <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/understanding-us-policy-somalia">military as well as political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions</a>. The overall goal is to stabilise the country, contain and weaken al-Shabaab, and build an effective set of state institutions. </p>
<p>The military is often the most visible form of assistance but it should support Washington’s overall political objectives. </p>
<p>Military tasks include supporting some of the African Union’s troops in the new <a href="https://atmis-au.org">Transition Mission (ATMIS)</a>; training and advising elements of the Somali security forces, including most prominently the Somali National Army’s Danab advanced infantry brigade; and participating in joint operations with those forces.</p>
<p>With the consent of the Somali government, the arrangement also permits the US military to engage in unilateral strikes. </p>
<p>The longer-term project is for the US troops to help build an effective set of security services in Somalia. This includes the necessary infrastructure and institutional architecture to make those forces sustainable. It remains to be seen how much emphasis US troops will put on kinetic operations compared to security sector reform.</p>
<h2>Why is security such a hard nut to crack in Somalia?</h2>
<p>The core problem is the lack of an agreement among Somali political, religious, and business elites on how to govern their country. This is reflected in the lack of a finalised constitution, lack of agreement on the nature of federal governance, and the lack of agreement on Somalia’s national security architecture. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab is one symptom of this lack of consensus about governing Somalia. It has proved a deadly and resilient opponent for over 15 years with the ability to generate the resources, fighters and administrative systems to carry out a persistently high tempo of attacks. </p>
<p>At an operational level al-Shabaab remains the biggest challenge facing US troops. According to the Biden administration’s assessment, al-Shabaab has “unfortunately only grown stronger” since Trump’s December 2020 decision to withdraw. </p>
<p>A White House official <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html">is quoted as saying</a> that al-Shabaab “has increased the tempo of its attacks, including against US personnel” and that its “upward battlefield and financial trajectory” has the potential “to generate more space for the group to plan and ultimately to execute external attacks.”</p>
<p>At the strategic level, the challenge for US policymakers is to use the military in a way that increases the likelihood of the war being brought to an end. </p>
<p>In my view, a military defeat of al-Shabaab is highly unlikely. US policymakers should therefore support a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/ending-united-states-military-operations-in-somalia/">negotiated settlement</a> to end the war.</p>
<h2>What would success look like?</h2>
<p>The goals of the US military in Somalia are to help contain and degrade al-Shabaab forces, strengthen Somali security forces, while simultaneously supporting the African Union mission. </p>
<p>At the operational level, success would entail fewer and less deadly al-Shabaab attacks against civilians and Somali, AU and other forces. This would include fewer large attacks on Somali and AU military bases, and a significant reduction in casualties caused by al-Shabaab. As well as large scale attacks on military bases, the terror group often uses improvised explosives, assassinations, and suicidal attacks by small units of commandos. </p>
<p>At the political and strategic levels, however, success will entail ending the war against al-Shabaab. Since the military defeat of the militants seems highly unlikely, progress would involve encouraging reconciliation between Somalia’s elites. This should include starting a political dialogue with al-Shabaab about how to negotiate an end to the war. </p>
<p>However, a major hurdle remains. Al-Shabaab’s current leadership has shown few signs of being willing to engage in such a dialogue. Indeed, the last time al-Shabaab’s leaders discussed the possibility of negotiating an end to the war was 2018. Even then, their spokesperson described negotiations as a tool for “<a href="https://www.undispatch.com/biden-is-sending-hundreds-of-american-troops-to-somalia-and-expanding-us-drone-strikes/">fragmenting the mujahideen</a>.” </p>
<p>In such circumstances, it is hard to see a quick pathway to stabilising Somalia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams has previously received research funding from the United States government to produce the following publication: <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA616394.pdf">https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA616394.pdf</a> </span></em></p>The core obstacle to stability in Somalia is the lack of agreement among political, religious, and business elites on how to govern their country.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804302022-04-19T14:25:03Z2022-04-19T14:25:03ZSomalia is still fragile: what the new African Union mission can do to help stabilise it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456127/original/file-20220404-21-cg5xjq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somali police officers in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union Mission in Somalia – <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">AMISOM</a> – has ended its 15-year political and military experiment in post-conflict state building. On 1 April 2022, a shift took place as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia <a href="https://atmis-au.org/">(ATMIS)</a> came into being. The transition’s mission is to pave the way for lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa country. </p>
<p>The initial mission’s <a href="https://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/#">mandate</a> – which began in 2007 and ended on 31 March 2022 – was unusual. It had to contend with systemic and institutional dysfunction and security collapses in Somalia. </p>
<p>It also faced a major militant threat from the Al-Shaabab islamist insurgency. The terror group had captured territory in central and southern Somalia in its quest for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Utopian caliphate</a>. This included key ports in Kismayu and Mogadishu. </p>
<p>Since its establishment, however, the Somali government <a href="https://igad.int/attachments/article/1765/030318-communique-tc-somalia.pdf">has reclaimed</a> 80% of Al-Shabaab-held territory. There has been gradual <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13341.doc.htm">economic and institutional reconstruction</a>. The country has also seen significant investment is peace-building efforts. A formal political and constitutional order is slowly supplanting warlordism based on clan affiliation. </p>
<p>Yet, the African Union Transition Mission faces significant security and political risks. These include a resurgence of Al-Shabaab activities, a weak national security sector, dysfunctional politics and a protracted electoral crisis. </p>
<p>To jump these hurdles, the transition mission will need to implement a draw down of external forces. And conditions will need to be attached. It will also need to find ways to harmonise security interventions from major players. These include Turkey, the US, Britain, the European Union and Germany. It will additionally have to support the Somalia election process, and protect gains made since 2007 by ensuring no major military or political vacuums occur.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-toxic-elite-politics-and-the-need-for-cautious-external-mediation-159270">Somalia: toxic elite politics and the need for cautious external mediation</a>
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<p>There are various structures, mandates and operational <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2022/02/exit-of-amisom-consolidating-gains-and-charting-new-trajectories-in-the-african-union-presence-in-somalia/">differences</a> between the new mission in Somalia and the previous one. </p>
<p>The most important is the alignment of the new mission’s <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2022/03/amisom-somali-military-commanders-set-up-teams-to-agree-priorities-for-new-au-mission/">Concept of Operations</a> with the Somalia Transition Plan 2021. This will see the new mission build the capacity of Somalia’s security and governing institutions for a full handover in December 2024. </p>
<h2>Reasons for exit</h2>
<p>Efforts to bring the African Union’s mission to an end were hampered for a long time by concerns around the stability of political and security organs in Somalia. This inevitably led to repeated annual extensions of the mission’s mandate. But after a decade, debate about winding it down gained traction.</p>
<p>Fatigued funding partners, including the US, UK and European Union, increasingly favoured a full exit of the mission. The Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations Security Council also wanted an exit. They wanted security responsibilities handed over to Somalia’s national forces. </p>
<p>This campaign initially ran up against the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b176-reforming-au-mission-somalia">regional mood</a> and the sentiments of the five countries contributing troops.</p>
<p>However, concerns of financial sustainability – the mission’s annual budget ran in excess of <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/">$900 million</a> – and the fear that <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140316141714/http://www.the-star.co.ke:80/news/article-158458/amisom-must-leave-somalia-mission-creep-sets">“mission creep”</a> would develops informed a hard push for exit. </p>
<p>As a result, in 2017, the <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2019/07/somalia-is-making-progress-transition-plan-is-on-track-ambassador-francisco-madeira/">Somalia Transition Plan</a> was developed. This laid the foundation for a full exit through a systematic draw-down of forces.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
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<p>However, Al-Shabaab surged back with an <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab">attack</a> in Mogadishu in October 2017 that killed 500 people. And then in 2020, the country descended into a political crisis after the Somali government <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/why-somalias-electoral-crisis-has-tipped-violence">failed</a> to meet constitutional electoral timelines. This situation has persisted.</p>
<h2>The risks ahead</h2>
<p>In such an environment, a peacekeeping transition needs to be delicately managed. Current achievements need to be protected, with sustainable peace and stability promoted. </p>
<p>Several risks plague the Somalia transition.</p>
<p><strong>Electoral crisis:</strong> The political crisis caused by a flawed electoral process since 2020 is far from resolved. The elections, especially the presidential poll, threaten to throw Somalia back into instability. In April 2021, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210427-somali-opposition-cordons-off-parts-of-mogadishu-as-political-feud-turns-violent">violent confrontations</a> between pro-government and pro-opposition forces. This followed parliament’s attempted unconstitutional extension of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s mandate.</p>
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<p>In addition, the credibility and legitimacy of an election is not guaranteed in the current environment. The president and Prime Minister Mohamed Roble have regular fall-outs over the management of polling. These could be exploited by an increasingly aggressive opposition to stoke chaos.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-protracted-political-battle-led-to-the-extension-of-the-somalia-presidents-term-159073">How a protracted political battle led to the extension of the Somalia president's term</a>
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<p><strong>Fragile security sector:</strong> Somalia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-toxic-political-and-security-order-the-death-knell-of-democracy-159549">security sector</a> is a patchwork of local, regional and foreign (US, European Union, Turkish and German) trained units. It’s disjointed both tactically and doctrinally. The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38914771/The_Somali_National_Army_an_assessment">security forces</a> are semi-professional, under-equipped and ill-trained to fill the gaps that would be left by the exit of the African Union mission.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to reform the sector to the capacity required to take charge of security responsibilities in just under three years. In addition, the Somali National Army, Somali National Police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2021.1885976?journalCode=fdef20&">fragmented</a> along clan lines. They have also been politicised by both the government and the opposition. This risks a systematic collapse should the political gridlock degenerate into aggressive clan-based or separatist mobilisation.</p>
<p><strong>Persistent terror threat:</strong> The Al-Shabaab threat is far from over. The group continues to collect <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561">revenue</a> despite United Nations sanctions. It also wields <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137489890_3?noAccess=true">significant</a> ideological, political and administrative legitimacy among Somalis. This makes it impossible to adequately de-legitimise the group during the short transition window. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_somalia-assesses-al-shabab-moles-infiltration-government/6173903.html">infiltrated</a> the executive and legislative branches of government in Somalia. It has occasionally <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_al-shabab-attacks-military-bases-southern-somalia/6204105.html">overrun</a> the national army and certain African Union military bases in ambush attacks. It is, therefore, highly possible that the group could seize certain operating bases during or after the exit of the transition mission. </p>
<p>It could also besiege the Somali national security architecture and mount a full-scale guerilla insurgency.</p>
<h2>Fragile hope</h2>
<p>The exit of the African Union Mission in Somalia was long-awaited by the government and conflict-fatigued donors. However, there hasn’t been full consideration of the local and regional realities in Somalia. The transition is predicated on overly optimistic assumptions of the role of the <a href="https://atmis-au.org/about-atmis/">new mission</a>. </p>
<p>Still, gains have been made over the past decade and a half, and a careful transition may create opportunities for sustainable peace in Somalia. For this to happen, the new mission will need to avoid certain practices of its predecessor. This includes the pursuit of <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/">vested interests</a> by some troop-contributing countries.</p>
<p>The new mission will need to adopt people-centered interventions that strengthen socio-political institutions, and build local legitimacy. These two aspects are critical for a successful transition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hassan Khannenje is affiliated with HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, a research and policy think tank. </span></em></p>A transition is underway in Somalia. There are massive risks if it is not handled with great care.Hassan Khannenje, Adjunct professor, Wayne State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1595492021-04-23T13:55:44Z2021-04-23T13:55:44ZSomalia’s toxic political and security order: the death knell of democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396749/original/file-20210423-13-1o7ypsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The grand designs of the major political and military actors lack an important ingredient: the views and the hopes of ordinary Somalis.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>By the mid-1990s, it was clear to the world that Somalia had become Africa’s first <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/09/10/most-failed-state">failed post-colonial state</a>. But this vast country of just 10 million people had had a glorious history before this calamity. It was the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2005vvv">first to enjoy a democratic transfer of power</a> on the continent, in 1964 and 1967. </p>
<p>In the 1960s, Somalia developed a reputation for running the most democratic elections on the continent. At the time the continent was mired in dictatorships, suffering under bloody military coups and lumbering under single party rule. </p>
<p>This glorious history is little known. Better known is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">chaos of the last 30 years</a>. In these years, Somalia has endured the most retrogressive and violent civil war engineered by one of the most sectarian African political elite in the continent today. </p>
<p>Is there any chance that this might change? Can the Somali people rise from the ashes?</p>
<p>I believe not, unless two of the key drivers to the Somali disaster are understood – and acted on. The first is that the political and security order – which numerous foreign actors have been investing in – has produced marginal benefits for ordinary people. And it has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Second, this order is built on the reification of a divisive apartheid-like political formula based on ethnic lines. </p>
<h2>Indigenous revolution snuffed</h2>
<p>In 2006, after a decade-and-a-half of cruel civil war, the Union of Islamic Courts, a home grown alliance of religious leaders, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">terminated 15 years of warlords’ terror and tyranny</a>. They pacified Mogadishu and surrounding areas and were about to set up local administration for the city and the surrounding settlements. </p>
<p>But the initiative was short lived. The international community, led by the US, reversed this local initiative, and <a href="https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/the-islamic-courts-and-the-mogadishu-miracle-what-comes-next-for-">empowered</a> a government dominated by warlords. </p>
<p>US (and foreign) influence was further consolidated after 2008 – the year Washington listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation. Since then, the US and its allies have spent billions of dollars on illusive security and superficial development that has failed to improve the capacity of Somalis to take charge of their future.</p>
<p>In addition, they have endorsed a tribal-based federal system advanced by the sectarian factions of the Somali political elite. This political cocktail has produced a context in which violence has become part of the population’s daily life under the shadow of a thoroughly corrupt and hopelessly inept government. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">African Union force</a> in Somalia, fully financed by the US and the European Union, claims to have pushed Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other major cities. But it has failed to defeat the terrorist organisation. This is due to the conventional warfare strategy it has adopted as well as its inability to mobilise the local population for self-defence. </p>
<p>As a result, Al-Shabaab, which has about 5,000 combatants, controls most rural areas. The group efficiently collects ransom (taxes) from all businesses, most notably in the capital city. This is due to the absence of a strong and effective police force in the capital.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s resilience is undergirded by the international community’s disorganised efforts at rebuilding a unified and integrated Somali defence and police forces. </p>
<h2>Ethnicity as political identity</h2>
<p>Foreign actors, including the African Union, back a political scheme that segregates Somalis into exclusive genealogical units in all spheres of political and public life. The country is divided into tribal regions. Parliamentary representation, ministerial appointments and employment in civil and security services (as well as the judiciary) are all based on tribal identity. </p>
<p>Each region is the preserve of a particular genealogical group. And each government department is the fiefdom of a certain tribe. The fundamental political effect of these divisions has been that Somalis cohabit the same national territory, but share little common civic agenda that can guide rebuilding their country.</p>
<p>Such reinvention of colonial and apartheid-like political order has created superficial and short term stability in pockets of the country. But this has been at the cost of country-wide insecurity, and economic and social progress. </p>
<p>This tribal-based political scheme is accepted under the false notion that it reflects Somali tradition. But it only fits the designs of a sectarian faction of the Somali political elite, and their erstwhile ally in Ethiopia, the late prime minister Meles Zenawi.</p>
<p>The current order is an amalgam of two totally contradictory systems. A public sector that is supposed to be inclusive and democratic, and an exclusive tribal-based politics. This mixture has produced a dysfunctional order inept in all of its operations except in looting public resources and alienating Somalis from each other. </p>
<h2>The hope?</h2>
<p>The grand designs of the major political and military actors lack an important ingredient: the views and the hopes of ordinary Somalis. Most Somalis have consistently rejected political tribalism as they so clearly recognise that such politics and polices are the root causes of their privations. </p>
<p>Over <a href="http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/resources/detail/en/c/1118196/">70% of the Somali people are under 30 years</a> of age. Yet this group has had no say in redesigning the country’s reconstruction strategy.
But the imminent political transition due to the expiration of the current leadership’s term of office will reproduce past disasters. </p>
<p>The most recent political conflict between the president and the opposition is about the rule of law and the sanctity of the provisional constitution. The president wants to extend his term of office for two more years after his tenure expired in February while the constitution forbids it. In addition, the president has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/25/the-way-out-of-somalias-political-impasse">stoking ethnic sentiments</a> to boost his illegal and illegitimate effort to stay in power. </p>
<p>Fortunately, the people of the capital clearly understand transforming political conflict into an ethnic one will be catastrophic and have refused to take the president’s bait. </p>
<p>The African Union, whose troops guard the presidency and much of the capital, has a moral and political obligation to thwart the president’s unconstitutional gerrymandering. Without a decisive AU intervention, the country appears destined to return to mindless civil strife.</p>
<p>Thus, the African Union has a fleeting opportunity at this eleventh hour to honour its motto of “African solutions for African problems”. It should challenge the president’s attempt to cling to power, and other sectarian Somali actors. Rather than endorsing a divisive agenda the AU must insist that conflating ethnic and political identity is disastrous not only for Somalia, but anywhere in the continent. </p>
<p>Such a stance will inspire young Somalis to aspire differently. They have shown <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-clans-idUSTRE7B70IU20111208">willingness to jettison political tribalism</a> and could yet rediscover the golden roots of Africa’s first democrats. Young Somalis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/16/world/africa/somalia-.html#:%7E:text=Amina%20Abdulkadir%20Isack%2C%2027%2C%20tended,the%20government%20could%20scarcely%20provide.">are ready for the challenge</a> – is the AU?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The political and security order which numerous foreign actors have been investing in has produced marginal benefits for the population.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1515922021-02-21T08:37:14Z2021-02-21T08:37:14ZWhy we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384987/original/file-20210218-22-5suhag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim women and children in Lamu in north east Kenya. Al-Shabaab's recruitment of female members is most evident in coastal and north eastern counties.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Eric Lafforgue/Art in All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The direct involvement of women and girls in terrorism has attracted increased interest as the nature of recruitment tactics has evolved. In Kenya, their involvement in terrorist networks, such as the Al-Shabaab, is an <a href="http://genderinkenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-role-of-women-in-VE-in-Kenya.pdf">emerging trend</a>. The recruitment of female members is most evident in Kenya’s coastal and North Eastern counties but has also been reported in many other counties.</p>
<p>Women and girls have been <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/monographs/violent-extremism-in-kenya-why-women-are-a-priority">identified</a> as recruiters for the terrorist group, logistics planners, financial conduits, spies for terrorist activities and in some cases, masterminds behind terrorist attacks or conveners of terror cells.</p>
<p>The Al-Shabaab, or “the youth”, emerged in the mid-2000s as an offshoot of a <a href="https://fas.org/irp/world/para/ogadin.htm">Jihadist movement</a> that peaked during Somalia’s civil war in the 1990s. Driven out of Mogadishu in 2006, it continues to pursue its main aim of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia through violent means. It has carried out repeated deadly attacks in Somalia but also in Kenya and Uganda. Both contribute troops to the African Union force in Somalia. </p>
<p>In one of my previous studies, I <a href="https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/women_and_recruitment_in_the_al-shabaab_network_stories_of_women_being_recruited_by_women_recruiters_in_the_coastal_region_of_kenya.pdf">found</a> that women may participate willingly because the extremist ideology resonates with their religiously inclined cultural values. They may also join due to the financial benefits that come with belonging to or associating with the group. Also, women may be forced or coerced to join through deception or intimidation.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2020.1810993">most recent study</a> I looked at different ways in which recruitment occurs to analyse the diverse motivations of women and girls to join Al-Shabaab in the coastal region of Kenya. In particular, I sought to establish the “voluntariness” of their decisions – in other words, did they sign up on their own volition? </p>
<p>I interviewed 36 women or girls who had returned home from terrorist camps or defected from the network. I generated 16 case accounts of women and girls who explained ‘voluntariness’ in Al-Shabaab recruitment. </p>
<p>The study revealed that the gender-dynamics of submission and subordination within families and the community contributes to Al-Shabaab recruitment. However, there were political and ideological motivations too. </p>
<h2>Volunteering to the Al-Shabaab</h2>
<p>But what do we mean by voluntary? </p>
<p>Recruitment was deemed to be voluntary if a woman or girl – without duress – elected to join the Al-Shabaab network. Recruitment was viewed as involuntary if it occurred through deceptive or coercive means. </p>
<p>However, I must caution that voluntary and involuntary are not always mutually exclusive. I found that depending on allegiances, social interactions, ideological resonance, and changing circumstances within and beyond the Al-Shabaab network, recruits may reverse their original views.</p>
<p>Furthermore, there is need to examine different aspects of autonomous decision-making. Some women who join terrorist networks do so to assert themselves within systems of oppression and patriarchy, and to embrace the lure of emancipation within the utopian caliphate. </p>
<p>In my study four main circumstances emerged as the reasons behind decisions to join Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p><strong>Defending the faith</strong></p>
<p>Al-Shabaab thrives on the narrative of Kenya as a Christian state oppressing Muslims in Somalia and Kenya. This resonates with the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt22727nc">global marginalisation</a> of Muslims. Political and religious motivations came up during our interviews, as well as the expressed desire to support or defend fellow Muslims.</p>
<p>Two women explained their motivations to be wives of martyrs and to play their role to support the Muslim Ummah, or community. Nine interviewees explained how ideology influenced their decisions to support the Al-Shabaab cause. These decisions belie Kenyan <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/thesauce/al-shabaab-luring-female-students-to-somalia-with-promise-of-marital-bliss/">media accounts</a> of naive girls manipulated through romantic notions of Jihadi brides or wives. </p>
<p>Aisha, 25 at the time, an Al-Shabaab returnee who defected after two years said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I read a lot of materials. I was sad at how Muslims were treated as a second class group. I didn’t want my people to suffer, I needed to do something. I wanted to assist them in Somalia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Reacting to a personal crisis</strong></p>
<p>Al-Shabaab recruitment thrives on revenge among individuals who see the state as the perpetrator of the injustices suffered in their lives. A crisis event in the life of women and girls – such as the police killing a loved one – was found to be an important tipping point. Some women join extremist networks to avenge the death of a husband, fiancé, or son at the hands of government security actors. </p>
<p>There’s also evidence of recruiters penetrating existing networks of aggrieved women, including relatives of fallen Al-Shabaab members. Peer influence is used to influence or coerce women to follow the relative’s cause. </p>
<p><strong>Close interpersonal relations</strong></p>
<p>Daily interactions with family, friends and peers also shaped the decision to join the network in 9 out of the 16 case studies. A woman’s autonomy in marital relationships may be constrained in ways that push her to follow her husband or other influential male relatives’ lead. </p>
<p>The decision to join is autonomous if it is her choice. Nevertheless, her choice may be coerced within marital and family relationships. This occurs when a woman exhibits excessive deference to the wishes of her family members. </p>
<p><strong>Ideology rubbing off in camps</strong></p>
<p>Some women may have been recruited involuntarily. However, after a prolonged period of time in the terrorist camp or association with terrorist fighters, three of the 16 identified for this study accepted the ideology and subsequently volunteered to join Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Mary, a Muslim convert, was recruited by a friend in the guise of a job in Somalia. She was 18 years old when she was recruited in 2015. In camp she was subjected to work and religious indoctrination. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>After a few days, I was worn out. I was also learning the religion…I kind of started to accept it. I felt it was right to fight for our [Muslim] freedom. It was like a moral obligation. I wanted to be a part of the Al-Shabaab network.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>An examination of the political and ideological motivations behind women joining the Al-Shabaab shows that in some cases, they do make autonomous decisions based on their response to the grievances of the Muslim community. </p>
<p>But other structural and cultural factors were at play such as the patriarchal set-up in families and their communities. Some women’s decision making conformed to subservient attitudes and roles. These women, mainly from the coastal Muslim communities, revealed that they were subject to traditional gender roles, suggesting deference to social norms.</p>
<p>But not all women joining the Al-Shabaab lived lives of subjugation prior joining. Some returnees had good family lives or were happily settled.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151592/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Women’s motivations for joining terrorist networks belie Kenyan media accounts of naive girls manipulated through romantic notions of Jihadi brides or wives.Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of MombasaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465892020-09-24T14:19:54Z2020-09-24T14:19:54ZWhy US diplomatic muscle could achieve more in Somalia than drone strikes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359056/original/file-20200921-14-hk9khd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A military drone replica is displayed in front of the White House during a protest against drone strikes on January 12, 2019 in Washington, DC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United States has used airstrikes against <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/everything-you-have-told-me-is-true/">al-Shabaab</a> forces in Somalia since January 2007, including armed drone strikes from June 2011. From early 2017, Donald J. Trump’s administration loosened the targeting rules and significantly increased the number of strikes in Somalia, apparently with the consent of the Somali federal government. </p>
<p>The new rules were intended to degrade al-Shabaab and reduce its ability to continue its series of particularly deadly attacks on African Union and Somali army bases between June 2015 and January 2017.</p>
<p>Now Trump’s administration is reportedly considering <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/us/politics/shabab-drone-authorities-kenya.html">expanding</a> its use of such airstrikes against the militants into parts of eastern Kenya. This follows al-Shabaab’s deadly attack on the US naval base at <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/world/africa/shabab-kenya-terrorism.html">Manda Bay</a> in January 2020. Three US security personnel – one service member and two Department of Defence contractors – were killed.</p>
<p>Most American airstrikes have been conducted in defence of US personnel or in collective defence of <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">African Union forces</a> and Somali National Army troops. A smaller number have been offensive strikes designed to kill “high-value” members of al-Shabaab. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorism-wars/the-war-in-somalia/">In general</a>, Barack Obama’s administration conducted far fewer strikes. Most of these were aimed at high-value targets. Trump’s administration has often struck rank-and-file al-Shabaab fighters as well as high-value figures. Some US strikes have also caused <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/9952/2019/en/">civilian casualties</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359032/original/file-20200921-14-k7dbdc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Although the number and types of airstrikes often capture the media headlines, Washington’s strategy to counter extremist groups in the region has remained consistent across three administrations for well over a decade. A 2016 <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.pdf">report</a> called it a “tailored engagement strategy.” </p>
<p>Under this strategy, the US supports various partner forces in order to resurrect a Somali state based on a federal system of governance that could contain those extremist groups. To achieve this strategic goal, successive US administrations have poured most resources into their military operations in Somalia. But there have been <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/understanding-us-policy-somalia-current-challenges-and-future-options">political, economic, and humanitarian</a> forms of engagement too.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/understanding-us-policy-somalia-current-challenges-and-future-options">report</a>, I argued that despite these American efforts, the war against al-Shabaab has been effectively stalemated since 2016. This is partly because the Somali federal and regional authorities remain fragmented. It is also because the US, African Union and Somali troops have no obvious way to inflict a decisive military defeat on a transnational, networked organisation like al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Consequently, instead of intensifying airstrikes or simply disengaging militarily from Somalia, the US should increase its diplomatic muscle in order to help secure a negotiated end to the country’s civil war.</p>
<h2>Military muscle</h2>
<p>Ethiopian forces installed the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu in December 2006. Since then, Washington’s principal goal has been to degrade and contain al-Shabaab, the Somali federal government’s principal opponent. To that end, successive US administrations have considered al-Shabaab to be an <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf">“associated force”</a> of al-Qaeda, for the purposes of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. </p>
<p>Since 2006 the United States has spent approximately <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155/13">$2.5 billion</a> on bilateral and multilateral forms of security assistance for contributing countries of the African Union Mission in Somalia. This includes training, equipment, advising and field mentoring programs, often implemented by contractor firms. </p>
<p>Washington has also provided security assistance to some Somali forces, now totalling over <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155/13">$500 million</a>. The plan was to help build local security forces that could take on al-Shabaab and stabilise the country. This would then allow the African Union mission to draw down and eventually leave the country. But attempts to build an effective Somali army encountered <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210">many problems</a>. </p>
<p>In December 2017, concerns about corruption led to the suspension of Washington’s security assistance to non-mentored units of the Somali National Army. The main exception was the <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/21/us-troops-nonprofit-trainers-and-a-lightning-brigade-battle-for-somalia/">Danab</a> advanced infantry units that have been trained, equipped, financed and mentored by the United States since 2014. </p>
<p>In July 2019, enough concerns had been allayed for Washington to resume some non-lethal assistance to Somali national army units engaged in <a href="https://wavellroom.com/2019/12/03/stabilization-2-0-insights-somali-african-union-operations-lower-shabelle/">Operation Badbaado</a>. This was a joint effort with African Union troops to recapture several towns southwest of Mogadishu. The United States also provided information and surveillance support for these operations. </p>
<p>In February 2020, Washington restored lethal, direct security assistance to the European Union-trained 143rd battalion of the national army, which was involved in this operation.</p>
<p>In addition, several hundred US troops have been deployed in Somalia since at least 2014. They operate out of several commands, including the US Africa Command, US Army Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Joint Special Operations Command, as well as a Military Coordination Cell based in Mogadishu. </p>
<p>These American forces have regularly conducted offensive operations, usually in partnership with Danab units, targeting important al-Shabaab figures and facilities. So far, two US soldiers have been killed in such operations, and several others injured.</p>
<h2>Negotiated settlements</h2>
<p>It is difficult to measure the effect of US military actions on the overall war. </p>
<p>This is evident from the relevant fatalities and conflict data produced by the <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a> and the <a href="https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a>. These suggest there is no obvious or direct relationship between US airstrikes and either the number or lethality of al-Shabaab attacks across south-central Somalia.</p>
<p>It is my view that rather than intensify airstrikes, the US should increase its diplomatic muscle in Somalia in order to secure two linked negotiated settlements. </p>
<p>First, a genuine political deal between Somalia’s Federal Government and regional administrations, now known as the Federal Member States. This must clarify the outstanding details of Somalia’s federal governance and set out a new, comprehensive security strategy. </p>
<p>To that end, Washington should be willing to place more conditions in order to increase its political leverage. These could apply on security force assistance, airstrikes and potential debt relief to the Somali government.</p>
<p>If such a deal can be achieved, the US should then support the idea of peace talks between the reconciled Somali authorities and al-Shabaab. In this scenario, Washington should see the strategic function of its airstrikes as being to incentivise al-Shabaab’s leadership to negotiate an end to the civil war. </p>
<p>Extending its air war into Kenya would only make strategic sense if there was good evidence it would help make a negotiated settlement more likely. At present, it’s difficult to see how this would be the case.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In spite of a massive military effort the war against al-Shabaab has been effectively stalemated since 2016.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1434652020-08-04T15:23:41Z2020-08-04T15:23:41ZPublic outrage deters Al-Shabaab more than counter-terror efforts. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351055/original/file-20200804-20-1carguc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hundreds gather for prayer at the scene of a massive truck bomb attack in Mogadishu in October 2017, the deadliest to hit conflict-torn Somalia.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>In September 2014, a US drone <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29034409">strike</a> killed Al-Shabaab’s most influential leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane. The immediate assumption was that Godane’s death would <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/11078304/US-confirms-death-of-al-Shabaab-leader-in-drone-strike.html">weaken</a> the group and reduce its capacity to carry out further terrorist activities. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab, which is Arabic for “the youth”, is the Al-Qaeda-linked militant group that seeks to create an Islamic emirate in Somalia. The killing of its longest-ruling leader was thought significant enough to <a href="https://somalianewsroom.com/2014/09/22/analysis-is-al-shabaab-stronger-or-weaker-after-godanes-death/">cause disarray and eventual collapse</a>. Indeed, the White House <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/statement-press-secretary-death-ahmed-godane">touted</a> it as “a major symbolic and operational loss” for the group. </p>
<p>What followed, however, was confounding. Al-Shabaab quickly replaced its fallen leader, and conducted more suicide-bombings than ever before. From Godane’s death to September 2017, the group carried out 91 suicide bombings. This was an almost <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021">doubling</a> of its attacks. </p>
<p>Then on 14 October 2017, the terrorist group carried out one of the world’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia">deadliest suicide-bombings</a> in Mogadishu. The airport compound which houses the United Nations, several foreign embassies and <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">African mission troops</a> was the intended target. But the attack didn’t reach its intended target. Instead, close to 600 civilians were killed in what still ranks among the world’s deadliest acts of terrorism since 11 September 2001 (9/11). </p>
<p>In the tragic aftermath, Al-Shabaab faced a public backlash, internal rifts and <a href="https://puntlandpost.net/2017/12/03/islow-63-shabaab-ahaa-ayaa-la-qabtay-kadib-qaraxii-isgoyka-zoobe/">defections</a>. The group’s suicide bombing campaign abated considerably. Its attacks in the 28 months between the Mogadishu outrage and January 2020 stand at 30.</p>
<p>It is clear that the 2014 drone strike and the 2017 suicide bombing yielded counter-intuitive results. The first bolstered the group’s terrorist activities, the second slowed them. Using the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/global-terrorism-database-gtd">Global Terrorism Database</a> plus content analysis of news articles in the English and Somali languages, my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021">study</a> seeks to explain these conflicting results. </p>
<p>My findings show that the death of Al-Shabaab’s leader triggered deadlier suicide bombings as the group desperately tried to demonstrate it remained powerful and active. On the other hand suicide-bombings leading to mass civilian casualties and causing strong public revulsion damaged the group’s legitimacy and forced it to reduce its suicide attacks substantially.</p>
<p>I conclude that targeting errors that anger its real (and imagined) supporters have a more serious detrimental effect on the group’s terrorist activities than the assassination of its leaders.</p>
<h2>Deadly response</h2>
<p>Instead of sapping Al-Shabaab’s strength and forcing it into chaos, the killing of its leader triggered a more lethal turn, including more coordinated and deadly attacks on African mission peacekeeping bases.</p>
<p>Examples include the killing of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/al-shabaab-attacks-african-union-base-somalia-scores-killed">54 Burundian soldiers</a> in June 2015, the deaths of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34137622">50 Ugandan soldiers</a> in September 2015, and the killing of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/31/africa/kenya-soldiers-el-adde-massacre/index.html">150 Kenyan soldiers</a> in January 2016.</p>
<p>The infamous 14 October 2017 suicide bombing was part of this protracted campaign. A truck carrying an estimated two tonnes of homemade explosives was making its way to the airport compound housing the United Nations, foreign embassies and the African mission to Somalia. But it was stopped during rush hour at Zoobe junction, a busy thoroughfare in Somalia’s capital.</p>
<p>Before the truck could be searched, the driver accelerated, crashing through a barrier before detonating the explosives next to a fuel tanker. Close to 600 Somali civilians were killed.</p>
<p>The next day, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/thousands-march-somalia-attack-truck-bomb-mogadishu">thousands of civilians</a> marched through the capital city. They wore red ribbons across their foreheads to symbolise unity and solidarity with those killed and injured in the bombing. Many chanted anti-Al-Shabaab slogans. In a country recovering from a destructive civil war, the incident was considered the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has never claimed responsibility for the 14 October attack, even though it’s the only group capable of an assault of that magnitude. Al-Shabaab’s unwillingness to claim responsibility was due to disquiet within its senior ranks regarding the scale of civilian deaths, which increased public hostility toward Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The dissatisfaction within Al-Shabaab manifested in a surge of defections, including 54 fighters deserting the group in one day. One defected Al-Shabaab explosives expert <a href="https://www.radiodalsan.com/en/2018/03/18/alshabaab-official-defects-to-protest-zoobe-bombing/">confessed</a> that he was</p>
<blockquote>
<p>touched by the large number of casualties in the Zoobe bombing.“</p>
</blockquote>
<p>More importantly, in the first two years following the incident, Al-Shabaab reduced its overall suicide bombings by 46%. This was more apparent in areas frequented by civilians.</p>
<h2>Need for legitimacy</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab was formed as the youth wing and radical offshoot of the Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled most of south-central Somalia until 2006. In late 2006, the union was defeated by troops from Somalia’s transitional government backed by Ethiopian military forces, and it splintered into different groups. </p>
<p>One of these, Al-Shabaab, re-emerged and reinvented itself as an Islamist-nationalist insurgency group. The group transformed into a formidable armed opponent of the Somali government, garnering support in Somalia and across the Horn of Africa. A power struggle in the early 2010s led to splintering within the movement, enabling its most militant members to take over and engage in a more aggressive campaign against successive Somali governments.</p>
<p>By 2012, faced with a strengthened Somali government backed by African Union troops and US air support, Al‑Shabaab vacated its major city strongholds in southern Somalia and was forced to retreat into rural areas in southern Somalia. Despite this, Al‑Shabaab has proved markedly resilient, and continues to operate a shadow government while controlling vast swathes of territory throughout rural Somalia in the country’s southern and central areas.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has always targeted civilian spaces. But when such attacks result in deaths that cause revulsion among its supporters, it is known to remain silent. One example is the 2009 Hotel Shamo attack, which killed university graduates. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab, due to its need for legitimacy to govern, <a href="https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/user_upload/2019_SJAG_CaseStudy_AlShabaab.pdf">values</a> public opinion and social capital. Targeting errors that invite strong public backlash have a more serious detrimental effect on Al-Shabaab’s use of suicide bombings than killing its leaders.</p>
<p>With the knowledge that such targeting errors are Al-Shabaab’s weakness, counter-terrorism strategies should include efforts to publicise the targeting errors made by militant groups in order to undermine their support and facilitate a public backlash. This public backlash will diminish their legitimacy, reduce their use of suicide bombings, and potentially lead to those groups’ demise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Ibrahim Shire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The death of Al-Shabaab’s leader triggered deadlier suicide bombings as the group desperately tried to demonstrate its resilience.Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, Lecturer in Security Risk Management, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1265242019-11-07T13:50:12Z2019-11-07T13:50:12ZUrban peacekeeping: What we’ve learnt from AU’s mission in Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300594/original/file-20191107-10940-1xxy6kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier on the African Union Mission in Somalia standing guard on a street during a security operation in Mogadishu, Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tobin Jones</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an ever more urbanising world, peacekeepers will <a href="https://cpr.unu.edu/peacekeeping-in-cities-is-the-un-prepared.html">increasingly operate in cities</a>. In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23802014.2019.1678399">recent article</a>, we analysed how attacks against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) affected the peacekeepers’ ability to operate in Mogadishu.</p>
<p>Cities host key logistical and political assets and institutions. They are frequently the object of fierce contestation among warring parties. Cities may also <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030280901">remain divided and insecure</a> long after formal peace agreements are signed, posing significant challenges to peaceful transitions.</p>
<p>Securing strategically important cities and protecting key institutions are thus <a href="https://cic.nyu.edu/publications/UN-Peacekeeping-in-Urban-Environments-The-Legacy-of-UNMIL">crucial tasks</a> for peace operations. However, operating in densely populated urban areas brings significant challenges.</p>
<p>For one, the density of cities makes it more difficult for peacekeepers to distinguish armed fighters from the civilian population. Militants with intimate knowledge of the city’s infrastructure may also counteract <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-review-of-the-red-cross/article/future-war-in-cities-urbanizations-challenge-to-strategic-studies-in-the-21st-century/D1999E08103B58ECB46D25B9F42C049A">peacekeepers’ technological advantage</a>. The city’s symbolic and political importance often makes it a prime target for large-scale attacks which can be difficult for peacekeepers to anticipate and prevent.</p>
<h2>Attacks on urban peacekeepers</h2>
<p>Some peace operations deployed in cities have come under attack by forces opposed to their presence. Such attacks, in turn, affect peacekeepers’ ability to operate and sometimes have led to their withdrawal. In Kigali, Rwanda, the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers posted to the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm">UN mission there</a> on 7 April 1994 led the country to withdraw its contingent. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unsom1backgr1.html">United Nations Operation in Somalia</a> was also forced to leave after the United States pulled out its troops. This was after the infamous <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legacy-black-hawk-down-180971000/">“Black Hawk Down”</a> battle in Mogadishu in October 1993. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2018.1512858">Recent research</a> has shown such responses may be the exception rather than the rule. But attacks on peacekeepers may have other important effects for operational effectiveness.</p>
<p>In our article, we focus on the African mission in Somalia between 2007 and 2009, the mission’s first three years of operations. The <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-9780198724544?cc=se&lang=en&">mission</a> was deployed where there was little “peace to keep”. It quickly came under attack from al-Shabaab, the main armed group opposing Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG).</p>
<p>Using data from the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317735882">Peacemakers at Risk (PAR) dataset</a> we analysed patterns of violence involving the peacekeepers. An estimated 50 peacekeepers were killed in direct acts of violence in Mogadishu between 2007 and 2009. This affected AMISOM’s operations in several ways.</p>
<p>First, the insecure conditions in Mogadishu forced it to concentrate on its core military tasks – protecting the TFG and its own troops. Patrolling and civilian engagement were limited, which also reduced the mission’s access to intelligence.</p>
<p>Second, attacks on AMISOM significantly hampered its ability to deploy throughout the city. After securing a few key locations, the mission had to focus on protecting these sites. It was not able to spread out across the city for several years. The concentration to a few key locations was partly the result of delays in the deployment of troops and mission support. However, the fact that many states were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159">unwilling to contribute</a> was partly due to the violence targeting the mission.</p>
<p>Third, attacks on peacekeepers at times led to heavy-handed responses. This prolonged fighting where civilians were caught in the crossfire. In turn, such cases increased popular criticism of the mission and led to pressure on the mission to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1291564">reduce the levels of civilian harm</a>. </p>
<p>Such instances also exemplify the challenges of peacekeeping in cities, as al-Shabaab often attacked from positions in civilian neighbourhoods.</p>
<h2>Lessons from AMISOM’s experiences</h2>
<p>These experiences illustrate the particular challenges that can result when peacekeepers face armed groups that know the urban terrain and rely on asymmetric tactics. These challenges appear to have hampered the implementation of some mandated tasks. These tasks included the wider stabilisation of the city of Mogadishu, promotion of dialogue, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. </p>
<p>Instead, the mission had to act defensively, focusing on protecting the contested transitional government and the mission’s supply lines.</p>
<p>These problems were amplified by another factor. For the first three years of its operation, the African mission was under-resourced. Later, it gained more troops and additional external support. It was eventually able to drive al-Shabaab’s main forces <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14430283">out of Mogadishu</a> in 2011.</p>
<p>In summary, our analysis indicates that al-Shabaab was able to exploit its knowledge of Mogadishu and the city’s density to attack mission positions. This restricted the mission’s ability to operate effectively. However, despite these challenges, troop contributing countries did not withdraw. Instead, these countries <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-9780198724544?cc=se&lang=en&am">added more troops</a> to the mission. This enabled AMISOM to prevent the overthrow of the Somali TFG, its core mission.</p>
<p>AMISOM’s experiences suggest that urban peace operations must be given sufficient resources from the outset – that is, personnel, equipment and relevant training. They must also invest in gaining detailed knowledge of the urban environment by engaging local populations. And they must prepare for spoilers to hide among the city’s civilians.</p>
<p>Many of the peacekeeping objectives associated with effective operations – such as extensive patrolling and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343316682063">civilian engagement</a> – seem difficult to accomplish in urban contexts where peacekeepers themselves become the target of attacks. As peacekeeping continues to become more urban, these issues warrant further attention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from Formas and the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams receives funding from the George Washington University. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Lindberg Bromley receives funding from Formas and the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p>AMISOM’s experiences suggest that urban peace operations must be given sufficient resources from the outsetEmma Elfversson, Post-doctoral Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityPaul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversitySara Lindberg Bromley, Post-doctoral researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1235702019-10-01T14:38:58Z2019-10-01T14:38:58ZFor the first time, a reliable count of Somalia peacekeeping deaths<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/294500/original/file-20190927-185403-1jz73qj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan soldiers at a prayer service in 2016 to honour compatriots killed in an attack on their Somali base by Al-Shabaab militants.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Daniel Irungu</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) leaves it to troop-contributing countries to release information about casualties in its peace operation in Somalia. To date, no country in the <a href="http://amisom-au.org/">AU’s mission</a> has publicly released a comprehensive list of their personnel killed in the battle against the al-Shabaab terror group.</p>
<p>I maintain that this is not a good policy for two main reasons. First, all peacekeepers who make the ultimate sacrifice should have their service publicly recognised. Not doing so is not only immoral – it is also likely to have a negative effect on morale.</p>
<p>Second, concealing peacekeeper deaths plays into al-Shabaab’s hands. The group is often able to dominate the media terrain in the absence of an authoritative and trusted AU or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) voice. <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.606/">Optimal strategic communications</a> for a peace operation like this would involve the mission’s representatives becoming authoritative voices in the Somali media ecosystem.</p>
<p>My <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/">previous report</a> in 2015 made clear that neither of the most widely used armed conflict databases – the <a href="http://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a> or the <a href="https://www.acleddata.com/">Armed Conflict Event and Location Data</a> project – provided plausible numbers for AMISOM’s casualties. </p>
<p>I also wrote that it was unlikely, as some reports suggested, that AMISOM had lost “<a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/dsgsm668.doc.htm">up to 3,000</a>” or “<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-01-27-somalia-a-case-for-very-cautious-optimism/#.VeNQTnt4gqE">perhaps over 4,000</a>” peacekeepers.</p>
<p>New evidence has made possible a more accurate estimate of how many African personnel have died since the Somalia mission deployed in March 2007. This new evidence comes from my research into the mission, <a href="https://au.int/en/financial-reports-and-financial-statements-african-union-commission">newly-released financial statements</a> from the AU from 2014 to 2018, a new <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343317735882">dataset</a> listing attacks on peacekeepers, and a new listing of dead peacekeepers on the “<a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/inauguration-of-a-memorial-wall-in-honour-of-the-african-union-au-heroes-and-heroines">Memorial Wall of Our Heroes</a>” at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Previous research combined with the new evidence suggests that a plausible estimate of AMISOM’s fatalities between March 2007 and December 2018 could be between 1,483 and 1,884. </p>
<h2>New financial evidence</h2>
<p>In March 2017 the AU released <a href="https://au.int/en/financial-reports-and-financial-statements-african-union-commission">financial statements</a> detailing the organisation’s spending between 2014 and 2017. In May 2019 it released the <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20181231/financial-reports-and-audited-financial-statements-african-union-au">report for 2018</a>. These financial reports include the death and disability grants paid by the AU to the mission’s troop-contributing governments which are currently Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.</p>
<p>Agreements signed between the AU and these countries fixed the death compensation at $50,000. The compensation for disability would depend on the degree of injury or disabilities suffered. <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/">Funding</a> for these payments came from the European Union, through its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en">African Peace Facility</a>.</p>
<p>Based on these payments, it can be gleaned that AMISOM suffered 439 fatalities <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping/">between August 2009 and September 2012</a>: 22 in 2009, 59 in 2010, 298 in 2011, and 60 in 2012. But there was also an additional $5,779,000 paid out in disability compensation, about $10,000 for each of the approximately 575 injured soldiers. </p>
<p>So, for the 37 months from August 2009 to September 2012, the AU spent $27,729,000 on death and disability compensation. Of this total, 79% was spent on death compensation and 21% on disability compensation.</p>
<p>It is in light of these insights that we should assess the death and disability compensation data provided in the newly released AU financial statements for 2014 through 2018. These public reports reveal that the AU paid $74,624,000 in death and disability compensation between 2014 and 2018.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291972/original/file-20190911-190007-cbxepk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paul D. Williams.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: African Union</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If we assume a similar proportion of death and disability compensation in these payments as in those made between August 2009 and September 2012, this would mean 79% was spent on death compensation ($58,952,960) and 21% on disability compensation ($15,671,040). This would equate to approximately 1,179 payments of $50,000 for deceased personnel and 1,567 payments of $10,000 for injured personnel. In contrast, if we assumed a 50:50 split between fatality and injury payments, this would suggest 746 fatalities and 3,731 injured peacekeeper payments.</p>
<p>Following the money is a plausible but not foolproof way to estimate the number of casualties suffered. It is in each country’s interest to claim the compensation to which it is entitled – but it’s also possible that compensation payments were made to the governments other than via the AU.</p>
<h2>The peacekeeper memorials</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/inauguration-of-a-memorial-wall-in-honour-of-the-african-union-au-heroes-and-heroines">inauguration</a> of the “Memorial Wall of Our Heroes” in 2018 was an interesting development. It lists the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/inauguration-of-a-memorial-wall-in-honour-of-the-african-union-au-heroes-and-heroines">names and ranks</a> (but no dates) of peacekeepers who have died on AU-led and AU-authorised peace support operations.</p>
<p>These include operations in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13698249.2012.706951?journalCode=fciv20">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2559--SE">Sudan</a>, <a href="http://misca.peaceau.org/en/">Central Africa Republic</a> and Somalia. AU-authorised multinational operations against <a href="https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/projects/multinational-joint-task-force-mnjtf-against-boko-haram">Boko Haram</a> and in the <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/crises-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and-the-sahel-alliance/">Sahel</a> also feature. As of August 2019, there were 1,108 names listed on the wall’s 19 columns.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-spurred-six-countries-to-join-the-aus-mission-in-somalia-90757">What spurred six countries to join the AU's mission in Somalia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Somalia mission, too, has a memorial for its fallen personnel just outside its force headquarters in Mogadishu. However, it lists no names or numbers. Rather, its <a href="https://twitter.com/PDWilliamsGWU/status/1110161051943927811?s=20">dedication reads</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In memory of the officers, men and women of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), who lost their lives in pursuit of peace and stability in Somalia.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>So what?</h2>
<p>There is now a reasonably plausible set of estimates for almost the entire period of AMISOM deployment between March 2007 and December 2018 derived from five sources.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, in my book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Peace-Somalia-Analysis-2007-2017/dp/0198724543">Fighting for Peace in Somalia</a>, I cite an internal AMISOM briefing on February 25, 2009 which listed 12 fatalities and 25 injured peacekeepers as of December 10, 2008. I assume this is accurate since it was provided discreetly by the AU to the mission’s bilateral partners. The numbers are low, reflecting the fact that there was relatively little fighting during 2007 and 2008.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343317735882">Peacemakers at Risk</a> dataset is the second source. For 2009, this estimates that 40 peacekeepers were killed in violent attacks. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Peace-Somalia-Analysis-2007-2017/dp/0198724543/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">research</a> suggests that another six AMISOM peacekeepers died in 2009 from illness (4) and motor vehicle accidents (2), making a total of 46.</p></li>
<li><p>A third source is the financial records between August 2009 and September 2012 discussed above, which revealed 439 fatalities. Twenty-two of those occurred between August and December 2009. This leaves 417 between January 2010 and September 2012.</p></li>
<li><p>Fourth, the publicly released AU compensation payments plausibly suggest approximately 1,148 or 747 fatalities between 2014 and 2018.</p></li>
<li><p>Finally, the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/pko">SIPRI database on multilateral peace operations</a> detailing fatalities between 2009 and 2014 had a figure of 261 fatalities for the 2013 calendar year.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Taken together, these sources cover most of the Somalia AU mission timeline, except a period of three-and-a-half months covering part of December 2008 and October to December 2012. But this represents a mere 2.5% of the entire deployment period. </p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article appeared in the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/09/update-how-many-fatalities-amisom-has-suffered/">IPI Global Observatory</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New evidence has made possible a more accurate estimate of how many African personnel have died since the Somalia mission deployed in March 2007.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1023482018-08-29T14:18:10Z2018-08-29T14:18:10ZBrexit, trade and security are all on the agenda during May’s Kenya visit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234038/original/file-20180829-195319-1tsjuy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">British Prime Minister Theresa May during her South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Rodger Bosch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>British Prime Minister Theresa May is visiting Kenya as part of <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1370486/brexit-theresa-may-to-visit-kenya-sa-nigeria-for-trade-talks/">a trip to Africa</a> that also included stops in two of the continent’s largest economies – South Africa and Nigeria. The Conversation Africa asked Kenyatta University’s Leah Barasa to unpack the key issues that will shape talks between May and Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta, and why the British leader placed Kenya on her itinerary.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the context of May’s visit to Kenya?</strong></p>
<p>May’s visit symbolically reaffirms the UK’s leadership role in Anglophone Africa. At the same time, it aims to strengthen trade links as her country prepares to leave the European Union. </p>
<p>During her speech in Cape Town this week – the first stopover on her African tour – May set a target for the UK to become the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/aug/27/may-africa-trip-rightwing-tories-overseas-aid">leading G7 business investor in Africa by 2022</a>. This is part of her bid to promote a post-Brexit agenda.</p>
<p>British <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45325701">direct investment in Africa</a> was USD$55 billion in 2016, just behind the US’s USD$57bn but ahead of USD$49bn from France and USD$40bn from China. May’s visit comes amid increased interest by <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001264331/chinas-investments-to-kenya-outdo-us-uk">China</a> and <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20180319/making-french-great-again-macron-looks-to-africa">France</a>.</p>
<p>The UK has a long history of direct investment in Africa. But it has recently faced growing competition from China. </p>
<p><strong>Trade and investment are on the agenda during May’s visit. What are the likely highlights?</strong></p>
<p>The UK is Kenya’s second most important export destination. Kenya mainly exports tea, coffee and horticultural products. The UK accounts for <a href="http://kenyahighcom.org.uk/kenya-united-kingdom-relations-2/">27% of Kenya’s fresh produce exports and 56% of its tea exports</a>. Motor vehicles, printed materials, machinery and chemicals form the bulk of imports to Kenya from the UK. </p>
<p>Kenya exported a total of 133,658.3 tonnes of cut flowers, earning 70.8 billion shillings, or <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2017/03/kenya-kicks-off-trade-negotiations-britain/">70% of the 2016 horticultural earnings</a>. The UK is also the <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/industry/Kenya-tourism-grew-20pc-in-2017-despite-poll-jitters/4003110-4296860-hfgikfz/index.html">second largest source market</a> for Kenya’s tourism. Kenya is therefore likely to bring up its dissatisfaction with frequent UK travel advisories which affect arrivals. </p>
<p>Currently, there are <a href="http://bcckenya.org/index.php/pages/economic-data-kenya">over 300</a> British companies based in Kenya making the UK the largest European foreign investor in the country. </p>
<p>The UK’s investment agenda will be particularly good news for Kenyatta, who is in his second and final term. The visit offers an opportunity to promote investments in Kenyatta’s <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Uhuru-pushes-Big-Four-agenda-in-key-House-speech-/539546-4541684-123sy3pz/index.html">Big Four agenda</a>. This places affordable housing, universal health care, food security and manufacturing growth at its heart. </p>
<p><strong>What’s likely to change after the UK leaves the EU?</strong></p>
<p>The commercial ties will remain strong because Britain remains a key importer of Kenya’s goods. The existing collaboration on security, which includes hosting training facilities for 7,500 British troops every year, are also unlikely to be affected. The main impact will be felt by businesses that export to both the UK and EU markets because they will face separate tariff regimes and export rules. </p>
<p>In addition, people travelling on business across Europe will face additional visa and trade rules. </p>
<p><strong>Kenya’s battle with corruption will be on the agenda. What can be expected?</strong></p>
<p>The likely focus will be on cooperation, particularly in technical capacity building such as forensic investigations and strengthening systems to deliver services at both national and county governments. Strengthening service delivery systems will build institutional capacity, reduce graft and improve the quality of services. </p>
<p>Additionally, the UK government could pledge to cooperate with Kenya in tracing and handing back illicit funds banked in its jurisdiction. Funds derived from some of Kenya’s big financial scandals involving public funds in the early 2000s were banked in the UK. In one case, the Kenyan government <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/06/20/sh68bn-paid-to-anglo-leasing-type-companies-never-recovered-githongo_c1583527">paid a UK company for goods that were never delivered</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya has suffered setbacks in its attempts to build strong institutions, including those fighting corruption. But in the past the pattern was one step forward and two steps backwards. The trajectory is looking more positive. The UK could keep Kenya on this trajectory by signing a deal <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/07/10/switzerland-to-help-kenya-recover-cash-stashed-away_c1784402">similar to one with Switzerland</a>, under the United Nations Convention against corruption that guides the recovery of stolen assets.</p>
<p><strong>Regional security is also on the agenda. What will be discussed?</strong></p>
<p>Kenya is an important security player in the East African region. Its troop contribution to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159">African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia</a> is critical to regional security. Talks between the two countries are likely to centre on collaborative efforts to tackle radicalisation and violent extremism. </p>
<p>Kenya’s contribution to regional peace is also exemplified by the hosting of <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance">more than 450,000 refugees from the region</a>. This has emerging security challenges for Kenya in the form of violence instigated by some refugees. Talks could focus on UK support for investing in human capital, developing physical infrastructure for the migration department, and the use of technological advancement in surveillance of refugees at the port of entry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102348/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leah Barasa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The British prime minister’s visit to Africa comes amid increased interest by China and France.Leah Barasa, Lecturer, School of Security, Diplomacy & Peace Studies, Kenyatta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1000272018-07-25T14:46:07Z2018-07-25T14:46:07ZAfrica’s ability to deliver peace and security rests on fixing key relationships<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228396/original/file-20180719-142438-19bq007.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">French soldiers patrol in Diabaly, Mali, in 2013, following the failure of the African Support Mission.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/summary-key-decisions-and-declarations-31st-african-union-summit">summit</a> was overshadowed by <a href="https://assodesire.com/2018/07/04/10-takeaways-from-the-african-union-summit/">peace and security issues</a>. In particular, the focus was on political instability and armed conflict in Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea and Somalia.</p>
<p>Conflict patterns on the continent, particularly when it comes to terrorism, have changed rapidly in recent years. This means that the AU has to respond to a highly complex and dynamic environment to achieve peace. And a rich variety of institutional partnerships, locally and globally, are needed to manage conflicts and bring about peace. </p>
<p>Several items discussed at the summit give an indication of the key unresolved issues. </p>
<p>Firstly, discussions on the AU’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/summary-key-decisions-and-declarations-31st-african-union-summit">2019 budget</a> showed that it depends largely on external donor funding. This matters because it keeps the AU reliant on ad hoc funding arrangements for peacekeeping operations. </p>
<p>Secondly, there was no substantial progress on <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20180706/summary-key-decisions-and-declarations-31st-african-union-summit">reforming</a> its institutions, including the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/psc">Peace and Security Council</a>. Reform is vital if the AU is going to be more responsive to conflicts. </p>
<p>Thirdly, given the power dynamics in the organisation, there wasn’t any agreement on integration among key actors in Africa. This means that the much debated issue on the division of labour between the AU and <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/4-11-2016-ASF-Amani-Media-Toolkit1.pdf">five regional arrangements</a> has not been resolved. The five include three regional communities: the Economic Community of West African
States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the
South African Development Community. And two other collaborations: the Eastern African Standby Force and the North African Regional Capability.</p>
<p>Where does this leave the AU in terms of next steps?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/237/Mediation%20Arguments/7459-up-cma-apuuli-mediation-arguments-hr.zp81376.pdf">Recent research</a> highlights several issues that should top the list of priorities. The first is that the AU needs to refine its strategic partnerships with other international actors. This includes its relationships with its five regional actors and the United Nations (UN). </p>
<p>The AU also needs to make the <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/505/Default.aspx">African Standby Force</a> fully operational. This needs to be based on all the technical requirements, ranging from pledged military capabilities to sustainable peacekeeping operations. Related to this, is the need to agree on the relationship between the (envisaged) standby force and the interim body that was set up to <a href="http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-insights/the-african-capacity-for-immediate-response-to-crisis-advice-for-african-policymakers">manage crises</a>. </p>
<p>Lastly, it needs to resolve the issue of funding for <a href="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/F/bo23364698.html">African peacekeeping operations</a>. </p>
<h2>Strategic partnerships</h2>
<p>An important aspect of African peace and security is the AU’s relationships with strategic partners. These include the UN, the continent’s regional actors and the EU. </p>
<p>These relationships have become of the utmost importance given that hybrid peacekeeping operations have become increasingly vital in Africa. The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a case in point. <a href="http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/30125/why-the-u-s-military-is-in-somalia">Several actors</a> played key roles in the mission in recent years. </p>
<p>The AU acted as a primary security actor with several African countries providing troops – initially Uganda and Burundi, and later Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Sierra Leone. The UN, the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in east Africa, as well as several countries – especially the US, the UK, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates – played key roles in giving political support, and the required funding.</p>
<p>Being able to organise something as complex as this requires clarity about the roles and responsibilities of particular players.</p>
<p>That’s not always the case. Take the role of regional bodies and the AU’s relationship with the UN. The AU works on the principle that the regional actor(s) nearest to a particular conflict is best positioned to conduct a peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council devolves power to the local level. The AU finds itself at the intersection of these interactions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228398/original/file-20180719-142435-p0g5iv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The volatile situation in the DRC, sparked by President Joseph Kabila’s refusal to leave office, worries the African Union.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Robert Carraubba</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent case of the African Support Mission in Mali clearly showed how divisions between the AU and the Economic Community of West African
States prevented African actors from effectively mediating and managing the crisis. This case also highlighted the unresolved tensions and <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/237/Mediation%20Arguments/7459-up-cma-apuuli-mediation-arguments-hr.zp81376.pdf">unclear divisions of political roles</a> between the UN, the AU and the regional actors. This got in the way of the peacekeeping effort. The security situation continued to deteriorate and ended up in the (unwanted) <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/01/2013116101421991386.html">French intervention in 2013</a>. </p>
<h2>African Standby Force</h2>
<p>Another example that highlights the need for better relationships is experiences around the African Standby Force. The standby force is a long-standing pan-African dream and is planned to be a continental peacekeeping force with military, police and civilian contingents under the direction of the AU.</p>
<p>In December 2017, four of the five regions where the African Standby Force is based were <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51339">declared</a> to have reached full operational capability. This is a major achievement and shows how far the AU has moved in its stride as Africa’s leading peacekeeping actor. </p>
<p>But challenges remain. A lack of progress in some of regions was behind the AU’s decision to establish a transitional arrangement. Called the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, the idea is based on the principle that states across the continent should voluntarily contribute troops for peacekeeping. It’s seen as a short to medium term arrangement until the African Standby Force is fully developed in all the regions. </p>
<p>In the meantime, harmonising and aligning the two is hugely important and needs ongoing attention.</p>
<h2>Funding peace operations</h2>
<p>A more systematic and predictable financing model for peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN, but led by the AU, remains a critical concern. The AU decided in 2015 that African states should take responsibility for 25% of the <a href="https://cedricdeconing.net/2017/03/28/can-the-au-finance-its-own-peace-operations-and-if-so-what-would-the-impact-be/">AU peacekeeping budget</a>. This was meant to be done gradually over five years.</p>
<p>But the USD$681 million budget approved for 2019 is still not enough for the AU to respond to highly complex and dynamic peace and security challenges on the continent. </p>
<h2>Global</h2>
<p>As African peacekeeping actors face rapidly changing conflict patterns, especially increasing acts of terrorism, they increasingly need a rich variety of global-local institutional linkages and hybrid partnerships. But they’re not all in place yet and many need further development and refinement. </p>
<p>And to be a truly meaningful and leading continental peacekeeping actor the AU also needs to develop the African Standby Force and to work on having more predictable funding for peacekeeping operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theo Neethling receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Conflict patterns in Africa have changed rapidly in recent years posing a challenge to peace and security.Theo Neethling, Professor and Head: Political Studies and Governance in the Humanities Faculty, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909652018-02-18T07:54:16Z2018-02-18T07:54:16ZWhat Kenya has to show for sending troops into Somalia seven years ago<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/206347/original/file-20180214-174963-1facoan.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Somali man talks to Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) soldiers as they secure an area in the coastal town of Kismayu in southern Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siegfried Modola</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops crossed the border into Somalia. The <a href="http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11295/76111/Migue_Military%20diplomacy.pdf?sequence=3">official reason</a> was that Kenya’s national security was threatened by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab. The terrorist group had in fact carried out a number of <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation">cross-border raids</a> during the months preceding the operation. </p>
<p>There’s still considerable disagreement about the reasons for Kenya’s military action in October 2011. </p>
<p>More than six years after Nairobi made the drastic move, Kenyan troops are still in Somalia and Al-Shabaab is still considered a threat to Kenya. Numerous terrorist attacks have been carried out by the Somali group, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">deadly siege </a> on the Westgate shopping mall in 2013. </p>
<p>There are a number of possible explanations as to why the Kenyan authorities made the decision to engage Al-Shabaab in Somalia. These range from trying to prop up the Kenyan army’s image, to currying favour with the West, to making the north east of the country safer. Some strategies have proved more successful than others.</p>
<h2>Proving a point</h2>
<p>One possible explanation for the action is that the Kenyan Defence Force was eager to show that it could actually fight a war. In the run up to the action, the Kenyan military had been stung by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s mocking remark that it was a <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/688334-1233186-a5f0bfz/index.html">“career army”</a> ill-equipped to face a guerrilla insurgency.</p>
<p>Added to this were <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13509/strategic-posture-review-kenya">Kenyan concerns</a> about Uganda’s growing military footprint in Somalia which could threaten the self-perception of the KDF as a superior military power in East Africa. So crossing the border deploying troops in Somalia was part of an exercise to <a href="https://textbookcentre.com/catalogue/operation-linda-nchi-kenyas-military-experience-in-somalia_10730/">enhance the image of the KDF</a> in the eyes of the population in the midst of allegations of corruption.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/454/1/2195212">reports have also suggested</a> that some senior officers expected that the Kenyan troops committed to Somalia could eventually join the African Union Mission in Somalia. The countries contributing to the mission at the time were Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti.</p>
<p>The integration of Kenya into the mission would have meant that some, if not all, of the costs of the military action would be funded by international donors. In these Kenyan officers’ calculation, joining the mission would mean the government would have to find less from the national budget. </p>
<p>Combined, these factors gave the Kenyan army a strong institutional interest in crossing over into Somalia. </p>
<h2>The Somali connection</h2>
<p>Nevertheless, the then Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia">appeared initially to have been hesitant</a> to approve the invasion. He seems to have been <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2011-11-15/why-kenya-invaded-somalia">persuaded to go ahead</a> by the Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, the Defence Minister Yusuf Haji, the Chief of the Defence Forces Julius Karangi and the head of the intelligence Services Michael Gichangi. </p>
<p>An important decision maker in this group was Yusuf Haji, an ethnic Somali. Haji was known to be <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kenya%E2%80%99s-intervention-somalia">behind the idea of establishing a state</a>, Jubaland, inside the borders of Somalia close to Kenya. Jubaland is a potentially rich region with lush rangelands and farmlands as well as offshore oil and gas deposits.</p>
<p>Haji was also known to back the push to unite his Ogadeni clan scattered across northern Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. Leading academic and expert on Kenyan politics David Throup has <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/kenya%E2%80%99s-intervention-somalia">argued</a> that “personal economic and political interests of senior Kenyan politicians and soldiers from Northeastern Province’s Ogadeni Somali community” were decisive factors in the decision. </p>
<h2>Economic and military aid from the West</h2>
<p>There is a third factor. Since the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya has been perceived as a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/97/72275?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic ally of the US in its counter terrorism efforts</a> on the continent. As a result, the country has become one of the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747731.2012.627722?journalCode=rglo20">largest recipients</a> of Western foreign aid and security assistance on the continent. </p>
<p>Despite the close relationship between the West and Kenya, in the years leading up to 2011 Washington had become <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34378.pdf">increasingly critical</a> about Kenya’s inability to implement political and economic reforms. Towards the end of 2011 Nairobi was facing the possibility of Washington reducing its assistance. </p>
<p>Kenya’s incursion could therefore be seen in the context of a country propping up its image as a reliable ally in the global war on terrorism. Nairobi was keen to present the intervention as part of the ongoing Western-led war on terror. A crucial official argument was that the invasion was an <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Risks-and-opportunities-in-Kenyas-intervention-in-Somalia/1064-1276082-a07ervz/index.html">anti-terrorist operation</a>.</p>
<h2>Making the northeast safe</h2>
<p>A fourth explanation is Kenya’s desire to make the vast semi-arid north-east safe for tourism and foreign direct investment. Further south lies Lamu, the focal point of the <a href="http://www.lapsset.go.ke/">country’s most ambitious infrastructure project</a>. Violent attacks by al-Shabaab in the north-east would not only keep the tourists away from the region but also deter potential foreign investors. </p>
<p>There are also great expectations related to <a href="https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/east-africa/kenya">oil exploration</a> and to the establishment of huge transportation systems linking Lamu port with the Kenyan and South Sudan oil fields and the 80 million people in the Ethiopian market. </p>
<h2>Outcomes</h2>
<p>Only a few months after the Kenyan army started the incursions into the southern part of Somalia, a <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-signs-deal-with-S-Sudan-on-highway-to-Juba/-/539546/1679248/-/mocq70/-/index.html">billion dollar deal with South-Sudan</a> was signed. And less than half a year after October 2011, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-strikes-oil-in-Turkana/996-1373886-format-xhtml-10osubz/index.html">Kenya announced the discovery oil for the first time</a>. </p>
<p>If the main reason for the incursion was to make Kenya safe from al-Shabaab and attract foreign direct investments, the impact is less obvious. There has been some foreign investment, but far from enough. </p>
<p>If the main driver was to improve the Kenyan army’s image, it can be described a success. The defence force has <a href="https://textbookcentre.com/catalogue/operation-linda-nchi-kenyas-military-experience-in-somalia_10730/">enhanced it’s standing</a> in the Kenyan population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gorm Rye Olsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya cited national security when it crossed into Somali territory in pursuit of Al-Shabaab militants. But there were numerous other potential aims at play.Gorm Rye Olsen, Professor, Institute for Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907572018-02-01T13:40:55Z2018-02-01T13:40:55ZWhat spurred six countries to join the AU’s mission in Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204270/original/file-20180131-157455-p7rzqw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somali soldiers and peacekeepers from the AU Mission during an operation in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Feisal Omar </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>To understand why states provide peacekeepers to multilateral operations I recently <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159">analysed</a> what motivated states to join the African Union Mission in Somalia. <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/fighting-for-peace-in-somalia-9780198724544?prevSortField=1&sortField=8&start=20&resultsPerPage=20&prevNumResPerPage=20&lang=en&cc=gb">The mission</a> was deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007 and has been fighting al-Shabaab militants for more than 10 years. It has become the African Union’s longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation. </p>
<p>The mission and its partners are currently debating how to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/30/somalias-african-union-mission-has-a-new-exit-strategy-but-can-troops-actually-exit/?utm_term=.7da2163602f1">transfer its security responsibilities</a> to local Somali forces. </p>
<p>Of the AU’s 54 members in 2007, only six contributed troops to the mission. They are Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014). Thirteen others reportedly considered deploying troops but decided against it.</p>
<p>Research conducted as part of a <a href="http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/">project that analyses</a> the effectiveness of peace operations suggests the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/providing-peacekeepers-9780199672820?cc=us&lang=en&">decisions about deployment</a> were based on the interplay between five sets of factors: political, security, economic, institutional and moral. </p>
<p>The decision was political when countries sought to enhance their prestige, reputation, and influence or in response to pressure or persuasion by external actors. Security concerns were behind the decision to act if national, regional or global threats are at play. Economic factors included financial benefits or losses to government. And countries might also have deployed peacekeepers to boost their security sectors. The intended benefits included improved reputation, operational experience and assistance packages. </p>
<p>Finally, countries might act to meet ethical commitments to promote peace or assist people caught up in war.</p>
<p>To establish why the six countries deployed troops to Somalia I examined the story behind each government’s decision. My conclusion is that there was no single or uniform explanation. And that there was often a mismatch between the most common public justifications and what I suspect were the main drivers of the deployments. </p>
<h2>Mismatch between official positions and reality</h2>
<p>The official justifications for joining the mission were usually that events in Somalia posed a direct security threat. Moral commitments to African solidarity to help fellow Africans in distress were also invoked. But these justifications were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. </p>
<p>These included that the mission delivered a number of benefits to countries that contributed troops. For example, their armed forces were strengthened. Or there were political advantages relating to international prestige and external partnerships. There was also economic support for the domestic security sector. </p>
<p>These factors all played a role in the decisions taken by Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia to join the AU mission. </p>
<p>Of course, the mission helped alleviate some regional security concerns. But the tangible benefits for the troop-contributing governments and their militaries were often more important.</p>
<p>Overall, the most important motive was institutional. The next was enhancing national reputation and key political relationships. Third were the economic benefits. In the initial decision these factors were consistently more important than dealing with direct threats to national security and commitments to restoring peace or solidarity.</p>
<p>Gaining access to external sources of finance was also a crucial part of explaining why the countries contributed troops. This includes Kenya and Ethiopia. They initially conducted unilateral interventions into Somalia, mainly for reasons of national security. But they then joined the AU mission largely because of financial concerns. </p>
<p>It also points to a limitation of AU peace operations. That they require financial support from donors can make them a less attractive option than providing peacekeepers to UN missions. UN missions come with a reliable system of financing for personnel and contingent owned equipment.</p>
<h2>Political risks</h2>
<p>In sum, joining the mission brought important material benefits for the governments and their armed forces. But there were other benefits too. For Burundi and Sierra Leone, the deployments were a crucial part of professionalising and forging new identities for their post-civil war militaries. </p>
<p>Politically, the decision to join also helped countries strengthen relationships with key external donors, especially the US, UK and European Union. </p>
<p>But, because they couldn’t control the military forces receiving the money, the donors faced a number of risks. These included operational risks – that the peacekeepers may under-perform as well as the economic risk that resources might have been used more effectively. There were also inherent political risks to the donor’s reputation if the peacekeepers behaved badly while on mission. Or if troops were involved in oppression in their home countries.</p>
<p>The political risks did in fact materialise. AU peacekeepers were accused of misconduct. This included indiscriminate use of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/32221223/The_ambiguous_place_of_civilian_protection_in_the_African_Union_Mission_in_Somalia_AMISOM_">force against civilians</a>, <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/726">illicit commerce</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces">sexual exploitation and abuse</a>. There were also political tensions between donors and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese-killings">Uganda</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/247-burundi-army-crisis">Burundi</a> when soldiers were involved in oppression back home. Nevertheless, joining the Somalia mission sometimes helped authoritarian regimes deflect more severe criticism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams received funding from the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University to conduct this research. </span></em></p>Official reasons for joining the Somalia mission were that the conflict posed a security risk. But in fact other factors played a bigger role.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/873712017-11-15T13:28:05Z2017-11-15T13:28:05ZWhy Al-Shabaab targets Kenya – and what the country can do about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/194320/original/file-20171113-27622-47lgx4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An armed policeman searches for Al-Shabaab gunmen during the deadly Westgate shopping mall terrorist attack in Nairobi in 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Goran Tomasevic</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has suffered the far-reaching effects of repeated attacks by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terrorist group for years. Tourism has <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/africa/kenya/articles/Kenya-visitor-numbers-fall-25-per-cent-as-terrorism-hits-tourism/">declined</a>. Jobs have been lost and foreign direct investment has <a href="http://sciedu.ca/journal/index.php/ijba/article/view/4772">withered</a>. The greater Horn of Africa region bordering Somalia has also suffered, but statistics indicate that Kenya experiences an inordinate <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=&end_yearonly=&start_year=2008&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31&asmSelect0=&country=104&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20036&perpetrator=20037&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=">number of attacks</a> by the terror group.</p>
<p>This trend cannot be explained by geography alone. Granted, Kenya’s porous and ill-guarded borders does make it easier for terrorists to infiltrate the country. But Ethiopia has a much longer border with Somalia than Kenya does.</p>
<p>Between 2006 and 2007 Al-Shabaab conducted few attacks outside of Somalia. There was only one terrorist attack in Ethiopia; there were none in Kenya. In contrast, between 2008 and 2015, the group executed <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1290607">a total of 272 attacks</a> in Kenya and only five in Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Some scholars have focused on Al-Shabaab’s retaliation for Nairobi’s armed <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/114/454/1/2195212">intervention</a> in Somalia, beginning in late 2011, as the reason for Kenya’s woes. Yet Ethiopian forces have been <a href="http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Somalia_Feb_09_2009.pdf">in Somalia</a> for more than a decade and both Burundi and Uganda contribute heavily to the African Union Mission In Somalia <a href="http://amisom-au.org/">(AMISOM)</a>. </p>
<p>It is also worth remembering that the incursion by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) was itself a reaction to Al-Shabaab <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/04/kenya-kidnap-attacks-tourism-hit">attacks</a> within Kenya that date back to 2008. </p>
<p>So what explains Al-Shabaab’s focus on Kenya? <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1290607">Our research</a> indicates that Al-Shabaab attacks critical Kenyan targets for both logical and opportunistic reasons. They are based on geographical proximity to Al-Shabaab’s bases in southern Somalia and reinforced by other variables that play into terrorist groups’ general <a href="http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism/html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter">modus operandi</a>. </p>
<p>For example, attacks such as those perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya exploit existing opportunity spaces and can be referred to as “propaganda by deed”. In this, they seek to raise attention to the group’s existence and viability, thereby enticing recruits to its ranks and spreading fear. In essence, the larger and more brutal the attack, the more the group is perceived as potentially more relevant and powerful than it possibly is. </p>
<p>Indeed, Al-Shabaab’s attacks in Kenya have been characterised by their gruesome effect and have attracted critical news coverage internationally. This gives Al-Shabaab a level of publicity, notoriety and international relevance that often belies its increasing isolation in Somalia.</p>
<h2>Why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s current – though shrunken – stronghold is in southern Somalia. The geographic proximity of southern Somalia to targets in Kenya makes it easier to plan and launch terrorist attacks. The terror group has attacked not only Nairobi, but Mandera and Garissa in the north-east, as well as Kenya’s tourist-filled coastline. In contrast, potential targets such as Addis Ababa, Djibouti or Kampala are geographically distant and logistically difficult to reach.</p>
<p>Kenya is also one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most important states and East Africa’s hub. Its international visibility and status lead Al-Shabaab to make conscious decisions and efforts to attack it. Attacking targets in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi or on the coast, guarantees Al-Shabaab a level of international coverage that a similar attack in Ethiopia, for example, would not.</p>
<p>Most international media operate freely in Kenya. Many outlets, such as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/africa/chinas-news-media-make-inroads-in-africa.html?_r=0">Xinhua</a>, <a href="http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact-sheet/">CNN</a> and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/e">Al-Jazeera</a> base their Africa operations in Nairobi. The media coverage given to horrific attacks here presents presents Al-Shabaab the “oxygen” it needs to survive and, potentially, thrive.</p>
<p>Kenya’s highly-developed tourism sector is another target. The cumulative result of attacks and terrorism related travel advisories has been a marked decline in the number of tourists visiting the country since 2013. This has also <a href="http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Kenya-loses-Ksh40bn-as-hotels-hit-by-tourism-drop/1840360-2426240-qaqalgz/index.html">led</a> to hotel closures and job losses along the entire tourism supply chain. </p>
<p>This appears to bleed into arguments that posit Al-Shabaab attacks Kenya to bring it to its knees economically, influence foreign policy and force it to withdraw from Somalia. We argue that while this is partially true, it is not the only reason Al-Shabaab attacks Kenya’s tourist spots. Rather, it attacks Kenya because it’s a tourist hub and offers ample, opportune targets for terror.</p>
<p>Finally, Kenya’s security services are reportedly <a href="https://search.proquest.com/openview/96e8b0146e01e911cd5e09c582b56378/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=616415">riddled</a> with inefficiency and corruption. Al-Shabaab has exploited this fact. There have been strong allegations as well as <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Julius-Karangi-KDF-Corruption-Terrorism/-/1056/2831984/-/jrikx3/-/index.html">hard evidence</a> that Kenya’s police and military have occasionally colluded with Al-Shabaab.</p>
<h2>What Kenya can do</h2>
<p>Kenya needs to squarely face this reality and take appropriate measures to counter a persistent and therefore predictable threat. </p>
<p>This does not imply that the Kenyan government should anticipate the location or timing of attacks. But it should be aware of and take appropriate measures to counter this threat. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/strategic-logic-of-suicide-terrorism/A6F51C77E3DE644EBD20ADE176973547">Research has demonstrated</a> that the most promising way to reduce terrorism is to reduce the terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out attacks. Kenya needs to proactively address border security and revamp national security apparatuses. </p>
<p>But before shelling out money for the recruitment and training of more security and military personnel, Kenya must firmly deal with the omnipresent bugbear of corruption. <a href="https://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.1235/">Research on the proposed Kenya-Somalia border wall</a>, for example, demonstrated it will have little positive effect if the design and construction are simply vehicles for corruption. </p>
<p>Walls may stop some determined terrorists but they are largely useless if guards are susceptible to bribes and let attackers through. In 2014 two Al-Shabaab affiliated border guards bribed Kenyan border guards to escort them from Somalia to Mombasa. The two were later <a href="http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000153365/how-police-helped-al-shabaab-smuggle-their-arsenal">captured</a> in the city driving a vehicle stuffed with automatic weapons, rounds of ammunition and almost 50 kilograms of explosives. </p>
<p>The overall lack of training and professionalism in the security sector must also be addressed. Close attention should be paid to the well-being and quality of security personnel and equipment at installations ranging from shopping malls to private homes, government buildings and borders. </p>
<p>Third, the Kenyan government has been unable or unwilling to effectively counter negative news stories and Al-Shabaab propaganda that paint the country as a <a href="https://theforeignpolicyanalyst.wordpress.com/tag/terrorism/">“hotbed of terror”</a>. The fact remains that some states, including Kenya, appear to suffer more from the public perception of instability and danger from terrorism than others. These perceptions often correspond little to reality or statistics. </p>
<p>Terrorism is a region wide problem. It makes sense for Kenya to work with Somalia and Ethiopia on shared borders, refugees and the like. </p>
<p>Yet Kenya must also understand that it is the primary Al-Shabaab target outside of Somalia. No amount of regional cooperation will entirely alter that. As such, it must attempt to positively and consistently address the reasons why it is the target of attack largely on its own.</p>
<p><em>Dominic Ruto Pkalya contributed to this article and the research it cites.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya faces a serious threat of terrorist attacks given its strategic geopolitical position, its tourism and corruption. The country needs to squarely face this and take appropriate measures.Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security, Department of Humanities and Social Science, Khalifa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/816902017-08-03T16:11:24Z2017-08-03T16:11:24ZElection offers Kenya the chance to provide clarity about Somalia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/180676/original/file-20170802-549-x3uww6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">AMISOM and Somalia army soldiers after their advance on three Al-Shabaab controlled towns in the Lower Shabelle region. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AU-UN IST Photo / Tobin Jones</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s upcoming general election will have ramifications beyond its borders – particularly for its most fragile neighbour, Somalia. The two front runner <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/01/30/foresight-africa-2017-election-spotlight-on-kenya/">coalitions</a> headed by incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga have both pledged to cement Kenya’s place as the cornerstone of the region. In each manifesto security has been a key platform, ranging from domestic security and anti-corruption and stabilising the border region with Somalia. </p>
<p>Concerns about Kenyan public safety are reasonable given the 2013 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">Westgate mall attacks</a> and the 2015 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080">Garissa University</a> attacks. Kenya has worked hard to recover its place as a vibrant and secure state. </p>
<p>A fragile neighbour with the terror group Al-Shabaab lurking along its borders is justifiably unsettling. So is the long and protracted <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/amisom.htm">military campaign</a> dating back to 2011 and involving a significant Kenyan contingent inside Somalia. Approximately <a href="http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/">3,660 Kenyan troops</a> are on deployment in the South of Somalia in an effort to secure the border from Al-Shabaab militants.</p>
<p>But it’s surprising that Somalia has had limited impact on the electoral platforms in the campaigns of the two major coalitions. Indeed, when it comes to Somalia-Kenyan relations, the manifestos for both parties remain vague at best.</p>
<p>The effect of this has been twofold. Firstly, the plans for the future of Kenya’s troops in Somalia are unclear. Without a clear mission mandate or clear plan for withdrawal risk destabilising the fragile security apparatuses in place or being misconstrued as a victory for Al-Shabaab. Secondly, the vagueness of the manifestos has left Somalis living in Kenya in a state of limbo. Threats of Dadaab’s closure means that more than <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/ke/475-dadaab-refugee-complex.html">170,800</a> people are left without certainty in the upcoming election, risking alienation and possible instability or recruitment by terror groups like Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>The election presents an opportunity for the Kenyan government to provide some clarity – both for Somalis now living in limbo in the country, as well as for the country’s most fragile neighbour. What’s needed is a careful and cohesive plan. </p>
<h2>The refugee question</h2>
<p>The government proposed the closure of Dadaab, the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-10/kenya-court-says-biggest-refugee-camp-to-stay/8257416">largest refugee settlement camp</a> in May 2016. Many saw this as a strategic move on the part of the party because the camp has for a long time been portrayed as fertile recruiting ground for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Political analyst <a href="http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2016/10/closing-dadaab-an-omen-for-kenyas-2017-election/">Laura Beck </a> persuasively argues that such a move would demonstrate a strong stance on terrorism mixed with attracting popular support. Polls have shown that around <a href="http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2016/10/closing-dadaab-an-omen-for-kenyas-2017-election/">two-thirds</a> of Kenyans support the closure and voluntary repatriation of the refugees. </p>
<p>The closure of Dadaab has in fact been stalled since February following a High Court ruling that it would be <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170523-fate-kenyas-somali-refugees-overshadowed-general-election">unconstitutional and discriminatory</a> against Somalis.</p>
<p>What this means for the people living in the camp is that they have been left vulnerable and their future in Kenya in limbo. This is <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20170523-fate-kenyas-somali-refugees-overshadowed-general-election">dangerous</a> for two reasons: it leaves Somalis open to accusations that they are all Al-Shabaab sympathisers, and it opens the door to a large group of people being dissatisfied which in turn opens the possibility of radicalisation.</p>
<p>On top of this, Somalis are notably absent from most discussions about strengthening community, underscoring the ambiguous position they occupy. The lack of clarity makes it difficult to establish, what, if any, plans there are for them going forward. </p>
<h2>Border security</h2>
<p>Both major electoral coalitions say they want to strengthen security along the border with Somalia and against the Al-Shabaab menace. Yet both parties are vague about how to do this. The <a href="https://nasacoalition.com/Nasa-Coalition-Manifesto.pdf">NASA manifesto</a> notes that the coalition will “develop a framework”. But it’s unclear what security threats can be addressed, or how they’d be managed. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://deputypresident.go.ke/images/jpmanifesto2017.pdf">Jubilee coalition</a> is equally opaque. While cataloguing the government’s achievements to date, what the party can deliver going forward is unclear. <a href="http://deputypresident.go.ke/images/jpmanifesto2017.pdf">Regional integration</a> is a priority within the realms of combating terror and fostering greater trade and knowledge transfer through a proposed East African Political Federation. But how to facilitate these aims isn’t spelt out. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/regional-integration-has-taken-a-back-seat-in-kenyas-election-why-it-matters-80574">tension</a> in much of the region, and without details about how these plans will be implemented, it seems as though there is no clear plan ahead for addressing Somali-Kenyan border security. </p>
<h2>Kenya troop withdrawal</h2>
<p>Similarly, it is unclear what the impact of the Kenyan Defence Force <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p058drst">withdrawal</a> will be. It has been difficult to gauge the intensity of the fighting and the conditions for troops and insurgents as a result of confusion and at times <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/27/al-shabaab-claims-to-have-killed-dozens-of-kenyan-troops-in-somalia">conflicting reports</a>. How this withdrawal is managed will have significant ramifications for Somalia. </p>
<p>The Jubilee party has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39810869">insisted</a> the troops will remain until Somalia is stable. But the <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/28/countdown-amisom-withdrawal-somalia-ready">AMISOM withdrawal</a> which will see the contingent start a gradual withdrawal pencilled in for October 2018 and then a full withdrawal of all the 22,000 AMISOM troops from Somalia scheduled for the end of 2020. Thus it seems Kenya’s troops will withdraw when Somalia stabilises or in 2020, whichever comes first. </p>
<p>On the other hand, if NASA are elected, Odinga has already <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p058drst">outlined</a> that he will begin the process of a staggered withdrawal of troops, depending on the situation in Somalia. So, as many <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p058drst">analysts</a> have pointed out, it is unclear exactly when either candidate will begin the process of withdrawal.</p>
<p>But any withdrawal needs to be handled with care. If it’s too rushed, Somalia’s limited infrastructure and security apparatuses are likely to struggle. This risks destabilising the region even further. There is also the danger that a withdrawal could be portrayed as a victory for Al-Shabaab victory, possibly fuelling further support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephanie Carver does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s unclear exactly when Kenya’s next president will begin the process of withdrawing troops from Somalia. If it’s too rushed, the move might destabilise the region.Stephanie Carver, PhD candidate in International Relations, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670672016-10-17T15:20:04Z2016-10-17T15:20:04ZHas Shabaab been weakened for good? The answer is ‘yes’ and ‘no’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141789/original/image-20161014-30269-v1sq2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somalia security escort Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni's convoy to a regional summit in Mogadishu, the first in 35 years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Feisal Omar</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Several analysts have highlighted the supposed weakening of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689">Al Shabaab</a>, the violent Somali Islamist militant group. The Somali foreign minister Abdisalam Hadliyeh Omer <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Joint-military-efforts-weaken-Shabaab-control/1056-3394406-26e9aw/">claimed</a> recently for example that the Al-Qaeda allied terrorist outfit controls less than 10% of Somali territories. </p>
<p>Omer could also point to Mogadishu’s hosting of the regional heads of state of Intergovernmental Authority on Development for an <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/security-beefed-up-mogadishu-host-igad-summit/3494784.html">extraordinary summit</a> in September. This was the first high-level diplomatic meeting in the Somali capital for over 35 years. </p>
<p>Al Shabaab has been battling the Somali government for at least a decade and is responsible for devastating attacks in Kenya and Uganda. As such the regional summit presented the group with an opportunity to attack the top leadership. But the organisation failed to launch any attack and the summit passed off peacefully. </p>
<h2>Under pressure on many fronts</h2>
<p>The Somali national army is increasingly taking on a larger role in combat operations, becoming both a target for offensives and launching them. The regional states, a crucial part of the new federal structures of Somalia often based around local clans, have also increasingly become more involved in the fighting. </p>
<p>The federal arrangement was created to address the distrust between regional – often clan-based – factions and Mogadishu. Several of these have launched relatively successful attacks against Al Shabaab in areas where the Somali army <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2014/02/12/on-federalism-and-constitutionality-in-somalia-difficulties-of-post-transitional-institution-building-remain-by-mohamed-mubarak-and-jason-mosley/">lacks local support</a>. For example, in recent months the interim southwestern administration has launched at least three sizeable, and successful, <a href="https://horseedmedia.net/2016/03/01/somalia-jubaland-forces-kill-7-al-shabaab-fighters-surprise-attack/">attacks</a> against Al Shabaab.</p>
<p>Additionally, an American <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/somalia-accused-killing-22-troops-air-strike-160928171913430.html">air strike</a> in September confirmed that the US remains involved and committed to strike at Al Shabaab. Added to these are rumours about low scale <a href="http://www.africareview.com/special-reports/Al-Shabaab-loyalty-split-between-Al-Qaeda-and-ISIS/979182-2956252-11pj6qvz/index.html">clashes</a> between Al Shabaab fighters loyal to the Islamic State and those loyal to Al Qaeda continued in the more central areas.</p>
<p>Finally, another reason for the new optimism is that the Somali capital is booming. Although there are terror attacks, small hit and run attacks, assassinations and improvised explosives, investors have not been deterred. </p>
<p>All of these developments signal that Al Shabaab is facing stress under increased pressure from the government and the regional states. But it should also be noted that predictions of Al Shabaab’s collapse have come and gone since 2007. So far, the group has remained potent.</p>
<h2>A semi-territorial organisation</h2>
<p>Al Shabaab has transformed into a semi-territorial organisation. The transformation has not been without losses. By losing territories, it has lost prestige, many of its foreign fighters have returned home and it has lost leaders. But it has survived the transformation. </p>
<p>In one sense it perhaps signals, as has happened before, a precedence for the future of the Islamic State. It is possible to survive a transformation from holding territories to a semi-territorial presence. There is “life” after territorial collapses, especially if your enemies neglect rural security. You can survive the wear and tear of this transformation.</p>
<p>It seems Al Shabaab is doing just this, albeit in a weakened state. The future does hold potential trouble for the organisation if the national army and the forces of the regional states manage to protect regional villages. While this remains to be seen, the latest developments have shown some increased potential for this to happen.</p>
<h2>Why Al Shabaab remains potent</h2>
<p>Al Shabaab remains potent partly because it is a relatively low cost organisation. The current situation in Somalia allows it to live off the land. The assertion that Al Shabaab controls only 10% of Somalia is itself debatable. It is entirely true that the areas where Al Shabaab have a permanent territorial control probably is less than 10% of Somali territory. But they have launched attacks in all parts of Somalia except for, Somaliland, the areas of the former British colony that <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/butty-somaliland-20th-anniversary-nur-18may11-122134824/158138.html">seceded</a> in 1991 and have been at peace since. Yet Somaliland hosts Al Shabaab cells as well, and has been used as a staging ground for terror attacks against Djibouti and Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Their fronts are relatively stable in central Somalia. Al Shabaab still holds onto areas it has administered for years without being challenged. The last offensive to deprive the group of its last territorial holdings have yet to emerge. This is despite the forces of the African Union being vastly superior both in numbers, training and equipment.</p>
<p>Outside these areas, the terror group has established a semi-territorial presence. Events in mid-2016 are a clear example of this. According to UN sources, the forces of the South Western state successfully attacked Al Shabaab in the Bulo Fur village on June 21. Al Shabaab in the end withdrew. But the forces of the South Western state also withdrew to their base in Qansax-Dheere District, according to the UN sources. This pattern has been repeated all across central Somalia for years. </p>
<p>Locals expect Al Shabaab to come back after the withdrawal of its enemies. In this way, villages are left at the mercy of Al Shabaab. It means that the group can still pressure locals to support them. It can sanction government supporters in these small villages and it can also tax locals, gain recruits and food. Local villagers have to hedge their bets by accommodating Al Shabaab. </p>
<p>The result is a form of semi-territorial presence that ensures:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>income and recruits that can enable the organisation to exist for many years; </p></li>
<li><p>stream of support for terror cells both in Mogadishu, Somaliland and even inside neighbouring countries; and</p></li>
<li><p>Mogadishu business people who operate outside of the city have a big incentive to pay Al Shabaab to prevent disruption.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These factors are seldom highlighted in the media, who would rather focus on more spectacular but less strategically important terror attacks in Mogadishu.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al Shabaab is facing stress under increased pressure from the government and the regional states. But it should also be noted that predictions of its collapse have come and gone beforeStig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.