tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/afrobarometer-survey-27739/articlesAfrobarometer survey – The Conversation2023-11-09T14:08:42Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166712023-11-09T14:08:42Z2023-11-09T14:08:42ZGhanaians don’t trust the police. A criminologist on what needs to be done about it<p><em>The relationship between Ghanaian citizens and officers of its police service is a tenuous one. Recent <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/ghana-round-9-data-2023/">reports</a> by the research network Afrobarometer show a decline in trust between citizens and officers amid complaints of harassment and bribery. There have also been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/22/ghana-police-arrest-49-as-high-cost-of-living-triggers-street-protests">accusations</a> of the police being used by the political hierarchy to stifle dissent by force during protests. The Conversation’s Godfred Akoto Boafo speaks to criminologist <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/justice-tankebe-579992">Justice Tankebe</a> about the reasons behind the breakdown in trust and ways to improve it.</em></p>
<h2>Do Ghana’s police serve the interests of citizens?</h2>
<p>We can think of these interests in terms of people’s expectations of policing. My <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00291.x?casa_token=INNkhWFO_ZcAAAAA:2fK2oO-IL0kjTq80ptljt3OkL6FHzWX107uJKb5n36mWULN5Qv1oZeLZ-rpssekYoWmQPT76YeabH-g">research</a> has identified four dimensions of these interests. </p>
<p>First is the effective use of police authority to protect citizens from violence and threats to their constitutional rights. Fear of crime is a reasonable indication of police effectiveness. Data from <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/ghana/">Afrobarometer</a> shows that, in <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/AfropaperNo34.pdf">2002</a>, 16.8% of Ghanaians feared becoming victims of crime at their homes. This declined to 9.2% in 2012 but has now <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/ghana-round-9-data-2023/">risen</a> to 24.6%. </p>
<p>The second dimension is lawful police conduct. Police officers do not serve this interest when they engage in illegal practices such as robbery, unlawful killing of civilians or bribery. A recent <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2022/GHANA_-_Corruption_survey_report_-_20.07.2022.pdf">survey</a> funded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime showed that 53.2% of Ghanaians who interacted with police officers paid them a bribe. </p>
<p>Thirdly, policing serves the interests of Ghanaians when it treats people equally. Simply put, people’s social class, ethnicity, religious beliefs, or political affiliation should not influence the decisions of police officers. </p>
<p>Finally, policing must listen to citizens, explain decisions to them, treat them with respect and care for their wellbeing. Fair treatment communicates symbolic messages about a person’s social standing and inclusion; hence it matters greatly to citizens. A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10439463.2019.1636795?casa_token=lLDS6YkQKysAAAAA%3AXkzh0nvzEzSoWaqE7EbUwgVceZH8ko9DjBZmrUw2j8DR5-WzOG9T3YNFE0K2vM7jhax0bria8B2e">survey</a> of Ghanaians shows a little over half of them think the police treat them fairly. </p>
<h2>Why are the police struggling to serve Ghanaians?</h2>
<p>The first reason is the colonial roots of the Ghanaian police, which continue to show in three ways:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>police officers expect people to accept decisions without question </p></li>
<li><p>officers are subservient to elites, who have undue influence on police work</p></li>
<li><p>the police are not sufficiently accountable to local communities. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Some officers try to curry favour with politicians in the hope of future advantages such as promotions. This is exemplified in the leaked audio of an <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2023/10/leaked-tape-ill-be-vindicated-after-parliamentary-committee-probe-cop-mensah/">alleged plot</a> to replace Ghana’s police chief, which is now the subject of a parliamentary investigation. </p>
<p>Beyond the colonial legacy, <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/I-have-sent-over-1-000-people-from-my-constituency-to-security-agencies-govt-companies-Kennedy-Agyapong-1086103">political interference</a> means there’s a risk of unsuitable people being recruited to the police. They may lack the appropriate motivation and ethical inclination. The adequacy of training and the quality of supervision are also doubtful. The absence of credible accountability structures also limits scrutiny of how officers behave. </p>
<p>Finally, the behaviours that supervisors model to frontline officers can affect how they interact with citizens. For example, a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1748895812469380?casa_token=hJs2udKv6gUAAAAA%3Aq5AyvRoxyV6LETdlVElSm3QorxqtSKpB1-_p5C1-xfiLdr6e_oZZvhRNrjD4ZPwg34ruqxO-bNTE&journalCode=crjb">survey</a> found that officers who felt their superiors treated them with disrespect and partiality were less committed to fair treatment of the public. </p>
<h2>What are the consequences for democracy?</h2>
<p>Police scholar David Bayley has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3054129">argued</a> that the quality of policing is an important measure of democratic governance. A country cannot claim to be democratic if the police arbitrarily arrest people, humiliate them, suppress political dissent, and exceed their legal mandate.</p>
<p>When citizens lose faith in democracy, they become tolerant of military interventions. So efforts at democratic consolidation must pay attention to the state of the police. Indeed, some scholars argue that this may help <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=sInqr5ILPE8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&ots=_GhR888aCk&sig=K1cbO5_d9JgjsBbg_Cve6QBhw1Q&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=internal%20security&f=false">save democracy</a> from the threat of the military taking control. </p>
<p>This matters greatly in a sub-region of increasing political instability and terrorism threat. </p>
<h2>What reforms are required?</h2>
<p>First, there is a need for ideological re-orientation. The Ghana police <a href="https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/mandate/">say</a> their mandate is to “prevent and detect crime, to apprehend offenders and to maintain public order and safety of persons and properties”. This is indistinguishable from their colonial mandate. Unsurprisingly, police tactics are militaristic and prioritise order over the democratic rights of citizens. </p>
<p>A democratically oriented police service would view its mandate as creating conditions for citizens to enjoy their constitutional rights. It would ask: “how can we facilitate protests and protect protesters?” rather than “what reasons can we find to prevent a protest?”.</p>
<p>The second area for reform is police accountability. Ghanaians have limited information about the internal accountability mechanisms, such as what happens to complaints filed against police officers. <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/criminology-as-a-moral-science-9781509965342/">Research evidence</a> shows the lack of appropriate signals from the Ghana Police Service deters officers from reporting unethical colleagues.</p>
<p>As I have previously <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-police-violence-in-ghana-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-105813">argued</a>, the Ghana Police Service needs independent democratic oversight. </p>
<p>Thirdly, reforms are required to insulate the police from political capture. Ghana’s constitution grants the president the right to appoint the police chief. The president also effectively controls the promotion of senior officers through the police council. The same processes as those used in recruitment into civil service should be considered. Yet this is unlikely to make a difference unless police officers are fully committed to their democratic mandate. They must maintain ethical relationships with politicians and other elites who seek to capture the state for their personal interests. </p>
<p>Finally, there is a need to develop a culture of <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/670819">evidence-based policing</a>. This requires a closer relationship between the police and academics who have the methodological tools to support the police in evaluating the effects of their interventions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216671/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justice Tankebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The very low public trust in the Ghanaian police suggests a crisis of legitimacy.Justice Tankebe, Associate Professor of Criminology, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127102023-09-13T13:09:11Z2023-09-13T13:09:11ZKenyans don’t trust the courts - the main factors behind this trend<p>The international reputation of the Kenyan judiciary is <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/the-bbi-judgment-and-the-invention-of-kenya/">running high</a> following a raft of judicial reforms brought on by the 2010 constitution. The reforms, displays of judicial independence, and largely positive personal experiences might lead one to expect that public trust in the courts has increased. But among the Kenyan public it has not.</p>
<p>High-profile Supreme Court judgments have showcased a newfound judicial independence. The most notable include the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-supreme-court-nullifies-uhuru-kenya-s-re-election-orders-fresh-vote-1372638">nullification</a> of a presidential result in 2017, the rejection of government efforts to force through <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-s-supreme-court-declares-bbi-unconstitutional-3766868">constitutional changes</a> in 2021 and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001467772/supreme-court-gays-and-lesbians-have-a-right-of-association">confirmation</a> in 2023 of the rights of LGBTIQ+ people to form associations. </p>
<p>Personal experience of the courts is also largely positive. In March 2023 I commissioned Trends and Insights For Africa, a market research company based in Nairobi, to add questions on the Kenyan judiciary to a nationally representative face-to-face <a href="https://www.tifaresearch.com/azimio-protests-other-opposition-issues-2023-national-survey-post-post-election-issues/">survey</a>. </p>
<p>It revealed that 18.7% of respondents reported having been involved in a case in a Kenyan court room. Of these, 43.4% rated the experience as very positive, 25.1% as quite positive. Neutral responses made up 11.9%; 6.3% were quite negative; and 11.9% were very negative. Of the overall sample, 12.8% had a positive personal experience of the courts, and only 3.4% a negative one.</p>
<p>Public perceptions of the Kenyan judiciary have been tracked for nearly 20 years. According to 2021 data from the independent research network Afrobarometer, 16.9% of Kenyans had <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-9-data-2023/">no trust</a> in this key institution, up from 11.4% in <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-2-data-2003/">2003</a>. The only time that public trust was clearly lower was in 2008. This followed the 2007 election and post-election crisis, which drew attention to a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC10308">perceived lack of judicial independence</a>.</p>
<p>More worryingly still, a majority of respondents in my March 2023 poll thought that Supreme Court judges were very often or sometimes bribed (58.1%) or intimidated (59.4%) to give a verdict unsupported by the evidence. There was hardly any distinction between public perceptions of the Supreme Court, High Court and magistrates.</p>
<p>This confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role. For example, the fact that the Kenyan opposition <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">did not trust the courts</a> in 2007 led them to protest about the election on the streets, rather than bring a petition. It sparked the country’s worst crisis. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">political scientist</a> who has studied Kenya for 20 years. My current research focuses on the critical role of the judiciary, which is relatively understudied. </p>
<h2>What shapes perceptions</h2>
<p>It’s important to try to understand the confidence crisis.</p>
<p>Despite reforms there are still regular reports of judicial bias and <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/chief-justice-koome-cites-corruption-in-case-backlog-110117/">corruption</a>. There are also interactions that <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">suggest</a> a “cosy relationship” between the judiciary and the political elite. This casts a shadow over the whole judiciary. </p>
<p>Public perception reports must also be considered in context. The year 2003 was a time of great optimism in Kenya. It followed the landslide victory of Mwai Kibaki over the party that had ruled the country since independence. Kenyans were the <a href="http://www.gilanifoundation.com/homepage/eoy/2002_EoY02comment.pdf">most optimistic citizens in the world</a> at the end of 2002. Public confidence in other key institutions – including the president, parliament, electoral commission, police, and army – was higher in 2003 than any subsequent round of the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/kenya/">Afrobarometer</a>. </p>
<p>Optimism soon turned to pessimism and finally <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">deadly violence</a> following the disputed election of 2007. A new constitution in 2010 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11103008">failed to provide “quick fixes”</a>. Governance and socio-economic problems persist. </p>
<p>Scholars and the international observers have high regard for the Supreme Court’s 2017 presidential petition ruling and subsequent bold decisions. But public opinion in Kenya is divided. My March 2023 poll asked people whether there was a Supreme Court case that they disagreed with. Ordinary citizens cited exactly those cases that have been internationally lauded: 47.4% referred to the gay rights of association case (freshly concluded in February 2023); 21.2% cited the 2022 presidential petition, 8.6% the 2017 petition, and 5% the 2013 petition. </p>
<p>People’s views on these cases differ depending on their own views and interests, the opinion leaders they listen to, and their expectations of how a court should behave. For example, of the 26.3% of respondents who said they were dissatisfied with the way the Supreme Court handled the 2022 presidential petition, 43.8% said one of the reasons was that the decision was not based on evidence or was biased; 11.3% cited outside interference or coercion and 32.8% bribery. And 18.2% said that they were annoyed because the court didn’t nullify the election. </p>
<p>However, 24% said that they were dissatisfied because the court was rushed or had insufficient time and 10% because the ruling used rude or dismissive language. Those who cited time issues or language as one of the reasons for their dissatisfaction were a minority but they remind us of how public perceptions are informed not only by the substance of rulings, but by how judges behave.</p>
<p>It also means that acts that have attracted public criticism – such as the chief justice and deputy chief justice <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">lining up alongside politicians</a> to welcome President William Ruto to the opening of parliament in September 2022 – have helped to reinforce popular perceptions of a judiciary that is biased or liable to being bribed or intimidated. </p>
<h2>The role of the media</h2>
<p>High profile and highly divisive cases, such as presidential petitions, receive much traditional media coverage of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JK0GTl4WbI8">proceedings</a> and associated <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/azimio-responds-to-supreme-courts-full-judgment-on-presidential-election-petition-n306468">allegations of injustice</a>. This coverage places the Supreme Court in an almost impossible situation, earning the public ire of either the opposition (for example, the 2022 petition) or the government (for example, the 2023 gay rights association case). </p>
<p>At the same time, an increasing number of Kenyans gain their political news from social media either <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2023.2232160?src=&fbclid=IwAR2l_o889e75LO1rc3gM33RufPbpn69mFglO0yQvKdOdhdWgjd1C-zKbyrA">directly or indirectly</a> by sharing online stories offline. Traditional media are relatively careful about what they say about ongoing cases or judges – lest they be held in contempt of court or be sued for libel. Discussions on social media are not as regulated. It has become commonplace for opinion leaders of different political persuasions to <a href="https://twitter.com/makaumutua/status/1569342163573415936">publicly attack</a> the judiciary. </p>
<p>The allegations range from those likely to have some basis to misinformation. Views in 2023 are likely coloured by the failure of reforms to bring significant socio-economic change, and by a cost-of-living crisis. In this situation, negative information is more likely to resonate. </p>
<p>This interplay of factors helps to explain why public trust in the courts is lower than in 2003 after years of reform and investment, improved judicial independence and largely positive personal experiences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch received funding from the University of Warwick Policy Support Fund. </span></em></p>Kenya’s confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076752018-12-02T09:44:27Z2018-12-02T09:44:27ZTaking Africa’s democratic temperature as a dozen countries prepare for polls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247701/original/file-20181128-32180-15epy30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Elections, and observer processes are a big priority in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/6124051652/in/photolist-akancs-8mSagA-an1fUo-cL6KV5-Thx7Mf-9Z4FLs-8mRHm3-fjNXKj-6pqC1Q-7TECcV-7TECci-bU3m84-6h8Vwe-bo9sEL-6pqDGN-eF6DxB-4RuJch-9JG8Yy-52Tnxd-6he2Fj-ayfYsU-5m3orW-9JDiYp-yUF2J3-8muuvR-8mP4va-5kY7Ma-aGQLMe-eFKQnc-aDbz5M-8qKc2R-7TECbM-9JDkWM-9FMELA-6pkkLf-nekXcc-9XzUDt-mhtT8X-5HdCsH-eF5XEp-6hfvuc-6j6JjX-9vQJrY-p7MRfr-aWdBRB-7THSNG-6hfQfP-fa865-9p5LqF-dni4cx">UN Photo/Flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than a <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2019.php">dozen national elections</a> will be held across Africa next year. All 55 members of the African Union (AU) are obligated to hold regular and ostensibly democratic elections. They must also invite teams of AU election observers to publicly monitor, assess and <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">report the results</a>. </p>
<p>Is all this electoral activity helping to entrench democracy as the foundation for national and regional security, development and integration? Or have elections become the means for demagogues to grab power – or, more typically, for powerful elites and authoritarian rulers to entrench themselves? </p>
<p>Democratic theory prescribes credible elections as a necessary, but insufficient means, to consolidate real democracy. Real democracy typically abets peace and security. National circumstances vary. But three additional conditions are also vital. They are freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and an independent nonpartisan judiciary to resolve disputes and ensure the rule of law predominates. </p>
<p>Most deadly conflicts in Africa occur within – not between – <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1904/RAND_RR1904.pdf">sovereign states</a>. Recognising this, the AU has made observing and assessing democratic elections an <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/guide-elections/">integral part</a> of its operations. This often happens alongside observers from regional economic communities.</p>
<p>As observations improve, so do opportunities to gauge whether electoral violence and other severe human rights abuses threaten regional peace and security. </p>
<p>In mid-November, there were three important developments at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. These promise to improve Africa’s long-term prospects for collective self-reliance and democratic peace. And this will happen regionally, nationally and locally. </p>
<p>The first was a streamlining of the continental body’s operations. The second was a move to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of member countries. The third was a renewed commitment to improve the depth, duration, and diligence of African election observation missions. </p>
<h2>Three Changes</h2>
<p>President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has been the chair of the AU this year. He has driven a set of administrative and financial reforms to improve its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35132-doc-ext-assembly-2xiannex_-_administrative_reform_roadmap_e.pdf">efficiency and effectiveness</a>.</p>
<p>Headline reforms include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reducing the number of AU Commission portfolios, </p></li>
<li><p>Introducing merit-based hiring and promotion procedures, and </p></li>
<li><p>Reducing dependence on foreign donors. This has been achieved by revising the scale of member state contributions and penalties for nonpayment. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The key structural reform will be combining the portfolios of Political Affairs and Peace and Security. This makes sense strategically. It will ensure that the lion’s share of AU resources supports both urgent peacemaking needs and creates conditions conducive to developing politically capable states. Failures on either front could jeopardise the AU’s strategic plan for the <a href="http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf">socio-economic transformation of the continent</a>.</p>
<p>Two other developments complement these shifts.</p>
<p>One is the Assembly’s decision to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20181118/11th-extraordinary-summit-summary-key-decisions">key governance areas on the continent</a>. This promises substantial improvements in the role and functioning of the <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. The mechanism was established in 2003. It aims to encourage member states to critically and regularly assess their progress in governance and socio-economic development. </p>
<p>After much initial excitement, the mechanism devolved into a largely technical and widely ignored exercise. Its governing Forum of Heads of State sought to infuse it with greater political clout and relevance in 2016. It mandated its new director, Professor Eddy Maloka, to produce an Africa-wide comparative assessment of governance challenges facing AU member states. </p>
<p>This will be presented to the next regular AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/comment/The-key-outcomes-of-the-African-Union-Summit/434750-4648608-sdx3oaz/index.html">February 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The final change involves beefing up election monitoring. Ten years ago the AU entered into a formal partnership with the <a href="https://eisa.org.za/">Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa</a>. The parties agreed on 16 November to seek ways to extend and improve the partnership. </p>
<p>The institute is based in Johannesburg. It boasts an all-African staff from more than a dozen nations. It has helped AU missions on several fronts. This has included the training and application of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a common set of observation principles and democratic election standards, and </p></li>
<li><p>more comprehensive, rapid and technologically advanced tools and training of AU observers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The partnership has also helped the AU to acquire a leadership role among domestic and international election observer groups pursuing greater electoral transparency and accountability. This is true even within Africa’s most troubled states. </p>
<h2>Is democracy dying?</h2>
<p>These efforts would seem to run counter to the question “Is Democracy Dying?”, which has become a preoccupation in the era of US President Donald Trump. African politics, too, are vulnerable to demagoguery, debauchery and divisiveness. More notable is the proliferation of progressive forces at all levels of African politics. They are exposing and combating corruption and other egregious abuses of power. </p>
<p>Progress is slow, erratic, and dangerous for democracy advocates and activists to pursue. Yet in a year when <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018">Freedom House’s latest global survey</a> concludes democracy is in decline, Africa may well be bucking the trend. </p>
<p>The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s 2018 <a href="http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/">Index of African Governance</a> found that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance on our continent, on average, is slowly improving … approximately three out of four African citizens live in a country where governance has improved over the last ten years.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite Africa’s many problems, it continues to sustain a wide variety of democratic experiments. Extensive surveys by <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, the non-partisan research network, show the majority of Africa’s citizens still prefer democracy to the alternative. This is a reality the African Union increasingly recognises and is attempting to support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107675/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau serves on the EISA Board without compensation and in that capacity was a member of the team that met with AU officials on 16 November 2018. </span></em></p>Surveys shows that the majority of Africans prefer democracy, despite its flaws, to the alternatives.John J Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1007312018-08-01T13:22:22Z2018-08-01T13:22:22ZA tug of war in Togo over term limits and the distribution of power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229799/original/file-20180730-106496-ius8wf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Togolese opposition supporter during protests over alleged electoral fraud in 2005. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://international.la-croix.com/news/gods-role-in-resolving-togo-political-crisis/8164#">ongoing conflict</a> in Togo about the introduction of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-togo-protests/togo-must-introduce-two-term-limit-swiftly-to-prevent-crisis-u-n-idUSKCN1BK0IY">presidential term limits</a> is one of the most important battle grounds between the ruling party Union pour la République and the opposition. And it’s far from resolved. </p>
<p>The outcome of the crisis will have a decisive impact on the fate of the West African country of 7.6 million citizens that’s bordered by Ghana to the west, Benin to the east and Burkina Faso to the north. </p>
<p>The struggle for presidential term limits is not just an issue of electoral reform. It’s also about the distribution of power in Togo. </p>
<p>The country’s political landscape has been dominated by the Gnassingbé family for nearly half a century. President Faure Gnassingbé is the son of Gnassingbé Eyadema, who ruled from 1967 until his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/togos-president-defiant-speech-protests-171029144126897.html">death in 2005</a>. The opposition has been fighting a twofold struggle: for an electoral turnover and, at the same time, for constitutional reform that guarantees a more even electoral playing field. Term limits are an important pillar of constitutional reform. </p>
<p>In many African countries, term limits have been introduced to curtail the concentration of power in the hands of lifetime rulers. This has been effective in a number of countries, such as <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5410583">Nigeria</a>. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/24/do-term-limits-work-in-africa-the-answer-might-surprise-you/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d04f4458f28a">in others</a>, like Uganda and Burundi, acting presidents have tried to reverse the process of electoral reform, abolished term limits, and stood for another election. </p>
<p>Constitutions that provide the legal framework for political conduct are not enough. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2018.1483916">Real power structures</a>, including an informal circle of elites with strong ties to the president and his family, determine the degree to which the law is respected and implemented. This is what’s playing out in Togo now.</p>
<h2>The north-south divide</h2>
<p>To understand what’s at stake in Togo’s crisis, it’s necessary to look into the country’s history of political conflict. </p>
<p>The first president, <a href="https://afrolegends.com/2011/03/30/sylvanus-olympio-togos-first-president/">Sylvanus Olympio</a>, ruled from 1960 to 1963 after independence from France. He was assassinated during a military coup led by Northern officers. Olympio’s government was backed by ethnic groups in the south of Togo, while the military was dominated by Northerners, especially whose from the president’s Kabyé ethnic group. </p>
<p>The north-south cleavage has since remained an important feature of the country’s political geography ever since. </p>
<p>The succeeding government of Nicolas Grunitzky (1963 to 1967) was weak and unable to solve the country’s problems. This led to a second military takeover, which brought Gnassingbé Eyadema to power. </p>
<p>Eyadema established a personalised style of rule which placed a lot of power in the hands of a small ruling elite closely connected to him. No political parties were allowed except the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, and <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9a9c.html">human rights violations were widespread</a>. The president’s power was secured by the military and was largely unconstrained by formal rules.</p>
<p>In the 1990s, the struggle to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340500126772">free the political system</a> led to a series of violent confrontations between the regime and the mostly southern-based opposition. The opposition demanded the legalisation of opposition parties, freedom of speech and assembly, as well as fair and free elections. Multiparty elections had been abandoned after the 1967 military coup. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340500126772">regime accepted a few changes</a>, including the re-introduction of multiparty elections. But it did not concede any real power. </p>
<h2>Change – but not enough</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades the political system became more open. But the electoral process remained an uneven playing field with electoral laws and conditions stacked against the opposition. </p>
<p>The Union pour la République has superior financial resources, better access to the media, and has still been able to count on the military. The decisive power of the military became visible in 2005 when Eyadema died: after <a href="http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/17087384/2/2/22109730_v2n2_s5.pdf?expires=1532957677&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=9DC9858F8BEF8C4E1E905CFBEBE40A16">a brief constitutional crisis</a>, the armed forces installed his son Faure Gnassingbé as the new president. </p>
<p>The international community condemned the unconstitutional change of government, and opposition <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/07/andrewmeldrum">protests broke out</a>. Faure <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/27/theobserver1">stepped down</a>, but legitimised his power with an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4512125.stm">electoral victory in the same year</a>. He also emerged as the winner of the 2010 and 2015 elections. </p>
<p>This outcome is hard to explain, even given that there were accusations of fraud and electoral malpractice at each poll. But a number of other factors were at play, including the fact that the opposition camp has never been able to overcome its fragmentation, and attempts at forming an effective united platform for political change have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2018.1483916">repeatedly failed</a>. </p>
<p>The struggle for term limits could provide the battle ground that unites the opposition – at least for the moment. </p>
<h2>Term limits a sensitive issue</h2>
<p>There have been some shifts.</p>
<p>The ruling party has been renamed to create the impression of a reformed regime. In addition, a unity accord was signed with the Union des Forces de Changement, the oldest opposition party which is run by Sylvanus Olympio’s son Gilchrist. And Faure, whose mother comes from the south of Togo, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2018.1483916">is seeking</a> more regional balance in his ruling coalition than his father did.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, a good deal of influence remains in the hands of old elites who control strategic positions in the state, administration, and security sector. </p>
<p>But unlike his father Faure can’t afford to completely ignore public opinion. According to the Afrobarometer Survey, a public opinion poll in Africa, the Togolese are unhappy with their economic and social conditions. And <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/togo-0">85% support presidential term limits</a>. </p>
<p>Togo’s situation illustrates the difficulty of moving away from personalised politics and introducing more checks and constraints on the executive. Constitutional reform, and especially term limits, can be one of the keys to push this agenda forward.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anja Osei receives funding from ERC (European Research Council). </span></em></p>Togo illustrates the difficulty of moving away from personalised politics.Anja Osei, Senior Research Fellow, University of KonstanzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/912512018-02-11T08:16:45Z2018-02-11T08:16:45ZHow corrupt local officials kill decent education in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205033/original/file-20180206-14064-6j14fw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Better local governance can make classrooms happier and more productive.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/un_photo/16080079069/in/photolist-quWBhz-8zsRZd-dYRuT7-bSQLse-dM69jk-dvm6hA-a3Dqz6-pZ4djj-8ZabG7-dYKMEv-hxgLmL-dScMXR-F7ZXGW-dYKMHR-65xNyr-4kJvcX-dYRuS1-dYRuSf-bYhYzu-37Pu4a-37PtGa-BUcjBK-CZfFyc-Ci8Jxd-asxZce-8q4U6A-i7d4i2-gbZuAN-bnGNHk-6P4LKw-aAGbmf-aADbm6-W31VEB-pQBnmt-7fii9v-gSpzw6-oJQoiS-VrR8fj-bPQxSR-bAWva9-bcbs6p-dUrWWB-dUxyBu-6NZfwr-W31VJz-dUxxKd-pvyEMx-9ebpzf-5sf9oL-cYTm3q">United Nations Photo/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s no disputing that many African countries’ education systems are in trouble. Despite <a href="http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml">significant investment and some improvements</a> linked to the push to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, children in large parts of Africa are <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4244Chapter%205%20Measuring%20progress2.pdf">simply not</a> being well taught or learning what is needed as they progress through the school system.</p>
<p>A lot of the discussion around this problem centres on resources: people argue that teachers must be trained better. More money must be spent. This is, of course, correct. </p>
<p>And governance is sometimes discussed, though mostly only as it relates to central governments and their responsibilities. But the quality of local governance matters, too. Local governments – those at a regional, provincial level, district or village level – are closer to communities. They are more likely to understand particular populations’ needs. At a practical level, they are often in charge of providing or distributing goods and services. In education this would mean textbooks, furniture and repairs to classrooms.</p>
<p>This suggests that local governance can have a real effect – positive or negative – on the quality of learning resources in a community and, by association, on how children perform?</p>
<p>I set out to explore this effect by using a series of surveys conducted by Afrobarometer in 33 African countries. This is an independent and non-partisan research network which conducts nationally representative surveys in Africa measuring public attitudes on economic, political and social matters. More than 50,000 citizens have been interviewed in the selected surveys I used for this study. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS_No_278_Education_resources_and_the_quality_of_local_governance_in_Africa__.pdf">My study</a> showed a strong link between the quality of local governance and the quality of the educational resources in Africa’s public schools. </p>
<p>In fact, I found that corrupt behaviour by local government councillors increased the likelihood that schools would lack textbooks, have poor facilities and overcrowded classrooms, have poor quality of teaching, and would record high levels of teacher absenteeism. This finding stands no matter how much money a particular country’s central government had invested in education. </p>
<p>If Africa is serious about improving its schooling systems (and meeting the Sustainable Development Goal related to education), it must tackle corruption among local councillors.</p>
<h2>What the data shows</h2>
<p>My research was based on survey data Afrobarometer collected between 2005 and 2013. Some of the questions related to education; others to people’s perceptions of their local government councillors’ performance and ability.</p>
<p>Among the questions about education, interviewees were asked whether they had encountered the following challenges in their local public schools: expensive school fees; lack of textbooks or other learning supplies; poor teaching; teacher absenteeism; overcrowded classrooms; and facilities that were in poor condition.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205042/original/file-20180206-14064-3nyf4k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=248&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011 - 2013)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For almost each of the items listed, more than 50% of the respondents had encountered the challenge in the question. </p>
<p>Most interviewees complained particularly about a lack of textbooks and teaching materials; poor teaching quality and teacher absenteeism. These are all key determinants of what students can achieve by the end of an academic year.</p>
<h2>A crisis of corruption</h2>
<p>Corruption, like low-quality education, is a real problem across Africa. In its <a href="http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.253668937.1942901850.1517602704-502629705.1517602704">2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance</a>, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation warned that the level of corruption on the continent had risen between 2007 and 2016.</p>
<p>This is borne out by what interviewees told Afrobarometer in the surveys I studied. More than 80% of those surveyed on the subject said that at least some of their local government councillors were involved in corrupt activities. Less than 10% of those surveyed believed that their local councillors listened to their communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/205044/original/file-20180206-14093-ticrxq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011 - 2013)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The study shows that a 1% increase in the measure of local government corruption is associated with an increase of about 0.4% to 0.9% in the percentage of people who face poor human or physical school resources in local public schools. This statistical evidence suggests tackling issues in local governance can help education systems in Africa.</p>
<p>And it matters because good local governance can ensure that textbooks and learning materials are available and that they reach the students at public schools. The behaviours and attitudes of local government councillor’s may affect the way public sector employees, like teachers, are hired and treated. </p>
<p>The performance of teachers in public schools depends on many factors, and their degree of accountability depends also on the degree of accountability and responsiveness of those in charge of the management of the schools that include local government councillors.</p>
<h2>Taking action</h2>
<p>Improving the quality of education systems will have huge benefits for Africa’s present and future generations. Part of this improvement must involve tackling people’s negative perceptions about their local councillors, whether those relate to corruption, effectiveness or responsiveness. </p>
<p>Central governance remains important. It should be coupled with careful plans and actions to fix local governance, make councillors more accountable and ensure they’re providing the services schools need to thrive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91251/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maty Konte does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local governance can have a real effect - positive or negative - on the quality of schooling.Maty Konte, Research Economist, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/648572016-09-06T09:11:06Z2016-09-06T09:11:06ZGabon violence reflects longstanding and deep mistrust of election handling<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136618/original/image-20160905-4773-1ueqdje.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in Paris against Gabonese President Ali Bongo with placards reading: 1967-2016, 50 years in power is enough!</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gabon’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-01/gabon-eurobond-yields-jump-as-election-outcome-triggers-violence">closest election</a> since independence has erupted into controversy and violence. President Ali Bongo, who succeeded his father’s 42-year rule in 2009, claims the narrowest of victories over challenger Jean Ping. Ping is former chairman of the African Union and son-in-law of the former president.</p>
<p>Massive protests amid allegations of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/05/opinion/save-gabon-from-election-fraud.html?_r=0">election fraud</a> began after Bongo was declared the winner by a mere 5,594 votes, 49.8% to Ping’s 48.23%. Of particular concern to the opposition and international observers is the reported <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37252778">99% turnout</a> in Haut-Ogooue, Bongo’s home province, where 95.5% of the vote went to the incumbent. Ping won six out of the nine provinces. Turnout in the other provinces was between 45% and 71%, according to the Interior ministry. Even members of the government, including Justice Minister Séraphin Moudounga who has just resigned, have begun to question whether the results “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37281970">tally with reality</a>.”</p>
<p>This close and contested result has been released in a <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/gabon-overwhelming-public-distrust-cenap-and-election-quality-forms-backdrop-presidential-vote">context</a> where Gabon’s electoral commission has continually failed to meet the public’s demands for transparency and confidence in managing free and fair elections. Data from the <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org">Afrobarometer survey</a> conducted in September and October of 2015 reveal that a majority (51%) of Gabonese had no trust “at all” in the election commission. Another 24% reported “a little bit” of trust <strong>(see Figure 1)</strong>. These are the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136614/original/image-20160905-4787-qxahgc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gabon enjoys a per capita income <a href="http://www.forbes.com/places/gabon/">four times</a> that of most sub-Saharan African nations. But because it has high levels of income inequality, a large proportion of the population remains poor. Oil accounts for approximately 80% of its exports. </p>
<h2>Election mistrust runs deep</h2>
<p>Not only do Gabonese mistrust the electoral commission, they also do not feel elections are free and fair. When asked to judge Gabon’s last election (in 2011 for the National Assembly), a majority (55%) found the elections to be seriously flawed. One-third of citizens (31%) reported that the elections were “not free and fair”. Another 24% found them “free and fair but with major problems”. </p>
<p>The most intense discontent with election quality was recorded among urban residents. A majority (58%) said they were not free and fair or had major problems. This is compared to 45% in rural areas.</p>
<p>At the heart of the protests that have broken out are allegations of fraud in the form of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>multiple voting, </p></li>
<li><p>ballot stuffing, and </p></li>
<li><p>a manipulated vote count. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Afrobarometer data reveal that seven in 10 Gabonese citizens (71%) believe votes are “never” or only “sometimes” counted fairly. A mere 15% believe that the vote count is always fair. Citizens who doubt that votes are counted fairly may question the government’s announcement of fewer than 6,000 votes separating the two contenders and 99% turnout in the president’s home area.</p>
<h2>Fears of violence and intimidation</h2>
<p>Gabonese also expressed major concerns about the environment leading up to elections <strong>(see Figure 2)</strong>. Significant proportions (56%) believe that the government interferes with the political opposition by at least “sometimes” preventing opposition candidates from running. Three-fourths (77%) said the news media “never” or only “sometimes” provides fair coverage of all candidates. That is the worst rating among the 36 surveyed countries. And 71% perceived that voters are “often” or “always” bribed, well above the 36-country average of 43%.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136615/original/image-20160905-4765-qrpvah.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 2015 survey, Gabonese also reported high levels of fear of intimidation or violence during election campaigns. Nearly two out of three (64%) expressed at least “a little bit” of fear, including almost one-fourth (23%) who expressed “a lot” of fear. With protests and government response turning violent, the fears of many have become reality. </p>
<p>Since the results were announced and protests broke out, the situation has escalated from:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>protesters’ attacks on the Parliament building to; </p></li>
<li><p>a helicopter attack on the opposition headquarters; </p></li>
<li><p>the arrests of opposition figures and hundreds of protesters as well as several deaths; to</p></li>
<li><p>the government cutting off Internet and social media communication</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Gabon has one of the lowest proportions among surveyed countries (only 45%) who believe that voters are “often” or “always” given a genuine choice in voting. Few citizens believe that elections function “well” or “very well” to ensure that voters’ views are reflected (23%) and that voters can remove poorly performing leaders from office (19%). Both of these figures are the lowest among the 36 surveyed countries.</p>
<h2>But Gabonese have faith in democracy</h2>
<p>Yet despite their extreme levels of discontent with the current implementation of elections, Gabonese still have <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/press/behind-gabons-election-dispute-citizens-strongly-support-multiparty-democracy-reject-autocratic-alternatives">faith</a> in the ideals of democracy and rule through elections. Two-thirds (68%) of Gabonese citizens say democracy is preferable to any other political system. This matches average support for democracy across the surveyed countries. </p>
<p>Large majorities reject forms of autocracy (one-party, one-man and military rule). And three-fourths (76%) of Gabonese say that regular, open and honest elections are the best way to choose leaders. In their support for multiparty competition (80%), Gabonese are second only to Ivoirians (82%) and far above average (63%) <strong>(Figure 3</strong>).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136703/original/image-20160906-6130-104vuoo.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Afrobarometer results underscore the longstanding concerns of ordinary Gabonese about the extent to which the country’s elections are free, fair and an honest reflection of the will of the people. Unfortunately, neither the government nor regional or international attention addressed these concerns in time to prevent bloodshed. The gap between the reality of Gabon’s elections and its democratic ideals appears to be widening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon has the lowest trust ratings of any election commission among the 36 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/597672016-05-25T04:15:17Z2016-05-25T04:15:17ZMore Africans are accessing health care – but states still have work to do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/123783/original/image-20160524-25236-1diy5ec.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Malian mother waits to have her baby vaccinated. Though access to health care has improved, many people say their governments must do more.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dominic Chavez/World Bank</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People across Africa rank health as the second most important national problem they believe that governments should address. Only unemployment outranks it as an issue among ordinary citizens, and only education outstrips it as a funding priority.</p>
<p>These are the findings of <a href="http://afrobarometer-mande.msgfocus.com/c/1ix6ZjHnDvdGymYIgQy9q">a survey</a>, “Despite Gains, Barriers Keep Health Care High on Africa’s Priority List”, which was conducted across 36 African countries in 2014 and 2015. It is part of a series of public-attitude surveys about democracy, governance, economic conditions and related issues run by <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, a pan-African, non-partisan research network.</p>
<p>On average across the countries, just over half of those interviewed listed health care among their top two priorities. It ranked first or second in 31 of 36 countries. The only exceptions were Guinea, Kenya and Liberia, where it ranked third; and Lesotho and Nigeria, where it ranked fifth. </p>
<p>As part of the survey, census enumeration areas were assessed. In these areas, the study considered issues like access to health care, government performance and other matters that needed government action. In looking into these issues, the rural-urban breakdown was also considered.</p>
<p>We tracked health care in several of these countries over the past decade and found that the proportion of Africans going without medicine or medical care decreased from 58% in 2005/2006 to 48% in 2014/2015. Despite this decrease, citizens still perceived some challenges standing between themselves and universal health care. In many areas, these included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>an absence of basic health-care facilities; </p></li>
<li><p>shortages of necessary medical care; </p></li>
<li><p>difficulty in obtaining care, which sometimes compels people to pay bribes; and</p></li>
<li><p>poor government performance in improving basic health services.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Accessing health care</h2>
<p>Field teams made on-the-ground observations of services and facilities in each census enumeration area they visited. They looked at whether the health centres were in the area or within easy walking distance and how difficult it was to access services once individuals got in touch with a health-care worker. </p>
<p>Almost two-thirds of the clinics were accessible or within walking distance.</p>
<p>According to our survey, Zimbabwe experienced the largest improvement: fewer people were unable to access health care in the country than was the case in the 2004/2005 survey. </p>
<p>In about <a href="http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_zwe_en.pdf">2008</a> the Zimbabwean health sector was near collapse. Its infrastructure had deteriorated, investment was limited and health workers were poorly paid. There was a shortage of essential supplies and commodities. </p>
<p>But change came in the country when the Government of National Unity created the multi-donor <a href="http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/cpo.nsf/vWebSEn/23E646D4AB7FF8A9852579CD004F0D3C">Health Transition Fund</a> to support the Ministry of Health and Child Care. In 2013, the right to health was also affirmed in the new constitution. </p>
<p>On the other end, Benin recorded the greatest deterioration. Benin’s <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno28_healthcare_reform_in_benin.pdf">public health-care system</a> has historically been underfunded and ill-equipped to meet the population’s health-care needs.</p>
<p>In 2009, the government of Benin embarked on a series of policy initiatives to increase public access to health services, especially for pregnant women, children under five and the poor.</p>
<p>Though the take-up of health services increased sharply, by 2014 public approval of the government’s efforts had dropped sharply, reflecting dissatisfaction with what was actually rolled out in terms of new government policies.</p>
<h2>Paying a bribe</h2>
<p>Corruption also featured in the survey but did not have a major impact on health care. In evaluating whether anybody went without medical care, we also looked at whether some interviewees paid bribes to get the help they needed. </p>
<p>But only one of every seven people who accessed health services paid a bribe or gave a health-care worker a gift to obtain the needed service.</p>
<p>Corruption was most pronounced in conflict-ridden Liberia. More than half of the Liberians interviewed said they had to pay bribes. There is a critical <a href="http://www.mohsw.gov.lr/documents/Health%20Sector%20Assessment_Report_Final_2015.pdf">health workforce shortage</a> in the country, compounded by high attrition.</p>
<p>Corruption was also common in Morocco, Sudan, Egypt and Cameroon. </p>
<p>In contrast, corruption levels were low in 11 of the 36 countries, where fewer than one in 20 respondents said they paid bribes. Botswana and Mauritius set the example, with only one reported case of bribery for health-care services between them. In Mauritius, this may be linked to the government’s <a href="http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_mus_en.pdf">heavy investment</a> to provide free health care. </p>
<h2>The urban-rural dynamic</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032315-021507">Research</a> has highlighted the differences in health care for urban and rural people. Our survey corroborated this. </p>
<p>We found that close to 75% of the urban zones had health clinics compared with only half of the rural zones. This made it harder and more expensive for rural residents to obtain care as it would include transport costs.</p>
<p>Urban dwellers were more likely than rural residents to say they found it difficult to get health-care services. This pattern was replicated in most of the countries, led by Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>The urban-rural gap was most pronounced in Morocco, Mali and Malawi, while there was an equal spread of clinics in the rural and urban areas of Sierra Leone and Cameroon.</p>
<h2>Government performance</h2>
<p>Close to half of the citizens interviewed said their government was performing “fairly badly” or “very badly” in improving basic health services. In 18 countries tracked since 2005, negative evaluations increased by 13 percentage points over the past decade, from 33% in 2005/2006 to 46% in 2014/2015.</p>
<p>While Afrobarometer does not ask respondents to explain their ratings of government performance, it seems reasonable to consider whether negative performance ratings may be related to: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>a lack of available health-care facilities; </p></li>
<li><p>the experience of going without medicine or medical care; </p></li>
<li><p>difficulties faced while seeking medical care; or </p></li>
<li><p>having to pay bribes to obtain medical care. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Going without care, encountering difficulties, and having to pay a bribe all appeared to be strongly linked to negative ratings of government performance on health care. </p>
<p>Our survey showed that citizens did not rate government’s performance based on whether or not there was a health clinic in the zone. And there appeared to be no strong link between presence of health facilities and the frequency with which individuals went without care or experienced difficulties in obtaining care.</p>
<h2>Governments must take action</h2>
<p>Citizens’ perceptions suggest a number of barriers to health-care access and, ultimately, “health for all”.</p>
<p>Overall, citizen ratings of government efforts were fairly negative – significantly more negative than a decade ago. </p>
<p>The experiences and perceptions of health care varied widely by country. More specific data would be able to identify the most important difficulties patients encounter and factors that explain the negative public perceptions of government performance. </p>
<p>But citizens spoke clearly in saying that health care was one of their top priorities for government action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59767/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Afrobarometer survey was funded by USAID, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, DFID, World Bank and SIDA. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Afrobarometer survey was funded by USAID, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, DFID, World Bank and SIDA.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edem E. Selormey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Across the continent, citizens’ perceptions of health care show several barriers to access and better health for all.Daniel Armah-Attoh, Senior Research Officer and the Afrobarometer Project Manager for Anglophone West Africa, Centre for Democratic Development GhanaEdem E. Selormey, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Democratic Development GhanaRichard Houessou, Afrobarometer Project Manager for Francophone West Africa, based at the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP), African School of EconomicsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.