tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/al-shabaab-7313/articlesAl-Shabaab – The Conversation2024-02-07T13:27:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211312024-02-07T13:27:32Z2024-02-07T13:27:32ZSomaliland-Ethiopia port deal: international opposition flags complex Red Sea politics<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67858566">memorandum of understanding</a> between Ethiopia and Somaliland announced on 1 January 2024 set off diplomatic rows in the Horn of Africa – and beyond. </p>
<p>Details of the agreement are not publicly known, but both state leaders have touched on its content. Among the main elements:</p>
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<li><p>Ethiopia gets <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f1a7ffa3-03d8-46e4-a009-3710b4abc27d">a 50-year lease</a> on a strip of land on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast for naval and commercial maritime use and access to the Berbera port. </p></li>
<li><p>Somaliland gets a share of Ethiopian Airlines. It also gets <a href="https://twitter.com/SomaliGuardian/status/1741854201162985590">an undertaking that</a> Ethiopia will investigate recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state. If it decides to do so, Ethiopia will be the first country to recognise Somaliland. The breakaway state has operated autonomously since it declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, but lacks international recognition. </p></li>
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<p>The list of countries opposed to the memorandum of understanding includes those in the region, such as Egypt, and western powers such as the US and the EU. China and Turkey add to the powerful mix.</p>
<p>Reasons for their objections vary. Some attest to the geopolitical significance of ports and other infrastructure like roads, dams or railways. These projects are often contested, a subject I <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/">have studied at close quarters</a>. </p>
<p>Infrastructure is deeply intertwined in political identities. Ethiopia’s political leadership, for example, has declared maritime access as a “<a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopias-quest-to-access-sea-not-a-matter-of-luxury-but-of-survival-premiers-security-advisor-briefs-military-attaches-reps-of-international-partners/">matter of survival</a>”. It argues that the country’s historical status and its rapid economic growth entitle it to sovereign access to the sea. </p>
<p>Infrastructures aren’t the only drivers of dissent over the deal. But they emphasise geopolitical struggles and point to political and economic competitions that are raising worries of increasing instability in the region. </p>
<p>The diplomatic squabbles show re-configurations of political alliances in the Red Sea region and beyond. The memorandum of understanding has placed the question of Somaliland’s recognition into the centre of these political dynamics.</p>
<h2>Opposition</h2>
<p>Somalia is the biggest opponent of the port deal. The president of the federal government of Somalia, Sheikh Hassan Mohamud, declared the memorandum a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He announced Somalia would defend its territory against Ethiopian “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67861390">aggression</a>”. </p>
<p>However, the federal government in Mogadishu has no actual authority in Somaliland. It does not even exert full territorial control across Somalia – Al-Shabaab controls territory in south and central Somalia. The militant Islamist group also declared the agreement a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>So far the United Arab Emirates, a close partner of Somaliland and Ethiopia, has been silent. The UAE is increasing its influence in the Red Sea region and Africa more generally. It has <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2022/12/berbera-the-making-of-a-global-port-and-the-unmaking-of-a-people/">containerised</a> and manages Somaliland’s Berbera port. UAE companies <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/article/uae-s-overarching-role-in-african-ports-development">are building</a> port infrastructures across Africa. The UAE is among the largest foreign investors on the continent, following China, the US and the EU. </p>
<p>The lineup of globally and regionally powerful countries opposed to the deal suggests that the deck is stacked against the agreement.</p>
<p>The US, the EU and Turkey have invested heavily in attempts to rebuild Somalia’s state and security apparatus and to counter Islamist terrorism. </p>
<p>For example, Turkey took over the management of the airport and seaport in Mogadishu. It has built social and physical infrastructure in the capital, and opened its first external military base in the country.</p>
<p>The US and Turkey have each trained special forces in Somalia, and both countries have military on the ground. A confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia would put their investments at risk, provide further challenges for the stability of the region and, likely, play into the hands of Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The role of the EU and of European countries is more ambiguous. The EU is a crucial financial backer of the Somalia federal government, which is part of its Horn of Africa <a href="https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/global-gateway-eu-and-horn-africa-countries-sign-alliance-boost-economic-development-and-combat-2023-12-15_en">Global Gateway Initiative</a>. </p>
<p>The initiative promises to connect regional infrastructure to foster economic integration. That’s something Ethiopia also promises with the memorandum of understanding. The EU doesn’t recognise Somaliland, but provided support to build its state institutions. </p>
<p>The UK is even funding the Hargeisa bypass road, part of the Berbera corridor that links Somaliland’s port to the Ethiopian border. </p>
<p>Not surprising is the opposition of Djibouti and China. Djibouti’s seaport processes over 80% of Ethiopia’s overseas trade. Ethiopia’s use of Berbera port is likely to reduce the trade volume handled in Djibouti. </p>
<p>Djibouti is also a crucial location in <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/port-infrastructure/2023/03/21/djibouti-fiddles-amid-the-scramble-for-the-red-sea/">China’s</a> Belt and Road Initiative. China supports Djibouti’s port development, operates an international free trade zone, and funds the renovation of the railway to Ethiopia. </p>
<p>Eritrea and Egypt also support Somalia. This is mainly because their relations with Ethiopia have been marred with conflicts. Eritrea and Ethiopia fell out again after Ethiopia struck peace with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022. </p>
<p>Egypt is opposed to the building of Ethiopia’s hydroelectric <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66776733">Grand Renaissance Dam</a>, which increases Ethiopia’s control of the Nile waters on which both countries depend. Egypt and Eritrea are also not eager to see Ethiopia having a naval presence, and Egypt works against the UAE’s expansion of power in the Red Sea region. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The regional Intergovernmental Authority for Development, chaired by Djibouti, recently convened an extraordinary meeting to discuss <a href="https://igad.int/communique-of-the-42nd-extraordinary-assembly-of-igad-heads-of-state-and-government/">tensions</a> between Somalia and Ethiopia. It affirmed the territorial integrity of Somalia, but also called for de-escalation and dialogue. </p>
<p>Ethiopia did not attend the meeting. But Ethiopia’s president, who uses access to the sea to mobilise public support, has a lot to lose by offending these states. The country’s international reputation has already suffered from allegations of war crimes and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1140872">mass atrocities in Tigray</a>. The government’s militarised response to opposition in several regions has had a negative impact on Ethiopia’s economy and contributed to <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/">food insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>The good news is that a violent confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia seems unlikely. Ethiopia would risk political isolation, as major world powers and regional organisations, such as the African Union and Arab League, have confirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The winner of rising political tensions in the region would be al-Shabaab, which is already calling Somalis to defend their land from foreign interference. </p>
<p>The most likely loser of the diplomatic row is Somaliland, which now seems even more unlikely to receive the international recognition it so craves.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This author is part of a research project on Port Infrastructure, International Politics, Everyday Life in the Horn of Africa (<a href="http://portinfrastructure.org">http://portinfrastructure.org</a>) which received funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this article are solely the responsibility of the author. </span></em></p>If the international reactions are anything to go by, Ethiopia’s Red Sea port deal is easier said than done.Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181792024-01-07T07:33:35Z2024-01-07T07:33:35ZYoung Africans could disrupt authoritarian states but they don’t – here’s why<p>Africa has the <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development#:%7E:text=Africa%20has%20the%20youngest%20population,to%20realise%20their%20best%20potential.">world’s largest youth population</a>. By 2030, <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/africas-future-youth-and-the-data-defining-their-lives/">75%</a> of the African population will be under the age of 35. The number of young Africans aged 15-24 is projected to reach <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/06/27/investing-in-youth-transforming-afe-africa">500 million</a> in 2080. </p>
<p>While population dynamics vary across the continent, most sub-Saharan countries have a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africas-median-age-about-19-median-age-its-leaders-about-63">median age below 19</a>. Niger is the youngest country in the world with a median age of 14.5, while South Africa, Seychelles, Tunisia and Algeria have median ages above 27. </p>
<p>These demographics are a potential <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-myths-about-youth-employment-in-africa-and-strategies-to-realize-the-demographic-dividend/">force for growth</a>. However, the potential of Africa’s demographic dividend has been overshadowed by concerns among governments and international donors about the relationship between large youth populations, unemployment rates and political instability. </p>
<p>Many countries with large youth populations and high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348858/the-outcast-majority/">remain peaceful</a>. But the dominant policy narrative is that unemployed youth pose a threat to stability.</p>
<p>Further, the role of youth in popular protest – such as in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7420-after-the-uprising-including-sudanese-youth">Sudan in 2019</a> – has created high expectations about their role in countering autocratic governments and contributing to democracy. </p>
<p>As political scientists and sociologists, we’re interested in understanding the interaction between youth and autocratic regimes – especially as elected autocracies <a href="https://alinstitute.org/images/Library/RetreatOfAfricanDemocracy.pdf#page=1">are taking hold</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>Electoral autocracies are regimes elected into power using authoritarian strategies. These include manipulation of elections and repression of the opposition, independent media and civil society.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> focuses on the interactions between youth and regimes in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe. All are cases of electoral autocracies.</p>
<p>These regimes are aware of their large youth populations and are sometimes challenged by them. <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-has-shaken-up-ugandan-politics-four-things-worth-knowing-about-him-153205">Uganda’s Bobi Wine</a>, a popular musician turned presidential candidate, is one example. </p>
<p>The four countries in our study have also been through civil wars, where the victorious armed groups have taken power and stayed in power since the end of the war. This has created a particular set of dynamics between the ageing rebel governments and the youth majorities.</p>
<p>In autocratic contexts like these ones, efforts to empower youth can easily be manipulated to serve the interests of the regime. Some young people may decide to play the game and take up opportunities offered by regime actors. Others might resist them. Some take up the opportunities, hoping it serves their own and not the regime’s interests. Still, this might reproduce forms of patronage. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">Abiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he's silencing them</a>
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<p>All of this matters because the future of democracy is at stake, and using state-led opportunities might contribute to authoritarian renewal.</p>
<p>Our research teams in each country <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">studied</a> the range of policies that governments put in place to “cater” for the youth. They included loans for young entrepreneurs, and setting up youth councils and youth quotas in political institutions. </p>
<p>We found that youth-targeted strategies – largely aimed at promoting employment and political participation – are part of the authoritarian rule book in all four countries we studied. Employment and entrepreneurship schemes were open to abuse through ruling party patronage networks and channelled to regime supporters.</p>
<h2>Not saving democracy</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research</a> found that young people in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe felt aggrieved about these opportunities being channelled to regime supporters. They also noted the lack of opportunities to have a meaningful voice. Institutions that were established to enable youth participation were co-opted and lacked independence from governments. </p>
<p>Some young people express their grievances through pro-democracy protests – like in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/violent-protests-break-out-mozambique-after-local-elections-2023-10-27/">Mozambique in October 2023</a>. But overall, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221141/why-africas-youth-is-not-saving-democracy/">Africa’s youth are not saving democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Neither are they countering the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2022.2235656">deepening</a> trend of autocratisation on the continent, where incumbent governments have increasingly <a href="https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/60999">concentrated power</a> in the hands of the executive. Our research has confirmed this in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda.</p>
<h2>Country case studies</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8797-the-risk-of-authoritarian-renewal-in-zimbabwe-understanding-zanu-pf-youth">Zimbabwe</a>, Zanu-PF has been in power since the country’s independence in 1980. The ruling party and many of its now ageing leaders use their history of having been part of the liberation war in the 1970s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436590600842472?casa_token=B53EF1Ev0XcAAAAA:7W-Izw-iDMuOCRc8RZiW8UcDpXn7kH5E-siDc2W1ux_L9w1WpyB-2mnTSMzmAXrLM5YmfFCx3Mlo4YA">to retain their hold on power</a>. </p>
<p>They do so by creating narratives around the country’s liberation history and patriotism, and accuse the “born-free” generation (those born after independence) of betraying the liberation war. This delegitimises any discontent young people may feel. Zanu-PF targets young people among its <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/14906">wider repertoire of strategies</a> to maintain power.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8798-poorly-designed-youth-employment-programmes-will-boost-the-insurgency-in-mozambique">Mozambique</a>, the ruling party Frelimo has won every election since 1992. The party has concentrated power and resources in the hands of the political elite. The youth continue to be under-represented and have serious challenges in accessing resources. This, in addition to other conflict dynamics, contributed to an insurgency in the northern region of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">Cabo Delgado from 2017</a>. It’s led by the radical religious group locally called Al-Shabaab, or sometimes “machababo” (the youth).</p>
<p>Youth-dominated protests in <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">Ethiopia</a> contributed to the 2018 fall of the ruling party that had been in power since 1991. They also led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-change-happened-in-ethiopia-a-review-of-how-abiy-rose-to-power-110737">coming to power</a> of Abiy Ahmed that year. </p>
<p>Mobilisation among the youth has since <a href="https://theconversation.com/abiy-ahmed-gained-power-in-ethiopia-with-the-help-of-young-people-four-years-later-hes-silencing-them-195601">been silenced</a>. Only loyalists get access to job creation schemes. There has also been a militarising of youth-dominated ethnic movements. This was seen, for instance, with the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/">Fano Amhara group</a> in the war in Tigray in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-tigray-war-parties-agree-pause-expert-insights-into-two-years-of-devastating-conflict-193636">2020-2022</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/8801-moving-ugandas-national-development-planning-to-the-grassroots-whats-in-it-for-youth">Uganda</a> was a pioneer in institutionalising youth participation in decision-making. Youth engagement in political structures is considered to be a tool for government control. We found that young politicians felt that this flawed system of representation provided opportunities for mobilising both against and in favour of the current regime. Young candidates running for one of the youth quota seats in parliament, for instance, can’t easily evade ruling party patronage.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Young Africans are diverse. However, they have often been characterised as either <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-march-2020/african-youth-and-growth-violent-extremism">violent</a> or as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13968.doc.htm">changemakers and peace activists</a>. These characterisations represent opposite ends of a spectrum. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">Our research project</a> engaged a diversity of young people positioned and constantly moving across different parts of the spectrum. This has enhanced our understanding of how they navigate and respond to the ways their regimes seek to handle the youth population.</p>
<p>In our view, research and policy initiatives towards young people in authoritarian states must acknowledge that well-intended youth interventions may reproduce authoritarian politics when they are channelled to party loyalists. </p>
<p>Interventions that aim to promote job creation and youth empowerment should monitor how youth participants are selected and funds disbursed to avoid interference from partisan actors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218179/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Research Council of Norway's Norglobal programme (grant # 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marjoke Oosterom received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p>Africa’s youth are not countering the deepening of autocratisation across the continent.Lovise Aalen, Research Professor, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteMarjoke Oosterom, Research Fellow and Cluster Leader, Power and Popular Politics research cluster, Institute of Development StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069912023-06-09T11:04:40Z2023-06-09T11:04:40ZKenya’s new spy chief will lead the national intelligence service – what the job is all about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530379/original/file-20230606-21-9adq4m.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s President William Ruto recently nominated a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/return-to-spy-roots-ruto-nominates-noordin-haji-for-top-nis-role-4237026">new national intelligence chief</a>. Breaking with tradition, the president picked a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/weekly-review/noordin-haji-the-kenyan-spy-who-came-from-the-cold-4260316">career intelligence officer</a>, Noordin Haji. </p>
<p>But what is national intelligence and what work does it do, particularly in Kenya? Since <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071222015716/http://www.nsis.go.ke/about.php">1999</a>, the country’s spy chiefs have been picked from <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000132285/major-general-philip-wachira-kameru-is-president-uhuru-choice-for-gichangi-successor-at-nis">the military</a>. Haji was previously the director of public prosecutions. </p>
<p>Parliament vetted Haji, in keeping with the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/PublicAppointmentsParliamentaryApprovalAct_No33of2011.pdf#page=6">law on public appointments</a>. Legislators <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/former-dpp-noordin-haji-sworn-in-as-nis-director-general-4269530">approved</a> his nomination to the <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/index.html">National Intelligence Service</a> as director-general. </p>
<p>Ruto’s choice reflects his <a href="https://africacheck.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2022-08/Kenya%20Kwanza%20UDA%20Manifesto%202022.pdf#page=62">election pledges</a> on security sector reforms. He said he would end political interference, extrajudicial killings, ineffective oversight and poor accountability in the sector. </p>
<p>In my view as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6iQ6w3MAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">political scientist</a> who has studied Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies and strategies, Haji could improve civilian oversight and accountability in the intelligence service. Civilian leadership could also help establish a service that adheres to the law and respects human rights. Its covert operations <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/24/investigation-highlights-transparency-need-us-uk-roles-kenyan-counterterrorism">haven’t always</a> fallen within the law.</p>
<h2>What is intelligence?</h2>
<p>Intelligence is information that can avert threats to national security or promote national interests. </p>
<p>Intelligence services are state agencies that <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=2">produce</a> reports to help maintain national security. These reports also provide strategic information relevant to a country’s economic growth. </p>
<p>By providing <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">reliable information</a> about potential threats to national security, intelligence agencies contribute to peace and stability. This supports a country’s social, economic and political development.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">Kenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them</a>
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<p>The information such agencies gather is classified as counter-intelligence, domestic intelligence or external intelligence. Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/structure.html">National Intelligence Service</a> has three primary divisions responsible for these different kinds of information. </p>
<p>In the Kenyan context, <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=7">counter-intelligence</a> aims to prevent attacks from foreign powers. It also counters subversion, sabotage and espionage. This covers any hostile activity that targets Kenya’s people, institutions, installations or resources. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=7">Domestic intelligence</a> is information about internal threats to national security. <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=8">External intelligence</a> covers any threats to national security from foreign powers.</p>
<p>In Kenya, credible intelligence has foiled several Al-Shabaab <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">terror attacks</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the functions of intelligence?</h2>
<p>The National Intelligence Service <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=13">functions</a> to detect actual and potential national security threats. </p>
<p>It then advises Kenya’s president and government on these threats. It also recommends security intelligence measures for other state agencies to adopt. It advises Kenya’s 47 county governments on security matters. </p>
<p>The intelligence service provides confidential security reports on people who apply for state positions that require vetting. It promotes national interests within and outside Kenya. It supports law enforcement agencies in detecting and preventing serious crimes. </p>
<p>By law, the National Intelligence Service <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=16">isn’t allowed</a> to undertake paramilitary activities. It can’t commit acts of violence against individuals or take part in activities that promote a political organisation. The service falls under the office of the presidency.</p>
<p>It’s a <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/faqs.html">civilian agency</a>. This means it is not legally permitted to carry out police functions, such as <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/faqs.html">search, arrest and prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the threats it detects, for example terrorism, have criminal implications. In such cases, the <a href="https://www.cid.go.ke/index.php/aboutus/our-functions.html">Directorate of Criminal Investigations</a>, which falls under the National Police Service, investigates and sets the appropriate charge. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-agency-needs-speedy-reform-or-it-must-be-shut-down-200386">South Africa's intelligence agency needs speedy reform - or it must be shut down</a>
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<p>There’s an important <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">difference</a> between collecting intelligence for national security and gathering evidence for criminal investigations. </p>
<p>For intelligence services, <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">the secrecy of sources</a> is essential. In criminal investigations, there must be <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">public access to the evidence</a> to deliver a fair trial. </p>
<p>As a former director of public prosecutions, Haji gained experience in gathering information for criminal investigations. This adds to his experience as an intelligence officer. This background could have a positive impact on the service’s intelligence-gathering role. </p>
<h2>How is intelligence gathered?</h2>
<p>This is done through a process known as the <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=4">intelligence cycle</a>. It includes: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>planning and allocation of resources based on threat assessments</p></li>
<li><p>collecting information on individuals, places, events and activities</p></li>
<li><p>processing and analysing this information</p></li>
<li><p>sharing information with decision-makers </p></li>
<li><p>feedback to intelligence agencies. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=4">feedback</a> begins a new cycle.</p>
<p>Kenya’s National Intelligence Service gathers information by working with individuals and organisations. It also cooperates with foreign governments and intelligence agencies, such as the <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/">MI5</a> in the UK. </p>
<p>During his vetting, Haji <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-06-01-haji-outlines-vision-to-reform-nis-bolster-security/">spoke</a> about the value of information from agents, informers and diplomatic attachés.</p>
<p>The service also <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=14">monitors and records</a> data <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">transmitted</a> electronically. This could be via email, instant messaging and mobile phones. </p>
<p>It uses physical tapping or eavesdropping, but must have a <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=44">warrant</a> issued by a judge to do so.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>During his vetting, Haji listed <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-06-01-haji-outlines-vision-to-reform-nis-bolster-security/">several proposals</a> to make the service more accountable and efficient. They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>revising recruitment policies to represent the country’s social diversity, particularly gender</p></li>
<li><p>using modern technology</p></li>
<li><p>improving public relations and employee welfare</p></li>
<li><p>strengthening regional partnerships to address transnational crimes. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In my view, such efforts could succeed if the country’s leadership commits to them. The state needs to give the service the financial, technological and human resources it requires to be more autonomous.</p>
<p><em>Note: the article was updated to reflect Noordin Haji’s confirmation as director-general of the National Intelligence Service.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Intelligence reports offer information that can avert threats to national security or promote national interests.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2050512023-05-09T10:39:49Z2023-05-09T10:39:49ZKenya cult deaths: a new era in the battle against religious extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525114/original/file-20230509-19-9sk5c5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Worshippers gather at the New Life Prayer Centre and Church. The head of the Church was recently arrested.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by SIMON MAINA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/kenya-cult-deaths-a-new-era-in-the-battle-against-religious-extremism-205051&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>More than a hundred people in Kenya – among them children – have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/kilifi/shakahola-cult-number-of-bodies-from-mass-graves-hits-109-4214878">found dead</a> close to a small village in the south-east of the country. Most of the deceased were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/09/autopsies-missing-organs-kenya-cult-deaths-police">reportedly followers</a> of pastor Paul Nthenge Mackenzie. While starvation appears to be the main cause of death, some of the victims were strangled, beaten or suffocated, <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/health/national/article/2001472118/children-in-shakahola-cult-were-strangled-johansen-oduor-says">according</a> to the chief government pathologist.</em></p>
<p><em>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, who has studied the drivers of religious extremism, particularly among violent extremist groups in the east African region, talks to The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina about the cults and religious extremism challenges in Kenya where freedom of religion or belief is protected by the constitution.</em> </p>
<h2>What do we know so far about the cult deaths in Kenya?</h2>
<p>No fewer than 109 men, women and children are known to have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/02/kenyan-cult-leader-accused-of-inciting-children-to-starve-to-death">died</a> after a Kenyan charismatic church pastor encouraged his followers to fast to death to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/amp/coast/article/2001470894/four-people-starve-to-death-while-fasting-to-meet-jesus">“meet Jesus”</a> in the afterlife. Bodies of the dead were recovered from numerous mass graves on a farm at Shakahola, a village on Kenya’s south-east coast, where Pastor Paul Mackenzie had his Good News International Church. Autopsies revealed that most had starved to death. But a small number, some children, had been strangled or suffocated to death.</p>
<p>Mackenzie now faces charges over the deaths. The victims came from all corners of the country, drawn to a man whose controversial teachings had come under government scrutiny as far back as <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/88517-ig-koome-how-pastor-mackenzie-countered-police-arrests-2017">2017</a>. Mackenzie’s apocalyptic narratives focused on the end of times, and were against the modern or western <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/people/family/503292-the-making-a-cult-rise-pastor-paul-mckenzies-good-news-international-empire/">ways of life</a> such as seeking medical services, education or music. His conspiracy theories emphasised the Catholic Church, the US and the United Nations as “<a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/people/503407-world-order-pastor-mc-kenzie-taught-catholic-church-usa-agents-satan/">agents of Satan</a>”.</p>
<p>His other brush with the law came in 2019, when he faced counts of incitement to disobedience of the law and <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/preacher-paul-mackenzie-freed-re-arrested-in-malindi-n319020">distributing unauthorised films</a> to the public.</p>
<p>That same year, he <a href="https://www.fox44news.com/news/world-news/kenyan-pastors-appear-in-court-over-deaths-of-parishioners/">closed the church</a>, sold his TV station and moved to a ranch in a forested area of Kilifi county, where hundreds of families built houses. The church and TV station were sold to Ezekiel Odero, another televangelist. Odero is well known for his so-called miracle healing crusades, which draw <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yRuvtXIN6wA">tens of thousands</a>. He is also under <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenyan-pastor-odero-faces-court-over-shakahola-cult-massacre-4222776">investigation</a> for offences associated with the Shakahola mass suicide.</p>
<p>Religious <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986">extremism</a> or religious movements with a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/commission-on-devil-worship-the-1995-cult-report-that-government-ignored-4217722">cultic flavour</a> are not new in Kenya.</p>
<h2>How will this change the way religious extremism is viewed in Kenya?</h2>
<p>New religious movements or individual preachers in Kenya rarely attract public scrutiny. There is also little public awareness of the social impact of such groups. Public debates in Kenya are more likely to focus on the occult – with <a href="https://www.globalsistersreport.org/column/religious-tackle-devil-worship-recruiting-phenomenon-45856">“devil worship”</a> as the popular catchphrase. </p>
<p>As far as religious extremism is concerned, Kenya’s focus has been on Islamic extremism, including what constitutes “terrorism”. These are highly politicised debates.</p>
<p>The president’s description of the Shakahola incident as “<a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/ruto-speaks-shakahola-cult-paul-mackenzie-belongs-in-jail-4210598">akin to terrorism</a>” opens up a new epoch in which Kenyans can begin to look at all religions as potential incubators of extremism. Preventive measures can therefore be designed to address not just Islamist extremism but all forms of religious extremism.</p>
<h2>In what ways is the cult similar to violent extremism?</h2>
<p>I would place the Shakahola cult deaths within the narrow confines of cultism and religiously inspired violent extremism. A cult is a group of people inspired – or brainwashed – by a charismatic leader to follow extreme religious beliefs or practices at any cost to themselves. Such beliefs and practices rarely resemble those of established faiths or groups.</p>
<p>This is very close to violent extremist groups such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19392206.2021.196392">Al-Shabaab</a>
or <a href="https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/downArticlepdf/20/8/23/1326">Daesh</a> who follow rigid religious value systems and beliefs. Such groups may differ in their justification for using violence to achieve political, ideological or social change. But both religiously inspired cults and extremist groups do tend to reimagine or reinterpret traditional scripture.</p>
<p>Both cults and violent extremist movements have similar push and pull factors at the individual level. In the cult death case, followers came from all over Kenya to seek out Mackenzie. Many of those individuals and families abandoned all their comforts to join his church in a remote location without basic amenities. Recruits to extremist networks such as Al-Shabaab show similar tendencies. They pledge to give up their earthly comforts for a higher calling in the name of misinterpreted or imaginary versions of religious texts.</p>
<p>In each case, the victims are exposed to mind control by charismatic religious preachers. The only difference is in the mode and motive for death in the name of the chosen cause. In Shakahola, it was massive casualties through starvation. The alternative might be suicide bombings aimed mainly at political objectives.</p>
<h2>How have Kenya’s constitutional freedoms been misused by religious extremists?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/198-32-freedom-of-conscience-religion-belief-and-opinion#:%7E:text=(1)%20Every%20person%20has%20the,%2C%20thought%2C%20belief%20and%20opinion.">Freedom of religion or belief</a> is guaranteed by the Kenyan constitution: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every person has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The question that confronts Kenya is whether “fasting to death” falls within constitutional rights to freedom of religion. How does this sit with <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/112-chapter-four-the-bill-of-rights/part-2-rights-and-fundamental-freedoms/192-26-right-to-life">the right to life</a> in the constitution? </p>
<h2>What needs to be done to prevent this from happening again?</h2>
<p>In Kenya, countermeasures dealing with Islamist extremism have shown us that religious institutions and activities can be scrutinised and regulated to prevent extremism and terrorism.</p>
<p>These can be extended to religious cultism without infringing the constitutional right to freedom of religion or belief. Kenya needs an honest discussion about how regulations can safeguard the right, to prevent fake religious leaders from misusing it. </p>
<p>President Ruto has <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-05-05-shakahola-deaths-justice-lessit-to-chair-inquiry-commission/">commissioned a team</a> to investigate the Shakahola deaths. The team has the broader mandate of developing a legal framework for scrutiny and self-regulation of religious institutions. This is a complex task. What we can learn from Kenya’s previous attempts to curb religious radicalisation is that <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear-33.pdf">public participation</a> is key in designing and putting legal frameworks to action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Both cults and violent extremist movements have similar push and pull factors at the individual level.Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of MombasaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2009412023-03-07T10:23:47Z2023-03-07T10:23:47ZMilitant Islamist violence in Africa surges – deaths up nearly 50%, events up 22% in a year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513135/original/file-20230302-16-w2o9n4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Burkina Faso servicemen hold portraits during the burial of soldiers killed in an Al-Qaeda attack in Gaskinde in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Olympia de Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surges-deaths-up-nearly-50-events-up-22-in-a-year-200941&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Militant Islamist violence in Africa set <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">new records for violent events and fatalities</a> this past year. This continues a relentless decade-long upward trend. </p>
<p>In a recent Africa Center for Strategic Studies <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/">analysis</a>, we found that there were 6,859 episodes of violence involving militant Islamist groups in Africa in 2022. This is a 22% increase from 2021. Fatalities linked to these events shot up 48% to 19,109 deaths. This reflects a sharp rise in deaths per event. </p>
<p>Notably, the spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians – from 4,307 in 2021 to 7,220 in 2022. This figure is significant: these militant groups are not focused on winning hearts and minds so much as intimidating local populations into compliance.</p>
<p>The threat is also accelerating. Both violent events and fatalities have almost doubled since 2019. In 2019 there were 3,520 events and 10,336 fatalities. </p>
<p>This analysis draws from data compiled by the <a href="https://acleddata.com/about-acled/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> (ACLED) – a non-profit data collection and crisis mapping organisation. It aggregates violent events from local and international news sources, as well as UN, government and NGO reports. The Africa Center then corroborates the data through independent sources. These include the jihadist monitoring group <a href="https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/">SITE Intelligence</a>, the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/">International Crisis Group</a> and <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants">Stanford University’s Mapping Militants Project</a>. </p>
<p>Having monitored the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sahel-and-somalia-drive-uninterrupted-rise-in-african-militant-islamist-group-violence-over-past-decade/">trends of Africa’s militant Islamist groups</a> for many years, we are concerned by this spike. A more comprehensive and contextualised response is needed. This must integrate the efforts of local communities with those of national, regional and international actors. </p>
<h2>Violence concentrated in Sahel and Somalia</h2>
<p>The militant Islamist threat is not monolithic but comprised of over a dozen different militant groups. Each has distinct leadership, objectives, organisational structure, funding and supply of weapons. </p>
<p>They are motivated by a host of factors. These include: religious ideology, money, revenge against real and perceived government abuses, criminality, ethnic polarisation and political ambition. </p>
<p>The threat is concentrated in five theatres: the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. </p>
<p>The Sahel and Somalia accounted for 77% of all such violent events in the past year. This is a growing trend. In 2020 the Sahel and Somalia accounted for 58% of events, in 2021 for 73%. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513219/original/file-20230302-18-q5jlny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Sahel – specifically Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – experienced the most rapid expansion of militant Islamist violence of any theatre over the past year. It accounted for 7,899 deaths, more than 40% of the continental total of fatalities. The groups driving this violence are the Macina Liberation Front, Ansaroul Islam, Ansar Dine and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/five-zones-militant-islamist-violence-sahel/">violence in the Sahel has also spread geographically</a>. From northern Mali, violent events have shifted to the more populated regions of central and southern Mali. This includes the capital, Bamako, which has <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-militant-islamist-insurgency-bamako-doorstep/">seen attacks on an increasingly regular basis</a> after years of relative insulation.</p>
<p>Militant Islamist violence has similarly spread rapidly into northern, western, and eastern Burkina Faso. Today, Burkina Faso experiences more violent events than any other country in the Sahel.</p>
<p>Once seen as highly unlikely, there is now a real chance that Bamako and Ouagadougou – the capital cities of Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively – could fall under militant control. Both countries have struggled with a breakdown in governance and an <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">acceleration of militant Islamist violence following coups</a> starting in 2020.</p>
<p>The erosion of security in Burkina Faso, in turn, threatens bordering countries, especially Togo and Benin. Both nations saw double digit increases in the number of violent events involving militant Islamist groups in the past year.</p>
<p>In Somalia, fatalities linked to al-Shabaab shot up from 2,606 in 2021 to 6,225 in 2022. This 133% increase was accompanied by a 29% rise in violent events. This reflects an escalation in both the pace and lethality of violence. The tempo of fighting significantly accelerated after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for an <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-president-vows-total-war-against-al-shabab/6714508.html">all-out offensive</a> against al-Shabaab. Driven from areas it once controlled, al-Shabaab has reverted to retaliations against soft targets. One example is the October 2022 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/">twin bombings in Mogadishu</a> that killed over 100 people.</p>
<p>The Lake Chad Basin region (northern Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and southeastern Niger) saw a levelling out of violence from Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the past year. However, this obscures a 33% increase in violence against civilians. There’s also been a geographic spread of attacks from northeastern Nigeria to regions in the west and centre.</p>
<p>In northern Mozambique, violent events linked to Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama’a (ASWJ) rose by 29% in 2022. They had initially dropped when forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda intervened in 2021. Dislodged from the coastal cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia, ASWJ has shifted its attacks to districts further west and south. ASWJ is notorious for mounting a higher share of violent attacks against civilians than seen in any other region in Africa.</p>
<p>North Africa is the one region that has seen a demonstrable drop in activity over the past year. There’s been a 32% decline in violent events. In 2022 there were 162 events, compared to 238 events in 2021. Roughly 90% of the 2022 incidents, resulting in 276 fatalities, were in Egypt involving the Islamic State in Sinai. </p>
<h2>Time for a rethink</h2>
<p>These developments underscore that the overall trajectory of militant Islamist violence is trending in the wrong direction. African militant groups are becoming increasingly resilient, particularly in the Sahel and Somalia. </p>
<p>In both regions, these groups have been operating for years. They’ve established the capacity to recruit, train, supply and deploy their forces. Vitally, they’ve also become adept at generating revenue. This occurs through a combination of looting, extortion, control of mining sites and trade route domination. In most cases, this equates to becoming more criminally rather than ideologically motivated. This operational and financial resiliency suggests that these groups are unlikely to fade away anytime soon.</p>
<p>The flipside of this reality is that these militant groups thrive in regions with weak governments. They are a symptom of fragility rather than a demonstration of militant strength. When confronted with an effective and capable statutory force, they take heavy losses and are forced to retreat. </p>
<p>This points to the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">central role that governance plays</a> in defeating an insurgency. Experience shows that effective counterinsurgency requires: government legitimacy, political will, control of corruption, investment in development activities and the mitigation of human rights abuses, among other factors. This makes sense. Successful counterinsurgency entails gaining the trust and support of local populations. </p>
<p>The ineffectiveness of the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are illustrative of this. In addition to intimidating dissenters and forsaking government services, the Malian junta, by partnering with the notorious Russian paramilitary Wagner Group, has become party to <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">serial human rights abuses</a>. <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">Four out of five people killed by the Wagner Group</a> alongside the Malian junta were <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">civilians</a>. Meanwhile, militant violence is accelerating.</p>
<p>In addition to reestablishing legitimate governance processes, <a href="https://africacenter.org/publication/strengthening-sahelian-counterinsurgency-strategy/">effective counterinsurgency efforts</a> will require:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>sustaining pressure on militant groups, including holding territory retaken</p></li>
<li><p>protecting civilians</p></li>
<li><p>building support with and providing services to local populations</p></li>
<li><p>cutting off revenue flows for militant groups.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Regional security forces</h2>
<p>Experience from countering militant Islamist groups in Africa has also highlighted the vital role played by regional security forces. </p>
<p><a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/25/3/article-p236_002.xml#:%7E:text=amisom%20was%20designed%20to%20support,Shabaab%20and%20other%20militia%20groups">AMISOM/ATMIS</a> in Somalia, <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/regional-security-support-vital-first-step-peace-mozambique">SADC</a> in Mozambique and the <a href="https://trainingforpeace.org/publications/a-quest-to-win-the-hearts-and-minds-assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-multinational-joint-task-force/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a> in the Lake Chad Basin have all been instrumental in mitigating the threats faced, supporting overstretched government forces. </p>
<p>The juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, meanwhile, have done just the opposite. They have alienated the G-5 Sahel, <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma">MINUSMA</a> and European Union forces. This has resulted in a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/">dramatic downsizing of security partner support</a> at the very time that militant Islamist activity is accelerating.</p>
<p>Effective counterinsurgency operations are hard. Moreover, success is not guaranteed. Even when legitimate governments <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR291z1/RAND_RR291z1.pdf">demonstrate political will</a>, it takes six years on average to prevail in a counterinsurgency. </p>
<p>African countries facing insurgencies and their regional partners should be prepared for a long slog to reverse the deteriorating trends of militant Islamist group violence. The alternative is an ever more emboldened and enriched Islamist militancy with expansive ambitions on neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The spike in violence was marked by a 68% increase in fatalities involving civilians.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandWendy Williams, Associate Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979332023-02-14T13:43:23Z2023-02-14T13:43:23ZAl-Shabaab attacks in Somalia affect communities as far as 900km away – aid agencies need to take note<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506619/original/file-20230126-12-jm23rr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier stands guard at a makeshift camp in Somalia's Baidoa, a southwestern town frequently attacked by Al-Shabaab militants.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Policymakers tend to assume that the effects of conflict are felt only where violence occurs. As a result, humanitarian aid, protection efforts or asylum policies largely focus on conflict-hit areas. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.who.int/">World Health Organisation</a>, for instance, provides emergency medical supplies in areas directly affected by violence. The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/6328ce824.pdf">UN Refugee Agency</a> ties protection status to residing in areas hit by conflict. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://docs.iza.org/dp15761.pdf">recent study</a> finds, however, that conflict negatively affects food security, nutrition, health and education outcomes of families living hundreds of kilometres away from the epicentre of violence. </p>
<p>This underscores the need to broaden policy responses to conflict and consider its ripple effects. </p>
<p>Our research in Somalia examined how the impact of violent conflict spread to distant locations. We looked specifically at conflict that affected Somalia’s food logistics network, which gets food to far-flung markets.</p>
<p>We focused on Somalia because of its high number of terror incidents arising from the government’s war with <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">Al-Shabaab</a>, a militant group that has terrorised the country’s southern region for about 15 years.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-shabaab-is-just-a-symptom-of-somalias-tragedy-the-causes-are-still-in-place-197554">Al-Shabaab is just a symptom of Somalia’s tragedy – the causes are still in place</a>
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<p>We used data from the <a href="https://www.fao.org/home/en">Food and Agricultural Organisation</a>, which tracks food prices. Our results show that terrorist attacks that hit food transportation networks increased food prices in markets located up to 900km away (a 17-hour drive) from where the violence occurs. </p>
<p>In response to these terrorist attacks and resulting price increases, households in far-flung areas adjusted their eating patterns. They also reduced their non-food spending, primarily on health and education. </p>
<p>Yet, the responses to violent incidents by donor and aid agencies, as well as domestic policymakers, hardly take such ripple effects into consideration. </p>
<h2>Tracking conflict</h2>
<p>To track these ripple effects, we focused on the distribution of maize, a staple food eaten throughout Somalia. We got the geo-coordinates of maize growing areas, tracked how maize was transported by road to markets, and mapped the Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks that occurred along these transport routes. </p>
<p>This helped us map the impact of conflict on maize prices and the ripple effects on household welfare. </p>
<p><a href="https://fews.net/">The Famine Early Warning Systems Network</a> provides maps showing the exact routes taken by Somali drivers who are transporting maize. We drew a corridor of five kilometres around these roads and counted the number of violent incidents occurring each month between 2001 and 2018. The <a href="https://www.fao.org/home/en">Food and Agricultural Organisation</a> provided us with monthly maize price information for 10 markets across Somalia. </p>
<p>We combined this data with <a href="https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3181">World Bank surveys</a> that recorded food consumption, eating patterns, and the health and education of Somali families. </p>
<h2>Our findings</h2>
<p>We <a href="https://docs.iza.org/dp15761.pdf">found that</a> conflict along transportation roads increased maize prices substantially, even in markets located hundreds of kilometres away. This finding is in line with studies on the impact of conflict on supply chain networks elsewhere in the world, such as in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-highlights-africas-need-to-diversify-its-wheat-sources-181173">Russia-Ukraine war</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-conflict-is-driving-up-wheat-prices-this-could-fuel-instability-in-sudan-180878">Russia-Ukraine conflict is driving up wheat prices: this could fuel instability in Sudan</a>
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<p>During the height of the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia (between 2016 and 2018), violent incidents occurring very close to transportation roads alone increased maize prices by around 11% over sustained periods of time.</p>
<p>During these times, we found violence en route had around half as large an impact on maize prices as rainfall, which the World Bank has highlighted as one of the most important <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27379">determinants of food prices</a>. </p>
<p>We also scrutinised satellite images of nightlights emitted on transportation roads. We found that conflict along transit roads dimmed the light emitted on these roads several hundreds of kilometres away. This decrease in road traffic underscores a reduction in the quantity of maize transported along roads from growing areas to markets.</p>
<p>Looking at family welfare, we found that households reported having to adjust their eating patterns due to food price shocks. Families substituted the more expensive maize with sorghum. Still, we found that lower food security decreased the nourishment available to households.</p>
<p>Considering child outcomes, we found that far-away conflict along transit routes increased the incidence of diseases, such as gastroenteritis, malaria and typhoid. This is in line with <a href="https://gdc.unicef.org/resource/relationship-between-childhood-malnutrition-infectious-diseases">well-known links</a> between malnutrition and infectious diseases. </p>
<p>Finally, we also found a decrease in the school enrolment of children. Violent incidents along maize transportation routes reduced the probability of children joining primary and middle school hundreds of kilometres away. This is likely to be related to the economic effects of food price rises. This makes schooling less affordable and increases the incentives for child labour. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p><a href="https://docs.iza.org/dp15761.pdf">Our study</a> has wide-ranging policy implications. </p>
<p>The ripple effects of violence have important welfare costs. The negative effects of conflict on human capital – particularly nutrition, health and education – are larger than commonly assumed. We estimate that these ripples add around 30% to the cost of locally occurring conflict. </p>
<p>Our findings also have important implications for the regional targeting of policies. </p>
<p>Humanitarian interventions or refugee policies most commonly focus on those locations where conflict occurs. The World Food Programme, for instance, provides nutritional assistance in areas around Mogadishu, in the south-west of Somalia where most conflict is concentrated. </p>
<p>Similarly, when evaluating asylum eligibility, the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/6328ce824.pdf">UN Refugee Agency</a> highlights the south-west of Somalia as the area where individuals are at risk of serious harm. </p>
<p>By contrast, our results provide evidence that individuals can be affected by conflict even if it occurs far away. For instance, the city of Galkayo (700km from Mogadishu) is part of the north-eastern Puntland state. It isn’t covered by either the World Food Programme or the UN’s refugee policies. Yet conflict in the south-west increases food prices, decreases food security and erodes human capital in Galkayo. </p>
<p>This long reach of violence highlights the need to consider extending humanitarian aid, protection efforts or asylum status eligibility to areas further away from conflict epicentres.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The negative effects of conflict on human capital – particularly nutrition, health and education – are larger than commonly thought.Marco Alfano, Lecturer, Lancaster UniversityThomas Cornelissen, Professor of Economics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975542023-01-18T14:50:47Z2023-01-18T14:50:47ZAl-Shabaab is just a symptom of Somalia’s tragedy – the causes are still in place<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504205/original/file-20230112-52283-w708x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abdurashid Abdulle Abikar/AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For at least 14 years now, the militant group Al-Shabaab has <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab">terrorised</a> the southern region of Somalia. Its ambition is to impose a tyrannical dictatorship over the entire country through fear and brutality. To achieve its aims, it has sought to oust the Somali government and its foreign military allies. </p>
<p>I have been a student of Somali political economy for over three decades. I <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/1690.htm">predicted the collapse</a> of the Somali state and political order 33 years ago. That analysis foretold the miserable conditions Somalis have endured since. The political and humanitarian catastrophe predates the terrorist group’s rise – thus, Al-Shabaab is a symptom rather than the cause of Somalia’s misfortune. </p>
<p>There are two main forces responsible for the catastrophe that is Somalia. The dominant faction of the Somali political class is the chief culprit. Their agenda has been to attain power and loot the country’s resources for private gain. </p>
<p>Second is the international community, who are the junior partners of the political class. Based on my observations, representatives of western and African governments fear that Somalia could become a base for “terrorists”, which might destabilise the strategic Horn of Africa. But they are unwilling to engage with civic and independent-minded Somalis. </p>
<p>Most of the expatriate people I have encountered in my research and interacted with in my civic activities see tribalism as a Somali’s defining political character. Such a view dates back to the colonial era when colonisers segmented African people into ethnic camps to divide and rule them. </p>
<p>Out of this has emerged a strange marriage of convenience between the Somali political class and the diplomatic community. Each pretends progress is being made. The truth is that little progress has been made in reforming the political disorder. And much less has been done to tackle the country’s urgent human and development needs.</p>
<p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is willing or capable of changing, short of a radical shift in international pressure or a determined public. As I argue in my recent <a href="https://africaworldpressbooks.com/framing-somalia-beyond-africas-merchants-of-misery-by-abdi-ismail-samatar/">book</a>, unfortunately the tragedy might fester for decades, with or without Al-Shabaab. </p>
<h2>Al-Shabaab’s midwife</h2>
<p>In its first decade of independence, Somali leaders <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Africas-First-Democrats-Somalias-Abdirazak/dp/0253022304">stood out in Africa</a> for democratic rule by respecting the rule of law, the independence of public institutions and electoral terms. Nevertheless, Somalia’s first president, Aden Abdulle Osman, was deeply concerned about the behaviour of a segment of the political class. He registered his <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253022301/africas-first-democrats/">worries</a> in his diary on 5 July 1964: </p>
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<p>God save Somalis from the scavenging beasts in human form that are the so-called representative of the people. </p>
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<p>The democratic project ended when those who defeated President Osman in the 1967 election turned the country into a quasi single-party state. The mess they generated led to the murder of President Abdirashid Sharmarke by one of his bodyguards in 1969. The military quickly seized power, and foreclosed a return to a representative and accountable system of government for the next 21 years. </p>
<p>After half a decade in power, the dictatorship intensified the tribalisation of public power. The political opposition followed suit. Civil service and promotions in the military, and access to state resources, became based on an individual’s genealogical identity or loyalty to the regime. From the late 1970s to 1990, the military dictatorship confronted a fragmented and equally tribalised and armed political opposition. The state became the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia_1990.pdf">agent of terror</a>. Whole communities were punished and towns destroyed because of their cultural pedigree. This was long before Al-Shabaab’s rise. </p>
<p>The military regime <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161268">collapsed</a> in January 1991, but opposition groups failed to agree on a common civic agenda. The opposition group most active around Mogadishu, the United Somalia Congress, forced out the dictator. Among the consequences of the factional bloodletting that followed was the destruction of livelihoods and the making of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/31/world/somalia-1992-picking-up-pieces-as-famine-subsides.html">first famine</a> in the country since independence in 1960. This was long before Al-Shabaab appeared on the horizon.</p>
<p>Warlords and tribalistic political fiefdoms replaced the dictatorship, and much of the educated elite fled. The balkanisation of the country and society <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03736245.2019.1612769?journalCode=rsag20">impoverished everyone</a> except the very few who controlled the means of violence. Illiteracy rose dramatically and the population’s state of health took a nosedive, depriving the young majority of a productive future. </p>
<p>Most of the country’s current population were born after the fall of the military; few therefore know what civic politics and leadership look like. That makes them easy pawns of the sectarian elite.</p>
<p>It took almost 16 years for a religious group known as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Union of the Islamic Courts</a> to defeat the warlords. This event gave hope to the population that a more inclusive and accountable system of authority would be restored. But America and its regional allies were alarmed by the possibility of an “Islamist” foothold in the Horn of Africa. Consequently, Ethiopia <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/7/21/ethiopian-troops-enter-somalia">invaded</a> Somalia and installed in Mogadishu the tribal-based Somali Federal Government, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-interim-government-relocate-nairobi">formed in Nairobi</a>. The Union of the Islamic Courts forces broke into smaller units, adopted guerrilla tactics and successfully resisted the invasion.</p>
<p>America and its allies recognised that the Ethiopian occupation was doomed and subsequently engineered a split among the Union of the Islamic Courts. This schism marked the birth of Al-Shabaab as an autonomous organisation dedicated to take revenge on their former allies, western supporters of the Somali governments, and anyone who opposed them.</p>
<h2>A devil’s pact</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab is only the latest manifestation of the consequences of 50 years of exclusivist political ideology and inept leadership. </p>
<p>It is estimated that the Somali defence force is about 20,000 strong. But several factors have prevented it from taking the challenge to Al-Shabaab’s militias. The lack of necessary resources and quality leadership is partly to blame. Another problem is the prominence given to tribal identity over patriotism and competence in the running of the national force. </p>
<p>In addition, tribalised provinces have their own armed forces because they mistrust the federal government and each other. Finally, Somalia has been under a UN <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Impact-of-the-Global-Arms-Trade-in-Somalia-A-%C3%87anci-Medugu/4df6f722153e1270753c89ec2809047d0d1aba53">arms embargo</a> since the civil war began nearly three decades ago. The embargo has limited the capacity of the Somali government to sustain the war against Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The current governing leadership has not learned any lesson from past failures. The regime is using the National Security Agency to demonise the business community, under the cover of the war with Al-Shabaab. And it has <a href="https://hornobserver.com/articles/1746/Somalias-president-plans-to-use-clan-militia-to-degrade-al-Shabaab-Sources">mobilised tribal militias</a> in the fight. These acts deepen divisions among Somalis at a time when when the regime should be unifying the population for a common cause. Finally, such strategy bodes ill for the establishment of a post Al-Shabaab inclusive civic dispensation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar is Extraordinary professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Pretoria, a professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota. He is also a senator in the Somali Parliament.</span></em></p>It’s likely that the terrorist group will be defeated one day. But there are no signs that the political elite is capable of changing.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Extraordinary Professor, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945892022-11-24T11:32:45Z2022-11-24T11:32:45ZAl-Shabaab: sensational media reports about Kenyan terror attacks keep kids out of school<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495610/original/file-20221116-18-ek5k2x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pupils in Kenya hold prayers for victims of a 2013 terror attack in Nairobi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joseph Kanyi/Nation Media/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sensational reporting on terror attacks in Kenya is keeping children out of school, with dire consequences for their education and their futures. </p>
<p>That is the conclusion we came to in a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvac054/6754733?searchresult=1#378488194">recent paper</a> that examines how local media reporting on terrorist attacks affected primary school enrolment in Kenya between 2001 and 2014. </p>
<p>We found that households with access to such media reports were more likely than homes without access to feel that they and their children could die in terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/publications/">Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics</a> data on the country-wide number of primary school children, we estimate that in 2014, for instance, more than 70,000 learners didn’t enter school on time because of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/kenya/terrorism">terrorist attacks</a>. Our analysis finds that half of this number can be attributed to an over-response fuelled by media reporting. </p>
<p>We estimate that for the average affected learner, this will lower their lifetime earning potential by around 25% of a year’s income. This loss in earnings can be expected to have severe consequences for the country’s broader economic development. </p>
<p>To arrive at these insights, we built a model of how parents choose whether to send their children to school, have them work for pay or keep them at home. We incorporated the effects of terrorist violence into these choices. </p>
<p>Our results can be considered as a caution, not against reporting on terrorism, but against sensationalism. Moderate, facts-oriented reporting on terrorist events is not problematic. However, as a <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/terrorism-and-media-handbook-journalists">UNESCO report</a> puts it, the media are “often operating in over-drive”, thus inadvertently becoming “the megaphone of terrorism to attract audiences”. </p>
<h2>Fear as disruption</h2>
<p>Terrorists use violence strategically to spread fear and disruption beyond the violent act itself. Media platforms, because of their reach, are the <a href="https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/11/The_Battlefield_of_Media_SynthesisReport2-2.pdf">ideal vehicles</a> to disseminate this disruption. </p>
<p>As a result of the interplay between terrorism and media, terrorists can affect pillars of economic development, such as education. This does not mainly happen through destroying infrastructure or harming staff and pupils, but by affecting the demand for schooling. </p>
<p>This parallels the effects of terrorism seen elsewhere. In attacks in Europe or the US, the economic effects are not derived from the immediate destruction of capital, but from changes in people’s attitudes and expectations. </p>
<p>We set out to examine how incidents of terrorism, together with access to mass media, affect education by changing its perceived risks and rewards. We selected Kenya for our analysis. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-shabaab-targets-kenya-and-what-the-country-can-do-about-it-87371">Why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya – and what the country can do about it</a>
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<p>Parts of the country, since the late 2000s, have experienced a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-shabaab-targets-kenya-and-what-the-country-can-do-about-it-87371">stark increase</a> in terrorist activity by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">Al-Shabaab</a>, a Somali terrorist group.</p>
<h2>How we did it</h2>
<p>We analysed the spatial concentration of terrorist attacks in Kenya using precise information from the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/">Global Terrorism Database</a>. We also studied the chronology of attacks between 2001 and 2014 – a time period that saw a steep rise in terrorist violence in the country and for which good data is available. </p>
<p>We then used two independent data sources on school attendance and enrolment in Kenya – the <a href="https://www.hsnp.or.ke/">Hunger Safety Net Programme</a>, and the <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/fr229/fr229.pdf">2009</a> and <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR308/FR308.pdf">2014</a> rounds of country-wide demographic health surveys, which are the latest available. To capture public attitudes to violence, we complemented our analysis with <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/data/">Afrobarometer</a> data. </p>
<p>Using the geographic coordinates of respondents provided by these surveys and three types of wireless signal coverage (radio, GSM telephone and television), we were able to identify variations and trends in the data. </p>
<p>We looked at the trends in primary school enrolment in relation to media coverage and the incidence of attacks. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>We found that while Al-Shabaab rarely targeted educational institutions in Kenya, its attacks substantially decreased school enrolments by about 0.5 percentage points for families outside the reach of mass media. Crucially, our results show that this negative effect doubled if parents had access to mass media.</p>
<p>We found that Kenyan families with access to radio, mobile phones or TV were significantly more afraid of terrorism than those without signal coverage. </p>
<p>Specifically, Kenyan parents with access to mass media believed that the risk of dying in a terrorist attack was 12 times larger than actual rates. As a result, these parents were more likely to keep their children out of school. </p>
<p>Our analysis also shows that families without media access reacted predominantly to attacks close to their homes. However, families with access to media kept their children out of school in response to terrorist attacks happening more than 100 kilometres away.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-photographs-of-dead-in-nairobi-terror-attack-failed-journalism-and-dishonoured-victims-110010">Why photographs of dead in Nairobi terror attack failed journalism -- and dishonoured victims</a>
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<p>Comparing school enrolment rates over time, our study found that the negative effect of terrorist attacks on school enrolment was twice as large for children with access to mass media as it was for children without access. </p>
<p>This suggests that media coverage plays a crucial role in stoking fears and keeping children out of school.</p>
<p>To investigate the long-term impact of missing school on lifetime earnings, we estimated a model of how parents chose whether to keep their children at home, send them to school or have them work outside the household. </p>
<p>We found that the decline in school enrolment led to decreased earnings later in life. This decrease was about three times as pronounced if parents had access to mass media. Overall, sensational media coverage of terrorist events reduced children’s incomes in their later life by around 25% of a year’s income.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The study is informative for the Kenyan government and other similar African nations striving to boost school attendance and the quality of education for young people. </p>
<p>The results show that access to media has significantly increased the fear of terrorism in the country. This has had a significant ripple effect on younger generations who are being kept out of school and will suffer financially later in life. </p>
<p>Our finding that distance to school increases the negative effect of a terrorist attack suggests that reliable and secure transport to school is important. Providing transport would likely make a considerable difference to children’s education, and Kenya’s long-term growth and development.</p>
<p>Governments could counteract over-responses with informational campaigns. Informing parents of the actual risks posed by terrorist attacks could counteract the fears stoked by the media, resulting in higher school enrolments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194589/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenyan families with access to mass media are significantly more afraid of terrorism than those without access.Marco Alfano, Lecturer, Lancaster UniversityJoseph-Simon Goerlach, Assistant Professor, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1932412022-10-27T14:41:45Z2022-10-27T14:41:45ZDroughts don’t need to result in famine: Ethiopia and Somalia show what makes the difference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491664/original/file-20221025-246-423c6v.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman at a camp for those displaced by drought in Baidoa, Somalia, in September 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ed Ram/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Horn of Africa is facing its worst drought in 40 years. Scientists <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/stubborn-la-ni%C3%B1a-persists">suspect</a> that a multi-year <a href="https://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/africa/east-africa-drought-climate-change-is-making-la-ni-a-impact-severe--83283#:%7E:text=The%20exceptional%20weather%20situation%20is,high%20temperatures%20in%20East%20Africa.">La Niña cycle</a> has been amplified by climate change to prolong dry and hot conditions. </p>
<p>After multiple failed harvests and amid high global food prices, the Horn is confronted with a severe food security crisis. Some <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123812">37 million people</a> face acute hunger in the region, which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.</p>
<p>In Somalia alone, 40% of the population is facing <a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-october-2022-january-2023">food insecurity</a>: about 6.7 million people. In neighbouring Ethiopia, the proportion is lower – 20% – but the absolute numbers are higher at 20.4 million. </p>
<p>It was not too long ago that drought led to highly divergent impacts between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 2010-2011, a <a href="https://news.un.org/audio/2013/05/579912">devastating drought</a> led to more than 260,000 deaths beyond normal levels of expected mortality in Somalia. Yet almost no one died in Ethiopia after a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/opinion/is-the-era-of-great-famines-over.html">severe drought in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Why did so many people die in Somalia but so few in Ethiopia? I explore these and related questions in my recent book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/States-Nature-Effects-Climate-Security/dp/110895846X">States and Nature: The Effects of Climate Change on Security</a>. </p>
<p>Using the cases of the two countries, among others, the book shows why Somalia had a famine in the early 2010s while Ethiopia did not, despite both being exposed to severe droughts.</p>
<p>The biggest differences were that, compared with Somalia, Ethiopia enjoyed a state with more capacity and more political inclusion, and made good use of foreign aid. These are factors that I identify in the book as contributing to how climate change is affecting the security of states. I include famine as a form of insecurity.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-should-not-exist-in-2022-yet-somalia-faces-its-worst-yet-wealthy-countries-pay-your-dues-191952">Famine should not exist in 2022, yet Somalia faces its worst yet. Wealthy countries, pay your dues</a>
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<p>Better outcomes are expected in states with high capacity to deliver services, high political inclusion where all social groups are represented in government, and where international assistance is welcomed and shared broadly. </p>
<h2>Two sets of conditions, two different outcomes</h2>
<p>So how did Somalia and Ethiopia stack up on the three factors that contribute to a bad situation being made worse?</p>
<p>In the lead-up to Somalia’s famine in 2011, the country faced persistent problems of a weak national government that was being challenged by Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist militia that controlled significant territory in the south of the country. The Somali government had limited ability to deliver services in the areas it controlled, let alone areas under Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>For its part, the Ethiopian government invested in <a href="https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/project_psnp_ethiopia">social safety net programmes</a> to feed people in the midst of the drought through cash transfers, employment programmes and food assistance. </p>
<p>The issue of sections of the society being excluded was also in greater evidence in Somalia than in Ethiopia. A number of marginalised groups, notably the Bantu Somalis and the Rahanweyn clan, were among the most affected by the drought. Better connected groups diverted aid that otherwise would have benefited these communities.</p>
<p>Finally, Somalia was in much worse shape when it came to aid. Al-Shabaab militants were blocking aid into the country, which led to a number of humanitarian groups withdrawing from Somalia. In addition, the US, through the Patriot Act, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/07/22/138596343/terrorists-u-s-policy-hinder-famine-aid-to-somalia">discouraged</a> NGOs from providing aid for fear it would end up in Al-Shabaab’s hands. Together, this meant that <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/famine-in-somalia/">little humanitarian assistance</a> came into Somalia precisely at the time when the country needed it most. Hundreds of thousands died. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">What drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government</a>
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<p>Ethiopia was a favourite of the international community for foreign assistance. It received funds that supported its social safety net programmes, which helped it prepare for the drought and administer emergency aid supplies. </p>
<p>The current food security crisis in the Horn of Africa, however, reveals persistent vulnerability in both countries. </p>
<p>As Ethiopia’s case shows, progress can be undone. Rising political exclusion is leading to huge food security risks, particularly in the Tigray region where aid is currently <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/wfp-regional-director-says-virtually-no-aid-access-in-tigray-104069#:%7E:text=Following%20the%20resumption%20of%20fighting,at%20the%20World%20Food%20Programme.">largely blocked</a> amid the ongoing <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/a-call-to-action-averting-atrocities-in-ethiopia-s-tigray-war-3994170">violent conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Equally worrisome is Somalia’s situation, where both local and external actors have struggled to build state capacity or inclusion in the face of a long-running violent insurgency. </p>
<h2>What can work</h2>
<p>My book provides some hopeful insights, as well as caution. It shows that for countries like Ethiopia and Bangladesh, international assistance can help address weak state capacity. Donors worked with local officials to address specific climate hazards, like drought and cyclones.</p>
<p>Such international assistance helped compensate for weak state capacity through discrete investments in early warning systems, targeted social services, such as food assistance or cash transfers, and hazard-specific protective infrastructure, such as cyclone shelters. </p>
<p>Those examples suggest that climate adaptation can save lives and contribute to economic prosperity.</p>
<p>However, as the unfolding dynamic in Ethiopia shows, progress can be reversed. Moreover, it’s far more challenging for external actors to build inclusive political institutions if local actors are not so inclined. </p>
<p>With climate change intensifying extreme weather events around the world, it is incumbent upon policymakers to enhance the practice of environmental peacebuilding, both to resolve ongoing conflicts through better natural resource management and to prevent future emergencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Busby received funding from the Minerva Initiative from the U.S. Department of Defense, the Skoll Foundation, and the University of Texas. </span></em></p>States with more capacity, more political inclusion and that make good use of foreign aid tend to see better outcomes.Joshua Busby, Professor, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913662022-10-11T14:02:01Z2022-10-11T14:02:01ZWhat drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486829/original/file-20220927-24-32z7kt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu where a 30-hour Al-Shabaab siege left 21 people dead in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hassan Elmi/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In response to external – and at times internal – pressure, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia has evolved over time. </p>
<p>Before 2008, Al-Shabaab was a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">small player</a> within the larger Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Union was an umbrella entity that emerged around 2003 to provide justice and security in Mogadishu in the absence of a formal state.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Ethiopia</a> – in support of the transitional Somali government – militarily defeated the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Over the next two years, Al-Shabaab broke away from the Union and rose to prominence in Somalia.</p>
<p>It transformed from a terrorist organisation, fighting Ethiopian occupation, to something of a de-facto state. It gained territory, eventually controlling most of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>Between 2010 and 2013, the group survived <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">military and territorial losses</a>, as well as a significant <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf">leadership crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab adapted and honed its ability to conduct attacks. It also established systems to tax businesses and the public, both inside and outside of the territory it controlled. The group began to provide an alternative justice structure based on a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strict and harsh interpretation</a> of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law">Sharia</a> (Islamic law) – though its understanding of Sharia was highly debatable even among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafi circles</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Al-Shabaab remains the most <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-us-counterterrorism-somalia-necessary-insufficient">formidable challenge</a> to the Somali government, and its regional and international partners. </p>
<p>Despite the shifts it has experienced over 15 years, some things have remained crucial to Al-Shabaab’s mission in Somalia. Scholars have noted <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299149628">three goals</a> that have been continually reasserted:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ridding the country of foreign troops</p></li>
<li><p>implementing Sharia </p></li>
<li><p>defeating the Somali federal government </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fully understanding these motivations, however, can be a challenge. This is because the organisation’s goals can change with time and the views of the leadership can be different from those of recruits. </p>
<p>Yet, examining these motivations offers important and actionable insights into the factors that perpetuate the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">conflict in Somalia</a> or block efforts to resolve it.</p>
<h2>Hostility to foreign troops</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s nationalist stance against foreign troops in Somalia has been a theme throughout its evolution.</p>
<p>Following the US backing of a warlord coalition during the Islamic Courts Union era and Ethiopia’s military intervention, Al-Shabaab began to <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-courts-union#text_block_19602">spread a message</a> in opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Somalia. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">“maximalist and violent pan-Islamist members”</a> within the group’s leadership ranks at the time. However, Al-Shabaab’s outspokenness against foreign forces resonated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">deep-rooted Somali hostility</a> against Ethiopia and broader nationalist narratives that existed, separate from Salafi and extremist trends. Ultimately, this served as an incredible recruitment tool.</p>
<p>After Ethiopia withdrew forces in 2009, Al-Shabaab shifted its focus to the expulsion of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission’s role included <a href="https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/">protecting federal institutions</a>. AMISOM has since been replaced by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-is-still-fragile-what-the-new-african-union-mission-can-do-to-help-stabilise-it-180430">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</a>, which Al-Shaaab continues to oppose. </p>
<p>The group also wants to <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">get rid of the US</a>. This is due to the country’s airstrikes and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61631439">special operations forces in Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey is another <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaabs-expanding-anti-turkish-campaign-in-somalia/">unwelcome foreign power</a> because it supports the Somali federal government. It also advises and trains the military. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab additionally opposes the <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">United Arab Emirates’ economic interests</a> in Somali ports and military bases.</p>
<h2>Implementing Sharia</h2>
<p>Implementing its own version of Sharia (Islamic law) has remained a pillar of Al-Shabaab’s agenda throughout its existence. </p>
<p>The group embraces a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafist interpretation</a> of Sharia. This includes the imposition of harsh punishments for infractions and the rejection of Sufi traditions that many Somalis follow. However, this goal has, as researchers have pointed out, taken “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">different forms according to the situation and the strength of the organisation</a>”. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2006, Al-Shabaab didn’t antagonise Sufi orders in the way it did between 2008 and 2009 because it wasn’t as powerful. As the group began to experience military pressure and territorial losses in the period after 2011-2012, the implementation of Sharia varied across Somalia, with some Al-Shabaab provincial (<em>wilayat</em>) governors operating more reasonably than others.</p>
<p>More recently, in 2019, Ahmed Diriye – Al-Shabaab’s current leader – expressed a tougher stance. He declared that Sharia ought to be implemented without “<a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">concession or compromise</a>”. </p>
<h2>Desire to govern</h2>
<p>Defeating the Somali federal government and federal member states is another important agenda item for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The group sees itself as an alternative to the Somali government. This is evident in its efforts to govern territory. It also provides security, justice and other services that the government <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">has failed</a> to effectively provide. </p>
<p>The organisation’s influence in the sphere of governance is notable in three areas: justice, taxation and dispute mediation. </p>
<p>First, Al-Shabaab’s shadow court system has offered pathways to justice for Somalis. It addresses the problems of the population it controls, including divorce, inheritance and land disputes. It then provides rulings it can actually enforce. </p>
<p>The government’s court and justice system are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">reportedly</a> less consistent. Its rulings aren’t always enforced and it faces issues of corruption.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s courts <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">attract residents</a> from areas outside the organisation’s immediate territorial control. This is because the courts help solve practical problems. </p>
<p>Second, the group maintains a taxation system that has spread beyond government-controlled territories. This <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">likely surpasses</a> the Somali government’s own taxation abilities. </p>
<p>Through its taxation of businesses, transportation, ports and other sectors, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://hiraalinstitute.org/a-losing-game-countering-al-shababs-financial-system/">some services</a>, such as regulating the production of certain export products. However, the main benefit of “taxation” is protection from the group. </p>
<p>The organisation also collects <em>zakat</em>, a charitable contribution required for Muslims. However, it uses much of this collection to bolster its own coffers rather than redistributing it to the community. </p>
<p>Third, Al-Shabaab has presented itself as capable of successfully intervening in clan disputes. In an <a href="https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/in-hearts-and-minds-effort-shabaab-boasts-of-settling-dispute-between-conflicting-tribes-in-southern-somalia.html">October 2020 press release</a>, the organisation claimed it’s “keen to solve the problems and differences that arise between the tribes, and it has shown remarkable success in settling decades-long disputes among them”. </p>
<p>Mediating clan disputes is central to Al-Shabaab’s ambitions to establish a unified Islamic state. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>After 15 years of conflict, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to stability in Somalia and its neighbours, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">like Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>Understanding its motives to expel foreign troops, implement its version of Sharia and defeat the government raises questions on how to end their insurgency. </p>
<p>With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-election-raises-more-questions-than-answers-183833">recent election</a> of Somali president Hassan Mohamud, there appears to be renewed government focus on not just weakening Al-Shabaab, but eliminating it. As part of this effort, the government has “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">hailed</a>” mobilisation efforts by local militia (called Ma'awisley) against the group. </p>
<p>The new administration has called for the expansion of these resistance efforts. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">sent government troops</a> to join local militia in an offensive against Al-Shabaab. Time will tell if this new strategy will strategically alter the course in the fight against the group. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-engagement-al-shabaab-somalia">Political engagement</a> with Al-Shabaab is another potential avenue that could complement military operations. </p>
<p>However, prospects for negotiation are poor. This is because of Al-Shabaab’s reluctance to engage in negotiations, its uncompromising position on foreign troop withdrawal and the government’s commitment to eliminating the group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daisy Muibu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab’s evolution over nearly two decades has been centred around three major goals.Daisy Muibu, Assistant Professor, University of AlabamaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901742022-09-15T13:38:42Z2022-09-15T13:38:42ZSomalia on the brink of famine: aid efforts risk failing marginalised communities yet again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483453/original/file-20220908-9735-w43w1h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Habiba Hassan Leesow, who had to leave her home due to drought, sits outside her tent with her daughter Najima Barre in a displacement camp.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Ed Ram/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/somalia-on-the-brink-of-famine-aid-efforts-risk-failing-marginalised-communities-yet-again-190174&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Somalia is facing a <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-69/en/">humanitarian crisis</a> of enormous severity and magnitude. This follows four failed rainy seasons, protracted conflict, political instability and the impact of rising global food prices – the latter made significantly worse by the war in Ukraine and the disruption to global food and fuel markets. </p>
<p>There’s a strong possibility of famine being declared later this year and this dire situation is predicted to continue well into next year. </p>
<p>Up to <a href="https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/alert/september-5-2022">7.1 million people</a> are considered in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. That’s nearly half of Somalia’s population. The last two famines in Somalia saw roughly 250,000 people die in each. The people that die <a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/somalian-famine-narratives/">largely come from</a> marginalised and minority groups in the country. Experts are worried that the death toll this time could meet or even exceed this level. </p>
<p>I’ve studied and highlighted many of the issues with the humanitarian response in Somalia. Judging by discussions I’ve had with experts and observers close to the ground I’m dismayed that, once again, not enough aid is reaching marginalised and minority people within the country, by either Government or aid agencies. </p>
<p><a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/Another-Crisis-in-Somalia_6-9.pdf">In a report</a> that I’ve put together with colleagues – a mix of academic and humanitarian experts – we reveal that many of the problems that our research team <a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/somalian-famine-narratives/">highlighted eight years ago</a> remain today. </p>
<p>In particular, the humanitarian community’s failure to help the most vulnerable groups in southern Somalia <a href="https://minorityrights.org/publications/swiss-mfa-review/">remains an unresolved</a> challenge. These groups – who are marginalised because of Somalia’s social hierarchies – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/abs/daniel-maxwell-and-nisar-majid-famine-in-somalia-competing-imperatives-collective-failures-201112-new-york-oxford-university-press-2016-xvii-269-pp-maps-acknowledgments-notes-bibliography-index-paper-3250-isbn-9780190499389/A8AABBD34FBE1BCF347B6760A2634CC1">suffered the highest levels</a> of mortality in the 1991-1992 and 2011 famines. </p>
<p>Since late last year, in anticipation of a potential famine, my colleagues and I have lobbied humanitarian donors and agencies to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/1/8/somalia-may-be-on-the-verge-of-another-famine">focus attention</a> on their exclusion from aid resources. This has taken place through presentations and direct advisories with these agencies. </p>
<p>Many individuals within the “system” are genuinely motivated to find solutions in order to ensure that aid is much more equitably distributed. But the humanitarian sector mirrors broader structural inequalities and power dynamics in Somalia. This reflects vested interests and an acceptance of the status quo in many quarters. It’s a stagnation that must be addressed. </p>
<p>The implications of this situation are that, ultimately, the humanitarian community means little, and brings few benefits, to many groups that it claims to represent and assist – the “most vulnerable”. </p>
<h2>Somalia’s neglected groups</h2>
<p>All societies have their marginalised and minority groups. These populations typically reflect ethnic or religious identities, racial or caste groups. </p>
<p>Somalia is no different in this respect. It has its own societal hierarchy. There are four main clan families in the country – the Dir, Hawiye, Darod and the Digil and Mirifle. </p>
<p>The Digil and Mirifle are a historically marginalised clan family. The Somali Bantu, are a large minority group, who are not part of the clan system at all. </p>
<p>These two groups are mainly found in the south of the country and are not small minorities. Together they may constitute over 40% of the entire population of Somalia. They comprised the majority of famine victims in both the 1991-1992 and the 2011 famines. They also make up the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/45781648/The_Political_Economy_of_Displacement_Rent_Seeking_Dispossessions_and_Precarious_Mobility_in_Somali_Cities">vast majority</a> of the internally displaced population.</p>
<p>In the latest warnings of famine, the geographic areas <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-69/en/">identified that are of most concern</a> are exactly those that have seen famine previously. And a recent <a href="https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Revised-Final-Report_Minority-Inclusion-Learning-Review_27_07.pdf">study</a> found that they have not been sufficiently consulted or reached in emergency assessments. Because of this, we believe that many will not be receiving the cash, food, medical and other interventions they are entitled to. </p>
<h2>Increased vulnerability</h2>
<p>These marginalised groups are already highly vulnerable to food insecurity and famine because of their structural position in society – they are largely rural <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2211912412000041">and missed out</a> on education and international migration. This has limited their members from obtaining formal employment (including with government and aid organisations), the creation of business communities and the establishment of significant diaspora populations. </p>
<p>This is crucial, as <a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/somalian-famine-narratives/">our research on the 2011 famine</a> showed. Families and clans that had members (close or distant) in urban employment, as part of a business community or in the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/remittances-and-vulnerability-somalia">diaspora</a>, were able to call on crucial support through their social networks.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian sector failures and struggles</h2>
<p>This issue of marginalisation and minority exclusion from aid resources has been a regular topic of conversation in humanitarian circles since at least 2014. This followed the release of <a href="https://minorityrights.org/publications/swiss-mfa-review/">research</a>, including ours. However, the humanitarian sector in Somalia as a whole has failed to turn these words into significant actions and organisational change. </p>
<p>We’ve seen how, in some instances, humanitarian resources and actors empower certain groups over others. For instance, we found that there are few employees or credible NGOs and institutions from these two groups – the Somali Bantu and the Digil and Mirifle – and where they exist they are likely to be discriminated against in job and resource opportunities. This maintains, or exacerbates, structural inequalities. </p>
<p>Discord, competition and a lack of leadership <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/5840.pdf">often characterise</a> the humanitarian sector. It’s beset by a high turnover of staff and, because it’s also so dependent on individuals, struggles to learn from past experience. This makes it hard to develop and maintain an understanding of complex issues and their solutions. </p>
<p>The humanitarian system is currently scaling up – albeit late – in recognition of the scale and severity of the situation, however the incentives inherent in the humanitarian response lean towards scale rather than severity. This means that the easiest people to reach are likely to be prioritised rather than those most at risk of death; it is not easy to reach many of the groups we are most concerned by, whether in camps for internally displaced people or in remote areas under al-Shabaab influence. </p>
<p>There are a number of changes that could address this issue.</p>
<p>Agencies must develop a more strategic approach – and make the organisational changes needed – so that exclusion is addressed as a priority both internally as well as in relation to those they work with. An immediate step that could yield positive results would be to seek out these groups. However, the reality is that these problems are so deeply entrenched it will take years to overcome. </p>
<p>Next, there must be comprehensive research on and with these groups to better understand their predicament and get their input on how to include them in aid practices. Bringing legitimate representatives of these groups into humanitarian circles and discussions will give them a greater voice at the table. </p>
<p>Understanding local power dynamics, including majority-minority tensions, let alone resisting them is not easy but it is incumbent on agencies to invest in doing this better.</p>
<p>Without concerted efforts in this direction the humanitarian sector will continue to neglect and miss its own claimed priority populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nisar Majid has received funding from the Gates Foundation, FCDO and USAID. </span></em></p>Millions of Somalis are in urgent need of aid. But not enough is being done to reach marginalised groups.Nisar Majid, Research associate, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1840702022-07-06T13:33:09Z2022-07-06T13:33:09ZWhy US-Kenya cooperation on wildlife and drug trafficking matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470797/original/file-20220624-15-12zt89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ivory seized on a Kenya flight arriving in Bangkok, Thailand, in 2016.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Vichan Poti/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya and the United States have worked very closely against <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2021/04/climate-change-terrorism/">terrorism</a> since the targeting of the American embassy in Nairobi in <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2022/03/25/victims-of-nairobi-embassy-attack-register-to-lobby-00020628">1998 by Al-Qaeda</a>. But much less debated is US-Kenya cooperation on other issues such as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334974678_Transformations_Changes_and_Continuities_in_Conservation_Governance_A_Case_Study_of_Wildlife_Conservation_in_Kenya_1980-2016">environmental conservation</a> and law enforcement among others. </p>
<p>Cooperation between the two countries on tackling <a href="https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-announces-new-partnership-kenya-combat-wildlife-trafficking#:%7E:text=NAIROBI%2C%20Kenya%20%E2%80%93%20U.S.%20Secretary%20of,driving%20several%20species%20towards%20extinction.">illicit trade in wildlife</a> and <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/global-war-against-drugs-reaches-kenya">narcotics</a> has yielded some notable success in the recent past. A good example is the case of the infamous Akasha brothers - Baktash Akasha and Ibrahim Akasha. Baktash Akasha was <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-leader-violent-kenyan-organized-crime-family-sentenced-25-years-prison-narcotics">expelled from Kenya</a> and became the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/global-war-against-drugs-reaches-kenya">first Kenyan</a> to be sentenced on drug trafficking charges in New York in 2019. </p>
<p>Both brothers were reported to have <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-07-27-akashas-had-links-with-al-shabaab-court-told/">links with Al-Shabaab</a>, the Al Qaeda linked terrorist group operating in the Eastern African region. Their arrest and prosecution was considered significant in the fight against transnational organised crime. </p>
<p>Another example was the recent arrest of Abubakar Mansur Mohammed Surur - a Kenyan national wanted in the United States for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/29/kenya-arrests-man-wanted-for-illegal-ivory-trading">ivory related offenses</a>. His arrest followed a joint Kenyan-US press conference in Nairobi in which <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/u-s-announces-two-1-million-rewards-for-information-leading-to-the-arrests-of-two-kenyan-fugitives-involved-in-narcotics-wildlife-trafficking/">a $2 million bounty</a> was announced for two other Kenyan fugitives – Badru Abdul Aziz Saleh and Abdi Hussein Ahmed. They are believed to be part of a transnational organised crime network engaged in extensive rhino horn smuggling.</p>
<p>The Eastern Africa region in which Kenya falls is made up of states classified by <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//FrontOffice/07413_UNODC_Promoting_the_Rule_of_Law_English.pdf">United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> as either developing or fragile states. This provides <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//FrontOffice/07413_UNODC_Promoting_the_Rule_of_Law_English.pdf">“fertile grounds”</a> for transnational organised crimes. These include piracy, terrorism, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and wildlife trafficking. </p>
<p>Corruption facilitates large-scale smuggling. In Kenya, for example, corruption delayed completion of a recently launched <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/uhuru-launches-sh4bn-forensic-lab-at-dci-headquarters-3847488">ultramodern forensic lab</a> by about 20 years with implications for the fight against crime. This has implications for <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003221081/human-security-sustainable-development-east-africa-jeremiah-asaka-alice-oluoko-odingo">human security and sustainable development</a>.</p>
<p>Transnational organised crime is cross border in nature. Thus, cross border cooperation is central to tackling it effectively. My <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2021/04/climate-change-terrorism/">research</a> on the interplay between climate change and terrorism focuses on US-Kenya counter-terrorism cooperation and suggests areas that need improvement. </p>
<p>In my recently published <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Human-Security-and-Sustainable-Development-in-East-Africa/Asaka-Oluoko-Odingo/p/book/9781032116969">co-edited book</a> I argue for multilateral cooperation and a people-centered approach to security and development in the Eastern Africa region. </p>
<h2>Why the US-Kenya relationship matters</h2>
<p>Bilateral and multilateral cooperation<a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003221081-2/human-security-jeremiah-asaka?context=ubx&refId=9c3ccbfc-0b45-46a4-a181-b63f88e9a53d%20%22%22"> is the best way</a> to deal with a growing list of transboundary concerns. This includes transnational organised crime, climate change and pandemics. </p>
<p>The US-Kenya bilateral partnership is therefore important, especially when complemented with multilateral cooperation. This is true for three reasons.</p>
<p>First, bilateral and multilateral partnerships boost capacity needed to counter transnational organised crime. Neither the United States as a global superpower nor Kenya as a regional powerhouse can deal with the threat in isolation. But working together they can be much more effective by, for example sharing intelligence and technology. </p>
<p>Cooperation means that countries can share the costs and benefits. For example, by providing Kenya with <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-kenya-strategic-partners-2/#:%7E:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20provided,in%20counterterrorism%20assistance%20to%20Kenya">financial support</a>, the United States outsources the burden of chasing after and arresting transnational criminals operating in the Eastern Africa region to Kenya. </p>
<p>Second, cooperation contributes towards reducing the burden of countering transnational organised crime. Going it alone means that each country must contend with the threats by themselves. This can be a very heavy burden to bear for both developing and developed countries.</p>
<p>Third, cooperation has the potential to provide impetus for similar cooperation in other areas of mutual interest. This can include areas not directly related to transnational organised crime. An example is <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346503580_Climate-terrorism_nexus_A_preliminary_reviewanalysis_of_the_literature">climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Research on environmental peacebuilding establishes that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010836718808331">cooperation can spill over</a> across sectors and scales. This means that US-Kenya partnerships on wildlife and drug trafficking have implications for future cooperation on other issues. </p>
<p>Finally, there is need to ensure that such partnerships don’t undermine either country’s sovereignty. They also should not contribute to human rights abuses and interference with individual freedoms. United States funded counter-terrorism campaign in the East African region is notorious for <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/somalia-us-must-not-abandon-civilian-victims-of-its-air-strikes-after-troop-withdrawal/">human rights abuses</a>. This includes <a href="https://missingvoices.or.ke/">forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings</a>, and <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war">killing of non-combatant civilians by drone strikes</a>. </p>
<p>There are also signs that this is already creeping into the counter-trafficking realm. A recent US Congressional Research Service <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11923">report</a> notes, in part, that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Some anti-poaching units that have received funding from U.S. aid implementers have been implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings, including in Cameroon, Central African Republic, DRC, Kenya, and Republic of Congo.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This should not be allowed to take root. Respect for human rights and dignity should be front and centre in global efforts in countering wildlife and drug trafficking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremiah Ogonda Asaka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is the best way to deal with a growing list of transboundary concerns.Jeremiah Ogonda Asaka, Assistant Professor of Security Studies, Sam Houston State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1839622022-05-30T14:10:56Z2022-05-30T14:10:56ZWhat US re-entry into Somalia means for the Horn of Africa and for bigger powers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465988/original/file-20220530-26-gv2m4n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Navy sailors for the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa off the coast of Djibouti.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US has announced it will resume a limited military presence in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/16/us/politics/biden-military-somalia.html">Somalia</a>. The former administration withdrew troops from the country in 2020. The mission of the American soldiers is still what it has been for the last <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia/exclusive-u-s-discloses-secret-somalia-military-presence-up-to-120-troops-idINKBN0F800V20140703">15 years</a>: to advise and assist Somali forces. US troops will not be directly involved in conflict. Their number, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/biden-approves-deployment-of-hundreds-of-us-troops-to-somalia">450 to 500</a>, is <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-55196130">smaller</a> than the last deployment. </p>
<p>The decision to redeploy in Somalia might appear to be surprising, for two important reasons. First, US president Joe Biden promised during his campaign to avoid the <a href="https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/">“forever wars”</a> against terror lasting since 2002. None of these wars were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1959130">ever fully won</a> and remain unpopular with the US electorate. It is also surprising in the light of moves <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/marine-corps-radical-shift-toward-china">to restructure the US military to meet a threat from China</a>. </p>
<p>What better explains this decision, however, is the <a href="https://www.state.gov/united-with-ukraine/">renewed emphasis</a> on the old rivalry with Russia since Russia’s Ukrainian intervention. </p>
<p>Announcing the redeployment, the Pentagon <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3033345/us-to-resume-small-persistent-presence-in-somalia/">claimed</a> it was partly for operational security. After their withdrawal in 2020, American special forces continued to train Somali soldiers outside Somalia, and at times travelled in and out of the country. The Pentagon said the redeployment would end the ad hoc support by creating bases inside Somalia.</p>
<p>Unofficially, American officials have claimed that the redeployment is due to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/16/us-troops-somalia-return/">worsening security conditions in Somalia</a>. This argument is open to question: the security situation is in reality relatively stable. </p>
<p>What is without doubt is that the deployment will have a direct influence on US-Russian rivalries in the region. </p>
<h2>Military situation in Somalia</h2>
<p>Somalia’s security landscape has not changed much since the US pullout over the previous year. The frontlines between the al-Qaida affiliated Harakat al-Shabaab, the Somali government, and the Forces of the African Union in Somalia have remained largely the same during the American absence. So has the rate of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022">terror attacks</a>. Al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2021.1959130">has not expanded</a> its territories though it does exercise control in areas supposedly under government control. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/17330-into-darkness-scrutinizing-economic-explanations-for-african-jihad">Several researchers</a> have reported that al-Shabaab is booming economically and is able to infiltrate the Somali security services. But this was also the case before the American withdrawal from Somalia.</p>
<p>What has changed is the international setting. Over the past few years the China-US rivalry has intensified. And over the past year, the US-Russia rivalry has exploded, partly influenced by the outbreak of the Ukraine war. These rivalries have large scale impacts at the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>It is notable that the American redeployment announcement came days after the electoral defeat of Somali president <a href="https://raadinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/a_near_end_to_somali_election.pdf">Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (“Farmaajo”)</a>. The former Somali president was a close ally of Russia’s new friends in the Horn of Africa – Ethiopia and Eritrea. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/15/somalia-elects-hassan-sheikh-mohamud-as-president">newly elected</a> Somali president is much cooler towards Ethiopia and Eritrea. He has also pointedly <a href="https://twitter.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1526546816275255297?s=20&t=by7gPoc3Q4IRp6KfFv07Xw">welcomed</a> the US redeployment. </p>
<h2>Post-Ukrainian reality in the Horn of Africa</h2>
<p>Farmaajo enjoyed a close alliance with Ethiopian president Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea’s president Issayas Afeworki. Ethiopian forces <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/potential-impact-ethiopias-war-tigray-somali-stability-28933">helped</a> Farmaajo insert his candidates in states hostile to him by, for example, suppressing his opponents. This was the case in Somalia’s south west regional state during the election there in 2018. They also backed Farmaajo against his political rival president Ahmed “Madobe” of the Somali Jubaland regional-state in 2019.</p>
<p>In return, Farmaajo sent his Somali forces to <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20210609-un-report-says-somali-army-participated-in-tigray-war">fight on the side of Abiy Ahmed</a> in the Ethiopian civil war. And Issayas Afeworki <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/foreign-powers-are-intervening-in-ethiopia-they-may-only-make-the-conflict-worse/2021/11/19/55266426-487d-11ec-95dc-5f2a96e00fa3_story.html">intervened</a> in Ethiopia’s civil war and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_clandestine-training-somali-forces-eritrea-stirs-families-concern/6202295.html">trained Somali forces</a>. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian civil war and the Ukrainian war increasingly saw the United States at odds with this tripartite alliance. First the US criticised the Ethiopian government for its actions in Tigray, which the United States saw as heavy handed and filled with human rights transgressions. The US special envoy to the Horn of Africa <a href="https://www.state.gov/a-perspective-on-the-ethiopian-u-s-relationship-after-a-year-of-conflict/">stated</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the war approaches its one-year anniversary, the United States and others cannot continue ‘business as usual’ relations with the government of Ethiopia. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The worsening US-Ethiopian relations were also fuelled by a Russian military cooperation <a href="https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du">agreement</a> with Ethiopia. This came in a period when Ethiopia had lost a lot of Russian produced materials in the battlefields of Tigray. Anti-American demonstrations took place in Addis Ababa, with Russian flags and <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/31/why-are-protestors-in-ethiopia-and-mali-waving-russian-flags/">pro-Russian slogans</a>. And the US imposed sanctions on Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders.</p>
<p>The relationship between the US and Eritrea and Ethiopia was worsening before the Ukrainian war. When the Ukrainian war broke out, Eritrea <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/03/09/figure-of-the-week-african-countries-votes-on-the-un-resolution-condemning-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/">fully supported</a> Russia at the United Nations while Ethiopia abstained from a vote condemning the action. That’s not all. The US was also worried about <a href="https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du" title=") in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and [Russian attempts](https://anchor.fm/krulak-center/episodes/MES-Research-Talk---Dr--Stig-Jarle-Hansen--Phoenix-Rising-U-S--Strategic-Competition-in-the-Red-Sea-Zone--Horn-of-Africa-with-China-and-Russia-e1f03du ">Chinese investments</a> to secure a naval base in Eritrea.</p>
<h2>US deployment timing</h2>
<p>The timing of the American redeployment in Somalia has two possible explanations in my view. It might have been delayed until after the recent elections in order to insulate it from local politics. Or one could see it as the US way to shore up a president with the will and potential to withstand the Russian-backed alliance of Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn. That would in turn shore up the US and its allies against Russia. </p>
<p>The latter point will be an outcome of the deployment anyway. It may well turn out to be the most important outcome, given that US engagement over 13 years has failed to bring about the end of al-Shabaab. The insurgents remain strong, and rich, but short of the ability to overrun the Somali government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision to redeploy in Somalia represents a renewed emphasis on the old rivalry with Russia.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1829592022-05-12T16:02:35Z2022-05-12T16:02:35ZA sense of history and urgency as Somalia moves to elect a new president<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462708/original/file-20220512-13-pjqcvw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A policeman marches with a Somali flag during a parade in the capital Mogadishu.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jose Cendon/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Somali lawmakers <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/6/somalia-lawmakers-to-decide-president-on-may-15">vote</a> for the country’s new president on May 15, marking the end of a long-delayed and controversial process. The Horn of Africa nation of 16 million has been struggling to achieve viable political stability after decades of civil war and violent insurgency that has spilled across its borders. Under the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-elections-are-finally-under-way-five-things-you-should-know-177584">indirect electoral process</a>, clan elders select the 275 members of the lower house who – together with 54 upper house members nominated by regions – in turn choose the president. Mohammed Ibrahim Shire sets out the scene ahead of an important election.</em></p>
<h2>Who is who in the May 15 elections?</h2>
<p>Somalia’s long-delayed presidential vote has set a record in attracting 39 contenders. These include the incumbent president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, two former presidents, a former prime minister, a former mayor of Mogadishu, former ministers, academics, lawmakers and a single female candidate. </p>
<p>This reflects a significant increase compared to previous years. In 2012 there were <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/09/somalias-presidential-vote/">25 candidates</a> for the top seat and at the 2017 elections there were <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/30/c_136020020.htm">24</a>. While the race features a slate of familiar faces, many political newcomers are taking their shot.</p>
<p>Somali voters don’t exercise universal suffrage, so the country’s 329 lawmakers will pick the president. Previous elections were notoriously tainted by fraud, intimidation and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html">vote-buying</a>. Memories of these issues will undoubtedly hang over the upcoming vote.</p>
<p>Somali’s election of the president is often marked by identity politics. Since 2000, the country has used a clan-based power-sharing <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/fact-sheet-somalia-s-2016-electoral-process">model</a> where parliamentary seats are shared among the four major clan families (Dir, Darod, Hawiye and Rahanweyn) and numerous minority clans. </p>
<p>This formula is also informally used when allocating ministerial posts and offices of state. The lower house speaker post is mostly contested by Rahanweyn while upper house speaker is nominally reserved for Dir. Previous leaders occupying the two top seats in today’s Somalia (president and premier) have been drawn from either Darod or Hawiye clans. Most candidates going into the election are primarily from these two clans.</p>
<p>Some candidates, most of them familiar faces, stand out from the large field. They include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo: From the Darod clan. His political manifesto is centred on sustaining the “comprehensive and far-reaching reforms” that his administration embarked on in <a href="https://twitter.com/M_Farmaajo/status/1524741897880711168">2017</a>. Among them is the promise to deliver universal suffrage if re-elected.</p></li>
<li><p>Former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud: From the Hawiye clan. Hassan’s political manifesto is centred on repairing the fraught ties between the federal government and federal member states so that a <a href="https://hassansheikh.so/">“peaceful Somalia contribute to a peaceful world”</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Former President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed: From the Hawiye clan. Sharif’s political manifesto is based on finalising Somalia’s protracted constitutional review process and shifting the stalemate with Al-Shabaab.</p></li>
<li><p>Former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre: From the Hawiye clan. Khayre’s political manifesto rests on correcting any mistakes he made during his tenure as prime minister and bridging Somalia’s major political divides.</p></li>
<li><p>Puntland President, Said Abdullahi Deni: From the Darod clan. Deni’s political manifesto is centred on three key pledges: Strong Somali shilling, strengthening legal institutions, and securing Somalia’s national borders.</p></li>
<li><p>Fawzia Yusuf Haji Adam, the sole female candidate: From the Dir clan. Her political manifesto is grounded on her vast experience as Somalia’s first female foreign minister and deputy prime minister. She’s firmly of the <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/nasikiliza/importance-somali-women-leadership-sustainable-development-and-peace">view</a> that women politicians can effect change and open the door for other women leaders.</p></li>
</ul>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-elections-are-finally-under-way-five-things-you-should-know-177584">Somalia's elections are finally under way: five things you should know</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>What are some of the salient features of the poll?</h2>
<p>Somalia is consistently ranked as <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/somalia">one</a> of the world’s most corrupt countries. It’s expected that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/9/11/somali-mps-elect-hassan-sheikh-as-president">bribes</a> paid by candidates to lawmakers and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38105023">voter intimidation</a> will fuel the upcoming election. </p>
<p>However, these tactics don’t always win the presidency, if previous elections are anything to go by. A popular saying in local parlance: ‘Take the money but vote with your heart.’ For this reason, candidates have spent a substantial amount of money on paid advertising and implemented digital media campaigns that include slick videos to sell their election manifestos.</p>
<p>Then there’s the degree of foreign state influence and political lobbying from domestic Islamist organisations, which can be the overriding factor in getting elected.</p>
<p>A common theme among different political campaigns is ‘big change’ and a charting a new way forward. Even the incumbent, President Farmajo, has joined the bandwagon with a well-organised campaign under the slogan “<a href="http://www.wardoon.net/2022/05/06/farmaajo-oo-halku-dheg-yaab-leh-la-baxay/">the change continues</a>”.</p>
<h2>How significant is the 2022 election?</h2>
<p>This election has a special significance and a sense of urgency for many Somalis. Somalia was scheduled to hold indirect parliamentary and presidential elections more than a year ago. However, elections were repeatedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-swears-lawmakers-paving-way-presidential-vote-2022-04-14/">delayed</a> by a bitter power struggle between the president and prime minister. </p>
<p>There were also repeated <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/somalias-electoral-crisis-in-extremis/">flare-ups</a> of political tensions between Somalia’s federal government, federal member states, and the opposition. A climate of distrust has kept leaders at loggerheads for months, oscillating between periods of uncertainty and heightened tensions.</p>
<p>Beyond the turbulent political environment, Somalia has been grappling with the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114902">worst drought</a> in decades. Millions of people are in need of aid and thousands are on the brink of starvation. This humanitarian crisis has been overshadowed by the crisis in Ukraine. The United Nations warned in March that it <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/news/newsworld/un-worried-about-lack-of-funds-to-tackle-somalia-drought/ar-AAUQeKj">faces</a> “crippling lack of funds to tackle Somalia’s devastating drought”.</p>
<p>Then there’s the country’s budget. For years, Somalia has struggled with salary payments for its security forces and civil servants. However, since 2019, it has reformed the payroll system by rolling out a biometric payment system that ensures regular salary payments. Nevertheless, the country relies on budget support from international partners. </p>
<p>In February the International Monetary Fund warned that Somalia could lose funds that go towards military wages and other essential services if no new government was in place by May 2022 to endorse planned reforms. </p>
<p>Finally, Al-Shabaab – the militant group fighting to overthrow Somalia’s government – has in recent years witnessed significant military <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalia-s-al-shabaab-down-far-out">pressure</a> from international and national forces. This has hampered the group’s ability to plan and prepare for major operations. However, the delayed polls and divisions between political leaders have boosted Al-Shabaab’s capacity to mount complex attacks. A week ago, the militant group <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/at-least-30-burundian-au-soldiers-killed-in-al-shabab-attack-official-says-/6557087.html">overran</a> an African Union base in southern Somalia, killing at least dozens of soldiers.</p>
<p>Concluding the election will present Somalia and its international partners with an important opportunity to refocus on broader priorities. These include the shared goal of rolling back Al-Shabaab’s insurgency.</p>
<h2>What next for Somalia after the election?</h2>
<p>The Somali government and federal member states will have finally come through a delayed, chaotic and divisive election process to elect a new president. Whoever wins the presidential election will inherit a host of challenges, many of them long standing. </p>
<p>These include a fragile economy with high levels of poverty and inequality, a youth bulge, high unemployment, and significant infrastructure gaps. In addition, the new president will be judged on the score of returning Somalia to full, democratic elections four years from now. </p>
<p>Another pressing challenge is overcoming the trust deficit between Mogadishu and regional capitals.</p>
<p>If Somalia elects a new president with cross-clan support, it will open an opportunity to promote much needed political and security reforms. This is essential for dealing with entrenched insecurity and humanitarian challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Ibrahim Shire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whoever wins the presidential election will inherit a host of challenges that have persistently tormented previous Somali leaders.Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804302022-04-19T14:25:03Z2022-04-19T14:25:03ZSomalia is still fragile: what the new African Union mission can do to help stabilise it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456127/original/file-20220404-21-cg5xjq.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somali police officers in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union Mission in Somalia – <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">AMISOM</a> – has ended its 15-year political and military experiment in post-conflict state building. On 1 April 2022, a shift took place as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia <a href="https://atmis-au.org/">(ATMIS)</a> came into being. The transition’s mission is to pave the way for lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa country. </p>
<p>The initial mission’s <a href="https://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/#">mandate</a> – which began in 2007 and ended on 31 March 2022 – was unusual. It had to contend with systemic and institutional dysfunction and security collapses in Somalia. </p>
<p>It also faced a major militant threat from the Al-Shaabab islamist insurgency. The terror group had captured territory in central and southern Somalia in its quest for a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Utopian caliphate</a>. This included key ports in Kismayu and Mogadishu. </p>
<p>Since its establishment, however, the Somali government <a href="https://igad.int/attachments/article/1765/030318-communique-tc-somalia.pdf">has reclaimed</a> 80% of Al-Shabaab-held territory. There has been gradual <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13341.doc.htm">economic and institutional reconstruction</a>. The country has also seen significant investment is peace-building efforts. A formal political and constitutional order is slowly supplanting warlordism based on clan affiliation. </p>
<p>Yet, the African Union Transition Mission faces significant security and political risks. These include a resurgence of Al-Shabaab activities, a weak national security sector, dysfunctional politics and a protracted electoral crisis. </p>
<p>To jump these hurdles, the transition mission will need to implement a draw down of external forces. And conditions will need to be attached. It will also need to find ways to harmonise security interventions from major players. These include Turkey, the US, Britain, the European Union and Germany. It will additionally have to support the Somalia election process, and protect gains made since 2007 by ensuring no major military or political vacuums occur.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-toxic-elite-politics-and-the-need-for-cautious-external-mediation-159270">Somalia: toxic elite politics and the need for cautious external mediation</a>
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<p>There are various structures, mandates and operational <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2022/02/exit-of-amisom-consolidating-gains-and-charting-new-trajectories-in-the-african-union-presence-in-somalia/">differences</a> between the new mission in Somalia and the previous one. </p>
<p>The most important is the alignment of the new mission’s <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2022/03/amisom-somali-military-commanders-set-up-teams-to-agree-priorities-for-new-au-mission/">Concept of Operations</a> with the Somalia Transition Plan 2021. This will see the new mission build the capacity of Somalia’s security and governing institutions for a full handover in December 2024. </p>
<h2>Reasons for exit</h2>
<p>Efforts to bring the African Union’s mission to an end were hampered for a long time by concerns around the stability of political and security organs in Somalia. This inevitably led to repeated annual extensions of the mission’s mandate. But after a decade, debate about winding it down gained traction.</p>
<p>Fatigued funding partners, including the US, UK and European Union, increasingly favoured a full exit of the mission. The Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations Security Council also wanted an exit. They wanted security responsibilities handed over to Somalia’s national forces. </p>
<p>This campaign initially ran up against the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b176-reforming-au-mission-somalia">regional mood</a> and the sentiments of the five countries contributing troops.</p>
<p>However, concerns of financial sustainability – the mission’s annual budget ran in excess of <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/01/amisom-african-union-peacekeeping-financing/">$900 million</a> – and the fear that <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140316141714/http://www.the-star.co.ke:80/news/article-158458/amisom-must-leave-somalia-mission-creep-sets">“mission creep”</a> would develops informed a hard push for exit. </p>
<p>As a result, in 2017, the <a href="https://amisom-au.org/2019/07/somalia-is-making-progress-transition-plan-is-on-track-ambassador-francisco-madeira/">Somalia Transition Plan</a> was developed. This laid the foundation for a full exit through a systematic draw-down of forces.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
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<p>However, Al-Shabaab surged back with an <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab">attack</a> in Mogadishu in October 2017 that killed 500 people. And then in 2020, the country descended into a political crisis after the Somali government <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/why-somalias-electoral-crisis-has-tipped-violence">failed</a> to meet constitutional electoral timelines. This situation has persisted.</p>
<h2>The risks ahead</h2>
<p>In such an environment, a peacekeeping transition needs to be delicately managed. Current achievements need to be protected, with sustainable peace and stability promoted. </p>
<p>Several risks plague the Somalia transition.</p>
<p><strong>Electoral crisis:</strong> The political crisis caused by a flawed electoral process since 2020 is far from resolved. The elections, especially the presidential poll, threaten to throw Somalia back into instability. In April 2021, there were <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210427-somali-opposition-cordons-off-parts-of-mogadishu-as-political-feud-turns-violent">violent confrontations</a> between pro-government and pro-opposition forces. This followed parliament’s attempted unconstitutional extension of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s mandate.</p>
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<p>In addition, the credibility and legitimacy of an election is not guaranteed in the current environment. The president and Prime Minister Mohamed Roble have regular fall-outs over the management of polling. These could be exploited by an increasingly aggressive opposition to stoke chaos.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-protracted-political-battle-led-to-the-extension-of-the-somalia-presidents-term-159073">How a protracted political battle led to the extension of the Somalia president's term</a>
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<p><strong>Fragile security sector:</strong> Somalia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-toxic-political-and-security-order-the-death-knell-of-democracy-159549">security sector</a> is a patchwork of local, regional and foreign (US, European Union, Turkish and German) trained units. It’s disjointed both tactically and doctrinally. The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/38914771/The_Somali_National_Army_an_assessment">security forces</a> are semi-professional, under-equipped and ill-trained to fill the gaps that would be left by the exit of the African Union mission.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to reform the sector to the capacity required to take charge of security responsibilities in just under three years. In addition, the Somali National Army, Somali National Police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14702436.2021.1885976?journalCode=fdef20&">fragmented</a> along clan lines. They have also been politicised by both the government and the opposition. This risks a systematic collapse should the political gridlock degenerate into aggressive clan-based or separatist mobilisation.</p>
<p><strong>Persistent terror threat:</strong> The Al-Shabaab threat is far from over. The group continues to collect <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561">revenue</a> despite United Nations sanctions. It also wields <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137489890_3?noAccess=true">significant</a> ideological, political and administrative legitimacy among Somalis. This makes it impossible to adequately de-legitimise the group during the short transition window. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_somalia-assesses-al-shabab-moles-infiltration-government/6173903.html">infiltrated</a> the executive and legislative branches of government in Somalia. It has occasionally <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_al-shabab-attacks-military-bases-southern-somalia/6204105.html">overrun</a> the national army and certain African Union military bases in ambush attacks. It is, therefore, highly possible that the group could seize certain operating bases during or after the exit of the transition mission. </p>
<p>It could also besiege the Somali national security architecture and mount a full-scale guerilla insurgency.</p>
<h2>Fragile hope</h2>
<p>The exit of the African Union Mission in Somalia was long-awaited by the government and conflict-fatigued donors. However, there hasn’t been full consideration of the local and regional realities in Somalia. The transition is predicated on overly optimistic assumptions of the role of the <a href="https://atmis-au.org/about-atmis/">new mission</a>. </p>
<p>Still, gains have been made over the past decade and a half, and a careful transition may create opportunities for sustainable peace in Somalia. For this to happen, the new mission will need to avoid certain practices of its predecessor. This includes the pursuit of <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/">vested interests</a> by some troop-contributing countries.</p>
<p>The new mission will need to adopt people-centered interventions that strengthen socio-political institutions, and build local legitimacy. These two aspects are critical for a successful transition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180430/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hassan Khannenje is affiliated with HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies, a research and policy think tank. </span></em></p>A transition is underway in Somalia. There are massive risks if it is not handled with great care.Hassan Khannenje, Adjunct professor, Wayne State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1775842022-02-23T14:21:14Z2022-02-23T14:21:14ZSomalia’s elections are finally under way: five things you should know<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447551/original/file-20220221-22-9rcasa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somalia is on course to hold the long-awaited presidential election provided that the current pace is maintained. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Following a series of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_somali-elections-delayed-again-no-new-date-set/6208741.html">setbacks</a> going back more than a year, Somalia is nearly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/somalias-leaders-agree-to-hold-delayed-election-by-february-25">wrapping up</a> parliamentary elections (Lower House) leading to presidential elections. The Horn of Africa country uses a complex indirect model, whereby state legislatures and clan delegates pick lawmakers for the national parliament, who will in turn choose the president. Mohammed Ibrahim Shire unpacks the five things you should know as the civil war wracked nation of 16 million progresses towards a new government in Mogadishu.</em></p>
<h2>1. Lower House elections are key to political stability</h2>
<p>Since 2012, Somalia has been recovering slowly from nearly 23 years of <a href="https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf">civil war</a>. The current indirect electoral college, adopted in 2012, is designed to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power. </p>
<p>The House of the People forms the lower house of the country’s bicameral federal parliament. The upper house, representing the federal member states, forms the Senate. Both houses of parliament then vote for the next president. </p>
<p>It’s the House of the People that bears the greater burden of lawmaking in the country. Therefore, any delays in holding the House of the People elections would delay electing a new president and make any peaceful transfer of power practically impossible.</p>
<p>Indeed, repeated <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220109-somalia-leaders-in-deal-to-complete-delayed-polls-by-feb-25">poll delays</a> have threatened to degenerate into a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/16/somalia-crisis-deepens-as-president-withdraws-pms-powers">constitutional crisis</a>. The delays have also stoked political <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/18/un-council-urges-somalias-feuding-leaders-to-settle-dispute">tensions</a> between Somalia’s federal government, federal member states, and the opposition. In addition, they ignited a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59800515">bitter power struggle</a> between the country’s highest-ranking leaders – notably the president and prime minister – which continues to play out.</p>
<p>President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo, in power since 2017, remains in power <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/79553/somalia-is-farmaajos-term-extension-a-power-grab-or-the-way-forward-to-election-reform/">a year after the official end of his term</a>. In April 2021, parliamentarians - at the behest of the executive - extended Farmaajo’s term for another two years due to the prolonged elections impasse.</p>
<h2>2. What happens next</h2>
<p>As things stand, the election of the 54-member Senate chamber has been completed. Also 170 of the 275 lawmakers have been elected in the House of the People, leaving 105 yet to be elected. The lawmakers are elected in an indirect manner by <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somali-leaders-agree-on-revised-election-model/1977240">101 electoral</a> delegates selected by half a dozen elders and civil society members.</p>
<p>Somaliland recently concluded the election of all 46 seats. But other regions have only partially filled the alloted seats. These are Puntland (15 out of 37), South West (50 out of 69), Jubbaland (23 out of 43), Galmudug (22 out of 37), Hirshabelle (14 out of 38) and Banaadir (none out of 5). With only days left, electing the remaining 105 lawmakers is unlikely to happen.</p>
<p>For months, the UN and Western donors have voiced their <a href="https://unsom.unmissions.org/international-partners-call-credible-house-people-elections-0">frustration</a> over the slow and uneven progress of the electoral process. However, earlier this month, the United States took a step further by announcing a decision to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-restricts-visa-issuance-somali-officials-accused-undermining-democratic-2022-02-08/">restrict visas</a> to current or former Somali officials believed responsible for “undermining the democratic process in Somalia”. This has arguably accelerated the process, which was nearly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-pm-discusses-political-situation-with-us-official-2021-12-29/">grinding to a halt</a>.</p>
<p>The accelerated pace has been largely welcomed by international donors and many Somalis. But it has also led to a host of complaints from civil society organisations and candidates. They feel this international push to meet a deadline has given the Somali government and regional leaders leeway to manipulate the parliamentary election. They have done this by barring serious candidates and replacing them with dummy candidates or <a href="https://www.bbc.com/somali/war-60212732">‘wedding attendants’</a> in local parlance, practically leading to uncontested elections and ‘quick victories’. </p>
<p>Indeed, reminiscent of previous Somali elections, there are widespread allegations of vote-buying, bribery, intimidation and violent coercion. These raise serious questions about the integrity and credibility of the process.</p>
<p>International donors are faced with a classical dilemma. One choice is a quick election, however imperfect and deeply flawed. This offers a guaranteed transfer of power. The second is to exert considerable leverage by withholding funds with the view to enhance transparency in the management of elections. But this risks triggering a new set of delays.</p>
<p>The quick way out seems the preferred choice.</p>
<h2>3. Powerful forces could still derail the process</h2>
<p>Significant challenges remain that could derail the electoral process indefinitely.</p>
<p>First, the federal government led by prime minister Hussein Roble is accused of indirectly using the federal electoral implementation body to invalidate the winning results of rival candidates. Somalia has an independent electoral dispute resolution body, permitting candidates to file formal complaints. However, recently the chairman of the federal electoral implementation body unilaterally invalidated the results of three seats won by candidates aligned with President Farmaajo. This essentially usurps the mandate of the independent dispute resolution mechanism in place. </p>
<p>Such direct interference will not only lead to intense contestation of results and endless delays but can lead to renewed violence.</p>
<p>The second obstacle is an attempt to revise the adopted electoral model. A key component of the indirect electoral model was that federal member states were tasked with holding the vote in two cities within their territory, including the regional capital. So far only two federal member states have managed to hold the vote in the second city. </p>
<p>This seeming foot-dragging can be partly explained by federal member states’ diminished influence in their second city. If federal member states decide to sidestep the model and hold all elections in the regional capital, large segments of the Somali public will lose confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. This could lead to mass demonstrations and possibly violence.</p>
<h2>4. Al-Shabaab is always waiting to pounce</h2>
<p>Always in the background is the militant group Al-Shabaab, which has been battling for over a decade to topple the country’s federal government. While the group is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/somalia-attacks-signal-escalation-of-al-shabaab-offensive">known</a> for disrupting the country’s election process, the current political uncertainty and a distracted government have amplified the impact of their attacks. Al-Shabaab has also stepped up its propaganda outputs.</p>
<h2>5. Prospects for a new government in 2022</h2>
<p>Somalia is on the road to holding the long-awaited presidential election in three months provided that the current pace is maintained and the deadline is extended for another month. That’s if existing tensions are curtailed and resolved. International actors should target those who persist with actions that undermine Somalia’s stability and the prospects of getting to a quick election. Failure to hold spoilers accountable will block the path to elections once more.</p>
<p>Save for spoilers and Al-Shabaab, it is in everyone’s interests for a quick election, primarily the Somali public. The Somali public have been disenfranchised in this election, and had to settle for another indirect election while still battling drought, COVID-19 and insecurity. A peaceful transfer of power prevents them from being starved of government budget funds meant for them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Ibrahim Shire does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The accelerated pace of Somalia’s election has been welcomed at home and abroad – but it comes at a credibility cost.Mohammed Ibrahim Shire, Senior Lecturer in Security and Risk, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1765192022-02-14T14:50:47Z2022-02-14T14:50:47ZFive reasons why militants are targeting Kenya’s Lamu county<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445342/original/file-20220209-25-cktzva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"> US marines take part in the joint military exercises with the Kenyan Army near Lamu, Kenya. PEDRO UGARTE/AFP via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/marines-take-part-in-the-us-kenyan-joint-military-exercises-news-photo/51350988?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The frequency of terrorist attacks within Kenya’s Lamu County on the border with Somalia has been alarming. Frequent kidnappings there were the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/16/kenyan-troops-somalia-kidnappings">ostensible reason Kenya invaded Somalia</a> in 2011. Three years later, the seaside county was the scene of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27862510">deadly attack</a> in which 48 were killed during an Al-Shabaab siege. </p>
<p>Lamu is in the news again. In January this year, the government declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew amidst a <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-01-05-government-imposes-dusk-to-dawn-curfew-in-parts-of-lamu-after-wave-of-killings/">wave of killings</a>. Several <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/lamu-residents-forced-to-spend-nights-on-trees-in-fear-of-al-shabaab-attacks-n291820">terrorist attacks</a> have also been carried out. </p>
<p>Here are the five reasons why Lamu County is a constant target of Al-Shabaab militants:</p>
<h2>1. Unique topography</h2>
<p>The natural and physical features of Lamu county offer an ideal setting for political violence, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344530">including</a> insurgency and terrorism. It is one of the counties that border Somalia. Its expansive Boni Forest comprises about 21.4% of the county’s land area. </p>
<p>Lamu’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/how-boni-forest-became-the-warzone-it-is-today-426780?view=htmlamp">proximity</a> to Somalia, and the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001247405/why-boni-forest-has-become-the-deadliest-point-in-the-war-on-terror">Boni Forest</a>, therefore makes it conducive for Al-Shabaab’s infiltration. The forest provides a haven for military training and a staging point for hit and run tactics. </p>
<p>The short distance to Somalia also makes it easy for terrorists to move illicit weapons that can be used for such crimes. <a href="https://kecosce.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/LAMU_COUNTY_CVE_ACTION_PLAN.pdf">Hotspots</a> of violent extremism and terrorism in Lamu include, Pandanguo Basuba, Boni Forest, Pangani, Gamba, Milihoi, Bargoni, Mpeketoni, Amu, Witu, Kiunga, Faza, Pate, Siu and Dar es salaam Point</p>
<h2>2. Land Tenure</h2>
<p>Competition for land is another significant factor that creates opportunities for Al-Shabaab operations in Lamu. Land disputes in Lamu are <a href="https://kecosce.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/LAMU_COUNTY_CVE_ACTION_PLAN.pdf">historical</a> and contemporary. The tensions between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities are influenced by several historical and contemporary factors. In Mpeketoni, the scene of the deadly 2014 attack, land disputes spring from the settlement of communities from other parts of Kenya. </p>
<p>Topping this list is local level politics. Local <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2022-01-20-police-probe-businessman-abubakars-link-to-lamu-killings/">leaders</a> tend to politicise land ownership. This is due to the perception that non-indigenous communities in some parts of the county have significant influence on local political decisions and electoral outcomes.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001434452/questions-over-attacks-in-lamu-three-years-after-dusitd2-carnage">politisation</a> fuels land grievances and political intolerance. This leads to the emergence of organised militias at the local level. This provides ideal conditions for Al-Shabaab to advance its agenda – by using such militias as proxies and affiliates. </p>
<p>Non-indigenous communities often complain that some of the attacks are conducted by locals who appear to have <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001434452/questions-over-attacks-in-lamu-three-years-after-dusitd2-carnage">military</a> training. </p>
<h2>3. Religious diversity</h2>
<p>Related to the settlement tension is the issue of <a href="https://kecosce.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/LAMU_COUNTY_CVE_ACTION_PLAN.pdf">religion</a> in Lamu. Originally, the county was overwhelmingly Muslim like other counties bordering Somalia – Garissa, Mandera and Wajir – where <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/2019-kenya-population-and-housing-census-volume-iv-distribution-of-population-by-socio-economic-characteristics/">98%</a> are Muslim. </p>
<p>However, the historical and contemporary migration of non-indigenous communities have contributed to religious diversity in the county. Today the Muslim population <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/download/2019-kenya-population-and-housing-census-volume-iv-distribution-of-population-by-socio-economic-characteristics/">comprises</a> 51%, Christian 47% and other religious groups at 2%.</p>
<p>The religious diversity provides an ideal opportunity for Al-Shabaab to advance its divisive <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">political ideology</a> through radicalisation of the local population. Attacks seek to <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">symbolise</a> the militants’ ideological aims and objectives of creating an Islamic Caliphate in the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab also often targets non-Muslims in the hope of creating interfaith tension. That is why Al-Shabaab prefers to attack areas that have large non-indigenous populations. </p>
<h2>4. Tourist attractions</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s operations target Lamu because of the symbolic significance of tourism in the county. The county is one of Kenya’s <a href="https://maarifa.cog.go.ke/assets/file/b9546727-lamu-county-covid-19-social-economic.pdf">top</a> beach, festival and agro-tourism destinations. This is because of its rich marine ecology, terrestrial wildlife and pristine beaches. Others are water sports, cultural and heritage assets as well as its religious, cultural and food festivals. </p>
<p>More significant is that Lamu County is a popular destination for tourists from various Western states. Al-Shabaab targets tourists from Western states in Lamu and other coastal areas for both symbolic and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001435472/hoteliers-upbeat-tourism-in-lamu-on-road-to-recovery-despite-attacks">economic</a> reasons. </p>
<p>As part of its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344530">war tactics</a>, the attacks involve kidnapping tourists for ransom. They are also designed to attract <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">international media</a> attention. </p>
<p>The group requires such a profile as part of its financing strategy. It is also part of Al-Shabaab’s strategy of sabotaging both the Lamu’s and Kenya’s economy. </p>
<h2>5. High-profile projects and military bases</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s attacks also target large-scale development and defence infrastructure. The most notable public project is the <a href="https://www.lapsset.go.ke/">Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport corridor</a> (LAPSSET). This project which seeks to link Lamu port to South Sudan and Ethiopia – via rail and roads – is the single largest infrastructure undertaking in the eastern Africa region. </p>
<p>Other targets include military personnel and assets stationed in Lamu. They include Kenyan and US military bases at Manda Bay. The Kenya Navy Manda Bay base serves as a national, regional and global military installation. </p>
<p>Given that Al-Shabaab is now a transnational actor, and a threat to domestic and regional security, Manda Bay base has been used as a launching pad for several major counter-terrorism operations.</p>
<p>The Manda Bay military facility is also used by the US Department of Defence as a forward operating location. It falls under the operational control of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti. </p>
<p>Lastly, attacking <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/lapsset-road-works-halted-over-attacks-3693298">Lamu port</a>, and the military facilities used by the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/coast/article/2001413213/eight-kdf-soldiers-feared-dead-in-lamu-ied-explosion">Kenya Defence Forces</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_al-shabab-attacks-military-base-used-us-forces-kenya/6182111.html">the US</a> military, is part of Al-Shabaab’s symbolic response to Kenya’s state-led <a href="https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/port-expansions-could-open-kenya-to-more-crime">development</a> initiatives and global counter-terrorism operations. </p>
<p>On January 2020, Al-Shabaab attacked <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2020.pdf">Manda Bay</a> and killed one US military service member and two contractors. The militants also destroyed aircraft and infrastructure. This was Al-Shabaab’s first and most fatal attack, beyond Somalia, on a US military facility in Africa since 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boni forest provides a haven for military training and a staging point for hit and run tactics.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1760722022-02-08T07:28:12Z2022-02-08T07:28:12ZKenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443436/original/file-20220131-13-73ocyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Special forces arrive at the scene of a terrorist attack at the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Terror alerts are issued in Kenya periodically by foreign governments and international institutions due to the threat posed by the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab. Kenya has, over the years, suffered several deadly terror attacks which have been claimed by the group. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, who has studied Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies and strategies, unpacks the intelligence behind terror alerts and what you need to know about them.</em></p>
<h2>How is intelligence on impending terrorist attacks gathered?</h2>
<p>Cooperation between governments and security agencies is a crucial element in combating terrorism. This is more so for transnational terrorism. Effective <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2016.1264436">inter-agency cooperation</a> depends on the timely and accurate sharing of intelligence through established channels. </p>
<p>Kenya cooperates with various western countries to arrive at the conclusion that a terror attack is imminent. For instance Kenya and the UK have a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-kenya-sign-new-defence-cooperation-agreement-to-tackle-shared-threat-from-al-shabaab">mutual agreement</a> to counter Al-Shabaab’s threat. The two countries share information and identify new ways to disrupt the group’s operations in east Africa and beyond. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">UK</a> and <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf">Kenya</a> gather information in a number of ways. These include covert human intelligence sources, directed surveillance, intercepting communications, data obtained from communications service providers, bulk personal data, intrusive surveillance and equipment interference. </p>
<p>The National Counter Terrorism Centre also provides <a href="https://counterterrorism.go.ke/countering-terrorism/">online channels</a> where the public can, anonymously, report terrorism-related activities.</p>
<p>Kenya’s government also <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2020.pdf">cooperates</a> with the US. For instance the General Service Unit counterterorrism response team is funded by the US.</p>
<p>In addition, information on imminent attacks is also provided by terrorist groups themselves. As part of its publicity, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/addressing-enemy-al-shabaabs-psyops-media-warfare/">information on imminent attacks</a> through its media outlet, Al-Kaitab Media Foundation. </p>
<p>Individual states are responsible for providing travel advisories to their citizens based on the information shared. </p>
<h2>How reliable is the intelligence prompting alerts?</h2>
<p>Sound intelligence research and analysis identifies trends and specific terrorist groups’ strategies and tactics. </p>
<p>For the most part this means that sufficiently reliable data on imminent attacks is produced.</p>
<p>However, it’s not a perfect science. <a href="https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/03/Handbook-Ch-20-Duncan-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-Prevention-of-Terrorism.pdf">Intelligence sources</a> sometimes offer opinions rather than hard evidence. Hence the analysis can at times be subjective rather than objective.</p>
<p>The reliability of the intelligence is determined by how correct or true the information is. The UK’s MI5, for example, records <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">credible intelligence</a> correctly by recording its origin and validity. Assessments of valid threats are regularly adjusted in view of new intelligence. </p>
<p>But terrorist groups behave in unpredictable ways. Some terrorist attacks are <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">commemorative</a>, that is to celebrate prior successful attacks. Attacks can be <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">symbolic</a>, intended to advance ideological aims and objectives. They can also be carried out in response to the target state’s counterterrorism interventions. </p>
<p>Diplomatic advisories or alerts are adjusted frequently as they are based on security information that is <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/ReiseUndSicherheit/10.2.8Reisewarnungen#content_3">constantly changing</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of Kenya, terror threat warnings have been vindicated time and again. Between January 2019 and December 2021, the US government <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/category/messages-for-citizens/">published</a> nine travel advisories and alerts warning of terrorist attacks around the Kenya-Somalia border and the country’s coastal areas. During this period, five attacks and two foiled attacks were reported in these areas. </p>
<p>On 5 January 2022, the US embassy in Nairobi issued a <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/january-5-2022-travel-advisory-for-u-s-citizens-kenya-level-3-reconsider-travel/">travel advisory</a> to US citizens warning them not to travel to some coastal areas because of terrorism. Kenya has since <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220103-several-people-killed-in-suspected-al-shabaab-attack-in-kenya">witnessed attacks</a> conducted by Al-Shabaab in the coastal county of Lamu. </p>
<h2>Why are alerts usually general, rather than specific?</h2>
<p>It is often difficult to predict an imminent terrorist attack in a place or time. Terrorism, as a special form of political violence, is a <a href="https://www.language-and-society.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/7-Mwangi-_-Mwangi-For-Publication.pdf">complex and dynamic</a> phenomenon. Its strategies and tactics keep mutating rapidly to adapt to changing local-level, national, regional and international circumstances. </p>
<p>The tactics have been described as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344530">asymmetric warfare</a> – they are both ideological and military. The unconventional tactics aim at winning over marginalised local-level communities. Asymmetric warfare is therefore long-term and more sustainable than conventional warfare.</p>
<p>The unpredictability of this type of warfare based on ideological motives is a key defining feature of terrorism as a special form of political violence. Hence forecasting terrorism is problematic. </p>
<p>The more complex a terrorist group is in terms of organisation and ideology, the more difficult it is to predict its strategies and tactics. </p>
<h2>What steps should the public and security forces take?</h2>
<p>The public, once aware of the threats, are supposed to take precautions. These include avoiding crowded public spaces and avoiding specific areas where prior attacks have occurred. </p>
<p>The public should perceive these alerts and react to them in a positive rather than negative way. The primary responsibility of securing oneself begins with the individual. </p>
<p>It is also the responsibility of the state to provide basic security. The government should take additional security measures. Measures include additional installation of surveillance cameras, scanners, security barriers, and enhancing visible policing. </p>
<p>But a robust security response risks unintended consequences. For example, certain areas can become viewed as hotspots of terrorism. Communities in these areas can be unfairly profiled as “suspects”. This has a tendency of increasing suspicion and distrust, including intolerance between communities.</p>
<p>Security actors should also avoid employing repressive counterterrorism operations that target specific individuals and communities who live in volatile areas. Such operations only serve to entrench perceptions about human rights violations committed by the state. </p>
<p>The state and its security agencies should react to alerts using alternative methods. These include preventing and countering violent extremism and employing soft approaches. These are often ideological, communicative and social. They are based on trust not fear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is often difficult to place an imminent terrorist attack in a location or time.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721542021-11-22T15:30:35Z2021-11-22T15:30:35ZEast Africa’s terrorism hotspots: examining the roots and solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432586/original/file-20211118-26-1jt7hvs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Somalia is one of East Africa's terrorism hotspots.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/SAID YUSUF WARSAME</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Uganda has had a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/suicide-bomb-attacks-kampala-uganda">string</a> of terror attacks lately. The most recent bombings took place in Kampala’s central business district and were <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/islamic-state-claims-deadly-bombings-in-uganda-s-capital-kampala-3621676">claimed</a> by the Islamic State jihadist group. Tensions have been <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-11-17-kampala-bombings-kenya-tracking-terror-cells/">increasing</a> across the border too, in Kenya. The government has instructed security agencies to be more vigilant. Moina Spooner, of The Conversation Africa, asked terrorism researcher Dr Anneli Botha to provide insights into what drives terrorism in the region and how it should be addressed.</em></p>
<h2>Where are Eastern Africa’s terrorism hotspots?</h2>
<p>Eastern Africa has two primary terrorism hotspots.</p>
<p>The first is Somalia. It has experienced continuous instability since 1991, due to clan-based warlords and the lack of a functioning central government. The creation of ungoverned spaces provided Al-Qaeda with a foothold in the region. Ethiopian intervention in 2006 added fuel to the fire after the establishment of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) earlier in the 2000s. In 2005, Al-Shabaab was established as an offshoot of the ICU to become the most relevant actor in Somalia. Since then it has executed attacks beyond its area of operations in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36400842">Uganda</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSKBN0E72AA20140527">Djibouti</a> and Kenya.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab has been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328791465_Assessing_the_vulnerability_of_Kenyan_youths_to_radicalisation_and_extremism">recruiting</a> from marginalised communities in Kenya. It has also attracted fighters from Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, the US and Europe. </p>
<p>Secondly, similar to Somalia, the eastern part of the DRC has been a hotspot since its own civil war from <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/drc-conflict-facts">1997 to 2003</a>. An ungoverned part of the country provided a “safe” area where over 100 rebel organisations could base their operations. Groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces and Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda, under pressure from Ugandan security forces, established themselves in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) along with others in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. </p>
<p>The origins of the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/54b642a14.html">Allied Democratic Forces</a> can be traced back to Christian-Muslim and ethnic divisions even before independence in 1962. The perception of government interference in Muslim affairs played a role in establishing the idea of fighting for an Islamic state (not Islamic State as we know it today). The change in leadership following the arrest of Jamil Mukulu introduced a new chapter under Seka Musa Baluku. Since 2019, the organisation has executed attacks under the umbrella of Islamic State in the Central African Province (IS-CAP), which is also linked to the instability in northern Mozambique.</p>
<p>In the DRC, the local communities within the organisation’s area of operations have had to bear the brunt of attacks. </p>
<h2>What have been the main root causes of terror attacks in the region?</h2>
<p>The root causes of terror attacks are domestic, with origins in each country’s history. There is no single “profile” or reason. It is always a combination of factors – political, social, and economic – that cannot be separated from regional and international events. </p>
<p>The main question is why anyone would want to join any violent extremist organisation, risking death or capture. </p>
<p>Some join voluntarily. Identity politics, due to existing ethnic and religious divisions and subsequent marginalisation and frustration, can drive people to join violent extremist organisations. Others will join for financial reasons.</p>
<p>The final “push” relates to the way security forces respond to the terrorist threat. In my <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council">research since 2011</a> and as part of <a href="https://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIma_5zYai9AIVDu3tCh0dDg36EAAYAiAAEgJk7fD_BwE">research projects</a> with the United Nations Development Programme and Finn Church Aid, involving interviews with former members of violent extremist organisations, I’ve heard repeatedly how revenge, anger and hatred of governments and their security forces drove people into joining.</p>
<p>Some are tricked into joining, not knowing what they’ve signed up for. Others are forced, especially where not joining could be interpreted as spying for the government, as <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-executes-5-people-for-spying/2162149">witnessed</a> in Somalia. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
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<p>In Somalia there is also a nationalistic-religious component that facilitated recruitment into Al-Shabaab. This followed the intervention of Ethiopia (supported by the United States), then Uganda, Kenya and Djibouti (African Union Mission troop contributing countries). These are regarded as “Christian nations” invading a Muslim country. It played into a broader narrative starting with the US and western intervention in Afghanistan, but especially Iraq following 9/11.</p>
<h2>How have governments sought to deal with terror attacks and their root causes?</h2>
<p>Predominantly from a short-term security perspective, by “eliminating” the “problem” of suspected terrorists. This has included disappearances and extrajudicial killings. </p>
<p>The way governments respond depends on the level of government control over territory. Where government has no or limited control, the military takes the lead in counterinsurgency (as seen in Somalia and eastern DRC). Where government control increases, the police take the lead. Respecting human rights while countering violent extremism and terrorism has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/">proved</a> to be particularly <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_nigerias-military-burns-villages-war-boko-haram-rights-group-says/6184250.html">difficult</a> under military command. One reason is that the military’s focus is not on collecting evidence to build a criminal case.</p>
<p>Governments worldwide seldom look into their role in communal marginalisation and frustration. But it’s a crucial root cause. People feel excluded if development in their part of the country is neglected because they don’t support certain politicians. </p>
<h2>Have governments been successful? If not, why?</h2>
<p>No, unfortunately not completely, due to two primary challenges.</p>
<p>First, limited capacity and training and a history of very limited relations between the state, its security forces and the public across the continent. Security sector reforms and community policing initiatives require trust, dedication and time. </p>
<p>Second, governments on the continent have tended to invest more in the military (securing their regime) and not in the police and the broader criminal justice framework (including the judiciary and prisons).</p>
<p>Third, addressing the root causes is not the responsibility of security agencies only. It requires an all of government approach starting with good governance and providing basic public goods equally.</p>
<h2>What else should they do?</h2>
<p>International organisations – for example the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, through its Regional Office for Eastern Africa and Interpol – and the international community have made considerable strides in building capacity and providing equipment to law enforcement agencies across the region. This happens under the guidance of the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/what-we-do/terrorism-prevention/supporting-the-eapcco-counter-terrorism-centre.html">Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Also NGOs and a growing civil society, through research and working with vulnerable communities, provide important guidance and support.</p>
<p>Government and security agencies must be willing to receive support and act in a responsible manner to prevent and counter violent extremism. In eastern Africa, this investment has started to show results. This is clear if one compares the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/16/africa/kenya-hotel-complex-terror-attack/index.html">DusitD2 attacks in Nairobi in 2019</a>, when law enforcement took the lead, with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya">2013 Westgate attack</a>, when the military took the lead.</p>
<p>Not all countries have received assistance across the region. Nor can the threat of violent extremism be addressed by individual countries. Violent extremism and organised crime always present transnational challenges. Coordinated efforts, cooperation and capacity building are needed to address an increasing threat that is already having a ripple effect into southern Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anneli Botha is a consultant for the UNODC in Eastern Africa. </span></em></p>All terrorism in the region has domestic origins but is linked to regional and international events.Anneli Botha, Senior Lecturer, Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1681232021-09-19T08:26:19Z2021-09-19T08:26:19ZHow big is the Islamist threat in Mozambique? And why are Rwandan troops there?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421880/original/file-20210917-15-rk96di.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Military intervention by Rwanda and SADC only buys time for Mozambique to address lack of development in its northern region</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EMIDIO JOZINE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58079510">has sent troops</a> to Mozambique to assist the government in fighting against a four-year Islamist militant insurgency. Political scientist Phil Clark provides insights into the threat and why Rwanda is supporting Mozambique.</em></p>
<h2>Do the insurgents in Mozambique represent a new front of Islamic terrorism on the continent?</h2>
<p>Since 2017, jihadist militias in the northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2021/the-islamist-insurgency-in-mozambique">have mounted</a> an armed insurgency against the Mozambican government. Their <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">stated objective</a> is to instil Sharia law across northern Mozambique. This is said to be in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">response</a> to the region’s chronic poverty, unemployment and weak public services under the Frelimo-led government in Maputo. </p>
<p>The Mozambican insurgents represent a new armed Islamic front, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56773012">entirely local</a> motivations and command structures. However, their propaganda invokes common tropes of regional and global jihad. </p>
<p>They often claim responsibility for attacks using the <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/the-evolution-and-escalation-of-the-islamic-state-threat-to-mozambique/">name given</a> to them by the local population, ‘Al-Shabaab’. But there is no evidence that they have any direct links to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. </p>
<p>Recently, Islamic State (ISIS) <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack.html">claimed</a> responsibility for jihadist attacks in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But, again, there appears to be little direct connection between the Mozambican jihadists and the Islamic State. ISIS has previously <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-finds-no-evidence-islamic-state-control-over-congo-militia-2021-06-16/">attempted to claim responsibility</a> for attacks by unassociated Islamist groups elsewhere in Africa, for example the Allied Democratic Forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo </p>
<h2>How big a threat do they represent?</h2>
<p>The jihadists pose a significant threat to local civilians and foreign economic interests in Cabo Delgado. The four-year low-intensity civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/aug/18/i-ran-my-heart-was-broken-inside-mozambiques-evolving-cabo-delgado-conflict">has</a> killed more than 3,000 civilians, displaced 800,000 and caused widespread food insecurity. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the energy giants ExxonMobil and Total <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/frances-total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project-2021-04-26/">have suspended</a> their liquid natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado. ExxonMobil <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxonmobil-mozambique-lng-exclusive-idUSKBN285326">is investing US$30billion</a> and <a href="https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/about-mozambique-liquefied-natural-gas-project">Total US$20billion</a>. </p>
<p>The insurgents have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54183948">cited</a> the perception that local people will fail to benefit from government deals with the multinational companies as one catalyst for their attacks.</p>
<p>The combination of widespread violence and threats to foreign businesses have led to a patchwork of international military and security interventions. This <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html">includes</a> <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/oil--gas_corporate-strategy/2020/06/01/total-brings-in-former-military-man-to-head-lng-plant--security-unit,108407836-art">reports</a> of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the Mozambican government’s use of Russian and South African mercenaries </p></li>
<li><p>the presence of Portuguese military trainers, and </p></li>
<li><p>Total’s hiring of a former French foreign legionnaire to coordinate security for its gas plant on the Afungi peninsula. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) –- including South African special forces – <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/south-african-special-forces-arrive-in-mozambique/">have deployed</a> peacekeepers to Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>This raises major concerns over a seeming lack of coordination among these armed actors.</p>
<h2>Why is the Rwandan government getting involved?</h2>
<p>There is vociferous debate about this. </p>
<p>The Rwandan government <a href="https://www.gov.rw/blog-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique">frames this</a> as a ‘responsibility to protect’ mission. This, it argues, has been inspired by the international community’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-why-the-international-community-looked-away/a-4157229">failure to protect</a> civilians in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. </p>
<p>The Rwandan intervention in Mozambique came shortly after French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Kigali in May 2021. Some commentators have <a href="https://zitamar.com/what-does-rwanda-stand-to-gain-from-its-mozambique-deployment/">suggested</a> that Rwanda, <a href="https://newscentral.africa/2021/09/06/rwanda-denies-total-energies-france-funded-mozambique-operation/">funded by France</a>, has intervened to shore up France’s interests, principally the gas reserves of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Total-SA">French-owned Total</a>.</p>
<p>The Rwandan government has chafed against the claim that it is simply doing France’s neo-colonial bidding. It <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/rwandas-intervention-on-cabo-delgado-not-financed-by-third-parties-says-president-kagame-further-africa-200443/">has stressed</a> the humanitarian basis of its intervention.</p>
<p>There is scant evidence of direct French backing for Rwanda’s military campaign. Nevertheless, France held a series of high-level talks with Rwanda and South Africa about the Cabo Delgado conflict in the months preceding their interventions in Mozambique. This suggests close coordination between Paris and these actors, reflecting the enormous French interests at stake.</p>
<p>In May this year Macron <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202105190780.html">discussed</a> military solutions to the crisis with a number of African heads of state at a summit in Paris. They included Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. This was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/french-president-macron-arrives-in-sa-to-talk-vaccines-trade-and-mozambique-insurgency-20210528">succeeded</a> by similar talks with Kagame and Ramaphosa in Kigali and Pretoria several weeks later.</p>
<p>Crucial to Rwanda’s involvement in Cabo Delgdao are <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2018/07/rwanda-mozambique-sign-trade-skills-exchange-agreements/">growing ties</a> between Rwanda and Mozambique after the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 2018. </p>
<p>Earlier this year Nyusi made a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-nyusi-flew-to-rwanda-for-talks-with-kagame-fight-against-terrorism-at-the-top-of-the-agenda-watch-190901/">lightning-stop visit</a> to Kigali to ask for Rwanda’s military assistance in Cabo Delgado. Nyusi had previously <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mozambiques-push-failed-to-involve-rwanda-directly-in-sadc-matters-20210530">stated</a> his preference for bilateral rather than multilateral military intervention. He is perhaps concerned about ceding too much control to a SADC mission led by regional powerhouse South Africa.</p>
<p>He also noted Rwanda’s track record of conducting highly disciplined and effective peacekeeping missions. These have included Rwandan battalions <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108040261.html">operating</a> in the Central African Republic outside the broader UN peacekeeping mission, similar to Rwanda’s current support for Mozambican forces outside of SADC.</p>
<p>Alongside its humanitarian objectives, the Rwandan government stands to benefit in security and diplomatic terms from its involvement in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>The intervention fits a pattern of Rwanda’s ‘responsibility to protect’ role in peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Mali, CAR and Haiti. These have bolstered its international image and afforded it considerable international leverage. For example, in 2010 when foreign donors considered prosecutions and suspending aid to Rwanda because of its alleged crimes in eastern Congo, Kigali <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11417721">threatened</a> to withdraw its peacekeepers from Darfur.</p>
<p>The Cabo Delgado campaign is also consistent with Rwanda’s recent talk of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/37f38a17a8a140c39a20b15c5983068d">tackling Islamist threats at home and in the wider region</a>.</p>
<p>In regional geopolitical terms, Rwanda will have delighted <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/113311/mozambique-rwandan-troops-celebrate-first-success-south-africa-forces-arrive/">in reports</a> that its troops in northern Mozambique have <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_politics/2021/08/31/in-cabo-delgado-rwandans-fight-sadc-troops-sit-tight-mozambicans-look-to-the-future,109688059-art">proven more effective</a> than those of SADC, with which it has often had a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-19-sadc-slams-rwanda-for-drc-interference/">testy relationship</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, Rwanda’s intervention bolsters its bilateral relations with Mozambique and France. A key catalyst for Rwanda’s diplomatic push with Mozambique in recent years has been the concern that Maputo had become a launching pad for exiled Rwandan dissidents. This has included members of the opposition Rwanda National Congress. Closer security ties have included Rwanda’s request that Mozambique rein in opposition members <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/trade-security-define-kagame-s-african-diplomatic-offensive--1357608">on its soil</a>.</p>
<p>Kagame has for years lambasted France for failing to apologise for its complicity in the 1994 genocide. It therefore took some genocide survivors by surprise when he warmly welcomed <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210526-macron-seeks-reset-with-rwanda-on-africa-visit-after-years-of-tensions">Macron’s remarks</a> on the issue. They had misgivings about whether Macron had fully acknowledged and apologised for France’s role in the genocide.</p>
<p>Kagame’s warm comments preceded <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/27/france-and-rwanda-strengthen-relations-increase-cooperation/">the announcement of a new €500 million </a> French development package to Rwanda.</p>
<h2>What are the implications of its involvement?</h2>
<p>The Rwandan forces have so far proven effective in tackling the jihadist insurgents. This has led the Mozambican government to claim that Rwanda’s entrance has fundamentally altered the direction of the conflict and improved the security situation for civilians and foreign companies.</p>
<p>The concurrent operations by Rwandan and SADC forces, however, could pose problems in the coming months. Various SADC leaders – as well as Mozambique’s largest opposition party Renamo – <a href="https://www.chronicles.rw/2021/06/01/sadc-opposes-deployment-of-rwandan-troops-in-mozambique/">have criticised the arrival of Rwandan troops</a>. They argue that this should have been an exclusively SADC effort.</p>
<p>These issues were clearly on the mind of Rwandan Foreign Minister Vincent Biruta who travelled to Pretoria in early June <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/rwanda-proposes-co-operation-with-south-africa-on-mozambique-20210605">to discuss Rwanda-South Africa cooperation in Mozambique</a>. This came shortly after Rwandan military chiefs conducted their first reconnaissance trip to Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>But military force can achieve only so much. This has been made clear in comparable cases of Islamist violence in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria and the Sahel. </p>
<p>Systemic political and socio-economic interventions are necessary to address years of Frelimo neglect in northern Mozambique. These have produced the deprivation and marginalisation that underpin the insurgency. </p>
<p>Mozambicans themselves are clearly the key actors in this situation. Nevertheless, Rwanda and SADC should use their diplomatic leverage to encourage Nyusi to address the structural causes – and not only the violent manifestations – of the conflict. This includes ensuring that the immense natural gas wealth that will flow once the conflict abates benefits not only Nyusi’s government and multinational corporations but, most importantly, everyday Mozambicans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phil Clark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique’s war against Islamic insurgents has included a request that Mozambique rein in Rwandan opposition members on its soilPhil Clark, Professor of International Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1652762021-08-12T10:36:51Z2021-08-12T10:36:51ZAl-Shabaab: why women join the Islamist militant group – podcast<p><em>The Conversation Weekly podcast is taking a short break in August. For the next few weeks, we’ll be bringing you extended versions of some of our favourite recent interviews.</em></p>
<p>This week, we speak to a researcher who interviewed Kenyan women about why they joined the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab.</p>
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<p>Al-Shabaab is in a violent stalemate with the Somali government and a coalition of foreign peacekeeping troops. Attacks and car bombs continue on a regular basis, and in recent weeks the US government <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-military-carries-out-second-strike-somalia-this-week-2021-07-23/">targeted Al-Shabaab militants with air strikes</a>. </p>
<p>From its bases in Somalia, Al-Shabaab recruits people from the coastal region of neighbouring Kenya – including women. Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, a lecturer in the department of social sciences at the Technical University of Mombasa in Kenya, has interviewed some of these women to understand the complex dynamics surrounding their involvement in Al-Shabaab. Some joined willingly, and others were forcibly recruited, but the line between voluntary and involuntary is often blurred. </p>
<p>Badurdeen explains how she gained the trust of the women and their families and what her findings mean for their rehabilitation.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">Why we did it: the Kenyan women and girls who joined Al-Shabaab</a>
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<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly features an extended version of an interview <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-why-do-children-keep-getting-kidnapped-podcast-159099">first published on April 22</a>. The episode was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165276/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
From the archive: a researcher on the complex dynamics surrounding Kenyan women’s involvement in Al-Shabaab. Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1613012021-05-20T15:07:07Z2021-05-20T15:07:07ZKenya launches Lamu port. But its value remains an open question<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401887/original/file-20210520-17-14pdu4b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The first container ship to dock in the new Lamu Port</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Official image from LAPSSET</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Kenya’s newest mega infrastructure project, the Lamu port, has received its first ship. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked Jan Bachmann and Benard Musembi – who <a href="https://www.gu.se/en/research/controversial-corridor-exploring-changing-human-environment-and-security-dynamics-along-the-lapsset-development-corridor-in-kenya">study</a> the environmental, socio-economic and security dynamics along the <a href="http://www.lapsset.go.ke">Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor</a> – to provide insights into the history of the port, the opportunities it presents and the concerns around it.</em></p>
<h2>When and why was the Lamu port project initiated?</h2>
<p>The Lamu port is part of an ambitious transport corridor between Lamu – a small archipelago north of Mombasa in Kenya – South Sudan and Ethiopia. </p>
<p>Kenya already has one deep-water port in Mombasa. Plans for a second one to diffuse economic dependency on Mombasa <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=K00001873&DB=k">go back to</a> the mid-1970s. However, it only materialised in March 2012. The occasion was marked when the then East African heads of states – Kenya’s Mwai Kibaki, Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi and South Sudan’s Salva Kiir – laid the port’s foundation stone. </p>
<p>In its early ambition, the Lamu port figured as connecting the landlocked East African economies to global trade routes. More specifically, it was envisioned as an alternative outlet for South Sudan’s oil, which is currently pumped via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline to Port Sudan.</p>
<p>With South Sudan mired in continuous war and Ethiopia upping its stakes in the ports of Djibouti and, most recently, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-ethiopia-backed-port-is-changing-power-dynamics-in-the-horn-of-africa-93308">Berbera</a>, the international ambitions of the transport corridor shrivelled somewhat. </p>
<p>Yet, as a cornerstone of the Kenyan government’s Vision 2030 development plan, it is now branded as a <a href="http://www.lapsset.go.ke">“game changer”</a> project. </p>
<p>Its new aim is to integrate marginalised northern Kenya into the Kenyan economy and the nation. Plans for the corridor include a pipeline, a railway line, a road network connecting Lamu, Garissa, Isiolo, Moyale and Turkana, a dam along Tana river, airports and resort cities. There are also plans <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7w3900K6lYnQWRnZi1sTV9DeDg/view">to establish</a> numerous industrial areas along the corridor. </p>
<p>We show in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12720">our research</a> that most of the plans are real on paper and government websites only. Nevertheless, the implications for communities across northern Kenya are very concrete. Beside the <a href="https://www.lapsset.go.ke/projects/highways/">completion of</a> the 500km Isiolo-Moyale road, the official opening of Lamu port marks the project’s most salient achievement so far.</p>
<p>Constructed by the China Communication Construction Company, the <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/lamu-port-kenya-s-transshipment-hub-risks-becoming-a-white-elephant">first three</a> of the planned 32 berths come at a cost of US$367 million.</p>
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<h2>What opportunities does the port present?</h2>
<p>Mobilising projections about future trade, the Kenyan government has <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/chinese-company-close-to-sh250-billion-lamu-port-special-economic-zone-deal-2259896">persistently argued</a> that the Lamu port will become a viable and necessary complement to the hub of Mombasa. Local authorities specifically invest their hopes in plans for a special economic zone, though to date these have rather been illusive. This promises significant investments in the port and the creation of hundreds of jobs.</p>
<p>Since the port will primarily serve as a transshipment hub, it’s expected to attract key shipping lines by competing with the ports of Djibouti on the horn of Africa and Durban in South Africa. In addition it would serve key markets in southern Ethiopia and South Sudan. </p>
<p>So far, around 19 shipping lines have inspected the port. The Kenya Ports Authority <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/first-ship-lamu-port-on-thursday-ahead-of-launch-3402858">anticipates</a> many will use it and take the generous promotional offers currently in place.</p>
<p>On the positive side, road works connecting Lamu to Nairobi via Garissa are well <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business-news/article/2001409675/state-to-spend-sh25b-on-key-roads-in-lamu">under way</a>. And the new road between Lamu and Garsen has already reduced transport costs as trucks and travellers no longer need to go via Mombasa. </p>
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<p>Once the project’s highway towards Garissa and Isiolo is completed, the former northern “frontier” region may benefit from the connection to the port.</p>
<p>But there are big question marks when it comes to the overall economic value of a second Kenyan deep-water port. This concern is driven by the deficient infrastructural integration of Lamu and Northern Kenya. </p>
<p>Logistics experts also <a href="https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/lamu-port-kenya-s-transshipment-hub-risks-becoming-a-white-elephant">warn</a> that Lamu port has formidable potential to become a white elephant project because of the immense uncertainties about its core use.</p>
<h2>What have been the big issues around construction?</h2>
<p>Planning and construction of the port have yielded a wide range of concerns and contestations, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2019-04-18-squatters-protest-against-land-grabs-in-lamu/">particularly on</a> land rights, the environment, local livelihoods and security.</p>
<p>Different rights groups have documented numerous complaints by residents about compulsory land acquisition. One <a href="https://naturaljustice.org/the-curse-of-compulsory-land-acquisition-in-lamu-kenya/">study</a> found that the government had taken more land than it paid compensation for.</p>
<p>Another major concern touches on the environmental impact of the port’s construction, some of which came to light in a 2018 <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/156405">High Court ruling</a>. </p>
<p>And local protests against the project have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/17/they-just-want-silence-us/abuses-against-environmental-activists-kenyas-coast#">met with</a> harassment by Kenyan security forces.</p>
<p>The economic livelihoods of hundreds of local fishermen will be disrupted by the port because its extensive restricted area restrains access to viable fishing grounds. And in contravention of a court ruling that awarded fishers about KSH1.7 billion (US$ 18.4 million) compensation for their economic losses, the government has delayed the payments <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S46BNVjsLsI">over disagreements</a> about the list of beneficiaries and the mode of compensation.</p>
<p>Concerns about employment opportunities to residents are also growing. So far, around 100 youths from Lamu have secured employment at the Lamu port. </p>
<p>Lastly, there are security concerns. In the last 15 years or so, Lamu has become a highly volatile region. Attacks by the al-Shabaab militant group have brought violence to the area and turned it into a highly securitised region. Security operations have significantly reduced insecurity incidences. But periodic al-Shabaab <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/job-losses-as-firms-halt-operations-over-terror-attacks-at-kenyan-coast-1434682">attacks</a> have affected construction activities.</p>
<h2>How should these concerns be handled?</h2>
<p>The concerns from the community are weighty and require serious attention since they affect many aspects of their daily lives. </p>
<p>Our ongoing research shows that many of the concerns could have been averted if due process had been followed from the project’s inception. This includes timely and adequate compensation to everyone affected by the project. It also includes proper and robust environmental and social impact assessments as well as considering qualified residents for employment opportunities. Finally, there’s the issue of addressing the perennial problems of land rights in Lamu.</p>
<p>It’s vital that Lamu residents are treated as direct stakeholders and partners to the project. Their voices, concerns and aspirations should be taken seriously.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Bachmann receives funding from VR-Swedish Research Council and FORMAS-Swedish Research Council on sustainable development</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benard Musembi Kilaka receives funding from VR- Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>The Lamu port is part of an ambitious transport corridor with the aim of integrating marginalised northern Kenya into the Kenyan economy and the nation.Jan Bachmann, Senior Lecturer , University of GothenburgBenard Musembi Kilaka, Doctoral Student, University of GothenburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1599652021-04-30T10:20:51Z2021-04-30T10:20:51ZWhy insurgent groups in northern Nigeria continue to kidnap school children<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/397800/original/file-20210429-23-1m24iif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=124%2C52%2C3046%2C2018&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Education for children growing up in northern Nigeria is fraught with danger. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/maiduguri-nigeria-september-9-2015-girl-1031332591">bmszealand/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is a transcript of episode 12 of The Conversation Weekly podcast: “<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigeria-why-do-children-keep-getting-kidnapped-podcast-159099">Why children keep getting kidnapped in Nigeria + the Kenyan women who join Al-Shabaab</a>”. In this episode, insurgent groups in northern Nigeria continue to kidnap schoolchildren as the government struggles to protect communities against militants such as Boko Haram. And we speak to a researcher who has interviewed Kenyan women about why they joined the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab.</em></p>
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<p><em>NOTE: Transcripts may contain errors. Please check the corresponding audio before quoting in print.</em></p>
<p>Gemma Ware: Hello and welcome to The Conversation Weekly. I’m Gemma Ware in London, and for this episode I’m joined by my colleague Wale Fatade in Lagos, Nigeria. Hello Wale.</p>
<p>Wale: Hi Gemma. Good to be with you. </p>
<p>Gemma: This week, why insurgent groups in northern Nigeria continue to kidnap school children. </p>
<p>Wale: And why the government has been unable to improve the security situation in the region.</p>
<p>Hakeem Onapajo: They use children to negotiate during conflict. </p>
<p>Gemma: And we speak to a researcher who has interviewed Kenyan women about why they joined the militant group Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen: So because you’re not strong as an individual then you feel like joining the Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Gemma: You’re listening to The Conversation Weekly, the world explained by experts. </p>
<p>Wale: Gemma, today I’m going to take you to Nigeria. </p>
<p>Gemma: Wale, where are we talking to you from?</p>
<p>Wale: I’m talking to you from Lagos, but today we are going to talk about the north, specifically the north-eastern part of Nigeria.</p>
<p>Gemma: And what’s it like in the north?</p>
<p>Wale: The north used to be very beautiful. We have partly desert, partly savannah.
You can stand in a particular location and see farther, farther, far without any structure obstructing your view, like the forest that you have in the south. But now it’s been pretty scary these days, because now it’s a scene of banditry, kidnapping and terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Gemma: And we’re talking today about children in particular. So what’s it like being a child growing up in this part of Nigeria in the north?</p>
<p>Wale: Children used to roam around and move freely, but now to be a child in north-eastern part of Nigeria, it’s more likely to be kidnapped, abducted or taken away in the classroom or on the way to school. </p>
<p>Gemma: Are children still being kidnapped?</p>
<p>Wale: Oh yes, we had an incident in December last year where 333 students were kidnapped. Some days later, another batch of students were kidnapped from an Islamic school, in Mahuta too, in Katsina state. Early this year in February 27, students were abducted in Kagara, Niger state. Some days later, 317 school girls were abducted in Jangebe. And some days later, at the Federal College of Forestry and Agriculture, some students were kidnapped. As of now, 29 of them are still being captured by these kidnappers. </p>
<p>Gemma: And even this week there’s been another attack, hasn’t there? </p>
<p>Wale: Yeah, there’s been another attack in a town called Damasak in Borno state, which has witnessed several attacks. People have been chased away from their homes and some people were killed, I think about eight people. </p>
<p>Gemma: And so who is behind these attacks? </p>
<p>Wale: It used to be Boko Haram. It’s a terror group, that is known for abduction. Known for trying to prevent children from going to school and it loosely translate “book is forbidden”, that is anything western education is not something that they’re in support of. But now that has metamorphosed into Islamic State in West Africa, ISWAP as they are called. And then there are also other groups kidnapping for money. And these are the people that the Nigerian media loosely refer to as bandits.</p>
<p>Gemma: And so for this episode, you’ve been speaking to some experts about what’s been happening, right? </p>
<p>Wale: I’ve been speaking to two experts to find out more about why children are being targeted by insurgent groups, including Boko Haram and all these other groups. And then also the challenges the Nigerian government faces now in improving security in the northern part of the country.</p>
<p>Hakeem Onapajo: I’m Hakeem Onapajo, I’m a senior lecturer in the department of political science and international relations at Nile University of Nigeria. That’s in Abuja.</p>
<p>Wale: Hakeem’s research focuses on the northeast of Nigeria, and the neighbouring region surrounding Lake Chad. </p>
<p>Hakeem: I’ve researched extensively on the problem of Boko Haram and the north-eastern part of the country. So we were talking about, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger Republic. These are the areas that are more affected by the activities of the terrorists. </p>
<p>Wale: He says that civilians have borne much of the brunt of the conflict involving Boko Haram. The militant organisation wants to overthrow the government of President Muhammadu Buhari and create an Islamist state.</p>
<p>Hakeem: Civilians have been a major casualty in the whole violence in that particular region. About 16,000 people have been killed and we’ve had over 2 million people that have been displaced. </p>
<p>Wale: Recently, Hakeem’s research has turned to look at the impact the conflict in northern Nigeria has had on the most vulnerable: children. He’s recently published <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19392206.2020.1770919?journalCode=uafs20">new research in the journal African Security</a> on the issue, and has just written <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-children-are-prime-targets-of-armed-groups-in-northern-nigeria-156314">an article about it for The Conversation</a>.</p>
<p>Hakeem: I was able to discover that the conflict has a huge impact on the welfare and security of children in that area. A <a href="https://www.undocs.org/S/2017/304">UN report</a> show that almost 4,000 children were killed between 2015 and 2016, that’s just in one year and while we have about 7,000 of them injured in various attacks.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-children-are-prime-targets-of-armed-groups-in-northern-nigeria-156314">Why children are prime targets of armed groups in northern Nigeria</a>
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<p>Wale: Children have been caught right in the middle of the conflict and have as a result often suffered the most. </p>
<p>Hakeem: As a result of suicide attacks, as a result of air and ground strikes. As a result of extra judicial killings by state security forces, especially on suspicions of being suicide bombers. </p>
<p>Wale: Many of those who survive attacks are then displaced from their homes by the conflict.</p>
<p>Hakeem: <a href="https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/stories/displaced-children-navigate-covid-19-camps-north-east-nigeria#:%7E:text=In%20north%2Deast%20Nigeria%2C%20an,under%20the%20age%20of%20five&text=The%20outbreak%20of%20COVID%2D19,general%20disruption%20of%20normal%20life.">UNICEF reported</a> that about 57% of the total 2 million people, those who are affected as internally displaced people, in the IDP camps are children and half of this number. You have about 244,000 of them suffering from severe malnutrition. And worse still, it’s estimated that about 49,000 of them would die if there was no emergency treatment. So it’s a serious situation that we have in that part of the region. And the more worrisome aspect of it is a massive recruitment of children as child soldiers in that area. </p>
<p>Wale: While the conflict has only received international attention in the past five to six years, Boko Haram’s activities go back at least until 2009. </p>
<p>Hakeem: The activities of the group have been there for some time in terms of missionary activities. </p>
<p>Wale: The general consensus among researchers is that the group’s mostly missionary activities were generally peaceful. </p>
<p>Hakeem: The menace of Boko Haram actually started in 2009 when the group had a clash with state security agencies.</p>
<p>Wale: In the clashes, the Nigerian government killed an estimated 800 Boko Haram members including the leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Following the attack, the group retaliated under its new leader Abubakar Shekau, by launching an insurgency campaign against the Nigerian state.</p>
<p>Hakeem: They started by targeting security officials or anything that has a semblance or has a figure of the state. </p>
<p>Wale: But soon the group shifted its focus to target civilians. </p>
<p>Hakeem: Later they were seeking means to gain international attention. So they moved towards attacking civilians because they are actually the vulnerable groups in the society. Now civilians constitute one of their major targets.</p>
<p>Wale: And gradually, Boko Haram militants began targeting children. </p>
<p>Hakeem: They started by going to dormitories, boarding houses, schools to attack the children. They were used by suicide bombers then. And if you look at the gender dimensions their penchant to go after girls. They also use them as domestic slaves to work for them in their camps. They use them as sex slaves. They rape them.</p>
<p>Wale: Eventually, Boko Haram garnered international attention in 2014 when it kidnapped 276 girls in Borno State in a place called Chibok. </p>
<p>Hakeem: The group was relatively unknown before their kidnap of the Chibok girls. And immediately after the kidnap, there was this global campaign for the release of the children, the Bring Back Our Girls campaign.</p>
<p>Wale: High-profile politicians and celebrities, including then-first lady, Michelle Obama, came forward posting pictures of themselves on social media, holding up banners that said “Bring Back Our Girls”. </p>
<p>International efforts to rescue the girls involved the intervention of the human security division of the Swiss government’s foreign ministry and the Red Cross. Between 2016 and 2021 some 100 of the Chibok girls were freed in exchange for about US$3.7 million in ransoms. Of the remaining 176, some have escaped or died, and at least 100 girls are still believed to be living in Boko Haram’s captivity.</p>
<p>Hakeem says, it was this reaction from the international community that led Boko Haram to kidnap the girls in the first place.</p>
<p>Hakeem: So that itself popularised the group. And besides that, they can also use that to negotiate for some ransom in order to fund their operations. So these are some of the reasons why children are very strategic to their activities.</p>
<p>Wale: There are other reasons why Boko Haram continues to kidnap children.</p>
<p>Hakeem: They use the children to negotiate during conflict, for the release of their members that have been in prisons. Because of the emotional aspect of children, they feel the government would easily listen to them.</p>
<p>Wale: But Boko Haram is just one of many insurgent groups in Nigeria. Across the country, conflict and armed groups are threatening the lives of Nigerians, such as the conflict in the west, between Fulani herdsmen and Yoruba farmers. </p>
<p>And security issues are not confined to the north-east of the country. Bandits and other armed groups, like the Islamic State in West Africa, have begun doing copycat kidnappings in the north-west of the country, most recently in Zamfara state when 300 schoolgirls were kidnapped and released a few days later in early March.</p>
<p>Earlier this month, in April, a prison in Nigeria’s southeast in the town of Owerri, was attacked by members of a new armed insurrection. The gunmen share no affiliation or ideological interest with Boko Haram. Whether it’s Boko Haram or other insurgent groups, this all points to a much larger question around security in Nigeria.</p>
<p>To understand more about what the government has been doing – or hasn’t been doing – I reached out to Samuel Okunade. </p>
<p>Samuel Okunade: The state of insecurity in Nigeria is rife. Currently there’s still killings, banditry and of course kidnapping. </p>
<p>Wale: Samuel is a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, where he researches the goevrnment’s response to the attacks by Boko Haram and how communities in the north-east of Nigeria have dealt with the conflict.</p>
<p>Samuel: The constant attacks being carried out by the insurgent group, built my curiosity to finding out the coping strategies which they’ve been able to evolve over the years to ensure their continued survival within those communities.</p>
<p>Wale: Samuel’s research focuses on communities living near Nigeria’s borders. </p>
<p>Samuel: We can also call this places borderlands. So these are, these are communities that you find on the borders between two independent states. And when you look at the way Boko Haram carry out their attacks at times, they live in, in some communities on the other side of the border. So they come into these communities at will to carry out their attacks, burn down houses, kill people, kidnap people. </p>
<p>Wale: As part of his work, Samuel focused on six border communities in 2017 and 2018, in the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where he looked at the Nigerian military’s response to the attacks by Boko Haram.</p>
<p>Samuel: I discovered that the Nigerian government, which is supposed to be the major player, the key stakeholder, has failed in its responsibility of combating the menace of the Boko Haram within that region and within the country at large. And that’s why the Boko Haram still continue to grow in leaps and bounds til date and they still continue to carry out attacks within the region. And gradually the attention is shifting to the bandits in the north-western part of Nigeria.</p>
<p>Wale: Samuel says this all points to the fact that there is a high rate of insecurity in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Samuel: And it’s not just the Boko Haram element now. It has peeled to the southern part of Nigeria. When we look away from the north-eastern region of Nigeria and we look into the north-western part, a lot of people have lost their lives to banditry, kidnappings, clashes between the farmers and the herders within that region. </p>
<p>Wale: But by far the biggest security threat continues to be Boko Haram. Until 2010 the Nigerian government had largely ignored the security conditions in north-east Nigeria. </p>
<p>Samuel: The Nigerian government was forced, was pushed, to respond. And this only happened when the United States blacklisted the Nigerian state for terrorism in January 2010.</p>
<p>Wale: Samuel is referring here to the use of a directive issued by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2010, which placed Nigeria on the US terror watch list alongside other so-called “countries of interest”. The measure effectively meant that citizens from countries including Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, who travelled to the US were subjected to enhanced background checks and interrogation techniques at US airports. </p>
<p>As a result of the blacklisting, a diplomatic row ensued: Nigeria’s (then) minister of information, Professor Dora Akunyili, described the move as “unfair” and discriminatory, while foreign affairs minister then, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, said: “The new security measures by the US targeted at Nigerians is an unacceptable new year gift.”</p>
<p>But Samuel says, it was this designation of Nigeria as a country of interest that eventually spurred the government in Abuja into action the year after. </p>
<p>Samuel: They decided to work on an anti-terrorism legislation and that was what led to the Terrorism Prevention Act, which was signed into law in June 2011. Shortly after, the president then decided to form a special joint task force called JTF to respond. At the initial stages was composed of 30,000 troops and they were mobilised into the north-eastern state, especially the troubled areas to combat the attacks of the Boko Haram.</p>
<p>Wale: The Joint Task Force, made up of both members of the military and the Nigerian Police Force, coordinates intelligence and supports the Nigerian security forces in the fight against insurgents. While initially focusing mainly on localised counterinsurgency campaigns, its remit has expanded progressively over the years. In addition to armed protection of communities under attack by Boko Haram, members of the Joint Task Force have more recently been tasked with providing security to displaced populations living in camps for internally displaced people. But Samuel says much of the current strategy depends on regional and international support. </p>
<p>Samuel: At a point they got support from within Africa and from beyond. They got support for training, they got intelligence support. And they were also supported in terms of arms and ammunition, which are donated to them by various countries of the world. And some of them, even sent down troops to support in the fight against the Boko Haram.</p>
<p>Wale: But the government’s strategy wasn’t working. </p>
<p>Samuel: The Boko Haram still continued to grow and they still continue to carry out attacks within that region. The lackadaisical attitude being shown towards the fight against insurgency as impeded, or has prevented, the Nigerian government from successfully fighting the menace of insurgency within the region.</p>
<p>Wale: He says this is because the Joint Task Force is often overpowered by the insurgents, who carry superior arms and use guerrilla tactics in their attacks.</p>
<p>Samuel: The government has failed to adequately coordinate these huge resources is available to them to be able to fight and combat the Boko Haram menace. When you look at the reality, the kind of weapon, the military or the JTF carry is far, far, far less than what the force they are fighting is carrying. </p>
<p>Wale: Part of the reason the government has been unable to coordinate an effective response, Samuel says, is widespread corruption.</p>
<p>Samuel: Corruption has eaten deep into the fabrics of the Nigerian state. And that is the reason why they were earmarked so much money to purchase arms and ammunition and then at the end of the day, you discover that nothing as been purchased in the fight against this insurgency. </p>
<p>Wale: As a result of the corruption, many Nigerian soldiers have had to survive on meagre or often unpaid salaries. </p>
<p>Samuel: They’re being treated like slaves in their own country. And that’s the situation of the soldiers. We don’t have basic things to keep us going. And what are those basic things: water, food. It’s so alarming that things like that people who are risking their lives for their country would lack this kind of things. So if they lack food, if they lack of water, then we won’t be surprised that they would lack the needed firearm to combat the Boko Haram within that region. </p>
<p>Wale: Another part of the problem is that the Joint Task Force has allegedly engaged in unlawful killings, arrests, extortion and intimidation.</p>
<p>Samuel: They’ve been killing the local people indiscriminately, especially the youth and the men. And as a result of that, the people have lost trust in them.
And we can see how the fight against insurgency within that region as dragged up til date to a point in which we now have another group in the north-west coming up now and carrying out kidnappings and all that. </p>
<p>Wale: In the interviews Samuel conducted for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358533.2020.1849496?journalCode=ctrt20">his research</a> with people living in the border communities, he found that many had felt neglected by the government, leaving them to fend for themselves. </p>
<p>Samuel: There is this lady she’s called Aisha Bakari Gombi. She’s leading a force in Borno State, to counter the attacks of the Boko Haram in some of the border communities to see to the release of kidnapped children, women, by the Boko Haram. Today, we can see that some of them can happily to return to their farms, to live in those communities again, although they still have to be very conscious of their environment when they move around, because it’s still pretty dangerous for them. </p>
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<p>Wale: Hakeem Onapajo told me that the issue goes beyond the government’s failure to protect its population, but that in some cases the state is complicit in using children.</p>
<p>Hakeem: The state supported militia group, that’s the CJT, the Civilian Joint Task Force, both of them are using children to fight in that particular region. So according to UN estimates, for example, about 8,000 children, are presently child soldiers in that region.</p>
<p>Wale: I asked Hakeem what he thought the government’s strategy should be to protect communities from attacks against insurgents and to stop more children from being kidnapped.</p>
<p>Hakeem: Number one, government has to have a new approach towards addressing the insecurity in the country. You know, it’s abhorrent that the approach has not been working. Security in the country, especially in that region, there should be much more commitment to international collaborations in addressing the problem of that area. There should be much more provision of the needed equipment for the soldiers to fight this particular group. And also they should be much more focused on the non-military approaches towards addressing the problem. You know, there are root causes behind the reign of terror in that region. I think much more focus should be on how to try to introduce programme that will prevent the easy recruitment and attacks of children in that region.</p>
<p>Wale: And he says the government needs to start prioritising children. </p>
<p>Hakeem: When I wrote my article someone commented that why should we be talking about child security? Why not talk about general security? But the answer to that is that, children have some of their peculiar interest and children are much more vulnerable. So the government must find a way to provide special security at places where children are actually located in schools, in IDP camps, in their homes. </p>
<p>Wale: Samuel warned that, unless the government rebuilds the trust with communities living in the shadow of Boko Haram, these communities will find other solutions to keep themselves safe.</p>
<p>Samuel: So one of the coping strategies, which I found out in some of the communities, many of them are going into alliance with the Boko Haram in terms of negotiation for security. And every month they give out groceries to them, they give out whatever the agreement is in exchange for security. When the lives of your citizens are not being protected, then people will lose trust in your government. And that’s exactly what we are witnessing presently in Nigeria. So the Nigerian state has to stand up to its responsibility of protecting lives and properties of the people.</p>
<p>Gemma: Thank you, Wale, for digging into the history of all that and how complex it is and how big a task it is for the government to really protect these communities. It sounds like it’s a real challenge. </p>
<p>Wale: Seriously, the government, must up its game in responding to all these attacks. </p>
<p>Gemma: Our listeners can read more from Hakeem Onapajo and Samuel Okunade about their research in some articles that they’ve written for The Conversation, which we’re going to be putting links to in our show notes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-poor-response-to-boko-haram-has-left-border-communities-feeling-abandoned-155891">Nigeria's poor response to Boko Haram has left border communities feeling abandoned</a>
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<p>Wale: And they can find out more about banditry in Nigeria and the young people being drawn into it, in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-100-tackling-banditry-terrorism-and-kidnapping-in-nigeria-157357">recent interview I did with Sheriff Folarin</a> at Covenant University for our podcast Pasha. The link is in the shownotes too.</p>
<p>Gemma: Do go listen everyone to Pasha, it’s a great show. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pasha-100-tackling-banditry-terrorism-and-kidnapping-in-nigeria-157357">Pasha 100: Tackling banditry, terrorism and kidnapping in Nigeria</a>
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<p>Wale: And now we are crossing the continent from west to east for our second story today to hear about some new research in Kenya about another Islamist group - Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Gemma: Al-Shabaab is a militant group based in Somalia where it’s in a kind of violent stalemate with the Somali government and a coalition of foreign peacekeeping troops. From its bases in Somalia, Al-Shabaab continues to recruit people from the coastal region of neighbouring Kenya, including women. To find out more about these women, and the complex dynamics surrounding their involvement in Al-Shabaab, I called up Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen in Mombasa to talk <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">about the interviews that she’s been doing with some of these women</a>. </p>
<p>Fathima: I’m Fathima Azmiya. I work at the Department of Social Sciences, Technical University of Mombasa in Kenya. My study focuses on, recruitment of women and girls into extremist networks, such as the Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>Gemma: And where am I speaking to you from today?</p>
<p>Fathima: From Kenya, I’m based in Mombasa. </p>
<p>Gemma: Can you explain to our listeners who are Al-Shabaab and what is their kind of goal and what do they want as an organisation?</p>
<p>Fathima: Al-Shabaab are a transnational terrorist network. The origin is in Somalia, it’s mainly a Somali-based militant, I could say insurgency group. And it spreads its influence in most of the east African regions and even beyond. So ideology is mainly to have a caliphate in the east African region. The primary areas of operation are Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania, Uganda, even today to a level like Mozambique. </p>
<p>Gemma: We’re talking in March 2021 and Al-Shabaab has been in existence since the early 2000s. How much territory does it have? And what’s the kind of balance of power between it and the Somali government?</p>
<p>Fathima: They have their bases. Today, too, we have particular, we call it a sort of a transition government, but still Al-Shabaab becomes very strong in the southern areas, mainly because of its tax bases, their control. </p>
<p>Gemma: OK, so they’re more powerful along the southern part of Somalia, which is actually bordering Kenya. Your research has focused on coastal Kenya and kind of the northern bit of Kenya will work going down towards Mombasa, which is in the south of the country. Can you explain to me what kind of the dynamics are this area that you research? </p>
<p>Fathima: So, my study is based on the coastal region of Kenya. This includes areas like Lamu, Kwale, Mombasa, Kilifi. Kenya becomes a conducive ground for recruitment from this transnational extremist movement due to the prevailing pockets of marginalised communities and also deprived situations. The broken state-citizen relationships, youth unemployment and also some underdeveloped areas. But today the trends are changing from what it was before. So it’s not only the coast, but we also have other areas which are vulnerable for radicalisation and recruitment.</p>
<p>Gemma: And your focus has been predominantly on women being recruited into the Al-Shabaab. Can you explain why is Al-Shabaab trying to recruit women?</p>
<p>Fathima: So like many other terrorist organisations or insurgency networks, Al-Shabaab also uses women, and girls. This is not something very new, but the main reason why Al-Shabaab had this trend emanating is because of women’s important roles and the need for their role in tactical operations. Like for example, when the surveillance increased on men, actually, the trend was to have women now to carry out these activities so that they can bypass these surveillance. Women are more often looked from a passive view of not being violent. So when they carry out activities, it’s a shocking thing.</p>
<p>And also women and girls can perform many activities in their traditional roles, and at the same time, as in the combatant roles, like in the camps, they can be cleaning, cooking, they can be combatants also. They can also be sent to Kenya to gather information or to find certain things. They play a very important role in logistics support, like hiding members in their houses or weapons. They also become important in fundraising efforts, to recruit other women and men mainly because of their social interaction skills and their are pivotal positioning in families and the community. So women play a very important role in those countries. </p>
<p>Gemma: Could you explain a bit about how you go about this research?</p>
<p>Fathima: It was really important for me to understand the person from their own cultural context. So I started with the observing terror suspect trials. And I used to go and talk to the parents, then ask for permission. Some would give, some won’t give you. Once you get a start-up interview, you don’t directly ask questions,
you just build a trust until the person itself feels like they are ready to talk to you. And I had to stay long periods of time in these communities, so that I understand their perspective better. </p>
<p>Gemma: So you’ve built up this group of around 36 women that you’ve interviewed and you’ve written a number of academic papers about them. But your most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2020.1810993">recent paper</a> has focused on women who joined Al-Shabaab voluntarily. Can you explain what is the difference between a voluntary and involuntary reason for joining?</p>
<p>Fathima: When you look into voluntary recruitment, I look into it as women who join out of their sheer will. So this can be based because they like the Al-Shabaab ideology. Or sometimes we have even women who go because of group belongingness that you feel, like it is a Muslim group. You have to be part of it, or you have joined with a friend. So those are mainly the voluntary aspect. Then you have the involuntary recruitment. That is when women and girls are forced to join these networks. Or those who join the groups are joining because of particular receptive, or elimination strategies used by the Al-Shabaab network. </p>
<p>Gemma: You had these 36 women, and then you picked up 16 of them who you can categorise as women who’d voluntarily joined the group. Can you explain what the main factors were for those women?</p>
<p>Fathima: When I made the selection of these 16, those are the women who I’m mainly inclined on building a caliphate. They were the ones who were completely, resonating with the ideology of the Al-Shabaab. They are very minority, but they play a very important role because they have prominent positions in the network because of their ideological resonance.</p>
<p>Then you have another group that might join because of particular anger involved, like maybe they want to get revenge from the state. So because you are not strong as an individual, now you feel like joining the Al-Shabaab as a revenge motive. Then you have the third one, which I consider as the majority. </p>
<p>So the third one is mainly in line with the circumstances based on their daily interactions with the family or the peers. Now, these relationships are very important because as woman growing up in a patriarchal setting, maybe in particular dependency relationships, like you’re dependent on your husband or a male relative, or it can be the aspect of she’s really in love with him so she doesn’t want to lose him or maybe because she’s scared. She may not have a man. And you know, it also comes back to the economics, with children. So sometimes, you make your decision based on these dependency relationships. It seems like you’re volunteering, but it has been shaped because of your family, your circumstances or you want to be your obedient wife. So that is mainly the majority. </p>
<p>And then you have the fourth one, which is mainly focused on the camp. That is your voluntariness was based on the time you spent in the camp, the ideological trainings you underwent in the camp. Maybe you join involuntarily, but because of the ideological training that has been constantly given to you in the camp, now you have the voluntariness based on trainings you undergo.</p>
<p>Gemma: And I wonder what significance your findings have for Kenya in particular, the counter-terrorism strategies and policies that the government is trying to put in place. </p>
<p>Fathima: I would say the study would be more significant in preventing and countering violent extremism. Because the study tries to understand and place the role of women in radicalisation and recruitment. First, we should acknowledge there is problem. Second, and you look into the topic of women in deradicalisation, or disengaging or re-integration, it’s important to have this gendered angle, because what fits men may not fit women. Then what measures can we take when you’re trying to prevent women from getting into these networks, whether it is voluntary or involuntary. </p>
<p>Then also when it comes to voluntary, mainly with ideology, how can we respond to this ideological tenants that facilitate a voluntary recruitment? Like for example, misinterpreted Quranic verses. So those are some of the discussions we need with these young women, girls so that they understand before they make a decision. So it comes back into this life skills, critical thinking, decision-making type of interventions that are needed. </p>
<p>Gemma: Just finally, what are you working on next? Are you still interviewing these women or are you moving to, to look at other issues with Al-Shabaab?</p>
<p>Fathima: I’m still working with these women, mainly in line with the reintegration processes. But I’m also working on, the topic of boys. That is the topic of masculinities, radicalisation and recruitment with boys and men to whether recruitment pathways are changing and whether trends are different for men and women. </p>
<p>Gemma: OK. Well, we’ll look forward to reading about that in the future. Thank you very much, Fatima. It’s been fascinating talking to you. </p>
<p>Fathima: Thank you too for having me. </p>
<p>Gemma: You can read an article by Fatima with more details about her research by clicking the link in the show notes.</p>
<p>Wale: And now to end the show, we’ve got a message from Bryan Keogh, business editor at The Conversation in the US. </p>
<p>Bryan: Hi, I’m Brian Keogh, a senior economy and business editor for The Conversation based in New York. My first recommendation is on the controversial topic of vaccine mandates. A lot of companies have considered requiring their workers to get vaccinated as they try to get everyone back to the office.</p>
<p>This has prompted some US states try to prevent this. Liz Tippett, an employment law expert at the University of Oregon has an interesting take on this debate. Employers <a href="https://theconversation.com/vaccine-mandates-arent-the-only-or-easiest-way-for-employers-to-compel-workers-to-get-their-shots-159028">don’t need to worry about mandating vaccines</a> because they already have plenty of other tools to compel compliance from their employees. As Liz explains, companies have gotten so good at manipulating our behaviours through various types of nudges, that your boss probably won’t even need a mandate to get you to take a shot. </p>
<p>My second recommendation comes from Clare Mehta, a psychologist at Emmanuel College. A recent survey asked if you could be one age for the rest of your life, what would it be? <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-what-age-are-people-usually-happiest-new-research-offers-surprising-clues-156906">The surprising answer was 36</a> and disappointing for me since it suggests I’m already past my prime. It wasn’t to Clare, however, who has been studying the experiences of people in the thirties and early forties. It’s an interesting time in a person’s life. So much tends to be happening from buying a home for the first time to getting married, having children to beginning to really own one’s career. Her research found that though these big changes and challenges brought a lot of stress, they also brought a lot of joy, too. People also said they were feeling more self-confident and generally happier. Unfortunately, Clare didn’t learn when everything goes downhill. That’s all for me. Thanks and happy reading.</p>
<p>Gemma: Brian Keogh in New York there. That’s it for this week. Thanks to all the academics who’ve spoken to us for this episode.</p>
<p>Wale: And many thanks to the Conversation editors Adejuwon Soyinka, Caroline Southey, Julius Maina, Bryan Keogh and Stephen Khan for their help with this episode. </p>
<p>Gemma: And thanks to Alice Mason, Imriel Morgan and Sharai White for our social media promotion. </p>
<p>Wale: If you want to learn more about any of the things we talk about on the show today, there are links to further reading in the shownotes where you can also find a link to sign up to our <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email</a>. </p>
<p>Gemma: You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a> or on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or email us at podcast@theconversation.com</p>
<p>Gemma: The Conversation Weekly is co-produced by Mend Mariwany and me, Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. </p>
<p>Wale: And I’m Wale Fatade from Lagos, Nigeria. Thanks for listening.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
This is a transcript of episode 12 of The Conversation Weekly podcast, including a story on the reasons why Kenyan women who join Al-Shabaab.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioWale Fatade, Commissioning Editor: NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1595492021-04-23T13:55:44Z2021-04-23T13:55:44ZSomalia’s toxic political and security order: the death knell of democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396749/original/file-20210423-13-1o7ypsu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The grand designs of the major political and military actors lack an important ingredient: the views and the hopes of ordinary Somalis.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>By the mid-1990s, it was clear to the world that Somalia had become Africa’s first <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/09/10/most-failed-state">failed post-colonial state</a>. But this vast country of just 10 million people had had a glorious history before this calamity. It was the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2005vvv">first to enjoy a democratic transfer of power</a> on the continent, in 1964 and 1967. </p>
<p>In the 1960s, Somalia developed a reputation for running the most democratic elections on the continent. At the time the continent was mired in dictatorships, suffering under bloody military coups and lumbering under single party rule. </p>
<p>This glorious history is little known. Better known is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">chaos of the last 30 years</a>. In these years, Somalia has endured the most retrogressive and violent civil war engineered by one of the most sectarian African political elite in the continent today. </p>
<p>Is there any chance that this might change? Can the Somali people rise from the ashes?</p>
<p>I believe not, unless two of the key drivers to the Somali disaster are understood – and acted on. The first is that the political and security order – which numerous foreign actors have been investing in – has produced marginal benefits for ordinary people. And it has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Second, this order is built on the reification of a divisive apartheid-like political formula based on ethnic lines. </p>
<h2>Indigenous revolution snuffed</h2>
<p>In 2006, after a decade-and-a-half of cruel civil war, the Union of Islamic Courts, a home grown alliance of religious leaders, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">terminated 15 years of warlords’ terror and tyranny</a>. They pacified Mogadishu and surrounding areas and were about to set up local administration for the city and the surrounding settlements. </p>
<p>But the initiative was short lived. The international community, led by the US, reversed this local initiative, and <a href="https://experts.umn.edu/en/publications/the-islamic-courts-and-the-mogadishu-miracle-what-comes-next-for-">empowered</a> a government dominated by warlords. </p>
<p>US (and foreign) influence was further consolidated after 2008 – the year Washington listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation. Since then, the US and its allies have spent billions of dollars on illusive security and superficial development that has failed to improve the capacity of Somalis to take charge of their future.</p>
<p>In addition, they have endorsed a tribal-based federal system advanced by the sectarian factions of the Somali political elite. This political cocktail has produced a context in which violence has become part of the population’s daily life under the shadow of a thoroughly corrupt and hopelessly inept government. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://amisom-au.org/">African Union force</a> in Somalia, fully financed by the US and the European Union, claims to have pushed Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and other major cities. But it has failed to defeat the terrorist organisation. This is due to the conventional warfare strategy it has adopted as well as its inability to mobilise the local population for self-defence. </p>
<p>As a result, Al-Shabaab, which has about 5,000 combatants, controls most rural areas. The group efficiently collects ransom (taxes) from all businesses, most notably in the capital city. This is due to the absence of a strong and effective police force in the capital.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s resilience is undergirded by the international community’s disorganised efforts at rebuilding a unified and integrated Somali defence and police forces. </p>
<h2>Ethnicity as political identity</h2>
<p>Foreign actors, including the African Union, back a political scheme that segregates Somalis into exclusive genealogical units in all spheres of political and public life. The country is divided into tribal regions. Parliamentary representation, ministerial appointments and employment in civil and security services (as well as the judiciary) are all based on tribal identity. </p>
<p>Each region is the preserve of a particular genealogical group. And each government department is the fiefdom of a certain tribe. The fundamental political effect of these divisions has been that Somalis cohabit the same national territory, but share little common civic agenda that can guide rebuilding their country.</p>
<p>Such reinvention of colonial and apartheid-like political order has created superficial and short term stability in pockets of the country. But this has been at the cost of country-wide insecurity, and economic and social progress. </p>
<p>This tribal-based political scheme is accepted under the false notion that it reflects Somali tradition. But it only fits the designs of a sectarian faction of the Somali political elite, and their erstwhile ally in Ethiopia, the late prime minister Meles Zenawi.</p>
<p>The current order is an amalgam of two totally contradictory systems. A public sector that is supposed to be inclusive and democratic, and an exclusive tribal-based politics. This mixture has produced a dysfunctional order inept in all of its operations except in looting public resources and alienating Somalis from each other. </p>
<h2>The hope?</h2>
<p>The grand designs of the major political and military actors lack an important ingredient: the views and the hopes of ordinary Somalis. Most Somalis have consistently rejected political tribalism as they so clearly recognise that such politics and polices are the root causes of their privations. </p>
<p>Over <a href="http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/resources/detail/en/c/1118196/">70% of the Somali people are under 30 years</a> of age. Yet this group has had no say in redesigning the country’s reconstruction strategy.
But the imminent political transition due to the expiration of the current leadership’s term of office will reproduce past disasters. </p>
<p>The most recent political conflict between the president and the opposition is about the rule of law and the sanctity of the provisional constitution. The president wants to extend his term of office for two more years after his tenure expired in February while the constitution forbids it. In addition, the president has been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/2/25/the-way-out-of-somalias-political-impasse">stoking ethnic sentiments</a> to boost his illegal and illegitimate effort to stay in power. </p>
<p>Fortunately, the people of the capital clearly understand transforming political conflict into an ethnic one will be catastrophic and have refused to take the president’s bait. </p>
<p>The African Union, whose troops guard the presidency and much of the capital, has a moral and political obligation to thwart the president’s unconstitutional gerrymandering. Without a decisive AU intervention, the country appears destined to return to mindless civil strife.</p>
<p>Thus, the African Union has a fleeting opportunity at this eleventh hour to honour its motto of “African solutions for African problems”. It should challenge the president’s attempt to cling to power, and other sectarian Somali actors. Rather than endorsing a divisive agenda the AU must insist that conflating ethnic and political identity is disastrous not only for Somalia, but anywhere in the continent. </p>
<p>Such a stance will inspire young Somalis to aspire differently. They have shown <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-clans-idUSTRE7B70IU20111208">willingness to jettison political tribalism</a> and could yet rediscover the golden roots of Africa’s first democrats. Young Somalis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/16/world/africa/somalia-.html#:%7E:text=Amina%20Abdulkadir%20Isack%2C%2027%2C%20tended,the%20government%20could%20scarcely%20provide.">are ready for the challenge</a> – is the AU?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdi Ismail Samatar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The political and security order which numerous foreign actors have been investing in has produced marginal benefits for the population.Abdi Ismail Samatar, Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1590992021-04-22T10:54:52Z2021-04-22T10:54:52ZNigeria: why do children keep getting kidnapped? – podcast<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, insurgent groups in northern Nigeria continue to kidnap schoolchildren as the government struggles to protect communities against militants such as Boko Haram. And we speak to a researcher who has interviewed Kenyan women about why they joined the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab.</p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/608147528763861f89ee7de3?cover=true&ga=false" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay" width="100%" height="110"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Nigeria is gradually becoming one of the most dangerous places to live. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2020-the-ten-countries-most-impacted-by-terrorism/">identified</a> the country as the third most affected by terrorism. There was a sharp increase in Boko Haram’s targeting of civilians by 25%, and killings by herdsmen increased by 26%, compared with the previous year. </p>
<p>According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, 2,769 violent deaths were <a href="https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483">recorded</a> between February 2020 and February 2021 in Borno State alone. Similarly, ransom-kidnapping by armed groups has <a href="https://www.sbmintel.com/2020/05/the-economics-of-nigerias-kidnap-industry/">increased</a> substantially in the past five years. Over <a href="https://www.sbmintel.com/2020/05/the-economics-of-nigerias-kidnap-industry/">US$18 million</a> (£13 million) was paid as ransom for kidnapped victims between 2011 and 2020.</p>
<p>While insecurity is common in Nigeria, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483">northern region</a> has been most affected. This is due to Boko Haram attacks, banditry, farmers-herdsmen conflicts, kidnappings and ethno-religious conflicts. Sadly, children have not been spared.</p>
<p>In the north-east, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/nigeria-help-children-ravaged-by-war-or-risk-a-lost-generation-in-the-northeast/">children</a> have been murdered, abducted and used as sex slaves, forcefully recruited as child soldiers, and suffer from diseases and malnutrition at the internally displaced persons camps. </p>
<p>We speak to two experts about the situation, and why <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-children-are-prime-targets-of-armed-groups-in-northern-nigeria-156314">children are the prime targets of armed groups</a>. Hakeem Onapajo, senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nile University in Nigeria, explains that Boko Haram targets children for use as slaves in its camps, including girls as sex slaves. “They can also use that to negotiate for some ransom in order to fund their operations,” he tells us, and for the release of militants from prison. </p>
<p>Despite setting up a joint task force to fight Boko Haram in the north-east, the Nigerian government has made little headway on improving the security situation. Samuel Okunade, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Pretoria, laments that this has left communities to fend for themselves. “When the lives of your citizens are not being protected, then people will lose trust in your government,” he tells us. </p>
<p>And in our second story, we cross the continent to Kenya to hear about women who joined the Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab. From its base in Somalia, where the group controls much of the countryside and remains in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-somali-clan-elders-could-hold-the-key-to-opening-dialogue-with-al-shabaab-152759">violent stalemate</a> with the government, it continues to carry out terrorist attacks in the region and to recruit across the border in Kenya. </p>
<p>Women and girls are used to recruit others, as logistics planners and as spies for terrorist activities within Kenya. Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen, lecturer in the Department of Social Sciences at the Technical University of Mombasa in Kenya, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-did-it-the-kenyan-women-and-girls-who-joined-al-shabaab-151592">has been interviewing women</a> who have since left Al-Shabaab about their experiences and why they joined the group. Some joined willingly, and others were forcibly recruited, but the line between voluntary and involuntary is often blurred. Badurdeen explains what she’s found about the circumstances behind women’s decisions to join Al-Shabaab, and what this means for their rehabilitation. </p>
<p>And Bryan Keogh, business editor at The Conversation in New York, gives us his recommended reads. </p>
<p>The Conversation Weekly is produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p><em>A transcript of this episode <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-insurgent-groups-in-northern-nigeria-continue-to-kidnap-school-children-159965">is available here</a>.</em></p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlpZr8IRUcY">Aljazeera</a> <a href="https://archive.org/details/ALJAZAM_20140415_220000_News/start/1800/end/1860">News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uOYyo1XcYHg">VOA News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Z4lniQHnmI">CGTN</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK4rYzsLST8">News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8vws8UGFgU">CGTN Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6HhbzQoei7g">euronews</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nqh-PmTVSCE">DW News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nzZJecidaoI">Reuters</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/CNN_20100122_160000_CNN_Newsroom/start/5340/end/5400">CNN</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHN1DJsgZC0">News</a>, <a href="https://rtd.rt.com/films/hunting-boko-haram/">RT News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD7Zf7en9UQ">africanews</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rmq911bArck">Arise News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dYT6x00kYLY">TVC News Nigeria</a>, and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NifxCuYxVnk">KBC Channel 1</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, why women join Al-Shabaab in Kenya. Listen to episode 12 of The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioWale Fatade, Commissioning Editor: NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.