tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/american-isolationism-35349/articlesAmerican isolationism – The Conversation2024-02-22T18:48:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239422024-02-22T18:48:25Z2024-02-22T18:48:25ZWhat does Donald Trump’s NATO posturing mean for Canada?<p>Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/trump-says-he-would-encourage-russia-to-do-whatever-the-hell-they-want-to-any-nato-country-that-doesn-t-pay-enough-1.6764435">recent candid admission</a> that he would encourage Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members shirking their alliance commitments predictably dominated the news cycle for several days.</p>
<p>What this veiled threat means to <a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeau-and-nato-the-problem-with-canadian-defence-isnt-cash-its-culture-204252">Canada, which perpetually fails to meet NATO’s benchmark of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence</a>, is uncertain — but certainly worrisome.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/justin-trudeau-and-nato-the-problem-with-canadian-defence-isnt-cash-its-culture-204252">Justin Trudeau and NATO: The problem with Canadian defence isn’t cash, it's culture</a>
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<p>Even a potential Pierre Poilievre government would only <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/poilievre-says-he-would-cut-wasteful-foreign-aid-work-towards-nato-spending-target-1.6770426">“work towards”</a> meeting the target. Poilievre’s simultaneous <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-politics-briefing-too-early-to-say-how-conservatives-would-balance/">commitment to balancing the budget</a> suggests that any substantial spending increases on the Canadian Armed Forces are unlikely.</p>
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<h2>Unilateralism, not isolationism</h2>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/14/trump-foreign-policy-advisers-nato-remarks-00141287">some Republican</a> efforts <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4475656-graham-responds-to-trump-nato-comments-if-you-dont-pay-you-get-kicked-out/">to calm</a> the waters churned up by former president Trump, a <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/majority-trump-republicans-prefer-united-states-stay-out-world?utm_source=media&utm_campaign=ccs&utm_medium=atlantic">recent survey</a> conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs highlights the decreasing Republican appetite for foreign commitments.</p>
<p>It found that a majority of “Trump Republicans” would prefer the United States was less involved in global affairs. Findings like this <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/13/opinion/gop-senate-ukraine-aid.html">predictably inspire</a> headlines about <a href="https://bnnbreaking.com/politics/the-resurgence-of-isolationism-in-us-politics-shadows-over-foreign-policy">American isolationism</a>. The <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-stalled-u-s-aid-for-ukraine-exemplifies-gops-softening-stance-on-russia">recent stalled funding for Ukraine</a> in the U.S. Congress reflects this development. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-01-20/jacksonian-revolt">According to historian Walter Russell Meade</a>, Trump pursued a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957209368">classical “Jacksonian” approach to governance</a> during his presidency: a minimalist government that aims “to fulfil the country’s destiny by looking after the physical security and economic well-being of the American people in their national home, and to do that while interfering as little as possible with the individual freedoms that makes the country unique.” </p>
<p>However, this approach is <a href="https://notesonliberty.com/2017/04/11/unilateralism-is-not-isolationism/">less about “isolationism” than it is “unilateralism</a>.” It’s in keeping with what Trump announced in his 2017 <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">“America First” national security strategy</a> and later re-emphasized in his <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/">2019 address to the United Nations General Assembly</a> — U.S. domination unshackled by having to work with others.</p>
<p>This is evident in the Chicago poll finding that “half of Trump Republicans (48 per cent) say the U.S. should be <em>the dominant</em> world leader, while a majority of non-Trump Republicans (65 per cent) say the country should play a <em>shared leadership</em> role.” In essence, Jacksonians see no value in working with foreigners because that curtails America’s ability to make decisions solely in its own interests.</p>
<h2>What would the end of NATO mean?</h2>
<p>A bipartisan bill in the U.S. Senate passed in late 2023 <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/4360407-congress-approves-bill-barring-president-withdrawing-nato/">prohibits a unilateral presidential withdrawal from NATO</a> without a two-thirds Senate majority or a specific act of Congress. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/01/trump-2024-reelection-pull-out-of-nato-membership/676120/">an American president could easily hobble NATO</a> by withdrawing Europe-based U.S. troops, forgoing active participation in NATO exercises and, more generally, by <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-nato-speech-article-5-2017-6">raising doubts about the sanctity of Article 5 of the NATO treaty</a>, which essentially assures collective defence if any member is attacked.</p>
<p>The end of NATO would mark the destruction of the post-Second World War international system and a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540">return to a balance-of-power arrangement</a>. In such a world, the largest powers would dictate the structures and rules under which their regional spheres of influence would be governed, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine">regardless of the wishes of the citizens of those sovereign nations</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-is-already-flustering-foreign-leaders-who-are-trying-to-prepare-for-a-possible-presidency-223767">Donald Trump is already flustering foreign leaders who are trying to prepare for a possible presidency</a>
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<p>What would this mean for Canada as part of the American sphere? While <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/CAN/Year/LTST/Summarytext">most of Canada’s trade flows south</a> rather than across oceans — and although the collapse of the post-war multilateral system of relationships would normally be a disaster for a medium-sized trading nation like Canada — it would nonetheless probably be able to weather the storm thanks to its close attachment to the U.S. </p>
<p>But lacking the resources of a great power, countries like Canada rely on established norms, rules and institutions to make the world predictable and stable. These concepts are at significant risk when the great powers start acting unilaterally.</p>
<p>Remaining trans-Atlantic relationships would be of little strategic value to Canada in the face of American abuses of power. Its allies would be of no assistance in remediating <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/mercantilism">mercantilistic behaviour</a> from the United States. Canadian governments have never been able to shift our national economy <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/free-trade-20/has-north-american-integration-resulted-in-canada-becoming-too-dependent-on-the-united-states/">away from the pull of the U.S. market</a>, and it would be increasingly impossible to do so if NATO no longer existed.</p>
<p>The worst outcome, in fact, would be the strategic confinement of Canada to the North American continent.</p>
<h2>Special relationship on life support</h2>
<p>The “special relationship” Canada once enjoyed with the U.S. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/what-special-relationship-canada-grimaces-amid-hail-us-trade-blows-2021-06-22/">has largely disappeared</a>, save for a residual sense of <a href="https://today.yougov.com/travel/articles/24068-what-america-thinks-canada-might-surprise-you">good will Americans typically reserve for Canada</a>. The Trump administration demonstrated that <a href="https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/may-2020/rethinking-the-canada-us-relationship-after-the-pandemic/">no such bonhomie existed, and furthermore treated Canada with zero-sum precision</a> in its economic policies.</p>
<p>Still, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/congress-executive-and-intermestic-affairs-three-proposals">complex and intertwined relationship</a> between the U.S. and Canada <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-hidden-wiring-of-the-canada-us-relationship/">would be difficult to disentangle</a>, and doing so wouldn’t be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2018.1542604">painless for the Americans, either</a>. The depth of the cross-border relationship might be its best defence against efforts to undo it. </p>
<p>But Canadians should not expect to be exempt from the growing mistrust within America, especially in the event of a second Trump presidency.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-canada-shouldnt-always-count-on-special-treatment-from-the-u-s-93235">Why Canada shouldn't always count on special treatment from the U.S.</a>
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<p>The security of the northern border <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/republican-presidential-candidates-turn-attention-to-border-with-canada-1.6739098">continues to arouse suspicion</a>. <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/u-s-officials-say-no-indication-rainbow-bridge-vehicle-explosion-was-terrorist-attack-after-canadian-caution-1.6656266">A car accident late last year near the Niagara Falls Rainbow Bridge</a> quickly raised fears of lax Canadian border controls <a href="https://toronto.citynews.ca/2023/11/23/some-were-quick-to-blame-terrorism-and-canada-after-fatal-rainbow-bridge-border-explosion/">by some American commentators</a>, even though those concerns turned out to be baseless. </p>
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<p>The Greek general Thucydides famously observed that “<a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191866692.001.0001/q-oro-ed6-00010932#:%7E:text=Thucydides%20c.&text=I%20have%20written%20my%20work,a%20possession%20for%20all%20time.&text=The%20strong%20do%20what%20they,weak%20suffer%20what%20they%20must.&text=Of%20the%20gods%20we%20believe,they%20rule%20wherever%20they%20can.">the strong do what they can and the weak suffer as they must</a>.” </p>
<p>An increasingly unilateral America under Trump will be far more predatory towards both Canada and Mexico. <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-would-canada-approach-the-prospect-of-war-181106">Canada’s relative geographic isolation from the world</a>, which historically has kept the country remarkably secure, <a href="https://www.libraryjournal.com/review/canada-alone-navigating-the-postamerican-world-1800371">could then become something of a prison</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul T. Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada relies on established norms, rules and institutions to make the world stable. These concepts would be a great risk if Donald Trump made good on threats to disregard NATO.Paul T. Mitchell, Professor of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/907922018-01-26T21:53:47Z2018-01-26T21:53:47ZWhat Trump’s every-country-for-itself rhetoric gets wrong about Davos<p>There is a disarming and almost touchingly naive belief among the presenters and the government delegations in the cloistered mountain village of Davos that “<a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AM18_Overview.pdf">creating a shared future in a fractured world</a>” – the title of this year’s World Economic Forum – is actually possible. </p>
<p>To the outside world, the panels and speeches fleetingly catch the news cycle, doing little to alter the perception that it’s just a <a href="https://qz.com/1184584/the-list-of-davos-attendees-for-2018/">gathering of elites and billionaires</a>. But inside the forum, political leaders mingle with entrepreneurs, scientists and humanists. It’s a menagerie of power, money, brains and innovative thinking mainly, though not exclusively, being <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/davos-corporate-social-impact.html">channeled toward social good</a>. </p>
<p>So what happens when the “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-free-world-leader/514232/">leader of the free world</a>” walks into the room and promotes a form of isolationism as his recommended method for creating that shared future?</p>
<h2>Universal values meets ‘America First’</h2>
<p>Like Trump, this year was my first at Davos. But my reason for being there was markedly different. </p>
<p>As the director of the University of Southern California’s Shoah Foundation, I was invited to present “<a href="https://sfi.usc.edu/collections/holocaust/ndt">new dimensions in testimony</a>,” a collaborative project that aims to bring the stories of Holocaust and other genocide survivors to three-dimensional life by using articial intelligence to simulate a conversation.</p>
<p>On a typical day teaching on <a href="https://sfi.usc.edu/about/unesco">Holocaust and genocide</a>, I would never have the chance to speak with Iraqi clerics or Saudi journalists. The distance is just too great physically, intellectually and emotionally. </p>
<p>Not so at Davos. In the last few days, for example, I have had detailed conversations with members of the United Arab Emirates government who agreed that Holocaust testimony could be used to teach universal human values at home. Davos allows such boundaries to be crossed.</p>
<p>Enter Donald Trump, the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/america-first-34020">America First</a>” president whose rhetorical track record at first glance seems at odds with the Davos globalists. In a <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/26/full-text-trump-davos-speech-transcript-370861">keynote address</a> on Jan. 26, Trump chose his words carefully and stuck to the script, ostensibly encouraging collaboration.</p>
<p>“Together let us resolve to use our power, our resources and our voices, not just for ourselves but for our people, to lift their burdens, to raise their hopes and to empower their dreams,” he said.</p>
<p>Trump described himself as America’s “cheerleader,” but the effect was more salesman, as he anchored his speech in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/26/gdp-q4-2017-first-reading.html">revival of the American economy</a>, reassuring investors that their money is safe with him.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://twitter.com/kenroth/status/956880603785416704">Trump’s critics</a> saw his speech as out of touch, the globalist gathering at Davos is known for embracing a broad spectrum of political, social and fiscal perspectives. It could be argued that Trump’s rumbustious isolationist rhetoric adds a healthy disruption to the remarkably polite company at Davos, but it is also a fact that the United States is by no means the only power here, a point <a href="https://qz.com/1188895/davos-2018-xi-jinping-has-shaped-the-theme-of-the-world-economic-forum-chinese-media-say">not lost on the Davos die-hards</a>. </p>
<h2>An invitation to isolation</h2>
<p>More to the point, it was not what he did say but what he did not that was so at odds with the tenor of the forum. </p>
<p>Trump focused on the fiscal performance of his country but said nothing about the shared global values at the heart of this year’s forum. Trump’s thesis is that if every country looks after its own interests, then ultimately common outcomes will prevail. This flies in the face of the hard work leaders in government, business, academia and others have put in at Davos this year to create multilateral agreements on key issues of global security, such as international efforts to <a href="https://thinkprogress.org/davos-climate-world-leaders-without-trump-8ab608162c95/">tackle climate change</a>. </p>
<p>While most leaders who attend also speak to their own country’s interests, only Trump promoted a “my country first” brand of isolationism. </p>
<p>Even his invitation for delegates to visit America, as generous as it sounds, is disingenuous, as some – such as the delegates from Chad and Iran I have been working with this week – cannot get visas <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2018/01/travelling-ban">because of his travel ban</a>. Trump’s insistence that “putting America first” is his duty as president – just as other heads of state must do so in their own countries – ignores the many political leaders at Davos, such as <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/5-takeaways-from-macrons-big-speech-on-europes-future/amp/toward">France’s Emmanuel Macron</a> or <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/01/24/580266951/in-davos-merkel-warns-against-poison-of-right-wing-populism">Germany’s Angela Merkel</a>, who were genuinely trying to find shared interests at the forum. </p>
<p>Trump and even a few of the Davos delegates may believe that his administration’s policies, such as corporate tax cuts, deregulation and increased military spending, do in fact create the “shared future” promoted by the forum. The reality is doing so requires a less self-interested strategy, one that doesn’t put “America first.”</p>
<p>In other words, his claim that “America First does not mean America alone” rings hollow.</p>
<p>Rather, the goal of a shared future was being met elsewhere at Davos, such as in a conversation I had with Salih Al-Hakeem, a cleric and director of the <a href="http://al-kalima.iq/?p=1289&lang=en">Hikmeh Center for Dialogue and Cooperation in Iraq</a>, who lost his entire family during the Saddam Hussein regime. I watched Al-Hakeem as he listened to the interactive testimony of <a href="https://sfi.usc.edu/news/2018/01/20876-new-dimensions-testimony-showcased-world-economic-forum-davos-switzerland">Holocaust survivor Pinchas Gutter</a> describing the destruction of his family by the Nazis. </p>
<p>After interacting with the holographic Gutter, he invited the real one to visit Iraq to tell his story to Muslims there. Al-Hakeem then turned to me and said, “When he speaks about the Holocaust he speaks for all of us.” </p>
<p>That for me is the Davos not seen in the glare of the cameras. Call me naive, but it just might help create a more shared future in an otherwise fractured world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90792/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen D. Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s keynote address in Davos struck a discordant note with many of those in attendance, including this one.Stephen D. Smith, Director of Shoah Foundation, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/719312017-02-01T03:42:05Z2017-02-01T03:42:05ZWhat does ‘America first’ mean for American economic interests?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/155064/original/image-20170131-3285-1bqo5o3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">America first, but at what cost?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trump paper via www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/20/donald-trumps-full-inauguration-speech-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.8efe9dc46192">inauguration speech</a>, Donald Trump used the phrase “America first” to describe his approach to governance. </p>
<p>Trump’s speech, of course, was <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/">not the first time</a> that we have heard this phrase. Historically, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-america-first-echoes-from-1940s-59579">politicians and activists</a> have used the idea of putting America first to advocate for policies ranging from strict immigration to foreign policy isolationism. </p>
<p>But what did the new president intend to say by borrowing this well-worn but vague phrase? What does it really mean, in economic terms, to put America first?</p>
<h2>The history of ‘America first’</h2>
<p>Today, what unites “America first” populists is a rejection of the idea that the country’s self-interest is inextricably bound to the prosperity and liberty of the broader world. </p>
<p>According to this way of thinking, the world outside is full of more threats than opportunities, and America would do well to guard itself against pernicious influences from abroad. Worse, America’s generosity is <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/politics/donald-trump-speech-pennsylvania-economy/">constantly being abused</a> by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-14/how-donald-trump-could-wipe-420-billion-off-china-s-exports">Asian exporters</a>, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-28/trump-s-visa-ban-order-the-view-from-a-worried-middle-east">Middle Eastern miscreants</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/25/enough-with-the-complaints-of-european-free-riding-already/">European free-riders</a>. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, we’ve seen before where such a foreign policy approach can lead.</p>
<p>During the Great Depression, the United States and the countries of Europe found themselves caught in a spiral of increasing trade protection and currency devaluation. This period of <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Adjusts-Domestic-Sources-Economic-Interwar/dp/0691017107/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552534&sr=8-1&keywords=who+adjusts">“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies</a>, in which one country’s protectionist moves trigger tightened borders from trade partners, was to no one’s economic benefit. More to the point, the deepening economic crisis that ensued, combined with the declining economic interdependence of the great powers, <a href="http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/022516/economic-conditions-helped-cause-world-war-ii.asp">likely contributed</a> to the outbreak of war in 1939.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, inside the United States, the year 1940 saw the creation of the “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-america-first/514037/">America First Committee</a>,” which opposed entry into the Second World War. This movement attracted supporters of all political stripes and motivations, but some of its leaders were uncomfortably sympathetic with the fascist parties of Europe. It is with this movement that the phase “America first” is most associated today.</p>
<p>Of course, it is no longer the 1930s, and we shouldn’t press the analogy too far. In all likelihood, despite the <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21709028-how-contain-vladimir-putins-deadly-dysfunctional-empire-threat-russia">ominous behavior of Russia</a>, world war is not on the horizon. But this doesn’t mean that adopting a narrow understanding of American self-interest will be any less dangerous for the nation’s (and the world’s) economic future.</p>
<h2>The rise of ‘enlightened self-interest’</h2>
<p>At the end of World War II, when the “America first” rhetoric had been discredited, U.S. leaders set about creating a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Forgotten-Foundations-Bretton-Woods-International/dp/1501704370/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1485551734&sr=8-4&keywords=bretton+woods">new international system</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/neoliberalisms-failure-means-we-need-a-new-narrative-to-guide-global-economy-69096">They envisioned</a> the U.S. as leading a world order that embodied democracy, open trade and growing prosperity. This vision was founded on generous programs such as the Marshall Plan and on institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which morphed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. </p>
<p>Of course, the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Cold-War-New-History/dp/0143038273/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552290&sr=8-1&keywords=cold+war">exigencies of the Cold War</a> led to many abuses and mistakes in the years that followed. But the basic idea that “enlightened self-interest” required an internationalist and benevolent United States ensuring an open, prosperous and democratic world <a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/09/what-trump-is-throwing-out-the-window/">was largely accepted</a>, at least in principle, by both parties. </p>
<p>This consensus found particular resonance in trade as the world shifted in the postwar period from unilateral to multilateral commercial policies. Under the aegis of the GATT/WTO, trade policy came to be set by the give-and-take of international negotiation rather than the individual decisions of national governments. </p>
<p>These international negotiations required that each country <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm">open its domestic markets</a> in return for improved market access abroad. The growing trade openness that resulted from this system <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Capitalism-Fall-Twentieth-Century/dp/039332981X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552358&sr=8-1&keywords=global+capitalism+its+fall+and+rise+in+the+twentieth+century">helped undergird</a> America’s postwar prosperity as well as the economic miracles in Europe and East Asia.</p>
<h2>Trump’s new protectionism</h2>
<p>The administration’s resurrected “America first” rhetoric implies that the internationalism and “enlightened self-interest” that built the postwar order, and that was still recognizable in Obama’s foreign policy, was a gigantic mistake. </p>
<p>Several of Trump’s campaign aides <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/trump-advisers-start-america-policies-nonprofit-45148833">have even used the phrase</a> to christen a new group, “America First Policies,” to advocate on behalf of their new populist vision.</p>
<p>It is a vision that rejects the give-and-take of take of international agreements, the generosity of foreign aid and the conviction that what is good for our friends is good for America. It replaces these ideas with a narrow understanding of self-interest, one that risks exchanging long-run benefits for short-term satisfaction. </p>
<p>Take, for example, the Trump administration’s trade policy. During his first 10 days in office, the president took three extraordinary steps in a protectionist direction. </p>
<p>First, and most significantly, he <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html?_r=0">withdrew</a> the United States from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/tpp-7972">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> (TPP) agreement, formally ending years of U.S. negotiations for expanded markets in Asia. The TPP would have created a free trade zone between the United States and 11 Pacific nations. </p>
<p>It is true that the administration is considering a new <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/japans-abe-to-meet-trump-on-february-10-with-agenda-spanning-security-trade/">bilateral agreement with Japan</a>, the most important of the prospective TPP member states apart from Canada and Mexico, both of which are already in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). </p>
<p>Even so, the strategic fallout from America’s rejection of TPP is likely to be significant. It sends a signal to countries in the region that the U.S. is unwilling to act as a buffer against the economic power of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-will-be-the-winner-if-us-backs-out-of-the-tpp-63328">rising China</a>, quite an ironic message from a president so enamored with <a href="https://www.thestreet.com/story/13953199/1/cramer-trump-s-anti-china-rhetoric-puts-qualcomm-nxpi-deal-at-risk.html">anti-Beijing rhetoric</a>. It also needlessly sacrifices a potentially useful bargaining chip in future negotiations with China. </p>
<p>Second, President Trump threatened to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/26/trump-calls-for-20-tax-on-mexican-imports-to-pay-for-border-wall">slap a 20 percent tariff</a> on Mexico, and possibly on other countries that run a large trade surplus with the United States. This threat, along with others made by Trump’s closest advisers, calls into the question the future of NAFTA, which has ensured open borders in North America for more than 20 years. Trump, for his part, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/trump-renegotiate-nafta/">has promised to renegotiate the trade deal</a> or even pull the U.S. out of it. </p>
<p>While President Trump cannot permanently raise tariffs without congressional approval, he may be able to <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/23/news/economy/trump-tariff-power/">do so temporarily</a>. In the event that he does, Mexico and other countries will certainly retaliate. The resulting trade war could deny America access to foreign markets in a way that we haven’t seen since the end of World War II.</p>
<p>Third, the new administration backed a Republican proposal in Congress that would incorporate “<a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-declares-partnership-with-hill-gop-embraces-tax-proposal">border adjustment</a>” into a broader reform of corporate income taxes. This proposal, while less troubling than the two actions above, could have even longer-term consequences. </p>
<p>To improve the trade balance, the tax reform would allow U.S. companies to write off the value of their exports but would also require them to pay taxes on the inputs that they import. The problem is that this tax reform would likely violate America’s <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/republican-tax-reform-trade-war-232251">WTO commitments</a>, inviting in the process legal action and retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, the president’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/annotating-trump-immigration-refugee-order.html">new executive order</a> on immigration can also be seen as a symptom of “America first” thinking. It exchanges the talents of foreign workers, the goodwill of the Muslim world and the American tradition of nondiscrimination for the elusive promise of increased security. The gains, if any, will be small and temporary, while the <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/30/trump-immigration-ban-could-have-catastrophic-impact-on-us-commentary.html">costs will be much larger</a> and more enduring.</p>
<h2>America first puts America last</h2>
<p>To see what is wrong with Trump’s “America first” economic policy, we need to return to the basics. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://modeledbehavior.com/2010/08/24/consensu-among-economists/">overwhelming majority of economists</a> agree that prosperity requires countries to specialize in what they are good at producing, rather than trying to make and consume everything domestically. And the only way that specialization can work is if countries <a href="https://www.amazon.com/International-Economics-Theory-Policy-Pearson/dp/0133423646/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1485552719&sr=8-1&keywords=krugman+and+obstfeld">trade with one another</a> and also allow a degree of capital and even labor mobility. </p>
<p>Since an open international system requires mutual consent, it also demands that the world’s most powerful country think beyond the moment and make temporary sacrifices to preserve the structure of economic relations that has benefited it so much in the past. And it demands that that country encourage others to remain open, use its foreign aid and internal market to promote development abroad and lead with its ideas. </p>
<p>In this sense, the old internationalism of “enlightened self-interest” is the only real way to put America first. </p>
<p>If the United States reverts to protectionism and isolationism, Trump may find satisfaction in punishing China for its exchange rate policy or in preventing some factories from moving to Mexico. </p>
<p>But the loss of American commitment to economic internationalism will probably signal the demise of the postwar system, a system that may be imperfect but that has brought prosperity and peace to millions. And if that happens, the first victim will be the United States itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71931/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Hankla does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump’s ‘America first’ rhetoric implies that the internationalism and ‘enlightened self-interest’ that built the postwar order was a big mistake. The evidence and basic economics disagree.Charles Hankla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Georgia State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/716892017-01-29T19:01:44Z2017-01-29T19:01:44ZAmerica has never been truly isolationist, and Trump isn’t either<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154498/original/image-20170127-30404-1nhjmig.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Interventionism, not isolationism, is the norm in US foreign policy – and Donald Trump's rise will not change that.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kevin Lamarque</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump is often called an <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-isolationist-temptation-1470411481">“isolationist”</a>. Some commentators argue he has revived a dormant isolationist tradition <a href="http://theweek.com/articles/627638/brief-history-american-isolationism">that goes all the way back to the Revolution</a>. </p>
<p>His slogan “America First”, which featured prominently in his inauguration speech, evokes the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/27/opinions/trump-america-first-ugly-echoes-dunn/">movement of the same name</a> that fought to keep the United States out of the second world war.</p>
<p>Since assuming the presidency, Trump has not backed down from his campaign rhetoric about <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/23/politics/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-withdrawal-trumps-first-executive-action-monday-sources-say/">withdrawing from trade deals</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/europe/donald-trump-nato.html">reconsidering alliances</a>. And there would seem to be no better metaphor for isolation than the promise to build a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/us/trump-mexico-wall.html">“big, beautiful wall”</a> around the country’s borders. </p>
<p>But America has almost never been genuinely isolationist, and Trump isn’t either. Like many political leaders throughout American history, he believes the US needs to rewrite the rules of the international order so it can assume its proper role in the world. That is a role of domination, not withdrawal.</p>
<p>Americans have often felt ambivalent about alliances. The founding fathers saw European alliance systems as outgrowths of the corrupt, princely politics their new republic was rejecting. George Washington warned against permanent alliances in his farewell speech. As president, Thomas Jefferson <a href="http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp">pledged</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This desire to avoid “entanglement” did not mean abstaining from world affairs. Jefferson himself launched America’s <a href="https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/first-barbary-war">first overseas war</a>, against the Barbary States of North Africa that were demanding tribute from American merchant ships. Far from looking inward, Jefferson dramatically expanded the boundaries of the US in 1803 through the <a href="https://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson/louisiana-purchase">Louisiana Purchase</a> from France. </p>
<p>In 1823, President James Monroe set out a <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe">doctrine</a> that reaffirmed American non-involvement in the affairs of European powers. The Monroe Doctrine also prohibited European powers from interfering with the newly independent countries of the Americas, giving the US a free hand to expand further west across North America, dominating commerce and politics throughout the hemisphere.</p>
<p>The southern politicians who controlled US foreign policy before the Civil War <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674737259">sought to protect slavery in other American countries</a>. The Monroe Doctrine became more blatantly imperial in 1904 with the Roosevelt Corollary, under which the US assumed “police power” in Latin America and the Caribbean. President Theodore Roosevelt described his foreign policy as “speak softly, and carry a big stick.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/154137/original/image-20170125-16080-dp6ow0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Theodore Roosevelt and his big stick in the Caribbean.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">By William Allen Rogers Courtesy of Granger Collection</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interventionism is the norm in American foreign policy. Even during the most supposedly isolationist period in American history, the interwar years, American leaders wielded heavy influence in international politics.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.braumoeller.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Myth-of-US-Isolationism.pdf">Bear Braumoeller has shown</a>, while standing formally aloof from the League of Nations, the US orchestrated numerous agreements and conferences on collective security, some of which were temporarily successful. American financial power more than made up for lack of membership in the League, which could do little without it.</p>
<p>Although Americans in the late 1930s were keen to stay out of any looming European war, this was mainly because they underestimated the threat posed by Nazi Germany. After the shocking surrender of France, public opinion quickly swung behind American intervention. </p>
<p>The US has never been opposed to international engagement, or even international co-operation – but it must always be co-operation on American terms. What is novel about Trump is that rather than tearing up rules written by other countries, he is tearing up rules written by his own. </p>
<p>Trump has long believed that the postwar American system of alliances and free trade agreements is too generous to other countries. This is what he means by “America First”. </p>
<p>Trump is famous for changing his politics whenever it suits him, but his attitudes towards foreign policy are quite consistent. In 1987, Trump paid for an open letter in the New York Times, Washington Post and Boston Globe <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/ilanbenmeir/that-time-trump-spent-nearly-100000-on-an-ad-criticizing-us?utm_term=.hnBPAvDb#.llNMNroG">titled</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There’s nothing wrong with America’s Foreign Defense Policy that a little backbone can’t cure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For decades, Japan and other nations have been taking advantage of the United States … The world is laughing at American politicians as we protect ships we don’t own, carrying oil we don’t need, destined for allies who won’t help … Make Japan, Saudi Arabia and others pay for the protection we extend to our allies. Let’s help our farmers, our sick and our homeless by taking from some of the greatest profit machines ever created – machines created and nurtured by us. “Tax” these wealthy nations, not America.</p>
<p>End our huge deficits, reduce our taxes, and let America’s economy grow unencumbered by the cost of defending those who can easily afford to pay us for the defense of their freedom. Let’s not let our great country be laughed at anymore.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thirty years later, the same message was at the core of Trump’s campaign: our leaders have let other countries take advantage of us. </p>
<p>Reading his campaign <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/B015ND2B0K/ref=dp-kindle-redirect?_encoding=UTF8&btkr=1">book</a>, it is striking how directly he attributes his country’s domestic problems to the fact that America doesn’t “win” internationally. Illegal immigration, for example, is not a matter of “a few individuals seeking a better way of life”, but is a way for foreign governments to “get rid of their worst people without paying any price for their bad behavior”.</p>
<p>Trump’s claim that the US has put other countries’ interests ahead of its own may surprise anyone outside the US, but it had a willing audience during the election. He <a href="http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-allies-20160930-snap-story.html">underestimates</a> how much US allies already pay for American protection, but even <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-europe-free-riders/475245/">Barack Obama complained</a> that European countries weren’t paying their fair share in NATO. All four of the top candidates for the presidency ultimately opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/donald-trump-first-orders-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp">Trump has just withdrawn</a> the US.</p>
<p>Trump’s <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/01/trump-u-s-may-get-another-chance-to-take-iraqi-oil.html">repeated claim</a> that the US should have taken Iraq’s oil underscores his <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-limits-trumps-transactional-foreign-policy-18898?page=show">“transactional”</a> approach to foreign policy: if the US is going to be militarily involved in other countries, it should make a profit.</p>
<p>Given that Trump wants a <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/senate-democrats-could-still-thwart-trump-s-military-buildup-plans-1.450410">massive military build-up</a>, and will have to pay for it somehow, this is not likely to result in isolationism. Trump may strip the US of its claims to be a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/23/what-a-trump-doctrine-might-look-like-if-theres-one-at-all/?utm_term=.8256937e84de">“moral superpower”</a>, but it will remain a superpower.</p>
<p>Trump is looking for a pay rise for his country, not a new job for it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has never been opposed to international engagement, or even international co-operation – but it must always be co-operation on American terms.David Smith, Senior Lecturer in American Politics and Foreign Policy, Academic Director of the US Studies Centre, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/719852017-01-26T23:41:15Z2017-01-26T23:41:15ZTrump’s arrival means it’s time for Australia to review our relationship – and perhaps learn to say ‘no’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154489/original/image-20170126-30407-1gtl32o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Trump administration may prove to be a turning point for US-Australian relations.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Kevin Lamarque</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is discovering the political cliché “change the government, change the country” might have bigger implications for Australia’s relationship with the United States than anticipated.</p>
<p>We might re-engineer the cliché to read “change the government, change its foreign policy”, and thus how America manages its relationships with friends and foes alike.</p>
<p>If it has not already dawned on Turnbull and his foreign policy advisers then it should have: a new American administration like no other in recent memory will require a rethink in how Australia calibrates its relations with Washington.</p>
<p>Not since the Gough Whitlam’s Labor government of 1972-75 has such a potentially awkward relationship existed between Australia and its principal ally, or to use another description, custodial power.</p>
<p>Whitlam parted company with his predecessors in his testy interactions with the Richard Nixon White House. Whitlam felt under no obligation to espouse a “pro-American” perspective on matters relating to the war in Indo-China in particular.</p>
<p>Many Australians found this refreshing.</p>
<p>While it was inevitable that a moment would arise when Australian and US interests would find themselves out of kilter, it has perhaps come more quickly than anticipated, driven by the arrival in the White House of a man untethered from principles that have guided American foreign policy for generations.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-election/us-president-donald-trumps-inauguration-speech-transcript-20170120-gtvwes.html">In Trump’s Inauguration speech</a> there was one passage that should have given Turnbull and his advisers pause, even if these words might be dismissed as a rhetorical flourish:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We assembled here today are issuing anew decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land, from this day forward, it’s going to be only American first, America first.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He added: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Protection will lead to greater prosperity and strength.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The latter observation could hardly have been more antagonistic to the free trade principles and practice on which Australian prosperity rests, or for that matter be regarded as anything more than an affront to America’s own history.</p>
<p>In 1930, Congressmen, Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis C. Hawley sponsored legislation that raised punitive tariffs on some 900 imports, and in the process added poison to the well of slowing global trade, <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/12798595">as The Economist put it</a>.</p>
<p>Smoot and Hawley did not cause the Great Depression or add significantly to it, but the legislation represented a populist response to political anxiety.</p>
<p>Nearly a century later, an American president appears to hold the view that an “America first” approach – or a form of isolationism – will serve his own country’s economy well and those of its friends.</p>
<p>This view, even if you accept that the trade liberalisation pendulum has swung too far, is not sustainable if economic growth globally is to be nurtured.</p>
<p>Otherwise, disaster beckons, including a global entrenchment that will serve no-one’s interests, including America’s.</p>
<p>Trump’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-24/trump-withdraws-from-tpp/8206356">stroke-of-a-pen end</a> to America’s involvements in the liberalising Trade Pacific Partnership gave expression to his antagonism towards trade deals generally and spelled a pause in American leadership of a laborious process of opening markets and reducing trade barriers.</p>
<p>From the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs Trade, to the formation of the World Trade Organisation, to progress towards open markets under the Uruguay Round – alongside a plethora of bilateral trade deals – an era of liberalising trade has underpinned global prosperity.</p>
<p>So, the question becomes: how should the Turnbull government respond to these new circumstances in a way that serves Australia’s interests, and in an environment in which the world is in disarray? And it is likely to become more so if the early stages of an idiosyncratic Trump administration is any guide.</p>
<p>Policymakers need to think outside the narrow confines of what has been regarded as “America first” policy postures that have dictated Australia’s foreign policy choices, to consider what might be regarded as a less dependent relationship on our security guarantor.</p>
<p>None of this is an argument to weaken Australia’s commitment to the ANZUS alliance, nor our alignment with what we have always regarded as America’s better angels. But the time has come for a reassessment.</p>
<p>Trump’s ascendancy to power reminds us there is no such thing as permanent alliances, simply permanent interests.</p>
<p>Australia is not obliged to make a choice between its security in the form of its treaty arrangements with the US and its commercial interests, namely with China. But it does need to move to a position where it gives itself more flexibility in addressing its security and other challenges.</p>
<p>In other words, arguments for greater self-reliance – including defence preparedness – grow by the day.</p>
<p>How Turnbull achieves such a shift will prove a test of his diplomatic and leadership skills, and indeed his understanding of our country’s history. After relying on great and powerful friends for our security, we may be entering a new and distinct phase.</p>
<p>Whatever judgements might be made about the likely trajectory of a Trump administration, early days suggest that what he said on the campaign trail will guide his actions in office.</p>
<p>So when he talks about a form of isolationism summed up by the phrase “America First” he must be taken at his word, until demonstrated otherwise.</p>
<p>This poses obvious challenges for Australian policy. Do we gravitate towards the sort of world defined by Trump – with its risks of a return to a 1930’s isolationism or perhaps a form of 19th century mercantilism – or do we assert our own separation from such a worldview?</p>
<p>Are we seeing the end of “pax Americana”, in which the US proved to be the indispensable cornerstone of global security in the rebuilding of Europe, the containment of the Soviet Union, and a security presence in Asia post the Korean war that has enabled an extraordinary economic transformation in our own region to our advantage?</p>
<p>Turnbull needs to ask himself whether it is in Australia’s national interest for institutions like the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to be weakened.</p>
<p>Is it in Australia’s interests for there to be a confrontation between the US and China on trade, or security in the South China Sea?</p>
<p>Or a return to a ground war in the Middle East that would demand a larger commitment from Australia with unknowable consequences?</p>
<p>Lessons might have been learned from an earlier disastrous intervention.</p>
<p>Finally, Turnbull should resist pressure from his the right wing of his party, salivating over the arrival of an authoritarian in the White House.</p>
<p>Turnbull was derided over his initial response to <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/president-donald-trump-signs-order-to-withdraw-from-transpacific-partnership-20170123-gtxb5k.html">Trump’s decision to abandon the TPP</a>, in which he said China may wish to fill the gap as if, reflexively, he needed to fall in line with Washington.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-24/donald-trump-tpp-federal-government/8207250">While the TPP may be dead</a>, Turnbull and his ministers shouldn’t be blamed for trying to keep alive an idea that would have provided a basis for a liberalising trade and investment zone in the Asia-Pacific.</p>
<p>Contrary to the views of its critics, the TPP was always about more than simply a trade liberalisation mechanism. It was also aimed at providing a framework for further action in counterpoint to China’s growing dominance.</p>
<p>Finally, Turnbull might consider the example of former Canadian Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who politely declined when he came under pressure to join George W. Bush’s cavalry in the invasion of Iraq.</p>
<p>Chretien, as leader of a country that shelters under a US security umbrella and is a fellow NATO member, said “no”, or “non” in his native Quebecois.</p>
<p>Last time we checked the sky had not fallen in for Canada.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Policymakers need to think outside the narrow confines of what has been regarded as “America first” policy postures that have dictated Australia’s foreign policy choices.Tony Walker, Adjunct Professor, School of Communications, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.