tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/anc-policy-40516/articlesANC Policy – The Conversation2020-06-25T16:00:32Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1413162020-06-25T16:00:32Z2020-06-25T16:00:32ZSouth Africa’s Freedom Charter campaign holds lessons for the pursuit of a fairer society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/344092/original/file-20200625-33546-11z276w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Frédéric Soltan/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">Freedom Charter</a>, the document that became the blueprint for a free South Africa, turns 65 this year. </p>
<p>It was adopted by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/congress-people-kliptown-1955">Congress of the People</a> in Kliptown, Soweto, on 26 June 1955. The meeting brought together several organisations and individuals allied to the liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC). </p>
<p>Much has been written about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legacy-of-south-africas-freedom-charter-60-years-later-43647">enduring significance of the document</a>. This includes its vision for a just social and economic order, its influence on South Africa’s widely celebrated <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03768350600556570">constitution</a>, and the degree to which changes in the country since the end of apartheid in 1994 have <a href="http://wwmp.org.za/images/pubs/60yrsofFreedomCharter-WEB.pdf">lived up to the ideals</a> of the charter.</p>
<p>Less attention has been devoted to the underlying process of collecting, collating and representing the voices of ordinary South Africans in preparing the Freedom Charter. This article briefly reflects on this process. </p>
<p>It argues that this exercise remains a pioneering effort directed at capturing mass opinion and using it as a broad framework to inform public policy. Every generation of South Africans has its own “Freedom Charter moment”, when fundamental questions are asked about the type of society desired, and the true meaning of freedom. </p>
<p>Today, the Freedom Charter campaign process holds lessons concerning the importance of inclusive, bottom-up governance and active citizenship as the basis for addressing the challenges, needs and aspirations of South Africans across gender, class, generational and other lines. </p>
<h2>Genesis of a vision</h2>
<p>The Congress of the People idea was put forward by <a href="http://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/4181">Professor ZK Matthews</a>, president of the ANC in the Cape, at a provincial conference of the organisation in August 1953. He maintained that <a href="http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/11808/Working%20Paper%20Number%208.pdf">the time had come for</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>convening a national convention, a congress of the people, representing all the people of this country irrespective of race or colour, to draw up a Freedom Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This proposal was adopted, and subsequently endorsed by the ANC national conference in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/42nd-african-national-congress-conference-resolutions-20-december-1953">December 1953</a>. </p>
<p>Planning of the congress campaign was organised through the Congress Alliance, comprising the National Action Council of the ANC, <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03502.htm">South African Indian Congress</a>, <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03464.htm">South African Coloured People’s Organisation</a> and the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv03445/04lv03446/05lv03466.htm">South African Congress of Democrats</a>. </p>
<p>The Congress of the People campaign process was mapped out at a meeting of the alliance in March 1954. This entailed the establishment of provincial committees, followed by committees at workplaces, villages and black urban residential areas, known as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/township-South-Africa">townships</a>.</p>
<p>At the heart of the process was the recruitment of a vast corps of “freedom volunteers” to inspire awareness of the Congress and to collect demands for incorporation into the charter.</p>
<h2>The will of all the people</h2>
<p>In the months that followed, a tide of rallies, meetings, and door-to-door canvassing took place. This led to thousands of public demands</p>
<blockquote>
<p>flooding in to COP headquarters, on sheets torn from school exercise books, on little dog-eared scraps of paper, on slips torn <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=GtWgrbO7CXEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">from COP leaflets</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The demands were written in multiple languages, and varied in style from pithy one-liners to wordier contributions, including the odd essay. Sadly, only a small set of the individual demands have been preserved in archives. </p>
<p>In April 1955, while final logistics for the Kliptown event were under way, the subcommittees of the National Action Committee sorted the multiplicity of demands thematically. A small drafting committee eventually used these materials to prepare the charter. </p>
<p>This document text was hurriedly prepared, primarily by Lionel “Rusty” Bernstein of the South African Congress of Democrats, with the ANC leadership seeing it only on the eve of the Congress of the People. Around 3,000 delegates assembled at the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/congress-people">two-day congress</a>, approving each clause in the charter with a show of hands. The charter was adopted before the apartheid police halted the proceedings. </p>
<p>The Freedom Charter campaign and document have been the subject of <a href="http://wwmp.org.za/images/pubs/60yrsofFreedomCharter-WEB.pdf">wide-ranging, ongoing theoretical and political debate</a>. This has touched on organisational and ideological foundations, interpretive differences on content, as well as the degree to which the public demands are reflected in the final drafting process. </p>
<p>It led to fierce debates between <a href="https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Focus-on-the-Charter_M-Ndletyana.pdf">“Africanists” (African nationalists)</a> in the ANC Youth League and “Charterists”. The former rejected the ANC’s non-racialism and the Freedom Charter, with its assertion that</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/freedomchart/freedomch.html">South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This precipitated the breakaway that culminated in formation of the <a href="https://pac.org.za/about-us/">Pan Africanist Congress</a>, led by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-sobukwe">Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe</a>. </p>
<p>The Freedom Charter, nonetheless, remained a programmatic vision for the ANC for more than 30 years, and continues to have a broad influence on the policies of government, such as those aimed at <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/broad-based-black-economic-empowerment-act">addressing past injustices</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/employment-equity-act">promoting equity</a>. </p>
<h2>Abiding relevance</h2>
<p>The Freedom Charter process was an imperfect but impressive attempt at capturing the will of the people and articulating an alternative vision to apartheid South Africa. The approach, scale and reach of the undertaking during exceptionally fraught times has relevance to contemporary debates about liberal democracy, public opinion and public policy. </p>
<p>From a democratic theory perspective, the Freedom Charter process has abiding relevance. It showcases the importance of ascertaining the pressing needs of citizens, as well as holding the elected to account in responding to the priorities inherent in this <a href="http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/9562/9124.pdf">“public agenda”</a>.</p>
<p>It was ahead of its time: not just from a human rights perspective, but also in capturing the concerns and hopes of the public, and using this to inspire and mobilise for progressive change. </p>
<p>As the late anti-apartheid activist Denis Goldberg said in <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-27-freedom-charter-explained">Freedom Fighter and Humanist</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Freedom Charter was drawn up after about 10,000 meetings with the people of South Africa. It is special because it was not drawn up by a small group of visionaries seeking to impose their ideals. It is an authentic reflection of the views of the mass of the people who wrote down and submitted their wishes for the future of their country… </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The process of preparing the charter resonates well with the unprecedented times South Africans find themselves in. The COVID-19 pandemic will worsen poverty, unemployment, inequality and indebtedness in the country. Now, more than ever, an urgent need exists for robust public engagement and debate around a vision and social compact that will shape the post-COVID society in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Roberts receives funding from various national and international funding institutions for a programme of research on understanding social attitudes in South Africa.</span></em></p>The Freedom Charter process was an imperfect but impressive attempt at capturing the will of the people and articulating an alternative vision to apartheid South Africa.Benjamin Roberts, Chief Research Specialist: Developmental, Capable and Ethical State (DCES) research division, and Coordinator of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194012019-07-03T14:06:26Z2019-07-03T14:06:26ZEvolution of ANC economic policy sheds light on squabble over the central bank<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/281112/original/file-20190625-81762-i8miak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Debate about SA Reserve Bank's mandate must be done in a more considered manner, informed by evidence.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/anc-heavyweights-divided-reserve-bank-mandate">squabble</a> over the mandate of the <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/Pages/default.aspx">South African Reserve Bank</a> has very little to do with real economic policies. It is rather emblematic of the intensely polarised levels of political distrust that currently exists within the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC), the governing party. Compounding the problem is the lack of any coherent grand vision from the post-apartheid leadership of the ANC about the road they wish South Africa to embark on.</p>
<p>The ANC has been largely clear on values and principles (non-racial, democratic, state led, re-distributive) that inform economic policy but short on specific details of what strategies could achieve these. This may have served the ANC well during its years in exile. However, since the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-6-negotiation-transition-and-freedom-chapter-1-transition-context-christopher-saunders">transition</a> to democracy in 1994, the costs of its inability to deliberatively focus on important issues in the economic realm have come back to haunt the party. </p>
<p>Now, as it muddles from one crisis to the next, the various factions of the party will use particular issues on the economy, and everything else from the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-06-09-00-clear-policies-needed-for-effective-land-reform">land issue</a> to the role of the ANC Women’s League, to fight their battles. What should concern all South Africans is the enormous costs this lack of coherence has on the economy – from <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">President Jacob Zuma’s</a> firing of Finance Ministers <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-19-nenegate-the-financial-cost-of-political-uncertainty">Nhanhla Nene</a> and <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2017/03/30/president-jacob-zuma-cabinet-reshuffle-pravin-gordhan-fired">Pravin Gordhan</a>, to the recent squabble, and the Public Protector’s outrageous <a href="http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/443.html">over-reach</a> in her bizarre Absa “findings”.</p>
<h2>Evolution of economic policy</h2>
<p>We have found no evidence of the official ANC policy stance on the Reserve Bank and monetary policy going into the negotiations that delivered the 1994 political settlement. It is mentioned only once. And that is in a administrative sense in the <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">Ready to Govern</a> document the ANC published in 1992.</p>
<p>During the negotiations, the ANC’s stance on an independent central bank seems to have been informed by a visit, among others, to the <a href="https://www.bundesbank.de/en/bundesbank/organisation">German Bundesbank</a> by some members of its Department of Economic Policy. This visit convinced the ANC that support for an independent central bank would buttress the credibility of its economic policy management. For the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/national-party-np">National Party</a>, the objective was to keep what they perceived to be a populist and ‘socialist-inclined’ ANC away from the levers of monetary policy-making.</p>
<p>As it turned out, the sections of the constitution that dealt with the central bank were not debated much during the negotiations because the major parties were in agreement. </p>
<h2>How SARB’s mandate came about</h2>
<p>We do not yet have the official transcripts of what was discussed behind the closed doors of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">CODESA </a>. Such transcripts should shed light on how the decision on the independence of the Reserve Bank was contoured around the economic policy positions of the major parties.</p>
<p>Also noteworthy is the fact that the Constitutional <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Mandate/Pages/Mandate-Home.aspx">clause</a> on the mandate of the Reserve Bank bears an uncanny resemblance to the bank’s 1990 mission statement. This is no coincidence. <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/History/PreviousGovernors/Pages/DrChristianLodewykStals.aspx">Chris Stals</a> who was the Reserve Bank Governor at the time has said that the constitutional clause was drawn directly from the Reserve Bank’s mission statement. </p>
<p>The Reserve Bank’s 1990 mission statement stated that the Bank’s “primary aim was the protection of the internal and external value of the rand”. These words are virtually the same as those which entered the final Constitution in 1996. We understand that the ANC added in words to the effect that the Bank had to carry out its mandate in the interests of “balanced and sustained growth…”. </p>
<h2>Neither balanced nor sustainable</h2>
<p>The notion of ‘balanced growth’ is a curious and largely meaningless turn of phrase that has little or no traction in monetary or economic theory. The only <a href="https://www.economiainstitucional.com/eng/abstracts/rei39.htm">reference</a> we are aware of relates to its use in the early 1950s. That was in the famous debate between economists <a href="https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/65220/">Albert Hirschmann</a> and <a href="https://economicsconcepts.com/big_push_theory.htm">Paul Rosenstein-Rodan</a> about the best route to development for the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia.</p>
<p>To argue that this vague phrase means that the Reserve Bank also has <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/AboutUs/Mandate/Pages/Mandate-Home.aspx">growth mandate</a> is disingenuous. The Reserve Bank has succeeded in its narrow (and narrowing) price stability mandate. But its policy stance has not helped to create sustainable or ‘balanced’ growth, however one interprets the latter. The growth of an economy with such high levels of income and wealth inequality, arguably the highest in the world, as well as unemployment of 40% (by the broader definition) is neither sustainable nor balanced. </p>
<p>We accept that economic reform is not a matter for monetary policy alone. But limiting the role of monetary policy to ensuring price and financial stability doesn’t help either. Added to this is the ruling out of activist fiscal policy because of the pre-occupation with budget deficits. This therefore means that the burden of economic policy reform will have to fall on microeconomic restructuring alone. If that is the position of government, perhaps <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-policy-on-sarb-has-not-changed-20190606">President Cyril Ramaphosa</a> should just say so.</p>
<h2>Historical anomaly</h2>
<p>The ‘ownership’ of the Reserve Bank is not a matter to get ourselves into knots about. That the SARB has private shareholders is an <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/should-central-banks-have-private-shareholders/">anomaly of history</a>. While most central banks established in the early 20th century had private shareholders, most have since changed this to state ownership.</p>
<p>This really is a matter that the ANC should have sorted during the negotiations phase of the transition to democracy but, as we have argued above, there was neither an appetite in the top echelons of the ANC to address this anomaly or related policy matters nor did they apply their minds to that matter in the hurly burly of the CODESA negotiations. </p>
<p>There was an opportunity again to address this in the early 2000s when the Bank came under fire from a group of right wing shareholders hell bent on <a href="https://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/Colleges/CEMS/Journals/SA%20Business%20Review/documents/Sabview_21_Chap1.pdf">gate-crashing</a> the Board and cashing in on the nationalisation of the bank they hoped would follow. It has now become a political football, symbolic of the political fractiousness we are now experiencing.</p>
<p>We would have no problem with, and in fact would strongly support, taking the central bank into state ownership while retaining its operational independence. This will bring it into line with the global norm. But this has to be done at the right time, under the right conditions. </p>
<p>Whatever the debate of the early 1990s may have been, the Reserve Bank was granted operational independence. Tampering with its independence now will be <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/south-africa-reserve-bank-attacks-could-hurt-rating-says-sp-20190607">risky</a> in the extreme, not least in terms of the country’s credit rating. One point worth emphasising is that most independent central banks are also state-owned. But we fear that those in a particular faction of the ANC pushing for the nationalisation of the central bank may have a far more insidious agenda.</p>
<h2>A matter for informed debate</h2>
<p>The issue of the mandate of the Reserve Bank is of course a matter that has been the subject of serious debate. Given the challenges of growth and employment in the economy, it is difficult to sustain the argument that these are entirely irrelevant to the Reserve Bank. On the contrary, any reasonable state would align its policy mechanisms and institutions to its overall economic agenda. </p>
<p>But the debate needs to be held in a more considered manner, informed by evidence. This should include inputs from specialists who understand how financial systems operate and how the economic growth process works.</p>
<p>We would argue that the debate about the mandate of the South African Reserve Bank needs to be located within a clearly articulated political vision and social compact on the transformative good society South Africans aspire to. Such a vision and a social compact have yet to emerge. When they do emerge, they must be accompanied by the mechansims of economic and social policy that will be required to give effect to such a vision.</p>
<p><em>Vishnu Padayachee and Robert van Niekerk are authors of “Shadow of Liberation: Contestation and Compromise in the Economic and Social Policy of the African National Congress, 1943–1996” (Wits University Press, October 2019)</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119401/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vishnu Padayachee. I have over my career received funding from a number of international and national foundations, but none related directly to the research that informed this article in Conversation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert van Niekerk receives funding from national and international organisations and foundations supporting research but this funding has no relevance for the article.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Imraan Valodia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The debate about the mandate of the South African Reserve Bank must be located within a clearly articulated political vision and social compact on the kind of society South Africans aspire to.Vishnu Padayachee, Distinguished Professor and Derek Schrier and Cecily Cameron Chair in Development Economics, School of Economics and Business Sciences, University of the WitwatersrandImraan Valodia, Dean of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the WitwatersrandRobert van Niekerk, Wits School of Governance's Chair in Public Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808412017-07-25T15:14:00Z2017-07-25T15:14:00ZA 10-point plan to accelerate orderly land reform in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179156/original/file-20170721-14731-14fz5gm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Land reform remains a divisive subject 23 years after democracy in South Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A more than 365 year history of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa">colonialism</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">apartheid</a> have indelibly affected land, heritage and human rights in South Africa. </p>
<p>Among the vast array of discriminatory laws was the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/natives-land-act-1913">Land Act of 1913</a> that spatially segregated people through land dispossession. It amplified the vast canyon of inequality, further shattered the social fabric of <a href="http://www.saha.org.za/billofrights/property.htm">communities</a> and radically compromised economic development of the black majority.</p>
<p>It was only after the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">1994 democratic elections</a> that the vast majority of citizens could hope for constitutional restitution of their land.</p>
<p>Significant socio-economic advances have been made <a href="https://www.idc.co.za/reports/IDC%20R&I%20publication%20-%20Overview%20of%20key%20trends%20in%20SA%20economy%20since%201994.pdf">since 1994</a>, but several challenges need to be overcome as indicated by <a href="https://www.idc.co.za/images/2017/IDC_RI_publication_Key-trends-in-SA-economy_31-March-2017.pdf">recent trends</a>. Much more needs to be done. This is particularly true when it comes to land distribution and restitution. </p>
<p>The 2013 state <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Cadastral-Survey-management/Booklet/land%20audit%20booklet.pdf">land audit report</a> illustrates why. By 1994 about 87% of the land was owned by whites and only 13% by black people. By 2012 only 7.95 million hectares had been transferred to black owners through land reform. This represented only 7.5% of <a href="http://www.plaas.org.za/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/No1%20Fact%20check%20web.pdf">formerly white-owned land</a>. </p>
<p>Land reform was discussed with understandable intensity during the recent <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">National Policy Conference</a> of the governing African National Congress. Debates centred on whether land should be <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/more-drama-at-anc-policy-conference-over-land-20170705">expropriated without compensation</a>. </p>
<p>It’s within this context that a <a href="http://nationalforum.nmmu.ac.za/">National Forum</a> was established for dialogues on land reform. The National Forum is made up of a network of organisations that includes three universities, the <a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/">South African Human Rights Commission</a> and <a href="https://www.fhr.org.za/">Foundation for Human Rights</a>. </p>
<p>The National Forum focused on whether it was possible to achieve effective land reform through <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#25">Section 25 of the South African Constitution</a>, which deals with property rights. The National Forum also examined the bureaucratic, legal and constitutional constraints that slow down land redistribution and restitution. It also explored the policy and legislative options necessary to address the complex challenges.</p>
<p>The National Forum concluded that South Africa’s constitution doesn’t stand in the way of land reform. However, it’s clear that <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-problems-lie-in-political-negligence-not-its-constitution-80474">political negligence</a> has fuelled undue bureaucracy, mismanagement and corruption, which have severely hampered meaningful land reform. It reached consensus on a 10-point plan for constitutionally accelerated land reform. The hope is that it can help break the long-standing impasse over land, and move the country toward radically inclusive socio-economic growth. </p>
<h2>Accelerating land reform</h2>
<p>Aspects of the 10-point plan include:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>A human rights approach to land redistribution, grounded in the effective implementation of Section 25 of the Constitution. This could still guarantee a life of dignity, equality and freedom for all citizens. </p></li>
<li><p>Existing land reform legislation is not effectively implemented. The <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/339-land-claim/685-re-opening-of-land-claims#.WW-Xr01f34g">Land Claims Commission</a> and <a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/">Land Claims Court</a>, which were created through the<a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/docs/1994-022.pdf"> Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994)</a>, have not been effective. Unnecessary bureaucratic bungling, significant corruption and limited expert skills have been exacerbated by cadre deployment. This is the practice of appointing party political loyalists to government positions irrespective of ability. In addition, these institutions have yet to be made more accessible and more representative.</p></li>
<li><p>The possibility of adopting further laws to accelerate land reform is not being used. This is the case even though Section 25(8) of the Constitution specifically indicates that it can be done.</p></li>
<li><p>The possibility of repealing existing legislation that’s inconsistent with or hampering land reform is not being pursued. This should be rectified.</p></li>
<li><p>There is a need for national legislation on expropriation. A bill is before Parliament – the <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/b4-2015_150213_edited.pdf">Expropriation Bill</a> – but it’s been introduced late and processed without urgency. The possibility of effecting appropriate amendments to the <a href="http://www.did.gpg.gov.za/Acts/saf9927.pdf">1975 Expropriation Act</a> should also be considered. </p></li>
<li><p>There should be improved communication and coordination between various government departments. Currently, the location of relevant land reform mandates and competencies are spread across several departments. These should be aligned to accelerate the pace of the process.</p></li>
<li><p>A draft bill on cultural and spiritual access to land must be developed to enable citizens’ access to cemeteries and related holy sites where their family members are buried. </p></li>
<li><p>The courts should pronounce on the meaning of “just and equitable” compensation in Section 25 of the Constitution, to provide for better definition and interpretation of this provision within the context of land reform.</p></li>
<li><p><a href="http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/Factsheet_CPAs_Final_Feb2015.pdf">Communal Property Associations</a>, community and traditional leader tensions must be resolved through meaningful engagement. Communication channels must be open, all role-players included and all relevant information made available to every stakeholder. Furthermore, all affected parties must be able to influence the decisions taken. In addition, skills training for officials dealing with land restitution is necessary, whilst an updated land audit is required. </p></li>
<li><p>There is need for a Land and Economy Convention, similar to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">(CODESA)</a>. This was held to negotiate the country’s peaceful transition to democracy. A role for the new convention would be to address poverty, inequality and unemployment. The aim would be to restore citizens’ dignity, strengthen the economy and advance democracy.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>The National Forum envisions the 10-point plan being effected within the context of the country’s <a href="http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf">National Development Plan’s Vision 2030</a>. The plan was drawn up to provide a roadmap for the country to 2030. Its central aims are to reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality. </p>
<p>If land reform is realised, South Africa could present a more humane, just, peaceful, prosperous and democratic face to the world.</p>
<p><em>Key dialogue leaders at the National Forum were:
Retired Justice <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/judge-albert-louis-albie-sachs">Albie Sachs</a>, <a href="http://www.thenewage.co.za/president-zuma-appoints-prof-bongani-majola-chairperson-of-human-rights-commission/">Professor Bongani Majola</a>, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/mathole-serofo-motshekga/">Professor Mathole Motshekga</a>, <a href="http://advocatesgroup21.co.za/staff/la-makua-leks/">Advocate Leks Makua</a>, <a href="http://www.derebus.org.za/retirement-ceremony-of-justice-johann-van-der-westhuizen/">Retired Justice Johan van der Westhuizen</a>, <a href="https://eiuc.org/education/global-campus-regional-masters/university-of-pretoria/programme-director.html">Professor Frans Viljoen</a>, <a href="https://za.linkedin.com/in/victor-mavhidula-544236b6">Victor Mavhidula</a>, <a href="https://za.linkedin.com/in/makgatho-motshekga-35689910a">Makgatho Motshekga</a>, <a href="http://democracyworks.org.za/who-we-are/our-people/associates">Koogan Pillay</a>, <a href="http://saintzadvertising.wixsite.com/hkkinc/elson-kgaka">Elson Kgaga</a> and <a href="https://www.fhr.org.za/index.php/about/staff/">Advocate Hanif Vally</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The South African Human Rights Commission and Foundation for Human Rights have provided support for the National Forum Dialogues. </span></em></p>After South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, the previously oppressed and dispossessed black majority hoped for constitutional restitution of their land. This has largely failed.Quinton Johnson, Campus Principal: Strategic Leadership and Management, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/807052017-07-09T10:59:47Z2017-07-09T10:59:47ZANC policy conference shows shifting balance of power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177427/original/file-20170708-29852-p06zyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Competing to be the next president of South Africa's ANC: Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The media <a href="https://theconversation.com/anc-policy-conference-deeper-polarisation-and-a-stalemate-for-south-africa-80515">reported</a> on the national policy conference of the African National Congress (ANC) through the perspective of power struggles. This wasn’t far off the mark. While the ANC’s internal election campaign for its <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/26/paul-mashatile-confident-anc-will-head-to-elective-conference-united">December conference</a> - at which it will elect a new party leader - has not yet officially opened, in reality its party election campaigns are similar to US primaries, which run for an entire year.</p>
<p>In fact power politics was underway long before the national policy conference <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-30-anc-policy-conference-reporters-notebook-a-frozen-start/#.WV-4CoSGPIU">started</a> just outside Johannesburg on June 30th. Before policy motions were submitted, ordinary members are supposed to seek approval from branches. They then purportedly go to regional and finally provincial policy conferences.</p>
<p>But the reality was much rougher. The <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/06/25/factional-battles-plague-the-anc-in-the-western-cape_a_22980590/">experience</a> in the Western Cape, one of the nine ANC provincial structures, provides a good example. Its provincial policy conference started two hours late, and then had an hour and a half of disguised electioneering <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-02-28-analysts-put-their-money-on-cyril-ramaphosa-winning-anc-leadership-battle/">for Cyril Ramaphosa</a> – the deputy president – complete with rival sing-alongs by some 60 supporters of Ramaphosa and 30 supporters for <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-05-19-00-what-lies-beneath-the-many-faces-of-dr-dlamini-zuma">rival contender</a> Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Next, branch after branch took the floor to complain that they had not been allowed to register for the provincial policy conference. </p>
<p>The Provincial Executive Committee, with observers deployed by the party’s National Executive Committee, explained that the province had only been allocated 155 delegates to the national policy conference. This was less than the number of branches in good standing. (To be in good standing, a branch must have at least 100 paid up members. Only branches in good standing are allowed to send voting delegates to any conference.) So they had selected branches to ensure representation by geography and demographics. After continuing protests, the conference was abandoned without any debate over branch policy motions.</p>
<p>Political contestation likewise preceded – and had an impact on – the national policy conference. The ad hoc action grouping of 101 ANC veterans and stalwarts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-06-29-anc-stalwarts-reject-policy-conference-in-battle-for-heart-of-the-party/">turned down</a> an offer of interceding during the first two days of the conference, partly on the grounds that the delegates would not have been mandated by their branches on how to vote. The veterans had been <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-06-30-zuma-says-anc-veterans-calling-for-him-to-step-down-not-as-strong-as-they-think/">publically criticised</a> by President Jacob Zuma.</p>
<p>And the composition of the national policy conference was altered to allocate double the number of delegates originally designated for both the ANC Women’s League and Youth League. (Between 3 700 to 5 000 delegates <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2017-07-03-branch-members-make-up-two-thirds-of-anc-policy-conference-delegates/">reportedly</a> attended the conference). Since both had publically endorsed Dlamini-Zuma over Ramaphosa, this move tilted the voting power of the rival blocs.</p>
<p>A combination of the pre-conference politicking, plus the machinations just before it met meant heightened tensions between rival factions. Plus eagerness for report-backs to branches.</p>
<h2>Efforts to stop the party splitting</h2>
<p>The media highlighted decisions that were symptomatic of the struggle between the Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma blocs. After debate, Zuma <a href="https://www.enca.com/south-africa/don-t-discard-losing-candidates-at-anc-conferences-zuma">proposed</a> that in the December election for party president, whichever candidate came second should automatically become ANC deputy president. This was proposed as a mechanism to prevent splits in the party as happened in 2008 when <a href="http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/its-not-over-for-cope--willie-madisha">COPE was formed</a>, and then again in 2013 when the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">EFF was set up</a>. </p>
<p>That Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma support this motion indicates that they are uncertain they will win in December.</p>
<p>The media also flagged four motions as examples of the Ramaphosa faction outvoting the Dlamini-Zuma faction: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the defeat of the motion for land expropriation without compensation;</p></li>
<li><p>the Reserve Bank will retain its autonomy entrenched in the Constitution; only its mandate may be revised, and private shareholders nationalised;</p></li>
<li><p>the choice of the slogan “monopoly capital”, not White Monopoly Capital;</p></li>
<li><p>the latest Mining Charter is not endorsed, but needs to be revised.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>This outcome is interesting because it indicates that while Zuma has a voting majority at the national executive committee, he does not have one at the level of the branches. It appears that the cumulative impact of the steady drip, drip of front page <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/longer-walk-corruption">corruption scandals</a>, the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/full-text-constitutional-court-rules-on-nkandla-public-protector-20160331">Nkandla judgment </a>of the Constitutional Court, and the Gupta email leaks, have alienated branches one by one.</p>
<h2>Policy motions</h2>
<p>What are the chances of any of the policy motions agreed at the policy conference being implemented? Common sense is a good guide. Where the relevant cabinet minister strongly opposes any motion, it will not usually survive. On top of this, when the ANC-as-party recommends them to the ANC-as-government, Treasury will speak up on the cost implications. </p>
<p>An example from earlier conferences serves to make the point. More than a decade ago, a conference policy motion urged that school feeding be extended from primary schools to high schools, for a full cooked meal per day. When the motion was finally accepted by the ANC-as-government it had been amended by removing the reference to a cooked meal, and the insertion of the phrase “the progressive realisation of”. And that is what happened.</p>
<p>Now it’s over to the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). When will they hold regular periodic policy conferences to give their grassroots members in branches the opportunity to revise and update party policies?</p>
<p>Where this leaves the country is that there are no major changes in ANC policies. We can expect escalating campaigning by rival ANC factions all the way until the ANC national conference in December. The race is now wide open between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma, with the margin between them both constantly shifting and too close to call.</p>
<p>This in turn could have a major impact on abstentions by voters who previously supported the ANC – or lack of them – in the 2019 general elections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>A combination of politicking ahead of the ANC policy conference, plus the machinations just before it met meant heightened tensions between rival factions.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/806932017-07-09T10:59:36Z2017-07-09T10:59:36ZANC policy anarchy – its leaders are too weak to lead, or too weak to take over<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/177340/original/file-20170707-23720-v9d03h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters expressing their view of President Jacob Zuma's government ahead of the ANC National Policy Conference.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Disputed resolutions, deferred decisions and policy uncertainty were the prime bequests of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/5th-national-policy-conference-2017">policy conference</a> of South Africa’s governing African National Congress to the troubled organisation. Hot on the heels of these incongruities were opaque proposals on how the ANC will act on wobbly state institutions that need to implement policy, and porous pitches on improved ethics and integrity.</p>
<p>Even more, the proceedings confirmed that the ANC leadership is in stalemate. Leadership is in transition and factional leaders lack the authority to steer policy in directions that will address the country’s massive delivery backlog.</p>
<p>To the question: is President Jacob Zuma leading the ANC onto <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-anc-may-be-stumbling-closer-to-its-most-serious-split-yet-80282">a path of implosion</a>, the verdict is a sad but unambiguous “yes”. The conference confirmed that the president and his faction are not letting go – neither of their ambitions to determine Zuma’s successor, nor of their efforts to make <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/radical-economic-transformation-zuma-vs-ramaphosa-20170502">“radical economic transformation”</a> their platform. </p>
<p>The conference confirmed that the ANC recognises that the cancer of corruption and capture afflicts it badly. Yet the organisation remains stunted in finding ways to deal with it. </p>
<p>While the conference opted for unity, it’s a unity that precludes cutting out the cancer because it’s embedded in a faction that’s not budging. It will do everything in its power to retain power. That includes gambling with the conference’s policy outcomes.</p>
<p>The policy conference was, in effect, a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/07/05/zuma-outlines-remedy-to-kill-anc-factions">six-day war over policy</a>. Factional forces manoeuvred relentlessly to secure influence and power. The epitome of this deep factionalism was that Zuma in his closing address put forward a <a href="https://spiritofcontradiction.eu/dara/2013/02/13/war-of-positionwar-of-manoeuvre">“power-sharing” proposal</a>. His intervention tried to influence delegates to campaign for sharing the top ANC leadership positions. But the president’s factional interests meant that his proposal carried little weight.</p>
<p>Affected by the succession campaign, the overall outcome was approximate policy anarchy. It was directed by leaders who were either too weak to lead or too weak to take over. </p>
<h2>Stalemate state of the ANC</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/splash/index">national policy conference </a>, held every five years, is the ANC’s precursor to the December <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">national elective conference</a> that also adopts the final policy resolutions to supplement or substitute previous policy.</p>
<p>The character of the conference itself revealed a great deal about the indecisive and stalemate state of the current ANC. Unlike previous ones, there was no reliable stream of reports containing draft resolutions. And it failed to deliver consensual recommendations on crucial matters. </p>
<p>Several of the media briefings were delayed or rushed due to ongoing contests – some rhetorical, some ideological – between <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2B1377MXGug">factions in commissions</a>. The Secretary General’s <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/own-up-mantashe-warns-those-implicated-in-guptaleaks-20170630">report</a>, which mentioned the problem of how Zuma has allowed the Indian-born Gupta family to wield undue and corrupting influence, was tabled. But it was immediately <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-03-00-pushback-against-sg-report">discredited</a> by the pro-Zuma faction.</p>
<p>Some media briefings, like the pivotal report and proposed resolutions on legislature and governance – which presumably put the spotlight on issues of corruption, capture, and lack of cadre capacity – never happened. The briefing on organisational renewal was largely made up of a shopping list of issues that had been discussed. Very little else. </p>
<p>Policy certainty was a mirage. The best indicators of future policy were to be found in the subtly changing balance of forces in the succession contest for national ANC leadership. This was the price that the ANC and its factions paid for its short-term goal of unity.</p>
<p>The factional struggle was clearest around the battle over the terminology of “radical economic transformation”. Under this umbrella lay issues such as land expropriation, the mining charter and the role of the <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/183925/the-anc-policy-conference-was-never-really-about-the-policy-anaylst/">Reserve Bank</a>. Where resolutions on these matters materialised, such as “monopoly capitalism” winning vis-à-vis “white monopoly capitalism”, the battle was merely deferred. The reported losers proclaimed that party branches, and thereafter the December conference, would be the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Premier-league-coined-by-those-with-political-agenda-Mahumapelo-20151011">next battleground</a>.</p>
<h2>Share of contested positions</h2>
<p>Previous ANC policy conferences have also had their fair share of contested positions. Five years ago the fight between whether South Africa finds itself in a “second transition” or in the “second phase of the transition to a democratic society” was resolved. </p>
<p>Ten years ago the divisive question was whether then president Thabo Mbeki could contest for a third term as ANC president. Opposing factions compromised, deciding that the ANC president should “preferably” only run for <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/53rd-national-conference-resolutions">two terms</a>. This was followed by the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/docs/res/2013/resolutions53r.pdf">Polokwane</a> national conference at which Mbeki lost to Zuma as party leader.</p>
<p>If the ANC still has the power to <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/227503/the-centre-is-holding-gwede-mantashe">self-correct</a> – or ensure that its centre holds – it certainly didn’t show at this recent policy conference. The need to be radical and ensure equity and justice were conflated with the opportunistic appropriation of “radical economic transformation” for factional succession and continued capturist control of the South African state. </p>
<p>A compromise position of “radical socioeconomic transformation” – a long-standing and considered to be sufficient pivot of the ANC’s ideological stance – was announced but rejected by those supporting the president, including some of the so-called <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1280539/the-ancs-cr17-and-premier-league-factions-explained/">Premier League</a> members (a group of provincial party leaders) and the party’s youth and women’s leagues.</p>
<p>This policy conference will be remembered for an ANC in disarray, plagued with internal dissent. It was a policy conference with ambiguous, unresolved policy stances. It ended without a definitive positioning on reconnecting the party with South African citizens and voters. This was the price the ANC paid to keep two powerful factions in the same broad church. </p>
<p>Chances are that the conference exacerbated rather than ameliorated the credibility of the ANC in the eyes of voters. The best hope for this haplessly acting ANC at this stage is not self-correction, but that opposition parties will make mistakes that surpass its own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Susan Booysen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The policy conference of South Africa’s governing ANC will be remembered for a party in disarray, plagued with internal dissent.Susan Booysen, Professor in the Wits School of Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.