tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/arabs-43346/articlesArabs – The Conversation2023-02-21T09:40:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1999972023-02-21T09:40:14Z2023-02-21T09:40:14ZSouth Africa and Israel: new memorial park in the Jewish state highlights complex history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510859/original/file-20230217-16-6qx4p0.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An artist's impression of Gan Siyobonga memorial park in Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Supplied by author</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israeli officials and Jewish South African activists <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-723790">inaugurated</a> a memorial park in Tel Mond, a city north of Tel Aviv, in November 2022. Gan Siyabonga (We Thank You Garden) commemorates several dozen Jewish South African anti-apartheid activists who had personal connections to Israel. </p>
<p>The main sponsors of Gan Siyabonga are the <a href="https://www.jnfsa.co.za/">Jewish National Fund South Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.sazf.org/">South African Zionist Federation</a>. The park’s creation is a milestone in the South African Jewish community’s decades-long introspection into its complex relations with the apartheid regime. </p>
<p>This memorial site is unique in Israel, where an <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-south-africa-home-white-colonialists">estimated</a> 20,000 South Africans live.</p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is the first site in Israel to highlight the involvement of Jews in the anti-apartheid struggle. It is also unique because it calls attention to a group that was both anti-apartheid and pro-Zionist, or at least not anti-Zionist. The combination is considered unconventional today. That’s because <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zionism">Zionism</a>, the political ideology that favours a Jewish state, is largely associated in South Africa with collaboration with apartheid and the oppression of Palestinians. </p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is a reminder that relations between Zionism and apartheid, and between Israel and South Africa, were complex and multilayered. In the last few years I have been working on a PhD dissertation that explores this complexity. Digging into archives and historical periodicals revealed a fascinating story that defies some assumptions. </p>
<h2>Israel’s troubled relations with apartheid</h2>
<p>Israel is commonly remembered as one of the last allies of apartheid South Africa. From the mid-1970s, the Israeli government maintained <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/unspoken-alliance-israels-secret-relationship-apartheid-south-africa-sasha-polakow-suransky">close relations</a> with the minority white regime in Pretoria. </p>
<p>It was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/09/17/israel-imposes-sanctions-on-south-africa/70cbb4f4-77b9-4898-8df7-dc39c2c5a500/">last countries</a> to enforce full sanctions on Pretoria. As a result, many anti-apartheid activists, including Jewish ones, held fierce anti-Zionist stances. These were amplified by the strong alliances South African liberation movements forged with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/history-may-explain-south-africas-refusal-to-condemn-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-178657">Soviet Union</a> and the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220609-the-plo-at-58-and-the-anc-at-110-how-they-evolved-and-where-do-they-stand-today/">Palestinian Liberation Organisation</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-push-led-by-south-africa-to-revoke-israels-au-observer-status-is-misguided-168013">Why the push led by South Africa to revoke Israel’s AU observer status is misguided</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">accusation</a> that Israel practises apartheid-like policies against Palestinians is another reason Israel hasn’t been seen as anti-apartheid. Recent anti-Zionist rhetoric by some Jewish veterans of the South African struggle, such as <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2021/05/17/how-stop-apartheid-israel">Ronnie Kasrils</a>, strengthened this feeling of unbridgeable contradiction between Israel and anti-apartheid values.</p>
<h2>Support for Israel</h2>
<p>But anti-apartheid activism and Zionism were not always in conflict. Up until the late 1960s, many radical anti-apartheid activists were sympathetic towards Israel and Zionism’s more progressive strands.</p>
<p>In 1948, most radical activists in South Africa supported the establishment of the State of Israel and its war against the invading Arab armies in Palestine. <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/362107/pdf">The Guardian</a>, the main radical weekly in South Africa at the time (linked to the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a>), rooted for an Israeli <a href="https://twitter.com/AfrIsrRel/status/1626615101770936322">victory</a>. </p>
<p>Young Israel was a symbol of opposition to racial persecution and fascism. Those two themes strongly resonated with South African anti-apartheid activists. They tended to see the Afrikaner <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Party-political-party-South-Africa">National Party</a> as an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02582473.2021.2009014?tab=permissions&scroll=top">ideological relative</a> of the Nazis. </p>
<p>The initial <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/martinkramer/files/who_saved_israel_1947.pdf">Soviet support for Israel</a>, and a prominent socialist element within Zionism, also contributed to these feelings, especially among South African Marxists.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-search-of-advantages-israels-observer-status-in-the-african-union-165773">In search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union</a>
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<p>From the late 1950s, many anti-apartheid activists cherished Israel’s stances against South Africa <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/132/559/1440/4831456">at the United Nations</a>. Similarly its <a href="https://www.academia.edu/90295451/_We_Are_Returning_to_Africa_and_Africa_is_Coming_Back_to_Us_Israels_Evolving_Relations_With_Africa">support for decolonisation</a> in Africa. By the early 1960s, Israel had become the most anti-apartheid country in the “western” camp of the Cold War. In 1963, it <a href="https://www.jta.org/archive/south-african-premier-attacks-israel-for-recall-of-envoy-israel-mum">recalled its envoy</a> and supported international sanctions against South Africa. Israeli archives contain many <a href="https://twitter.com/AfrIsrRel/status/1524773424324923393">letters</a> from South African liberation movements <a href="https://www.archives.gov.il/archives/Archive/0b071706800399c8/File/0b071706804bc4fc">thanking Israel</a> for its support at the UN and elsewhere. </p>
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<img alt="An old typed letter signed by an ANC official praises Israel" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510860/original/file-20230217-22-kdw80u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Letter from ANC officials praising Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Israel State Archive</span></span>
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<p>During the 1960s, Israel offered covert material support to anti-apartheid groups, perhaps even <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2013-12-20/ty-article/.premium/mandela-and-the-mossad/0000017f-e66d-dc7e-adff-f6eda1960000">to Nelson Mandela</a>. Israeli experiences inspired the early stages of uMkhonto we Sizwe, the African National Congress’ (ANC) military wing, for example through <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/arthur-goldreich">Arthur Goldreich</a>. It also had stable communication channels with the <a href="https://www.archives.gov.il/archives/Archive/0b0717068031bdef/File/0b0717068062f0ae">Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania</a>. </p>
<h2>Post-1967</h2>
<p>Sympathy towards Israel diminished considerably after the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4325413">Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973</a>. But relations between anti-apartheid activism and Zionism remained complicated.</p>
<p>Many Jewish individuals who joined the struggle against apartheid had been active in Zionist youth movements. The socialist-oriented <a href="https://habonim.org.za/">Habonim</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Shomrim_in_the_Land_of_Apartheid.html?id=ZMltAAAAMAAJ">Hashomer Hatzair</a> stand out. Those who joined the anti-apartheid struggle (such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Slovo_the_Unfinished_Autobiography.html?id=9QxzAAAAMAAJ">Joe Slovo</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Revolutions_in_My_Life.html?id=vQYwAQAAIAAJ">Baruch Hirson</a>) typically abandoned Zionism. But they acknowledged its role in forming their radical worldview.</p>
<p>Jewish South African individuals were prominent in the liberal strand of the anti-apartheid struggle too. They usually used their professional skills to challenge the apartheid regime. Lawyers like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/advocate-israel-isie-aaron-maisels">Isie Maisels</a>, parliamentarians like <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/helen-suzman">Helen Suzman</a>, journalists like <a href="https://southafrica.co.za/benjamin-pogrund.html">Benjamin Pogrund</a>, and rabbis like <a href="https://www.sajr.co.za/rabbi-ben-isaacson-a-maverick-soul-finds-rest/">Ben Isaacson</a> were examples. Jewish liberal activists usually expressed support for Israel in various ways.</p>
<p>Developments since the mid-1970s have largely overshadowed the complex history of Zionism’s engagement with the apartheid regime. The anti-apartheid struggle became tightly associated with the Palestinian struggle. And, after its rise to power in 1994, the ANC reaffirmed its commitment to its Palestinian allies.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>Since then, relations with Israel have largely remained chilly. The ANC <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/news/s-africas-ruling-party-anc-reaffirms-boycott-israel-resolution">supports</a> the movement to boycott Israel and Pretoria <a href="https://thewire.in/external-affairs/south-africa-israel-anc">downgraded</a> its representation in the Jewish state. South African foreign affairs minister Naledi Pandor has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/bds-threat/article-713140">called</a> for Israel to be declared an “apartheid state”. </p>
<h2>A step in the right direction</h2>
<p>Israel and South Africa’s Jewish communities have a long and ambiguous history of entanglement with race politics. There were admirable moments in this history. But there were also periods of complicity with racism. In Israel, both sides of this history are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Gan Siyabonga is an important first step in placing this history in the Israeli public sphere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199997/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asher Lubotzky does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gan Siyabonga is unique in Israel. It highlights a group that was both anti-apartheid and pro-Zionist.Asher Lubotzky, PhD Candidate, History, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1829802022-05-27T16:44:29Z2022-05-27T16:44:29ZThe Tinderbox: why I disagree with the view of history in this documentary on the Israel-Palestine conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465798/original/file-20220527-13-funzwh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C991%2C568&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jerusalem, the city that is sacred to Jews, Christians and Muslims.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/wailing-wall-mousque-alaqsa-dome-rock-138993065">S1001/Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When filmmaker Gillian Mosely, a Jewish Anglo-American, decided to make a documentary examining the question of belonging and home in the <a href="https://www.seetheholyland.net/what-is-this-holy-land/">Holy Land</a> – the coastal strip that stretches from Syria to Egypt, with Israel in the centre – she believed she understood the roots of the current <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343301038003006?casa_token=DXVGZXaATvAAAAAA:1Ep8bZfQEzmTn4CLujfF5B2NHI0V9ISfPJHM6VLAvlC_lcxVVjfAOAINPL8xUXXo05-HDWPaHlJKqw">Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Like many, she thought the conflict began when the state of <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/state-of-israel-proclaimed">Israel came into existence</a> in 1948 following the United Nations’ decision to <a href="https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/resolution_181.pdf">partition the land</a> to give Jews a homeland following the horrors of the <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-was-the-holocaust">Holocaust</a>.</p>
<p>Mosely’s film, <a href="https://thetinderboxfilm.com/">The Tinderbox</a>, combines personal interviews with historical evidence and jumps between events from the past to the present in its search for an answer. Mosely interviewed people on both sides, asking how and why the conflict started and how it affects the lives of people today.</p>
<p>Critically, Mosely learned that the roots of the conflict actually took hold long before 1948. She attributes this lack of knowledge to her education and what she had been told by her family as she grew up. </p>
<p>Her conclusion is that the catalyst for the conflict was Britain and the promises it made as part of a <a href="https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/6/23/lessons-from-bismarck-for-twenty-first-century-competition">power play</a> during and after the first world war, when, desperate for allies, it committed to Arab independence. But how does this explanation stack up historically?</p>
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<h2>History of a troubled land</h2>
<p>Before 1948, the land between Lebanon in the north and Egypt in the south was known as <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/palestine#:%7E:text=Throughout%20history%2C%20Palestine%20has%20been,ruled%20much%20of%20the%20region.">Palestine</a>. The area was predominantly Arab and had been ruled by <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/palestine">numerous entities</a> over the centuries, the last of which were <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/history2/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-i-1917-1947/#Origins_and_Evolution_of_the_Palestine_Problem_1917-1947_Part_I">the British</a>, who assumed control over the area following the fall of the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/ottoman-empire#:%7E:text=The%20Ottoman%20Empire%20was%20one,for%20more%20than%20600%20years.">Ottoman Empire</a> in 1917.</p>
<p>During the first world war, the British favoured the Arab population, seeking support in their campaign against German expansion in the Middle East. But towards the end of the war, they switched their favour towards the Jewish population. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41765892">Balfour Declaration</a> of November 1917 promised them a home in that same land. </p>
<p>In 1920 the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Conference-of-San-Remo">San Remo Conference</a> awarded the British a <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/british_mandate_for_palestine#:%7E:text=The%20British%20army%20ruled%20Palestine,by%20the%20League%20of%20Nations.">mandate to control Palestine</a> both internationally and on behalf of the inhabitants. But tensions grew, leading both Arabs and Jews to turn against the British. </p>
<p>They, in turn, decided the mandate was too costly and turned to the US and the UN for a solution. <a href="https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/resolution_181.pdf">UN General Assembly resolution 181</a> divided Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian areas. The Jewish representatives accepted the decision and, on May 14, 1948, declared a state on their portion of the land.</p>
<p>The Arabs refused to accept this, and <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war">war broke out</a> when the armies of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia joined local Palestinian forces in attacking the nascent state. In February 1949, formal armistice lines, known as “<a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/the-green-line">the green line</a>” were agreed between Israel and its neighbours, with Israel gaining more territory than was originally granted to it by the UN partition plan. </p>
<p>Ever since, Israel has continued to expand its hold over the land, to the detriment of Palestinians. Some areas such as the Sinai peninsula, Gaza, parts of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights were won over by Israel in the numerous wars since independence. </p>
<p>East Jerusalem and the West Bank remain the main areas of dispute. The international community and Palestinians argue that these are occupied territories and Israel <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-ban-on-israeli-settlements-could-be-a-game-changer-16158">builds settlements illegally</a> there. Israel claims that the specific territory was not under any sovereign power before 1967 and therefore it is disputed territory rather than occupied land. It is <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/middleeast-resolution338">agreed</a> that the final status of the land would be determined by direct negotiation between the parties. </p>
<h2>One woman’s perspective</h2>
<p>If you are interested in the history of the Middle East, in the Israel-Palestine conflict, or in the impact of colonialism on current world politics, The Tinderbox attempts to provide a balanced review of this history and covers key moments in the region without determining who was right or wrong.</p>
<p>Mosely offers a fresh look at several key issues pertinent to the conflict: the problems of misinformation, disinformation and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/09/world/middleeast/israel-palestinian-violence.html">growing extremism</a> within the two communities that can be partly attributed to the “enforced separation that fuels mistrust and fear”, as Mosely rightly observes. The film ends on an optimistic note while stressing the necessity of dialogue and empathy towards the other. </p>
<p>Should you watch The Tinderbox? Absolutely. But also keep in mind it is a deeply personal quest for answers by a Jewish woman who does not live in Israel. As an academic who has studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its origins, in my view the film makes some mistakes with the way it recounts history. </p>
<p>While I agree that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23525764?seq=1">British imperialism</a> played a significant role in the history of the region, there are many other reasons for the situation today. Using the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1464884918791219?casa_token=JIPXnOKJZLMAAAAA:rnyo_Qslzf249Ww2-80T9x4Y6snGI1-CtJJ6Qhufts3_GLu4yulyMrO-9mbN4fYP316N-16ui-4PWw">language of blame</a> – especially towards a third party – is unhelpful in transforming any conflict’s dynamics as it shifts focus away from how the disputing sides can take responsibility for their own contributions. </p>
<h2>Questioning the narrative</h2>
<p>There are times in The Tinderbox when I believe the facts are seen in such a way as to fit a specific narrative. For example, the map below, displayed in the film to show the distribution of the populations over the years, is <a href="https://www.polgeonow.com/2021/05/israel-palestine-control-map-west-bank-areas-gaza.html">inaccurate</a>. It attributes Israel more land than it holds in reality and does not reflect the rule the Palestinian Authority has over specific areas. </p>
<p>The film also appears to overlook several facts, such as the UN decision to give Israel state status at the same time the Palestinians were offered a state, too. The Palestinians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-abbas-idUSTRE79R64320111028">refused the resolution</a>, claiming it was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ajinde-Oluwashakin/publication/315646381_Geopolitical_Conflicts_The_Case_of_Israeli_-_Palestinian_Conflict_1947_-_2012/links/5d528448a6fdcc85f88db074/Geopolitical-Conflicts-The-Case-of-Israeli-Palestinian-Conflict-1947-2012.pdf">unjust</a> given their hold over the land, their history in the area and their proportion of the population.</p>
<p>The film brushes over the long history of the two communities prior to the arrival of the British. Though they may have been far fewer in numbers, not all Jews left the region in Roman or Babylonian times as the film suggests. </p>
<p>Some Jewish communities have continuously existed there – peacefully or not – throughout history. Clashes between the communities, including <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ooUqc8snyZUC&oi=fnd&pg=PP7&dq=related:y3G8O5HuVR4J:scholar.google.com/&ots=2HxfZfopbe&sig=-RhKoND89ykjNv0XuDBhDi9YYbQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">massacres and campaigns</a> of violence, happened long before the British ever set foot in the area. </p>
<p>The documentary also fails to give Arab Israelis due attention – the communities of Arabs (whether Muslim, Christian or other) who comprise almost <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1267491/total-population-of-israel-by-population-group/">20% of the Israeli population</a>. This further skews the narrative offered, and is unhelpful for the promotion of a meaningful dialogue between the communities over the future of the land. </p>
<p>The Tinderbox is an interesting watch, but one that does not dig deep enough into the relevant and timely questions of the conflict, or help us imagine a better future of shared existence and peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronit Berger Hobson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new documentary looks at the enduring conflict, examining its origins and the impact on people’s lives on both sides.Ronit Berger Hobson, Lecturer Politics and International Relations, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1829932022-05-16T19:47:39Z2022-05-16T19:47:39ZWhat is the Lag BaOmer pilgrimage?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463340/original/file-20220516-20-ua0k96.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=120%2C10%2C6579%2C4436&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ultra-Orthodox Jews gather at the gravesite of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai at Mount Meron in northern Israel on April 29, 2021, as they celebrate the Jewish holiday of Lag BaOmer.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ultra-orthodox-jews-gather-at-the-grave-site-of-rabbi-news-photo/1232595538?adppopup=true"> Jalaa Marey/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The annual Lag BaOmer pilgrimage to Mount Meron in Israel – which in 2022 falls on Wednesday night, May 18 – until recently has attracted as many as half a million visitors every year. The annual gathering, which takes place at what is believed to be the gravesite of the second-century Talmudic sage <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520221123/defenders-of-the-faith">Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai</a>, is by far the largest Jewish pilgrimage in modern times. </p>
<p>In 2021, at least 45 people – <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-killed-in-stampede-at-israeli-religious-festival-11619748818">mostly ultra-Orthodox Jews, known as “Haredim” in Hebrew – died</a> in a stampede when <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/110-years-ago-100-people-fell-from-a-balcony-at-mt-meron-11-were-killed">over 100,000 people</a> gathered in a space meant for only 15,000. </p>
<p>This year, Israeli authorities have <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/admission-tickets-among-changes-for-lag-bomer-at-mt-meron-a-year-after-disaster/">imposed strict new rules</a> to control the crowd. </p>
<p>I have participated twice in the pilgrimage – once in 1994 as a newly observant Jew seeking religious meaning, and again in 2001 as a <a href="https://jewish.cofc.edu/documents/jewish-studies-faculty-and-staff-bios/joshua-shanes,-associate-director.php">scholar of Jewish history</a>. What fascinates me about this pilgrimage is the way it weaves together Jewish mysticism, folk practices and modern-day nationalism. </p>
<h2>Early history</h2>
<p>The Jewish practice of worshipping at the graves of holy men is at least a thousand years old. Many Jews – particularly those whose ancestry comes from the Arab world, called “Mizrahim” or “Sephardim” – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/640490">believe that these saints can act as their advocates</a> in the “celestial court.” They pray at their gravesites for everything from children to good health to a livelihood. </p>
<p>The pilgrimage to Meron, in the hills of the Galilee near Safed in the northern part of Israel, <a href="https://seforimblog.com/2011/05/printing-mistake-and-mysterious-origins/">initially focused on the graves of other holy figures</a> said to be buried there, particularly the early rabbinic sages Hillel and Shammai, whose debates on Jewish law helped lay the foundation for rabbinic Judaism 2,000 years ago. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Jews-of-Spain/Jane-S-Gerber/9780029115749">Jewish expulsion from Spain in 1492</a>, Safed grew into an important center of Jewish mysticism, <a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/kabbalah-a-very-short-introduction-9780195327052?cc=us&lang=en&">known in Hebrew as Kabbalah</a>. The most important and influential of these mystics was the 16th-century scholar Isaac Luria, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=1174">whose innovative teachings</a> transformed Judaism and changed the course of Jewish history. Under his influence, the focus of the Meron pilgrimage shifted to Shimon, whose burial place was among the many such graves of ancient rabbis that Luria <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=1174">“identified” with supernatural guidance</a>. </p>
<p>Shimon is by tradition credited with the composition of the Zohar, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=6634">the core text of all subsequent Jewish mysticism</a>, though scholars have determined it was actually composed in 13th-century Spain. </p>
<p>Sixteenth-century mystics, and the Jews who follow in their footsteps, are thus particularly interested in connecting to him. They are especially interested in doing so on the anniversary of his death, the day on which the Zohar states he revealed the deepest secrets about God, and pilgrims expect to experience a taste of that revelation. Since at least the <a href="https://seforimblog.com/2011/05/printing-mistake-and-mysterious-origins/?fbclid=IwAR2jQqJFvOdpZl_JuiIlZia5MJR1gyvHrFqiiRkiYmgJkBMMwRKEzP4sjy8">18th century</a>, Jews have widely recognized that date as the holiday of Lag BaOmer.</p>
<h2>The pilgrimage</h2>
<p>The Hebrew name of the holiday Lag BaOmer refers to its date in the Jewish calendar: the 33rd day of the ritual to “Count the Omer.” During this period, observant Jews count the 50 days from the holiday of Passover, which commemorates the exodus from Egypt, to the holiday of Shavuot, commemorating God’s revelation and giving of the <a href="https://www.ou.org/judaism-101/glossary/torah/">Torah</a>, the Jewish holy canon. </p>
<p>These seven weeks of the Omer are traditionally days of mourning, commemorating the death of 24,000 students of the <a href="https://www.ou.org/holidays/expressions_of_mourning_in_sefirat_haomer/">great sage Rabbi Akiva</a> in the second century from a plague, seen as a punishment by God. Only five people survived, including Shimon. Haircuts, music, weddings and all celebrations are prohibited during that seven-week period. </p>
<p>On Lag BaOmer, the restrictions are lifted in accordance with the tradition that on this day the plague ended. <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520221123/defenders-of-the-faith">Mystical tradition credits this to Shimon’s death</a>, which was understood as having the power to eradicate the decree of the plague. According to that tradition, Shimon instructed that the day of his passing be celebrated rather than mourned, and thus was born the celebration we know today.</p>
<h2>Rituals and prayers</h2>
<p>In the 20th century, even before the founding of Israel, the Lag BaOmer pilgrimage to Meron grew into a mass event.</p>
<p>Pilgrims light bonfires symbolizing the light of Torah revealed by Shimon, or perhaps the literal fires that the Zohar states surrounded him at the moment of his death. In fact, they are lit not only at Meron, but throughout Israel and the world. </p>
<p>For some secular Zionists it evokes not Shimon Bar Yochai but instead Shimon Bar Kosiba, known as <a href="https://web.nli.org.il/sites/NLI/English/digitallibrary/gallery/yearly_cycle/lag_baomer/Pages/lag-baomer.aspx">Bar Kochba, who led a rebellion of Jews in Judea against the Roman Empire</a> that occurred around the same time. For over a century, the <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo3641233.html">Zionist movement has glorified</a> that rebellion for its military heroism, despite Bar Kochba’s ultimate crushing defeat.</p>
<p>The earliest pilgrims to Meron <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/640490?seq=1">were mostly Moroccan Jews</a> who arrived in Israel intent on continuing their tradition of graveside visits to saints, convinced of the possibility of magical remedies and blessings through their holy intervention.</p>
<p>Many pilgrims to Meron celebrate the kabbalistic custom there of giving a boy his first haircut, leaving the sidelocks, at 3 years of age. In recent years, ultra-Orthodox Jews of European ancestry – especially Hasidim – have increasingly dominated the site, although all sectors of Jewish society are represented there. </p>
<p>The pilgrimage is one of the only truly widespread expressions of folk religion in Judaism today. As anthropologist <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0228.xml">Edith Turner</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501726033-011">wrote in her classic essay on Meron</a>, pilgrims come to Meron with deep faith in its power to bring blessings to them.</p>
<p>The celebration is an intense, highly packed event that offers participants an ecstatic experience of communing with God in a collective of tens or even hundreds of thousands of fellow Jews. </p>
<p>I can certainly attest to this effect. In 1994, at the start of my journey into Orthodox Judaism, I joined the Lag BaOmer pilgrimage to Meron. At that time, the festival hosted many Moroccan Jews, who camped outside the main grounds. Several among them had live animals ready to be slaughtered and eaten to celebrate their sons’ first haircuts. The Ashkenazic Hasidic Jews – <a href="https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Hasidism">sects of Jews from Eastern Europe</a> deeply influenced by Jewish mysticism and devoted to their leaders – dominated the inner spaces of the compound. </p>
<p>Everywhere I walked, people offered me free drinks, convinced of the promise that it would bring blessings to their family. Meanwhile, gender-segregated crowds <a href="https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1387837918132195330">sang and danced in unison</a> for hours into the night, creating a palpable sense of euphoria and connection to a collective eternity. Some of us pushed inside to approach the gravesite and prayed for blessings of success, while others pushed to reach closer to the bonfires. </p>
<p>There were several fires, each representing a different Jewish community, although by custom the main fire is lit by the head of the “Boyan” Hasidim, so called because their leaders originally lived in the city of Boyan in Ukraine. It was in the <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/what-is-toldot-aharon-hassidic-sect-whose-members-were-killed-at-meron-666808">area of a different Hasidic group, known as Toldos Aharon</a>, that the tragedy on April 30, 2021, occurred. This group <a href="https://twitter.com/moshe_nayes/status/1387889426412544014">can be seen dancing</a> in 2021, just before the tragedy. </p>
<p>By the time I returned in 2001, I had become a full-fledged Hasid myself and was living in Betar Illit, a massive Haredi settlement south of Jerusalem. I recall far fewer Moroccan families camping in tents. But the number of Haredim, joined by Sephardim, modern Orthodox and even secular pilgrims, seemed to have exploded, serving to enhance that sense of eternal community, of Jewish connection across time and space. </p>
<p>I have long since left that Hasidic world, for a variety of reasons. But I do not for a moment discount the very real experience of divinity and eternity enjoyed by Meron pilgrims, and their deep need to return to it each year. </p>
<h2>Political overtones</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded men dressed in black and wearing wide-brimmed black hats walk amid a sea of gravestones." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399050/original/file-20210505-23-1j7g7o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ultra-Orthodox Jews attend a funeral at Segula cemetery in Petah Tikva on April 30, 2021, for one of the victims of the Meron stampede.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ultra-orthodox-jews-attend-the-funeral-of-one-of-the-news-photo/1232607694?adppopup=true">Gil Cohen Magen GIL /AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The events leading up to the deadly stampede of 2021 need to be viewed in context of Haredi society in Israel – <a href="https://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/Haredi_Jews_around_the_world.Final.May_2022.pdf">today over 14% of the Jewish population, but growing rapidly</a> – and the power wielded by its leaders. Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-meron-calamity-haredim-question-the-price-of-their-own-autonomy/">granted Haredim extensive autonomy</a> in their education system, military deferments, welfare funding and more. Israel’s parliamentary system, which offers small political parties disproportionate power, has <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/an-israeli-irony-status-quo-erodes-as-haredi-political-power-increases-668034">carefully protected and expanded that autonomy</a> </p>
<p>As a result, Haredi leaders have successfully fought enforcement of government oversight and safety regulations, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/17/world/middleeast/israel-orthodox-jews-haredim.html">from COVID-19 restrictions</a> to the Meron festival. <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-meron-calamity-haredim-question-the-price-of-their-own-autonomy/">Countless officials</a> had warned that Meron was a disaster waiting to happen. But on the eve of Lag BaOmer last year, Aryeh Deri, then interior minister and leader of the Sephardic (and Ultra-Orthodox) Shas party, said Jews “should trust in Rabbi Shimon.” “This is a holy day, and the largest gathering of Jews [each year].” “Bad things,” <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-meron-calamity-haredim-question-the-price-of-their-own-autonomy/">he promised</a>, “don’t happen to Jews on religious pilgrimage.” </p>
<p>Similar sentiments were <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-leading-rabbi-thinks-not-studying-torah-is-more-dangerous-than-coronavirus-1.8677335">voiced by Haredi leaders</a> when they prematurely opened their schools in 2020, promising that Torah study would hold the plague at bay. </p>
<p>One hopes that the Haredim and other Israelis will accept government oversight and limits at the site imposed in 2022. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article <a href="https://theconversation.com/lag-baomer-pilgrimage-brings-orthodox-jews-closer-to-eternity-i-experienced-this-spiritual-bonding-in-years-before-the-tragedy-160149">first published on May 7, 2021</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Shanes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Jewish history explains why the annual Lag BaOmer pilgrimage to Mount Meron in Israel has such power and meaning.Joshua Shanes, Associate Professor of Jewish Studies, College of CharlestonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1620602021-06-09T14:35:02Z2021-06-09T14:35:02ZUncovering anti-Blackness in the Arab world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404918/original/file-20210607-28202-17te7ea.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=18%2C23%2C3107%2C2071&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Black people constitute a significant percentage of the global Arab population.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Brett Jordan/Unsplash)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Black Arabs are underrepresented and largely invisible in “white” Arab-dominated countries, <a href="https://csalateral.org/forum/cultural-constructions-race-racism-middle-east-north-africa-southwest-asia-mena-swana/introduction-el-zein/">and excluded from political, academic, artistic and religious institutions</a>. “Black” and “Arab” are not mutually exclusive: some Black people are Arab and some Arab people are Black. </p>
<p>As an Arab intellectual in the West (I’m an Arabic language and literature professor at the University of Waterloo), speaking out on anti-Blackness in the Arab world has placed me in a critical position.</p>
<p>Until recently, anti-Blackness has been a taboo topic within Arab society. In 2004, this began to change when Bahraini cultural critic Nader Kadhim published <a href="https://www.almadasupplements.com/view.php?cat=7831"><em>Representations of the Other: The Image of Black People in the Medieval Arab Imaginary</em></a>. I am currently translating the book into English to raise awareness in the West about anti-Blackness in the Arab world.</p>
<p>Anti-Blackness in the Arab world exists within a global context. The Black Lives Matter movement spread worldwide after the death of George Floyd, and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2020/0622/Voicing-solidarity-against-US-racism-Arabs-expose-scourge-at-home">Black Arabs connected with the movement as an opportunity to shed light on the oppression they face daily</a>.</p>
<h2>Roots of Arab racism</h2>
<p>Kadhim coined the term <em>al-istifraq</em>, or Africanism, to refer to perceiving, imagining and representing Black Arabs as a subject of study in Arabic writings. His book underlines the core elements that characterize the discourse of representing Black Arabs in Arab culture. </p>
<p>The underpinnings of Africanism in classical and Medieval Arab narratives — including travel literature, books on geography, astronomy, astrology, history, theology, biographies, marine science, philosophy and ancient medicine — pejoratively represent Black people as inferior. Even today, <a href="https://scenearabia.com/Life/Arab-Anti-Blackness-Racism-and-the-Violence-that-Doesn-t-Get-A-Hashtag">a derogatory depiction is present in many aspects of modern Arab culture</a>.</p>
<p>Kadhim theorizes that the negative image of Black people in Arab cultures emerged from three streams: (1) the controversial anthropological conception that culture — including religion, language, laws and values — defines what it means to be human; (2) <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123707/the-curse-of-ham">the Biblical narrative of Noah’s cursing his son Ham’s descendants — understood to be darker-skinned — with servitude</a>; and (3) the Greek philosopher Ptolemy’s theory of the seven climes, which posits that a person’s geographical location determined their race, as the proximity to the sun “prepared” humans in ways <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X14000512">ranging from raw and undercooked to burnt and overcooked</a>.</p>
<h2>Vilification of Arabs</h2>
<p>In 2014, I presented a paper titled, “Waiting for Obama: The Forgotten Black in Iraq,” at York University’s conference on Home/Land: Transnationalism, Identity and Arab Canadians. I demonstrated how Afro-Iraqis conception of homeland has been destabilized by the racist and discriminatory discourse perpetuated by other Iraqis towards them.</p>
<p>During the question period following my presentation, an established Arab novelist who was in attendance denied that anti-Black racism existed in the Arab world. After the event was over, the novelist asked me: “Why are you vilifying our culture?”</p>
<p>In May, I facilitated a public lecture called “<a href="https://uwaterloo.ca/culture-and-language-studies/news/deconstructing-africanism-image-black-people-arab-imaginary">Deconstructing Africanism: The Image of Black People in the Arab Imaginary</a>,” by Kadhim on the topic of his book. One of the main concerns expressed by the Arab audience was that the lecture portrayed Arab culture as racist. After the event, an audience member and acquaintance called me and asked: “Why are you showing our shit?” </p>
<p>I reflected on whether it was my intention to show my own culture’s shit. Not really, although other Arabs might have perceived it as such.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Nader Kadhim’s lecture on Blackness and the roots of anti-Blackness in Arab culture.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Airing dirty laundry</h2>
<p>I am originally from Basra, Iraq, where the majority are “white” Arabs like myself. A few years after moving to Canada, I began learning about racism in the West, and experienced a change in my racial identity from a white Arab to a person of colour. This new and personal racial reconfiguration led me to reflect on racism against the Black community in Basra. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Black Iraqis in Basra advocate for political representation and inclusion.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Some Iraqis are not even aware of Black Iraqis who have been living there for centuries. The sense of home and belonging of Afro-Iraqis has been destabilized by the racism disseminated against them.</p>
<p>To respond to this racism, I embarked on exploring the roots of anti-Blackness in my culture, and found that it has been around since before Islam. I started writing, translating and documenting Black Arab heritage, but I keep encountering resistance. Some Arabs refuse to acknowledge racism in their own communities. </p>
<p>There are personal implications of raising awareness of anti-Blackness in the Arab world — I am at risk of being considered a <em>comprador</em>, someone acting on behalf of western institutions. This could lead to me being completely ostracized from diasporic Arab intellectual circles and violently targeted in my home country. I feel the tension between celebrating the richness and beauty of my culture (I established an annual Arab cultural festival) and calling out its shit.</p>
<p>There is a critical thin line between contributing to a movement for racial justice and contributing to the already demonized image of Arabs. Showing our “shit” could fuel this. However, as a Canadian-Iraqi intellectual, I have privilege and thus responsibility to leverage it for racial injustice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amir Al-Azraki receives funding from the University of Waterloo/Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Explore grant. </span></em></p>Black Arabs face racism and discrimination throughout the Arab world. Exposing this anti-Blackness is challenging but critical work.Amir Al-Azraki, Assistant Professor, Arabic language and literature, Renison University College, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1613942021-05-26T19:02:43Z2021-05-26T19:02:43ZHow the Arab Spring changed the Middle East and North Africa forever<p>Ten years after people rose up against their leaders in country after country around the Middle East and North Africa, from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, what can we say about how society, politics and religion have changed in the region?</p>
<p>To put it mildly, the social, cultural, religious, political and strategic events that history will remember as the “Arab Spring” sent a shockwave across an entire region. Today, the legacy of this chain of events is contested and to an extent still uncertain, but one thing is clear: the conditions for engaging in politics in these countries have shifted completely.</p>
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<p><strong>Lire cet article en français:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/revolutions-arabes-an-x-des-societes-a-jamais-transformees-161029">“Révolutions arabes, an X: des sociétés à jamais transformées”</a></p>
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<p>It’s true that in many places, like Egypt, we’ve seen a return to some form of the authoritarianism that reigned before the people asserted their right to take part in politics at the beginning of the 2010s. But social powers are the forces that write the definitive version of history, and these have seemingly been disrupted forever.</p>
<p>Citizens now know that ruling power is fragile; it can be shaky; it does not last forever. In 2021, the question is no longer whether it’s possible to topple a regime, or at least make it grant concessions, but rather what the cost-benefit analysis is for a process of political change. What price are people prepared to pay to see their situation improve?</p>
<h2>The power of protest</h2>
<p>The most obvious change has been the redefinition of political space in Arab societies. This has been shown again and again in the years since 2011, from the recent protests in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210309-protesters-in-lebanon-block-roads-over-worsening-poverty">Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50595212">Iraq</a>, to the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/end-line-algerias-hirak-movement">Hirak movement</a> in Algeria.</p>
<p>Across North Africa and the Middle East, protests and demonstrations of public anger are no longer simply seen as signs of a challenge toward authorities, but rather as the potential forewarning of an uprising, or even a revolution.</p>
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<p>Each social crisis opens the floodgates for real and uninhibited challenges to the regimes in power. Even <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200921-protests-against-sisis-rule-break-out-across-egypt/">Egypt</a>, which in 2013 saw a return to authoritarianism that would make previous regimes in other Arab countries pale in comparison, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200929-even-egyptians-in-rural-areas-are-protesting-again/">is not exempt</a>. Activists and groups have learned how to speak out against the government, often at <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/egypt-no-end-escalating-repression">great personal risk</a>. A majority of citizens are now reasoning based on the hypothesis that the players currently holding power can be removed.</p>
<h2>Secularism v religion</h2>
<p>Across the region, the social and political spheres have become more secular, as both a cause and a consequence of the Arab Spring. The push for democratisation both fed into and was fed by the belief in egalitarian citizenship. Regimes, feeling challenged, encouraged sectarian attitudes and divisions, hoping to transform a vertical conflict (between society and authority) into a series of horizontal disputes (Sunnites against Shiites, Muslims against Copts, Arabs against Kurds, and so on).</p>
<p>In other words, by changing the original narrative, which was mainly secular and drew on political and social progress as a foundation, certain regimes placed their survival above that of their country’s unity. Syria is a <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/sectarianizing-faith-safeguarding-authoritarianism-in-syria">textbook example of this</a>.</p>
<p>While a number of religious groups, Islamists among them, took the side of popular uprisings during the Arab Spring, it is nevertheless difficult to give a definitive judgement on the role of specific religious groups, both at the time and since. It would be hard to compare Tunisia’s <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/05/ennahda-s-uneasy-exit-from-political-islam-pub-79789">Ennahda</a>, for example, with Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, given how widely communication, strategies, and even long-term goals vary from one group to another.</p>
<p>This is partly because the Arab Spring uprisings were not religious by nature; they were never built on the necessity of defending religious traditions, and even less so a threatened Muslim identity. Nor was the Islamist narrative the engine for these changes. Religious figures and movements jumped on the bandwagon, but they never managed to control the direction of these wide-reaching movements.</p>
<p>However, in burgeoning democracies, starting with Tunisia, the power distribution phase gave way to other laws, specifically those regarding the ability to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23210458?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">siphon off votes</a>. Islamist groups were clearly masters of this game, boosted by their claimed capital of moral and political purity and long-established abilities to mobilise people.</p>
<p>And so over the past ten years we have seen the subject of religion take centre stage, as social revolutions, in becoming constitutional and partisan, had a duty to tackle the question at the same time as Islamist parties were integrating themselves into national political scenes in transition. Right now, the key takeaway is undeniably the rupturing of the Islamist landscape.</p>
<h2>The rise of jihadism</h2>
<p>Though jihadism has been an important part of the political and religious landscape in Arab countries and elsewhere for several decades, this phenomenon was indirectly strengthened by the uprisings in the early 2010s.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/jihadism-arab-world-after-2011-explaining-its-expansion">rise of jihadism over the past ten years</a> is connected to the fact that parts of these societies, particularly the youth, saw the Arab Spring uprisings from two related perspectives. On one hand, it was clear that the revolutions were not going to bear fruit immediately. On the other, they were no longer exclusively rooted in the present time and in their country’s society as it had always been. Another utopia existed, and jihadism competed with that promised by revolution.</p>
<p>As a result, certain countries such as Syria, which is still gripped by civil war and a serious sovereignty crisis, became echo chambers for Arab tensions, or even laboratories for new kinds of violent, radical movements to spread, as illustrated by Islamic State’s caliphate in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Smoke rises from buildings in the Islamic State’s former caliphate in Syria’s eastern Deir Ezzor province near the Iraqi border, a day after the group was declared defeated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402659/original/file-20210525-23-1kx4oif.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Islamic State’s former caliphate in eastern Syria, a day after the group was declared defeated by the Syrian Democratic Forces.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guiseppe Cacace/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The undeniable politico-religious violence that has arisen since 2011, driven by jihadi movements, is also social and generational. Jihadism attests to the fact that the political realities in the regions are currently at an unprecedented crossroads, between the shift away from traditional religion, the plight of governments, and the many social, economic and psychological tensions weighing on entire populations desperate to see their hopes come to pass.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is published as part of <a href="https://www.ipev-fmsh.org/fr/transition-from-violence-lessons-from-the-mena-region/">IPEV Live: Transition from Violence, Lessons from the MENA</a>, a series of eight live conversations held every Tuesday from May 18 to June 29, 2021.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed-Ali Adraoui ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>In the ten years since the Arab Spring, the countries affected have transformed completely. Here’s how.Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Chercheur, London School of Economics & Membre du Panel international sur la sortie de la violence, Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme (FMSH)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1301102020-01-29T13:21:25Z2020-01-29T13:21:25ZIslamophobia in the US did not start with Trump, but his tweets perpetuate a long history of equating Muslims with terrorism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311872/original/file-20200124-81352-1atbgwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against Islamophobia in TImes Square in March 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/new-york-ny-march-24-2019-1348368149">Dev Chatterjee/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump retweeted a doctored image of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi wearing a hijab and Senator Chuck Schumer wearing a turban on Jan. 13. In the fake photo, both were seen standing in <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-trump-retweets-fake-image-nancy-pelosi-muslim-head-coverings-in-front-of-iranian-flag/">front of an Iranian flag</a> with a caption saying: “The corrupted Dems trying their best to come to the Ayatollah’s rescue.” </p>
<p>Trump was again criticized for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/14/trump-retweet-fake-islamophobic-image-pelosi-schumer">promoting anti-Muslim sentiments</a> and for being <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/13/politics/donald-trump-pelosi-schumer/index.html">a social media troll</a> who spreads false information. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1216667026191605760"}"></div></p>
<p>The image was, presumably, meant to criticize Pelosi and other <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/trump-iran-iraq.html">Democrats for questioning</a> Trump’s order to kill the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani by positioning Pelosi and Schumer as defending America’s “enemy” – Iran. </p>
<p>The image portrays the hijab, turban and Iranian flag in a <a href="https://press.syr.edu/supressbooks/930/race-and-arab-americans-before-and-after-9-11/">derogatory manner</a>. </p>
<p>It’s not the first time Trump has promoted Islamophobia. With <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index.html">rhetoric</a> like “Islam hates us” and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/us/politics/donald-trump-syrian-muslims-surveillance.html">policies</a> such as <a href="https://qz.com/1736809/statistics-show-that-trumps-travel-ban-was-always-a-muslim-ban/">banning the entry of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries</a>, Trump has reinforced the idea that Islam is a threat to the U.S. </p>
<p>Trump may have brought Islamophobia into the highest office in the land, but American Islamophobia did not originate with Trump. As a scholar of the history of representations of <a href="https://nyupress.org/9780814707326/arabs-and-muslims-in-the-media/">Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. media</a>, I argue that Trump’s tweet plays into a long history of equating Arabs, Muslims and Iranians with terrorism and anti-Americanism.</p>
<h2>A series of political events</h2>
<p>Representations of Arabs, Muslims and Iranians as terrorists emerged after a <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">series of political events</a> starting in the late 1940s. </p>
<p>In 1947, in the shadow of World War II and the Holocaust, the United Nations proposed that <a href="https://merip.org/palestine-israel-primer/">Palestine be partitioned</a> to create the state of Israel. Most Palestinians <a href="https://merip.org/palestine-israel-primer/">rejected the U.N.’s proposal</a>, seeing it as a transfer from British to Israeli colonial rule. They questioned why they would forfeit their land to compensate for the genocide committed by Nazi Germany.</p>
<p>Subsequently two Arab-Israeli wars – one in 1948 and another in 1967 – were fought which <a href="https://merip.org/palestine-israel-primer/">resulted in</a> the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories and the denial of civil rights to Palestinians.</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/A-History-of-the-Modern-Middle-East-6th-Edition/Cleveland-Bunton/p/book/9780813349800?gclid=CjwKCAiA35rxBRAWEiwADqB3777OzOD-PiH8m5iSpjIRB8hRy4w3Ery3Ul3aJrzPGCqamlqUgpbg_xoCD7wQAvD_BwE">objective of recovering their land</a> and bringing attention to their plight, Palestinian groups carried out a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/middleeast/airline-hijacking-history.html">series of airplane hijackings</a>. In 1972, at the Munich Olympics, they took <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/massacre-begins-at-munich-olympics">members of the Israeli team hostage</a>. These athletes were killed during the rescue attempt. </p>
<p>“At the same time,” <a href="https://www.sfu.ca/history/faculty-and-staff/retired/william-cleveland.html">points out</a> historian <a href="https://www.sfu.ca/history/faculty-and-staff/retired/william-cleveland.html">William L. Cleveland</a>, “the Israeli government conducted operations against Palestinian leaders in Europe and Beirut and the Israeli air force killed scores of people in Jordan and Lebanon during its frequent raids.”</p>
<p>What captured the Western world’s attention, however, was Palestinians’ terror activities. U.S. <a href="https://time.com/4798084/1967-dayan-six-day-war/">news reports</a> focused on an “Arab enemy” and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">awe</a> at the capabilities of the Israeli military. </p>
<p>In the U.S., every president since the creation of Israel stated their <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=5983537-National-Security-Archive-Doc-02-Memorandum-of">unequivocal support</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/obama-arrives-in-israel-for-two-day-trip.html">for the country</a>. </p>
<p>Hollywood also frequently portrayed Palestinians as terrorists. The late media scholar <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/jack-shaheen-who-resisted-and-cataloged-stereotyping-of-arabs-dies-at-81.html">Jack Shaheen</a> found 45 Hollywood films from 1949 to 2001 <a href="https://www.interlinkbooks.com/product/reel-bad-arabs">that depicted Palestinians as terrorists</a>, including the 1986 film “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0090927/">The Delta Force</a>” and the 1996 film “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0116253/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Executive Decision</a>,” both about Palestinians hijacking airplanes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.interlinkbooks.com/product/reel-bad-arabs">Shaheen says</a> “absent from Hollywood’s Israeli-Palestinian movies” are stories that reveal Palestinians as normal people – “computer specialists, domestic engineers, farmers, teachers and artists.” </p>
<h2>Developing the stereotype</h2>
<p>While the terrorist stereotype emerged through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it developed an anti-American angle through a series of political events that followed. </p>
<p>In 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced an <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807858981/american-orientalism/">oil embargo</a> against several nations, including the United States, in retaliation for their support for Israel in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24402464">1973 October War</a> with Egypt and Syria. The six-month <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-decades-later-has-america-finally-got-over-the-oil-crisis-33541">Arab Oil Embargo</a> led to gas shortages, an increase in heating bills and an economic recession in the U.S. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312118/original/file-20200127-81346-1yql4q0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image from March 1974 showing long lines at a gas station in California as a result of the oil embargo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Recession-Watch/a2f5775e99684a0299a9819932bd1af6/13/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Soon thereafter, <a href="https://www.interlinkbooks.com/product/reel-bad-arabs">Hollywood films</a> such as the 1976 “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074958/">Network</a>” and 1981 “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083006/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Rollover</a>” portrayed rich and greedy oil sheikhs who were a threat to the U.S. economy.</p>
<p>Midcentury developments in Iran, an oil power, contributed to these stereotypes. </p>
<p>In 1953, intelligence services in the U.S and England collaborated to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days">oust</a> the democratic secular prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, because he had nationalized the country’s oil industry, severing the U.S. and U.K. as beneficiaries. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, also known as the shah of Iran, who kept a pro-Western foreign policy and was seen by many as suppressing political opposition. His rule resulted in violent demonstrations. In 1979, he was <a href="https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/28/5/663/337167?redirectedFrom=PDF">overthrown in the Islamic Revolution</a> and Ayatollah Khomeini took over as the “supreme leader.” </p>
<p>The overthrown shah, fleeing Iran, entered the U.S. seeking cancer treatment. Iranian students protested by holding U.S. Embassy staff and diplomats hostage for 444 days. They demanded that the shah be returned to stand trial. Known as the “Iran hostage crisis,” it became one of the most widely covered stories in U.S. </p>
<p>As professor of international affairs <a href="https://americanstudies.columbian.gwu.edu/melani-mcalister">Melani McAlister</a>’s research shows, it was also a <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">turning point</a> in how Americans saw the Middle East.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=887&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312289/original/file-20200128-81346-1czo29l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A poster of the film, ‘Not Without My Daughter.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Not_without_my_daughter.jpg">impawards</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>News reporting broadcast Iranian students burning the American flag and chanting “<a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/11/04/242941163/for-many-iranians-death-to-america-are-just-words">Death to America</a>.” This reporting conflated Iran with Arabs and Islam in general. Iran also <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">came to symbolize</a>, as McAlister points out, virulent anti-Americanism and a threat to the U.S. </p>
<p>The late scholar Edward Said, in his <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/159777/covering-islam-by-edward-w-said/">book</a> on the Iran hostage crisis, documents how scholars and journalists cast Islam as a threat to the West by explaining the crisis as resulting from a “Shi’a penchant for martyrdom” and “the Islamic mentality.”</p>
<p>Hollywood, again, furthered the conflation of Islam and terrorism. Films like “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0102555/">Not Without My Daughter</a>,” about an American woman taken hostage by her husband and his primitive religion, Islam, and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1024648/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1">Argo</a>,” about the hostage crisis, <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">depicted Iranians</a> as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/27/movies/embrace-the-stereotype-kiss-the-movie-goodbye.html">unreasonable fanatical people</a>. </p>
<p>The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001 entrenched this decades-long narrative of Arabs, Iranians and Muslims – as a conflated category – as the enemy. </p>
<h2>Advancing Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Following President Trump’s retweet, White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham was <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-trump-retweets-fake-image-nancy-pelosi-muslim-head-coverings-in-front-of-iranian-flag/">asked</a>, “Why would the president take even the time to retweet something like this?” Grisham <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-trump-retweets-fake-image-nancy-pelosi-muslim-head-coverings-in-front-of-iranian-flag/">responded</a>, “I think the president was making the point that the Democrats seem to hate him so much that they’re willing to be on the side of countries and leadership of countries who want to kill Americans.”</p>
<p>Both President Trump’s retweet and this rebuttal tap into the deep-seated U.S. perception that Islam, Arabs and Iran are a threat to the U.S. </p>
<p>[ <em>You’re too busy to read everything. We get it. That’s why we’ve got a weekly newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybusy">Sign up for good Sunday reading.</a> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130110/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evelyn Alsultany does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In retweeting a doctored image of Nancy Pelosi standing in a hijab in front of an Iranian flag, Trump is playing into fears that Iran and Islam are evil and anti-American.Evelyn Alsultany, Associate Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1233172019-09-18T10:50:17Z2019-09-18T10:50:17ZThe 4 big questions that the next Israeli government will decide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292878/original/file-20190917-19035-1i7054p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ultra orthodox Jews watch Rabbi Israel Hager vote in Bnei Brak, Israel, Sept. 17, 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel-Elections/498b7a01563d4e50b329a1b3034050d3/8/0">AP/Oded Balilty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Sept. 17, <a href="https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israelis-head-to-the-polls-with-one-question-in-mind-should-netanyahu-stay-or-go/2019/09/17/e72cd5e4-d886-11e9-a1a5-162b8a9c9ca2_story.html">Israelis went to the polls</a> for the second time in less than six months. </p>
<p>They were voting again because – for the first time in the country’s history – a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2019/may/30/israel-faces-new-election-as-netanyahu-fails-to-form-coalition-video">coalition government could not be assembled</a> after the last election took place on April 9. To everyone’s surprise, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – long renowned for his political skills and deals – failed to form the right-wing governing coalition he wanted. He was one seat short of securing a majority in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset. </p>
<p>Netanyahu did not want to give his rival, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/middleeast/benny-gantz-israel-netanyahu.html?module=inline">Benny Gantz, of the centrist Blue and White party</a> – which received the same number of Knesset seats as Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party – the chance to form a government, as is customary. Instead, he pushed the newly elected parliament to dissolve itself and trigger another national election. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292883/original/file-20190917-19030-1b6zdbf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz speaks after he voted in Rosh Haayin, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel-Elections/c7c42be03d9145a3a2f79dabec322757/10/0">AP/Sebastian Scheiner</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A referendum on Netanyahu</h2>
<p>The campaign for this second, “do-over” election has been largely devoid of substance. The many issues facing the country have been mostly ignored as politicians, particularly Netanyahu, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium-israel-election-2019-leaders-harness-fear-factor-to-fight-voter-fatigue-1.7854041">have focused on personal attacks and scaremongering</a>. </p>
<p>The most notable features of the election campaign were <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Bibis-Arab-problem-602010">Netanyahu’s incitement against Israel’s Arab minority,</a> his transparent attempt to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-tells-media-it-installed-cameras-outside-arab-polling-stations/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">suppress the turnout of Arab voters</a> and his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/world/middleeast/netanyahu-israel-election-arabs.html">unsubstantiated accusations of electoral fraud</a>. </p>
<p>More than anything else, this do-over election, like the April election, has been about Netanyahu, who is now Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. Once again, the biggest issue for Israeli voters has been whether they’re for Netanyahu or not. </p>
<p>This time around, however, Netanyahu is more politically vulnerable than he has been since he was defeated in the 1999 election.</p>
<p>Netanyahu desperately needs to stay in power so that he can try to secure his immunity from prosecution in <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/look-corruption-scandals-facing-israels-163755505.html">three cases of corruption</a>. Yet while the vote was to a large extent a referendum on Netanyahu, his political future and personal freedom are not the only things on the line.</p>
<p>There’s a lot more at stake.</p>
<p>The next Israeli government will have to decide at least four major questions. The decisions it reaches will significantly shape the future of the country and the relations among its citizens. The lives of non-citizen Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who, of course, don’t get to vote in Israel’s national elections, will also be affected in many ways. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292884/original/file-20190917-19040-6p9kmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A campaign poster for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Israel-Elections/99957c3423724a8b85a27d45b34a8c08/33/0">AP/Oded Balilty</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1. Will Israel annex parts of the West Bank?</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has spent years procrastinating about the future of the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Now he has promised to annex some areas currently under full Israeli control, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/10/world/middleeast/netanyahu-israel-west-bank.html?module=inline">such as the settlement blocs and much of the Jordan Valley</a>. </p>
<p>Gantz, Netanyahu’s main challenger for the position of prime minister, also insists on retaining Israel’s control over the settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-no-2nd-disengagement-the-public-will-decide-on-any-diplomatic-deal/">but he hasn’t committed to annexing these areas</a>. </p>
<p>The difference may seem merely semantic (or cosmetic), but proceeding with formal annexation would end any slim prospect for a <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/09/israel-palestine-netanyahu-plan-annex-jordan-valley.html">two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</a>. It might also trigger a chain reaction that could lead to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/A-declaration-of-war-on-the-two-state-solution-601399">escalating violence in the West Bank and the dissolution or collapse of the Palestinian Authority</a>. A Palestinian state probably won’t come about under a Gantz-led government, but it will at least remain a possibility.</p>
<h2>2. Will Israel’s judiciary maintain its independence?</h2>
<p>A narrow right-wing government is likely to enact judicial reforms aimed at neutralizing the Israeli Supreme Court’s ability to overturn laws and government practices it deems unconstitutional. Netanyahu himself supports a bill that would <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-how-would-a-broader-high-court-override-bill-help-netanyahu-1.7237773">enable the parliament to “override” Supreme Court rulings</a> – which could help him stay out of jail. </p>
<p>By contrast, a more centrist “national unity” government, involving the Blue and White party and Likud (probably without Netanyahu), is much more likely to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/opposition-slams-pms-reported-plan-to-override-supreme-court-in-immunity-bid/">preserve the independence and powers of the judiciary</a>. </p>
<p>The future of Israel’s judicial system – which has been assailed by right-wingers in recent years <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/23/israel-appoints-three-conservative-judges-to-supreme-court">for its allegedly liberal bent</a> – will in turn determine the quality, if not the very existence, of Israeli democracy.</p>
<h2>3. Will ultra-Orthodox Israeli Jews keep their privileges and powers?</h2>
<p>Ultra-Orthodox Jews make up roughly <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/latest-population-statistics-for-israel">12% of Israel’s population</a>. Under a new government, will they continue to be largely exempt from mandatory military service? Will ultra-Orthodox rabbis maintain their near-monopoly over Jewish marriages, divorces and burials in Israel, even for staunchly secular Jews who, for example, cannot have a civil wedding in Israel?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-15/how-ultra-orthodox-perks-set-israel-election-agenda-quicktake">This perennial issue</a> returned to the political agenda <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/middleeast/israeli-election-religious-secular.html?module=inline">after the April election</a>. That’s when Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of a small, secular right-wing party, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-wont-budge-on-haredi-draft-likens-pro-pm-daily-to-stalins-pravda/">insisted that ultra-Orthodox men be drafted into the army</a>. That in turn prevented Netanyahu from forming another right-wing government that included the ultra-Orthodox parties, with whom Netanyahu has forged a long-term political alliance. </p>
<p>Lieberman wants a secular coalition government without the ultra-Orthodox parties, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-09-16/netanyahus-former-top-aide-trying-to-bring-him-down">in which he would be a kingmaker</a>. This is a real possibility, especially if Netanyahu is deposed as Likud’s leader. </p>
<p>Such a secular government could well pass popular legislation transforming the relationship between religion and state, and dramatically reduce the long-running, disproportionate influence that the ultra-Orthodox have had over the lives of other Israeli Jews.</p>
<h2>4. Will Israeli Arabs be accepted as political equals?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-status-of-arabs-in-israel">Israel’s Arab citizens – 21% of the population</a> – have the same democratic rights as its Jewish citizens. But their political parties have always been marginalized and ostracized, except, briefly, <a href="https://972mag.com/rabins-legacy-a-government-inclusive-of-all-citizens-not-only-jews/113375/">in the early 1990s when Yitzhak Rabin was prime minister</a>.</p>
<p>An unofficial rule has <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/09/10/why-bibi-fears-arab-voters/">kept Arab parties out of Israeli governing coalitions</a>. So they’re unable to wield serious influence or extract significant benefits for their constituents as, say, the ultra-Orthodox can. </p>
<p>There’s still little chance that the <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Arab-parties-agree-to-run-under-joint-list-in-upcoming-elections-596920">Joint List – a union of four Arab parties</a> – will be invited to join the next government. Nor is it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/blue-and-white-mks-rule-out-center-left-coalition-with-arab-lawmakers/">likely to accept such an invitation</a>. </p>
<p>But the government could signal in a host of ways to Arab citizens that they belong in Israel, that their communal concerns and needs matter and that their elected representatives in parliament are legitimate. </p>
<p>In short, the next government could pursue a much more conciliatory approach toward Israel’s Arab minority than recent right-wing governments have done. </p>
<p>Although <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/government-okays-nis-15b-upgrade-plan-for-arab-communities/">Netanyahu has greatly increased government spending on the Arab community</a>, he has also repeatedly engaged in incitement against Arabs, and he oversaw the passage of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-new-nation-state-law-restates-the-obvious-100310">controversial Nation-State Law</a> that Israeli Arabs regard as formally relegating them to the status of second-class citizens.</p>
<h2>Coalition talks will determine the winner of this election</h2>
<p>The composition of the next Israeli government will ultimately be determined not at the ballot box, but in the coming coalition negotiations. Whichever party wins the most seats will have the first opportunity to try to cobble together a coalition. But the real winner of this do-over election will be whoever succeeds in assembling a majority of at least 61 seats in the Knesset. </p>
<p>Will it be Netanyahu or Gantz? Another right-wing and religious government or perhaps a national unity secular government? At this early stage, it’s impossible to predict. But whatever the eventual makeup of the next Israeli government, one thing is clear: It will decide a lot more than just Netanyahu’s future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The winner of Tuesday’s Israeli election must form a government and tackle four problems that will shape the future of the country and the relations among its citizens and Palestinian non-citizens.Dov Waxman, Professor of Political Science, International Affairs and Israel Studies, Northeastern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1156082019-05-26T17:39:36Z2019-05-26T17:39:36ZHow the new ‘Aladdin’ stacks up against a century of Hollywood stereotyping<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276149/original/file-20190523-187157-ake32f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In the live-action 'Aladdin,' Mena Massoud stars Aladdin, while Will Smith plays the Genie.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.rollingstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/aladdin-review.jpg?crop=900:600&width=440">Daniel Smith/Walt Disney Pictures</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Though critically acclaimed and widely beloved, the 1992 animated feature “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0103639/?ref_=nv_sr_2?ref_=nv_sr_2">Aladdin</a>” had some serious issues with stereotyping.</p>
<p>Disney wanted to avoid repeating these same problems in the live action version of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcBllhVj1eA">Aladdin</a>,” which came out on May 24. So they sought advice from a Community Advisory Council comprised of Middle Eastern, South Asian and Muslim scholars, activists and creatives. I was asked to be a part of the group because of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=HZ-HRd0AAAAJ&hl=en">my expertise on representations of Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. media</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that a major studio wants to hear from the community reflects Hollywood’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/02/21/696471501/hollywood-diversity-report-finds-progress-but-much-left-to-gain">growing commitment to diversity</a>.</p>
<p>But while the live action “Aladdin” does succeed in rectifying some aspects of Hollywood’s long history of stereotyping and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2016/2/22/11091170/john-oliver-hollywood-whitewashing-oscars">whitewashing</a> Middle Easterners, it still leaves much to be desired.</p>
<h2>Magical genies and lecherous sheikhs</h2>
<p>In his seminal 1978 book “<a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Orientalism.html?id=66sIHa2VTmoC">Orientalism</a>,” literature professor <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Said">Edward Said</a> argued that Western cultures historically stereotyped the Middle East to justify exerting control over it. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276181/original/file-20190523-187143-1skowhb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A movie poster for the 1921 film ‘The Sheik.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Sheik_with_Agnes_Ayres_and_Rudolph_Valentino,_movie_poster,_1921.jpg">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/ideas/videos/when-will-we-stop-stereotyping-people/p06p97cr">Orientalism in Hollywood</a> has a long history. Early Hollywood films such as “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0012675/?ref_=nv_sr_2?ref_=nv_sr_2">The Sheik</a>” and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0034465/?ref_=nv_sr_4?ref_=nv_sr_4">Arabian Nights</a>” portrayed the Middle East as a monolithic fantasy land – a magical desert filled with genies, flying carpets and rich men living in opulent palaces with their harem girls.</p>
<p>While these depictions were arguably silly and harmless, they flattened the differences among Middle Eastern cultures, while portraying the region as backwards <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Unthinking_Eurocentrism.html?id=KqjAAwAAQBAJ">and in need of civilizing by the West</a>.</p>
<p>Then came <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520244993/epic-encounters">a series of Middle Eastern conflicts and wars</a>: the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the Iran Hostage Crisis and the Gulf War. In American media, the exotic Middle East faded; replacing it were depictions of violence and ominous terrorists.</p>
<p>As media scholar Jack G. Shaheen <a href="https://shop.mediaed.org/reel-bad-arabs-p133.aspx">observed</a>, hundreds of Hollywood films over the last 50 years have linked Islam with holy war and terrorism, while depicting Muslims as either “hostile alien intruders” or “lecherous, oily sheikhs intent on using nuclear weapons.” </p>
<h2>Cringeworthy moments in the original ‘Aladdin’</h2>
<p>Against this backdrop, the Orientalism of Disney’s 1992 animated “Aladdin” wasn’t all that surprising. </p>
<p>The opening <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3kkVGuiKFI">song lyrics described</a> a land “Where they cut off your ear if they don’t like your face” and declared, “It’s barbaric, but hey, it’s home!” </p>
<p>When the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee <a href="https://variety.com/1993/film/news/aladdin-lyrics-altered-108628/">protested the lyrics</a>, Disney removed the reference to cutting off ears in the home video version but left in the descriptor “barbaric.”</p>
<p>Then there were the ways the characters were depicted. As <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/12/27/when-will-it-be-okay-to-be-an-arab-the-disney-people-didnt-have-to-invent-a-fictional-city-for-aladdin-its-set-in-baghdad/22c97a21-58f9-468b-a575-514e1c65e894/">many</a> <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1222519.Thinking_Class">have noted</a>, the bad Arabs are ugly and have foreign accents while the good Arabs – Aladdin and Jasmine – possess European features and white American accents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/276151/original/file-20190523-187185-49t47e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In the animated ‘Aladdin,’ the good Arabs are drawn with Caucasian features, while the bad guys speak with foreign accents.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cdn.mamamia.com.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/20114412/aladdin-jafar-hot.jpg">Disney</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The film also continued the tradition of erasing distinctions between Middle Eastern cultures. For example, Jasmine, who is supposed to be from Agrabah – originally Baghdad but fictionalized because of the Gulf War in 1991 – has an Indian-named tiger, Rajah. </p>
<h2>Questionable progress</h2>
<p>After 9/11, a spate of films emerged that rehashed many of the old terrorist tropes. But surprisingly, some positive representations of Middle Eastern and Muslim characters emerged. </p>
<p>In 2012, I published my book “<a href="https://nyupress.org/9780814707326/arabs-and-muslims-in-the-media/">Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11</a>.” In it, I detail the strategies that writers and producers used after 9/11 to offset stereotyping.</p>
<p>The most common one involved including a patriotic Middle Eastern or Muslim American to counterbalance depictions as terrorists. In the TV drama, “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1796960/">Homeland</a>,” for example, Fara Sherazi, an Iranian American Muslim CIA analyst, is killed by a Muslim terrorist, showing that “good” Muslim Americans are willing to die for the United States. </p>
<p>But this didn’t change the fact that Middle Easterners and Muslims were, by and large, portrayed as threats to the West. Adding a ‘good’ Middle Eastern character doesn’t do much to upend stereotypes when the vast majority are still appearing in stories about terrorism.</p>
<p>Another strategy also emerged: reverting to old Orientalist tropes of the exotic, romantic Middle East. Maybe writers and producers assumed that depicting the Middle East as exotic would be an improvement over associating it with terrorism. </p>
<p>The 2004 film “<a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/454768/pdf">Hidalgo</a>,” for example, tells the story of an American cowboy who travels to the Arabian desert in 1891 to participate in a horse race. In classic Orientalist fashion, he saves the rich sheik’s daughter from the sheik’s evil, power-hungry nephew. </p>
<p>The 2017 movie “<a href="https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/victoria-abdul-stephen-frears-judi-dench-eddie-izzard/Content?oid=31655216">Victoria and Abdul</a>” depicts an unlikely friendship between Queen Victoria and her Indian-Muslim servant, Abdul Karim. While the film does critique the racism and Islamophobia of 19th-century England, it also infantilizes and exoticizes Abdul. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, some glaring problems persisted. <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2010/05/why-is-a-white-actor-playing-prince-of-persia-title-role/345435/">Jake Gyllenhaal was cast</a> in the lead role of “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0473075/?ref_=nv_sr_1?ref_=nv_sr_1">The Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time</a>” (2010), while Christian Bale and Joel Edgerton were cast in “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1528100/?ref_=nv_sr_1?ref_=nv_sr_1">Exodus: Gods and Kings</a>” (2014) as Egyptian characters. </p>
<p>Why were white actors assuming these roles?</p>
<p>When challenged, producer Ridley Scott <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2010/05/why-is-a-white-actor-playing-prince-of-persia-title-role/345435/">infamously said</a> that he can’t “say that my lead actor is Mohammad so-and-so from such-and-such. I’m just not going to get it financed.”</p>
<h2>Does the new ‘Aladdin’ make strides?</h2>
<p>Perhaps in a desire to avoid the mistakes of the past, Disney executives sought advice from cultural consultants like me. </p>
<p>There’s certainly some notable progress made in the live-action “Aladdin.”</p>
<p>Egyptian Canadian actor Mena Massoud plays Aladdin. Given the <a href="https://www.menaartsadvocacy.com/">dearth of people of Middle Eastern descent in lead roles</a>, the significance of casting Massoud cannot be overstated. And despite the fact that <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/disney-aladdin-skin-darkening_n_5a54e36fe4b003133eccb275">some white extras had their skin darkened during filming</a>, Disney did cast actors of Middle Eastern descent in most of the main roles. </p>
<p>Casting Indian British actress Naomi Scott as Jasmine was <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/07/17/disney-aladdin-jasmine-naomi-scott_a_23034316/">controversial</a>; many hoped to see an Arab or Middle Eastern actress in this role and wondered whether casting someone of Indian descent would simply reinforce notions of “Oriental” interchangeability. Nonetheless, the film does note that Jasmine’s mother is from another land.</p>
<p>The biggest problem with the 2019 “Aladdin” is that it perpetuates the trend of reverting to magical <a href="http://arabstereotypes.org/why-stereotypes/what-orientalism">Orientalism</a> – as if that’s a noteworthy improvement over terrorist portrayals. In truth, it’s not exactly a courageous move to trade explicit racism for cliched exoticism.</p>
<p>To be fair, “Aladdin” distinguishes itself from “Hidalgo” and other Orientalist films of this trend by not revolving around the experiences of a white protagonist.</p>
<p>However, once again, characters with American accents are the “good guys” while those with non-American accents are mostly, but not entirely, “bad.” And audiences today will be as hard pressed as those in 1992 – or 1922, for that matter – to identify any distinct Middle Eastern cultures beyond that of an overgeneralized “East.” Belly dancing and Bollywood dancing, turbans and keffiyehs, Iranian and Arab accents all appear in the film interchangeably. </p>
<p>Just as making positive tweaks within a story about terrorism doesn’t accomplish much, so does making positive tweaks within a story about the exotic East. Diversifying representations requires moving beyond these tired tropes and expanding the kinds of stories that are told.</p>
<p>“Aladdin,” of course, is a fantastical tale, so questions about representational accuracy might seem overblown. It is also a really fun movie in which Mena Massoud, Naomi Scott and Will Smith all shine in their roles. But over the last century, Hollywood has produced <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Reel-Bad-Arabs-Hollywood-Vilifies/dp/1566567521/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=reel+bad+arabs&qid=1557265888&s=books&sr=1-1-catcorr">over 900 films that stereotype Arabs and Muslims</a> – a relentless drumbeat of stereotypes that <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bad-news-for-one-muslim-american-is-bad-news-for-all-muslims-61358">influences public opinion and policies</a>. </p>
<p>If there were 900 films that didn’t portray Arabs, Iranians and Muslims as terrorists or revert to old Orientalist tropes, then films like “Aladdin” could be “just entertainment.” </p>
<p>Until then, we’ll just have to wait for the genie to let more nuanced and diverse portrayals out of the lamp.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evelyn Alsultany served on the Community Advisory Council for Disney's "Aladdin." </span></em></p>While the 2019 ‘Aladdin’ is a big improvement from the 1992 version, it still recycles some old tropes.Evelyn Alsultany, Associate Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1114502019-02-14T10:24:35Z2019-02-14T10:24:35ZWhy India’s Hindu nationalists worship Israel’s nation-state model<p>India’s Hindu nationalists and the Israeli right have a remarkable mutual affinity. Binyamin Netanyahu <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Politics/NXcGk3YkatXaVuMJuBnssM/Modi-in-Israel-Day-1-Live-Narendra-Modi-arrives-in-Tel-Aviv.html">welcomed</a> Narendra Modi to Israel in 2017 with these words: “Prime Minister Modi, we have been waiting for you for a long time, almost 70 years … We view you as a kindred spirit.” </p>
<p>The two premiers, both battling for re-election in spring 2019, share a warm rapport, and <a href="https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1059842760159694849?lang=en">regularly refer to each</a> other on Twitter as “my friend Narendra” and “my friend Bibi.”</p>
<p>The Modi-Bibi bonhomie rests on much more than personal chemistry, or even the Israeli military-industrial complex’s <a href="https://jewishchronicle.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-trip-comes-as-israel-india-defense-tech-ties-continue-to-grow/">significant role</a> in servicing Indian needs. It is rooted in the profound admiration of generations of Hindu nationalists for Zionism and its product, Israel, whose model of nation-state they seek to emulate in India. </p>
<p>Indian secularists often claim that the Hindu nationalists intend to turn India into a Hindu version of Pakistan. This is not wrong. Just as Pakistan founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s politics fused religion, nation and state, so does “Hindutva”, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-origins-of-todays-hindu-nationalism-55092">political ideology</a> of Hindu nationalism born in the 1920s.</p>
<p>But the Pakistan analogy is limited. For more than 60 years, Pakistan has been a state dominated by the military. India is a highly evolved democracy. It has always been inconceivable that an equivalent of Zia-ul Haq, the Islamist military dictator who ruled Pakistan from 1977 to 1988, could appear in India and “Hinduise” the state. The intent of Hindu nationalism to remake India therefore needs to be pursued, and accomplished, in a way compatible with a democratic polity.</p>
<p>The prototype exists of a form of state which is simultaneously democratic and supremacist: Israel. Israel was a self-described “Jewish and democratic state” until July 2018, when the right-wing majority in its parliament <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-contentious-jewish-nation-state-bill-into-law/">narrowly won a vote</a> to further tighten Israel’s identity to “the nation-state of the Jewish people, which respects the rights of all its citizens”. The revision reflects the ascendancy of hardliners and extremists in Israeli politics.</p>
<h2>Affinity for Zionism and Israel</h2>
<p>Successive generations of Hindu nationalists – from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), who coined and elaborated the Hindutva concept, to Modi today – have professed a deep affinity for Israel. Savarkar <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vrxsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA275&lpg=PA275&dq=If+the+Zionists%E2%80%99+dreams+are+ever+realised+savarkar&source=bl&ots=wmqqu6fcg7&sig=ACfU3U0lZHiSJZq2nAhx0YmQ4MsiM6g9XA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj9jPfWkKzgAhUF6aQKHcvyDCsQ6AEwC3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=If%20the%20Zionists%E2%80%99%20dreams%20are%20ever%20realised%20savarkar&f=false">wrote</a> in the 1920s: “If the Zionists’ dreams are ever realised – if Palestine becomes a Jewish state – it will gladden us almost as much as our Jewish friends.” </p>
<p>In late 1947, Savarkar was very upset when the Indian delegate in the UN General Assembly argued for a binational Arab-Jewish state in Palestine and voted against the proposal to partition Palestine into a larger Jewish state and a smaller Arab state. </p>
<p>Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906-73), who steered the Hindu nationalist movement in post-independence India as the chief of the volunteer organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), wrote in the late 1930s that the Zionist movement exemplified his own “five unities” framing of Indian nationhood: “The Jews had maintained their race, religion, culture and language, and all they wanted was their natural territory to complete their nationality.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257976/original/file-20190208-174861-1mm0x2o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israel: model for a type of ethnic democracy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/group-ultra-orthodox-jews-yeshiva-students-376429960?src=fslvwYZcAgXxvYi6IvgUiQ-1-35">Nina Mikryukova/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ethnic democracy as the shared ideal</h2>
<p>It is Jewish Israeli scholars who have explicated the paradigm of “ethnic democracy”, using the case of their own country. One such scholar, Sammy Smooha <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1469-8219.00062">defined ethnic democracy</a> as “an alternative non-civic form of democratic state that is identified with and subservient to a single ethnic nation.” He said this is “best exemplified by Israel”, which is “based on Jewish and Zionist hegemony and the structural subordination of the Arab minority” – who are currently <a href="https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/MJB_Facts_and_Figures_on_the_Arab_Population_in_Israel_2018-English.pdf">20% of the population</a> of the Jewish state. Propelling this is an ideology, Smooha says, that “makes a crucial distinction between members and non-members of the ethnic nation”. Non-members are seen as undesirable and threatening – as agents of biological dilution, demographic swamping, cultural degeneration, security risks, and even as a fifth column for enemy states. </p>
<p>This is the typical Hindu nationalist perspective on India’s Muslims who, at <a href="https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php">just under 15%</a> of the population, are India’s largest religious minority.</p>
<p>The distinction made between members and non-members of the nation underlies a very controversial amendment to India’s citizenship laws that has been strongly pushed by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government since 2016. The <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/what-is-the-citizenship-amendment-bill-2016/article23999348.ece">proposed legislation</a> would confer Indian citizenship on members of designated religious minorities (Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians) from three Muslim-majority countries in India’s neighbourhood – Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan – who have settled in India without legal status. </p>
<p>So, Hindus and other non-Muslims from these countries would have a fast track to Indian citizenship, the argument being that they are victims of religious persecution. The proposed law is, in a more limited scope, analogous to the Israeli <a href="http://www.jewishagency.org/first-steps/program/5131">policy</a> of promoting migration of Jews from across the world to Israel. It sends an unmistakable signal of who are preferred as citizens and who are viewed as undesirables.</p>
<h2>India as a clone of Israel?</h2>
<p>Ethnic democracies do not totally exclude or disenfranchise the citizens viewed as undesirables. Israeli Arabs are entitled to cultural and religious rights. Arabic is officially recognised (though the July 2018 revision asserted the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/world/middleeast/israel-law-jews-arabic.html">primacy of Hebrew</a>), and usually around 10% of the Knesset’s members are Israeli Arabs. Still, a range of formal and informal policies ensure that the Arab community mostly remains ghettoised in deprived enclaves, relegated to what is in effect second-class citizenship.</p>
<p>Israel is not the only example of an ethnic democracy. There is Sri Lanka, where the post-colonial state was captured by majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism from 1956 onward. There is Croatia, since 2013 a member-state of the European Union. It <a href="http://constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm">proclaimed independence in 1991</a> as: “The national state of the Croatian people, and a state of other nations and minorities who are its citizens.”</p>
<p>What ethnic democracies do is to create a de facto but very real hierarchy of citizenship, in which some are full, first-class citizens and others are second class – at best. The current Hindu nationalist movement is remarkably faithful to the ideological creed laid down by its pioneers Savarkar and Golwalkar eight decades ago. In 1938, Savarkar <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vrxsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA264&lpg=PA264&dq=the+Hindus+are+the+Nation+in+India+and+the+Muslim+minority+a+community%22+just+as+%22the+Germans+are+the+Nation+in+Germany+and+the+Jews+a+community+savarkar&source=bl&ots=wmqqxac6a6&sig=ACfU3U2nYa2iSSxFhshNLRN_MomTpGMtjg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwpaLS9bXgAhUvVBUIHRozAQsQ6AEwBHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=the%20Hindus%20are%20the%20Nation%20in%20India%20and%20the%20Muslim%20minority%20a%20community%22%20just%20as%20%22the%20Germans%20are%20the%20Nation%20in%20Germany%20and%20the%20Jews%20a%20community%20savarkar&f=false">declared</a> that “the Hindus are the Nation in India and the Moslem minority a community” just as “the Turks are the Nation in Turkey and the Arab or the Armenian minority a community.” Golwalkar <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vrxsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217&dq=may+stay+in+the+country,+wholly+subordinated+to+the+Hindu+nation+sumantra+bose&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwir74Ov9rrgAhU3VBUIHSzyCyYQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=may%20stay%20in%20the%20country%2C%20wholly%20subordinated%20to%20the%20Hindu%20nation%20sumantra%20bose&f=false">wrote</a> in 1938: “The non-Hindu people of Hindustan … may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation.”</p>
<p>The type of “democratic” state exemplified by Israel – and not Pakistan – is the model the Hindu nationalist movement, led by its core RSS organisation, aspires to establish in an Indian variant. But will its vision prevail? It’s far from certain that a 1.3 billion-strong country, defined culturally by multiple identities and politically by cross-cutting cleavages, can be turned into a giant-sized version of Israel, Croatia, or Sri Lanka.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sumantra Bose does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The bonhomie between Narendra Modi and Binyamin Netanyahu is rooted in the admiration of generations of Hindu nationalists for Israel.Sumantra Bose, Professor of International and Comparative Politics, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1057052018-11-02T10:51:58Z2018-11-02T10:51:58ZJamal Khashoggi’s murder finally brings media attention to plight of Arab world’s exiled critics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243317/original/file-20181031-122162-1fhhn16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Candles, lit by activists, protesting the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, are placed outside Saudi Arabia's consulate, in Istanbul.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Saudi-Arabia-Writer-Killed/bb55e6d76ed947b8a7f26929c19e8342/50/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The gruesome and dramatic <a href="https://townhall.com/columnists/calthomas/2018/10/17/the-khashoggi-affair-n2529048">killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a> in the Saudi consulate in Turkey has captivated media outlets around the world.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/jamal-khashoggi-what-the-arab-world-needs-most-is-free-expression">A columnist</a> for the Washington Post, Khashoggi had been living in the United States since 2017 as a Saudi exile. </p>
<p>Some have frowned upon this excessive coverage, wondering why one particular instance of <a href="http://alonben-meir.com/writing/the-saudi-butchery-in-yemen-and-the-worlds-apathy/">Saudi butchery</a> was making headlines, while the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-says-the-time-to-end-the-saudi-backed-war-in-yemen-is-now/2018/10/31/67d930ea-dd2c-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html?utm_term=.90c7b03c8413">Saudi-backed war in Yemen</a> has been going on for years, has claimed the lives of thousands of children and hasn’t received a fraction of the attention.</p>
<p>But I think the coverage of Khashoggi’s murder is important. As an expert in Arab media, <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137020918?msclkid=6ef742eda7cd1925c0d71935c7f18358&utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Shopping%2520%257C%2520eBooks%2520%257C%2520US&utm_term=4576510994090740&utm_content=All%2520eBooks#otherversion=9781349437597">I’ve studied the cyberactivists</a> who work to bring about political and social change in the Arab world. </p>
<p>For the first time, the media is bringing widespread attention to the real dangers faced every day by opponents of Arab regimes living abroad. </p>
<p>This was not the first, nor will it be the last, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article/63/4/480/2402855">government-orchestrated crime</a> against Arab journalists and activists who are living in exile. However, before Khashoggi’s death, many of these crimes went unnoticed or underreported.</p>
<h2>The Arab Spring fizzles – and many flee</h2>
<p>Beginning in 2011, waves of opposition to the regimes in power swept through six Arab countries: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. </p>
<p>Known as the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/19/what-the-arab-uprising-protesters-really-wanted/?utm_term=.886fb8ef62e4">Arab Spring</a>, many of these protest movements had a similar set of demands: freedom, dignity and democracy.</p>
<p>Some of these countries were long led by dictators, such as <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/01/07/world/meast/hosni-mubarak---fast-facts/index.html">Hosni Mubarak</a>, who ruled Egypt for 30 years; <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2011/02/201122117565923629.html">Moammar Gadhafi</a>, who ruled Libya for 42 years; and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12196679">Zine El Abidine Ben Ali</a>, who ruled Tunisia for 23 years. It was the first time in decades that these countries witnessed popular uprisings that shook the thrones of political leaders and ousted them from power. </p>
<p><a href="http://natoassociation.ca/tunisian-exceptionalism-explaining-tunisias-post-arab-spring-success/">Tunisia</a> was able to chart a relatively smooth, peaceful path toward reform and democratization. </p>
<p>But it ended up being the exception.</p>
<p>The rest of the Arab Spring countries had brief dalliances with democracy, only to revert to a system of political oppression and authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-libya">Libya</a> is torn by sectarian strife; <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html">Yemen</a> is being bombed day and night; <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/civil-war-in-syria">Syria</a> is experiencing the worst civil war in modern history; <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/08/egypt-the-new-dictatorship/">Egypt</a> returned to a military dictatorship far worse than Mubarak’s; and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/13/how-bahrains-crushed-uprising-spawned-the-middle-easts-sectarianism/?utm_term=.395f831a553a">Bahrain’s uprising</a> was suppressed.</p>
<p>Fearing for their lives and safety – and unable to openly organize and express themselves – many of the leading Arab Spring activists and journalists fled their home countries.</p>
<p>Some, such as Egyptian blogger <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44226464">Wael Abbas</a>, didn’t make it out and remain imprisoned in their home countries. Others, such as Egyptian blogger <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/investing-in-the-legacy-of-the-arab-spring/2015/04/26/c44b1638-e9c7-11e4-9767-6276fc9b0ada_story.html?utm_term=.e7b260fce5d5">Maikel Nabil Sanad</a>, are now living in exile.</p>
<p>Although Saudi Arabia wasn’t officially one of the Arab Spring countries, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-protests/saudi-arabia-says-wont-tolerate-protests-idUSTRE72419N20110305">anti-government protests did crop up across the nation</a> in <a href="https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-women-defy-ban-to-register-for-polls-1.799161">2011</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arrest/saudi-police-arrest-prominent-shiite-muslim-cleric-idUSBRE8670GH20120708">2012</a>. There was enough concern among the ruling class to further <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/20111121195944732930.html">crack down</a> and <a href="https://www.webcitation.org/5xQmQEnJ2?url=http://www.acpra.net/news.php?action=list&cat_id=12">suppress opposing voices</a>. </p>
<p>The heightened repression and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35154411">stifling of freedom of expression</a> in Saudi Arabia forced many dissidents and opponents to flee the country and, like their Arab Spring peers, exercise their opposition in the diaspora.</p>
<p>For many years, Jamal Khashoggi worked as a journalist in Saudi Arabia, eventually becoming editor-in-chief of the Saudi Arabian daily al-Watan. But in 2003, authorities removed him from his position after one of his columnists wrote a piece critical of an Islamic scholar. Khashoggi moved to London, bounced around the Middle East, and <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/authors/J/Ja/Jamal-Khashoggi.html?currentPage=1">regularly wrote</a> for the Dubai-based periodical al-Arabiya.</p>
<h2>An attack on one, an attack on all</h2>
<p>While Khashoggi eventually relocated to the U.S. in 2017, many political bloggers and activists who oppose Arab ruling regimes have moved to Turkey.</p>
<p><a href="http://aymanoormasr.blogspot.com/2009/12/my-biography.html">Dr. Ayman Nour</a>, for example, was arrested in Egypt in 2005 for daring to run as a presidential candidate against former President Hosni Mubarak. After the military coup in Egypt in 2013, Nour founded <a href="https://www.egyptindependent.com/employees-at-turkey-based-al-sharq-news-channel-admit-qatari-financing/">al-Sharq</a>, a Turkey-based opposition TV channel, which aims to expose the repression and authoritarianism of the current Egyptian regime.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243316/original/file-20181031-122168-xqjqpf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman Nour has criticized Egypt’s ruling regime from Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Egypt-File-/6a684ccc15e1da11af9f0014c2589dfb/18/0">AP Photo/Nasser Nouri</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Shaken by Khashoggi’s murder, he and a number of prominent Arab and Turkish figures created the group “<a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/lifestyle/lifestyle-buzz/khashoggi-supporters-hold-vigil-outside-saudi-consulate/vp-BBOUqmB">Jamal Khashoggi Friends Association</a>” to raise international awareness about this hideous crime and the alarming message it sends to other opponents of autocratic regimes.</p>
<p>To activists like Nour, the attack on Khashoggi is an attack on everyone in the Arab opposition movement in the diaspora.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, their safety in their host countries has been far from guaranteed. In recent years, there have been a number of tragic incidents of violence and aggression directed at some of these activists. </p>
<p>Last year, Ahmed Barakat broke into the Istanbul apartment of his cousin, Syrian opposition activist <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/fbi-probing-murder-syrian-american-journalist-mother-turkey/story?id=51436199">Orouba Barakat</a>, and her daughter, Halla Barakat, a journalist who worked for the Syrian opposition channel <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orient_News">Orient News TV</a>, and gruesomely slaughtered both of them. <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/fbi-probing-murder-syrian-american-journalist-mother-turkey/story?id=51436199">Many suspect that Ahmed Barakat</a>, a former Free Syrian Army fighter, had been directed by the Assad regime to carry out the murders.</p>
<p>In March of this year, Saudi women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul was plucked from the streets of Abu Dhabi by security forces who returned her to Saudi Arabia, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-24/saudi-arabia-women-activists-jailed-as-driving-ban-ends/9900500">where she remains imprisoned</a>. </p>
<p>After Khashoggi’s murder, I reached out to a Syrian-American journalist living in exile in the United States, but who has contact with people in Turkey. Due to safety concerns, she spoke with me under condition of anonymity. </p>
<p>She noted that “especially after Khashoggi’s murder…the Turkish government [has] adopted tougher security measures.” But his death was only the latest. “Several Syrian opposition figures have been previously targeted and killed in Turkey,” she added.</p>
<h2>Saudi opposition weak at home and abroad</h2>
<p>Why aren’t the loudest voices opposing Khashoggi’s murder Saudi ones? </p>
<p>The country is, in many ways, a paradox.</p>
<p>On one hand, it has a very large, young, tech-savvy population and is the country with the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-twitter-users-in-selected-countries/">fourth-largest number of Twitter users</a> in the world. </p>
<p>On the other hand, however, there’s no freedom of the press, and public debate is pretty much nonexistent. </p>
<p>This explains why there has been complete silence inside Saudi Arabia around Khashoggi’s death aside from the ruling regime’s narrative, which <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-jamal-khashoggi-turkey-accuses-saudi-arabia-of-murdering-reporter-2018-10">has evolved</a> from denial, to evasion, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-jamal-khashoggi-turkey.html">to partial confession</a>. </p>
<p>While there has been a growing movement of Saudi opposition in the diaspora, unlike the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-arab-diaspora-finds-its-voice/article4243545/">Egyptian and Syrian opposition</a> movements, which have been more organized and capable of creating their own associations, Saudi opponents remain few and far between. They are mostly young activists using their social media platforms to voice individual criticisms.</p>
<p>One such activist is Omar Abdulaziz. A friend of Khashoggi’s, the young Saudi dissident lives in Montreal, Canada. </p>
<p>Using his YouTube, Twitter and Instagram accounts, Omar is openly critical of the Saudi regime for its repression, corruption and human rights violations.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1057395397931483143"}"></div></p>
<p>His vocal opposition hasn’t gone unpunished. In August 2018, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-arabia-arrests-brothers-and-friends-canada-based-bin-salman-critic-2018425">the Saudi regime arrested</a> two of his brothers and some of his friends in an act of retaliation. Yet, Omar <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/omar-abdulaziz-spyware-saudi-arabia-nso-citizen-lab-quebec-1.4845179">has insisted</a> that he won’t be silenced, intimidated or blackmailed. </p>
<p>Following Khashoggi’s murder, Omar described the Saudi crown prince as an “illegitimate leader” and a “killer” on Twitter and YouTube.</p>
<p>Because the price of activism – even abroad – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/10/critics-of-saudi-regime-are-at-risk-wherever-they-may-be">can be so high</a>, the public-facing Abdulaziz is an exception. Most Saudi opponents will keep a much lower profile, using pseudonyms or posting anonymously.</p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Authoritarian Arab regimes have tightened their grip on power and escalated their mechanisms of repression in the years since the Arab Spring uprisings. </p>
<p>Many of these regimes have been enabled by their own people, many of whom are either apathetic or supportive of their repressive policies: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/30/why-some-arabs-dont-want-democracy/?utm_term=.6d8a2ea6a421">They prioritize the promise of stability over the dream of freedom</a>.</p>
<p>They’ve also been emboldened by the current American administration, which practices <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-returns-u-s-to-realpolitik-in-world-affairs-1505851115">a brand of realpolitik</a> that prioritizes its economic interests over its values when dealing with autocrats and dictators. </p>
<p>But the death of Arab opponents such as Jamal Khashoggi doesn’t signal the death of Arab opposition. </p>
<p>With the whole world watching, texting, tweeting and chatting, I believe that many of these governments will eventually be condemned in the court of public opinion, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>If anything positive came out of the tragic murder of Khashoggi, it is that there has finally been extensive global media attention given to an extrajudicial killing in the diaspora. </p>
<p>The Saudi regime might think twice about trying to pull off something similar.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sahar Khamis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Will it embolden or neuter the Arab world’s autocratic regimes?Sahar Khamis, Associate Professor of Communication, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/966192018-05-23T10:42:02Z2018-05-23T10:42:02ZThe right-wing origins of the Jerusalem soccer team that wants to add ‘Trump’ to its name<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219269/original/file-20180516-155555-1iowx7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Throughout its storied history, the Beitar Jerusalem soccer team has won 13 state titles.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Israel-Racist-Fans/2d84200385f7491ea7da7cc94fcef681/38/0">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a nod of appreciation to Donald Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the Israeli soccer club Beitar Jerusalem <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2018/05/14/fc-beitar-jerusalem-soccer-add-donald-trump-name/606654002/">announced</a> that it would like to change its name to Beitar “Trump” Jerusalem.</p>
<p>The willingness of a major sports team to openly embrace a polarizing politician might come as a surprise to American sports fans. In the U.S., teams are generally loathe to publicly embrace particular politicians or candidates, lest they needlessly alienate segments of their fan base.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=0k4q_oAAAAAJ&hl=en">I study the cultural dynamics that shape Israeli political identities</a>, and sports in Israel are a powerful political sphere. Unlike American sports teams, Zionist sports federations <a href="https://journals.humankinetics.com/doi/abs/10.1123/ssj.6.4.305">were originally organized along political fault lines</a> in the first half of the 20th century, with political rivals competing on the playing field.</p>
<p>Beitar Jerusalem is closely aligned with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, and its fans have long viewed themselves as political and economic outsiders. When it’s viewed through this lens, the team’s eagerness to associate itself with Trump and his brand of politics make sense. </p>
<h2>The team of Israel’s forgotten Jews</h2>
<p>In 1923, <a href="http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/betar">the Beitar movement</a> was founded in Latvia. A Revisionist Zionist youth movement, it differed from mainstream Zionism in a few key ways: It promoted a more aggressive expansionism, seeking to establish a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan River; it assumed a belligerent posture toward the British government in Palestine; and, eventually, it adopted anti-socialist views.</p>
<p>In 1936, David Horn, who chaired the local Beitar branch in Jerusalem, recruited some Revisionist activists to establish the Beitar Jerusalem soccer club. Many of them belonged to the <a href="http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-the-irgun-etzel">Irgun</a>, an underground militia that launched attacks against Arab and, later, British targets. In the 1940s, because of some players’ affiliation with underground militias, British authorities expelled them. </p>
<p>After the state of Israel was established in 1948, Beitar’s image as a bastion of opposition only hardened. </p>
<p>In Israel’s early years, the socialist <a href="http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/mapai-political-party">Mapai party</a> was the country’s most powerful political party. Hapoel, the country’s largest soccer federation, belonged to the General Federation of Labor in Israel and, therefore, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d6849396-ef64-11de-86c4-00144feab49a">was closely aligned with Mapai</a>. </p>
<p>Beitar Jerusalem, on the other hand, tended to attract outsiders and the oppressed as fans. </p>
<p>During the 1950s and 1960s, Jerusalem absorbed many of the Jews who emigrated en masse from Arab and Muslim countries – people who, in Israel today, are called “<a href="http://img2.tapuz.co.il/CommunaFiles/44245324.pdf">Mizrahim</a>.” These immigrants, especially those from Northern Africa, often found themselves looked down upon, discriminated against, and relegated to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13531040801902708?scroll=top&needAccess=true">bottom of the socioeconomic ladder and the margins of the political system</a>. Those who didn’t belong to the ruling Mapai party suffered from additional discrimination in employment and housing.</p>
<p>In those years, Beitar attracted the sympathy of many Mizrahim, and the team’s circle of fans evolved into a kind of political and cultural opposition.</p>
<p>Politically, the team continued to be identified with the right-wing Herut party that was populist, anti-socialist and committed to territorial expansionism. Its bleachers, meanwhile, boomed with songs and slogans borrowed and adapted from old <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sephardic_music">Sephardi Jewish</a> religious tunes. Until the early 1980s, the government-monopolized media – run by Jews of European origin – often excluded these songs from the airwaves.</p>
<h2>Success on the pitch – and at the ballot box</h2>
<p>Over time, Beitar transformed from a team with a local following to one with a large national fan base. Its close ties to Likud leaders probably helped build its following and winning the state cup tournaments in 1976 and 1979 – just around the time Likud <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/This-Week-in-History-The-Likud-upheaval">seized power in 1977</a> – caused the team’s popularity to explode. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219271/original/file-20180516-155564-v0ikjm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The ascension of Likud founder Menachem Begin to prime minster in 1977 ended 29 years of Israeli Labor Party rule.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Israel-BEGI-/e6fda8f69ce5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/5/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Throughout the 1980s, the overlapping affiliations of Likud, the Mizrahi people and the Beitar soccer team crystallized. Beitar Jerusalem’s successes during the 1980s and 1990s – <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beitar_Jerusalem_F.C.#Cup_competitions">three championships and three state cups</a> – made the team popular among a wider circle of fans, which included even some Arab citizens.</p>
<p>However, the team remained especially popular among the people <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-in-israeli-ethnic-politics-this-is-what-revenge-looks-like-1.5843527">who were once called</a> “the second Israel” – the lower-class Mizrahim.</p>
<p>While Beitar’s right-wing leanings are nothing new, since the 1990s a new vocal segment of its fan base have expressed anti-Arab attitudes. Beitar remains the only professional soccer team in Israel <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/football/2017/09/14/israel-club-official-quits-after-saying-he-would-never-sign-muslims">to have never signed an Arab player</a>. The fan organization <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJOV_cN-JP8">La Familia</a>, established in 2005, has close ties with the country’s far-right politicians and it openly identifies with the outlawed <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/kach-kahane-chai-israel-extremists">Kach movement</a>, which seeks to install a theocracy and expel all Arabs from Israel and the territories it occupied in 1967.</p>
<p>The front office has made some attempts to bring Arab players on board, only to be <a href="https://www.haaretz.co.il/sport/israel-soccer/beitar/1.2678132">rebuffed by their fans</a>. Today, some hardcore fans consider anti-Arabism inherent to the identity of the club. Their repertoire of slogans and chants includes some rather <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJ0EIr37BQY">profane anti-Arab and anti-Muslim messages</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s behind the racism?</h2>
<p>Scholars of Israeli society have tried to explain why many Mizrahi Beitar fans espouse nationalistic, hawkish and, at times, Arab-hating views. Some point out that the Mizrahim are in competition with Arabs over the same low-paying jobs. <a href="http://theory-and-criticism.vanleer.org.il/%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9F-20-%D7%90%D7%91%D7%99%D7%91-2002/">Others argue</a> that, in a political atmosphere that stigmatizes Arab identities and discriminates against Arabs, Mizrahim feel the need to reject Arab elements of their identity. </p>
<p>At the same time, there are other soccer clubs, like Israel’s champion Hapoel Be'er Sheva and Bnei Yahuda, that have a big Mizrahi fan base. These teams signed Arab players, and their Mizrahi fans didn’t organize to prevent their inclusion.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/219268/original/file-20180516-155569-2x4ghm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beitar Jerusalem F.C. soccer supporters cheer during a match against the Arab team Maccabi Umm al-Fahm F.C.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-Israel-Soccer/5ea10da7fcd14db4b232498e0d49c6c8/34/0">AP Photo/Bernat Armangue</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So what’s going on with Beitar Jerusalem? Since 1967, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/50-years-israeli-occupation-longest-modern-history-170604111317533.html">when Israel occupied East Jerusalem</a> and annexed it against the will of its Arab residents, the city has been a hotbed of political extremism and violence. This political atmosphere interacts with Mizrahi fans’ feelings of marginalization; together, they can lead to hostile attitudes toward Arabs. </p>
<p>There are obvious parallels between Beitar Jerusalem’s fan base and the supporters of Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/trumps-rhetoric-of-white-nostalgia/485192/">who feel politically and culturally marginalized</a> – or, as Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-at-republican-national-convention-trump-to-paint-dire-picture-of-america/2016/07/21/418f9ae6-4fad-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html?utm_term=.7af73e5548fe">describes them</a>, the country’s “forgotten men and women.” In this context, the team name change makes sense. </p>
<p>It’s unlikely, however, that it will be officially implemented.</p>
<p>First, it contradicts the <a href="http://football.org.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/FTP/leer/%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%AA%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9F%20%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%93%20%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9B%D7%9F%2030.11.15.pdf">bylaws</a> of the Israel Football Association, which states that teams can only be named after dead people. </p>
<p>Second, many Beitar Jerusalem fans are vocally opposing the proposed name change <a href="https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2FBeitarFcJerusalem%2Fposts%2F699124623591425&">on social media</a>. </p>
<p>Trump, as an ally of Netanyahu, is very popular among these fans. But the team name has remained the same for all 82 years of the club’s existence. </p>
<p>In their view, tradition trumps political expediency.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tamir Sorek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beitar Jerusalem has always attracted the outsiders, the oppressed and the victimized – Israel’s ‘forgotten Jews.’Tamir Sorek, Professor of Sociology, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812462017-09-18T01:04:46Z2017-09-18T01:04:46ZOn Yom Kippur, remembering Mosul’s rich and diverse past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186213/original/file-20170915-8102-1lp2iuv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 1932 photograph showing the minaret of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, Mosul.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010001703/PP/">Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Yom Kippur each year, as Jews around the world pray for atonement, the biblical <a href="http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/book-of-jonah">Book of Jonah</a> is <a href="http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/jonah-yom-kippur/">read in its entirety</a>. </p>
<p>Jews recall the story of how God summons Jonah to go to the city of Nineveh to tell its inhabitants to turn from their evil deeds. At first reluctant, Jonah is famously humbled by God, who causes him to be swallowed by a fish. Jonah then returns to Nineveh; the city repents and is spared from destruction.</p>
<p>The newer, but still ancient, city of Mosul is located next to Nineveh in northern Iraq. The Islamic State, during its occupation of Mosul, deliberately destroyed many of the <a href="http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/04/160419-Islamic-State-ISIS-ISIL-Nineveh-gates-Iraq-Mosul-destroyed/">excavated remains of Nineveh</a>.</p>
<p>As a scholar of Islamic art, <a href="http://notevenpast.org/carved-in-stone-what-architecture-can-tell-us-about-the-sectarian-history-of-islam/">I know</a> that such acts of deliberate, ideologically based destruction are unusual in Islamic history. Although today Mosul is famous outside of Iraq primarily as a site of conflict, its rich and diverse history forms an important legacy. </p>
<h2>What was lost in Mosul?</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186048/original/file-20170914-24296-x589ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The heavily damaged al-Nuri mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Felipe Dana</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The precise date of the city’s foundation is unknown, but at least from the medieval era it was known in the Arabic spoken by Jews, Christians and Muslims in the city as “Madinat al-anbiya’,” or “City of the Prophets,” with <a href="http://www.monumentsofmosul.com/">dozens</a> of tombs, shrines, synagogues and churches. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most famous of these was the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonah">Tomb of the Prophet Jonah</a>, a figure revered by all three faiths alike. For Jews, Jonah is venerated as a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2010/08/the-sullen-prophet-a-commentary-on-the-book-of-jonah/61210/">symbol of repentance</a> – the reason for which the Book of Jonah is read on Yom Kippur. And in Islam, <a href="https://quran.com/10/98-108">Jonah evokes the themes</a> of justice, mercy and obedience – seen as exemplary models for human behavior. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.academia.edu/34200898/Shrines_for_Saints_and_Sultans_On_the_destruction_of_local_heritage_sites_by_ISIS_English_">numerous other sites</a> in Mosul linked to prophetic figures: among them, the Monastery of Elijah or <a href="http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/in-iraq-a-monastery-rediscovered-12457610/">Dar Eliyas</a>, a 1,400-year-old Christian monastery thought to be the oldest in Iraq but also visited by people of many faiths. </p>
<p>The Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul was founded in the 12th century by one of Islam’s most famous rulers, <a href="https://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/11993/original/DTP104378.pdf?1498152426">Nur al-Din ibn Zangi</a>. In the medieval period it was considered the “<a href="https://squarekufic.com/2017/06/23/the-mosque-al-nuri-in-mosul-what-was-lost/">ultimate in beauty and excellence</a>.” It was famous for its soaring, 150-foot <a href="https://www.wmf.org/project/al-hadba%E2%80%99-minaret">minaret</a>, the tallest in Iraq and nicknamed <a href="https://archnet.org/sites/3840">“al-Hadba’”</a> or “the Hunchback” because it leaned to one side, like an Islamic Tower of Pisa. </p>
<p>Sadly, <a href="https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Iraq_NebiYunis_422015_0.pdf">none of these monuments</a> – neither the tomb of Jonah, nor the monastery of Elijah – <a href="https://apnews.com/5093ba551d1b45b08fe8a26363b88f54/only-ap-oldest-christian-monastery-iraq-razed">survived</a> <a href="http://www.monumentsofmosul.com/">the destruction of IS</a>. The mosque was <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/21/islaimic-state-blows-landmark-great-mosque-al-nuri-famous-leaning/">destroyed</a> in June this year.</p>
<h2>World trade, intellectual center</h2>
<p>Mosul was also an important center for trade as well as scholarly exchange. </p>
<p>It sat at a key junction on the <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-silk-roads-9781408839973/">Silk Road</a> – a rich network of premodern superhighways – stretching over mountains, deserts and plains across three continents – that moved goods from lands that seemed impossibly distant and exotic to those at either end. Mosul itself was known for some of the most <a href="http://www.metmuseum.org/metmedia/video/collections/isl/blacas-ewer">luxurious inlaid metalware</a> of the medieval era.</p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-116" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/116/45b10421d26387bb4cb34a6f493a8604c713ee88/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As a center of such exchange, the city was home to a <a href="http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Mosul_Ethnic_lg.png">diverse</a> group of people: Arabs and Kurds, Yazidis, Jews and Christians, Sunnis and Shias, Sufis and dozens of saints holy to many faiths. </p>
<p>It was also a center for poets, scholars and philosophers, such as the 10th-century philosopher <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2wS2CAAAQBAJ&pg=PR46&lpg=PR46&dq=philosopher+al-mawsili&source=bl&ots=MOgBVUPXWY&sig=bwwiIxICiwr6DzmQCkGkqjjRKbk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_xZy2kaTWAhXoq1QKHbonCVgQ6AEIPDAF#v=onepage&q=al-mawsili&f=false">al-Mawsili</a> and the 11th-century astronomer al-Qabisi, <a href="https://nyupress.org/books/9780814780237/">one of a line of famous Mosul astronomers</a> who helped formulate a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Fz5kgjMDnOIC&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=critique+of+ptolemaic+astronomy+mosul&source=bl&ots=_bVpqJQEk9&sig=-vpa-RRxNKklDk6e-IzaIglNGH0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjF6cHWl6TWAhXliVQKHXO5AqcQ6AEISDAF#v=onepage&q=critique%20of%20ptolemaic%20astronomy%20mosul&f=false">critique of the Earth-centered model of the universe</a>. That model would eventually make its way to Europe to inform Copernicus’ view of the solar system. Mosul also produced one of Islam’s most famous historians, <a href="https://archive.org/details/IbnAlAthirInCicilianMuslims">Ibn al-Athir</a>, who completed his magnum opus, a monumental universal chronicle called “The Complete History,” in the city in 1231.</p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=HwpxDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT132&lpg=PT132&dq=medieval+mathematics+in+mosul&source=bl&ots=ytT7_LkuIA&sig=4pM1xX5wW4WQk6uaWJAGJNIMoUo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiQtYSox6fWAhXFKVAKHaPFDlUQ6AEINTAF#v=onepage&q=medieval%20mathematics%20in%20mosul&f=false">Important works of mathematics</a>, including a commentary on the Greek mathematician Euclid that was later translated into Latin, <a href="https://www.ircica.org/mathematicians-astronomers-and-other-scholars-of-islamic-civilization-and-their-works-7th-19th-c/irc601.aspx">were written in Mosul</a>. It was also a center for significant medical advances, including an early description of surgery to remove <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/eye-specialists-islamic-cultures#ftn2">cataracts</a>.</p>
<p>As mosques were traditionally places of <a href="http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/education-islam-role-mosque">knowledge transmission</a> and learning, it is entirely possible that some of these scholars’ ideas were formulated, discussed and refined within the mosque of al-Nuri’s walls. </p>
<p>Mosul’s medieval past informed its contemporary history as well: In modern times, the city was home to some of the most important museums, <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mosuls-library-without-books">libraries</a> and universities in Iraq, including a renowned <a href="http://medicinemosul.uomosul.edu.iq/en/page.php?details=15">medical school</a>. </p>
<h2>The meaning of the mosque in Iraq</h2>
<p>Although the mosque of al-Nuri was transformed over the centuries, it remained a beloved symbol of the ancient city and its diverse heritage. In 1942, much of the mosque, with the exception of the minaret, the prayer niche and some of its columns, went through significant <a href="https://archnet.org/system/publications/contents/11993/original/DTP104378.pdf?1498152426">renovation</a>. But the mosque did not lose its value for the citizens of Mosul – in fact, it appeared on the <a href="https://www.safedinar.com/10000-iraqi-dinar/">Iraqi 10,000 dinar bill</a>.</p>
<p>In June of 2014, when IS originally captured the city and approached the mosque with explosives, residents of the town <a href="http://nationalpost.com/news/world/israel-middle-east/iraqis-save-840-year-old-crooked-minaret-from-isis-after-militants-blow-up-old-testament-prophets-tomb/wcm/3cd00209-9c67-4fae-b8a4-963895b57db2">formed a human chain</a> around it. </p>
<p>Only a few short weeks later, in a complete about-face, IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stood at the pulpit of that same mosque and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iconic-al-nuri-mosque-mosul-destroyed/">declared</a> the creation of his “caliphate.” </p>
<h2>Mosul past and future</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186214/original/file-20170915-8102-yzeyr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1054&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leaning minaret.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/matpc.12380/">Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C. 20540 USA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mosul <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/global-development/la-fg-global-rebuilding-mosul-20170717-story.html">has already begun to rebuild</a> its damaged mosque, its Jewish shrines and its churches. But for those of us outside Iraq, who today know Mosul largely through newspaper stories of war and intolerance, the loss of these sites will make it that much harder to imagine the diverse intellectual and religious world that once characterized not only Mosul but all of the Middle East. </p>
<p>Although there were conflicts, Christians, Jews and Muslims lived in <a href="https://15minutehistory.org/2015/01/21/episode-62-sunni-and-shia-in-medieval-syria/">pragmatic cooperation</a> for much of their history. It was the Christians of the city, after all, who said that the minaret leaned because it was bowing toward the tomb of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/isis-blows-up-mosque-in-mosul-where-baghdadi-declared-caliphate/2017/06/21/7070ff30-56b9-11e7-840b-512026319da7_story.html?utm_term=.16b49173b533">the Virgin Mary</a>.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a piece originally published on Sept. 17, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephennie Mulder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Mosul rebuilds, its history is a reminder that people of many faiths lived in cooperation in the city. In the city was the Tomb of Prophet Jonah, venerated by Jews, Christians and Muslims alike.Stephennie Mulder, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.