tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/ariel-sharon-8556/articlesAriel Sharon – The Conversation2024-02-29T12:55:31Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247642024-02-29T12:55:31Z2024-02-29T12:55:31ZWhat is Netanyahu’s plan for a post-conflict Gaza and does it rule out a workable ceasefire? Expert Q&A<p><em>In recent days Joe Biden has been promising that a deal for a ceasefire is very close to agreement. But at the same time the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has revealed his vision for Gaza once the fighting stops, which appears to rule out Palestinian sovereignty on the strip. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>After weeks of wrangling, Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has published his vision for a post-conflict Gaza. How compatible is it with the idea of a two-state solution? To what extent is his tough line influenced by the more hawkish members of his government who take a hardline attitude to Palestinian sovereignty?</strong></p>
<p>Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/27/post-war-gaza-plan-netanyahu-israel-day-after-future-abbas/">plan for a post-war Gaza</a> is simply not practical and does not rise to the political challenges of the times. It is based on two principles: Israeli security control over Gaza and a civil administration run by non-Hamas officials. </p>
<p>But there has been Israeli security control over Gaza in one form since 1967 and it has not brought security for either Israel or Palestinians. There is no reason to think that the Israel Defense Forces can do better now, especially after this catastrophic war. At the same time, it is difficult to see where the non-Hamas Palestinian officials will come from. Hamas has had a tight grip of Gaza since 2007 and anyone with any experience of administration is likely to be a member of Hamas, a sympathiser or someone used to working with Hamas. </p>
<p>While there is opposition to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there is little organised political opposition that could replace them. Like the US and Britain in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, when they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/29/usa.iraq">banned officials from the Ba'athist party</a> from the administration, chaos will follow. The only realistic option is to extend the power of the Palestinian Authority – presently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/what-is-the-palestinian-authority-and-how-is-it-viewed-by-palestinians">based in Ramallah</a> – into Gaza. But Netanyahu and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">far-right allies</a> think it will advance pressure for a two-state solution – something they are opposed to. </p>
<p><strong>To what extent is this a starting point for Netanyahu? Has he left himself the political space to manoeuvre given pressure from the US and other international allies?</strong></p>
<p>The plan was provided mainly due to international pressure – especially by the Americans. It should be noted that the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, has been raising the issue of post-conflict Gaza with the Israelis since November and it still took months to produce this flimsy document. </p>
<p>This gives us an insight into how difficult it is in practice for the US administration to use its apparent power over the Israeli government. Netanyahu has much experience of dealing with American politicians and plays the system very well. He knows that Biden needs a calmer Middle East as a background to his re-election bid in November. As a result, the bargaining relationship is quite complex. </p>
<p>Netanyahu clearly thinks he has time on his side. The nearer it gets to the US election the more difficult it gets for Biden to please the progressive Democrats who want a ceasefire and the more traditional Democrats who have Israel’s back. What Netanyahu is doing is the minimum in the hope of hanging on hoping for a Trump win. </p>
<p><strong>Does Netanyahu’s vision reflect the feelings of the Jewish community in Israel? What about Arab voters? The prime minister appears deeply unpopular among most voter groups – is his intransigence more about maintaining his hold on power than on seeking a workable long term solution?</strong></p>
<p>While Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">deeply unpopular</a> with all sections of the Israeli public, we have to be careful in reading the public mood on policies for a post-war dispensation. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/opinion/israel-hostage-negotiations-entebbe.html">Polling suggests</a> that support for a two-state solution is declining. Israelis have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">so traumatised by October 7</a> that there is little support for Palestinian empowerment. </p>
<p>To some extent this is the result of the way that the Israelis view their country’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. It is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-decade-later-israelis-see-gaza-pullout-as-big-mistake/2015/08/14/21c06518-3480-11e5-b835-61ddaa99c73e_story.html">often presented</a> as an example of what happens when Israel ceases to occupy Palestinian land. In this account Israel leaves Gaza and Gaza becomes an armed encampment with the aim of destroying Israel – and indeed this <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67039975">remains Hamas’s policy</a>, despite the group releasing an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas">amended charter in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>But the 2005 disengagement which included dismantling all Israeli settlements in the strip was not the result of negotiations, but a unilateral act. The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, did not want to hand over power to the elected Palestinian Authority, thinking it would boost the PA’s for statehood. Instead, Israel just left – and that allowed Hamas, the major political force in Gaza, to claim that Israel has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/45870/chapter-abstract/400820054?redirectedFrom=fulltext">“retreated under fire”</a>. Hamas then capitalised on the situation and went on to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1">win the Palestinian legislative</a> elections in 2006. </p>
<p>The lesson of this is that Israel needs proper negotiations that can lead to a sustainable future – and that can only mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. That is not merely right for the Palestinians but essential in any plan to defeat Hamas. It’s not only a military operation but a political one and Palestinians need to be offered a peaceful and just alternative.</p>
<p><strong>The US president, Joe Biden, has been talking up the idea of a ceasefire deal in recent days. But Netanyahu’s plan seems to make the deal brokered in Qatar an impossibility. Is Netanyahu serious about bringing an end to the conflict? Or is talk about a possible deal more about Israel’s need to be seen to be playing the game as well as optimism from a US president who needs to be able to show to his own voter base that he is getting results?</strong></p>
<p>Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert argues that Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-22/ty-article-opinion/.premium/netanyahus-messianic-coalition-partners-want-an-all-out-regional-war/0000018d-d237-d06c-abbd-daf733870000">dragging Israel into a long term war</a> to save himself. Olmert draws some drastic conclusions from his analysis suggesting that Netanyahu and his far-right allies want a permanent war that would also see Palestinians driven out of the West Bank. That might seem too apocalyptic – but it does convey a sense of the mismatch between US aims and the Israeli political dynamic.</p>
<p>Talks are going on simultaneously in Qatar, in Paris and in Cairo. It is evident that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/what-we-know-so-far-about-the-draft-israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal#:%7E:text=It%20envisions%20a%2040%2Dday,and%20fuel%20to%20start%20rebuilding.">formula for a 40-day ceasefire</a> has been agreed but there is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">wrangling over the details</a>. Much of this focuses on the grizzly trading over how many Palestinian prisoners will be exchanged for which Israeli hostages – both those still alive and those dead. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">Gaza war: Palestinian prisoners will be a key condition of any ceasefire deal – here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What is quite clear is that both Israel and Hamas have been dragging their feet as each thinks it is gaining the advantage by continuing the fighting. But with the arrival of the month of Ramadan (beginning March 10 – the date that Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">plans to begin</a> its ground assault on the city of Rafah) there is some likelihood of a Ramadan truce. </p>
<p>Netanyahu is under <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/19/pressure-building-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-israel">massive popular pressure</a> in Israel to move on the hostages even if that means painful concessions. Hamas is also under pressure by the masses of displaced Gazans who just want a semblance of a bearable existence for their families. So while Washington is exerting maximum pressure on Israel and its Arab allies, it is likely to be factors in Israel and Gaza that will lead to at least a temporary ceasefire. The challenge will then be to use the time to produce something permanent. </p>
<p><strong>Is it even feasible for the Israeli government to continue with its policy of refusing to deal with Hamas?</strong></p>
<p>In effect Israel has been dealing with Hamas indirectly all along. If the Israeli war aims were being successful it would not have to be negotiating with them over the hostage release issue. But I think that it’s now no longer possible for Israel to talk to Hamas politically. In 2009 I thought <a href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/author/michael-walzer-john-strawson-ghada-karmi-donna-rob/">it was still possible</a> At the time it seemed possible that Hamas and Israel could agree a <em>Hudna</em>, an Islamic legal term for a long-term truce. But October 7 and subsequent Hamas statements and actions show that its real policy is the annihilation of Israel. So there is nothing to speak about. The real question is Israel speaking to the Palestinian Authority and having a viable plan for Gaza after the war rather than a renewed occupation. </p>
<p>The key to the next stage is to create a security mechanism that can replace the IDF and ensure the security of both Israel <em>and</em> the Palestinians. The international community – in particular the UN – has to stop being rhetorical and start being practical about peacemaking. What is needed is a security force that will give both Israelis and Palestinians confidence that the situation will change. Both sides must be able to feel secure – no more atrocities like October 7 and the Israeli response which has now killed 30,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians – and a high proportion of which have been women and children. </p>
<p>What is required is a multinational force that combines Arab League and Nato forces under perhaps Saudi command. Unless there is movement on this issue, there is little chance of a framework where any meaningful talks can take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, answers questions about the Israeli prime minister’s plan for Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2157362023-10-17T15:22:59Z2023-10-17T15:22:59ZGaza conflict: how children’s lives are affected on every level<p>Children living in Gaza have never known anything but overcrowding, shortages, conflict and danger. </p>
<p>It’s been 18 years since the then Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, moved all Israel’s settlers and military personnel out of the Gaza Strip. The country’s official narrative then became that they were no longer an occupying force. </p>
<p>But two years later, following the election of Hamas, the Israeli government <a href="https://euromedmonitor.org/en/gaza">imposed a blockade</a> on the entire Gaza Strip. So today’s 18-year-olds have suffered in a state of privation for pretty much their whole lives.</p>
<p>Relocation of settlers and soldiers and the imposition of the blockade did not release Israel from its responsibility under international law towards the civilian population in Gaza. According to the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ihl-occupying-power-responsibilities-occupied-palestinian-territories#:%7E:text=The%20ICRC%20considers%20Gaza%20to,of%20the%20border%20with%20Egypt">International Committee of the Red Cross</a>, Israel is still “bound by certain obligations under the law of occupation”. As detailed in <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-55?activeTab=undefined">article 55</a> of the fourth Geneva convention, this includes ensuring that the population of Gaza receives food, medicines and other basic goods.</p>
<p>But over recent days the Israeli government has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/defense-minister-announces-complete-siege-of-gaza-no-power-food-or-fuel/">tightened the blockade</a> so that even commodities essential for survival are denied to the civilian population. As researchers on the protection of children in Gaza, we – the authors of this article – are receiving messages from families that they are surviving on bread and contaminated water.</p>
<p>The world is learning, almost in real time, about the impact on the children of Gaza of the latest siege-like conditions imposed by Israel in the wake of Hamas’ attacks. The lack of water and food is inevitably affecting the young more immediately and more severely than adults. </p>
<p>Those children who fall sick or are injured seek treatment in a collapsing health system, with <a href="https://www.emro.who.int/media/news/hospitals-in-the-gaza-strip-at-a-breaking-point-warns-who.html">multiple facilities attacked</a>. Those still functioning must manage an impossible level of demand along with a drastic shortage of medicine. In such circumstances many children are vulnerable to severe harm and death.</p>
<h2>The toll of war</h2>
<p>But it would be a mistake to assume that even prior to the current tightening of the blockade, children in Gaza enjoyed healthy lives. Within the densely populated Gaza Strip, the health needs of children have grown exponentially due to the conditions of the Israeli blockade.</p>
<p>Regular exposure to direct military attacks affects both the physical and mental health of the young. Older children will have experienced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/conflict-between-israel-palestinians-gaza-2023-10-07/">six wars</a> including the current one in their brief lifetimes (2008-9, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2022 and 2023).</p>
<p>Since Israel imposed its blockade in 2007 up until the current war, Defense for Children International - Palestine (DCIP), a Palestinian human rights organisation specifically focused on child rights, has counted <a href="https://www.dci-palestine.org/child_fatalities_by_region">1,189 Palestinian children</a> killed in Gaza by Israeli military attacks. These wars have also created long-term threats to children’s survival and wellbeing. In the aftermath of each war, Israel has <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/briefing-notes/mb-gaza-israel-blockade-civilians-270818-en.pdf">tightened access</a> to Gaza via the main commercial crossing for construction materials, generators and water. </p>
<p>Without these materials, it has been impossible to clear the debris fully, and to rebuild homes, schools, hospitals and public spaces. The lack of reconstruction poses severe risks to children playing outside. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8736/UNEP_Gaza_EA.pdf?sequence=2&%3BisAllowed=">report</a> conducted by the UN Environment Programme following the 2008-9 war highlighted the serious health issues due to the debris that would particularly affect children. Polluted water supplies, contaminated soil, extensive rubble, including exposed metal rods, have all created grave risk for the young. </p>
<h2>Crumbling infrastructure</h2>
<p>Blockade has also made it impossible to develop vitally needed infrastructure. The provision of <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/failing-gaza-undrinkable-water-no-access-toilets-and-little-hope-horizon">clean water</a> and adequate sewage and waste disposal requires massive investment to meet the needs of the population. Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/seawater-pollution-raises-concerns-waterborne-diseases-and-environmental-hazards-gaza-strip#ftn1">electricity shortages</a> and shortage of sanitation structures mean that the sea in Gaza is highly contaminated by sewage and poorly treated wastewater. </p>
<p>With very few safe public play spaces for children, the beach is one place that many have turned to for relief. According to a <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2018-10-16/ty-article-magazine/.premium/polluted-water-a-leading-cause-of-gazan-child-mortality-says-rand-corp-study/0000017f-e847-dc7e-adff-f8ef68c50000">2018 report</a> by the RAND Corporation, however, water-related diseases are a primary cause of child and infant mortality in Gaza.</p>
<p>Some children require complex medical care that is not available in Gaza. Under international law, children’s access to adequate medical care is the responsibility of Israel. According to human rights organisations, <a href="https://www.mezan.org/uploads/files/1677830549CAAC%202022-%20English.pdf">requests for medical permits</a> for children to access necessary care in Israel are routinely denied. </p>
<p>The need for rehabilitative support for disabled children grew in 2018 and 2019 when thousands of children and youth participated in demonstrations during the “<a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/10/gaza-great-march-of-return/">great march of return</a>”. Israeli forces <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/two-years-on-people-injured-and-traumatized-during-the-great-march-of-return-are-still-struggling/">responded</a> with live and rubber bullets, killing 46 and injuring nearly 8,800 children. Many children who sustained life-altering injuries, including loss of limbs, were not granted permits to leave Gaza to receive the rehabilitative care they required.</p>
<p>Palestinian doctors, nurses, other medical practitioners, social workers and civil society organisations have spent 16 years doing their utmost to provide for the health and wellbeing of Palestinian children in Gaza under blockade.</p>
<p>Despite multiple evacuation orders from the Israeli military in the past week, <a href="https://www.map.org.uk/news/archive/post/1522-map-warns-of-catastrophic-situation-in-gaza-calls-for-immediate-end-to-bombardment-">hospital staff</a> continue to work around the clock to save lives. Yet health workers and facilities are <a href="https://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/Health_attacks_7-15OCT.pdf?ua=1">under attack</a>. Meanwhile DCIP is reporting that in the past week more than 1,000 Palestinian children <a href="https://www.dci-palestine.org/one_palestinian_child_in_gaza_killed_every_15_minutes_by_israeli_forces">have been killed</a>.</p>
<p>It must be understood that Israel’s actions in the last week –- termed as <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/un-expert-warns-new-instance-mass-ethnic-cleansing-palestinians-calls">“ethnic cleansing”</a> by UN human rights officials –- are an extension of 16 years of killing both children’s bodies and their hopes through its blockade.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215736/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Hart receives funding from FCDO and AHRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caitlin Procter and Mohammed Alruzzi do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Children living in Gaza have never known anything but deprivation and danger.Jason Hart, Professor of Humanitarianism and Development, University of BathCaitlin Procter, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Mohammed Alruzzi, Lecturer in Childhood Studies, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1575202021-05-17T14:06:22Z2021-05-17T14:06:22ZIsraeli politics and the Palestine question: everything you need to know<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/many-questions-few-answers-as-conflict-deepens-between-israelis-and-palestinians-160921">civilian causalities mount</a> in Gaza, Israeli politicians of all hues must face the stark reality that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot be managed but needs to be resolved. Relations between Palestinians and Israelis and between Jewish and Palestinian Israeli citizens have reached a new dangerous moment. The pretence that the conflict was marginal to Israeli politics has been exposed by the violent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/16/how-did-it-happen-that-israels-jews-and-arabs-rose-up-against-each-other">intercommunal strife</a> in Jerusalem, Haifa, Lod, Jaffa and other cities. </p>
<p>These events expose the bankruptcy of politicians who have <a href="https://theconversation.com/stark-choice-for-israel-as-voters-head-to-polls-for-fourth-time-in-two-years-157437">fought four elections in two years</a> as if the conflict was remote. The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has spent his years in office seeing the conflict as a purely administrative issue, keeping things quiet but never addressing the political aspirations of the Palestinians. </p>
<p>His extraordinary success lies in his ability to lure his political opponents – and parts of the Arab world – into the same dead end. Even the Israeli Islamist leader Mansour Abbas, now <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-election-mansour-abbas-emerges-as-possible-first-arab-kingmaker-in-nations-history-158155">central to the formation of any Israeli government</a>, ignored the conflict in his prime-time speech to the Israeli public after the last elections.</p>
<p>The trigger for the current crisis was <a href="https://theconversation.com/jerusalem-the-politics-behind-the-latest-explosion-of-violence-in-the-holy-city-160647">events in occupied East Jerusalem</a>. The attempt to remove Palestinian families from their homes in the East Jerusalem suburb of Sheikh Jarrah and provocative policing during Ramadan at the Damascus Gate and al-Aqsa mosque have had an impact on Palestinians on both sides of the “<a href="https://www.haaretz.com/misc/tags/TAG-green-line-1.5599076">green line</a>” – which divides Israel from the occupied territories and runs through Jerusalem. </p>
<p>The far right, emboldened by its success in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/24/israel-election-netanyahu-looks-to-far-right-as-early-count-deadlocked">winning six parliamentary seats in the Knesset in March</a>, has inflamed the situation with marches through East Jerusalem with slogans such as “Death to Arabs!” As intercommunal conflict spread throughout Israel, Hamas launched its rocket campaign.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/jerusalem-the-politics-behind-the-latest-explosion-of-violence-in-the-holy-city-160647">Jerusalem: the politics behind the latest explosion of violence in the Holy City</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Against this background, the arcane post-election process of attempting to form a government continued. Netanyahu failed in that task and Israeli president <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/reuven-rivlin">Reuven Rivlin</a> turned to Yesh Atid party leader, Yair Lapid, who set about <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/president-tasks-lapid-with-forming-new-government-after-netanyahu-fails/">trying to create a coalition</a> with centre, left and right-wing parties – a group united only by its opposition to Netanyahu. </p>
<p>Key to this project was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210325-naftali-bennett-the-israeli-nationalist-politician-who-could-determine-netanyahu-s-future">Naftali Bennett</a>, the leader of the small right-wing Yaminia party, a long-time Netanyahu rival who has long seen himself as a future prime minister. Lapid <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/lapid-bennett-said-to-reach-breakthrough-on-rotation-deal-for-joint-government/">offered Bennett a deal</a> in which they would rotate as prime minister, first Bennett and then Lapid. Despite Bennett’s politics, the centrist Yesh Atid, and leftist Labor and Meretz parties seemed willing to support such an arrangement. </p>
<p>By May 9 negotiations were going well and there was speculation that a new government could be formed within a week. But the next day Hamas and Islamic Jihad began launching rocket attacks into Israel. Within days, Bennett announced that the new security situation meant the deal was off the table. Lapid’s deal is now almost certain to fail. </p>
<h2>No appetite for peace</h2>
<p>Lapid’s alternative government would most likely have continued Netanyahu’s managerial approach to the conflict. It has been policy of most Israeli governments for 25 years. Except for a brief break during the premiership of Kadima’s Ehud Olmert from 2006 to 2009, Israeli leaders have claimed there are no partners for peace on the Palestinian side and therefore there can be no negotiations. </p>
<p>Labor’s Ehud Barak claimed that he only went to the US-held Camp David talks in 2000 to expose Yasser Arafat as terrorist. Ariel Sharon, Barak’s successor, used the second intifada (the Palestinian uprising of 2000-2005) as proof that negotiations were impossible. He then unilaterally disengaged from Gaza in 2005 but refused to negotiate an orderly handover to the Palestinian Authority. The result was a major boost for Hamas, which claimed the Israelis had left under (its) fire. That set the scene for the Hamas’s victory in the following year’s Palestinian legislative elections. </p>
<p>Olmert did hold intensive negotiations with the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, but it seems as if the latter <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-admits-he-rejected-2008-peace-offer-from-olmert/">walked away</a>. Netanyahu, meanwhile, has never had any intention of seriously moving on the issue. In his first term as prime minister from 1996 to 1999, he saw his task as undermining the <a href="https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/palestineremix/the-price-of-oslo.html#/14">1993-1995 Oslo Accords</a> by lowering Palestinian expectations that they would have an independent state.</p>
<p>Since 2009, there have been no negotiations but continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/10/netanyahu-vows-annex-large-parts-occupied-west-bank-trump">occasional threat</a> to annex parts of it. Peace, for Netanyahu, is just the absence of armed conflict and terrorism – not a resolution of the conflict, as the Oslo Accords envisaged.</p>
<h2>Things fall apart</h2>
<p>The price for this inaction on the Palestinian issue is now being seen as the fragile mosaic of Israeli society <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/may/14/the-guardian-view-on-intercommunal-violence-in-israel-a-dangerous-development-with-deep-roots">begins to unravel into warring ethnic groups</a>. The conflict over the future of the occupied territories as the future of Israel itself is political and not strategic. </p>
<p>For Netanyahu this means maintaining military superiority and dealing with terrorist threats rather than than recognising the need for political accommodation between two national movements. Palestinians and Israelis share the same environment, are attached to the land and both want to exercise their right to self-determination.</p>
<p>While Netanyahu will negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas, he will not hold political talks with the Palestinians. Yet the policy of managing the conflict has merely deepened it. After every round of fighting there are more dead, more grieving families and more hate. The tensions between Jews and Arabs in Israel will scar Israeli society for some time to come. </p>
<p>Over the past 25 years, few Israeli politicians have had the courage to address the roots of the conflict. When he signed the Oslo Accords in September 1993, then Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, turned to Israelis and Palestinians and said: “<a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-14-mn-34993-story.html#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CWe%20who%20have%20fought%20against,emotion%2Dladen%2C%20hourlong%20ceremony.">Enough of blood and tears</a>”. The people of Gaza, the West Bank and Israel must wonder when that time will come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Benjamin Netanyahu, is the latest in a line of Israeli prime ministers who have not engaged with the idea of Palestinian self-determination.John Strawson, Honorary Professor of Law and Co-director of the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1151782019-04-10T10:47:17Z2019-04-10T10:47:17ZThe generals who challenged Netanyahu ran a campaign largely devoid of substance<p>The close results of the April 9 Israeli elections, with <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/netanyahu-elections-gantz-vote-updates-results-1.7105719">Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as the apparent winner</a>, represent a missed opportunity for his centrist rivals.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/ziv.cfm">foreign policy scholar who researches Israeli politics</a>, I believe that perhaps the greatest irony of the election was the failure of Netanyahu’s challengers, the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/israeli-parties-form-election-alliance-in-bid-to-oust-netanyahu-1.3802129">newly formed “generals’ party,”</a> to contest his approach to security.</p>
<p>Security has long been the central issue in Israeli politics. It’s the one area in which this unique party would presumably have had the most to say. Former Israeli generals and retired intelligence chiefs have traditionally been the nation’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/netanyahu-prime-minister-obama-president-foreign-policy-us-israel-israeli-relations-middle-east-iran-defense-forces-idf-214004">most outspoken critics of Netanyahu’s security policies</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, the generals did not capitalize on their security credentials by offering a real alternative to the government’s policies, especially the government’s hard-line policies toward the Palestinians. Instead, their <a href="https://www.jns.org/new-israeli-centrist-alliance-to-be-called-blue-and-white-party-list-revealed/">“Blue and White” ticket</a> chose to turn this election into one more referendum on Netanyahu’s character.</p>
<p>In doing so, they failed in their effort to create a new centrist, nonideological bloc that would replace Netanyahu’s ruling right-wing bloc. </p>
<h2>Military at home in politics</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/world/middleeast/israel-generals-politics-netanyahu.html">participation of retired generals in Israeli politics</a> is nothing new. The Israel Defense Forces, or IDF, has always been the country’s most revered institution, and it has been common practice for generals to enter the political arena upon retirement. </p>
<p>Three of Israel’s 12 prime ministers – <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yitzhak-Rabin">Yitzhak Rabin</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ehud-Barak">Ehud Barak</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ariel-Sharon">Ariel Sharon</a> – were retired generals, and numerous other military veterans have entered the political fray over the years, some more successfully than others. </p>
<p>But the unified list of three former IDF chiefs – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/israel-s-gantz-claims-election-victory-over-netanyahu-1.7087481">Benny Gantz</a>, <a href="https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Personalities/From+A-Z/Lieutenant-General+Moshe+Ya-alon.htm">Moshe Ya’alon</a> and <a href="https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Personalities/Pages/Gaby%20Ashkenazi.aspx">Gabi Ashkenazi</a> – who teamed up in February to unseat the prime minister was without precedent. </p>
<p>The generals’ <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/parties/blue-and-white/">Blue and White</a> ticket was co-led by the popular centrist politician <a href="https://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=878">Yair Lapid</a>, whose enigmatic views on security issues mirrored the vague centrism of the three generals. The party tried to attract both right-of-center and left-of-center voters by running a campaign that was largely devoid of substance.</p>
<p>It studiously avoided engaging in key issues, such as the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Blue and White offered only banal policy pronouncements and a Trump-like “Israel First” slogan.</p>
<h2>Netanyahu’s agenda lives</h2>
<p>Netanyahu received bad news in the midst of his election campaign. In February, Israel’s attorney general announced his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-netanyahu-corruption/final-decision-on-netanyahu-indictment-to-follow-israeli-vote-idUSKBN1QS21B">intention to indict him</a> on three separate corruption cases. </p>
<p>By focusing on Netanyahu’s flawed character and homing in on his corruption scandals, the Blue and White candidates convinced center-left voters to abandon the traditionally left-leaning Labor and Meretz parties. </p>
<p>But they did not convince right-of-center voters to abandon Netanyahu. </p>
<p>I believe that by failing to offer a coherent alternative to the right’s hard-line national security approach, the leadership of Blue and White failed to sway voters from Netanyahu’s camp over to their centrist slate.</p>
<p>Instead, they took votes from the left-bloc parties. Indeed, Tuesday’s results show that both Labor and Meretz suffered stinging defeats, with Labor falling to historic lows – <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Labor-slated-to-drop-to-single-digits-586291">their voters shifted over to Blue and White</a>. </p>
<h2>Likud in the lead</h2>
<p>To be sure, replacing Netanyahu’s dominant Likud party was no small ambition – not even for generals who once led their country into the battlefield. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.apnews.com/14f75e3c5d054a0a86b1c135245982ff">right-wing bloc has dominated the Israeli political scene</a> for years. That’s due to several factors, including Israelis’ reaction to the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170928-remembering-the-second-intifada/">violence that accompanied the second Palestinian intifada</a> in the early 2000s, more violence – still ongoing – that followed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-gaza-disengagement-insight/shadow-of-israels-pullout-from-gaza-hangs-heavy-10-years-on-idUSKCN0QF1QQ20150810">Israel’s decision to unilaterally leave the Gaza Strip</a> and years of on-again, off-again failed peace talks. </p>
<p>Indeed, a preelection survey found that a <a href="https://gallery.mailchimp.com/e48e18b43a84387efa593e36a/files/23344088-c964-4009-8bf3-edf7f0048fd7/Peace_Index_February_2019_trans.docx.pdf">plurality of Jewish Israelis</a>, 40%, wanted to see the formation of a right-wing government. Just 25% preferred a right-center government; 16%, a centrist government of national unity; and a center-left or left-wing government was the least preferred option at 15%. </p>
<p>Even so, this election was a missed opportunity to do what the opposition in Israel has long failed to do: <a href="https://www.apnews.com/48a3273a98e04225ac55ea6e3887825c">to present a distinct alternative security agenda</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-netanyahu-goes-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-will-continue-113447">Netanyahu’s hardline approach on the Palestinian issue</a> is the only approach with which young Israelis, who have grown up with Netanyahu, are familiar. His narrative of Israel’s failure to reach peace with the Palestinians – <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Netanyahu-Palestinians-the-stumbling-block-to-peace-492128">it’s the Palestinians’ fault</a> – is their only version of that story. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, a preelection poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/young-israelis-want-netanyahu-older-ones-gantz/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">18-24-year-old voters overwhelmingly preferred Netanyahu</a> to the more moderate Gantz – the opposite of the trend among Israelis 65 and older. </p>
<p>Letting Netanyahu off the hook on security issues allowed him to maintain his self-cultivated image as “Mr. Security.” It also enabled him to put the generals on the defensive, warning that they would establish a Palestinian state that “<a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Did-Netanyahu-just-renounce-his-support-for-a-Palestinian-state-581577">will endanger our existence</a>.” </p>
<h2>Who defines Israel’s national interest?</h2>
<p>The security community, composed of veterans of the IDF and Israel’s intelligence agencies, has for years argued the opposite. </p>
<p>Several organizations of senior security establishment veterans have argued that the two-state solution is the only way to preserve Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state. They include the <a href="http://www.peace-security.org.il/?Lang=eng">Peace and Security Association</a> and the more recently formed <a href="https://en.cis.org.il/">Commanders for Israel’s Security</a>, and are supported by hundreds of former generals and intelligence chiefs. </p>
<p>The silence of Gantz’s team on the two-state solution also enabled Netanyahu to move the security discussion from a status quo policy, which critics call “creeping annexation,” to a full embrace of the hard-right’s agenda to annex the occupied territories. </p>
<p>Just three days before the election, Netanyahu vowed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/world/middleeast/netanyahu-annex-west-bank.html">annex West Bank settlements</a>, a step he had always resisted but apparently felt he needed to take to shore up his right flank. </p>
<p>It was also a step he could take in the absence of countervailing pressure from his centrist rivals, who could have emphasized – but didn’t – the dangers of annexation to Israeli national interests.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was therefore able to get away with a dramatic policy shift that, if carried out, would bury the prospects for a two-state solution. <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/1.5064276">He endorsed that position in June 2009</a>, but has since abandoned his pledge. </p>
<p>The last two IDF chiefs who beat a Likud prime minister – Rabin in 1992 and Barak in 1999 – offered clear alternatives to the incumbent’s policies. By calling for a reordering of national priorities, they were able to form left-of-center governments, a scenario that is impossible today due to the decimation of the left.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Ziv does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>They wanted to oust Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu in Tuesday’s election, but the failure of three centrist generals to talk about key issues may have made Netanyahu the apparent winner.Guy Ziv, Assistant Professor, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/219392014-01-14T06:42:40Z2014-01-14T06:42:40ZSharon, Thatcher, Mandela and the simplistic media postmortem<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38854/original/r8gcmcrg-1389371730.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sharon: a divisive legacy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA Archive</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel is mourning one of its political and military giants.
With help from Tony Blair and Joe Biden – but accompanied by a markedly less impressive roll call of world leaders than travelled to South Africa to farewell Nelson Mandela – the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25708082">country is farewelling</a> a soldier and statesman who has played one of the most important roles in bringing Israel to the position it now finds itself in.</p>
<p>How you see this is very much a matter of perception, and how you feel about Sharon depends very much on who you are. As Israel’s prime minister between 2001 and 2006, Sharon, 85, was a major architect of Israeli militarism who wasn’t afraid to get his boots dirty. As a soldier he had commanded divisions that played a crucial role in the 1967 and 1973 wars. As minister of defence in 1982, he masterminded <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7381364.stm">the invasion of Lebanon</a>, during which Lebanese Christian militias allied to Israel massacred hundreds, arguably thousands, of Palestinians in Beirut refugee camps. Sharon also promoted Jewish settlement in Palestinian Territories and the West Bank barrier.</p>
<p>But in 2005 he ordered the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip.</p>
<h2>Death, the great leveller</h2>
<p>Death ought to be as complicated as the life that precedes it. But instead, it is flattened into starker and more manageable judgements for public consumption.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38855/original/6djrdqy6-1389372236.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A saintly figure even before he died.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What a shame that death betrays what are inevitably complex biographies (such as Sharon’s), as it simultaneously provides an opportunity for a summary and a celebration of a life lived. The default position of the dead is “good”. </p>
<p>Sometimes the dead are very good. Witness the heart-wrenching statements by friends and family when a young person, or a victim of violent crime, dies unexpectedly. These heartfelt, and often impromptu, eulogies extol the exemplary qualities of the deceased, offered perhaps as a protest against untimely death: “they didn’t deserve to die”. The implication then is that some people do deserve to die, or deserve to die more than the deceased. But as to who these people are it is never quite clear.</p>
<p>These refrains are familiar fare at funerals. The dead, whatever the life they have lived, are reduced to simple perfection. Their misdemeanours and inconsiderateness are airbrushed; acknowledgement, perhaps, that they have run out of time for self-improvement.</p>
<h2>Beatifying Mandela</h2>
<p>Repeating this trope, public figures too are often conveyed as “good”. When Mandela died last December, the press and public reaction invoked another Nobel Peace Prize winner in Mother Teresa, who died in 1997 and was subsequently beatified.</p>
<p>Television, radio and newsprint coverage of Mandela, indisputably an important political leader of the ANC and a giant as the first black president of South Africa, expressed only his goodness, his virtual sainthood, his martyrdom as a political prisoner, and his almost holy stance on reconciliation.</p>
<p>This unblemished and simplistic goodness was the only version of Mandela allowed at the time of his death. This is despite the family feuds that surrounded his interment, his will and his legacy; despite the dogged persistence of poverty and racial inequality in South Africa over which he and his successors presided; despite the voices of critics of reconciliation for its superficiality, like Gillian Slovo; and despite the unpopularity and corruption of Jacob Zuma and doubt over whether the ANC can maintain its political credibility in the next election. None of these reservations could be raised at the time.</p>
<p>What could possibly be the problem with a more nuanced portrait of Mandela’s life? Yes, he was an inspiration, but some of his policies didn’t work out so well.</p>
<p>Instead of a nuanced portrait, we are fed a diet of platitudes centred on his life’s more cinematic moments: his backing of the formerly all-white Springboks in the rugby World Cup in 1995, for example. The boundaries between Mandela, Morgan Freeman and now Idris Elba are blurred around this fact-fiction portrait of his goodness.</p>
<h2>Thatcher revisited</h2>
<p>Margaret Thatcher had an even more controversial political life, and hence death. She did little towards Mandela’s release when she met then South African president PW Botha in 1984 as her papers, released a few days ago, show.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/38856/original/s4swwcs6-1389372373.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thatcher: state funeral.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Christopher Furlong/PA Wire</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thatcher, who died last year aged 87, provides the counterpoint to the goodness of Mandela and Mother Teresa, gesturing towards the difficulties that arose around her friendship with the controversial former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet. This counterpoint will inevitably arise with Sharon this week.</p>
<p>This counterpoint is evil: an equally simplistic assessment of Thatcher’s politics and her legacy. Her contradictory legacy and the emotions prompted by her death were contrasted in “The Witch is Dead” celebrations set against the quasi-state funeral that was held for the prime minister, an honour that no leader since Churchill has had. But this makes for an equally crass analysis. Highlighting her militarism in the Falklands and her handling of de-industrialising Britain would have made for a more powerful and balanced judgement of her premiership.</p>
<p>Sharon can expect the same treatment, the same platitudes from his supporters and caricatures of evil from his detractors. But only when we acknowledge that in death we are as complex and multi-dimensional as we are in life can we expect public commentaries on the dead to be more subtle, realistic and analytical.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21939/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Knowles does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel is mourning one of its political and military giants. With help from Tony Blair and Joe Biden – but accompanied by a markedly less impressive roll call of world leaders than travelled to South Africa…Caroline Knowles, Professor of Sociology, Goldsmiths, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.