tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/armed-conflict-3168/articlesArmed conflict – The Conversation2023-12-05T16:56:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188532023-12-05T16:56:48Z2023-12-05T16:56:48ZWarfare ruins the environment – and not just on the front lines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563364/original/file-20231204-17-mbv0cy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C486%2C4061%2C2212&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/russian-battle-tank-t72-b3-dramatic-1955971672">RoProy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of December 6 1917, a French cargo ship called SS Mont-Blanc collided with a Norwegian vessel in the harbour of Halifax in Nova Scotia, Canada. The SS Mont-Blanc, which was laden with 3,000 tons of high explosives destined for the battlefields of the first world war, caught fire and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Halifax-explosion">exploded</a>.</p>
<p>The resulting blast released an amount of energy equivalent to roughly 2.9 kilotons of TNT, destroying a large part of the city. Although it was far from the front lines, this explosion left a lasting imprint on Halifax in a way that many regions experience environmental change as a result of war.</p>
<p>The attention of the media is often drawn to the destructive explosions caused by bombs, drones or missiles. And the devastation we have witnessed in cities like Aleppo, Mosul, Mariupol and now Gaza certainly serve as stark reminders of the horrific impacts of military action.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/su14127138">research</a> is increasingly uncovering broader and longer-term consequences of war that extend well beyond the battlefield. Armed conflicts leave a lasting trail of environmental damage, posing challenges for restoration after the hostilities have eased.</p>
<p><strong>Research interest in the environmental impacts of war</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A figure showing the rising trend of publications on military-caused soil pollution since the 1990s." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/562996/original/file-20231201-18-wniw9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Interest in the topic of military-caused soil pollution increased in the first half of the 2000s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/12/7138#">Stadler et al. (2022)/Sustainability</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
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<h2>Toxic legacies</h2>
<p>Battles and even wars are over relatively quickly, at least compared to the timescales over which environments change. But soils and sediments record their effects over decades and centuries. </p>
<p>In 2022, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ejss.13297">study</a> of soil chemistry in northern France showed elevated levels of copper and lead (both toxic at concentrations above trace levels), and other changes in soil structure and composition, more than 100 years after the site was part of the Battle of the Somme. </p>
<p>Research on more recent conflicts has recorded the toxic legacy of intense fighting too. A <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15569543.2019.1684949">study</a> that was carried out in 2016, three decades after the Iran-Iraq war, found concentrations of toxic elements like chromium, lead and the semi-metal antimony in soils from the battlefields. These concentrations were more than ten times those found in soils behind the front lines. </p>
<p>The deliberate destruction of infrastructure during war can also have enduring consequences. One notable example is the first Gulf War in 1991 when <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-the-environmental-legacy-of-the-gulf-war-should-teach-us/">Iraqi forces</a> blew up more than 700 oil wells in Kuwait. Crude oil spewed into the surrounding environment, while fallout from dispersing smoke plumes created a thick deposit known as “tarcrete” over 1,000 sq km of Kuwait’s deserts.</p>
<p>The impact of the oil fires on the air, soil, water and habitats captured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/dec/11/the-sound-of-roaring-fires-is-still-in-my-memory-30-years-on-from-kuwaits-oil-blazes">global attention</a>. Now, in the 21st century, wars are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.157932">closely scrutinised</a> in near real-time for environmental harm, as well as the harm inflicted on humans.</p>
<h2>Conflict is a systemic catastrophe</h2>
<p>One outcome of this scrutiny is the realisation that conflict is a catastrophe that affects entire human and ecological systems. Destruction of social and economic infrastructure like water and sanitation, industrial systems, agricultural supply chains and data networks can lead to subtle but devastating indirect environmental impacts. </p>
<p>Since 2011, conflict has marred the north-western regions of Syria. As part of a research project that was led by my Syrian colleagues at <a href="http://shamuniversity.com">Sham University</a>, we conducted soil surveys in the affected areas. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1039/D2VA00333C">findings</a> revealed widespread diffuse soil pollution in agricultural land. This land feeds a population of around 3 million people already experiencing <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic">severe food insecurity</a>. </p>
<p>The pollution probably stems from a combination of factors, all arising as a consequence of the regional economic collapse that was caused by the conflict. A lack of fuel to pump wells, combined with destruction of wastewater treatment infrastructure, has led to an increased reliance on <a href="https://www.algherbal.com/archives/5076">streams contaminated by untreated wastewater</a> for irrigating croplands. </p>
<p>Contamination could also stem from the use of low-grade fertilisers, unregulated industrial emissions and the proliferation of <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/04/24/dying-to-keep-warm-oil-trade-and-makeshift-refining-in-north-west-syria/">makeshift oil refineries</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, the current conflict in Ukraine, which prompted international sanctions on Russian grain and fertiliser exports, has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fs41598-023-43883-4">disrupted agricultural economies worldwide</a>. This has affected countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Nigeria and Iran particularly hard. </p>
<p>Many small farmers in these countries may have been forced into selling their livestock and abandoning their land as they struggle to buy the materials they need to feed their animals or grow crops. Land abandonment is an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abm8999">ecologically harmful</a> practice as it can take decades for the vegetation densities and species richness typical of undisturbed ecosystems to recover.</p>
<p>Warfare can clearly become a complicated and entangled “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.166131">nexus</a>” problem, the impacts of which are felt far from the war-affected regions.</p>
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<img alt="A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine, mimicking the Ukraine flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563359/original/file-20231204-27-wopcng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A field of rapeseed flowers in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/field-colza-rapeseed-yellow-flowers-blue-2131379587">Delpixel/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Conflict, cascades and climate</h2>
<p>Recognising the complex, cascading environmental consequences of war is the first step towards addressing them. Following the first Gulf War, the UN set up a compensation commission and included the environment as one of six compensable harms inflicted on countries and their people. </p>
<p>Jordan was <a href="https://uncc.ch/hashemite-kingdom-jordan">awarded</a> more than US$160 million (£127 million) over a decade to restore the rangelands of its Badia desert. These rangelands had been ecologically ruined by a million refugees and their livestock from Kuwait and Iraq. The Badia is now a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140196320302378">case study</a> in sustainable watershed management in arid regions. </p>
<p>In the north-west region of Syria, work is underway to assess farmers’ understanding of soil contamination in areas that have been affected by conflict. This marks the first step in designing farming techniques aimed at minimising <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-cholera-outbreak-situation-report-no-20-issued-23-october-2023">threats to human health</a> and restoring the environment.</p>
<p>Armed conflict has also finally made it onto the climate agenda. The UN’s latest climate summit, <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/schedule">COP28</a>, includes the first themed day dedicated to “relief, recovery and peace”. The discussion will focus on countries and communities in which the ability to withstand climate change is being hindered by economic or political fragility and conflict.</p>
<p>And as COP28 got underway, the Conflict and Environment Observatory, a UK charity that monitors the environmental consequences of armed conflicts, <a href="https://ceobs.org/what-to-expect-on-militarism-conflict-and-climate-at-cop28/">called for</a> research to account for carbon emissions in regions affected by conflict. </p>
<p>The carbon impact of war is still not counted in the <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake">global stocktake</a> of carbon emissions – an essential reference for climate action. But far from the sound and fury of the explosions, warfare’s environmental impacts are persistent, pervasive and equally deadly.</p>
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<img alt="Imagine weekly climate newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434988/original/file-20211201-21-13avx6y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Bridge works voluntarily with the Council for At-Risk Academics (Cara) to support their Syria Programme, which funded some of the work described in this article.</span></em></p>War is often described as long periods of waiting punctuated by short periods of terror – for the environment, the reverse is true.Jonathan Bridge, Reader / Associate Professor in Environmental Geoscience, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2174542023-11-14T14:10:37Z2023-11-14T14:10:37ZProjects funded by the World Bank Group’s private sector arm fuel violent conflict – it’s time to reform the system<p>To what extent does private investment help developing countries to reduce conflict and violence and to achieve the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/#goal_section">Sustainable Development Goals</a>? </p>
<p>This is a hotly debated issue. Most international institutions such as the World Bank Group take the stance that the problem is <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/738131573041414269/pdf/Closing-the-SDG-Financing-Gap-Trends-and-Data.pdf">not enough private investment</a>. So they mobilise public resources to subsidise and protect private sector actors with the goal of greatly increasing foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, community, labour and human rights advocates – particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries – tend instead to see the dominant patterns of foreign direct investment as part of a continuing history of <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/suffering-others">exploitation of the developing world</a>.</p>
<p>To help shed light on this debate, we undertook <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4540583">a comprehensive study</a> of thousands of projects of the <a href="https://www.ifc.org/en/home">International Finance Corporation</a> (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. We focused on the period between 1994 and 2022. </p>
<p>We chose the IFC because it claims to invest with developmental purpose. It also purports to apply the highest standards of social and environmental performance. Additionally, many other private and public actors follow its lead in setting standards. If the IFC is getting it wrong it would be a good indicator of how things stand in the broader global system. We focused our study on the relationship between IFC projects and armed conflict, as violence has a clear and detrimental effect on human development. </p>
<p>The results establish that IFC projects cause significant increases in armed conflict around the world. A single project, on average, causes 7.6 additional armed conflict events in the year after it is introduced. These findings are consistent with <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3877872">other large quantitative studies</a> that question the relationship between foreign direct investment and development. Foreign direct investment that <a href="https://www.tommasosonno.com/docs/GlobalizationConflict_TommasoSonno.pdf">increases violent conflict</a> and makes development nearly impossible appears the rule, not the exception.</p>
<p>We conclude that current approaches to foreign investment need urgent reconsideration, with particular focus on the risk of violent conflict.</p>
<h2>Our methodology</h2>
<p>Many factors influence violent conflict, including the history of intergroup and state-society relations. So the study used sophisticated econometric analyses to isolate the IFC’s impact. </p>
<p>We first geolocated IFC projects and noted the years in which they were approved. Then we tested whether armed conflict rose in the area proximate to the IFC project in the following year. We controlled for other factors – such as the presence of politically excluded groups, GDP, the regime type, or the population size – that affect conflict. </p>
<p>In the analysis, we were careful to match and compare an IFC project area with those areas without IFC projects to which it is most similar. Finally, we considered and controlled for the possibility that conflict was already rising before the IFC project arrived. By excluding these other explanations for conflict events, we were able to make reasonable causal attributions.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/three-priorities-africas-newbie-on-the-world-bank-board-should-focus-on-181521">Three priorities Africa's newbie on the World Bank board should focus on</a>
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<p>Disturbingly, the study found that increases in armed conflict were concentrated in projects that the IFC told local and international stakeholders had potential limited adverse environmental or social risks. It claimed that these could be readily addressed through mitigation measures. These mitigation measures appear to be either ineffective or under-employed. Alternatively, the IFC is mis-classifying projects that carry more substantial conflict risk than it recognises or cares to make public.</p>
<p>One particularly disturbing example is the Ugandan government’s <a href="http://www.humanrightscolumbia.org/sites/default/files/SIPA%20Listening%20to%20community%20voices%20on%20effective%20remedy%20-%20final.pdf">campaign of terror against local citizens</a> to turn land over to an IFC client. The IFC also has yet to resolve activists’ complaints from 2019 of <a href="https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/liberia-salala-rubber-corporation-src-01margibi-bong-counties">gender-based violence and threats of reprisals and intimidation</a> against one of its project partners, Salala Rubber Corporation in Liberia.</p>
<p>The study also demonstrated that capital-intensive projects (that is, agribusiness, oil, gas, mining and infrastructure) have a larger propensity for socio-political and socio-economic disruption. Areas that receive capital-intensive projects experience, on average, an additional death from armed conflict in the following year.</p>
<h2>Not above the rule of law</h2>
<p>These results should perhaps not be surprising. Civil society groups have long concluded that the IFC prioritises its own profits and business interests over the “<a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/suffering-others">suffering of others</a>” in ways that contribute to “<a href="https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=social_encounters">multiple paths of extraction, dispossession, and conflict</a>”. In 2020 Human Rights Watch characterised the IFC as “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/24/world-bank-group-failing-remedies-project-abuses">failing at remedies for project abuses</a>”. This was based on the World Bank Group’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/brief/external-review-of-ifc-miga-es-accountability">own commissioned review</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/cautious-welcome-world-bank-and-imf-return-to-africa-but-questions-remain-214888">Cautious welcome: World Bank and IMF return to Africa, but questions remain</a>
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<p>Yet, the IFC’s strategy has been to position itself above the rule of law. It continues to assert sovereign immunity. It claims that, as an international organisation, <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/iolr/16/1/article-p105_105.xml">it should not be liable</a> in national courts – even to parties it admittedly harms. </p>
<p>It maintains this stance despite <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/10/17/world-bank-whistleblower-bridge-international/">recent reports</a> of IFC complicity in covering up the sexual abuse of children to further its investment projects. </p>
<p>It appears beyond time for the 186 member governments that own the IFC to demand transparency, accountability and redress for harms done from the corporation and the private sector actors it funds. Others can also play a role. Governments that have perhaps naively relied on the World Bank halo should question the benefits they are told they can expect from IFC investments. The ratings agencies that classify IFC bonds as positive from an environmental, social, and governance perspective may want to question the bases on which such determinations are made.</p>
<p>At the same time, perhaps more credence can be given to recent <a href="https://www.un.org/en/desa/un-secretary-general-calls-radical-transformation-global-finan-cial-system-tackle-pressing">calls by the UN secretary general</a> to reform the global financial system to better support human security and human development. </p>
<p>This could include specialised intermediaries between the IFC and sensitive projects in difficult places. Independent and empowered local oversight appears necessary to ensure more inclusive and accountable forms of contextual analysis and risk mitigation planning, monitoring and evaluation of development impact, proactive conflict management, and accessible redress for harms done. This could <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/conflict-environments-need-a-peacebuilding-approach-to-business-development">reduce violent conflict and open more developmental potential for private investment</a> in the developing world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217454/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work is part of the project Peace Positive Private Sector Development in Africa (P3A), funded by the Research Council of Norway. Additional funding was received from the Peace Finance Initiative.</span></em></p>A single International Finance Corporation project, on average, causes 7.6 additional armed conflict events in the year after it is introduced.Brian Ganson, Professor and Head, Centre on Conflict & Collaboration, Stellenbosch UniversityAnne Spencer Jamison, Assistant Professor of International Economics, Government, and Business, Copenhagen Business SchoolWitold Jerzy Henisz, Vice Dean and Faculty Director, ESG Inititative; Deloitte & Touche Professor of Management, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2169872023-11-13T23:07:59Z2023-11-13T23:07:59ZConflict pollution, washed-up landmines and military emissions – here’s how war trashes the environment<p>When armed conflict breaks out, we first focus on the people affected. But the suffering from war doesn’t stop when the fighting does. War <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/environment-in-war-protection-day">trashes the environment</a>. Artillery strikes, rockets and landmines release pollutants, wipe out forests and can make farmland unusable. </p>
<p>One in six people around the world have been <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/09/08/acled-conflict-index-2023-mid-year-update">exposed to conflict</a> this year, from civil war in Sudan to Russia’s war in Ukraine to the Israel-Hamas war. </p>
<p>War has returned. Conflicts are at their <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21216.doc.htm">highest point</a> since the second world war. Deaths are at a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-trends-global-overview-1946-2022">28-year high</a>. As we grapple with the immediate plight of people, we must not lose sight of what war leaves behind – the silent casualty of the environment. </p>
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<h2>What damage does war do?</h2>
<p>Armed conflict leaves a long trail of environmental damage, which in turn can worsen our health and that of other species. </p>
<p>Chemical weapons and pollution from weapons stay in the environment as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-leaves-a-toxic-legacy-that-lasts-long-after-the-guns-go-quiet-can-we-stop-it-197051">toxic legacy</a>. Explosives release pollutants such as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265931X02000413?via%3Dihub">depleted uranium</a> into soil, while landscapes can be destroyed by troop movement and the breakdown of infrastructure. </p>
<p>The damage can last far longer than you’d think. The bloody WWI Battle of Verdun in France left the once-fertile farmland contaminated. Over a century later, no one can live in the <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/red-zone/">Red Zone</a> due to the threat from unexploded bombs. </p>
<p>As the Russia-Ukraine war wears on, severe air pollution, deforestation and soil degradation <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004896972202962X?via%3Dihub">have mounted</a>. </p>
<p>Conflict also causes habitat loss and decreased biodiversity. Between 1946 and 2010, wildlife <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25194">noticeably declined</a> in African nations affected by armed conflict. </p>
<p>Landmines are particularly bad, as they are designed to remain in place until stepped on. Long after a war ends, they can still kill people or animals. Landmines also cause degradation and limit access to safe land, which can then become over-exploited. Landmines have been unearthed by flood waters <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-flood-update-flash-update-no3-16-september-2023-5pm-local-time">in Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mines-uprooted-ukraine-dam-disaster-could-pose-danger-years-come-red-cross-2023-06-08/">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1857786/middle-east">Lebanon</a> and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/undp-flooding-unearths-landmine-danger">Bosnia Herzegovina</a>. </p>
<p>Many explosive weapons are designed to withstand short periods of intense heat. But when high temperatures linger, unexploded bombs can detonate. As the world heats up, we may see more explosions – not just from remnant bombs, but from munitions dumps. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-war-on-tigray-wiped-out-decades-of-environmental-progress-how-to-start-again-201062">The war on Tigray wiped out decades of environmental progress: how to start again</a>
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<p>In the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/world/middleeast/iraq-water-crisis-desertification.html">fast-heating</a> Middle East, this is already happening. In Iraq, six arms depots <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-change-may-be-blowing-up-arms-depots">exploded</a> during intense heatwaves between 2018 and 2019. In Jordan, heatwaves <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-12/explosions-rock-military-facility-in-jordan-army-blames-heat/12657276">have been blamed</a> for a similar arms dump explosion in 2020. </p>
<p>At war’s end, weapons are often dumped in the ocean. From the first world war until the 1970s, out of date munitions and chemical weapons in the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663876/Future_of_the_sea_-_non_plastic_pollution.pdf">United Kingdom</a> were dumped into the sea. It may have seemed like an easy solution, but the bombs haven’t gone away. Over 1 million tonnes of munitions litter the floor of a natural ocean trench between Northern Ireland and Scotland. These sometimes detonate underwater, while chemical weapons have washed up on beaches. </p>
<p>During the second world war, intense fighting took place on the Solomon Islands. Even today, people die or are wounded every year when uncovered bombs <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/whats-next-solomon-islands-experts-say-uxo-problem-shocking">go off</a>. Fishers have to be wary of underwater bombs. </p>
<p>Environmental exploitation such as illegal logging or diamond mining <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099520010272224660/pdf/P1771510b38fda01e0afec01edd810d8cde.pdf">can accelerate during wartime</a>, with profits used to buy weapons to fuel more fighting. At least 40% of civil war and internal conflicts between 1946–2006 were tied to natural resources such as <a href="https://www.indiatimes.com/explainers/news/explained-why-teak-imported-from-myanmar-is-called-conflict-wood-595202.html">teak</a> and gold, according to the <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/7867">United Nations</a>. </p>
<p>Sometimes, natural resources can become targets, as in the <a href="https://landsat.visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=78594">deliberate firing of oil wells</a> in Kuwait or destruction of Ukraine’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-we-know-about-the-nova-kakhovka-dam-and-who-gains-from-its-destruction-207130">Kakhovka Dam</a>. These scorched-earth tactics do untold damage to the environment. </p>
<h2>How do war and climate change interact?</h2>
<p>The long-running war in Sudan’s Darfur region has been dubbed the world’s first <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/18/how-water-is-helping-to-end-the-first-climate-change-war#:%7E:text=The%20Darfur%20conflict%20was%20labelled,shown%20that%20climate%20impacts%20such">climate change war</a> due to its origins in drought and ecological crisis. While it’s difficult to clearly draw a link between the changing climate and an armed conflict, climate change is at minimum an indirect driver of armed conflict and can exacerbate existing social, economical and environmental factors. In turn, conflict worsens the damage done by climate change as it limits people’s ability to respond or cope with climate shocks. </p>
<p>Wars and extreme weather can both force people from their homes. At the end of last year, the number of people forced to <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2023">seek refuge elsewhere</a> in their own country was at an all time high. When people are forced to move, the disruption can add <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/displacement-and-environment-africa-what-relationship#:%7E:text=Displacement%20itself%20can%20have%20environmental,lead%20to%20uncontrolled%20waste%20disposal">extra environmental damage</a> through plastic and other types of waste. </p>
<p>When wars are raging, they take priority for governments. That, in turn, can limit efforts to reduce emissions or adapt to climate change. </p>
<p>That can make disasters worse. Colombia’s deadly <a href="https://odi.org/en/about/features/when-disasters-and-conflict-collide/">2017 landslide</a> killed over 300 people. Why was it so deadly? In part, because many people had fled to the affected town, Mocoa, to avoid war and had built makeshift houses with no protection against disasters. We also know deaths from disasters <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420923003618?via%3Dihub">increase</a> in nations riven by armed conflict. </p>
<p>The world’s military forces are intense users of fossil fuels, accounting for <a href="https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/SGRCEOBS-Estimating_Global_MIlitary_GHG_Emissions_Nov22_rev.pdf">5.5% of global emissions</a>. If we took the world’s military forces as one country, they would be the fourth highest emitter, after China, America and India.</p>
<p>We can no longer ignore the devastating coupling between war and environmental damage, including climate change. Wars make our ability to adapt to climate change worse, and environmental damage from conflict will exacerbate climate change.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/war-leaves-a-toxic-legacy-that-lasts-long-after-the-guns-go-quiet-can-we-stop-it-197051">War leaves a toxic legacy that lasts long after the guns go quiet. Can we stop it?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wars are multiplying – and the damage these conflicts do isn’t just immediate. They leave long-term environmental damageStacey Pizzino, PhD Candidate, The University of QueenslandJo Durham, Senior Lecturer in Disaster Risk Management and Health, Queensland University of TechnologyMichael Waller, Senior Lecturer Biostatistics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156372023-10-13T23:27:04Z2023-10-13T23:27:04ZWhere does international law fit into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?<p>Thinking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is never easy. Yet the growing number of declarations being made highlights how important it is to consider the factors involved in making an assessment of the situation under the applicable law.</p>
<p>While the solution to any conflict is political, the fact remains that any armed conflict is covered by a specific branch of international law, the law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law. </p>
<p>Although international humanitarian law is sometimes thought to lack effectiveness, we must not lose sight of the fact <a href="https://aoc.media/analyse/2022/03/10/les-conflits-armes-une-zone-de-non-droit/">that its application, however minimal</a>, ensures that civilian lives are spared.</p>
<p>As a professor at Laval University’s Faculty of Law and Scientific Director of the <a href="https://www.irsem.fr/en/index.html">Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire</a> (an interdisciplinary research centre for conflict and peace studies based in Paris), I specialize in international humanitarian law and am a member of the <a href="https://www.crdh.fr/en/">Paris Human Rights Centre</a> (Research Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law).</p>
<h2>Classifying the conflict</h2>
<p>The first step to be taken before making any legal analysis in international humanitarian law is to classify the situation. In the present case, this qualification is open to <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-context-operations-al-aqsa-flood-swords-of-iron/">debate</a>. </p>
<p>There are two possible ways to characterize it. It is either a non-international armed conflict between an armed group, Hamas, and a State, Israel, or it is an international armed conflict, owing to the situation of occupation that has prevailed in the Palestinian territories since the Six-Day War of 1967. </p>
<p>In 2012, <a href="https://access.archive-ouverte.unige.ch/access/metadata/3819f7ae-9778-49d4-8415-0563efb64f10/download">I argued that despite the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli troops, the territory of the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli occupation</a>. Indeed, when in 2004 the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-FR.pdf">International Court of Justice</a> stated that Israel was obliged to apply international humanitarian law and international human rights law by virtue of its status as occupying power in this territory, Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops from Gaza in 2005, claiming to be free of its obligations. </p>
<p>I believe that for a situation in a territory to be characterized as an occupation, and, therefore, for a power to establish its authority over it, that power needs to deploy its armed forces in the territory. However, the withdrawal of these forces does not ipso facto mean there is no more occupation, as long as the State continues to control the land, sea and air borders, to issue passports to its population and to have its currency in circulation. The fact that Israel can decide to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-cuts-electricity-supply-to-gaza/">completely cut off the electrical power supply</a> in Gaza only confirms this. </p>
<p>Since 2005, clashes and confrontations between Hamas and Israel have taken place on a regular basis. The fact that they have reached the scale demonstrated by the events of Oct. 7 is not likely to change this assessment. </p>
<h2>So, what difference does this make?</h2>
<p>None at all.</p>
<p>Whichever way one characterizes the conflict, it goes without saying that the acts of <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule1">deliberately targeting civilians</a> and taking <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule96">hostages</a> are strictly forbidden. This is even more the case when these acts are part of a pattern of violence whose principle aim is to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule2">spread terror among the civilian population</a>.</p>
<p>In the same vein, no matter how the conflict is qualified, it is difficult to see how <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/total-siege-of-gaza-prohibited-under-international-law-un-1abc1549">declaring a “total siege” of the Gaza Strip</a> could be consistent with international humanitarian law. The “siege” is not a notion that is expressed, in extenso, in international humanitarian law. The term siege refers to restricting the movement of people and goods in a specific area with the aim of forcing enemy forces to stop fighting. </p>
<p>While a siege, as such, is not prohibited, its effects inevitably lead to violations of international humanitarian law. For example, preventing the delivery of food or the supply of water can lead to the starvation of the population living in the territory. Using famine as a method of warfare is <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule53">prohibited</a>. Similarly, restricting or preventing the movement of people means that humanitarian personnel cannot carry out their relief work in the besieged zone. But humanitarian organizations must be allowed to deliver aid to the civilian population and, according to international humanitarian law, the parties in the conflict must even <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule55">“facilitate their passage”</a>.</p>
<p>The unleashing of violence that we are seeing, including the initial acts and the response to them, is inevitably leading to massive violations of international humanitarian law and therefore to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule156">war crimes</a>. </p>
<p>The situation raises the legitimate question of how effective international humanitarian law is. However, if, as <a href="https://msf-crash.org/en/rony-brauman">Rony Brauman</a> of Médecins sans frontières once said, “to promote international humanitarian law is to promote war” (the comment, in itself, merits conversation), promoting respect for this law in a situation such as the one in Israel and Gaza — which, whatever its nature, is undoubtedly an armed conflict — can do no harm. On the contrary, abandoning the pursuit of respect for international humanitarian law, even when it is being abused, will only lead to more chaos.</p>
<p>In this respect, it is worth remembering that third States, i.e. States which are not parties to this armed conflict, have an obligation to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gci-1949/article-1?activeTab=1949GCs-APs-and-commentaries">“ensure respect for international humanitarian law.”</a> This means that in all its interactions with the parties to the conflict, Canada, like every other state in the world, has a duty to remind them of their obligations under international humanitarian law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215637/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Grignon is a member of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (France), President of the Sous-commission droit international humanitaire et action humanitaire. She is also Development Director of the Osons le DIH! partnership for the promotion and development of international humanitarian law, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p>This unleashing of violence, including the initial acts and the response to them, inevitably leads to war crimes.Julia Grignon, Professeure en droit international humanitaire, Université LavalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154682023-10-11T16:07:50Z2023-10-11T16:07:50ZHow Hamas weaponised Palestinians’ despair<p>The scale of Hamas’ attack on Israel on 7 and 8 October is unprecedented and the failure of the Israeli army and secret services, astonishing. Yet for observers such as former Israeli ambassador to France, Elie Barnavi, the events that have unfolded in the region over the past days were <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/09/elie-barnavi-the-hamas-attack-is-the-result-of-the-combination-of-a-fanatical-islamist-organization-and-an-idiotic-israeli-policy_6157666_23.html">“surprising but predictable”</a>.</p>
<p>On the ground, from which I have just returned, there is a clear sense of growing despair and latent violence among the Palestinian population. No one is talking about “peace” any more, but rather “the end of the occupation”, as young people evoke “resistance, by all means”.</p>
<p>This is the context in which Hamas carried out its attack. And the militant organisation used this despair to legitimise itself and win the support of a section of Palestinian public opinion.</p>
<h2>Gaza, an open-air prison</h2>
<p>In Gaza, where Hamas operates, 2.3 million Palestinians are crammed into 365 km<sup>2</sup>, making the Gaza Strip one of the world’s most densely populated territories. More than <a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/09/1127031">two thirds of the population</a> live below the poverty line and, according to the Israeli NGO B’Tselem, the <a href="https://plateforme-palestine.org/Gaza-les-chiffres-cles-2023">unemployment rate is 75%</a> among people under 29.</p>
<p>Since 2007, this territory has also been subject to an <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2018/05/29/a-gaza-des-bateaux-palestiniens-contre-la-nouvelle-barriere-maritime-voulue-par-israel_5306341_3218.html">Israeli blockade</a> by sea, air and land, which almost entirely deprives it of contact with the outside world.</p>
<p>Gazans are regularly cut off from water and electricity, and depend mainly on <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinionfr/palestine-israel-aide-internationale-normalise-siege-gaza">international aid</a>. Entry into and exit from Gaza depend on permits given by Israeli forces and are extremely rare, earning it the nickname of “open-air prison”.</p>
<p>In these conditions, the Gazan population, and in particular the youth, who are isolated from the world, are becoming increasingly radical. Most feel they have nothing left to lose and no longer believe in political solutions or peace. The idea that the occupation of the Jewish state must be resisted through violence, as advocated by Islamist groups, is gradually spreading. This is playing into the hands of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who are gathering more and more fighters.</p>
<h2>The West Bank, a dismembered territory</h2>
<p>In the West Bank, the Hamas attack was not condemned, some Palestinians even showed their support in demonstrations.</p>
<p>The rest of the world is astonished that anyone could support such cruelty, which is unequivocally unacceptable. But we must also look at the roots of this support.</p>
<p>The Palestinian territory is completely dismembered. More than 280 settlements and 710,000 Israeli settlers have been counted by the United Nations. Palestinian homes are regularly <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/fr/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/">destroyed</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2002, more than 700km of wall have been built between the Palestinian territories and Israel. This security wall was supposed to follow the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Line_(Israel)">315km green line</a> outlined in the 1947 UN partition plan, but the past years have seen it snake on and on, gradually encroaching on Palestinian territory and isolating certain Palestinian towns.</p>
<p>One Palestinian MP told me “It’s the Arab Wailing Wall”, while others referred to it as the “Wall of Shame”. Even East Jerusalem is increasingly occupied, including the Esplanade of the Mosques, home to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third-holiest site. In fact, the name that the Hamas gave to its attack, “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”, shows just how the Islamist group has managed to act as a soundboard to the population’s grievances.</p>
<h2>Daily despair</h2>
<p>The freedom of movement of the inhabitants of the West Bank is extremely limited – they depend entirely on permits obtained from the Israeli authorities. Every day, Palestinians have to laboriously cross through <a href="https://books.openedition.org/pup/8020?lang=fr">checkpoints</a>.</p>
<p>Some children explain to me that they cross the checkpoint between Abu Dis in the West Bank and Jerusalem to go to school; they go alone because their parents don’t have the necessary permits and spend at least an hour there every day. Older students tell me that they used to be able to walk to their university, but now there’s the wall and a checkpoint. The UN estimates that there are around <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/in-facts-and-figures/">593 checkpoints</a>, mostly designed to protect Israeli settlers.</p>
<p>The economic situation in the West Bank is also deplorable. <a href="https://unctad.org/news/economic-restrictions-west-bank-exact-50-billion-toll-between-2000-and-2020">Israeli restrictions</a> on the movement of people and goods – such as bans on the importation of certain technologies and inputs, bureaucratic controls, checkpoints, gates, earth mounds, roadblocks and trenches – are choking development. The <a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2022/09/1127031">poverty rate</a> stands at 36% and the unemployment rate at 26%.</p>
<p>The Israeli army, especially since the arrival of the most recent Netanyahu government, has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/03/israeli-strikes-in-the-occupied-west-bank-kill-at-least-eight">stepped up its interventions</a> and preventive raids. Before the Hamas attack, 200 Palestinians had been killed since the beginning of the year. The <a href="https://news.un.org/fr/story/2023/05/1134792">UN counts</a> 4,900 Palestinian political prisoners and notes the deplorable conditions in Israeli prisons and the ill-treatment inflicted.</p>
<h2>Political deadlock, latent violence</h2>
<p>Added to all this is the political impasse. There have been no elections in Palestine since 2006. The Palestinian Authority, recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, has become an empty shell with no real power. Power is concentrated in the hands of 87-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, who has lost the support of his people. After the repeated failure of negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, some even consider <a href="https://www.iris-france.org/168899-palestine-biden-hypocrite-abbas-complice/">Mahmoud Abbas to be an accomplice</a> to the Israeli occupation. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/12/10/1063171482/palestinian-dissidents-rally-against-corruption-in-the-palestinian-authority">Corruption</a> is paralysing all Palestinian institutions.</p>
<p>The population no longer expects anything from politics and even less from negotiations. Since the beginning of the year, there has been a resurgence of “lone wolf” attacks driven by despair. Like the Palestinian driver who, at the end of August, <a href="https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1347957/attaque-a-un-checkpoint-en-cisjordanie-occupee-trois-blesses.html">ploughed into a group of Israeli soldiers</a> as he was about to cross a checkpoint.</p>
<p>It is this same despair that drives a section of the Palestinian population to rally around Hamas’s cruel attacks today. As Elie Barnavi points out, we could even fear the outbreak of a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/09/elie-barnavi-the-hamas-attack-is-the-result-of-the-combination-of-a-fanatical-islamist-organization-and-an-idiotic-israeli-policy_6157666_23.html">new intifada</a>.</p>
<h2>Hamas’ rise</h2>
<p>Over the years, Hamas has been able to weaponise these sentiments and so affirm itself as the “true defender” of the Palestinian cause.</p>
<p>In 2006, the militant group won the Palestinian legislative elections. Despite the democratic nature of these elections, the result was not recognised by the international community, which refused to allow a terrorist organisation to take power. Hamas therefore fell back onto the Gaza Strip, of which it took control. From Gaza, it continued to radicalise and delegitimise the Palestinian Authority, and waited for momentum to build before putting its words into action. In the eyes of the organisation, this moment has arrived. The leaders no doubt felt that the context was favourable for a large-scale attack.</p>
<p>On the one hand, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-netanyahu-facing-off-against-the-supreme-court-and-proposing-to-limit-judicial-independence-and-3-other-threats-to-israeli-democracy-197096">internal destabilisation in Israel</a> offered a breach of which Hamas could take advantage. Never has Israel been as divided as it has been since the arrival of Netanyahu’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-stunning-political-comeback-for-israels-netanyahu-may-give-way-to-governing-nightmare-ahead-193892">coalition of ultra-Orthodox and national-religious parties</a>. Large-scale demonstrations against the reform of the justice system shook the country for several months. In an unprecedented move, Israeli reservists, essential to Israeli defence, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/03/07/israel-faces-unprecedented-revolt-of-army-reservists_6018520_4.html">refused to serve for weeks</a> in protest against the reforms.</p>
<h2>Shifting geopolitics</h2>
<p>Hamas likely also had an eye on geopolitics, sensing that the balance of power in the region is shifting. Witness the agreement between Tehran and Riyadh, and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-abraham-accords-could-create-real-peace-in-the-middle-east-146973">Abraham Accords</a> which normalised Israel’s relations with the Gulf states. Today, global tectonic plates continue to wobble, the status quo in <a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-whats-next-for-the-south-caucasus-region-following-azerbaijans-aggression-against-armenians-214661">Nagorno-Karabakh has been shattered</a> and Africa is experiencing <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/9/10/23866908/africa-coup-gabon-niger-mali-burkina-faso">one coup after another</a>. The time was ripe for the group to strike.</p>
<p>Fifty years after the Yom Kippur War and 30 years after the Oslo Accords, the past days’ tragic events ought to be viewed through the prism of a complex conflict that has pitted two peoples against each other since 1948. Hamas has instrumentalised the anger and despair of Palestinians to commit unprecedented violence, thereby delegitimising a legitimate cause.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marie Durrieu ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Deprived of viable political alternatives, Gaza residents have increasingly looked to violence as their only salvation from an open air prison.Marie Durrieu, Doctorante associée à l'Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire en science politique et relations internationales (CMH EA 4232-UCA), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129262023-10-10T12:38:06Z2023-10-10T12:38:06ZPeace in Sudan is elusive for any would-be mediators – but a new window of opportunity has opened for outside intervention<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/552164/original/file-20231004-15-wakonh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C217%2C5010%2C2017&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Sudanese military has been at war with the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group since April 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-armed-forces-mark-army-day-in-sudans-eastern-news-photo/1598686946">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than five months have passed since <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/africa/sudan-presidential-palace-intl/index.html">intense fighting broke out</a> between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group also known as the RSF. In that time, <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/09/08/sudan-situation-update-september-2023-deadly-reciprocal-offensives-for-strategic-locations-in-khartoum-and-darfur/">more than 7,000 people have been killed</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/08/1139352">nearly 4 million others displaced</a>. The conflict is still ongoing, with little evidence of resolution.</p>
<p>The clashes were sparked by a disagreement over how the RSF, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more commonly known as Hemedti, could be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/">integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces</a>, or SAF, led by Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. </p>
<p>Sudan is the <a href="https://fsdafrica.org/countries/sudan">third-largest country</a> by area in Africa. It is also home to the Nile River basin, is mineral rich and is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-conflict-nile-africa-russia-03adebaff0c95992c6f90543dcb2c894">strategically located</a> on the Red Sea, close to the Middle East. So this conflict comes with heavy <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-plunge-into-chaos-has-geopolitical-implications-near-and-far-including-for-us-strategic-goals-204453">security and economic ramifications</a> for the region and beyond.</p>
<p>As a political science professor who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3EmhcmoAAAAJ&hl=en">studies civil conflicts</a>, I know that stability in Sudan requires a concerted effort from the international community. So far, a variety of <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/455156-sudan-faces-an-inflection-point-and-needs-us-leadership/">efforts have failed</a>. However, I believe that applying a right mix of international measures at the right time can give Sudan a chance at peace. </p>
<h2>Roots of conflict</h2>
<p>Much like Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/democracy-monitor/sudan/">Sudan is what is known as an “anocracy”</a> – that is, a <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1008934-the-perils-of-anocracy">political regime in transition</a> from autocracy to democracy.</p>
<p>Anocracies are <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/624156/how-civil-wars-start-by-barbara-f-walter/">prone to armed conflicts</a>. Mainly due to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717692652">growth of paramilitaries and weak civilian control of the military</a>, they face <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108500319">frequent coups and rebellions</a>. </p>
<p>Sudan experienced a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2023/6/30/between-two-wars-20-years-of-conflict-in-sudans-darfur">major armed conflict</a> in the western region of Darfur from 2003 to 2020, during which former president Omar al-Bashir used RSF paramilitaries to violently suppress rebel groups.</p>
<p>However, as the RSF grew more powerful, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/03/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-3.php">attempts to integrate it into the Sudanese army</a> failed. And in 2022, a <a href="https://news.umich.edu/u-m-expert-peace-elusive-in-sudan-with-intractable-generals-and-real-risks-of-worsening-conflict/">power struggle</a> between the two groups ensued.</p>
<h2>The limits of mediation</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-turmoil-turkey-erdogan-offers-mediate-conflict">Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-crisis-ethiopia-seeks-peace-talks/a-65442664">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/04/18/egypt-president-to-help-mediate-on-crisis-in-neighbouring-sudan/">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/israel-proposes-hosting-rivals-sudan-ceasefire-talks-after-mediation-2023-04-24/">Israel</a> have all offered to mediate between the SAF and RSF in Sudan. <a href="https://news.umich.edu/u-m-expert-peace-elusive-in-sudan-with-intractable-generals-and-real-risks-of-worsening-conflict/">So did the African Union</a>, along with the <a href="https://igad.int/">Intergovernmental Authority on Development</a>, an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. They proposed Kenya as the key mediator.</p>
<p>The SAF and RSF have not accepted any of these offers. </p>
<p>Efforts by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have yielded several ceasefires, including a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/17/air-raid-kills-17-in-sudans-capital-khartoum/">72-hour ceasefire</a> from June 18-21, 2023, but no concrete agreements. </p>
<p>Successful mediation requires that the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/International-Mediation-Bias-and-Peacemaking-Taking-Sides-in-Civil-Wars/Svensson/p/book/9781138200739">mediator has leverage</a> to <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol2/iss1/8/">offer incentives</a> to the warring parties, and also <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cupapsrev/v_3a103_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a02_3ap_3a248-263_5f09.htm">maintains impartiality</a> between them.</p>
<p>When it comes to Sudan, no mediator has managed to offer terms acceptable to both warring parties. Furthermore, many of the potential mediators have supported one side or the other. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-general-warns-kenya-against-sending-peacekeepers-2023-07-24/">Kenya</a> and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/28/analysis-uae-egypt-closer-to-different-sides-in-sudan-conflict">United Arab Emirates</a> have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-general-warns-kenya-against-sending-peacekeepers-2023-07-24/">accused by the Sudanese army</a> of supporting the RSF, which fought in Yemen and Libya <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/12/sudan-conflict-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-burhan-hemeti-rsf">alongside the UAE</a>. <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudan-and-new-age-conflict">Egypt</a>, meanwhile, supports the SAF due to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-burhan-heads-egypt-meet-president-sisi-statement-2023-08-29/">traditional ties with Sudanese generals</a>. </p>
<p>And while the U.S. does not have an official position of support for either side, <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-measures-in-response-to-the-crisis-in-sudan/">partly due to the atrocities committed by both warring parties</a>, its Saudi partners in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/15/sudan-army-returns-for-talks-in-jeddah-as-war-enters-fourth-month">Jeddah talks</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/12/sudan-conflict-saudi-arabia-uae-gulf-burhan-hemeti-rsf">back the SAF</a>. This may stem from their rivalry with the UAE.</p>
<p>But what doomed the Jeddah talks was not this perceived Saudi bias but the lack of political leverage. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia failed to provide clear and concrete terms that could be acceptable to both warring parties. </p>
<h2>Sanctions fall short</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/05/04/executive-order-on-imposing-sanctions-on-certain-persons-destabilizing-sudan-and-undermining-the-goal-of-a-democratic-transition/">U.S. sanctions</a> have targeted specific entities or individuals that disrupt the democratic transition in Sudan. </p>
<p>On June 1, 2023, the Department of the Treasury <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1514">announced sanctions against four companies</a> within the gold mining, vehicle and weapons industries that it accused of funding or arming the warring parties. Two of the companies were affiliated with the SAF, and two were linked to the RSF. Three months later, the department <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1712">also sanctioned Hemedti</a>, the RSF leader.</p>
<p>Usually, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/power-of-global-performance-indicators/can-blacklisting-reduce-terrorist-attacks/9CE6A7954342868355D1131874672A6D">United Nations coordinates sanctions</a> with the U.S., and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298448">U.S. allies follow suit</a>. However, this cascade of sanctions has yet to happen. The U.N. Sanctions Committee <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/sanctions-and-other-committees#cat1">has not added any new sanctions</a> on Sudan yet, while the European Union is working on <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-toughen-its-stance-sudan-war-with-sanctions-framework-sources-2023-07-25/">a framework for such sanctions</a>.</p>
<p>While current and future sanctions may hold, targets often find <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127">alternative sources of funding</a>. Despite U.S. sanctions targeting Hemedti’s RSF reliance on the gold trade, Russia has stepped in to supply weapons and training to Sudan <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">in exchange for gold</a> to fund its war in Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Peacekeeping efforts hold promise</h2>
<p>International peacekeeping can be <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/extraordinary-relationship-between-peacekeeping-and-peace/D2D5D262B60315387B0B23D1D4F79CC9">effective in conflict zones</a>, particularly when the efforts are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/36691/chapter-abstract/321734745?redirectedFrom=fulltext">properly resourced</a>. Peacekeeping missions in the Ivory Coast from 2004 to 2017 and in Croatia from 1996 to 1998 are often cited as <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131552">success stories</a>. </p>
<p>The United Nations-African Union Mission, or UNAMIS, was a peacekeeping mission in Darfur from 2007 to 2020 that used both police and troops to provide a buffer zone. The missions had only <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/the-legacy-of-unamid-and-the-future-of-hybrid-peacekeeping-missions/">partial successes</a>, mainly due to the lack of support from the al-Bashir government. </p>
<p>In 2020, after the UNAMIS ended, the U.N. Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, or UNITAMS, was tasked to assist political transitions in Sudan. However, it lacked police or troops, and its potential efficacy is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb11-ten-challenges-un-2023-2024">heavily disputed</a>. </p>
<h2>An integrated approach</h2>
<p>Observers of Sudanese politics and experts of international relations have suggested many solutions to stabilize Sudan, prevent further atrocities and eventually resolve the conflict.</p>
<p>These include <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/to-stop-the-fighting-in-sudan-take-away-the-generals-money/">stopping Hemedti’s flow of money</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-darfur-peacekeeping-mission-should-be-considered/7124875.html">sending peacekeepers with troops and police</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/13/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-so-silent-on-sudan">involving the International Criminal Court</a> to investigate atrocities, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">coordinating political dialogue</a> between international actors and warring parties, and <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/sudan-civil-war-fits-global-pattern-by-comfort-ero-and-richard-atwood-2023-06">restraining outside influences</a> – such as from the UAE or Russia – that weaken the effect of sanctions on Sudan.</p>
<p>One integrated solution is to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076">combine peacekeeping and mediation</a>. This would mean augmenting UNITAMS with police and troops from the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations">U.N. Peacekeeping division</a>, while forging a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-descent-chaos">united diplomatic front</a> on the international level.</p>
<p>A short-term action for this united front would be to employ the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">U.N. mediation team</a>. With a roster of experienced international mediators, the mediation team can try to provide opportunities for political dialogue. </p>
<p>A long-term solution, and one suggested in the international <a href="https://ifit-transitions.org/peace-treaty-initiative/">Peace Treaty Initiative</a>, is to institutionalize the mediation effort. Once a country accepts the proposed treaty, it can request mediation before or after conflict erupts. This process avoids the difficulty of getting to the mediation table in the first place, while guaranteeing a coordinated and concerted mediation process.</p>
<h2>A window of opportunity</h2>
<p>In April 2023, the warring parties <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230418-sudan-rejects-external-mediation-efforts/">rejected international mediation offers</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-sudans-military-factions-set-path-war-mediation-stalled-2023-04-28/">failed to send delegates</a> for internal mediation in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. Until mid-August, neither side seems had seemed to have reached the stage of a “<a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/9897/chapter/7">hurting stalemate</a>” – which is sorely needed for parties to come to the negotiation table. </p>
<p>However, with the death on Aug. 23, 2023, of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-in-africa-prigozhins-death-exposes-putins-real-motives-on-the-continent-212707">Wagner group in Russia</a>, Hemedti has lost a key Russian ally. This leaves him more vulnerable to U.S. sanctions on the gold trade. In fact, this may have been what prompted him to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/30/political-ploy-activists-experts-rubbish-rsfs-sudan-peace-proposal">suggest a peace proposal</a> on Aug. 27. </p>
<p>As for Burhan of the SAF, he has tried to burnish his image by visiting Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and he gave a <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141287">speech at the U.N. General Assembly</a> on Sept. 21. This occurred after the SAF had to move to Port Sudan from Khartoum, where the RSF took a stronghold. </p>
<p>Given the weakened positions of both the RSF and SAF, a mediation window may open soon.</p>
<h2>Challenges ahead</h2>
<p>Any effort, however, is not without challenges. </p>
<p>A sufficient supply of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/700203">well-resourced peacekeeping personnel</a> is not guaranteed in this <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2022-un-peacekeeping-budget-signs-progress-or-fleeting-moment-consensus">age of retrenchment</a>. UNAMID was a <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2021/5/26/can-a-new-un-mission-help-stabilise-sudan">US$1 billion endeavor</a>, while UNITAMS’ current budget is <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2021/5/26/can-a-new-un-mission-help-stabilise-sudan">$34 million a year</a>.</p>
<p>Forging a united international front is another challenge, given the <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/sudan-civil-war-fits-global-pattern-by-comfort-ero-and-richard-atwood-2023-06">various foreign alliances</a> both warring parties have.</p>
<p>Other tools are limited, however. For example, sanctions will not affect Burhan that much, as the SAF still has air power and will be able to sustain its airstrikes. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges ahead, Sudan cannot be ignored. However, a lasting resolution requires multiple measures that can augment each other. The lack of external interference, plus an impartial mediator and U.S. leverage, will be essential ingredients for mediation to move forward. And the mix of measures must be applied with the right timing and with the right actors involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hyeran Jo is a member of the expert advisory group of the Peace Initiative, an international legal effort led by the Institute for Integrated Transitions. This article's research was funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation (SES # 2049443).</span></em></p>An expert on civil conflicts explains why the international community has so far failed to create peace in Sudan, and what new opportunities lie ahead.Hyeran Jo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2153172023-10-10T11:52:26Z2023-10-10T11:52:26ZIsrael-Hamas war: A political scientist explains why the very subject of peace is now unthinkable<p><em>Hamas’ surprise attack on Southern Israel on 7 October marks the bloodiest assault the state has sustained since its creation in 1948. At the time of writing, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67050350">death toll</a> on the Israeli side has reached 900. In Gaza, retaliatory Israeli strikes have left more than 700 people dead, according to Palestinian authorities, a day after the government laid total siege on the Hamas-held Gaza Strip. The Israeli army has announced it has retrieved the bodies of 1,500 Hamas fighters.</em></p>
<p><em>Are we heading for all-out war? Can Israel defeat Hamas militarily, and vice versa? Will <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-netanyahu-facing-off-against-the-supreme-court-and-proposing-to-limit-judicial-independence-and-3-other-threats-to-israeli-democracy-197096">the far-right government of Benyamin Netanyahu</a> open up to the left to form a cabinet of national unity, and if so, with what consequences?</em></p>
<p><em>Samy Cohen, an emeritus researcher at Sciences Po, President of the French Association for Israel Studies (AFEIL) and author of many books on the Middle East, including “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/32273/chapter-abstract/268473458?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Doves Among Hawks: Struggles of the Israeli Peace Movements</a>” in English and most recently <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/content/israel-fragile-democracy-interview-samy-cohen">“Israël, une démocratie fragile”</a> (“Israel, a fragile democracy”) sat down with The Conversation France’s International affairs’ editor, Grégory Rayko, to provide some answers.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>Grégory Rayko: Why did the Hamas attack take Israel by surprise?</h2>
<p>Samy Cohen: On the Israeli side, there were flaws at two levels. Firstly, there was an intelligence failure. Until now, Israel’s internal security services, the <a href="https://www.shabak.gov.il/en">Shabak</a>, was very well informed about the situation in the Gaza Strip. Obviously, recently, it no longer had any sources within Hamas. Its blindness is no less astonishing. For example, journalists had reported in recent months that many Hamas militants regularly went out to train on motorbikes, and even learned to fly light aircraft; and yet the Israeli services saw nothing of it. This is a major flaw for which they will have to answer one day.</p>
<p>But it did not occur in a vacuum. Very often, intelligence failures are due to failures in the country’s political-military conception. Take the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago. The Israeli intelligence services had a lot of information indicating that Egypt was about to attack.</p>
<p>But the political leaders did not want to believe it because they were caught up in a completely defective strategic narrative, according to which Egypt was far too weak to dare to attack. In the same way, for several years now, the politico-strategic narrative has somehow trickled down to the world of intelligence: This narrative, defended for years by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, asserted that Hamas did not present a major danger to Israel and that it was necessary to preserve its presence in the Gaza Strip in order to convince Israeli society and the international community that there was no partner for peace since Palestinian society was fractured between Hamas on the one hand and Fatah on the other.</p>
<p>For Netanyahu and the entire Israeli right, the scarecrow of Hamas was a kind of insurance against any international pressure. Netanyahu even said one day that it was in Israel’s interest for Hamas to continue. To this end, he allowed money to be paid to Hamas, he authorised some 20,000 Gazans to go and work in Israel, and thus to bring money into the Gaza Strip so that life under Hamas would be at least liveable there.</p>
<p>The intelligence services were imbued with this vision, according to which Hamas was not a real threat. Moreover, a short while ago, Tzachi Hanegbi, head of the National Security Council, a body that advises the prime minister, and who is close to Netanyahu, declared that Hamas was not keen to resume hostilities. In short, the intelligence services fell asleep, but to a large extent this can be explained by the government’s stance – and it should be added that for months now the prime minister has been concentrating almost exclusively on his fight to take control of the Supreme Court, which was an absolute priority for him – at least until 7 October.</p>
<h2>Once the Hamas attack was launched, its fighters were able to advance fairly easily into Israeli territory, killing hundreds of people and taking <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/09/world/middleeast/israel-hostages-hamas-explained.html">at least 150 hostages</a></h2>
<p>Because the army units around Gaza were woefully inadequate. Why? Because they were in the West Bank. For two years, the Israeli government has been steadily tightening security in the settlements. It’s true that there has been an upsurge in attacks on the West Bank; but the explanation lies mainly in the fact that there are now representatives of the West Bank settlers in the government, starting with the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are demanding that the army provide security for these settlers, who are their loyal electorate – to the detriment of the populations living near the Gaza Strip, who vote in a much more heterogeneous way and are therefore not considered to be a priority electorate.</p>
<p>In short, the combination of blind intelligence, due to the vision of the country’s leaders, and the absence of troops around the Strip allowed this assault to take place with the human toll that we know.</p>
<h2>Netanyahu has said that he wants to form a government of national unity</h2>
<p>It will be complicated. The former prime minister and leader of the opposition, Yair Lapid, has requested that ultra-religious elements leave in exchange for his entry into government. But can Netanyahu manage without them? It is far from certain. As we speak, he has donned the costume of a warlord and is flexing his muscles, claiming that he is going to destroy Hamas.</p>
<h2>Is that possible?</h2>
<p>No. This is pure political rhetoric, not reality. Hamas is not an army that can be defeated on the battlefield and surrendered to. It is a highly decentralised paramilitary organisation whose fighters, who hide in tunnels, are very difficult to flush out. The Israeli air force will not be enough.</p>
<p>To achieve this, it would be necessary to enter Gaza with tanks and thousands of men, and there would be many victims on both sides, among Gazan civilians and Israeli soldiers alike. To which we must add another factor: the hostages…</p>
<h2>What are Hamas going to do with all the hostages it has taken in Gaza? Does it intend to exchange them for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel?</h2>
<p>At the moment, Hamas has no interest in negotiating the release of the hostages. Just imagine, hypothetically, that the movement were to obtain the release of all its prisoners currently in Israeli jails, and release the Israeli hostages it is holding. It would then lose a formidable human shield. Israel could then launch a massive attack on the Gaza Strip, without fear of causing the death of its own citizens in the process.</p>
<p>There might be negotiations, but not for a very long time. In the meantime, these hostages will no doubt be scattered all over Gaza, forcing the army to be extremely careful every time it decides to bomb an area.</p>
<h2>The Israeli-Palestinian peace process was already moribund; are we now looking at the final nail in the coffin?</h2>
<p>But the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been dead for a long time, at least since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/world/middleeast/17olmert.html">Ehud Olmert’s two-state peace plan in 2007</a>. Now we’re no longer hammering the last nail in the coffin; we’re throwing the coffin into the sea. In other words, the very subject of peace has disappeared. What we are seeing today is that even the most moderate Israeli population no longer believes in the possibility of peace. They have seen the images of the massacres of civilians committed by Hamas on 7 October, and they have seen Palestinians on the West Bank loudly celebrating the carnage.</p>
<p>A friend of mine, who lives in the south of Israel, near the Gaza Strip, has been a tireless campaigner for the peace camp for decades; this morning she gave an interview to a website in which she said: “I can’t talk about peace any more.” If even such committed people give up, you can imagine the state of the rest of society. We’re in for some very dark years. There will be no turning back.</p>
<h2>What future do you see for Benyamin Netanyahu?</h2>
<p>He bears huge responsibility for this. He thought that by establishing diplomatic relations with several countries in the Arab world – even though, for decades, all observers had been saying that there would be no Arab-Israeli normalisation without a solution to the Palestinian question – he had shown that Palestine was finally no longer an issue. But Palestine has come back to centrestage in an outburst of appalling violence, making it impossible for Saudi Arabia to continue moving toward a rapprochement with Israel.</p>
<p>However, given the trauma experienced by Israel on 7-8 October, one can’t be sure that Netanyahu will lose power any time soon. He had lost popularity in recent months because of his stance on the Supreme Court case. This loss of popularity also impacted upon the support of his ultra-religious allies, and benefited above all Benny Gantz’s National Unity Party, which has been leading the polls for months and could join the government in the near future.</p>
<p>Note that neither Gantz nor former Prime Minister Yair Lapid has called for Netanyahu’s immediate departure. They know that such a demand would be unpopular because it would be perceived as going in the direction of Hamas, since it would be a weakening of Israeli power following the attacks of 7 October. In short, Netanyahu is here to stay, and so is Hamas, and it is very difficult to find reasons for optimism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215317/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samy Cohen ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Rarely has been the prospect of peace between Israelis and Palestinians seem so remote.Samy Cohen, Directeur de recherche émérite (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115492023-08-17T10:20:48Z2023-08-17T10:20:48ZNiger: Ecowas military intervention could trigger 3 bad outcomes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542849/original/file-20230815-21-ogk7ja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria-led Ecowas artillerymen land by helicopter on 10 January, 1999 in Freetown. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jean-Philippe Ksiazek/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66465146">threat</a> of military force to end the coup in Niger has led to significant divisions in the region.</p>
<p>It has heightened tensions in Niger itself, as well as among its neighbours. </p>
<p>There are more and more signs that any military intervention is likely to be met with stiff opposition. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/niger-coup-supporters-rally-as-regional-force-mulls-intervention-/7222246.html">Growing support</a> for the junta has emboldened the coup plotters to stay in power and call the bluff of the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States</a>, Ecowas. </p>
<p>In reaction to the threat of force, more Nigeriens took to the streets to show their opposition, with one <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/08/military-junta-thousands-of-coup-supporters-gather-near-french-military-base-in-niger/">protest</a> held close to a French military base in Niamey. </p>
<p>The option of military force has divided countries in west Africa and the Sahel. Ecowas members are fully aware that an all-out war would increase the fragility of the region. A meeting of Ecowas military chiefs in Ghana on <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230817-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-ecowas-military-chiefs-to-meet-over-niger-coup">17 and 18 August</a> will discuss intervention options. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Ecowas parliament is <a href="https://punchng.com/ecowas-parliament-divided-over-planned-military-action-in-niger/">divided</a> over a military intervention. Member countries such as Nigeria, which currently holds the rotating chair, are also being put under internal pressure. <a href="https://punchng.com/niger-kano-residents-protest-planned-standby-force/">Protesters</a> took to the streets in Kano, the biggest city in northern Nigeria, against a possible invasion of Niger. </p>
<p>For their part, countries that neighbour Niger but do not belong to Ecowas, such as Chad and Algeria, have <a href="https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/niger-chad-and-algeria-opposed-to-military-intervention-would-aggravate-the-situation/">opposed</a> the use of force. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">politics and international relations</a>, I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329456894_US_Drone_Base_in_Agadez_A_Security_Threat_to_Niger">researched</a> the implications of foreign military bases in Niger. My view remains as I have <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">previously argued</a> that a military intervention in Niger is unlikely. </p>
<p>However, the threat of force means tensions remain high. This is understandable as a great deal is at stake. I have identified three major implications of a full-blown war. </p>
<p>The first casualty would be the ongoing regional war against terrorism because countries currently committed to this fight would have their armies and resources diverted. </p>
<p>The second is that there would be a mass influx of refugees into the seven countries bordering Niger. This would have a knock-on effect as more refugees seek to find their way to Europe. </p>
<p>The third is that the conflict would heighten tensions between Niger and France. The junta blames France for the country’s insecurity and economic woes. </p>
<h2>Counting the cost of war</h2>
<p>Nigerien soldiers, through the <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Counter-terrorism-projects/G5-Sahel">G5-Sahel</a> and <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>, are involved in the fight against <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html">Boko Haram</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state-west-africa-province">Islamic State West Africa Province</a> (ISWAP) and other terrorist groups around the Lake Chad Basin and other regions of the country. An attack led by Ecowas on Niger would distract the soldiers and divert critical resources. </p>
<p>Terrorist groups could then take advantage of borders weakened by conflict. They could also benefit from a situation where armies which previously fought side by side against insurgents such as Boko Haram and ISWAP were now fighting one another.</p>
<p>The example of Syria and how ISIS <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/comparing-al-qaeda-and-isis-different-goals-different-targets/">quickly emerged</a> in the region gives a glimpse of what could happen. </p>
<p>Most of the Nigerien population lives in the southern part of the country next to the borders with Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries would suffer an influx of refugees, further destabilising what are already fragile states.</p>
<p>A war between the Nigerien military and Ecowas would embolden human traffickers and lead to more Africans taking advantage of the chaos to travel north towards Europe. </p>
<p>Niger has several bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the European Union and other countries in Europe to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_4536">curb mass migration</a> through Libya and the Mediterranean sea.</p>
<p>Agadez in central Niger used to be a <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171213-focus-niger-agadez-desert-migrant-hub-people-smuggling-sahel-hotspots-route-libya">major hub for illegal migration</a> but this has changed as a result of the concerted effort between Niger and its European allies. </p>
<p>Military intervention would lead to a total collapse of the relationship between France and Niger’s people. There is already anger among a large part of the Nigerien public against the former colonial master and its activities in the country. </p>
<p>Niger was a French colony from 1922 till independence in 1960 and Paris has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230803-niger-coup-brings-france-s-complicated-relationship-with-its-former-colonies-into-the-spotlight">continued</a> to play a critical role in the domestic political and economic affairs of the country.</p>
<p>If people believe that Ecowas is being pushed to take military action by France and its allies, Nigeriens could look to Russia which has issued its own <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warning</a> against military intervention.</p>
<p>While Russia might not have the capacity and resources to fully mobilise in support of the junta, it might engage the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group</a>, the Russia-backed private military contractor, which already has a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/tracking-arrival-russias-wagner-group-mali">presence</a> in neighbouring Mali. </p>
<p>Russia has been careful not to support the coup plotters so as not to upset its allies in Africa, such as South Africa and Namibia, who both oppose the coup. But a full-scale military intervention would provide Moscow with an opportunity to get involved and “gain another ally”. The military leaders in Burkina Faso for instance have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/5/interim-burkina-faso-president-hails-russia-as-strategic-ally">strengthening </a> their relationship with Russia.</p>
<h2>Limited options</h2>
<p>Ecowas is desperate to “do something” after the junta defied its <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/ecowas-threatens-force-gives-7-day-ultimatum-for-return-to-democracy-in-niger">seven-day ultimatum</a> to step down.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the junta is not showing any signs of backing down. </p>
<p>I think the best option is to rule out military action and to negotiate a short transition period to restore democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The use of force to end the coup in Niger would come at great cost and cripple the regional fight against terrorism.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070622023-06-08T14:08:49Z2023-06-08T14:08:49ZChad on the brink: how the war in Sudan hurts its fragile neighbour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530631/original/file-20230607-17-bbcsrb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 2014 view of Gaoui refugee camp in N'Djamena, Chad. Pressure on refugee camps in Chad has increased due to latest fighting in Sudan.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sebnem Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 15 April <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">outbreak of hostilities</a> in Sudan, the civilian population has been bearing the brunt. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">Rapid Support Forces</a>, led by <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (called Hemeti</a>), are in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-al-burhan-sudans-military-de-facto-head-of-state">General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan</a>, Sudan’s de facto head of state.</p>
<p>Nearly <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/sudan/">1.4 million</a> people have been displaced. Of these, 330,000 have crossed into neighbouring countries. </p>
<p>Chad – already a fragile country itself – is one. Around <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/sudanese-refugees-fleeing-violence-flock-chad">90,000</a> Sudanese refugees have entered Chad since the conflict began. The new arrivals have added to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/over-60000-have-fled-chad-sudan-since-conflict-started-unhcr-2023-05-22/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20arrivals%20have%20added,for%20displaced%20people%20from%20Sudan.">600,000</a> mostly Sudanese refugees already in Chad after fleeing previous conflicts, especially in the Darfur region. </p>
<p>Despite its oil wealth, Chad is one of the <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/chad">poorest countries</a> in the world. Chad and Sudan share a common border of 1,400 kilometres. They also share the same ethnic groups living on both sides of their borders. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/helga-dickow-1209876">political scientist and expert in ethnic and religious conflict</a> with a focus on Chad, I outline how the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad. </p>
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<h2>Fragile security</h2>
<p>In the past, relations between Chad and Sudan have been characterised by <a href="https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP-12-Chad-Sudan-Proxy-War.pdf">conflicts, proxy wars and fragile peace agreements</a>. </p>
<p>The Darfur region plays a crucial role. It has at different times been a shelter for rebel groups of both countries.</p>
<p>Before he took power in Chad through a coup in December 1990, <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">Idriss Déby Itno</a>, an ethnic Zaghawa, and his militia had their rear base in Darfur. Members of Darfurian Zaghawa belonged to the inner circle of his rule. </p>
<p>After his <a href="https://theconversation.com/idriss-deby-itno-offered-chadians-great-hope-but-ended-up-leaving-a-terrible-legacy-159443">death in 2021</a>, a military council led by his son Mahamat took power in Chad.</p>
<p>Sudan’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/17/mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-the-feared-ex-warlord-taking-on-sudan-army-hemedti">Hemedti</a> is well connected within Chadian politics and military. He is of Chadian Arab descent and has his stronghold in the Darfur region. His family lives on both sides of the border. </p>
<p>Hemedti’s cousin, <a href="https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/13366/Death_on_the_front_line%2c_a_coup%2c_and_then_an_about_turn">General Bichara Issa Djadalla</a>, is the personal chief of staff to Mahamat Déby. Hemedti’s victory or defeat in Sudan could be a huge risk for the transitional president Déby in Chad.</p>
<p>In the case of his victory, Chadian Arabs could feel encouraged to try to take power in Chad as well. Many Chadians want an end to the Zaghawa rule, which has lasted for more than 30 years. Chadian Arab forces could be a real threat for Mahamat Déby.</p>
<p>In case of defeat, Hemeti would not give up his stronghold, Darfur. The gold of Darfur is the reason for his wealth and military strength. Hemedti is known for his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/who-is-hemedti-the-puppeteer-behind-sudans-feared-rsf-fighters">cruelty and ruthlessness</a>. The Zaghawa of Darfur could become the victims, as it was during the <a href="https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en">Darfur crisis in 2003</a>. If Mahamat Déby did not intervene, other sons of Déby and Zaghawa members of the army could quickly get rid of him.</p>
<h2>Humanitarian crisis</h2>
<p>The consequences of the outbreak of fighting in Khartoum were immediately felt in eastern Chad. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/23/more-than-90000-sudanese-take-refuge-in-chad-to-flee-the-fighting/">90,000 refugees</a> have fled from Sudan to Chad so far. Among them are about <a href="https://storyteller.iom.int/stories/plight-homecoming-chadians-fleeing-violence-sudan">12,500 Chadian returnees</a> who have been living in Sudan for decades. </p>
<p>Most refugees arrived in eastern Chad with only what they could carry. Here they met a poor but traditionally hospitable population, including earlier refugees. The arrival of more refugees risks worsening a precarious situation.</p>
<p>International aid is desperately needed. The people lack water, food, medical care and all other necessities of life. According to UNHCR, only <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/chad-funding-2023">17%</a> of the funds needed to meet the most urgent needs of refugees in Chad have been received from donors. </p>
<p>During her recent visit, USAID administrator Samantha Power pledged <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/readout/may-20-2023-administrator-samantha-power-travels-chad-visits-refugee-camp-support-humanitarian-response-crisis-sudan">$17 million</a> in humanitarian aid to the Chadian government for new and long-time refugees in the east of the country. </p>
<p>UNHCR’s deputy high commissioner for refugees, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/23/1177626408/unexpectedly-high-number-of-refugees-cross-into-chad-to-flee-fighting-in-sudan">Raouf Mazou</a>, also promised help for refugees and Chadians during his audience with Mahamat Déby on 22 May 2023.</p>
<p>In spite of these promises, there’s a risk that if any group feels neglected in the allocation of support, tensions between the local population and the newcomers could increase. </p>
<p>With the rainy season approaching, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Access to the refugee camps becomes almost impossible due to poor or non-existent roads. This will make it even more difficult for aid organisations to distribute relief supplies and to move the refugees away from the border region. A humanitarian disaster in eastern Chad is a possibility. </p>
<h2>Economic crisis</h2>
<p>Landlocked Chad is heavily dependent on imports of most goods – industrial products, raw materials and food. The two main ports that supply Chad are Douala in Cameroon and Bur Sudan in Sudan.</p>
<p>The closure of the borders has had an immediate impact on Chadian consumers. Prices of goods and services have risen by up to <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2023/05/18/nigeria-increases-trade-with-chad-on-war-in-sudan/">70%</a>, according to the Observatory for Economic Complexity. </p>
<p>The few Chadian exports have come to a standstill. Cotton, gum arabic and livestock are Chad’s <a href="https://www.export.gov/article?series=a0pt00000000GtoAAE&type=Country_Commercial__kav">main non-oil exports</a>. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan might bring the already weak Chadian economy to a standstill. To make matters worse, there is currently a <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/03/06/chad-reels-from-fuel-shortage/">shortage of fuel</a> in Chad. The shortage led to an increase in fuel prices of up to 300% - in a country where private households and manufacturers rely almost entirely on their own generators. </p>
<h2>Political implications</h2>
<p>Chad’s transitional president Mahamat Déby was surprised by the fighting in Sudan while on a pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia. It took him almost a week to find a safe way to fly back home to N'Djamena. </p>
<p>However, he announced on his <a href="https://www.facebook.com/presidencetd">Facebook account</a> that he had been in telephone contact with the two warring parties, trying to convince them to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>He wanted to present himself as a mediator to the international public. By talking to the two generals, he avoided choosing sides. He cannot afford to get caught on either side of the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemeti. </p>
<p>Since the death of his father, Mahamat Déby has tried to keep a firm grip on power despite national and international criticism. The transitional authorities suppress <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/26/chad-scores-protesters-shot-dead-wounded">opposition</a> to the Déby dynasty. </p>
<p>At its last meeting, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/communique-1152nd-meeting-peace-and-security-council-african-union-report-panel-wise-its-mission-republic-chad-held-11-may-2023">African Union Security Council</a> reiterated the ineligibility of the transitional government, including its president. </p>
<p>The war in Sudan and its outcome could destabilise Chad even further and lead it away from any path to peace and democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207062/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helga Dickow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing war in Sudan poses security, humanitarian, political and economic challenges for Chad.Helga Dickow, Senior Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of FreiburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2005662023-05-22T12:41:23Z2023-05-22T12:41:23ZSomaliland crisis: delayed elections and armed conflict threaten dream of statehood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525605/original/file-20230511-25-792wum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Workers next to the Independence Monument, depicting a hand holding a map of the country, in the city of Hargeisa, Somaliland, in September 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>With a presidential election <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/somaliland-election-delays-play-into-las-anod-chaos-4207382">delayed</a> for months and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230223-somaliland-clashes-between-government-and-militias-kill-nearly-100-in-two-weeks">deadly clashes</a> between security forces and clan militias, Somaliland’s <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-somaliland-can-teach-africa-about-peace-and-stability/">reputation for stability</a> lies in ruins. Violence erupted in the breakaway northern Somalia region a few weeks after elections were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-says-planned-presidential-poll-not-viable-postpones-next-year-2022-09-24/">postponed</a> late last year. President Muse Bihi Abdi, in power since November 2017, has been accused of sidelining some clans which have in turn demanded separation and direct administration from Mogadishu. Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, a Somali scholar who specialises in the Somali state and society, examines Somaliland’s rapid slide to instability.</em></p>
<h2>Somaliland has enjoyed relative peace for a period. What has changed?</h2>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-somaliland-can-teach-africa-about-peace-and-stability/">more than 25 years of stability</a>, Somaliland – a <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">breakaway</a> region of northern Somalia which seeks international recognition – has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/somaliland-conflict/">jolted</a> by armed conflict. In the worst of these clashes in February 2023, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230223-somaliland-clashes-between-government-and-militias-kill-nearly-100-in-two-weeks">nearly 100</a> people were killed in two weeks.</p>
<p>This armed conflict and violence is intrinsically centred on the northern city of Laas Caanood. Here, on 26 December 2022, a <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/conflict-in-las-anod-and-crisis-in-somaliland">protest over the gunning down</a> of a popular young political actor led to 20 deaths at the hands of Somaliland security forces. The protests soon morphed into a popular uprising by members of Dhulbahante clan to rejoin Somalia. Deadly clashes broke out between clan militias and government forces.</p>
<p>In contrast with southern Somalia, Somaliland has enjoyed relative peace since the late 1990s. This is when feuding within the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac0350.html">Somaliland’s largest clan</a> – the Isaaq – ended in a <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">peace settlement</a>, brokered by some non-Isaaq clans. The previous armed conflict within the Isaaq was based on who should control the political economy, which was weak at the time. But now the whole governance of the Somaliland state system, which has won international admiration but not recognition, is at risk. Presidential elections scheduled for November last year were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-says-planned-presidential-poll-not-viable-postpones-next-year-2022-09-24/">postponed</a> amid contestations and <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/somaliland-election-delays-play-into-las-anod-chaos-4207382">no new date</a> has been set.</p>
<p>I have worked intermittently for the past seven years in the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa, initially as a guest lecturer and finally as a visiting professor at the University of Hargeisa (2016-2023). But I have never felt the communal tension that I recently observed during my research fieldwork between mid-January and mid-February 2023. These <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/unhcr-seeks-support-for-somalis-fleeing-las-anod-fighting-into-ethiopia/6994261.html">tensions</a> were felt on the streets of the capital Hargeisa but also in Berbera on the Gulf of Aden coast and other towns.</p>
<p>In my ethnographic observation, the roots of the political armed conflict lie deeper than a presumed feud between pro-unionists – those who support reunion with southern Somalia – and anti-unionists. They include <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/conflict-in-las-anod-and-crisis-in-somaliland">cumulative economic and political grievances</a> of several clans at the periphery and President Muse Bihi Abdi’s authoritarian grip on power, which is in contrast with the conciliatory approach of his predecessor. The president <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/somaliland-election-delays-play-into-las-anod-chaos-4207382">remains in power</a> beyond his constitutional term, with extended authority contentiously granted by the council of traditional clan chiefs.</p>
<h2>Who’s playing what role in the conflict?</h2>
<p>Clans are important instruments in local politics in the Somali world. They help political players seeking power to win it or hold onto it. </p>
<p>Since the last election at the end of 2017, Somaliland’s “peripheral clans” (known as Darafyada) have regularly <a href="https://www.kormeeraha.com/2021/06/08/tyranny-of-majority-rule-in-somaliland/">pointed to a lack of proper power-sharing</a> by the political elites of the Hargeisa-based dominant Sacad Muuse sub-clan. President Bihi comes from this clan. Ministerial positions and senior directorates reveal a dominance of the Sacad Muuse.</p>
<p>Historically, the Sacad Muuse were <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Unknown_Horn_of_Africa.html?id=idUKAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">traders</a>. Today, they dominate not only trade and commerce but also politics in Somaliland. They control state power and resources unilaterally. In addition to Muse Bihi, the sub-clan has four ministers and vice ministers as well as the chief of the armed forces and solicitor general. Most significantly, they also control the profitable border trade around Wajaale, the most important economic hub in Somaliland.</p>
<p>Somaliland has reached a fork on the political road. The secessionist discourse is undergoing a speedy transformation. Now, Somaliland seems to be resembling southern Somalia, which for many years was defined by constant wars and violence. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Somaliland rulers’ burning desire is to affirm the territory’s borders marking northeastern Somalia, a border <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/somaliland-30-years-de-facto-statehood-and-no-end-sight-30363">created</a> by British and Italian colonial authorities in the late 19th century. The current conflict – with the risk of losing territory – is therefore a threat to Somaliland’s political future. If Laas Caanood falls on the side of the Dhulbahante clan militias, Somaliland authorities’ case for international recognition will further weaken. </p>
<p>For this reason, Muuse Bihi and his inner circle seek a military victory to recapture Laas Caanood. Somaliland authorities have resorted to artillery <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somalia-somaliland-violence-hospital-attack-09b05fe40f3d2727d4cadb216ea6cbdb">shelling</a> on public and private properties. Their troops operate from military garrisons located within populated areas in Laas Caanood, risking civilian lives.</p>
<p>The international recognition was not granted to Somaliland because most of the international community – the so-called <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/international-partners-concerned-over-recent-events-somalia-s-south-west-state">“Somalia partners”</a> – tends to preserve the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, as <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/340569?ln=en">stipulated</a> by successive UN resolutions on Somalia. </p>
<p>For many years, Somaliland’s image to the whole world was one of peace. This is even though activists and intellectuals for democracy and plural representation as well as critical media voices were suppressed. So long as there was peace, a glimmer of hope remained that the dream of statehood may be realised. The Laas Caanood conflict would have extinguished any remaining hopes of this. </p>
<p>With no end to the conflict in sight, the main loser will be President Bihi, who took the once relatively peaceful Somaliland to the edge of a cliff. Largely because he has exhausted his options to end the war through violence, he should seek to resolve the crisis peacefully. To save Somaliland from fragmentation, he should engage Laas Caanood clan chiefs to address their grievances expressed violently by the population. But, unfortunately, the prospects of this happening at this stage are next to nil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamed Haji Ingiriis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whichever way the ongoing armed conflict ends, the loser will be Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi.Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, Fellow, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043622023-04-24T20:05:55Z2023-04-24T20:05:55ZClimate isn’t a distraction from the military’s job of war fighting. It’s front and centre<p>It <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-24/defence-strategic-review-overhauls-army-navy-air-force/102258676">was pitched</a> as the “most significant” shift in Australia’s armed forces in decades. And among the headline announcements, climate change was recognised as an <a href="https://theconversation.com/senate-report-climate-change-is-a-clear-and-present-danger-to-australias-security-96797">issue</a> of national security. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">strategic review</a> of Australia’s military released yesterday doesn’t go a lot further than that when it comes to the climate crisis. The review devotes just over one of its 100 pages to what climate change means for defence. </p>
<p>And while overseas analysts and militaries seriously address the strategic effects of climate change and the role for defence, the Australian review focused more on climate change as a potential distraction from the military’s core business of war fighting. As our armed forces are increasingly called to respond to natural disasters, the review reports, they are less ready to fight a war. </p>
<p>This focus is too narrow. It’s also a long way from what the research is telling us, and a long way from what our allies are doing.</p>
<h2>What’s the link between climate change and national security?</h2>
<p>At a fundamental level, security doesn’t mean much if it doesn’t extend to conditions of survival. The climate emergency has been described as a direct threat to both <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reimagining-human-environment-relationship-why-climate-change-matters-human-security">human</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ecological-security/3EFBDFF1FE04D12D9503B3529DDDFF62">ecological</a> security. </p>
<p>But climate change also hangs over the traditional security agenda, which is to defend against any attacks. Forward-thinking militaries around the world have begun to prepare for these effects.</p>
<p>Climate change could make armed conflict more likely by acting as a “<a href="https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/climate-change-as-threat-multiplier_understanding-the-broader-nature-of-the-risk_briefer-252.pdf">threat multiplier</a>”. </p>
<p>Climate-driven droughts, desertification, changing rainfall patterns and the loss of arable land could lead to the collapse of governments or a fleeing population. </p>
<p>Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon and some analysts <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-06-16/climate-culprit-darfur">have pointed</a> to the role of climate change in contributing to armed conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region and Syria’s civil war. </p>
<p>Unchecked climate change is likely to trigger more demand for armed forces to <a href="https://toda.org/policy-briefs-and-resources/policy-briefs/climate-change-natural-disasters-and-the-military.html">respond to natural disasters</a>, predicted to increase in intensity and frequency on a hotter planet. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-poses-a-direct-threat-to-australias-national-security-it-must-be-a-political-priority-123264">Climate change poses a 'direct threat' to Australia's national security. It must be a political priority</a>
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<p>Yesterday’s strategic review focuses on this demand, and for good reason – it’s already happening. </p>
<p>Increasingly, the army and air force are <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10361146.2020.1776680">being called on</a> to respond to Australia’s tide of “unprecedented disasters” like the floods of the last three years, and the summer of fire in 2019–20. Navy ships <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/04/mallacoota-burns-panic-on-the-ground-as-the-australian-navy-called-in">evacuated hundreds</a> from the beach at Mallacoota in Victoria, under eerie light. </p>
<p>And then there’s the world. The demand for <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/preparing-australia-respond-disasters-home-abroad">army-backed humanitarian help</a> is rising. Our neighbours are among the most vulnerable <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/36114/files/rise-natural-disasters-asia-pacific.pdf">in the world</a> to the effects of natural disasters. </p>
<p>Beyond responses to refugees, conflict and natural disasters, there’s the question of how militaries are equipped, trained and resourced. </p>
<p>Higher temperatures, rising seas and natural disasters could threaten defence infrastructure and bases. Australia’s defence department is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10361146.2020.1776680">largest landholder in the country</a>, much of it in exposed coastal areas. </p>
<p>Our military has a substantial “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/2/667/7024982">carbon bootprint</a>”, given it relies heavily on machines which burn fossil fuels, from destroyers to tanks. Ensuring these have enough fuel in the future is a concern, especially if the substantial <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wnet/peril-and-promise/2022/01/militaries-produce-6-of-ghgs-but-theyre-not-required-to-report-it/#:%7E:text=The%20U.S.%20military%20is%20the,85%20million%20tons%20in%202004.">military contribution</a> to greenhouse gas emissions comes under more scrutiny. </p>
<p>In this sense it was good to see the review note the importance of the military accelerating a transition to clean energy. But the urgency of the climate crisis suggests our military should also be factoring climate change into procurement considerations and equipment management now. To date, there’s little evidence Australia has done so. </p>
<h2>What are other countries doing?</h2>
<p>Key partners like America, the UK and many other countries are well ahead of us. In my ongoing research, I’ve analysed climate responses and interviewed policymakers from other nations. This suggests we’re lagging well behind. </p>
<p>The US military began analysing what climate change would mean for it back <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/2/667/7024982">in the 1990s</a>. Biden’s government has given climate change greater priority in its National Security Council and firmly linked climate and security in what one interviewee told me was a “game changer”.</p>
<p>The UK has an expert body within its defence ministry examining the security implications of climate change. In 2021, it produced a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973707/20210326_Climate_Change_Sust_Strategy_v1.pdf">strategic document</a> with emissions cut goals for its armed forces, as well as investment to make the transition possible. </p>
<p>New Zealand has gone beyond reactive responses and embraced an active role for its military in responding to natural disasters <a href="https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/publication/responding-to-the-climate-crisis">at home and in the region</a>. One interviewee told me this was central to the military’s “social licence”. </p>
<p>New Zealand’s position has been strongly influenced by the concerns of its <a href="https://www.forumsec.org/2018/09/05/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/">Pacific neighbours</a>. Wellington decision makers also decided defence will not be exempt from government-mandated goals to get to net zero. </p>
<p>France has taken a <a href="https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/environment/france-includes-climate-change-key-feature-its-defence-activities">similar position</a> on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief focused on its overseas territories and the wider Francophone world. These operations are presented not as a distraction but as a core commitment.</p>
<p>Sweden and Germany used their time on the UN Security Council in recent years to <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/unsc_climatechange_2022.pdf">push for a resolution</a> on the organisation’s role in addressing the international security implications of climate change. And when Sweden <a href="https://www.government.se/government-policy/sweden-and-nato/swedens-road-to-nato/">joins NATO</a>, it’s likely to push for more military preparation for climate change given recent <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197241.htm">NATO commitments</a> on this front. </p>
<h2>Can Australia catch up?</h2>
<p>Yes. But the first step is to recognise where we are – and where the world is heading. </p>
<p>Australia’s defence sector must seriously engage with what climate change will bring, not least given our region’s acute vulnerabilities and the existential concerns of our Pacific neighbours.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, yesterday’s review suggests our defence establishment does not wholly share these concerns. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-finally-acknowledged-climate-change-is-a-national-security-threat-here-are-5-mistakes-to-avoid-186458">Australia's finally acknowledged climate change is a national security threat. Here are 5 mistakes to avoid</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt McDonald has received funding from the Australian Research Council and the UK Economic and Social Research Council. Research for this article was funded by an Australian Research Council grant: DP190100709.</span></em></p>Climate change is a real threat to national security. So why didn’t our armed forces review properly come to grips with this?Matt McDonald, Associate Professor of International Relations, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1997442023-02-22T17:11:50Z2023-02-22T17:11:50ZRussia’s invasion of Ukraine is proof the EU needs to get better at stopping mass atrocities<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that identifying mass atrocity risks is not a niche concern. Many who thought it would be irrational for Russia to launch an attack minimised long-standing Russian rhetoric that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/23/putin-genocide-language-ukraine-wipe-out-state-identity/">denied Ukrainian statehood and national identity</a>. If policymakers had used a “mass atrocity lens”, then they would have seen that a war of aggression was not only plausible but was likely to be accompanied by mass atrocities, taking into account Russia’s track record in Chechnya and Syria. </p>
<p>The fear of extermination explains why Ukrainians feel they are fighting for their survival and why the atrocities committed by Russian troops in <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/russia-committing-genocide-ukraine">Bucha and elsewhere</a> dealt a significant blow to any prospects of a peace agreement. A strategy on mass atrocities, therefore, is not only about empowering the European Union to save lives, but fulfil its declared ambitions to be a principled geopolitical actor in a divided world, effective at conflict prevention, management and resolution. </p>
<p>Ten years ago, the Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atrocities published a <a href="http://massatrocitiestaskforce.eu/Home.html">report</a> that weighed the EU’s strengths and weaknesses in preventing and halting mass atrocities. To strengthen the EU’s capacity in this area, we recommended that it:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>make explicit a commitment to preventing mass atrocities in strategic policy documents and through high-level statements;</p></li>
<li><p>cultivate expertise on mass atrocity prevention, especially country/regional expertise, and run training programmes to improve experts’ analytical and warning skills;</p></li>
<li><p>strengthen its early warning response system to enable earlier action against mass atrocity risks;</p></li>
<li><p>mitigate mass atrocity risks through diplomacy, including trade and development policies, and cooperation with other international players;</p></li>
<li><p>improve its capabilities to react quickly to ongoing mass atrocities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>To what extent has the EU made progress in line with our recommendations and where is there room for improvement?</p>
<h2>Commitment to preventing mass atrocities: still unclear</h2>
<p>The EU’s commitment to mass atrocity prevention is scattered across various documents. It has not followed the US in declaring mass atrocity prevention to be <a href="https://www.state.gov/2022-united-states-strategy-to-anticipate-prevent-and-respond-to-atrocities/">“a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility”</a>. Preventing atrocity crimes is included in documents such as the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf">“EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2020-2024”</a>, but not in other key documents such as the EU’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-0_en">Strategic Compass</a>, which assesses the security challenges facing the EU and makes specific proposals to strengthen the EU’s security and defence capabilities.</p>
<p>Neither the Council of the EU, the bloc’s diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), nor the European Commission have responded to the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2013-0180_EN.html">European Parliament’s 2013 call</a> for an interinstitutional “consensus on the responsibility to protect”. Instead, the EU’s 2016 <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en">Global Strategy</a> merely states that the EU “will promote the responsibility to protect’ (R2P), without indicating how the EU might <em>actively</em> protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. </p>
<p>In 2016 the <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/gr2p/12/4/article-p369_369.xml?language=en">EU became the first regional organisation</a> to appoint an "R2P focal point”, an official who facilitates internal EU coordination of atrocity prevention mechanisms, but we could not discern the identity of the current EU focal point from the EEAS website or organigram and we found no evidence of engagement with relevant stakeholders. Although the EU expresses support for R2P at the UN, EU Member States have been uneasy about the increasing politicisation of R2P: Russia, for example, contested the legitimacy of R2P references in the context of NATO’s intervention in Libya but <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/how-kremlin-distorts-responsibility-protect-principle">brought up R2P language</a> to legitimise its own war efforts in Georgia and Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Early warning response system and external action instruments: some progress</h2>
<p>In late 2018, the EEAS released an <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_r2p_atrocity_prevention_toolkit.pdf">“Atrocity Prevention Toolkit”</a> to help EU staff recognise and respond to atrocity crimes, by listing structural risk indicators, imminent warning signs and concrete measures to take to mitigate risks. Assessments of risks in conflict-affected or fragile countries now include analyses of the prevalence of hate speech, societal inequalities, a history of mass atrocities or failed recognition of past abuses. The toolkit feeds into the EU’s early warning system, which has been built since 2014. </p>
<p>Moreover, the EU’s toolkit goes further than one developed by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/early-warning.shtml">United Nations</a> and uses a gender lens in the assessment of atrocity risks. However, there is still a lingering belief within the EEAS that a focus on human rights, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066119883001">democratisation</a>, and conflict prevention is sufficient to assess atrocity risks and act upon them.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-has-new-powerful-tool-protect-human-rights-eu-global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-0_en">Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime</a>, the EU can impose sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which proved successful in cases like <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/24/3-4/article-p367_367.xml">Guinea</a>. EUROJUST, the EU’s agency for criminal justice cooperation, runs a European network for investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes, and is supporting a <a href="https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/eurojust-and-the-war-in-ukraine">joint investigative team in Ukraine</a>. The <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/">European Peace Facility</a> (EPF) is structured around human rights conditionality, but the extent to which mass atrocity risks are factored in remains unclear. The EU will need to ensure that it does not enable the acquisition of military equipment by governments in contexts where mass atrocities are likely.</p>
<h2>Capabilities to react quickly to mass atrocities: room for improvement</h2>
<p>The EU is developing a 5,000-strong <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-rapid-deployment-capacity_en">rapid deployment capacity</a> (EU RDC) – a substantial upgrade of the bloc’s current <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/33557_en">EU Battlegroups</a>, which comprises 1500 personnel. However, none of the current planning scenarios for the EU RDC involve a focus on preventing or stopping mass atrocities. Yet these force packages could play a key role in the prevention or mitigation of mass atrocity risks if appropriately trained and speedily deployed, and mandated to help protect civilian lives, as preventive peacekeeping deployments in <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sierra-leone/">Sierra Leone</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/27396/chapter-abstract/197201817?redirectedFrom=fulltext">North Macedonia</a> demonstrated.</p>
<h2>Overall assessment</h2>
<p>In the past decade, the EU has taken some steps to strengthen its capacity to prevent mass atrocities, but there is <a href="https://peacelab.blog/2019/07/first-things-first-prioritize-mass-atrocity-prevention">still a lack of consensus</a> within the EU on taking preventive action, and any <a href="https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/EU-and-RTP-in-an-illiberal-era.pdf">action taken in mass atrocity situations has often been fragmented</a>. Furthermore, in an increasingly divided international context, in which “liberal norms’ such as the responsibility to protect have been fiercely contested by developing countries and authoritarian regimes, the <a href="https://jcms.ideasoneurope.eu/2020/05/13/the-european-union-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/">EU’s ambivalence about R2P prevents it from leading globally on mass atrocity prevention</a>.</p>
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<p><em>Professors Christoph Meyer and Karen E. Smith were co-chairs of the task force, and Dr Chiara De Franco served as its coordinator.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chiara De Franco is a member of the International Studies Association (ISA). She has received funds from the Independent Research Fund Denmark to study how the EU protect civilians in conflict-torn territories. Her work for the Task Force for the EU's prevention of mass atrocities was funded by the Budapest Foundation for the international prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Meyer has received funding in the past from UK research council (ESRC) for the INTEL project, but not directly related to this research. He was also supported by the Budapest Foundation as the Task-Force Co-chair 10 years ago. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karen E. Smith est membre de International Studies Association, UACES, and British International Studies Association. </span></em></p>The war’s one-year anniversary is eerily close to that of an EU report on the prevention of mass atrocities. Ten years later, its authors reflect on what the bloc could have done differently.Chiara De Franco, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Southern DenmarkChristoph Meyer, Professor of European and International Politics, King's College LondonKaren E. Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1990342023-02-13T13:13:26Z2023-02-13T13:13:26ZNigerian elections: Eight issues young people want the new government to address<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508578/original/file-20230207-21-4s8k5u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C3679%2C2445&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Young people in Nigeria seek freedom from repression and other governance failures. Photo by Olukayode Jaiyeolai/NurPhoto,
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/youth-of-endsars-protesters-display-a-placard-in-a-crowd-in-news-photo/1229058489?phrase=EndSars&adppopup=true">Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Nigeria prepares for the 25 February presidential elections, it’s interesting to consider what young Nigerians are expecting. </p>
<p>There are plenty of them: 52.2 million people aged 18-35. That’s about 28% of Nigeria’s total population and more than the entire populations of Ghana and Benin Republic put together. In spite of the prospects that this number holds, young people in Nigeria are largely marginalised from governance.</p>
<p>This election holds immense significance for young Nigerians, particularly in light of the current economic difficulties, insecurity and their exclusion from the political process and decision making. </p>
<p>I have focused various studies on the political expectations of the youth. One of my more recent <a href="https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/cjfy/index.php/cjfy/article/view/29648/21609">studies</a> looked at the relationship between youth political participation, good governance and social inclusion in Nigeria. It involved 1,208 participants selected from Nairaland.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nairaland.com/">Nairaland Forum</a> is a Nigerian website created in 2005 that now has millions of readers. The online discussion site gets an average of 8.8 million visitors daily. It has become a place for young Nigerians to voice their opinions on a wide range of economic, political and social issues. </p>
<p>I am not assuming that the perspective of Nairaland users is representative of young Nigerians as a whole. But I contend that it provides valuable insight into how they see the world. In this article I focus on expectations around governance.</p>
<p>My study found a positive relationship between youth political participation and good governance. It suggests that involving young people in politics will promote political development, improve transparency and enhance human capital.</p>
<h2>Nigeria’s governance ranking</h2>
<p>Governance covers a wide range of issues, including security, the rule of law, participation, rights and inclusion, economic opportunity, human development, and public perception. Data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance reveals that <a href="https://iiag.online/data.html?loc=NG&view=table&meas=GOVERNANCE-AbsArmedConf-AbsUnInfGov-AbsCorrPubSect-MediaFree-EqSocEconOpp-PolPowRepWom-EffAdmin-TranspNet-AccHealth-AccWaterSanit-EduqQual-PovRedPol-IneqMitig-FoodSec&subview=rank&range1from=2016&range1to=2021&range2from=2017&range2to=2021&showLowest=true&showHighest=true&showHighlights=true&showFullContext=false&showAAT=false">overall governance in Nigeria</a> declined between 2016 and 2021. Nigeria currently ranks 30th on the continent. </p>
<p>My findings indicate that young Nigerians rank the largest declines as follows: media freedom, the representation of women, food security, corruption in the public sector, armed conflict, effective administration, undue influence on government by the political elite, and equality of socioeconomic opportunity.</p>
<h2>1. Media freedom</h2>
<p>Young Nigerians are deeply concerned about a lack of media freedom. They will want the incoming government to ensure that the media can operate freely in discharging its duties. The media, both mainstream and digital, must be protected by law and the government must ensure <a href="https://luminategroup.com/posts/news/digital-rights-in-nigeria-emerging-issues-and-opportunities">digital rights</a>, internet freedom and digital sovereignty (the right of entity to control its digital data) are upheld.</p>
<h2>2. Representation of women</h2>
<p>Young people want women to be represented better in governance and in parastatals. The incoming government must promote gender equality in its appointments, without compromising on merit. </p>
<h2>3. Food security</h2>
<p><a href="https://gjefnet.com/images/Vol2No1/2.pdf">Food security</a> is another pressing issue raised by young Nigerians. The challenges posed by climate change, such as flooding, drought and cyclones, have made people less food secure, particularly in communities near the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. </p>
<p>Climate governance policies must be put in place to mitigate the risk. The ongoing conflict between pastoralists and farmers, made worse by the strain on resources, also needs resolution. </p>
<h2>4. Corruption</h2>
<p>The incoming government must address corruption on both the demand and supply sides. Nigeria currently ranks 150 out of 180 countries on the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/nigeria">Corruption Perceptions Index</a>. Corruption requires the collusion of both giver and receiver. Therefore, it is necessary to address the complicity of Nigerian citizens in such activities. Petty and grand corruption in the academic, judicial and administrative sectors needs attention.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Man standing on a platform and waving a flag and surrounded by people raising their hands in protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508580/original/file-20230207-13-60q4xl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">During the EndSARS protest, young Nigerians called for an end to police brutality. Photo by Adekunle Ajayi/NurPhoto.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/end-sars-protesters-occupy-ibadan-lagos-expressway-on-news-photo/1229049222?phrase=EndSars&adppopup=true">from www.gettyimages.com</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>5. Armed conflict</h2>
<p>Young Nigerians want the incoming government to deal with armed conflict. In the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GPI-2022-web.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>, Nigeria currently ranks 143 out of 163 countries globally. The <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/epdf/10.31920/2732-5008/2020/v1n2a5">causes</a> of armed conflict in Nigeria are multifaceted and include water stress, competition for natural resources, climate change, identity crises, perceived relative deprivation and insurgent groups like Boko Haram. These conflicts are often driven by the proliferation of small and light weapons, porous borders, and ungoverned spaces.</p>
<p>The threat of insecurity looms large over Nigeria, casting a shadow over the prospects of peace and development for young people. The prevalence of police brutality has further eroded public trust and respect for the institution. The police allegedly use excessive force in their attempts to maintain order. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://bit.ly/3HCpFcZ">EndsSARS</a> protests of 2020 were an expression of discontent with the Special Anti-Robbery Squad, which was accused of harassing, brutalising and extorting young people. </p>
<p>The youth-led protests were met with government force. This may influence voting choices in the upcoming general elections.</p>
<p>The incoming government must address the grievances that underlie armed conflict and the factors that fuel it.</p>
<h2>6. Effective administration</h2>
<p>The government must also promote effective administration and equal socioeconomic opportunity. To close the well-documented equality gap, the government must empower people to succeed in business, agriculture and technology ventures. </p>
<h2>7. Undue influence</h2>
<p>The undue influence of the political elite, known as “cabals”, impedes transparency and diminishes trust in the government. The new government must run an open system devoid of cabals. It must be accountable and involve young Nigerians in decision making.</p>
<h2>8. Equal socioeconomic opportunity</h2>
<p>The Nigerian economy is currently beset by a host of challenges, including inflation, rising debt, susceptibility to external shocks, and high unemployment. Recent data from the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/NGA">International Monetary Fund</a> indicates a negative trend across various indicators.</p>
<p>The government must demonstrate a genuine commitment to diversifying the economy by making it more conducive to investment, providing tax relief for tech companies, reallocating infrastructure spending to support local industries, and deregulating the downstream sector.</p>
<p>To help create opportunities for all young Nigerians, education needs attention. Nigeria currently ranks 33rd in <a href="https://iiag.online/data.html?loc=NG&view=table&meas=GOVERNANCE-AbsArmedConf-AbsUnInfGov-AbsCorrPubSect-MediaFree-EqSocEconOpp-PolPowRepWom-EffAdmin-TranspNet-AccHealth-AccWaterSanit-EduqQual-PovRedPol-IneqMitig-FoodSec&subview=rank&range1from=2016&range1to=2021&range2from=2017&range2to=2021&showLowest=true&showHighest=true&showHighlights=true&showFullContext=false&showAAT=false">education quality</a> on the African continent. At the primary and secondary levels, teachers are underpaid and facilities are either obsolete or lacking. According to UNICEF, there are <a href="https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/education">10.5 million</a> out-of-school children in Nigeria. At the tertiary level, institutions and researchers are underfunded, lecturers are poorly paid, facilities are dilapidated and appointments are politicised. </p>
<p>The incoming government must increase the budget for education at all levels and encourage new funding models.</p>
<h2>Tough road ahead</h2>
<p>The incoming government will have an arduous task ahead of it and will have to break with the status quo. Young Nigerians expect a government that is responsive and responsible, one that will rebuild the country and place it on the path to consolidated development. </p>
<p>Failure to meet these expectations will subject young people to poverty and increase their exodus from the country in search of greener pastures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tope Shola Akinyetun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Young Nigerians actively discuss politics and governance despite being kept on the sidelines. They seek a government that would promote their inclusion and solve problems affecting them.Tope Shola Akinyetun, Researcher, Lagos State University of Education Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992652023-02-08T19:51:12Z2023-02-08T19:51:12ZCorruption and war: two scourges that feed off each other<p>In the world championship of corruption, the competition is fierce. The NGO Transparency International has just published its list of countries according to the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb">level of perceived corruption</a>.</p>
<p>The gold medal in the competition for the most corrupt country has just been awarded to Somalia, followed by South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Libya, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and North Korea.</p>
<h2>How do you measure corruption in a country?</h2>
<p>Since its inception in 1995, the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">Corruption Perceptions Index</a> (CPI) has become the world’s leading indicator of public sector corruption.</p>
<p>It ranks 180 countries and territories as more or less corrupt, using data from 13 external sources, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, private consulting and risk management firms, think tanks and others.</p>
<p>The scores given – on a scale ranging from zero (0 = high corruption) to one hundred (100 = no corruption), depending on the degree of perceived corruption in the public sector – reflect the opinions of experts and business figures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 shows perceived levels of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>When corruption eats away at the state…</h2>
<p>Holding the unenviable title of the most corrupt country on the planet since 2007, Somalia has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747730701695729">something in common</a> with its “challengers” that explain their high level of corruption. What are the reasons for the link between increased corruption and the multiplication of conflicts?</p>
<p>The first is that highly corrupt societies are characterised by a great weakness of the state. As the most corrupt country, Somalia has almost no state. Over the past 30 years, it has experienced catastrophic famines, failed international interventions, refugee flows, deaths by the hundreds of thousands, and endless corruption, leading to a continued lack of even rudimentary state services and institutions.</p>
<p>Thus Somali law enforcement forces serve only to terrorise the population and enrich themselves and serve their warlord. Somalis live in an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240500329379">environment of pervasive predation, threats and deprivation</a>. Another example is <a href="http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.522">Syria</a>, in which corruption and the civil war have challenged the functioning of the judicial system, a jungle where those who corrupt the judges win the most.</p>
<h2>Decaying public institutions</h2>
<p>Second, corruption leads to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2">loss of trust in public institutions</a>, which leads to near-permanent violence. Corruption deteriorates the democratic system in an endless cycle: impoverished citizens receive money to vote for the tyrant in power; electoral commissions are bought and become masquerades to proclaim plebiscites for despots hated by their people; and independent candidates in power are threatened and even sometimes murdered…</p>
<p>For example, South Sudan is a democratic nightmare with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan">permanent violations of human rights</a> – arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and murder. Venezuela, one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, such crimes have infiltrated all levels of the state and corruption has effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-corruption-kill-democracy-110637">killed the country’s democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Another reason is that corruption fuels war is the lack of press freedom. A tyrannical political system nourished by corruption further reinforces its authoritarianism by destroying press freedom. For example, without any media capable of thwarting his power, Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on Russia and made it impossible to challenge his country’s territorial ambitions such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2019.1625279">2014 annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD281.pdf#page=2">2022 attack on Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>As for Yemen, a particularly corrupt territory with very little press freedom, the NGO Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/yemen">says</a>: “The Yemeni media are polarised by the war’s different protagonists and, to avoid reprisals, have no choice but to toe the line of whoever controls the area where they are located”. As a result, Yemen has been ravaged by war since 2014, fuelled by corruption and an authoritarian press.</p>
<p>The final reason for the link between corruption and war is the importance of <a href="http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I4-P240.pdf">economic inequalities and the weakness of economic development</a>.</p>
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
<p>In a country where corruption reigns, a small minority monopolises national wealth, especially since <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1056492615579081">corruption is the use of its personal power for private interests against the collective interest</a>. When social injustice reigns, tensions develop and civil wars can break out. South Sudan has been portrayed as a kleptocracy, a governmental system in which the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/113/452/347/78186">ruling class appropriates public resources for its own benefit</a> at the expense of public welfare.</p>
<p>In the end, the vicious circle has set in: corruption leads to permanent tensions, and then violent conflicts, and then crimes and wars. As the latest Transparency International report shows, highly corrupt countries are all economically, politically and socially unstable territories that are gradually being destroyed by incessant wars. Over the course of the conflicts, all the institutions of governance have been destroyed.</p>
<p>Insecurity encourages the people to engage in trafficking. In the absence of national watchdog agencies, a feeling of total impunity sets in and corruption becomes systemic. The spread of corruption then makes it a social norm, leading populations of the most affected countries to eventually regard it as the only way to survive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Venard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A review of Transparency International’s recently released global corruption ranking confirms that corruption fuels war, and vice versa.Bertrand Venard, Professeur / Professor, AudenciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1945652023-01-13T09:16:00Z2023-01-13T09:16:00ZMining and armed conflict threaten eastern DRC’s biodiversity in a complex web<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504421/original/file-20230113-24-h4zyhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GettyImages</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict-affected eastern provinces are home to numerous protected areas. These areas host unique biodiversity and a range of threatened species, such as the okapi, forest elephant and mountain gorilla. They are also part of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is a crucial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/02/carbon-timebomb-climate-crisis-threatens-to-destroy-congo-peatlands">line of defence</a> against climate change. </p>
<p>The same protected areas overlap with globally significant deposits of minerals – including gold, coltan and cassiterite.</p>
<p>Mining is <a href="https://www.levinsources.com/assets/pages/Global-Solutions-Study.pdf">rampant</a> in these areas, including in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, Maiko National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve. </p>
<p>Most of this mining is labour-intensive artisanal mining, which makes use of basic technologies. However, in recent years, there has been a sharp increase in semi-industrial mining, which requires significant start-up capital for the purchase of intermediate technologies, such as dredges and pumps.</p>
<p>Both forms of mining have <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rspb.2018.1926">negative impacts</a> on biodiversity conservation. Direct impacts include deforestation, soil degradation and water pollution. </p>
<p>More indirect effects stem from the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-019-0310-6">construction of new roads</a> to make mining sites accessible, and population growth in the vicinity of mines. This leads to further natural resource exploitation, such as fuel and construction wood extraction, bushmeat hunting and shifting agriculture. </p>
<p>This destructive mining in conservation areas often happens under the protection of state and non-state armed actors, who take a portion of the revenues. Thousands of people also depend on such mining for their livelihoods. </p>
<p>The economic importance of mining makes it difficult to stop extraction in protected areas. It’s also at the heart of the complex linkages between mining, armed conflict and conservation in eastern DRC. <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">Our study</a> set out to grasp these linkages, which is crucial for designing effective measures to safeguard protected areas. </p>
<p>Based on research in the Okapi and Itombwe reserves, we found that mining sparks conflict between different branches of the state, between entrepreneurs and local populations, and between artisanal and semi-industrial miners. In a militarised environment, these conflicts can spark violence.</p>
<h2>Livelihoods and enrichment</h2>
<p>Mining is rampant in protected areas because it generates incomes for citizens, officials and armed actors. </p>
<p>Entry barriers are low, and miners’ earnings are <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/much-miner-earn-assessment-miners-revenue-basic-needs-study-drc/">higher</a> than those of comparable groups in the population. For many families, mining is one of the few opportunities for <a href="https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy-ub.rug.nl/science/article/pii/S0301420720309247#sec6">social mobility</a>.</p>
<p>Mining revenue also tops up the meagre wages of numerous administrators, soldiers and other state officials. In the DRC, the official salaries of state workers are low or remain unpaid. Most of these workers make money on the side and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240902863587">extract revenue from citizens</a> through various forms of taxation, protection fees and extortion. They are also under pressure to do so from their hierarchy, which expects a share of the income. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-extractive-industries-manage-to-carry-on-harming-the-planet-155323">How extractive industries manage to carry on harming the planet</a>
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<p>Officials from the agency responsible for regulating artisanal and small-scale mining (SAEMAPE), and the provincial ministry of mines often tax mining activities in protected areas. The Congolese armed forces also substantially enrich themselves by protecting this mining, which is forbidden in most conservation areas. Armed groups also <a href="https://ipisresearch.be/publication/accompanying-note-interactive-map-militarised-mining-areas-kivus/">benefit</a> by imposing taxes in mining sites and at roadblocks.</p>
<p>The recent increase in semi-industrial mining, often run by <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/sino-congolese-scandal-illegal-exploitation-minerals-and-forests-chinese">Chinese entrepreneurs</a>, has substantially benefited the Congolese army. The senior officers who protect these mining operations deploy army units to guard the installations and seal off the area from unwanted visitors. </p>
<p>The mining administration, too, has benefited from this development. For instance, the Mining Cadastre, the agency responsible for issuing and managing mining titles, has started to <a href="http://www.faapa.info/blog/le-ministere-de-mines-et-liccn-se-contredisent-sur-la-provenance-de-31-lingots-dor-saisis-a-mambasa/">circulate a new map</a> of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve with a different perimeter. This has allowed the agency to issue concessions inside the boundaries of the reserve, while arguing that they are located outside it. </p>
<h2>Sparking conflict</h2>
<p>Because mining is lucrative for many people, <a href="https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/files/8518/58b283b5-c074-4aac-9cd9-3ea11891c80c.pdf">our research shows</a> it has considerable knock-on effects on conflict dynamics. </p>
<p>To start with, mining creates friction between different branches of the state and different administrative levels. The environment ministry has contested the new map of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve circulated by the Mining Cadastre. The governor and mining ministry of South Kivu province took measures to regulate semi-industrial mining by Chinese companies around the Itombwe Reserve. These, however, were <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/mwetaminwa_vircoulon_scandale_sino_congolais_2022.pdf">halted</a> by national authorities who claimed the provincial level didn’t have the authority to do so.</p>
<p>On the ground, semi-industrial mining has sparked conflict by prompting the sometimes violent <a href="https://actu7.cd/2022/04/12/ituri-kimya-mining-accusee-dordonner-le-deguerpissement-des-creuseurs-artisanaux-dans-deux-sites-miniers-pres-de-badengaido/">displacement</a> of artisanal miners. This has led some of them to join armed groups, or to an upsurge in violent banditry. </p>
<p>Semi-industrial mining has also led to <a href="https://actualite.cd/2021/10/15/rdc-fizi-la-societe-chinoise-beyond-mining-et-une-cooperative-locale-exploitant-lor-au">disagreements</a> between mining companies and local populations around social investments, employment and compensation for the destruction of agricultural fields. </p>
<p>Combined with competition around accessing revenues, these conflicts have contributed to a spate of armed group attacks on Chinese mining operations. </p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>The involvement of high-level officials and the importance of mining income make it difficult to stop destructive mining from taking place in protected areas. </p>
<p>Moreover, closing down artisanal mining operations by force without offering other opportunities to make a living has often proven to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">counterproductive</a>. Displaced miners may simply return to mining sites, sometimes getting the help of armed groups to do this. </p>
<p>Where armed groups and army units lose their income from mining, they may resort to other ways to get money, such as violent banditry.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shedding-light-on-why-mining-companies-in-eastern-congo-are-under-attack-82922">Shedding light on why mining companies in eastern Congo are under attack</a>
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<p>The fact that different branches of the state are at odds with each other poses further difficulties. It’s impossible to curb or better regulate mining in protected areas when national and provincial authorities toe a different line or when the military violates restrictions imposed by civilian authorities. </p>
<p>The Congolese agency for nature conservation (ICCN), which is responsible for protected area management, lacks the political clout and <a href="https://roadsandkingdoms.com/2017/seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees/">resources</a> to make a difference. </p>
<p>For instance, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve covers over 13,000 square kilometres, but the ICCN has only enough rangers to conduct regular patrols in 15% of this area. In some areas, ICCN staff have been found to be <a href="https://24sur24.cd/parc-de-lupemba-face-au-presume-braconnage-entretenu-par-certains-gardes-parcs-de-liccn-long-tprdc-exige-des-enquetes-sur-terrain/">complicit</a> in authorising illegal resource exploitation.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>What can be done to improve this situation? </p>
<p>To start with, it’s important to differentiate between semi-industrial and artisanal mining. Semi-industrial mining, in particular gold dredging, is more destructive for the environment and benefits comparatively fewer people. Banning it from protected areas is more urgent and more feasible.</p>
<p>Banning artisanal mining appears difficult, so better regulating and containing it may be a more successful strategy in the short term. This is what has happened in the Itombwe Nature Reserve, where artisanal mining activities are still permitted in certain parts.</p>
<p>It is also crucial that different agencies and layers of the state cooperate. To promote such collaboration, international donors supporting administrative and security sector reform need to get the message across that profiting from mining in protected areas is not acceptable. </p>
<p>However, it is ultimately up to the Congolese government to ensure that state servants are properly paid and respect the law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Judith Verweijen receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fergus Simpson receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peer Schouten receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. </span></em></p>Destructive mining in Congo’s protected areas is rampant because it generates money for citizens, officials and armed groups.Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, University of GroningenFergus O'Leary Simpson, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of AntwerpPeer Schouten, Senior researcher, Danish Institute for International StudiesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959372022-12-09T07:31:24Z2022-12-09T07:31:24ZEast African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499498/original/file-20221207-26-fw7v41.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan troops fly the flags of the East African Community and Kenya in Goma, eastern DRC. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Augustin Wamenya/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East African Community decided to deploy troops in one of its member states for the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">first time</a> in June 2022. The deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) will test the regional body’s ability to respond to complex conflicts. </p>
<p>Already, the regional bloc has scored some early victories. Most significantly, on 6 December, following peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, 53 of the over 100 armed groups operating in the DRC <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/53-armed-groups-in-dr-congo-commit-to-end-war-4046010">agreed to a ceasefire</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC – which joined the East African Community in April 2022 – has been trapped in <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">cycles of violence</a> for nearly three decades. The reasons include ethnic intolerance, illegal exploitation of the country’s vast natural resources and a Congolese elite that benefits from the chaos. </p>
<p>The most recent wave of conflict follows the reemergence of the armed group <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement (M23)</a>. International forces drove the group out of the country in 2013. Its resurgence this past year has led to heightened levels of violence and mass displacement. </p>
<p>This has prompted the East African Community to mobilise a <a href="https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf">regional force</a> that could comprise up to 12,000 troops from member states. It will operate under <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/military-deployments-in-east-dr-congo-4009492">Kenyan command</a>, with a six-month renewable mandate to support the DRC’s national forces in containing, defeating and eradicating negative forces in the restive eastern region. </p>
<p>This is the second time regional actors have deployed a military force to tamp down an M23 insurgency. Following the armed group’s initial uprising in 2013, the 12-member <a href="https://icglr.org/">International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</a> proposed an intervention brigade. It was eventually brought under the <a href="https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background">umbrella</a> of the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. It became known as the Force Intervention Brigade.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2504-communiqu%C3%A9-the-third-heads-of-state-conclave-on-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-the-nairobi-process">June decision</a> to deploy an east African force may feel like déjà vu. While some factors are different now, not all developments are promising.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">research </a> has focused on armed conflict settings, with an in-depth analysis of the DRC. In my view, while the current Congo crisis is unlikely to be resolved without military force, any hope for success requires that operations remain closely tied to a political process.</p>
<h2>What’s changed?</h2>
<p>One difference between the East African Community’s intervention now and the 2013 Force Intervention Brigade mission is the merging of political and military processes.</p>
<p>The East African Community will retain authority over the regional force, while also leading the <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/2695-the-third-inter-congolese-dialogue-under-the-eac-led-nairobi-process">ongoing political dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>One of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">downfalls</a> of previous military responses in the Congo is that they haven’t been adequately linked to a political process. When the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, it was intended to be the “teeth” of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/drc-framework-agreement2013">regional political agreement</a>. However, these military and political interventions were never fully integrated. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the east African region’s effort to integrate the two processes will succeed. Decades of violence indicate just how intractable the conflict is. For instance, so far there has been no indication that Rwanda will cease (or even acknowledge) <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">its support of the M23</a>. The international community hasn’t done much to call for accountability on this front. </p>
<p>Further, the DRC has refused to enter into dialogue with the M23, which it considers a terrorist organisation, for fear that this will embolden other armed groups. </p>
<h2>Crowded theatre</h2>
<p>Deploying a force overseen by the East African Community presents the challenge of communication and coordination with other actors in the region. The confusion this can create was seen in the <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/12/ugandan-congolese-troops-joint-operations-monusco/">2021 deployment</a> of Ugandan forces to the DRC to combat the armed group, the Allied Democratic Forces. This confusion largely had to do with the extent of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate to support operations involving foreign forces. </p>
<p>While the mission has indicated its intention to partner with the east African regional force, the practicalities for doing so remain unclear. </p>
<p>There is also a concern that the east African force could elevate the risk of human rights violations. <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/publications/research/the-sum-of-all-parts/">Past reports</a> have documented the potential harm to civilian protection that can arise from crowded theatres. Actors may interpret their civilian protection obligations in different ways. And it may not be clear who is accountable for violations. </p>
<p>As opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission, the east African force doesn’t have a protection mandate. It is unclear to what extent it will prioritise civilian harm mitigation in its planning and operations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">Protests against UN in eastern Congo highlight peace mission's crisis of legitimacy</a>
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<p>Violations against civilians could undermine the east African force’s legitimacy, which is already likely to be weak given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sexual-exploitation-by-un-peacekeepers-in-drc-fatherless-children-speak-for-first-time-about-the-pain-of-being-abandoned-188248">history of abuses</a> committed by foreign forces in the Congo. Already, Kinshasa has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-agrees-to-eac-force-deployment-no-rwandan-army-3852276">refused</a> to allow Rwanda to deploy troops as part of the regional force. Other contributing countries have a <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-east-african-community-stabilise-eastern-drc">history of supporting</a> armed groups in the region. And the political economy of war in the Congo has been of benefit to a number of its neighbours. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202211260015.html">noted</a> by Daniel Levine-Spound, a researcher with the Center for Civilians in Conflict (<a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/">CIVIC</a>) based in the Congo:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Because many of the countries involved in the force have recently undertaken military operations on Congolese soil, there is a significant amount of mistrust and uncertainty among civilians that the force will need to overcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This will require adequate engagement with civil society organisations and prioritising civilian safety in military operations. </p>
<h2>The task ahead</h2>
<p>The M23 of today is not the same M23 of 10 years ago. It has more <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">sophisticated weaponry and tactics</a>, and a more centralised command and control. </p>
<p>Additionally, it’s operating more strategically than in 2013. The boldness of the group’s 2013 march directly on Goma – the capital of North Kivu in eastern DRC – elicited a swift response from the region and the international community. This ultimately led to the group being routed into neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. </p>
<p>While M23 is currently operating within the vicinity of Goma, it has avoided taking the city. It has instead focused on taking over larger areas of surrounding territory and could gain control over both roads into Goma. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Whether the east African regional force is up to the task remains unclear. </p>
<p>Its member states’ proximity to the conflict may lead to more sustained political will to tamp down the violence and find a political resolution. Yet, the countries’ individual interests in the conflict mean that not all players will have the DRC’s best interest at heart. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">Previous experience</a> casts doubt on the effectiveness of bringing in foreign military forces to resolve unrest in the Congo. These interventions have in some cases increased violence against civilians, led to the exploitation of natural resources and undermined Congolese authority over its own territory. </p>
<p>A successful intervention will require that neighbouring countries remain accountable to support the security and sovereignty of the Congo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195937/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.</span></em></p>There are advantages to a regional force overseen by the East African Community – particularly as the bloc is leading new political talks.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1939882022-11-21T09:33:46Z2022-11-21T09:33:46ZThe European Union in Syria: too complacent?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493529/original/file-20221104-10296-2qp6wd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C242%2C2044%2C1287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, head of the EU delegation for Syria, during a visit to the territories controlled by the Damascus regime on 8 August 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=603503987803706&set=pcb.603504244470347">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since 2011, Bashar Al-Assad has waged a brutal war that has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Syrians – estimates range between <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/un-human-rights-office-estimates-more-306000-civilians-were-killed-over-10">306,000</a> and <a href="https://www.syriahr.com/en/243125/">610,000 victims</a>. Overwhelming evidence ties Al-Assad to a range of <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/bashar-al-assad-is-guilty-of-war-crimes">war crimes and genocidal practices</a>, and the European Union has long advocated a firm stance against his regime.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/syria/who-we-are_en?s=209">EU Delegation for Syria</a>, which moved to Beirut in 2012, is designed to promote European values and supervise EU external relations and aid policy. In the name of pragmatism, it has recently tended to change its tone toward the Syrian government in place. What are the consequences?</p>
<h2>A firmness that only lasted so long</h2>
<p>Six months after the start of the Syrian revolution, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/the-right-honourable-catherine-ashton-baroness-upholland">Catherine Ashton</a>, then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_11_504">demanded the departure of Bashar Al-Assad</a>. This was in line with the strategy adopted within the UN Security Council by the United States and a majority of European countries, including France and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>In an August 2012 speech, US president Barack Obama defined a <a href="https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059/">“red line”</a> that, if crossed, would lead to devastating consequences for the Damascus regime: the use of chemical weapons. Just a year later, Al-Assad did just that in <a href="https://www.state.gov/ninth-anniversary-of-the-ghouta-syria-chemical-weapons-attack/">Eastern Ghouta</a>, yet the attack remained without consequences. Washington’s reversal heralded the EU’s gradual shift.</p>
<p>Indeed, from 2015 onwards, the fear of a “refugee crisis”, coupled with the initial successes of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220228-russia-s-growing-ties-to-syria-amid-military-backing">Russian intervention</a> and the establishment of <a href="https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/de-escalation-zones-in-syria-pro-et-contra/">“de-escalation zones”</a> in Syria, led the EU to focus on economic sanctions and humanitarian aid. It thus ruled out the possibility of trying to exert political influence to facilitate a resolution of the conflict.</p>
<p>At the time, researcher Dimitris Bouris and Anis Nacrour, former head of the EU delegation to Syria, <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-ins-and-outs-of-the-eus-shortcomings-in-syria/">asserted</a> that EU was “reducing its room for manoeuvre to the role of financial partner and provider of technical assistance to UN mediation initiatives.” With the West no longer calling for Al-Assad’s departure with the same vigour, Damascus’s allies began to assert that he had won the war – and this, despite the persistence of <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2022/09/04/the-most-notable-human-rights-violations-in-syria-in-august-2022/">systematic</a> even <a href="https://aljumhuriya.net/en/2019/09/19/terror-genocide-and-the-genocratic-turn/">genocidal violence</a>.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Syria: EU humanitarian aid (2021).</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The EU has gradually adopted the idea of an [“early rehabilitation plan”]plan (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/opportunities-strengthening-resilience-and-advancing-early-recovery-syria_en), is heavily involved in Syria alongside the UN, which has continued to call for a ceasefire combined with a Syrian-initiated political solution since the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc12171.doc.htm">resolution 2254 in December 2015)</a>.</p>
<p>This cooperation is manifested in the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2022/05/10/">annual conference on aid for the future of Syria and the countries of the region</a>. In May 2022, 6.4 billion euros were mobilised.</p>
<h2>Recent EU diplomatic movements</h2>
<p>Until 2021, the EU delegation to Syria remained discreet about the composition of its team, its activities and its movements in Damascus. </p>
<p>That changed with the <a href="https://www.rri.ro/en_gb/april_17_2021-2635454">September 2021 appointment</a> of Romanian diplomat <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410120_nl?s=209">Dan Stoenescu</a> to head the delegation. In his first official trip to Damascus, he met with Imran Raza, UN resident coordinator, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02fKLKchSbPkpxNxCyV2BhMGbAvoY6kPcjsRCjMZBFG2mSG1MHdiTKVZJcmXcUCAjgl">representatives of humanitarian aid agencies</a>, including the Red Cross, UNDP, WHO and the World Food Programme, as well as numerous diplomats.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490025/original/file-20221017-17-77xwso.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu, in blue suit in the centre, stands alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross president Christophe Martin and others, in Damascus, September 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2985836848370514&set=pcb.2985841275036738">EU Delegation to Syria Facebook page</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With this first visit to the regime-controlled area, Stoenescu broke the European promise not to favour Al-Assad’s quest for legitimacy. The presence of European diplomats whose Syrian embassies had closed since 2012 (only the Czech Republic’s embassy remained open; currently, seven European embassies are open) also breaks the taboo of resuming a form of exchange.</p>
<p>The visits are described in full transparency on the delegation’s and Stoenescu’s Facebook pages. On 8 August 2022, Stoenescu goes on a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid031k9xXuqixD9QXhZSmbkGYjuRkZeMbSXD9N1zN8gnMLXME7aAnpvk5ewPbzkkvhocl">“four-day humanitarian mission”</a> together with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/head-european-union-delegation-joint-field-visit-aleppo-homs-hama">Imran Raza</a>. Three cities under the control of the regime are visited for the first time: Homs, Hama and the <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Alep-sous-controle-regime-syrien-2016-12-23-1200812506">martyred city of Aleppo</a>.</p>
<h2>Archetypes of humanitarian and reconstruction discourse</h2>
<p>The delegation’s communication is that of a diplomatic service addressing a European audience that used to observing <a href="https://ia800307.us.archive.org/22/items/OnRevolution/ArendtOn-revolution.pdf">“suffering at a distance”</a>, to use Hannah Arendt’s phrase. Through its role as mediator, it must inform the citizens of the member countries but also of the whole world and <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">convey its conception of a form of social responsibility</a>. No culprit is named: the delegation does not opt for what the sociologist Luc Bolstanski defines as the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-91.htm">“topic of denunciation”</a>, which “turns away from the depressing consideration of the unfortunate and his suffering to look for a persecutor”, only the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/la-souffrance-a-distance--9782864241641-page-117.htm">“topic of feeling”</a>, which directs attention toward a benefactor and the good actions he or she accomplishes.</p>
<p>The responsibility here is humanitarian: it mobilises the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">“iconography of help”</a>. Any case of suffering <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/208779/1/cbs-phd2011-12.pdf">requires a good action</a>, “regardless of what brought the suffering on or what the consequences of assisting might be”.</p>
<p>The European action is divided into two parts: early reconstruction in the territories under the control of the regime, and humanitarian aid for refugees and displaced persons. The political scope of this strategy is relegated to the background. Stoenescu’s <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02S3J2LA5u8p5Xz883QkgVvJjFNiTQVVxxvTSS2jnuTEb6aAFy1HEWyeAFdu6CaqSZl">reaction</a> to the Security Council’s adoption of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/security-council-renews-cross-border-aid-operations-syrias-north-west-six-months-adopting-resolution-2642-2022-compromise-amid-divisions">resolution 2642</a>, which limits cross-border aid operations in northwestern Syria to six months so as to prevent Russia from using its veto power, is an example:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The humanitarian needs of Syrians, the majority of whom are women and children, should not be politicised! […] Cross-border operations must be depoliticised and must increase.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0BrwfHHq7wqyERtqftXxSeTRvt5AJrJXENfqPE6GCSxTzrJJVtkYsywGAzxYz51Rnl">passive forms</a> focusing on the plight of the victims, the names of those responsible for the abuses are carefully avoided, leading to a disempowering effect:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am outraged by the recent attacks in northern Syria that are said to have killed more than 17 people […] Innocent people continue to be victims of this conflict!”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Syrians, on the other hand, are described here as a homogeneous group, thus erasing the existence of oppressors and oppressed. To quote the delegation’s <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/syria_en?s=209">official website </a>: “The EU and the Syrians have a common goal: a stable and peaceful Syria”; “our interest, as Europeans, is the same as what the Syrians want”.</p>
<p>To support its discourse, the delegation uses photographs to create the picture of a people “rebuilding” themselves through the reconstruction of <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid088VMS5E1bYnQQSJkyQjT2tD9o9TFzrVxMRwPD5W6TDhsLAkmn92azNoyaX5Kj5gSl">schools, medical facilities, an infrastructure</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/490027/original/file-20221017-17-ujmh1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dan Stoenescu at a school in al-Qusayr, 9 August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=604297797724325&set=pcb.604299651057473">Dan Stoenescu/Facebook</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These emotionally powerful situations captivate the imagination of an often uninformed public, organise its <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674008014">“cultural knowledge”</a> of the region, and consolidate an idealised conception of the political situation in Syria. Thus, European readers discover “resilient” children <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid02rDsyh29SBjKTyYdZkm6JqGFRAyd9FYrkBFS49QXAmuLaFzjLrtLxApPw6FuwqyQ5l">colouring and singing together</a> in a youth centre in <a href="https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Syrie-Damas-reconquete-dAlep-2016-09-23-1200791259">Aleppo</a>, or <a href="https://www.facebook.com/DanStoenescuofficial/posts/pfbid0PLoDgC684AMMWVrvbDhvZQbqG1eMJ8sATgKqQpTM86QCcvjCokjfAPC5mK4Wx2LWl">playing music</a> in <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/qusayr-rules-syrian-regimes-changing-way-war">al-Qusayr</a>.</p>
<p>Images from the <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/index_fr">Directorate General for Civil Protection and European Humanitarian Aid Operations</a> or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees sometimes counterbalance these idealised images. Refugee children, this time destitute, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02ghGzhXBpdxGZ5xtLuWph7qfFZXsHKFjVAjDjHk2gZaz9ipMtiEa6ywhN81NPwjF8l">sitting on crates stamped “UNICEF”</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.facebook.com/EUinSyria/posts/pfbid02DnZ93CGdJhYz7339bRmnNQn3Szbk5jnGe3eu49JxJcVgmGULbLDGm243uLMNPrEql">mothers and infants</a> suffering from the cold of the camps in northeast Syria. These images <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-0424.00298">appeal to Western preconceptions</a> and emphasise the need to maintain international humanitarian assistance as it is.</p>
<h2>Early rehabilitation policy: what are the risks?</h2>
<p>The vision of the conflict conveyed by the EU and the UN has been denounced by politicians, activists, researchers and <a href="https://ifit-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Conclusions-and-Raecommendations-Toward-More-Principled-International-Support-A-Dialogue-between-Syrians-and-the-International-Community-31-March-2022-1.pdf">Syrian civil society organisations</a>, who warn that this policy must not be transformed into a political and financial support to Bashar Al-Assad.</p>
<p>At stake are the misappropriations of funds organised by the Syrian regime, which have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/21/assad-regime-siphons-millions-in-aid-by-manipulating-syrias-currency">generated headlines</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/syria0619_web3.pdf">reports</a> alike. The <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-war-assad-millions-un-procurement-costs-companies">Syria Trust</a>, founded by Bashar Al-Assad’s wife, is an example of how international aid can enrich the president’s inner circle. The <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/09/04/paradox-of-syria-s-reconstruction-pub-79773">scandal affecting UN agencies</a> present in 2018 in Aleppo illustrates the risks of co-optation. The regime systematically bombed of the eastern part of the city, destroying schools, hospitals, homes, and infrastructure. Yet UN experts were forced by the regime to work only in the neighbourhoods of western Aleppo.</p>
<p>In such a context, Stoenescu’s recent trip to al-Qusayr – a city that was <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-battle-for-qusayr-how-the-syrian-regime-and-hizb-allah-tipped-the-balance/">violently recaptured by Hezbollah and Shiite militias in 2013</a> – raises questions. While described as apolitical and humanitarian, this official visit can’t help but endorse the regime’s strategy. In al-Qusayr, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-qusayr-idUSKCN1U20LP">2019 return of refugees</a> escorted by Hezbollah supported the regime’s official discourse that the country was now stabilised and safe.</p>
<p>Finally, the plan implemented by international agencies is not without dramatic consequences for Syrians seeking justice and accountability: reconstruction can lead to the erasure of war crimes, for example in the case of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/05/safe-no-more/students-and-schools-under-attack-syria">schools bombed by the regime</a>.</p>
<p>Consequently, the current UN and EU strategy needs to be challenged so that in the future it makes trusted local intermediaries a central part of conflict resolution. Such action will limit the leakage of European funds, corruption and co-option of humanitarian aid, and the process of normalisation of relations with the regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193988/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Élise Daniaud received a PhD contract from the LUISS Guido Carli University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yahia Hakoum received a research grant.</span></em></p>In the name of contributing to the reconstruction of Syria, is the EU rehabilitating Bashar Al-Assad?Élise Daniaud, PhD candidate on Syria/Russia/Middle-East, LUISS Universita Guido CarliYahia Hakoum, Chercheur au Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1508912022-11-15T13:31:26Z2022-11-15T13:31:26ZWhy it’s important to understand the unique plight of internally displaced people in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389813/original/file-20210316-13-1r1i3cl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Internally displaced people from the Dinka ethnic group at the Minkamman camp in South Sudan in 2014.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Jim Lopez</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">adopted</a> an agreement more than 13 years ago to prevent the arbitrary displacement of people and to uphold the dignity of such victims.</p>
<p>Yet the problem has remained notoriously <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/view/129846">persistent in Africa</a>. In 2018, out of a global estimate of over <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data">45.6 million internally displaced people</a>, close to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/2019-africa-report-internal-displacement">19 million</a> were on the continent.</p>
<p>Globally, conflict and violence are the main <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/conflict_and_displacement-_voices_of_displacement_and_return_in_central_african_republics_neglected_crisis.pdf">drivers of internal displacement</a>. Africa accounted for <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">almost 70%</a>, of the world’s internal displacement statistics in 2018, due to armed conflict and related human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Environmental disasters were the <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">second most important cause</a> of internal displacement in Africa, <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">at 15%</a>.</p>
<p>Victims of internal displacement often <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/population-displacement-africa/">outnumber refugees</a> from other countries. Yet they receive less attention from the major aid bodies, researchers and the media.</p>
<p>Their vulnerability has been well documented. But most of the literature generalises their experiences, regardless of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20050923_em_idp_supplement.pdf">underlying causes of their displacement</a>. Or it simply conflates their experiences. Displaced people are often wrongly seen as better off than refugees. This heightens their vulnerability and prolongs their displacement.</p>
<p>A more nuanced understanding may benefit aid and development practitioners in their efforts to help displaced people. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92474-4_55">study</a> of internally displaced and refugee populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and South Sudan showed that those who were displaced within their nations’ borders faced peculiar risks. </p>
<h2>Falling through the cracks</h2>
<p>Refugees are usually well regulated, whether freely settled or in designated refugee camps (making them more visible and accessible). In contrast, internally displaced people are usually scattered about. This makes it more challenging to reach out to them or to <a href="https://www.unocha.org/es/themes/internal-displacement">identify them</a>. </p>
<p>In the face of limited attention from the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudan-a-neglected-conflict-and-donor-fatigue/a-44927742">global peace and security apparatus</a>, civil conflict, oppressive governments and human rights violations are some of the major causes of displacement.</p>
<p>A good historical example is <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/8.htm">Sudan, where in the 1980s</a> agro-pastoral Nuer and Dinka people were displaced from their oil-rich traditional homelands by the state. State-backed militias and later government soldiers erected garrisons, occupied land and prevented those displaced from returning to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-focus-oil-related-clashes-western-upper-nile">western Upper Nile</a>.</p>
<p>When displacement is induced by the state, the victims often lack protection, and some end up <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/new-challenges-for-refugee-policy-internally-displaced-persons/">avoiding detection altogether</a>. This makes it even harder to accord them the protections due to them.</p>
<p>Where governments are responsible for internal displacement, the sensitivity of the matter often leads to attempts to <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">keep the displacements a secret</a>. This affects the collection of precise data. Without reliable data, it is hard for aid and development partners to implement the <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stdtlp38&div=7&g_sent=1&casa_token=H-ThM8NP5iQAAAAA:b4peZJZB76GEk-qv7-8kbHDYlLNu1tDVKRkftI2Fhmd-PJanOIdcteXHc1KCL5oY9_c2EuMu&collection=journals">UNHCR guidelines</a> for national responsibility towards preventing displacement and finding durable solutions. </p>
<p>The longer displacement lasts, the more difficult it becomes to resolve. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0503_displacement_africa_ferris.pdf">More than 15 countries</a> in Africa have protracted displacement situations lasting over five years.</p>
<h2>Data and protection gaps</h2>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html">a single UNHCR definition for a refugee</a>. Not so with internally displaced people. Each country has its own <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">definition</a>. </p>
<p>These disparities have resulted in numerous protection gaps for those who do not fit the criteria in each country. Particularly at risk in such situations are those fleeing from environmental disasters, poverty, underdevelopment and overpopulation. These factors are called the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42864338?casa_token=uZmgIctRUaAAAAAA%3AEfqcN3K656mStsyNqcHbKbqvpnubAItPkmWa1qbvMowPyhcDEc1lMpFtNrLOnp9guAPvxyziIPy0vrzi4AT4k9ow0zVtvUBUebJKngVcsQXSbol_N-0&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">root causes of displacement</a>.</p>
<p>Where people are fleeing because of a number of factors, profiling them can become even more complex. For example, in the case of pastoralists in Somalia, displacement may be the result of a combination of drought, inter-clan conflicts and insecurity that <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">imperil their livelihoods</a>. Many people may not be able to articulate the complex interaction of factors that <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">led them to flee their homes</a>. </p>
<p>These issues make reporting on the internal displacement statistics <a href="https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/Publicaciones/2014/9958.pdf?view=1">a challenge</a>. </p>
<p>Where the state has its own data collection challenges, it may not grasp the full extent of the humanitarian situation, nor the need to form partnerships with external agencies to <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/stdtlp38&div=7&g_sent=1&casa_token=H-ThM8NP5iQAAAAA:b4peZJZB76GEk-qv7-8kbHDYlLNu1tDVKRkftI2Fhmd-PJanOIdcteXHc1KCL5oY9_c2EuMu&collection=journals">augment national capacity</a>. </p>
<p>The Sudanese government, for instance, has been blamed for <a href="https://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12913-018-3609-5?optIn=false">poor disaster preparedness</a> and <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03721-5_1">lack of capacity</a> in coordinating essential aid relief for its <a href="https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/sahel-emergency">millions of internally displaced people</a>. In the absence of holistic, long-term responses, recurring droughts have periodically displaced people in <a href="https://knowledge.unccd.int/sites/default/files/country_profile_documents/1%2520FINAL_NDP_Sudan.pdf">Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>Where internal displacement drivers remain unresolved, as seen in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrev/article/view/129846">Cameroon</a>, they not only recur but can also <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/nrcs-list-of-the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises/nrcs-list-of-the-worlds-most-neglected-displacement-crises.pdf">contribute to regional insecurity</a>.</p>
<h2>Addressing the problem</h2>
<p>The heightened vulnerability, limited visibility and limited protection of internally displaced people, <a href="https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/190715e.pdf">relative to refugees</a>, results from a poor appreciation of their peculiar plight. As seen in <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/south-sudan">Sudan, the DRC, Nigeria, Somalia and other countries</a>, this often results in their displacement becoming protracted and cyclical. </p>
<p>Displacements due to poverty and natural disasters on the one hand, and caused by conflict and human rights abuses on the other, are both on the rise. But conflict and abuses still account for <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/africa-report">most displacements in Africa</a>. Thus, to work, any intervention needs to address human rights abuses, underdevelopment, socio-economic inequities and conflict to <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BQ9kDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT9&dq=Duffield,+M.,+2014.+Global+governance+and+the+new+wars:+The+merging+of+development+and+security.+Zed+books+Ltd.&ots=rgkrWSmaUW&sig=b6i4n1WNd2dc1pdZlBfF0payaqs&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Duffield%2C%20M.%2C%202014.%20Global%20governance%20and%20the%20new%20wars%3A%20The%20merging%20of%20development%20and%20security.%20Zed%20books%20Ltd.&f=false">ensure a sustainable end to internal displacements in Africa</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150891/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sikanyiso Masuku is a Research fellow in the Institute for Democracy Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (IDCPPA) at the University of Cape Town. He also receives funding from the African Centre for Migration Studies (ACMS) and the African Academy for Migration Research (AAMR).</span></em></p>In 2018, Africa accounted for 70% of the world’s people displaced by armed conflict and human rights abuses.Sikanyiso Masuku, Research Fellow at The Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs (TM-School), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1938652022-11-07T11:02:50Z2022-11-07T11:02:50ZArmed conflict and climate change: how these two threats play out in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493782/original/file-20221107-17-9nbzq2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Lafforgue/Art in All of Us/Corbis via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world is falling miserably short of reducing carbon emissions in line with the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">Paris Agreement</a>, a 2015 treaty to keep global warming well below 2°C. </p>
<p>The results of this failure are a greater increase in the prevalence and severity of extreme weather events, more rapid sea-level rises and an elevated risk of triggering irreversible <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abn7950">climate tipping points</a>, like the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet or the loss of the Amazon rainforest. </p>
<p>The speed and magnitude of these changes have immediate consequences for <a href="https://ipbes.net/global-assessment">ecosystem health and biodiversity</a>. Further, sustained climate change threatens fundamental dimensions of <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/2022/02/28/pr-wgii-ar6/">human wellbeing</a>. </p>
<p>There are also frequent claims about looming “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-jp/Climate+Wars:+What+People+Will+Be+Killed+For+in+the+21st+Century-p-9780745651453">climate wars</a>”. These depict a chaotic world with unsustainable mass migrations, devastating weather-related disasters and violent clashes for survival in an era of rapidly diminishing resources. </p>
<p>However, the link between climate change and conflict is <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1300-6">weak</a> when compared to the main drivers of conflict, notably poverty, inequality and weak governance. </p>
<p>Instead, violent conflict in the context of a warming planet plays another and far more prominent role: it’s a critical driver of vulnerability, which makes adverse impacts from weather extremes more likely and more severe. In other words, violent conflict weakens communities and countries so that they are not in a position to adapt to the changing world around them.</p>
<p>Although it may be possible to maintain peace without successful climate adaptation, successful climate adaptation is impossible in the absence of peace. </p>
<h2>How climate change affects conflict</h2>
<p>Climate change is commonly framed as a <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sgsm21074.doc.htm">risk multiplier</a> that worsens conditions known to increase conflict risk, such as poverty and inequality. </p>
<p>Research shows that adverse climate conditions may lead to more <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720923400">support for violence</a>. These conditions can also contribute to <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.1411899111">escalating or prolonging conflict</a>. This is particularly the case in places marked by climate-sensitive economic activities, political marginalisation and a history of violence. </p>
<p>Typical hotspots of such dynamics are found in the Sahel and rural East Africa. However, the true role of climate change in causing conflict in these settings remains <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343311427343?casa_token=lTbQ0Nx_fJ8AAAAA%3AbQ0Z73f9lmAQUIjTpPAhbuQQobplFoaP2p7PqRSzgaNpw-DXgK14yPGif5BDItIbfqLiqp8hRnWgEUM">disputed</a>. How climate shapes peace and security depends on how societies respond to climate change. </p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.722">journal article</a>, my colleague and I outline several potential ways climate policy can be linked to drivers of conflict. These could, for example, be by way of addressing energy insecurity, financial vulnerabilities from altered tourism patterns or loss of oil revenues, and land-use competition related to environmental conservation projects.</p>
<p>These links have attracted little systematic study to date and remain a key priority for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320984210">future research</a>.</p>
<h2>How conflict affects climate risk</h2>
<p>The link from climate to conflict seems to be modest. But the reverse – from conflict to climate vulnerability – is very strong. </p>
<p>Armed conflict ruins economic activity and livelihoods. It threatens food security, obstructs markets and public goods provision, damages critical infrastructure and triggers forced displacement. All of these erode local capacity to cope and adapt to environmental hazards. </p>
<p>Put simply, armed conflict is <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2015/09/war-is-development-in-reverse/">development in reverse</a>. The consequence of the war in Ukraine on the <a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/war-ukraine-drives-global-food-crisis">food crisis</a> in developing countries today is evidence that armed conflict can affect social vulnerability and human security at a global scale. </p>
<p>Given the devastating effect of conflict on coping capacity, it’s extremely worrying that violent conflict is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433221108428">on the rise</a> in Africa. The continent is already judged to be the <a href="https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/">most vulnerable</a> to the impacts of climate change. </p>
<p>Conflict, alongside the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, has also been identified as a major cause of <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2022/">recent reversals</a> in sustainable development. The most severe <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-cant-ignore-2022">humanitarian crises</a> today are all found in countries suffering from major conflicts and wars.</p>
<h2>A vicious circle</h2>
<p>Each of the processes outlined above challenges sustainable development:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>violent conflict deters long-term growth and ruins local capacity to manage climate-driven risks</p></li>
<li><p>climate impacts threaten human security in vulnerable societies, thereby increasing conflict risk. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Together, they may result in a <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-014708">vicious circle</a> of destructive effects.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493229/original/file-20221103-14-9pz9py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The vicious circle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Halvard Buhaug</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The solution is peace</h2>
<p>The ways in which climate change and extreme weather events challenge peace and security are widely acknowledged and increasingly well understood. This is why the likes of the <a href="https://www.unssc.org/news-and-insights/blog/joint-efforts-sustaining-peace-meet-un-climate-security-mechanism">UN’s Climate Security Mechanism</a> exist. The UN Development Programme also plans to “<a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP-Typology-and-Analysis-of-Climate-Related-Security-Risks-First-Round-of-NDC_0.pdf">climate proof</a>” peace-keeping and stability in regions that have experienced conflict. </p>
<p>Climate security has additionally been the subject of <a href="https://climate-security-expert-network.org/unsc-engagement">nine open debates</a> at the UN Security Council since 2007, seven of which have been held in the past four years. </p>
<p>Successful climate adaptation allows for sustainable development and has <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-31202-w">important benefits</a> for peace. However, it should not replace traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding programmes. And it is important to be aware of the <a href="https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2020/01/beware-dark-side-environmental-peacebuilding/">dark sides</a> of environmental peacebuilding. </p>
<p>Less attention has been paid to “conflict proofing” climate adaptation programming. Instead, adaptation plans often <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X20305118">assume peaceful settings</a> and fail to consider political contexts that may underpin local conflicts and be a major source of vulnerability. </p>
<p>Yet, without peace on the ground, actions to address climate risks will be restrained, ineffective and possibly counterproductive.</p>
<p>From this follows a key insight: in violent contexts, peacebuilding should be seen as the first and most crucial step toward addressing complex climate risks. </p>
<p>Resolving conflict is no replacement for effective climate adaptation. But climate action without a safe environment with functioning governance structures is unlikely to solve structural sources of vulnerability. As has been <a href="https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/no-peace-no-sustainable-development-vicious-cycle-we-can-break">said elsewhere</a>: no peace, no sustainable development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Halvard Buhaug receives funding from the European Research Council (grant no. 101055133). </span></em></p>In the absence of peace, efforts to address climate risks will be restrained, ineffective and counterproductive.Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1699042022-08-22T12:27:10Z2022-08-22T12:27:10ZSlavery and war are tightly connected – but we had no idea just how much until we crunched the data<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479488/original/file-20220816-8518-l5gine.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C3%2C996%2C666&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandans watch the start of the International Criminal Court trial of former child soldier-turned-warlord Dominic Ongwen.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/residents-watch-the-screening-of-the-start-of-the-icc-trial-news-photo/628000204?adppopup=true">Isaac Kasamani/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm">40 million people</a> are enslaved around the world today, though estimates vary. Modern slavery takes many different forms, including child soldiers, sex trafficking and forced labor, and no country is immune. From cases of <a href="https://www.gahts.com/publications/ygsrx3nh2ecyz6z-34kln-yh99p-as9yk-e7k8n-slkln-f3htp-t9p9l-x9kb3-e75h9-mrbd6-rw7m5-t3bdh-j43r4">family controlled sex trafficking</a> in the United States <a href="https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/">to the enslavement of fishermen</a> in Southeast Asia’s seafood industry and <a href="https://www.verite.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/VeriteForcedLaborMalaysianElectronics2014.pdf">forced labor</a> in the global electronics supply chain, enslavement knows no bounds. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=WuHCE3sAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars</a> of <a href="https://unu.edu/experts/angharad-smith.html">modern slavery</a>, we <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/politics/people/kevin.bales">seek to understand</a> how and why human beings are still bought, owned and sold in the 21st century, in hopes of shaping policies to eradicate these crimes. </p>
<p>Many of the answers trace back to causes like poverty, corruption and inequality. But they also stem from something less discussed: war.</p>
<p>In 2016, the United Nations Security Council <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2331">named modern slavery</a> a serious concern in areas affected by armed conflict. But researchers still know little about the specifics of how slavery and war are intertwined. </p>
<p>We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211065649">recently published research</a> analyzing data on armed conflicts around the world to better understand this relationship.</p>
<p>What we found was staggering: The vast majority of armed conflict between 1989 and 2016 used some kind of slavery.</p>
<h2>Coding conflict</h2>
<p>We used data from an established database about war, <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)</a>, to look at how much, and in what ways, armed conflict intersects with different forms of contemporary slavery. </p>
<p>Our project was inspired by <a href="https://wappp.hks.harvard.edu/files/wappp/files/journal_of_peace_research-2014-cohen-418-28.pdf">two leading scholars</a> of sexual violence, <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty/dara-kay-cohen">Dara Kay Cohen</a> and <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/polisci/people/faculty/ragnhild-nordaas.html">Ragnhild Nordås</a>. These political scientists used that database to produce <a href="http://www.sexualviolencedata.org/bibliography/papers-in-progress/">their own pioneering database</a> about how rape is used as a weapon of war.</p>
<p>The Uppsala database breaks each conflict into two sides. Side A represents a nation state, and Side B is typically one or more nonstate actors, such as rebel groups or insurgents.</p>
<p>Using that data, our research team examined instances of different forms of slavery, including sex trafficking and forced marriage, child soldiers, forced labor and general human trafficking. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211065649">This analysis</a> included information from 171 different armed conflicts. Because the use of slavery changes over time, we broke multiyear conflicts into separate “conflict-years” to study them one year at a time, for a total of 1,113 separate cases.</p>
<p>Coding each case to determine what forms of slavery were used, if any, was a challenge. We compared information from a variety of sources, including human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, scholarly accounts, journalists’ reporting and documents from governmental and intergovernmental organizations.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in dark clothes sits, looking forlorn, over a crevice with rubble in it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478426/original/file-20220810-16-jwchpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Yazidi woman who was held captive by the Islamic State visits the mass grave where her husband is believed to be buried in Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/YazidiSlaveTrade/994255e1eb3a4296afa1a3f3599d7192/photo?Query=yazidi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=755&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Alarming numbers</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211065649">recently published analysis</a>, we found that contemporary slavery is a regular feature of armed conflict. Among the 1,113 cases we analyzed, 87% contained child soldiers – meaning fighters age 15 and younger – 34% included sexual exploitation and forced marriage, about 24% included forced labor and almost 17% included human trafficking.</p>
<p><iframe id="mSfzB" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/mSfzB/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>A global heat map of the frequency of these armed conflicts over time paints a sobering picture. Most conflicts involving enslavement take place in low-income countries, often referred to as the Global South.</p>
<p>About 12% of the conflicts involving some form of enslavement took place in India, where there are several conflicts between the government and nonstate actors. Teen militants are involved in conflicts such as <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/children-as-combatants-and-the-failure-of-state-and-society-the-case-of-the-kashmir-conflict-47514/">the insurgency in Kashmir</a> and the separatist movement <a href="http://www.humanrights.asia/news/alrc-news/human-rights-council/hrc6/AL-024-2007/">in Assam</a>. About 8% of cases took place in Myanmar, 5% in Ethiopia, 5% in the Philippines and about 3% in Afghanistan, Sudan, Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda, Algeria and Iraq. </p>
<p>This evidence of enslavement predominately in the Global South may not be surprising, given how poverty and inequality <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214559673">can fuel instability and conflict</a>. However, it helps us reflect upon how these countries’ historic, economic and geopolitical relationships to the Global North also fuel pressure and violence, a theme we hope slavery researchers can study in the future. </p>
<h2>Strategic enslavement</h2>
<p>Typically, when armed conflict involves slavery, it’s being used for tactical aims: building weapons, for example, or constructing roads and other infrastructure projects to fight a war. But sometimes, slavery is as part of an overarching strategy. In the Holocaust, the Nazis used “strategic slavery” in what they called “extermination through labor.” Today, as in the past, strategic slavery is normally part of a larger strategy of genocide.</p>
<p>We found that “strategic enslavement” took place in about 17% of cases. In other words, enslavement was one of the primary objectives of about 17% of the conflicts we examined, and often served the goal of genocide. One example is <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/beacons-of-excellence/rights-lab/resources/academic-publications/2020/establishment-and-regulation-of-slavery-by-the-islamic-state.pdf">the Islamic State’s enslavement</a> of the Yazidi minority in the 2014 massacre in Sinjar, Iraq. In addition to killing Yazidis, the Islamic State sought to enslave and impregnate women for systematic ethnic cleansing, attempting to eliminate the ethnic identity of the Yazidi through forced rape. </p>
<p>The connections between slavery and conflict are vicious but still not well understood. Our next steps include coding historic cases of slavery and conflict going back to World War II, such as <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/forced-labor">how Nazi Germany used forced labor</a> and how Imperial Japan’s military used <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/12/04/940819094/photos-there-still-is-no-comfort-for-the-comfort-women-of-the-philippines">sexual enslavement</a>. We have published a new data set, “<a href="https://www.csac.org.uk">Contemporary Slavery in Armed Conflict</a>,” and hope other researchers will also use it to help better understand and prevent future violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Our research team received the following funding that assisted with our work:
UK Arts and Humanities Research Council – Antislavery Usable Past project (AH/ M004430/1 and AH/M004430/2).
UK Economic and Social Research Council – Modern Slavery: Meaning and Measurement” (ES/P001491/1) (Including funds from ESRC International Impact Prize).
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angharad Smith is affiliated with United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Our research team received the following funding that assisted with our work: UK Arts and Humanities Research Council – Antislavery Usable Past project (AH/ M004430/1 and AH/M004430/2). UK Economic and Social Research Council – Modern Slavery: Meaning and Measurement” (ES/P001491/1) (Including funds from ESRC International Impact Prize).</span></em></p>Armed conflicts today involve slavery in many different forms, from forced marriage to child soldiers.Monti Datta, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondAngharad Smith, Modern Slavery Programme Officer, Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR), United Nations UniversityKevin Bales, Prof. of Contemporary Slavery, Research Director - The Rights Lab, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1863362022-08-08T13:42:10Z2022-08-08T13:42:10ZThe environment is the silent casualty in the Cameroon Anglophone crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476734/original/file-20220729-24-78zea6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women displaced from rural villages in the Anglophone region gather to wash clothes in a stream. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Giles Clarke/UNOCHA via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most analysis of Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis has been skewed towards the socioeconomic, cultural and political ramifications of the conflict. </p>
<p>But, based on my work on natural, environmental hazards and disaster management in Cameroon over the past two decades, I would argue that the environment in the Anglophone region is a silent casualty of the conflict. And it has largely been ignored.</p>
<p>Our recently <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1">published research</a> on the crisis showed that over 900,000 people had been internally displaced. Eighty percent of the inhabitants of villages that were conflict hot spots had fled into adjacent forests. The research investigated the consequences of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis and determined it to be an <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168071/research%20brief%20no%2016_final.pdf">acute complex emergency</a>. </p>
<p>These developments are leaving huge environmental footprints and causing serious damage. This will get worse if the armed conflict escalates into a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-022-00114-1">“complex disaster emergency”</a>. </p>
<p>I have identified six environmental consequences of the Cameroon Anglophone crisis. These range from failures in environmental governance to increases in deforestation, unmet measures in <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/cameroon-national-climate-change-adaptation-plan">Cameroon’s climate action plan</a>, poor municipal waste management, the effects of scorched earth tactics and the impact of improvised explosive devices. </p>
<p>There is a need to address these environmental oversights and build them into resolving the crisis. This would prevent the environmental legacies of the armed conflict from haunting the region’s population after the crisis has ended. </p>
<h2>The fallout for the environment</h2>
<p>One of the effects of the fighting <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon">since 2016</a> was that it brought conservation activities to a halt in the country’s biodiversity hot spots in the Anglophone regions. Cameroon has around <a href="http://www.parks.it/world/CM/Eindex.html">14 national parks</a>, 18 wildlife reserves, 12 forest reserves and three wildlife sanctuaries hosting rare and threatened species. </p>
<p>Before the crisis, many of these protected areas were still in a pristine condition because Cameroon had less tourism than other regions of Africa. </p>
<p>But the crisis has stalled several environmental projects. </p>
<p>For example, violence forced environmentalists and NGOS operating in the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary in Lebialem to flee. The Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary is home to the critically endangered <a href="https://www.berggorilla.org/en/gorillas/general/ecology/articles-ecology/survey-of-the-cross-river-gorilla-at-the-tofala-hill-wildlife-sanctuary-in-cameroon/">Cross River gorillas</a> and other endangered wildlife like the African chimpanzee and elephant. </p>
<p>These gorillas are also under increased threat from militias such as the “Red Dragons” which have set up camps within the sanctuary (see Figure 1). </p>
<p>Likewise, efforts to protect the Mount Cameroon National Park, which hosts endangered primates, have been <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2022/03/civil-conflict-in-cameroon-puts-endangered-chimpanzees-in-the-crosshairs/">hampered</a>. This poses a threat to the <a href="https://www.savetheelephants.org/about-elephants-2-3-2/elephant-news-post/?detail=cameroon-anglophone-crisis-environmentalists-express-fear-over-future-of-endangered-species-as-population-invade-forests">Nigerian-Cameroon chimpanzee</a>, which already faces extinction.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A map" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472342/original/file-20220704-18-ezj1kc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1: Landscape of the Lebialem Highlands hosting the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">GSAC (2022)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Insecurity in areas hosting wildlife has led to a rise in uncontrolled illegal hunting. <a href="https://alliance-gsac.org/archives/1644">Poaching</a> of endangered chimpanzees (see Figure 2) and elephants increased in the Tofala Hill Wildlife Sanctuary and the Takamanda and Korup National Parks after state rangers and eco-guards fled.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="An ape sitting on a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472343/original/file-20220704-24-t8g5mh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=441&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2: Endangered ape species in Cameroon’s protected reserves.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Julie Langford courtesy of the Limbe Wildlife Centre.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The rise in the number of internally displaced people has had a number of consequences.</p>
<p>Deforestation has risen as relocated communities have cut down trees to provide shelter and firewood. </p>
<p>They are also putting pressure on access to water. Toilet facilitates are inadequate in areas hosting large numbers of people. Drilling of wells, sometimes in unhygienic surroundings, and defecation in streams are also responsible for the <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/cameroon-s-english-speaking-region-facing-water-shortage-cholera-epidemic/2565585">poor water quality</a> in the region. </p>
<p>The southwest region has recently experienced a <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2022-DON374">cholera epidemic</a>. </p>
<p>Thirdly, measures in <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/cameroon-national-climate-change-adaptation-plan">Cameroon’s climate action plan</a> have been halted by the crisis. The measures include providing fertilisers and improved seeds to farmers; installing renewable energy in rural areas; and restoring mangrove forests along the Limbe coast.</p>
<p>Fourthly, the crisis has worsened the problem of municipal waste management.</p>
<p>Separatists have threatened to burn the garbage collection company, <a href="https://www.proparco.fr/en/ressources/hysacam-countrys-number-one-waste-management-contractor-cameroon-immersion-360deg">HYSACAM</a>. Some of its workers have been attacked. This has affected the collection of municipal waste in Bamenda and Buea, capitals of the Anglophone northwest and southwest regions.</p>
<p>Fifth, military forces are using <a href="https://onpolicy.org/scorched-earth-policy-in-the-anglophone-conflict-in-cameroon-a-crime-against-humanity/">scorched earth tactics</a> that could create serious environmental harm. The military has destroyed houses, crops and livestock in several villages perceived to be strongholds of militia groups.</p>
<p>Likewise, militias have destroyed property owned by the state and that of civilians suspected to be colluding with security forces. </p>
<p>Satellite images from February and March 2021 <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/cameroon-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-in-anglophone-regions/">confirm</a> the destruction of multiple villages in the northwest region. </p>
<p>Lastly, the use of improvised explosive devices by militia groups against Cameroon’s military vehicles has been <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_cameroon-military-says-rebels-turning-ieds-numbers-fall/6205704.html">increasing</a> and getting more sophisticated. </p>
<p>Explosive remnants and munitions can make the land uninhabitable, severely harm wildlife, and contaminate the soil and watercourses. Clearance of devices can also cause localised pollution, soil degradation and negative land use consequences.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A destroyed military vehicle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472349/original/file-20220704-3924-osguz3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 5: Military vehicle destroyed by IED.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo courtesy of SBBC (2022).</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Contingency plans being put in place by the Cameroon government for a potential complex disaster emergency should consider the environmental aspects of the conflict. </p>
<p>First it’s necessary to empirically diagnose the environmental ramifications and how they can be resolved. </p>
<p>When seeking political solutions to the crisis, stakeholders should also incorporate measures to mitigate the environmental consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henry Ngenyam Bang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis could escalate into a complex disaster emergency with dire environmental consequences.Henry Ngenyam Bang, Disaster Management Scholar, Researcher and Educator, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1856272022-07-06T10:33:47Z2022-07-06T10:33:47ZWe built an algorithm to predict how climate change will affect future conflict in the Horn of Africa: here’s what we found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472290/original/file-20220704-14-ptbw28.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.eda.admin.ch/deza/en/home/countries/horn-africa.html">Horn of Africa</a>, on the eastern coast of the continent, is currently being battered by an <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/horn-africa-drought-late-rains-ethiopia-kenya-and-somalia-are-inflaming-hunger-warns-wfp">intense and sustained drought</a> thanks to which around 20 million people are going hungry. And, given the ongoing armed conflict in the region – particularly in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-us-re-entry-into-somalia-means-for-the-horn-of-africa-and-for-bigger-powers-183962">Somalia</a> and Ethiopia – safely getting <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/12/ethiopians-escape-war-hunger-somaliland">nutritious food</a> to these hungry people has become even more challenging. </p>
<p>This isn’t the first time these two situations have coincided in this region, but this time they’re both worsened by high wheat prices – thanks to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-us-deploys-more-troops-in-eastern-europe-heres-how-it-compares-with-the-cold-war-186082">war in Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/global-grains-idAFL2N2X80ZR">export embargoes in India</a> affecting access to traditional foods such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-highlights-africas-need-to-diversify-its-wheat-sources-181173">porridge</a>.</p>
<p>Whether directly or indirectly, both drought and conflict can be linked to climate change. It’s of course vital to tackle these problems now. But if we don’t simultaneously address the long-term impacts of <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-key-points-in-the-ipcc-report-on-climate-change-impacts-and-adaptation-178195">climate change</a> too, any efforts we make in the present will be in vain.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A view of the Horn of Africa from space, with brown land on the left and dark blue sea on the right of the image." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472276/original/file-20220704-22-diayd7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Horn of Africa has long been prone to instability and conflict.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nasa2explore/9363412183">NASA Johnson/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>To try to project future risks from armed conflict in the region into the future, we – researchers from Utrecht University and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, together with the Peace Research Institute Oslo and Uppsala University – created a new <a href="https://joss.theoj.org/papers/10.21105/joss.02855">machine learning model</a> to look at how different scenarios of <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac3db2">armed conflict</a> over the African continent could play out between now and 2050. Specifically, we wanted to know how armed conflict could be affected by climate change, as well as by future social and economic development.</p>
<p>Our results showed that cutting emissions globally and investing in socioeconomic development locally can reduce the risk of conflict. Doing this would also have the added benefits of helping local food production flourish and lowering dependency on the international trade market. But when we ran this scenario, the Horn of Africa still remained especially prone to conflict.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/food-security-how-drought-and-rising-prices-led-to-conflict-in-syria-71539">Food security: how drought and rising prices led to conflict in Syria</a>
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<p>We needed to understand why this area remains more at risk than others. First, we specifically looked at the effect of climate change on conflict, using indicators such as soil moisture and rainfall. </p>
<p>What our model suggested was that these environmental factors weren’t actually as important as socioeconomic factors – such as education and <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-gdp-are-there-better-ways-to-measure-well-being-33414">GDP</a> – because they usually merely light the spark of conflict risk in situations where people are already struggling. That means, to avoid future conflicts being triggered, it’s crucial to focus on <a href="https://www.unicef.org/education/girls-education">investing in education</a> for young people – women in particular – and improving local housing, markets, schools and hospitals.</p>
<p>But we also found that in large parts of eastern Africa, climate change is still going to increase conflict risk. To prepare for that, we need climate adaptation and peace-building programmes that take <a href="https://www.iisd.org/articles/deep-dive/building-peace-and-climate-resilience-aligning-peacebuilding-and-climate">environmental change</a> into account. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A person wearing a shirt and jeans rakes soil on the right of the image, in a field with green plants growing in rows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/472279/original/file-20220704-14-jjj9gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Resilient crops are key for surviving droughts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/cabindaangola-09-jun-2010-rural-farmers-1066474067">Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>For example, it’s important that local farmers are given better access to banks and insurance, so if their crops fail one year they can start again the next. Farms need to prioritise crops that are <a href="https://theconversation.com/india-protests-farmers-could-switch-to-more-climate-resilient-crops-but-they-have-been-given-no-incentive-154700">more resilient</a> against drought, such as quinoa, millet and sorghum. And financial organisations, governments, businesses and local communities must all be made responsible for lowering emissions and keeping climate change <a href="https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html">to a minimum</a>. </p>
<h2>Challenges</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, it’s extremely difficult to understand how climate change will actually affect conflict risk. The future trajectories of <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-crisis-even-temporarily-overshooting-2-c-would-cause-permanent-damage-to-earths-species-185929">global warming</a> and conflict are both surrounded by uncertainty. </p>
<p>Just because conflict was driven by certain factors in the past doesn’t mean that those factors will influence conflict in the same ways in the future, meaning that using history to project upcoming conflict is tricky. And geopolitical shifts, such as the current war in Ukraine, can <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-effect-of-the-war-in-ukraine-on-global-activity-and-inflation-20220527.htm">alter conflict risk</a> by raising food prices, slowing economic growth and causing tension between national governments.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/food-prices-how-countries-are-using-the-global-crisis-to-gain-geopolitical-power-184598">Food prices: how countries are using the global crisis to gain geopolitical power</a>
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<p>Developing and improving the accuracy of long-term <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378021002028">conflict risk projections like ours</a> is vitally important – not just to help prevent conflict now, but also to decide how to adapt to a changing climate in ways that will also <a href="https://theconversation.com/training-local-leaders-in-mediation-can-reduce-violence-positive-results-in-nigeria-183746">reduce the likelihood</a> of conflict. That could include programmes creating stable, inclusive employment opportunities for young people, or running intercommunity projects designed to reduce tensions between <a href="https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2021-01/10208IIED.pdf">farmers and herders</a> over land use. </p>
<p>The UN climate change panel IPCC’s <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/">2021 report</a> has made it utterly clear that the window for action is shrinking. If world leaders don’t band together to cut emissions and prepare for a worsening climate in this “<a href="https://www.undp.org/stories/decade-action?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&utm_campaign=CENTRAL&c_src=CENTRAL&c_src2=GSR&gclid=Cj0KCQjwntCVBhDdARIsAMEwACmhERzR2mVZ6kL2jbhnCn7mAzxPLzR_du5H-h8AzUbIWhGcMjp7gKAaAnhfEALw_wcB">decade of action</a>”, the situation in the Horn of Africa will only get worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jannis Hoch is affiliated with Fathom. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niko Wanders receives funding from Utrecht University and The Netherlands Science Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie de Bruin is affiliated with PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. </span></em></p>Our research shows that although climate change is a key factor in starting conflict in eastern Africa, it’s not always the most important one.Jannis Hoch, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Natural Hazards, Utrecht UniversityNiko Wanders, Assistant Professor in Hydrological Extremes, Utrecht UniversitySophie de Bruin, Researcher in Environmental Change, Vrije Universiteit AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837462022-06-08T07:16:35Z2022-06-08T07:16:35ZTraining local leaders in mediation can reduce violence: positive results in Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466615/original/file-20220601-20-x4yiwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents flee Kukawa village, Plateau State, north central Nigeria in April 2022 after their houses were burnt by bandits.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Violence and insecurity are plaguing the northern parts of Nigeria. Banditry, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/03/africa/nigerian-president-kidnapped-victims-intl/index.html">kidnapping</a> and other forms of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/06/05/africa/mass-shooting-nigeria-church-intl/index.html">indiscriminate violence</a> have risen sharply during the pandemic.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/toxic-mix-of-bandits-arms-drugs-and-terrorism-is-alarming-nigerians-what-now-181205">Toxic mix of bandits, arms, drugs and terrorism is alarming Nigerians: what now?</a>
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<p>Conflicts over <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">diminishing resources</a>, religious extremism and identity continue as well.</p>
<p>These various forms of violence have heightened anxiety and limited movement for many Nigerians, impeding trade and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/nigerians-pay-more-for-insecurity-as-economic-impact-hits-n50tr/">further damaging an economy</a> that’s reeling from <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/08/understanding-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-outbreak-on-the-nigerian-economy/">pandemic fallout and inflation</a>. </p>
<p>The Nigerian government’s response has remained largely ineffective. Violence continues to rise and there have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/nigeria">accusations of police brutality</a>. </p>
<p>But there is hope that ways can be found to reduce the insecurity in this region. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/can-mediation-reduce-violence">a study</a> we ran with <a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/">Mercy Corps</a>, an international humanitarian and development agency, we examined whether training local leaders in mediation skills would improve their ability to resolve local disputes. The trainees included traditional chiefs, religious leaders, women and youth.</p>
<p>We found that mediation skills training improved local conflict resolution and reduced violence. Compared to leaders who did not receive training, trained leaders reported fewer violent events and higher perceptions of security. Moreover, so did the wider community. </p>
<p>This has implications for peacebuilding programmes seeking to prevent and stop violence worldwide.</p>
<h2>Mediation of intercommunal disputes</h2>
<p>In Plateau, Kogi, and Benue states in Nigeria, community leaders are involved in resolving local disputes over land, ethnic and family issues, as well as farmer-herder clashes. </p>
<p>The question was whether we could improve the way they already resolved disputes. We also looked at whether this type of training would change levels of violence and insecurity among those directly involved and in the wider community.</p>
<p>To train leaders to become more effective mediators, Mercy Corps used an approach called interest-based negotiation. The agency has used this method in numerous countries since 2004 – Kenya, Ethiopia and Mali among them. <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/313605.Getting_to_Yes">Interest-based negotiation</a> encourages parties to find mutually acceptable outcomes by meeting all parties’ interests. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, the local leaders came together for three days of training. </p>
<p>To measure the effectiveness of the intervention, we compared leaders from 44 communities who received the training with leaders from 44 communities who didn’t. Additionally, to see if the training improved security for the community as a whole, we compared communities whose leaders received the training with those who did not. </p>
<p>We collected survey measures from leaders and community members in the treatment and control areas before the programme started and about one year after the leaders were trained. </p>
<p>Leaders who had received the training felt they had stronger conflict resolution skills, perceived fewer violent events and felt there was greater security in their communities. Trained leaders also said they talked to people from other groups more often. And they thought that leaders from different groups wanted to prevent violence and would be more likely to stick to an agreement.</p>
<p>This positive impact of the training extended to the wider community. In the year following mediation training for leaders, 29% of citizens in those communities reported experiencing a violent event. In comparison, 55% of citizens in communities where leaders had not received training said they had experienced violence during that same time period. </p>
<p>Nearly 53% of respondents in comparison communities reported feeling unsafe “often” or “always”, compared to only 32% of the respondents in intervention communities. </p>
<p>People in communities with trained leaders also reported interacting more with people from other communities. For example, they traded or socialised more frequently and travelled more freely than people in communities without trained leaders.</p>
<p>Communities may already trust local leaders more than they trust the government. Enhancing their mediation skills can mitigate violence and secondary economic effects. And training is relatively low-cost. </p>
<p>The training and mentoring of 340 leaders over the course of a year cost about US$60,000. This is significantly lower than the cost of security forces, policing migration routes, imposing fines and arresting people. </p>
<p>For example, to deal with the rising insecurity throughout the country, Nigeria increased its security budget by US$500 million, to a total of <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-safety-and-security#:%7E:text=In%20the%202021%20budget%2C%20the,defense%20budget%20is%20shown%20below.&text=140%20billion%20naira%20(%24340%20million)%20allocated%20to%20the%20Nigerian%20Airforce.">US$4.8 billion</a>. </p>
<h2>Useful approach in farmer-herder and other communal conflicts</h2>
<p>These results should inform the efforts of international donor governments, the Nigerian government, and neighbouring countries like Mali, Benin, and Niger, to address the violence between farmers and herders. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-triggered-new-conflict-between-farmers-and-herders-in-nigeria-145055">What's triggered new conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria</a>
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<p>It points to ways these countries can mitigate violence without curtailing migration routes for herders (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/oct/27/days-of-roaming-free-are-over-for-nigeria-herders">a common policy</a>), impeding economic activity or risking further violence. </p>
<p>This type of intervention is applicable not just to farmer-herder conflict in West Africa but also in other parts of Africa.</p>
<p>Farmer-herder violence occurs across the <a href="https://africacenter.org/publication/growing-complexity-farmer-herder-conflict-west-central-africa/">Sahel</a> and further south into <a href="https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2021-12-09_GSDRC-Pastoralist-Mobility-FINAL2-1.pdf">Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan</a>.</p>
<p>It might also be useful for addressing other types of intercommunal violence, whether based on religion, ethnicity, or other identities. Divisions like these are
seen in <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-mozambiques-failure-to-find-lasting-peace-and-true-democracy-171434">Mozambique</a>, and <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2020/11/protests-elections-and-ethnic-tensions-in-west-africa-what-are-the-driving-forces/">coastal West Africa</a>, for example. </p>
<p>Preventing the escalation of violence between groups may also limit the ability of elites to use these divisions to mobilise support, as is the case in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2019.1640505">civil war in South Sudan</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-cattle-conflicts-say-about-identity-in-south-sudan-181637">What cattle conflicts say about identity in South Sudan</a>
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<p>Training leaders in mediation is not a complete or instant solution. It will not solve all the violence plaguing these communities. </p>
<p>But targeted investments in local leaders and their mediation skills can help prevent the escalation of disputes, break cycles of violence that have continued for generations, and build more peaceful communities.</p>
<p><em>Emmanuel Ogbudu, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Mercy Corps Nigeria and Catlan Reardon, a PhD student in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley are co-authors of this article and the research.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183746/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Jayne Wolfe worked for Mercy Corps from 2006-2020. She received funding from the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts for this work. </span></em></p>Improved mediation skills for local leaders can help prevent the escalation of disputes and break cycles of violence.Rebecca Jayne Wolfe, Senior lecturer, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818922022-05-12T12:14:57Z2022-05-12T12:14:57ZUkraine’s information war is winning hearts and minds in the West<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462340/original/file-20220510-12-v337jw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C5439%2C3618&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is introduced to the US Congress by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi on March 16, 2022 in Washington, DC. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/speaker-of-the-house-nancy-pelosi-introduces-ukrainian-news-photo/1239233680?adppopup=true">J. Scott Applewhite-Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated headlines since late February 2022. The war struck a nerve among Western audiences, evoking a high <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/03/15/public-expresses-mixed-views-of-u-s-response-to-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/#u-s-support-for-ukraine">degree of support</a> for Ukraine.</p>
<p>The reasons for the prominence of the war in the West are many and varied. </p>
<p>A ground war in Europe launched by a major military power evokes the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/26/russia-ukraine-war-soviet-legacy/">ghosts of World War II</a>. This is especially true when the attacking country <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/04/putin-sovereignty-ukraine-irredentism/">has designs on territory it considers integral to its nation</a>, and is led by a <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/putins-war-and-personalist-authoritarianism/">personalist authoritarian regime</a> where all <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-best-way-to-stop-strongmen-like-putin-is-to-prevent-their-rise-in-the-first-place-179624">power is concentrated in a single leader</a>. The deep involvement of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/united-with-ukraine/">U.S.</a> and European countries, both individually and collectively through <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm">NATO</a> and the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine_en">European Union</a>, also inspires <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-cold-war-0">Cold War comparisons</a>.</p>
<p>The resulting <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/humanitarian-crisis-ukraine">humanitarian crisis</a>, including the mass exodus of over 5 million <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ukraine-emergency.html">refugees</a>, underscores the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374980">ethical and moral implications of the war</a>. </p>
<p>These <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.40">historical analogies</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.397">simplifying ideas</a> help explain why the West’s imagination has been captured by this war.</p>
<p>But there’s more to the West’s captivation with the war than is immediately apparent. As a <a href="https://www2.clarku.edu/faculty/facultybio.cfm?id=631">scholar of armed conflict and security</a>, I also find a compelling explanation for why the West is so focused on Ukraine in the Ukrainian government’s ability to provide information about the war in a way that appeals to Western sensibilities.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The wreckage of buildings destroyed by shelling." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462343/original/file-20220510-12-4v88kl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘A ground war in Europe launched by a major military power evokes the ghosts of World War II,’ writes the author. Here, buildings destroyed by intensive shelling by Russian troops in Kharkiv, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rubble-and-debris-around-a-building-destroyed-in-the-news-photo/1395399390?adppopup=true">Eugene Zinchenko/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Weaponizing information</h2>
<p>Russia’s use of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/30/russia-putin-zampolits-ukraine-propaganda-campaign-war/">propaganda</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-letter-z-fascist-symbol/31758267.html">symbols</a> during the conflict, most recently in the “Victory Day” celebrations attempting to draw its own distorted parallels to World War II, has gotten a lot of attention. In the process, Ukraine’s skillful use of information warfare should not be overlooked. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/borden.pdf">Information warfare</a> entails one party denying, exploiting or corrupting the delivery and function of an enemy’s information. It is used both to protect oneself against the enemy’s information and to create a favorable environment for one’s own information.</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/comedian-wartime-leader-zelenskyy-helping-ukraine-win-information/story?id=84340282">charismatic</a> President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leading the way, Ukraine’s savvy use of traditional and <a href="https://theconversation.com/guns-tanks-and-twitter-how-russia-and-ukraine-are-using-social-media-as-the-war-drags-on-180131">social media</a> as well as direct appeals to the U.S. Congress, European Parliament and the court of world opinion have provided <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x">a clear and compelling framing</a> of the war. </p>
<p>That frame is structured around five affecting themes: the inherently just cause of Ukrainian self-defense; the tenacity of Ukrainian resistance; the barbarity of Russian conduct; Russia’s flawed military strategy and general ineptitude; and Ukraine’s desperate need for more, and more sophisticated, military hardware. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s successful strategy in the battle over information demonstrates the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271590?seq=1">connection</a> between armed conflict and information warfare. Ukraine has forged a stalemate with Russia by stressing these themes of a just war for national liberation using not only traditional tools of warfare – bullets, missiles, tanks – but also by shaping the Western public’s perceptions of the war.</p>
<h2>Learning from the enemy</h2>
<p>The information front in the Russia-Ukraine war is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0014">nothing new</a>. It was <a href="https://isd.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2022/03/Case-331.pdf">opened by Russia in 2014</a> during its annexation of Crimea and incursion in the Donbas region. Russia took the offensive to cover up its territorial aims, saying instead that it was there to protect civilians and resist the further spread of Western imperialism. </p>
<p>At the time, Ukrainians and Russians alike were buffeted with this disinformation through Russia’s state-controlled international English-language service <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/rt-sputnik-and-russias-new-theory-of-war.html?searchResultPosition=4">RT</a> and viral videos on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-31715389">YouTube</a> and various social media outlets. </p>
<p>Since then, Ukraine’s security and defense establishment has focused on improving its ability to counter such <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2015.1079047">disinformation tactics</a>. Zelenskyy’s surprise landslide victory in the 2019 presidential election gave Ukraine what has proved to be its biggest asset. A <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/14/volodymyr-zelensky-leads-the-defense-of-ukraine-with-his-voice">skilled communicator and performer</a>, Zelenskyy regularly and effectively uses available information to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russian-propaganda-zelensky-information-war/629475/">present Ukraine’s version of the war</a> and debunk Russia’s. His initial selfie videos from the streets of Kyiv underscored Ukrainian bravery and unity in a war of self-defense – “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/video/president-zelenskyy-posts-defiant-selfie-video-from-ukraine-s-capital-134062661977">the citizens are here, and we are here</a>.” </p>
<p>Zelenskyy’s mid-March <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/watch-live-zelensky-to-deliver-virtual-address-to-u-s-congress">virtual address to</a> the U.S. Congress drew a direct line from Russian atrocities – featured in a graphic video clip he showed to lawmakers – to the need for the West to “do more.” His <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/04/05/volodymyr-zelensky-full-united-nations-speech-bucha-massacre-sot-vpx.cnn">address to the U.N.</a> in early April expanded the scope and terms of the war, <a href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-zasidanni-radi-bezpeki-oon-74121">defining it as an existential struggle</a> against tyranny and evil and for the very soul of the U.N.: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“If this continues, the finale will be that each state will rely only on the power of arms to ensure its security, not on international law, not on international institutions. Then, the U.N. can simply be dissolved. Ladies and gentlemen! Are you ready for the dissolving of the U.N.? Do you think that the time of international law has passed? If your answer is no, you need to act now, act immediately.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Getting by with a little help …</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s use of the techniques of information warfare as well as its compelling messaging and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/24/europe/klitschko-brothers-battle-for-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html">messengers</a> account for much of its success on that front. Among those messengers are <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/24/europe/klitschko-brothers-battle-for-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html">former champion boxers the Klitschko brothers</a>, one of whom is the mayor of Kyiv, and both of whom are now prominent advocates for the defense of their country. </p>
<p>Ukraine has also benefited from pro bono public relations services from major Washington, D.C., firms such as <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/5wpr-announces-partnership-with-ukraine-based-non-profit-organization-tikva-odessa-301505456.html">5WPR</a> and <a href="https://www.axios.com/washington-lobbyists-aid-ukrainian-government-47125a71-cb77-4178-af6c-2652f5a599bc.html">SKDK</a> as well as some of their <a href="https://www.prweek.com/article/1748159/global-pr-community-rallies-help-ukraine-government-comms">U.K. counterparts</a>. </p>
<p>SKDK’s managing director, Anita Dunn, served as senior adviser to President Joe Biden throughout his presidential campaign and in the early months of his administration and is reportedly <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anita-dunn-white-house-returning/">returning to the White House</a> in advance of the upcoming midterm elections. SKDK assisted in <a href="https://efile.fara.gov/docs/7085-Exhibit-AB-20220228-1.pdf">drafting Zelenskyy’s speeches</a> condemning Russian aggression and war crimes to the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council. This parallels pro bono legal support from Washington, D.C., law firms such as Covington & Burling, which filed a <a href="https://www.natlawreview.com/article/law-firms-respond-to-russia-s-invasion-ukraine-how-legal-industry-public-can-help">brief to the International Court of Justice</a> on Ukraine’s behalf in March. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A section of PR and lobbying firm SKDK's disclosure form that stated it was providing free help to the Ukrainian government 'in connection with the foreign principal's remarks to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/462345/original/file-20220510-18-ag3m9b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A section of PR and lobbying firm SKDK’s disclosure form that stated it was providing free help to the Ukrainian government ‘in connection with the foreign.
principal’s remarks to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://efile.fara.gov/docs/7085-Exhibit-AB-20220228-1.pdf">FARA Registration Unit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The limits of framing</h2>
<p>In a textbook example of <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-hybrid-warfare-and-what-is-meant-by-the-grey-zone-118841">hybrid warfare</a> – warfare fought in domains other than the physical battlefield – Ukraine has transformed successes on the information battleground into effective defense of its homeland from Russian aggression. The West has massively increased its support of the country through weapons shipments, intelligence sharing and other aid.</p>
<p>Still, questions remain about the long-term viability of this strategy. Can Ukraine’s strategic use of information continue to offset Russia’s material advantages?</p>
<p>By definition, information warfare obscures and distorts reality in order to tilt perceptions of a conflict to a country’s advantage. Paraphrasing an age-old adage, the war between Russia and Ukraine is a reminder that the first battle in contemporary wars may be for the truth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181892/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Butler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The reasons for the prominence of the Ukraine war in the West are many – and include the Ukrainian government’s strategic efforts to tailor presentations of the conflict for Western sensibilities.Michael Butler, Associate Professor of Political Science, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792572022-04-25T12:28:48Z2022-04-25T12:28:48ZHow colonialism is a major cause of domestic abuse against women around the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459454/original/file-20220425-29880-rc2tgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Canada's residential school system has had a lasting effect on First Nations communities.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/vancouver-bc-canada-july-1-2021-2001759866">Blake Elliott | Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>One in three women around the world <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240022256">will experience</a> violence from an intimate partner at some point in their lifetime. That is a shocking figure. Even more shocking, though, is the fact that, in <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/7/3/e007704.full">23 countries</a> – from the Americas and Africa to Asia and the Pacific – it is more like two in three women. </p>
<p>As part of <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-health/research/z-research/eve-project-evidence-violence-prevention-extreme">a study</a> of countries with a high prevalence of violence against women, we analysed data from the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the United Nations and academic sources. We found that countries which were colonised are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08862605221086642">50 times more likely</a> to have a high prevalence of intimate-partner violence against women. When a patriarchal society is combined with a history of colonialism, the risk of domestic violence increases. </p>
<p>Postcolonial scholars have been telling us as much for decades. From widespread poverty to racial discrimination and gender inequalities, colonisation put in place systems and structures that are often at the root of heightened violence against women. </p>
<h2>Colonial policies</h2>
<p>Many colonial systems of governance were based on “racialising” the local population: categorising and marginalising groups of people according to race or ethnicity. For example, the divisions between Hindus and Muslims in pre-partition India and the racial hierarchy instituted in apartheid South Africa. These divisions have provided the fodder for many of the world’s contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-indigenous-women-who-survived-guatemalas-conflict-are-fighting-for-justice-92872">armed conflicts</a>. Scholars talk about <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/19/DuressImperial-Durabilities-in-Our-Times">colonial durabilities</a> to describe the way in which colonial histories continue to actively shape the world today. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A crowd of protestors hold up signs in a street setting." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459456/original/file-20220425-25-esfn9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protestors march against gender-based violence in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/port-elizabeth-south-africa-march-2019-1760049902">Bohemian Photography | Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 1994 Rwandan genocide is a case in point. Over 800,000 mostly Tutsi people were killed by Hutu extremists – two groups which were originally racialised by the Belgian colonial government, through the creation of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21681392.2021.1938404">hierarchical and exclusive</a> forms of citizenship. The genocide saw widespread sexual violence used against Tutsi women as a means of literally <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/1996/09/24/shattered-lives/sexual-violence-during-rwandan-genocide-and-its-aftermath">stripping them</a> of their humanity. </p>
<p>Survivors of the genocide were severely traumatised. Research shows that this trauma increased men’s likelihood to use violence against their <a href="https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-021-00410-4">families and intimate partners</a>. It also <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3109/01443615.2013.829031?casa_token=S_UYaLbPGZwAAAAA%3Ai_o847r2UMrwFYdrPbDquiB_EjdnLMkNiHv2TK6kFOHsoldqTvzUKoi9HIiwTjj7CL1l_F4x3aYFPQ">reduced women’s ability</a> to prevent it.</p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199846733/obo-9780199846733-0067.xml">colonial systems of governance</a> also established regulations and legal frameworks that were particularly damaging for women. Despite the fact that both men and women were in positions of leadership in pre-colonial Nigeria, British colonial officials <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-igbo-women-used-petitions-to-influence-british-authorities-during-colonial-rule-143309">refused to negotiate</a> with female chiefs. They also put in place a system of land ownership that <a href="https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/whp-origins/era-7-the-great-convergence-and-divergence-1880-ce-to-the-future/74-end-of-empires-betaa/a/read-decolonizing-women-beta">explicitly excluded women</a>. </p>
<p>The legacy of these policies is that women are still far less likely to own land than men in Nigeria. A <a href="https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202007.0225/v1">recent study</a> of national data has shown that women who do not own land are more likely to report domestic violence than those that do. This is because land ownership gives women income and power within a relationship. It also gives them options when they need somewhere to go. Women who have power and alternatives are simply less likely to put up with violence and more likely to leave.</p>
<h2>Historical trauma</h2>
<p>While people today may not have personally experienced colonialism, they may experience the <a href="https://www.goodtherapy.org/blog/Understanding_Intergenerational_Trauma">historical trauma</a> of their communities. Events shared by an entire community or ethnic group can result in trauma being passed on through generations. </p>
<p>Trauma is often defined as a condition that arises from an event in the past – such as child abuse, or exposure to a natural disaster. Historical trauma is different. It does not end when the person who experienced the event recovers or passes on. In fact, research shows it is <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2011-01946-014">often compounded</a> by the discrimination and oppression experienced by subsequent generations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women stand with their backs to the camera in an outdoor coffee bean processing facility, with green foilage in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/459464/original/file-20220425-12-ismo20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Coffee bean production has provided a means of income to genocide survivors in Rwanda.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/african-employers-working-coffee-beans-production-1986757901">Yaroslav Astakhov | Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Psychiatrist and political philosopher <a href="https://theconversation.com/quotes-from-frantz-fanons-wretched-of-the-earth-that-resonate-60-years-later-173108">Frantz Fanon</a> first set the stage for understanding the emotional and psychological consequences of historical trauma arising from colonisation. In <a href="https://www.litcharts.com/lit/black-skin-white-masks/chapter-6-the-black-man-and-psychopathology">Black Skin White Mask</a> (1967), Fanon argued that the representation of the colonial archetypal hero as white leaves black individuals in postcolonial societies with a desire to be someone else. They are thus robbed of their sense of self, their agency and their decision-making power. </p>
<p>Working with First Nations communities in Canada, women’s rights practitioner <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42978745">Karen Max</a> argues that we need to look at how communities understand violence against women as stemming not just from gender inequalities but from the traumatic experiences of men in the community. </p>
<p>In much the same way, the traumatic experiences of previous generations can influence the breakdown of social networks and family attachments within communities. Canada’s residential school policy saw First Nations children forcibly removed from their families throughout the 20th century. Research shows the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11013-018-9603-x">long-term impact</a> on First Nations communities of this policy includes higher rates of domestic violence, emotional detachment and suicide.</p>
<p>A history of colonialism is, of course, not the only driver of violence against women. Other <a href="https://www.bmj.com/wp-signup.php?new=gh">significant factors</a> include <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214109X15000133">social norms</a> that position women as inferior to men and deserving of violence in certain situations. However, our research shows that colonialism makes these other risk factors even worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenevieve Mannell receives funding from the UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship scheme, and the Medical Research Council for research related to the prevention of violence against women.</span></em></p>When a patriarchal society is combined with a history of colonialism, women in that country are at heightened risk of gender-based violence.Jenevieve Mannell, Associate Professor of Global Health, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.