tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/ayatollah-khomeini-20291/articlesAyatollah Khomeini – The Conversation2023-08-18T14:45:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116982023-08-18T14:45:08Z2023-08-18T14:45:08Z70 years ago, an Anglo-US coup condemned Iran to decades of oppression – but now the people are fighting back<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3cswpt1#:%7E:text=In%201953%20Iran's%20democratically%20elected,British%20and%20American%20intelligence%20services.">1953 coup d'etat</a> in Iran ushered in a period of exploitation and oppression that has continued – despite a subsequent revolution that led to huge changes – for 70 years. Each year on August 19, the anniversary of the coup, millions of Iranians ask themselves what would have happened if the US and UK had not conspired all those years ago to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected leader. </p>
<p>Iran, the Middle East and, arguably, the whole world may well have been profoundly different. Apart from rewriting the destiny of Iran and its neighbours, the coup paved the way for a series of imperialist interventions and the toppling of democratically elected governments across the global south. Perhaps Washington might have thought twice before plotting coups in <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/jacobo-arbenz-guzman-deposed/">Guatemala in 1954</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">Congo in 1961</a> or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/aug/18/1973-coup-chile-democratic-socialism-still-matters-britain">Chile in 1973</a>, if they’d been unable to overthrow Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, so easily and profitably.</p>
<p>As the democratically elected leader of Iran from 1951 to 1953, Mosaddegh championed nationalisation of Iran’s oil industry. This had previously been in the hands of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Persian_Oil_Company">Anglo-Persian Oil Company</a> – a British company, founded in 1909 after the discovery of a large oil field in Iran, which would later become BP. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Portrait of former Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=768&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543447/original/file-20230818-19-81nz7l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=965&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh was overthrown by an Anglo-US coup in 1953.</span>
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</figure>
<p>In March 1951, Iran’s parliament <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/032551iran-oil-vote.html">voted to proceed with nationalisation</a>. This caused consternation in the west – most notably in Britain, where the prospect of nationalisation was seen as potentially hugely damaging to the economy. Furthermore, it would have undermined Britain’s influence in the Middle East. Plotting to depose Mosaddegh began in earnest.</p>
<p>In the event, the coup – named <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/">Operation Ajax</a> – was a joint venture between the CIA and MI6. The shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who had recently fled the country after an earlier plot to remove Mossadegh had failed, returned to Iran.</p>
<p>Within a short period, he had tightened his grip on the country’s security services and imposed a dictatorial regime which ruled through brutality and fear. Pahlavi banned all opposition political parties, and many of the activists who participated in the movement for nationalisation of oil were arrested or fled the country. </p>
<h2>Government by fear</h2>
<p>In 1957, the shah established an internal security service, <em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAVAK">Sazman-e Ettel'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar</a></em> (Savak), which essentially ran Iran at the shah’s bidding. From then until 1975, only two major political parties were allowed to operate, the People’s Party (<em>Ḥezb-e Mardom</em>) and the New Iran Party (<em>Ḥezb-e Iran-e Novin</em>), and all parliamentary candidates had to be approved by Savak.</p>
<p>Both parties in reality were wholly under the shah’s control. The parliament only existed to rubber-stamp his decisions, as did the prime minister – who the shah appointed. </p>
<p>In 1975, the shah took his domination of Iranian politics further, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/03/archives/shah-decrees-iran-a-oneparty-nation.html">establishing a single party</a>, the Party of Resurrection of the Iranian Nation (<em>Hezb-e Rastakhiz</em>), which all Iranians were obliged to join. By 1979, when Iran <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">rose up in a popular revolution</a>, it was a virtual absolute monarchy, with the shah’s will enforced by the dreaded Savak secret police.</p>
<p>Within months of the revolution, though, Iran’s religious authorities took control under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Islamic Republic quickly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/07/khomeini-is-reported-to-have-a-savak-of-his-own/dfc8e0a4-85b5-4a35-9723-c8a57caabae6/">established its own secret police, Savama</a> – <em>Sazman-e Ettelaat Va Amniat Meli Iran</em> – which used many of the same brutal methods as Savak.</p>
<h2>‘Woman, Life, Freedom’</h2>
<p>This week, Iranians will recall the 1953 coup as they prepare protests ahead of the anniversary of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising. This movement began in September 2022 after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-on-fire-once-again-women-are-on-the-vanguard-of-transformative-change-191297">death of Mahsa Amini</a> at the hands of the morality police – which <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-66218318">patrols the streets</a> enforcing the laws on Islamic dress code in public – for the “crime” of not wearing her hijab (headscarf) in the approved manner. </p>
<p>The resulting explosion of unrest has posed the most serious challenge to the Islamic Republic in its history. Although the state tried to <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-using-every-effort-to-crush-protesters-intent-on-a-revolution-except-hearing-them-out-193684">crush the demonstrations</a> from the beginning, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/24/theres-no-other-option-but-to-fight-iranian-women-defiant-as-morality-police-return">protesters have defied</a> police brutality and the prospect of severe punishment, which included public executions and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/13/iran-death-sentences-against-protesters">hundreds of deaths of protesters</a> at the hands of the security forces.</p>
<p>At the same time as battling the oppression of their own state apparatus, ordinary Iranians are also suffering under the brutal US-imposed regime of sanctions. In the past five years, these sanctions – reimposed by Donald Trump after he unilaterally pulled the US out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, which had been signed by his predecessor Barack Obama in 2015 – have devastated the Iranian economy. Soaring inflation and devaluation of the national currency have caused <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c86fccb4-f56e-43b7-a596-29c036cb4ec1?accessToken=zwAGAzIWvP-IkdPIb8y09W5Dt9OllinANstOwQ.MEUCIB-C6PA2kZTxATwPKPY1n-zam6BzvbSibbybEmV1FFyZAiEAhZTNZOtTm3l-gtkRtQYHI-C5I9UpYRKxm-s5hZRRBjc&sharetype=gift&token=b91228d2-5530-4fe4-bbf3-071a531111a6">serious hardship</a> for ordinary Iranians.</p>
<p>As they <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">fight for a better future</a>, Iranians clearly grasp how, 70 years after the coup snuffed out their fledgling democracy, their internal struggles are still being influenced by foreign powers. </p>
<p>And they ask themselves if Mahsa Amini, and also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/08/mother-says-police-beat-daughter-to-death-in-iranian-protests">Nika Shahkarami</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/oct/07/another-teenage-girl-dead-at-hands-of-irans-security-forces-reports-claim">Sarina Esmailzadeh</a> – two other women beaten to death by members of the state apparatus for protesting – as well as hundreds of other young Iranians, would still be paying with their lives in Iran’s struggle for basic rights today if the 1953 coup had not happened.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211698/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simin Fadaee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After seven decades of oppression, Iranians yearn for democracy and are willing to risk their lives to win it.Simin Fadaee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2014222023-03-09T16:51:02Z2023-03-09T16:51:02ZIran: unions and civil rights groups demand democracy and social justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514489/original/file-20230309-26-6uvxky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C142%2C2066%2C1453&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women, life, freedom: protests against the oppression of Iranian women in Iran in Ottowa, Canada, September 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iran_Protests_%2852382844047%29.jpg">Taymaz Valley/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forty-four years after Iranians rose up against their hated monarch in February 1979, a group of 20 organisations engaged in long-term social and economic struggles – including labour unions, teachers, women’s groups and youth and student movements – <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/33695/">issued an ultimatum</a> to the government of the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>The Charter of Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organisations of Iran contains 12 demands concerning social justice, democracy and political reform. The charter is a protest:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>against misogyny and gender-based discrimination, economic instability, the modern enslavement of the workforce, poverty, distress, class violence, and nationalist, centralist, and religious oppression. It is a revolution against any form of tyranny, whether it be under the pretext of religion or not; any form of tyranny that has been inflicted upon us, the majority of the people of Iran.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This charter represents the first organised and collective demand from within Iran since the explosion of unrest on Iranian streets after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-on-fire-once-again-women-are-on-the-vanguard-of-transformative-change-191297">death of Mahsa Amini</a> at the hands of the morality police in September 2022. </p>
<p>The push for transformation inside Iran stands in stark contrast to the attempts of some exiled Iranians who want to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-14/iran-exiled-crown-prince-reza-pahlavi-revolution-regime-change/101961372">reimpose the pre-1979 monarchy</a>.</p>
<p>The revolutionary movement that overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah, the last monarch of Iran, was a broad-based coalition of mostly urban working- and middle-class people. Supporters of the revolution were united by their opposition to the monarchy, but they were motivated by a range of ideologies: socialism, communism, liberalism, secularism, Islamism and nationalism.</p>
<p>These groups were also unified by their fierce opposition to Iran’s foreign policy that left it subordinate to the west. Deeply etched in Iranians’ collective memory is the fact that the monarchy had been reinstalled in 1953 after a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-cia-toppled-iranian-democracy-81628">coup d’etat</a> against the democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The coup had been orchestrated by the US and UK, who backed Mohammad Reza Shah throughout his brutal and oppressive reign, in return for control of Iran’s oil industry. </p>
<p>By the 1970s, brutal state oppression was accompanied by <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-023-02365-2">increasing inequality</a>. Poor living and working conditions provoked unrest that was met with further repression and Iran’s jails overflowed with political prisoners. </p>
<p>In January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah and his family were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/17/frenzied-rejoicing-in-iran-as-shah-leaves-archive-1979">forced into exile</a> by a broad-based revolutionary coalition. But the unity that succeeded in ousting the hated regime proved to be shortlived and the theocratic Islamic Republic was established under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. </p>
<p>But a large segment of Iranian society that had supported the revolution staunchly opposed the Islamic Republic from the beginning. This opposition has remained firm to the present day and is represented in huge numbers in the street protests that have rocked Iran since the death of Amini.</p>
<p>Amini, a Kurdish Iranian, was visiting relatives in Tehran when she was arrested by the morality police for violating the Islamic Republic’s strict dress code. Her death, after reportedly being brutally beaten while in custody, <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-hijab-protests-reflect-society-wide-anger-at-regime-which-trashes-rule-of-law-and-human-rights-193773">provoked outrage across the country</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-hijab-protests-reflect-society-wide-anger-at-regime-which-trashes-rule-of-law-and-human-rights-193773">Iran: hijab protests reflect society-wide anger at regime which trashes rule of law and human rights</a>
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<p>In the protests that followed, many young women and men <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-is-using-every-effort-to-crush-protesters-intent-on-a-revolution-except-hearing-them-out-193684">have been killed</a> by security forces. Now the Islamic Republic faces the most serious challenge in its 44-year existence.</p>
<p>During the 1979 revolution, the hijab became a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-veil-in-iran-has-been-an-enduring-symbol-of-patriarchal-norms-but-its-use-has-changed-depending-on-who-is-in-power-193689">symbol of resistance</a> to the Pahlavi monarchy and its commitment to “modernise” – in other words, westernise – Iranian society. Many women wore the headscarf as a protest against the imposition of western norms. </p>
<p>After the Islamic Republic took power the dress code for women became stricter. A month after the revolution – on March 8 1979, women launched <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-protests-in-iran-are-part-of-a-long-history-of-womens-resistance-191551">massive demonstrations</a> across Iran against what they saw as patriarchal oppression on the part of the new Islamic regime. However, the hijab became obligatory in 1983, by which time Iran was at war with Iraq.</p>
<p>So the hijab symbolises Iranian women’s struggle against control by both the monarchy and the theocracy. The killing of Amini in September 2022 was the trigger for the current wave of protests, but they are a manifestation of long-lasting repressive gender relations. It is opposition to deeply rooted patriarchal relations that brought women and girls onto the streets in their hundreds of thousands across almost every city and town.</p>
<p>While women led the demonstrations, many men offered support. The slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”, which places women at the centre of the struggle, also calls for transformative changes in the economy (“life”) and politics (“freedom”). Like in 1979, the current protests enjoy support from diverse social groups. For many, this wave of demonstrations represents continuity with the 1979 revolution, and an opportunity to achieve the objectives that were undermined by the establishment of the Islamic Republic.</p>
<h2>Progressive revolution</h2>
<p>The 44th anniversary of the 1979 revolution marked a significant moment for which many Iranians have been longing. The <a href="https://en.radiozamaneh.com/33695/">new charter</a> calls for “an end to the formation of any kind of power from above and to start a social, progressive, and human revolution for the liberation of peoples from any form of tyranny, discrimination, colonisation, oppression, and dictatorship”. </p>
<p>The demands are broad-ranging. They include the freedom of all political prisoners, freedom of belief and expression, equality between men and women and improved wages and conditions for all workers. They demand the free participation of people in democracy through local and national councils and the redistribution of wealth and resources.</p>
<p>The charter provides the first draft of a vision for a new Iran. Its proclamation on the anniversary of the 1979 revolution makes a historical connection to that struggle and its anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial sentiments. The demands put forward demonstrate that Iranians have a clear vision for their future. And it shows that it is time for the reactionary forces outside Iran to accept that Iranian people can indeed alter their society from within.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simin Fadaee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Increasing numbers of Iranians want a government of the people, not a monarchy or an Islamic theocracy.Simin Fadaee, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1935072022-12-21T13:40:26Z2022-12-21T13:40:26ZHow female Iranian activists use powerful images to protest oppressive policies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/502184/original/file-20221220-13-loap2p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C17%2C3817%2C2535&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women have been at the forefront of protests in Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SyriaIran/3b79af71c23442d1bcae8e54248258b7/photo?Query=Iranians%20protests%20the%20death%20of%2022-year-old%20Mahsa%20Amini&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=323&currentItemNo=89">Hawar News Agency via AP via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of unveiled Iranian women and adolescent girls <a href="https://twitter.com/GEsfandiari/status/1585346972655190016">standing atop police cars</a> or <a href="https://twitter.com/ksadjadpour/status/1593673422290157569">flipping off the ayatollah’s picture</a> have become signature demonstrations of dissent in the past few months of protest in Iran.</p>
<p>In fact, among the Iranian protest photos selected for inclusion in Time magazine’s list of the “<a href="https://time.com/6234958/top-100-photos-2022/">Top 100 Photos of 2022</a>” are one of women running from military police brigades and another of an unveiled woman standing on a car with hands raised.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://cas.uoregon.edu/directory/political-science/all/pkazemi">a scholar studying the use of images in political movements</a>, I find Iranian protest photos powerful and engaging because they play on several elements of defiance. They draw on a longer history of Iranian women taking and sharing photos and videos of actions considered illegal, such as singing and dancing to protest gender oppression.</p>
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<h2>Pictures in past Iranian movements</h2>
<p>Iranian women did not stage mass public demonstrations against restrictions on their freedoms for nearly three decades <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/052159572X">following the 1979 Islamic Revolution</a>, when protests against compulsory hijab laws were brutally crushed by the Islamic regime.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white picture showing hundreds of young girls marching in a procession and holding up banners." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=76%2C4%2C2919%2C1625&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/501998/original/file-20221219-16-1hbucl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of Iranian women march in Tehran on March 12, 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranRevolutionWomen/0e669bf5cd5a42fc8e30a9398d680847/photo?Query=iran%20women%20protests%20&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=318&currentItemNo=198">AP Photo/Richard Tomkins</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 2009 Iranian Green Movement against election fraud, however, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00576.x">women played a major role</a>. Images of one young female protester, Neda Agha-Soltan, who was fatally shot by security forces during the protest, went viral, <a href="https://pure.au.dk/portal/en/publications/dramatic-diffusion-and-meaning-adaptation-the-case-of-neda(10d410cc-8e43-41f8-8d28-48694541e00b).html">catalyzing millions of Iranians to join the protests</a>.</p>
<p>In subsequent protests, visuals have been at the heart of women’s efforts to mobilize against the Islamic Republic. In 2014, women <a href="https://revistas.uam.es/reim/article/view/6936">began recording themselves</a> walking, cycling, dancing and singing in public unveiled, under the banner of the “My Stealthy Freedom” movement. Started by Masih Alinejad, an Iranian-born journalist based in New York, the movement protested the <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315716299-18/importance-social-social-media-gholam-khiabany">forced wearing of the hijab</a> and other restrictive laws by showing women breaking them.</p>
<p>Walking in busy city streets unveiled, riding a bike in parks where such activities are banned for women and joining dance circles in town squares were among the ways in which Iranian women protested oppressive laws and practices.</p>
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<p>Four years later, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-42954970">what came to be known as the “Girls of Revolution Street,” protests</a> started with one woman, Vida Movahed, standing atop a utility box on Tehran’s Revolution Street to wave her headscarf on a stick like a flag. Soon, others joined Movahed by repeating her action in other public spaces in Iran.</p>
<p>Images showing dozens of people protesting mandatory veiling in this way were widely shared on social media and later picked up by global news networks, bringing international attention to women’s resistance efforts in Iran.</p>
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<p>The use of images by protesters has been a central practice of resistance in other protests around the world as well. During the Arab Spring, a series of protests against the ruling regimes that spread across the Middle East and North Africa in the early 2010s, <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0163-786X(2013)0000035005/full/html">images</a> played an important role <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813489863">in mobilizing people</a> into joining the movement.</p>
<p>A photo of a woman dragged by government forces in the streets of Egypt with her body exposed persuaded many to protest against what was a clear <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/676977?casa_token=vd5wbfWy-OAAAAAA%3AgghjRf9NxTbRrCUmdCAriIv4iH70podl1ZPJ_LvB3KjX7GQbf8HR3Qnew3g7i4p2U49r1kgh3fuCXw">example of state violence</a> in the Egyptian uprising. These images challenged the regime interpretations of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01343.x">protesters as “troublemakers</a>” and helped <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01629.x">bypass the state-controlled news networks</a> to show the world what was happening on the ground.</p>
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<h2>What such a resistance means</h2>
<p>Iranian women have been protesting the Islamic Republic’s sexist policies and showing the world what <a href="https://acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1903">freedom</a> and <a href="https://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jsss/article/view/6284">gender identity</a> mean to them through their bodily expressions.</p>
<p>Images of women freely riding a bike or sitting with a member of the opposite sex while unveiled are ways of protesting through the everyday acts that women are barred from under the Islamic Republic. Through their widespread participation in these actions, women have shown a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1471772717302750">solidarity</a>.</p>
<p>As it is difficult for the Islamic Republic to suppress this kind of protest, it often responds by arresting key activists who can be identified and imprisoning them for several years. In 2019, one activist associated with this form of protest, Yasaman Aryani, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.au/shortened-sentence-for-yasaman/">was sentenced to a 16-year jail term</a> after a video surfaced of her handing out flowers in the Tehran metro unveiled.</p>
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<p>Images of Iranian women engaged in defiant acts make their daily oppression visible. Scholar <a href="https://www.gu.se/en/about/find-staff/monalilja">Mona Lilja</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2017.1382176">describes these protests in terms of</a> “resisting bodies” that speak in ways that are not always apparent at the outset of a demonstration or public act of defiance. Emotions, symbolic actions and women’s engagements with the spaces in which they protest combine to form the meaning of resistance we associate with these pictures. </p>
<p>Today’s protest pictures build on past resistance efforts and build on a tradition of resisting the Iranian government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parichehr Kazemi's research is supported by the University of Oregon's Center for the Study of Women in Society (CSWS) and the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF). </span></em></p>Iranian women have often used images of actions such as singing and dancing unveiled to show what freedom means to them and to protest the Islamic Republic’s gender oppression.Parichehr Kazemi, PhD Candidate, University of OregonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1960612022-12-16T11:57:23Z2022-12-16T11:57:23ZIran: dissent by public figures has amplified the protest across the country – and the world<p>Iran’s Islamic Republic continues to violently suppress ongoing pro-democracy protests, which broke out in September in response to the killing of a young woman who had been arrested for not wearing a proper head covering. According to the NGO <a href="https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5623/">Iran Human Rights</a> at least 458 protesters have been killed, including 63 children. Death sentences have been issued to at least 11 people. </p>
<p>Mohsen Shekari, a 22 year old Tehran café worker, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/08/iran-executes-man-23-mohsen-shekari-allegedly-stabbing-pro-regime-officer">was executed</a> on December 8 after being found guilty of charges of using a weapon with intent to kill and “enmity against God”. <a href="https://www.amnesty.ie/iran-execution/">Amnesty International</a> called it “a grossly unfair sham trial” with no due process. </p>
<p>Majidreza Rahnavard was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/12/scores-of-executions-feared-in-iran-as-23-year-old-hanged-in-public-execution">publicly hanged</a> on December 12. He was alleged to have killed two members of the paramilitary Basij force. Human rights advocates have resolutely condemned the execution, which took place <a href="https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5634/#:%7E:text=Iran%20Human%20Rights%20(IHRNGO)%3B,23%20days%20after%20his%20arrest">only 23 days after his arrest</a>, as being based on a forced confession. Similarly to Shekari, Rahnavard faced an unfair trial that was fast-tracked and lacked clear due process. </p>
<p>At least 18,000 people have been detained during the current protests. There are some fears of mass executions, raising the spectre of the notorious <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/prisoners/111232-irans-execution-of-protesters-is-a-repeat-of-1988-mass-killings-possible/">1988 mass executions</a> of Iranian political prisoners. The current Iranian president, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/08/irans-1988-mass-executions#five">Ebrahim Raisi</a>, was one of the judiciary officials who oversaw the 1988 executions.</p>
<p>The Islamic Republic shows no sign of relaxing its stranglehold over the country. Yet the broad-based protests have spanned various ethnic and religious communities, as well as across economic classes and geographic regions. The protesters have challenged limits on freedom of expression and civil liberties and have been strongly supported by Iran’s actors, musicians and athletes who have been among those arrested, imprisoned and tortured. This public dissent by well known public figures has had amplifying effects across Iran and internationally.</p>
<h2>Celebrity stances</h2>
<p>Rappers Toomaj Salehi and Saman Yasin <a href="https://pen.org/press-release/iran-steps-up-repression-of-rights-with-harsh-prison-sentences-for-writers-and-artists-and-reported-torture-and-abuse-in-custody/">were arrested</a> in October for online performances in support of the protesters. Toomaj Salehi articulated his criticism with the following lyrics:</p>
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<p>Someone’s crime was dancing with her hair in the wind.<br>
Someone’s crime was that he or she was brave and criticised…<br>
44 years of your government is the year of failure. </p>
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<p>Shervin Hajipour’s song <a href="https://youtu.be/z8xXiqyfBg0">Baraye (Because of…)</a> has also become part of the protest soundscape <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJb3uc1D1D8">reaching far beyond Iran</a>. Baraye has been covered by various international artists, including Coldplay in a performance with Iranian actor Golshifteh Farahani.</p>
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<p>In the world of film, Taraneh Alidoosti, award-winning Iranian actor, published a photo of herself <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63578923">without a headscarf</a>, holding a sign with the protest slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”. The photo was published on Alidoosti’s Instagram account, which has a following of eight million people. Other Iranian actors have engaged in similar acts of dissent. </p>
<p>Rakhshan Bani Etemad, the renowned Iranian director, posted a video of herself without a headscarf on social media in which she spoke out against the regime’s violence, and particularly lamented the death of nine-year-old <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/18/iran-protests-izeh-kian-pirfalak/">Kian Pirfalak</a>, who was killed when regime security forces opened fire on the car in which he was a passenger. </p>
<p>A group of prominent members of Iran’s theatre arts community also <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202211301557">issued a statement</a> on Instagram in which they announced that they “will not participate in or watch performances where women were subjected to compulsory hijab”.</p>
<p>The Committee to Follow Up on the Situation of Arrested Artists, a nongovernmental effort dedicated to <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202212043679">tracking the arrest and detention of artists</a>, says at least 150 figures from cinema and stage “have been summoned, arrested, accused, banned from leaving the country or persecuted” since the start of the protests. </p>
<p>Sports personalities and national sports teams have also had significant public reach during the protests. Elnaz Rekabi competed in an international sport climbing competition in South Korea without wearing a headscarf. She was welcomed home by crowds at the airport in a show of support. But she was later forced to make a public statement disowning the act and explaining it as an accident. It has since been reported that she has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/21/iranian-climber-elnaz-rekabi-reportedly-under-house-arrest">placed under house arrest</a>. It was also reported that her family home <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-63847173">was demolished</a> by government officials. </p>
<p>Similarly, Iranian archer, Parmida Ghasemi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-archer-joins-athletes-support-protests-2022-11-11/">removed her headscarf</a> in Iran only to be forced to recant and apologise for the action. Fasiha Radmanesh, who won bronze at an international Muay Thai martial arts competition in Turkey, accepted her medal at the awards ceremony having written out “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom) in black ink <a href="https://twitter.com/drninaansary/status/1600189695610191872?s=20&t=d9Vr-i158vbmWfxurzKz7w">across her forehead and cheeks</a>.</p>
<p>A number of Iranian sports teams, including the men’s national beach football team, men’s national basketball team, men’s national sitting vollyball team, and men’s national water polo team, have refused to sing the national anthem as a show of solidarity with protesters.</p>
<p>The men’s national football team initially followed suit in their first match of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In their match against England the team stood silent when the anthem was played. They had previously faced fierce criticism for meeting with Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi before departing for Qatar. </p>
<p>However, it was reported that after the game <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/28/football/iran-soccer-family-threats-intl-spt/index.html">they were summoned to meet</a> with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and that the families of team members were threatened with imprisonment and torture. They sang the anthem at subsequent games.</p>
<p>The head of the Political and Ideological Office of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Ali Saeedi Shahroudi, has <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202210107952">called for</a> stricter state control over the behaviour of musicians, actors and sports stars.</p>
<p>The protests continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> </span></em></p>The protesters have been strongly supported by Iran’s actors, musicians and athletes who have been among those arrested, imprisoned and tortured.Roja Fazaeli, Associate Professor Islamic Civilisation, Near & Middle Eastern Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1960232022-12-08T13:31:52Z2022-12-08T13:31:52ZWho are Iran’s morality police? A scholar of the Middle East explains their history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499666/original/file-20221207-25-m2zdo5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=89%2C0%2C4861%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protestors are pressing the Iranian regime for changes since the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TurkeyIranProtest/d9ae2b7e51934fa2adc8d553e095e291/photo?Query=mahsa%20amini%20iran&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=554&currentItemNo=157">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Until recently, most people outside of Iran had never heard of the country’s morality police, let alone followed their wider role in the region. But on Sept. 16, 2022, the death of Jina Mahsa Amini <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/16/iranian-woman-dies-after-moral-polices-detention-reports">sparked widespread protests</a> in the streets of Iran and elsewhere that have shown no signs of abating. Amini had been in the custody of Gasht-e-Ershad, the Persian name of this notorious police force, for “improper wearing of hijab.”</p>
<p>On Dec. 4, reports citing <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/05/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">Iran’s Attorney General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri</a> suggested that the morality police had been abolished. Montazeri said that the morality police lacked judiciary power and that hijab <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/04/middleeast/iran-hijab-law-under-review-intl/index.html">laws were under review</a>, which led to widespread speculation about whether the regime was trying to find a way forward. </p>
<p>Yet, there were those who doubted the comments and called it a “false flag” on the part of those in power. A <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/12/06/iran-morality-police-abolished-hijab/">few noted that even if the morality police</a> were abolished and the mandatory wearing of the hijab repealed, the regime would still need to be held accountable for all of its human rights violations. </p>
<p>These sentiments have formed the basis of <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202212052265">a three-day nationwide strike</a> that began on Dec. 5 and has shuttered thousands of shops, including those in the historic Grand Bazaar in the heart of Tehran, bringing the economy of the country to a grinding halt. </p>
<p>But who are the morality police? Where did they come from? And what is their history during and before the Islamic Republic of Iran? </p>
<h2>A vice squad in context</h2>
<p>The mandate and power of morality police date back to before the Islamic Revolution that shook Iran in 1979, and their reach has extended throughout the Middle East. </p>
<p>The Quran says that it is imperative that religious leaders “<a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/09/26/who-are-irans-hated-morality-police?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=Cj0KCQiA7bucBhCeARIsAIOwr-9ss672dmAmOubJUK8cfBd-COZDQcHn2oAQSSxpeCm_HDaJkuoiq8caAoDdEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds">ensure right and forbid wrong</a>.” To carry this out, beginning at the time of the Prophet Mohammad, public morals were overseen by market inspectors referred <a href="https://islamicmarkets.com/dictionary/a/al-muhtasib">to as muhtasib</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.pardismahdavi.com/">a scholar of gender and feminism</a> in the Middle East, I’ve studied the long history of debates about the role of Islam in regulating morality. The earliest evidence of a muhtasib, interestingly, was a woman selected in Medina by the prophet himself. </p>
<p>Over the centuries, the mandate of the muhtasib became focused on regulating dress, particularly for women. While these market inspectors were recorded as issuing fines and occasional lashings, they did not have the same <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/argument/the-dubious-roots-of-religious-police-in-islam/">level of authority as the judiciary</a>. </p>
<p>By the early 20th century, however, the muhtasibs had transitioned into the vice squads, patrolling the streets to make sure people were complying with Islamic values. It was mostly in Saudi Arabia under the influence of Wahhabism that morality police forces first gained prominence and momentum. <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1053195.pdf">The first modern morality police force</a>, an official committee charged with “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” was formed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1926. Comprised mostly of men, the force was charged with enforcing modest dress, regulating heterosocializing – engagement with members of the opposite sex if unmarried or unrelated – and ensuring citizens attended prayer.</p>
<p>By 2012, more than one-third of the 56 countries making up The Organization for Islamic Cooperation <a href="https://themedialine.org/news/iran-is-not-the-only-country-with-morality-police/">had some form of religiously informed </a> squadrons seeking to uphold right and forbid wrong as interpreted by Islamists in power. </p>
<h2>A committee to enact revolution</h2>
<p>In Iran, the morality police first appeared in the form of what was called the “<a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100041983">Islamic Revolution Committee</a>” following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite cleric who led the revolution, wanted to control the behavior of Iranian citizens after too many years of what he and his fellow Islamists called a period of “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/162924">secular Westoxication</a>.” </p>
<p>The Islamic Revolution Committee, called “Komiteh” by many Iranians, was merged in the 1980s with the <a href="https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gendarmerie">Gendarmerie</a>, the first rural police force overseeing modern highways, to form the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1983, when mandatory veiling laws were passed, the Komiteh was tasked with ensuring these laws were upheld in addition to their other duties of ensuring right and forbidding wrong. </p>
<h2>A changing time</h2>
<p>The current morality police – the Guidance Patrol or Gasht-e-Ershad – were given formal standing as an arm of the police force by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. </p>
<p>The group had been steadily growing in size since the 1980s, and by 2005 consisted of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36101150">more than 7,000 officers</a>. Women make up less than a quarter of the squadron but frequently accompany their male counterparts, who often arrive in unmarked vans and pour out into the streets in green uniforms. The women, meanwhile, wear black cloaks that cover them from head to toe. </p>
<p>For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the Komiteh was comprised of religiously devout followers of the regime who joined the force at the encouragement of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-irans-morality-police/a-63200711#:%7E:text=%22Gasht%2De%2DErshad%2C,mandatory%20in%20Iran%20in%201983">clerics</a>. However, by the early 2000s, Iran’s population was comprised mostly of young people. When Ahmadinejad made the Komiteh an official police force, a number of young men joined to fulfill their <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/iran/2022/12/05/who-are-irans-morality-police-and-what-do-they-enforce/">mandatory military conscription</a>. This younger generation was more lax than their older counterparts, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=15943">leading to inconsistent patrolling</a>. </p>
<p>When President Ebrahim Raisi came to power in 2021, he emboldened the morality police to engage in <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/10/iran-protests-hijab-mahsa-amini-morality-police-ebrahim-raisi/">harsh crackdowns on the Iranian populace</a>, particularly in the cities. Raisi, like Khomeini and other clerics, used this vice squad to send a message to Iranian citizens that the regime is watching. </p>
<p>This clampdown, particularly when it led to the death of Amini, has been met with outrage by a large number of Iranians. While it is not yet confirmed whether or not the morality police have been disbanded, protesters are continuing to press the regime for change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pardis Mahdavi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Morality police first appeared in Iran soon after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. But similar forces were present in parts of the Middle East even prior to the date.Pardis Mahdavi, Provost and Executive Vice President, University of MontanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1936892022-11-14T13:26:34Z2022-11-14T13:26:34ZThe veil in Iran has been an enduring symbol of patriarchal norms – but its use has changed depending on who is in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494691/original/file-20221110-25-c211vj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=59%2C0%2C3934%2C2658&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In much of the media outside Iran, female protesters not wearing the headscarf have been highlighted as symbols of defiance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranProtests/61ea947c119b40ab8d64c0b1f701fe35/photo?Query=iran%20protest%20woman&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=624&currentItemNo=294">AP Photo/Middle East Images, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In images of the uprising that followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini on Sept. 16, 2022, perhaps the most iconic ones, aside from that of Amini herself, are those of unveiled Iranian women photographed from behind, facing police barricades or raising a fist at the scene of mass protests.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63097629">wide use of images of Iranian female protesters</a>, without the headscarf, in the Western media highlights how the veil can often be seen as the single most important measure of women’s rights and well-being. </p>
<p>Indeed, oftentimes outside of Iran, wearing a veil is seen as oppression – and its removal as emancipation and freedom. This understanding, however, fails to take into account the veil’s broader symbolism and ignores the complex history of mandatory veiling and unveiling in Iran in the 20th and 21st centuries. </p>
<h2>Islamic Republic and the veil</h2>
<p>During the 1979 revolution, veiling became a symbol of resistance to the Pahlavi monarchy that ruled from 1925 to 1979. For many during the revolution, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511815249">veil was a symbol of authentic national identity</a>. It was used to push back against the Westernization and erosion of Iranian values that ignited the revolution.</p>
<p>After the Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, came to power, the veil became compulsory. Since then, certain forms of veiling – such as donning the chador, a cloaklike garment that covers the entire body and is required of women visiting a mosque in Iran – have come to be seen as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/women-and-politics-iran-veiling-unveiling-and-reveiling?format">signaling affiliation with</a> or support for the Islamic Republic. </p>
<p>Less comprehensive forms of veiling, such as a rusari, or head scarf, and the knee-length tunic or coat known as a rupush, are understood as signs of minimum cooperation and potentially a rejection of the norms of the Islamic Republic. These types of veiling allow the wearer to adjust the amount of hair shown and the fit and the length of the tunic. Women accused of “bad hijab,” as Amini was, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/jun/19/iran-morality-police-patrol">typically those adopting this form of veiling</a>. </p>
<p>However, in pre-1979 Iran, wearing the veil did not necessarily mean that a woman was straightforwardly “religious.” Instead, it could <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Anti-Veiling-Campaigns-in-the-Muslim-World-Gender-Modernism-and-the-Politics/Cronin/p/book/9781138687202">signal a variety of other social meanings</a>, such as being conservative, upholding traditional values or an indication of personal modesty, among others. </p>
<h2>Pahlavis and the era of modernization</h2>
<p>Indeed, four decades before the Islamic Republic was established, the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, had forced women to remove their veils through the Mandatory Unveiling Act of 1936. </p>
<p>Pahlavi, who installed himself as king in 1925 after overthrowing the Qajar monarchy, viewed the entry of unveiled women into public spaces as an essential component of modernity, modeled on Western norms. </p>
<p>As a consequence of the 1936 act, women were prohibited from veiling in public. Refusal to comply was met with <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Making-of-Modern-Iran-State-and-Society-under-Riza-Shah-1921-1941/Cronin/p/book/9780415450959">sometimes violent enforcement</a> and removal of the offending garment. While men too were instructed to wear European-style trousers, suits and hats, it was women’s bodies that were at the nexus of these reforms. </p>
<p>Pahlavi’s complex project of modernization included reforms to law and education, and the end of gender segregation of many public spaces. The reforms offered women greater rights and protections should their husbands choose to divorce them, and opened up new educational opportunities. But Pahlavi viewed the presence of unveiled women in public space as essential to signaling these changes. </p>
<p>My book “<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=20296">Burying the Beloved</a>” examines how ideas about women’s personhood and rights were explored during this period by novelists in Iran, particularly through stories about marriage. This era saw the publication both of the first novel by a woman and the first female protagonist in Persian fiction. Novels of this period <a href="https://www.halbanpublishers.com/a-persian-requiem">revealed social anxieties around the legal reforms</a> that gave women larger roles in society and more rights in marriage. </p>
<p>Pahlavi abdicated in 1941, during World War II, and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ascended the throne, adopted a more lenient attitude toward this law. He did not rescind it, but neither did he violently enforce it. At the same time, the modernity his regime promoted was signaled by a cosmopolitan secularism – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/women-and-politics-iran-veiling-unveiling-and-reveiling?format=HB">no veiled woman</a> could hope to advance in the diverse areas of society, politics and economy patronized and controlled by the monarchy during his rule, which lasted until 1979. </p>
<p>Social and familial pressures <a href="https://upf.com/book.asp?id=9780813024714">reigned over women’s veiling</a>, accompanied by changing cultural mores facilitated by virtually wholesale adoption of Western sartorial styles, cinema and other media. </p>
<h2>Dying to show their hair?</h2>
<p>Over the past few weeks, I have repeatedly seen comments on news articles that insist, “Women in Iran are literally dying to show their hair!” But a rejection of the head scarf in the context of these protests is not a simple demand for one personal freedom.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1572596744973881344"}"></div></p>
<p>Instead, it should be understood as a rejection of many things. Protesters in Iran are pushing back against an oppressive regime that has refused to brook any dissent and has destroyed voices for reform through imprisonment, exile or death. They are also pushing back against a long history of laws, beginning before the 1979 Revolution, that have used women’s bodies as symbols of political ideology. </p>
<p>The veil that is being removed is therefore not an insistence only on the right to personal freedom and expression – though it may be that for some who are removing it – but also a rejection of patriarchal norms that have animated both the pre-revolutionary regime and the Islamic Republic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Motlagh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The veil as a symbol of oppression has once again moved to center stage in Iran, but it’s important to know about the history of veiling – and mandatory unveiling.Amy Motlagh, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Middle Eastern/South Asian Studies, University of California, DavisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1914632022-09-29T12:31:54Z2022-09-29T12:31:54ZIranian women have been rebelling against restrictions since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 – with renewed hope that protests this time will end differently<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486891/original/file-20220927-26-aw4f6d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C37%2C4967%2C3274&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women holding up photographs of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini during a demonstration in Arbil, the capital of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region, on Sept. 24, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-hold-up-signs-depicting-the-image-of-22-year-old-news-photo/1243470122?adppopup=true">Safin Hamed/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Shouts of “death to the dictator” and “woman, life, freedom” are reverberating throughout the streets of Iran <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/23/europe/iran-protest-mahsa-amini-families-morality-police-hnk-intl-cmd/index.html">following</a> the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old woman, while in custody of the “morality police” in Tehran. </p>
<p>These protests have echoes from past resistance movements. For the past two decades <a href="https://www.pardismahdavi.com/">I have been studying gender and sexual politics</a> in post-revolutionary Iran through on-the-ground ethnographic fieldwork. For some 40 years following the Feb. 11, 1979, Iranian Revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini came to power <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution">and overthrew</a> the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, people have been rising up against the brutality of the regime in both urban and rural areas.</p>
<p>Today, these protests have been gaining increased momentum and international attention, giving many Iranians inside and outside of Iran some glimmers of hope.</p>
<h2>Islamists’ resistance to westernization</h2>
<p>Support for the Revolution grew out of many <a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-iranian-revolution-100453">Iranians’ desire to bring equality and democracy to Iran</a>. They criticized the monarchy as being overly deferential to the United States and were frustrated with increasing gaps between rich and poor. </p>
<p>The Islamists were most critical of westernization, which they saw as violating Islamic tenets and leading Iranians morally astray. They vowed to return Iran to Iranians and to re-center Iranian culture. </p>
<p>To do so, the Islamist regime juxtaposed its rule with everything that it believed to be wrong about “the West.” At the top of the list of critiques was what the regime viewed as loose morals. These <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sexual-politics-in-modern-iran/FE45625E63204DFBF52B982BF090F9D6">loose morals were exemplified</a> in the consumption of alcohol and women’s wearing miniskirts and heavy makeup and flaunting their hair and curves of their bodies in public. </p>
<p>As Khomeini ushered in the Islamists to power, <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/09/26/who-are-irans-hated-morality-police">a new era of austerity was born</a>. Khomeini replaced the shah’s brutal police squad, SAVAK, with an equally if not more brutal Revolutionary Guard and created a new unit referred to as the “morality police.” </p>
<p>This era is perhaps best exemplified in the Khomeini <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/13/world/teheran-journal-who-says-there-s-no-fun-in-an-islamic-republic.html">quote that was painted across buildings and billboards in Tehran</a>: “The Islamic Republic is not about fun, it is about morality. There is no fun to be had in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” </p>
<h2>Controlling women’s fertility</h2>
<p>Alongside the changes at home, Khomeini also engaged the country <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/10/09/how-the-iran-iraq-war-will-shape-the-region-for-decades-to-come/">in a decadelong war with its neighbor Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>Worried about the rising death toll coming out of the Iranian Revolution, combined with increasing numbers of soldiers needed for the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamists realized that <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.218.3630&rep=rep1&type=pdf">they would need to increase their population</a> quickly, according to demographic researchers. Thus, in the 1980s Khomeini instituted a series of <a href="https://www.earth-policy.org/mobile/releases/update124">policies in Iran</a> to encourage families to have more children. </p>
<p>As a result, the birth rate in Iran in the 1980s swelled to an average of 3.5 children per family, up 30% from the prior decade. </p>
<p>A decade later, the Islamists realized that the population boom would need government support. Infrastructure would have to be strengthened and jobs created. The government did a complete turnaround and replaced its policy <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=15943">with family planning messages</a> broadcast on the radio and television encouraging families to have fewer children. Sex education courses and free family planning resources were required for all couples who wished to be married. By 1994 the number of women using family planning was up <a href="https://www.earth-policy.org/mobile/releases/update124">30% from 1989</a>.</p>
<p>When the new millennium was ushered in, fully <a href="https://www.earth-policy.org/mobile/releases/update124">two-thirds of the country’s population was under the age of 21</a>. These young people were born into the Islamic Republic of Iran that Khomeini and the Islamists had created: Women were told to wear long black cloaks from head to toe, covering every inch and curve of their bodies; the most brutal people were members of the morality police, watching every move and any strands of hair that escaped covering. If young people were found holding hands, attending a party or reading a book, <a href="https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/azadeh-moaveni/lipstick-jihad/9781586485498/">they were deemed immoral</a> by the whims of a mercurial regime. </p>
<p>This generation had never known the supposed opulence of the monarchy. And as its members became more frustrated and more educated, the <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Soul_of_Iran_A_Nation_s_Struggle_for.html?id=Za59PAytkFwC">critiques of Iran’s past drilled into them by the Islamists made less sense</a>. </p>
<h2>Challenging the morality police</h2>
<p>Mohammad Khatami, who took over as president in August 1997, sought to harmonize Islamic rule with the needs of a changing population and a modernizing world. </p>
<p>Young people, who formed the majority of the population, had found their voice. They began challenging the morality police by pushing their headscarves back millimeter by millimeter, holding hands in public and organizing spontaneous street gatherings. </p>
<p>Between 2000 and 2007, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the cities of Tehran, Shiraz, Esfahan and Mashad, following what young people referred to as <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=15943">Iran’s Sexual Revolution</a>. The resisters demanded a more democratic regime focused on solving issues like unemployment and infrastructure challenges rather than on policing their bodies. During my research in Iran on sexual and social movements, I also had several run-ins with the morality police and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/26/iran-morality-police-protests/">experienced their brutality firsthand</a>. </p>
<p>These young people’s revolution was fought through the language of morality using their bodies, their choices in outerwear, makeup and hairstyles. They defied the morality police by sliding their headscarves back, wearing layers of makeup and eye-catching outerwear, dancing in the streets and holding hands or kissing in public. </p>
<p>The government responded by cracking down and <a href="https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38923">tightening its grip on the moral behavior of young people</a>. Increased raids and public floggings were meant to send a strong message. But young people persisted in their resistance.</p>
<p>In 2005, when conservative candidate <a href="https://worldleaders.columbia.edu/directory/mahmoud-ahmadinejad">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</a> was elected president, the sexual revolution came under heightened threat. </p>
<p>Unlike his predecessor, Ahmadinejad had no interest in finding ways to work with the growing youth population of Iran or in more progressive interpretations of Islam. He ordered the morality police to crack down on young people, raiding homes and parties and arresting women on the streets who dared to violate Islamist rules. Public floggings increased, as did arrests of scholars, feminists and journalists. The conservatives wanted to send a message.</p>
<p>The emboldened young revolutionaries continued pushing for change. These movements came to a head in 2009 when, <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/green-movement">despite not receiving the popular vote</a>, Ahmadinejad was reelected as president. </p>
<p>Led by the same young people who resisted the morality police during the sexual revolution, a new movement was born in the immediate aftermath of the 2009 elections. This was called the “Sabze,” or <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-14/irans-green-movement-never-went-away">Green Movement</a>. People took to the streets of Iran chanting “where is my vote?” and “not my president.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Candles lit before the photograph of a young woman in a headscarf." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486892/original/file-20220927-12-dnf9ou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian sporting a green ribbon on her arm lights a candle in front of a picture of Neda Agha-Soltan, a young Iranian woman who was killed in 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-iranian-sporting-a-green-ribbon-on-her-arm-lights-a-news-photo/88693049?adppopup=true">Marwan Naamani/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A catalyzing moment for this movement was the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/world/middleeast/23neda.html">chilling murder of Neda Agha-Soltan</a>. She was killed in June 2009 simply for being at one of demonstrations where one of the bloodiest clashes between protesters, the Revolutionary Guard and the morality police took place. Her death was captured on film and shared with the world. </p>
<p>On the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution in 2019, the streets of Iran were once again filled with resisters, many of whom had participated in street protests since the early 2000s. These same children of the revolution and Iran-Iraq war organized efforts such as <a href="https://www.mystealthyfreedom.org/">#MyStealthyFreedom</a> that featured women photographing themselves without headscarves in public in Iran and joining the global #MeToo movement. </p>
<h2>Demanding accountability</h2>
<p>By 2019 disenchantment with the regime had spread from the highly educated young people in the urban centers to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">even many of the most religiously devout families</a> in some rural areas who had been previous supporters of the regime. </p>
<p>Iranians of all backgrounds facing rising oil prices and unemployment as a result of years of sanctions were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/17/iran-no-justice-bloody-2019-crackdown">increasingly losing faith</a> in their government. Many no longer subscribed to the rhetoric about restoring moral order.</p>
<p>Today’s street protests are taking place <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/world/middleeast/iran-protests.html">in more than 50 cities throughout the country and have drawn the attention and support</a> of the international community. These protests are both a refrain of past protests as well as a renewal of courage and hope. </p>
<p>As in the past, since Sept. 16, 2022, activists are taking to the streets to challenge a regime steeped in a rhetoric of harshly interpreted morality rather than governing with the best intentions of the people. And as in the protests of 2009 and 2019, they are calling for accountability of the government’s shortcomings, as well as highlighting the poverty that rages throughout the country – along with the pain of the people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pardis Mahdavi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Iranian politics explains how Iranians have organized resistance movements for the past several decades while risking arrest and public flogging.Pardis Mahdavi, Provost and Executive Vice President, University of MontanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1888662022-08-17T12:37:59Z2022-08-17T12:37:59ZWhat is a fatwa? A religious studies professor explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479460/original/file-20220816-8518-xwbzmh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C35%2C5892%2C3925&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather at a vigil pray and observe a moment of silence after an attack on author Salman Rushdie on Aug. 12, 2022, in Chautauqua, New York.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SalmanRushdieAssault/5cbb84f6d2614f56bfa5ee526781bc60/photo?Query=salman%20rushdie&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=394&currentItemNo=25">AP Photo/Joshua Goodman</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When news broke on August 12, 2022, that the writer Salman Rushdie had been attacked, many people immediately recalled the fatwa, or edict, <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/fatwa-against-salman-rushdie">calling on all Muslims to take his life</a>, issued in 1989 by the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s Supreme Leader at the time. Khomeini <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-salman-rushdies-the-satanic-verses-remains-so-controversial-decades-after-its-publication-102321">accused</a> Rushdie’s 1988 novel, “<a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Satanic_Verses.html?id=k9wtA1He7e8C&redir_esc=y">The Satanic Verses</a>,” of insulting Islam and blaspheming against the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
<p>Violent riots and credible death threats sent Rushdie into hiding, and he spent the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/feb/24/rushdie-planning-book-time-in-hiding">next nine years</a> under British police protection. He did not emerge again until 1998, after Iran promised it would <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-feb-28-mn-12499-story.html">not enforce</a> the fatwa, though it did not rescind it. </p>
<p>According to several <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/88qxvz/salman-rushdie-hadi-matar-revolutionary-guard">intelligence sources</a> quoted by Vice news, Rushdie’s 24-year old alleged attacker, Hadi Matar, had been in contact through social media with members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the military branch tasked with protecting the country’s Islamic political system. However, there is no clear evidence that Iran was involved. Whether Matar was inspired by the decades-old fatwa remains a matter of speculation.</p>
<p>Given wide media coverage of the fatwa against Rushdie, some may conclude that a fatwa always means a death sentence.</p>
<p>However, a fatwa rarely calls for death, can be issued by a variety of religious authorities and is mostly of interest to a particular Muslim individual or community. My explanation of fatwas is based on expertise developed over several years of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rlSQbsAAAAAJ&hl=en">researching the writings of a Pakistani Muslim theologian</a> and on my collaborative academic work with scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. </p>
<h2>What is a fatwa?</h2>
<p>The Arabic word <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/fatwa">fatwa</a> can mean “explanation” or “clarification.” It refers, in simple terms, to an edict or ruling by a recognized religious authority on a point of Islamic law. The process of issuing a fatwa usually begins when a Muslim, confronted with a problem of life, belief or law, is unsure what to do.</p>
<p>Let’s say, for example, that a Muslim man wonders whether he should accept the teaching position he has been offered at a religious school or continue working in his father-in-law’s better-paying commercial enterprise. Faced with such a question, the man may turn to a recognized religious authority to request an expert ruling, or fatwa, on the matter. </p>
<p>In general, Muslims solicit fatwas <a href="https://books.google.fr/books/about/The_World_of_Fatwas_Or_The_Shariah_in_Ac.html?id=I1ExAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">when in doubt</a> regarding some point of conduct or when entangled in a dispute because they wish to avoid deviating from God’s dictates. They may believe that straying from the path of righteous conduct could jeopardize their entry into heaven. For them, the stakes are high.</p>
<h2>Who issues a fatwa?</h2>
<p>When seeking a fatwa, a Muslim can turn to a local cleric or a group of Islamic law scholars – <a href="https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/ulama">ulama</a> – who collaborate to render decisions, or to a trusted institution of religious learning.</p>
<p>Given the subjects that fatwas must address – matters ranging from personal hygiene, marital relations, inheritance law, lifestyle, or allegiance owed to one’s nation – an encyclopedic knowledge of Islamic law is required, including familiarity with fatwas that have already been issued.</p>
<p>India’s influential Islamic seminary, <a href="https://darululoom-deoband.com/en/">Darul Uloom in Deoband</a>, which adheres to its own <a href="https://theconversation.com/talibans-religious-ideology-deobandi-islam-has-roots-in-colonial-india-166323">Deobandi version</a> of jurisprudence, has issued enough fatwas to fill 12 volumes. One <a href="https://books.google.fr/books/about/The_World_of_Fatwas_Or_The_Shariah_in_Ac.html?id=I1ExAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">scholar compares</a> reading these volumes to reading the proceedings of the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>
<h2>Why are fatwas needed?</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An Islamic manuscript etched with a floral margin and etched predominantly in gold, blue and pink colors." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479482/original/file-20220816-2827-dipc7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shiite fatwas from the late 17th century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatwa#/media/File:Tazkarat_al-Fuqaha.jpg">The British Library via Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Why don’t Muslims simply consult the Quran for answers to religious questions? The simple answer is that the Quran is silent on certain issues. Moreover, different interpretations of various passages are possible – how can a believer decide which reading is correct?</p>
<p>While the Prophet Muhammad was alive, he could settle such questions. After his death, Muslims turned to members of his family and inner circle for assistance. Forward-looking followers gathered <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/mideo/2721">accounts</a> of the Prophet’s sayings and way of life, noting the provenance and trustworthiness of these reports.</p>
<p>Several collections of these accounts, called <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Hadith.html?id=iZGeSenYA3QC&redir_esc=y">hadith</a>, are held in such high esteem that they are shared across many Muslim communities. Because they record the sayings and doings of the Prophet, these collections are nearly as important as the Quran itself in providing guidance for daily life. Sharia law and Islamic jurisprudence draw on hadith.</p>
<p>And yet, despite the availability of resources like the Quran, hadith and law books, quandaries arise in daily life for which none of these provide clear guidance. When this happens, a fatwa may be requested. In a sense, <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/assr/23312">fatwas offer a picture</a> of the projects, wants and fears of Muslim individuals and communities.</p>
<p>Islam is composed of diverse branches and communities; it has no overarching institutional structure or single recognized leader. Because of this, divergent religious rulings are possible. As such, fatwas can either serve to preserve traditionalist readings of Islam’s sacred texts or to open the door to reformist interpretations.</p>
<p>Fatwas are <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/fatwa">nonbinding</a>. Muslims are not required to follow their guidance. The force of a fatwa derives from the authority, trust and respect accorded to the clerics, scholars or institutions who issue them. With this authority comes the power to shape the religious and social norms of the fatwa-requesting community. Like anyone in a position of power, issuers of fatwas can use or <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/10/india.randeepramesh">misuse their authority</a> to hand down rulings meant to achieve political ends. </p>
<h2>The range of fatwas</h2>
<p>While fatwas often begin with a request by a Muslim layperson, they may be issued in response to a given situation. Examples include the fatwa issued by Dar al-Ulum Deoband in 2010 <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/deoband-first-a-fatwa-against-terror/articleshow/3089161.cms">against terrorist organizations</a> like the Islamic State because they were judged to be not Islamic; and the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Council of Ulama in 2014 against <a href="https://jliflc.com/resources/fatwa-the-indonesian-council-of-ulama-protection-of-endangered-species-to-maintain-the-balances-ecosystems/">poaching</a> and the illegal wildlife trade. Rare are the fatwas like the one against Rushdie that call on Muslims <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/51219918/The-fatwa-of-Shaykh-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-against-Gaddafi">to kill</a> a particular individual. But for now, the fatwa against Rushdie stands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The attack on Salman Rushdie promptly led to speculation on whether the attacker had been influenced by the 1989 fatwa against the author. A scholar explains what a fatwa is, and isn’t.Myriam Renaud, Affiliated Faculty of Bioethics, Religion, and Society, Department of Religious Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1887562022-08-16T15:05:03Z2022-08-16T15:05:03ZSalman Rushdie attack: the legacy of the decades-old fatwa on the author, explained<p>In 1989, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who led the Islamic revolution in Iran ten years earlier, issued a fatwa – a religious edict – calling for the death of author Salman Rushdie. More than three decades later, at a literary event in New York state, a man who was not yet born when the fatwa was decreed is accused of stabbing the author.</p>
<p>The bounty on Rushdie’s head never went away, though the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13530194.2011.581819">Iranian government</a> did temporarily retreat from it in 1998. Still, 33 years have passed since the original tumult. Few would have predicted that the fatwa would find a willing taker in 2022. </p>
<p>Yet the political legacy of the edict was significant. To understand that, it’s important to see the fatwa in its historical context.</p>
<p>Many Muslims viewed Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses as blasphemous, depicting the Prophet of Islam as being without scruples, and using the names of his wives for characters who played prostitutes. Muslims believe that Muhammad is <em>insan-al-kamil</em> – the complete human being, and the only one who has attained perfection. The original death sentence was not just against Rushdie, but also his publishers who “were aware of [the book’s] contents” and still went on to publish it. </p>
<p>Islamic law stipulates that a fatwa is valid only under the jurisdiction of a Muslim leader and where Sharia law applies. And Rushdie was neither an Iranian citizen nor in Iran at the time of the ruling.</p>
<p>Khomeini’s fatwa, however, was not circumscribed by political boundaries or international relations – it called on all Muslims to kill Rushdie. The fatwa effectively made the whole world Khomeini’s personal polity. </p>
<p>This was significant because it usurped Saudi Arabia’s position as the central focus of the Muslim world. Theological differences pervade the Iran-Saudi Arabia relationship. The majority of Muslims in Saudi Arabia are Sunnis while Iran has a Shia majority. And both countries have ambitions for regional dominance. </p>
<p>Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are also important in understanding the timing of the fatwa. In early 1989, it was apparent that Afghan insurgents backed by Saudi Arabia and the US were on the brink of victory against Afghanistan’s government and the Soviet troops that were supporting it. The USSR withdrew from the country on February 15 1989. But the fatwa, issued just a day earlier, took the limelight. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-03-14-mn-681-story.html">Saudi Arabia opposed the edict</a> and attempted to work with other Muslim leaders to stop Khomeini using the episode to set himself up as the chief guardian and defender of Muslims and the Islamic world. However, the fatwa propelled The Satanic Verses and Rushdie’s alleged blasphemy into the international spotlight. </p>
<p>Footage even emerged of Muslims burning copies in front of the town hall in the British city of Bradford. For Iran, this was proof that religious leadership could transcend national boundaries, and a political ummah, or Muslim nation, was possible.</p>
<p>Ayatollah Khomeini died a few months after issuing the death sentence on Rushdie, but subsequent Iranian administrations have reaffirmed the fatwa. A brief reprieve by pro-reform government of President Mohammad Khatami in 1998 was followed by hardliners upholding the legitimacy of the fatwa, even increasing the bounty to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rushdie-idUSKCN0VV1TI">US$3.3 million (£2.7 million) in 2012</a>.</p>
<p>It is not clear what connection Hadi Matar, the 24-year-old man now charged with the attempted murder of Salman Rushdie, might have had to the wishes of a now-dead leader vying for power in the Muslim world. Iran has officially denied links with the alleged attacker, who was born and raised in the US in a Lebanese family. His social media accounts allegedly show sympathies with the Iranian state, though it is believed he acted alone.</p>
<p>Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-rushdie-supporters-blame-his-attack-2022-08-15/">Nasser Kanaani</a> said that “no-one has the right to accuse Iran”, and that Rushdie and his supporters are to blame for the attack. Today, as in 1989, the fatwa against Rushdie illustrates the deep disconnect between Iran and much of the rest of the world, most recently seen in the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51001167">efforts to build nuclear weapons</a> against the wishes of the international community.</p>
<h2>Free speech and diaspora Muslims</h2>
<p>The longest-lasting legacy of the fatwa has been as a symbol of the threat to free speech – considered a fundamental right in the west. At the time, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9jK9LnwmaAgC&lpg=PA45&ots=2WljzmCmwm&dq=margaret%20thatcher%20It%20is%20an%20essential%20part%20of%20our%20democratic%20system%20that%20people%20who%20act%20within%20the%20law%20should%20be%20able%20to%20express%20their%20opinions%20freely&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q=margaret%20thatcher%20It%20is%20an%20essential%20part%20of%20our%20democratic%20system%20that%20people%20who%20act%20within%20the%20law%20should%20be%20able%20to%20express%20their%20opinions%20freely&f=false">was clear</a> on this: “It is an essential part of our democratic system that people who act within the law should be able to express their opinions freely”. Several other writers and translators with links to Rushdie have been <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/fatwa-author-salman-rushdie-led-30-years-terror/story?id=88355931">attacked or killed</a> over the years.</p>
<p>But for some in the Muslim world, freedom of speech should not give licence to attack the fundamentals of faith. It is because of this that the fatwa and its aftermath have also had a <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137275165">lasting impact</a> on migrant identities in the the UK and Europe.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/salman-rushdies-attack-was-an-assault-on-free-speech-but-not-a-clash-of-civilisations-188709">Salman Rushdie’s attack was an assault on free speech – but not a clash of civilisations</a>
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<p>After the second world war, large numbers of Muslims settled in urban areas, and debates about the compatibility of Muslims in the west gained traction. While many Muslims did not agree with Khomeini’s fatwa or the book burnings, the Rushdie affair contributed to turning diaspora Muslims into a self-conscious group, who knew that others viewed them through the lens of religion.</p>
<p>In the 33 years since it was issued, the fatwa has continued to be used as evidence by those who view Islam and the west as being fundamentally distinct civilisations, with an ever-present potential for violent confrontation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188756/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parveen Akhtar has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy. </span></em></p>The fatwa against Salman Rushdie has political significance beyond the threat to free speech.Parveen Akhtar, Senior Lecturer: Politics, History and International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298442020-01-16T18:38:26Z2020-01-16T18:38:26ZUS and Iran have a long, troubled history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310315/original/file-20200115-134764-71x1uk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C233%2C6490%2C2841&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-flag-iranian-political-map-shape-1610522878">Benny Marty/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Relations between the United States and Iran have been fraught for decades – at least since the U.S. helped overthrow a democracy-minded prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in August 1953. The U.S. then supported the long, repressive reign of the shah of Iran, whose security services brutalized Iranian citizens for decades.</p>
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<p>The two countries have been particularly hostile to each other since Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, resulting in, among other consequences, <a href="https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/">economic sanctions</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-countries-in-conflict-like-iran-and-the-us-still-talk-to-each-other-129591">severing of formal diplomatic relations</a> between the nations. Since 1984, the U.S. State Department has listed Iran as a “<a href="https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/">state sponsor of terrorism</a>,” alleging the Iranian government provides terrorists with <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm">training, money and weapons</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the major events in U.S.-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others arguably presented real opportunities for reconciliation.</p>
<iframe src="https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1lbZCBLjB3WGNLuiO7_pUiMfahVbpzoJTU-Wkqh_DWG0&font=Default&lang=en&initial_zoom=1&height=650" width="100%" height="650" webkitallowfullscreen="" mozallowfullscreen="" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0"></iframe>
<h2>1953: US overthows Mossadegh</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310082/original/file-20200114-151825-1buge0n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1037&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mohammed Mossadegh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohammed_Mossadegh_in_middle_age.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1951, the Iranian Parliament chose a new prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, who then led lawmakers to vote in favor of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-and-iran-the-forgotten-history">taking over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company</a>, expelling the company’s British owners and saying they wanted to turn oil profits into investments in the Iranian people. The U.S. feared disruption in the global oil supply and worried about Iran falling prey to Soviet influence. The British feared the loss of cheap Iranian oil. </p>
<p>Unable to settle the dispute, President Dwight Eisenhower decided it was best for the U.S. and the U.K. to get rid of Mossadegh. Operation Ajax, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/world/secrets-history-cia-iran-special-report-plot-convulsed-iran-53-79.html">a joint CIA-British operation</a>, convinced the shah of Iran, the country’s monarch, to dismiss Mossadegh and drive him from office by force. Mossadegh was replaced by a much more Western-friendly prime minister, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html?_r=0">hand-picked by the CIA</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310071/original/file-20200114-151844-12qrf5n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Demonstrators in Tehran demand the establishment of an Islamic Republic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-International-News-IRAN-/7598c27645984aa982d79f639e2b9986/18/0">AP Photo/Saris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1979: Revolutionaries oust the shah, take hostages</h2>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theperspective.com/subjective-timeline/politics/us-iran-relations-ww2-hostage-crisis/">more than 25 years</a> of relative stability in U.S.-Iran relations, the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-politics-revolution/29752729.html">Iranian public had grown unhappy</a> with the social and economic conditions that developed under the dictatorial rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. </p>
<p>Pahlavi enriched himself and used American aid to fund the military while many Iranians lived in poverty. Dissent was often violently quashed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/09/savak-a-feared-and-pervasive-force/ad609959-d47b-4b7f-8c8d-b388116df90c/">SAVAK, the shah’s security service</a>. In January 1979, <a href="https://apnews.com/343d87fdb960424e9ec0f4a90dc64fcb">the shah left Iran</a>, ostensibly to seek cancer treatment. <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ayatollah-khomeini-returns-to-iran">Two weeks later, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile</a> in Iraq and led a drive to abolish the monarchy and proclaim an Islamic government.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310075/original/file-20200114-151834-l4t7a7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian students at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran show a blindfolded American hostage to the crowd in November 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Hostage-Crisis-Timeline/298028f123e3417bad960911275bd097/41/0">AP Photo, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In October 1979, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/17/magazine/why-carter-admitted-the-shah.html">President Jimmy Carter agreed to allow the shah</a> to come to the U.S. to seek advanced medical treatment. Outraged Iranian students <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/05/archives/teheran-students-seize-us-embassy-and-hold-hostages-ask-shahs.html">stormed the U.S. Embassy</a> in Tehran on Nov. 4, taking 52 Americans hostage. That convinced Carter to sever U.S. diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980. </p>
<p>Two weeks later, the U.S. military launched a mission to rescue the hostages, but <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/">it failed, with aircraft crashes in the Iranian desert</a> killing eight U.S. servicemembers.</p>
<p>The shah died in Egypt in July 1980, but the hostages weren’t released until Jan. 20, 1981, after 444 days of captivity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310079/original/file-20200114-151839-1toy017.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian cleric, left, and an Iranian soldier wear gas masks to protect themselves against Iraqi chemical-weapons attacks in May 1988.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-iranian-clergyman-wearing-a-turban-and-gas-mask-stands-news-photo/104045722">Kaveh Kazemi/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1980-1988: US tacitly sides with Iraq</h2>
<p>In September 1980, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm">Iraq invaded Iran</a>, an escalation of the two countries’ regional rivalry and religious differences: Iraq was governed by Sunni Muslims but had a Shia Muslim majority population; <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/">Iran was led and populated mostly by Shiites</a>. </p>
<p>The U.S. was concerned that the conflict would limit the flow of Middle Eastern oil and wanted to ensure the conflict didn’t affect its close ally, Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/">supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein</a> in his fight against the anti-American Iranian regime. As a result, the U.S. mostly turned a blind eye toward Iraq’s <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq24.pdf">“almost daily” use of chemical weapons</a> against Iran. </p>
<p>U.S. officials moderated their usual opposition to those illegal and inhumane weapons because the U.S. State Department did not “<a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf">wish to play into Iran’s hands</a> by fueling its propaganda against Iraq.” In 1988, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/iran-iraq-war">the war ended in a stalemate</a>, with a combined total of more than 500,000 military deaths and 100,000 civilians dead on both sides.</p>
<h2>1981-1986: US secretly sells weapons to Iran</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=860&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310081/original/file-20200114-151834-1nysw20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1080&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lt. Col. Oliver North is sworn in to testify before Congress about a U.S. deal to sell weapons to Iran, in breach of an embargo, and use the money to support rebels in Nicaragua.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-A-DC-USA-APHS-Iran-Contra-North/6873ba10cf0d45d6ac31f6063ad350d0/90/0">AP Photo/Lana Harris</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf">imposed an arms embargo</a> after Iran was designated a state sponsor terrorism in 1984. That left the Iranian military, in the middle of its war with Iraq, desperate for weapons and aircraft and vehicle parts to keep fighting. </p>
<p>The Reagan administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">decided that the embargo would likely push Iran</a> to seek support from the Soviet Union, the U.S.’s rival in the Cold War. Rather than formally ending the embargo, U.S. officials agreed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/08/world/iran-pipeline-hidden-chapter-special-report-us-said-have-allowed-israel-sell.html">secretly sell weapons to Iran</a> starting in 1981. Later, the transactions were justified as incentives to help Iran persuade militants to release <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/arms-for-hostages-plain-and-simple.html">U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon</a>. </p>
<p>The last shipment, of anti-tank missiles, was in October 1986. In November of that year, a Lebanese magazine exposed the deal. That revelation sparked the Iran-Contra scandal in the U.S., in which Reagan’s officials were found to have collected money from Iran for the weapons, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/iran-contra-hearings-boland-amendments-what-they-provided.html">illegally sent those funds to anti-socialist rebels</a> – the Contras – in Nicaragua.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310083/original/file-20200114-151867-1rhhgcv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">At a mass funeral for 76 of the 290 people killed in the shootdown of Iran Air 655, mourners hold up a sign depicting the incident.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-IRN-APHS166203-USS-Vincennes-Iran-A-/cb6c1e3b2e77457b97c5e10a9f225a81/7/0">AP Photo/CP/Mohammad Sayyad</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1988: US Navy shoots down Iran Air flight 655</h2>
<p>On the morning of July 8, 1988, the USS Vincennes, a guided missile cruiser patrolling in the international waters of the Persian Gulf, <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/07/the-vincennes-downing-of-iran-air-flight-655-the-united-states-tried-to-cover-up-its-own-destruction-of-a-passenger-plane.html">entered Iranian territorial waters</a> while in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">skirmish with Iranian gunboats</a>. </p>
<p>Either during or just after that exchange of gunfire, the Vincennes crew mistook a passing civilian Airbus passenger jet for an Iranian F-14 fighter. They shot it down, killing all 290 people aboard. </p>
<p>The U.S. called it a “<a href="https://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/VINCENNES%20INV.pdf">tragic and regrettable accident</a>,” but Iran believed the plane’s downing was intentional. In 1996, the U.S. agreed to pay US$131.8 million in compensation to Iran.</p>
<h2>1997-1998: The US seeks contact</h2>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310085/original/file-20200114-151880-s8yzsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian President Mohammad Khatami.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/istanbul-turkey-november-12-iranian-reformist-276222344">Prometheus72/Shutterstock.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In August 1997, a moderate reformer, Mohammad Khatami, won Iran’s presidential election. </p>
<p>U.S. President Bill Clinton sensed an opportunity for improved relations between the two countries. He <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iran/stories/iran010998.htm">sent a message to Tehran</a> through the Swiss ambassador there, proposing direct government-to-government talks. </p>
<p>Shortly thereafter, in early January 1998, Khatami gave an interview to CNN in which he expressed “<a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html">respect for the great American people</a>,” denounced terrorism and recommended an “exchange of professors, writers, scholars, artists, journalists and tourists” between the United States and Iran. </p>
<p>However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei didn’t agree, so not much came of the mutual overtures as Clinton’s time in office came to an end. In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke to the U.S.-based American-Iranian Council and <a href="https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html">acknowledged the government’s role in the 1953 ouster of Mossadegh</a>, but punctuated her remarks with criticism of Iranian domestic politics. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310088/original/file-20200114-93792-nwnm70.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President George W. Bush delivers the 2002 State of the Union address.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Bush_at_State_of_the_Union.jpg">Eric Draper/White House/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm">2002 State of the Union address</a>, President George W. Bush characterized Iran, Iraq and North Korea as constituting an “Axis of Evil” supporting terrorism and pursuing weapons of mass destruction, straining relations even further.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=227&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310095/original/file-20200114-151887-11s0sgv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Inside these buildings at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran, technicians enrich uranium.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iran-IRAN-NUCLEAR/16101ec8c3e4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/139/0">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2002: Iran’s nuclear program raises alarm</h2>
<p>In August 2002, an exiled rebel group announced that <a href="https://www.iranwatch.org/library/international-organization/international-atomic-energy-agency-iaea/other-iaea-document/irans-nuclear-power-profile-iaea">Iran had been secretly working on nuclear weapons</a> at two installations that had not previously been publicly revealed. </p>
<p>That was a violation of the terms of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact">the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a>, which Iran had signed, requiring countries to disclose their nuclear-related facilities to international inspectors. </p>
<p>One of those formerly secret locations, Natanz, housed centrifuges for enriching uranium, which could be used in civilian nuclear reactors or enriched further for weapons. </p>
<p>Starting in roughly 2005, U.S. and Israeli government cyberattackers together reportedly targeted the Natanz centrifuges with a custom-made piece of malicious software that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html">became known as Stuxnet</a>.</p>
<p>That effort, which <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Stuxnet-virus-set-back-Irans-nuclear-program-by-2-years">slowed down Iran’s nuclear program</a> was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html">one of many U.S. and international attempts</a> – mostly unsuccessful in the long term – to curtail Iran’s progress toward building a nuclear bomb.</p>
<h2>2003: Iran writes to Bush administration</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310090/original/file-20200114-151887-y4iwpm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An excerpt of the document sent from Iran, via the Swiss government, to the U.S. State Department in 2003, appears to seek talks between the U.S. and Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.scribd.com/document/170613340/2003-US-Iran-Roadmap-proposal">Washington Post via Scribd</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In May 2003, senior Iranian officials <a href="http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000467.htm">quietly contacted the State Department</a> through the Swiss embassy in Iran, seeking “a dialogue ‘in mutual respect,’” addressing four big issues: nuclear weapons, terrorism, Palestinian resistance and stability in Iraq.</p>
<p>Hardliners in the Bush administration <a href="https://archive.org/stream/ABCNews19781979/Libya-FT-1990-to-2007-c.txt">weren’t interested in any major reconciliation</a>, though Secretary of State Colin Powell favored dialogue and other officials had met with Iran about al-Qaida.</p>
<p>When Iranian hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005, the opportunity died. The following year, <a href="http://mideastweb.org/ahmadinejad_letter_to_bush.htm">Ahmadinejad made his own overture to Washington</a> in an 18-page letter to President Bush. The letter was widely dismissed; a senior State Department official told <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1006509">me</a> in profane terms that it amounted to nothing.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310091/original/file-20200114-151829-5e9mj8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Representatives of several nations met in Vienna in July 2015 to finalize the Iran nuclear deal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/minoritenplatz8/19067069963/">Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs/Flickr</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>2015: Iran nuclear deal signed</h2>
<p>After a decade of unsuccessful attempts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Obama administration undertook a direct diplomatic approach beginning in 2013.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/an-iran-nuclear-deal-built-on-coffee-all-nighters-and-compromise.html">Two years of secret, direct negotiations</a> initially bilaterally between the U.S. and Iran and later with other nuclear powers culminated in the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal. </p>
<p>The deal was signed by Iran, the U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom in 2015. It severely limited Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and mandated that <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">international inspectors monitor and enforce Iran’s compliance</a> with the agreement. </p>
<p>In return, Iran was granted relief from international and U.S. economic sanctions. Though the inspectors regularly certified that Iran was abiding by the agreement’s terms, in May 2018 President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement.</p>
<h2>2020: US drones kill Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An official photo from the Iranian government shows Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a Jan. 3 drone strike ordered by President Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-dated-september-18-2016-shows-iranian-news-photo/1191356889">Iranian Supreme Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>On Jan. 3, 2020, on the orders of President Trump, an American drone fired a missile that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, leader of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-are-iran-s-secretive-quds-forces-n1110156">Iran’s elite Quds Force</a>, as he prepared to leave the Baghdad airport. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/qassem-soleimani-iran-elite-quds-force-leader-200103033905377.html">Soleimani is described</a> by analysts as the second most powerful man in Iran after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.</p>
<p>At the time, the Trump administration asserted that he was directing an imminent attack against U.S. assets in the region, but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/us/politics/trump-suleimani-explanations.html">officials have not provided clear evidence</a> to support that claim.</p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html">responded by launching ballistic missiles</a> that hit two American bases in Iraq. As Iran entered a heightened state of alert, preparing for a possible U.S. retaliation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/world/middleeast/missile-iran-plane-crash.html">it accidentally shot down</a> a commercial Ukrainian airliner departing Tehran for Kyiv, killing all 176 people aboard.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.</span></em></p>Some of the major events in US-Iran relations highlight the differences between the nations’ views, but others presented real opportunities for reconciliation.Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294982020-01-09T13:33:24Z2020-01-09T13:33:24ZWhat Trump’s tweet threatening Iran’s cultural sites could mean for Shiite Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309119/original/file-20200108-107200-a4s7n3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Golden Iwan, Shrine of Fatima Masuma, built in the eighth century, is also a leading Shii seminary in Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kishwar Rizvi</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump warned the Islamic Republic of Iran in a tweet on Jan. 4 that the U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/trump-iran-cultural-sites.html">would target Iranian cultural sites</a>, if provoked. </p>
<p>His threat followed the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/iranian-general-qassem-soleimani-killed.html">United States’ killing</a> of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, the foreign branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which set off fears of retaliation. The Iranian government <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-news-qassem-soleimani-funeral-deaths-today-revolutionary-guard-threatens-us-allies-live-updates-2020-01-07/">vowed to avenge</a> his death, followed by missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq on Jan. 7.</p>
<p>Trump’s angry tweet, which was immediately <a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/trump-iran-cultural-sites-threat-1745940">condemned</a> by many, may never become reality, even as tensions in the region escalate. The Pentagon, contradicting Trump, has ruled out the possibility of attacks on cultural sites and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/trump-esper-iran-cultural-sites.html">acknowledged</a> that such an action would be a war crime. Talking to reporters later, Trump said, that he “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2020/01/07/iran-weapons-america-foreman-tapper-lead-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/tensions-with-iran/">likes to obey the law</a>.”</p>
<p>Nevertheless, it is important to understand the significance of Iran’s heritage sites to its people, and to the broader Shiite community – and what the world would lose with their destruction. </p>
<h2>A diverse architectural heritage</h2>
<p>Trump did not name the 52 cultural sites he threatened to attack. But as a <a href="https://academicminute.org/2017/03/kishwar-rizvi-yale-university-iran-and-global-exchange-in-the-early-modern-period/">scholar of Islamic art and architecture</a> who has done <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/the-safavid-dynastic-shrine-9781848853546/">fieldwork</a> on religious and national monuments in Iran for the past 25 years, I can imagine that among his targets would be several remarkable monuments that exemplify Iran’s glorious history. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309109/original/file-20200108-107200-1irhygw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Apadana Palace, Persepolis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Takhteh_Jamshid.jpg">Marmoulak</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>The ancient palace complex of <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Persepolis.html?id=KorZMqmTOJgC">Persepolis</a> was designated a World Heritage site by <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/114/">UNESCO</a> in 1979. Persepolis, located in the Fars province of southern Iran, was the capital of the Achaemenid Empire, which ruled this region from 550 BC to 330 B.C. </p>
<p>The magnificent structures of ancient <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/323723">Persepolis</a> reflect the history of Iran as part of a great Persian empire, which once extended from the Balkans to western India. </p>
<p>The audience hall of one of the oldest buildings at Persepolis, Apadana Palace, was built by the Persian King Darius I. Massive stone reliefs on its processional stairways that depict a royal feast are important examples of the architecture of the ancient Near East. Its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18803290">history is intertwined</a> with that of other great civilizations, such as the Greeks, who sacked Persepolis in 330 B.C. under the leadership of Alexander the Great. </p>
<p>Then there is the heavily populated city of Isfahan, in central Iran – the capital of the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jis/article/18/2/259/726956">Safavid Empire</a>, which ruled Iran from 1501 to 1736. The city has some of the <a href="https://arthistory.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/1-Rizvi_Shah2.pdf">finest examples of Islamic architecture</a> in the world. </p>
<p>Two iconic monuments on Isfahan’s Naqsh-i Jahan Square, a monumental plaza built at the end of the 16th century and sometimes compared to Venice’s San Marco Plaza, are the Imam Mosque and the Ali Qapu palace. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309110/original/file-20200108-107249-19t1ean.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Naqsh-i-Jahan Square Isfahan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Naghshe_Jahan_Square_Isfahan_modified.jpg">Arad Mojtahedi</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p><a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/isfahan-and-its-palaces-9781474437196?lang=en&cc=us">The mosque</a>, constructed in 1612 by the Safavid King Shah Abbas I as the main place of Friday congregational prayer, is covered with ornate, multicolored calligraphic and floral tiles. The Ali Qapu palace is similarly majestic, with its five-story gateway decorated with intricate wall-paintings and mosaics. </p>
<p>Isfahan and its monuments reflect the glory of the Safavid empire and its central role in trade and politics of the early modern world. As such they are considered national treasures, reflecting the best of Iranian art and culture. </p>
<p>But Isfahan, the third largest city in Iran, is also home to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11927720">two important nuclear facilities</a>, including a plant for the conversion of uranium, making it a vulnerable target for military aggression. </p>
<h2>Shiite shrines and pilgrimage networks</h2>
<p>Iran’s renowned heritage sites include religious centers venerated by Shii Muslims. The country has been majority Shiite since the 16th century, and views itself as the leader of the global Shii community. It is the primary patron and builder of <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9781469621166/the-transnational-mosque/">Shiite institutions across the world</a>, with a focus on holy sites in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. </p>
<p>Shiite Muslims revere the family of the prophet, Muhammad, and see his descendants as the rightful leaders of the Muslim world. They <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">differ in their beliefs</a> from Sunni Muslims on the succession that followed the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D. This schism is the fundamental point of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809">contention</a> between Iran and Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, its regional rival. </p>
<p>The primary sites of Shii veneration are the shrines of the Shii imams and their offspring, which are important pilgrimage destinations, especially during the holy months of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-ramadan-means-to-muslims-4-essential-reads-116629">Ramadan</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ashura-how-this-shiite-muslim-holiday-inspires-millions-122610">Muharram</a>. Among them is the tomb of the eighth imam, Reza, in Mashhad, in northeast Iran. A tomb of his sister Fatima Masuma in Qum, near Tehran, is also of particular significance. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/shah-abbas-the-remaking-of-iran/oclc/271772575">shrine of Imam Reza</a> was expanded and embellished in the early 17th century as a magnificent architectural complex. It is centered on his mausoleum and includes royal tombs, a massive mosque and an unparalleled collection of historical manuscripts and cultural artifacts.</p>
<p>The shrine of Fatima Masuma in Qum, like that of Imam Reza established in the eighth century, is also a leading Shii seminary. The library and madrassa, or Islamic school, serve thousands of students and scholars. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the ideologue of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40267811?seq=1">1979 Iranian Revolution</a>, studied and preached there. </p>
<p>They are the only major Shii monuments in Iran. The others are in neighboring Iraq, which explains to some extent the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/5/iraq-parliament-votes-expel-us-military/">close military and ideological ties</a> between the two countries. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309115/original/file-20200108-107204-1md1yxd.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Khomeini_Mausoleum.JPG">Ali Khamenei website</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>The tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini, located midway between Qum and the Iranian capital of Tehran, has itself become a highly popular pilgrimage and tourist site. It is at once a religious icon and a <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/muqj/20/1/article-p209_11.xml">national symbol</a>.</p>
<h2>Iran’s importance to Shiite Muslims</h2>
<p>The global Shii community reaches from Canada to Tajikistan, from Lebanon to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-protests-iran/thousands-protest-in-pakistan-over-us-killing-of-iranian-commander-idUSKBN1Z40NR">Pakistan</a>. When Trump threatens to destroy Iranian cultural sites, he risks angering not only Iran but also more than 200 million Shii Muslims worldwide for whom these monuments hold deep religious meaning.</p>
<p>Such aggressive tactics mimic the strategy employed by the Taliban when it destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas, or when Daesh <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/24/opinions/destruction-mosul-mosque-opinion-rizvi/index.html">blew up</a> the 12th-century Mosque of Nur al-din Zangi in Mosul. These extremist groups use the destruction of cultural sites as a tactic of war, to display their unilateral power and an absolute disregard for histories not allied with their own political agenda. </p>
<p>Moving American military policy away from only targeting military assets to threatening symbolically and religiously meaningful architectural monuments, in my view, would be provocative and expose the U.S. to <a href="http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html">international condemnation</a>. Thankfully, so far, the Pentagon has ruled out any such action. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kishwar Rizvi has received funding from Title VI Department of Education Grant.</span></em></p>Trump recently warned Iran that the US could target its cultural sites. Many of Iran’s cultural sites carry deep religious meaning for a global Shii community and such a threat risks alienating them.Kishwar Rizvi, Professor in the History of Art Islamic Art and Architecture, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295912020-01-09T13:32:22Z2020-01-09T13:32:22ZHow countries in conflict, like Iran and the US, still talk to each other<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309148/original/file-20200108-107209-ejixs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Diplomacy has provided a solution for how countries in conflict can communicate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/global-communication-international-messaging-translation-concept-450712048">Shutterstock/cybrain</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Even countries that have broken ties with each other need to communicate in times of crisis and war. </p>
<p>That includes the U.S. and Iran, which have not had an official way to talk directly to each other since President Jimmy Carter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Iranian_hostage_crisis">cut off diplomatic and consular relations</a> in April 1980, as part of the <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises">Tehran embassy hostage crisis</a>. The link has never been restored.</p>
<p>But international diplomacy has found an ingenious solution to the problem of communication between countries that have broken ties.</p>
<h2>Intermediaries</h2>
<p>A third country, often a neutral nation, acts as a go-between, called the “<a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e980">protecting power</a>.” For many years, for example, the Swedish have performed this role, acting on <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/25/why-trump-needs-the-swedes-in-pyongyang/">behalf of the United States in North Korea</a>. The Swedish Embassy in Beijing has been the intermediary between North Korea and other foreign countries which do not entertain diplomatic relations with North Korea.</p>
<p>Switzerland and its embassy in Tehran have played the same role between the U.S. and Iran. Since May 21, 1980, <a href="https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html">they have been the protecting power for the U.S. in Iran</a>. </p>
<p>The Swiss were called on to perform this role during the recent crisis, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-swiss/swiss-deliver-us-message-to-iran-over-soleimani-killing-idUSKBN1Z21AC">Reuters News Service reported on Jan. 3</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“ZURICH (Reuters) - A Swiss diplomat delivered a message from the United States to Iran on Friday over the U.S. killing of senior Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani, the Swiss foreign ministry said.</p>
<p>"The chargé d’affaires was informed of Iran’s position and in turn delivered the message of the United States,” the ministry said in an emailed response to a Reuters query, without elaborating.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html">Iranians have asked fellow Muslim nation Pakistan</a> to be their liaison country with the U.S.</p>
<p>These arrangements have provided U.S. and Iranian citizens with normal consular services for passport and visa issues and matters relating to health, adoptions and even negotiating the return of citizens imprisoned by the other country.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309147/original/file-20200108-107204-7skxdi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A rally marking the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution on Feb. 10, 2017, in the capital, Tehran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/iranians-hold-a-dummy-representing-us-president-donald-news-photo/634505838?adppopup=true">ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bridging the gap</h2>
<p>More importantly, these intermediaries have enabled politicians from the two estranged countries to keep in touch diplomatically. </p>
<p>Any message President Trump wishes to convey to his Iranian counterpart, or any urgent information Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wishes to pass on to Secretary of State Pompeo, will be transmitted through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran or the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>Thus, any exchanges regarding the Iranian nuclear deal, U.S. sanctions on Iran, military maneuvers and perhaps even sometimes information on forthcoming airstrikes tend to go through either Switzerland or Pakistan. Late last year, for instance, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/12/07/785814895/american-held-in-iran-released-in-prisoner-exchange">Switzerland brokered a carefully negotiated prisoner swap</a> between Iran and the U.S.</p>
<p>The air strike on General Soleimani, however, came as a total surprise to both Iran and Switzerland <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-allies-response-trump-iran-qasem-soleimani-attack-alone-world-2020-1">as well as the rest of the world</a>. Some information about the Iranian counterstrikes may well have been passed on to the U.S. via Switzerland, but this is difficult to verify at this stage. </p>
<p>Unusually, Switzerland has also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-iran-usa-exclusive/exclusive-swiss-humanitarian-channel-to-iran-seen-within-months-swiss-us-officials-idUSKBN1YF23E">taken the initiative to open a humanitarian channel to Iran</a> to provide Iranians with food, medicine and other essential supplies that have been affected by U.S. sanctions. It will begin in the next few months.</p>
<p>This initiative has received U.S. endorsement, though the U.S. intends to make sure that Iran’s Central Bank <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-iran-usa-exclusive/exclusive-swiss-humanitarian-channel-to-iran-seen-within-months-swiss-us-officials-idUSKBN1YF23E">is not involved and that no payments to the Iranian government occur</a>. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=thanksforreading">Thanks for reading! We can send you The Conversation’s stories every day in an informative email. Sign up today.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Klaus W. Larres does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even when countries have broken ties with each other, they can communicate – as the US and Iran did just a few days ago.Klaus W. Larres, Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor; Adjunct Professor of the Curriculum in Peace, War and Defense, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1116532019-02-13T09:44:18Z2019-02-13T09:44:18ZIranian revolution: world’s reactions show that, four decades on, tensions remain as high as ever<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258564/original/file-20190212-174880-13ygm9s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women played a prominent part in Iran's 1979 revolution.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 40th anniversary of Iran’s Islamic revolution in February 1979 was greeted by an extraordinary tweet from US president Donald Trump. In both English and Persian, it referred to “40 years of failure” and said the Iranian people deserved a “much brighter future”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1095049352840658944"}"></div></p>
<p>The reaction from Iran’s regional competitor Saudi Arabia was along much the same lines. As Iran celebrated the anniversary of the February 11 revolution, Prince Turki Al-Faisal said the country: “is turning its people into paupers instead of providing them with health services, with food and with things people look forward to”.</p>
<p>A tweet from Trump’s national security adviser John Bolton was blunter:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For all your boasts, for all your threats to the life of the American President, you are responsible for terrorizing your own people. I don’t think you’ll have many more anniversaries to enjoy.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In spite of such comments – and growing economic frustration in Iran – the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Republic is one that few envisaged in the early years of the state. </p>
<h2>Khomeini returns</h2>
<p>On February 1 1979, an Air France plane arriving from Paris touched down in Tehran. On board was a figure who would dramatically alter Iranian politics. Carefully helped down the steps from the plane, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was welcomed by a throng of photographers, supporters and cameramen before being swiftly ushered into a waiting blue Mercedes Benz. </p>
<p>Across Tehran, more than a million people demonstrated against the rule of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and in support of Khomeini. After years in exile, the returning Khomeini would have a dramatic impact on revolutionary life across Iran. Just ten days later the Regency Council – appointed to run Iran after the Shah went into exile amid increasing protests – fled, eventually seeking exile in France.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=791&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=791&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=791&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=993&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=993&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/258479/original/file-20190212-174857-139ied1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=993&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran after 14 years exile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">sajed.ir</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After Khomeini’s return and a national referendum, the Islamic Republic was declared on April 1. A year later, war broke out. Iraqi forces attacked their Iranian counterparts, demonstrating the level of concern that revolutionary action had provoked. The establishment of the Islamic Republic had a dramatic impact on regional security. This was not only as a consequence of the redrawing of old alliances and the struggle to assert and reassert influence across an increasingly unstable environment. It also stemmed from the creation of an Islamic Republic that was predicated on a set of Shia beliefs – despite Khomeini’s efforts to stress its pan-Islamic appeal.</p>
<h2>Sectarian strife</h2>
<p>Few states witnessed events in Iran with more trepidation than the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The kingdom had predicated its legitimacy and very survival upon claims to Islamic leadership – yet the establishment of an explicitly Islamic republic was seen to erode this legitimacy. It prompted the Al Saud regime to embark on a process of framing events in a sectarian manner, positioning the Islamic Republic as a Shia project and thus reducing its appeal to Sunnis. </p>
<p>Of course, we should not view 1979 as the event that triggered sectarian tensions. Instead, 1979 was the latest incident in a long history of tensions between different sects within Islam that are shaped by contextual factors, political agendas and regional aspirations. Yet in states with societies divided along sectarian lines, the revolution had a dramatic impact on the relationship between rulers and ruled. In Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, the revolution inspired Shia groups who had long experienced marginalisation at the hands of political elites wishing to retain power.</p>
<p>In the decade after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the elite wing of the Revolutionary Guards Corps – the <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-iran-s-long-arm-who-is-elite-force-that-attacked-israel-from-syria-1.6075400">Quds Force</a> – helped establish Shia groups across the region, most notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, and helped the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain <a href="https://www.citizensforbahrain.com/index.php/entry/militancy-in-bahrain-part-1-beginnings-1950-1990">plan a coup d’etat</a> which was ultimately unsuccessful. The desire to provide support to Shia groups – and those oppressed across the Islamic world – was enshrined in Article 3.16 of <a href="https://worldpolicy.org/2010/10/12/a-detailed-analysis-of-irans-constitution/">the Iranian Constitution</a>, which ultimately helped construct nefarious perceptions of the regime in Tehran perhaps best seen in the idea of a “<a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2013/08/the-shia-and-the-battle-for-survival/">Shia Crescent</a>” doing the bidding of Iran.</p>
<p>With the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeini, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia began to thaw, entering a period of burgeoning rapprochement – yet, with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, changing geopolitical dynamics put an end to this rapprochement. In such a climate, states with divided sectarian societies once again became sites of competition for political and economic influence, most notably in Iraq and Lebanon. </p>
<p>Violence begat violence, often taking place between sects within political projects. As tensions between Riyadh and Tehran worsened, these sites of competition took on increasing political importance, leading to the cultivation of a range of networks – often yet not exclusively along sectarian lines –- in an attempt to exert influence. </p>
<h2>Arab Spring</h2>
<p>The onset of the Arab Spring exacerbated these tensions, creating opportunities for Tehran and Riyadh to both increase their influence which was often seen in zero-sum terms: a win for one was a loss for the other and vice versa. The uprisings began as an expression of anger at political, social and economic conditions across the region, yet – much like the aftermath of the revolution in Iran – regimes created sectarian master narratives as a means of ensuring their own survival in a process that political scientists <a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-political-scientists-nader-hashemi-and-danny-postel-the-wests-intellectually">Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel</a> have termed “sectarianization”. </p>
<p>Across the region, domestic unrest took on increasingly sectarian characteristics. In Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, this sectarian difference became violent, located within broader geopolitical rivalries, with devastating consequences, most notably in Yemen.</p>
<hr>
<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/spinning-green-tape-as-the-climate-changes-6632">Spinning ‘green tape’ as the climate changes</a>
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</p>
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<p>Four decades after the revolution, Iran continues to wield a great deal of influence across the Middle East, yet the continued survival of the Islamic Republic also serves as a source of consternation. The regime in Tehran is seen as a pernicious presence behind any unrest in Shia communities across the region. This, in turn, shapes regime policies – not just towards Iran, but also their own Shia populations which continue to face <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">widespread discrimination</a> in a number of cases. </p>
<p>The resonance of the Shia Crescent narrative is testament of the legacy of revolutionary activity across Iran, revealing not only the fears of rulers in the Middle East, but also in the western world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation. </span></em></p>Hostility to Iran’s revolution from both the West and in the region is as virulent now as it was in February 1979.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1106932019-02-11T05:06:51Z2019-02-11T05:06:51ZForty years on from the Iranian Revolution, could the country be at risk of another one?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/258151/original/file-20190211-174880-1r6pcj5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The last four decades in Iran have been marked by internal tension due to its political system, which combines theocratic and republican elements.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s ruling clergy are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the 1979 revolution, during which Shi'ite Islamists, led by religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, toppled Mohammad Reza Shah’s secular monarchy. </p>
<p>The linchpin of the Islamic Republic’s political system is Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of <a href="http://www.logosjournal.com/amanat.pdf">Wilayat-i Faqih</a>, or guardianship of the jurist, which makes a Shia religious jurist the head of state. The jurist’s legitimacy to hold the most powerful position in the state is claimed to be based on divine sovereignty.</p>
<p>As its name suggests, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current system combines theocratic and republican elements. The president and parliament are democratically elected, while the members of powerful institutions such as the Guardian Council and the judiciary are appointed by the Supreme Leader (Walī-yi Faqīh).</p>
<p>The Guardian Council oversees elections and the final approval of legislation. According to the <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf">Constitution of the Islamic Republic</a>, all legislation, policies and programs must be consistent with the observance of Islamic principles.
The Guardian Council has a duty to monitor all legislative decisions and determine whether their implementation would cause a violation.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-iranian-revolution-100453">World politics explainer: the Iranian Revolution</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>This unprecedented political system brought in four decades of internal conflict. The established Islamic Republic of Iran also ceased being a US ally and instead became an enemy. International sanctions, along with the clergy’s mismanagement and endemic corruption, have resulted in a dire economic situation. There is a strong fear the high unemployment and inflation rate will continue to rise.</p>
<p>Under these circumstances, there are now <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-2018-bring-revolution-iran-24104">doubts the Islamic Republic</a> can survive. And some wonder whether we may soon see another revolution. So, what is the situation in Iran 40 years after the Shah was overthrown and who is agitating for change?</p>
<h2>Decades of unrest</h2>
<p>After Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, a more conservative Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, came to power and strengthened the theocracy.</p>
<p>The reformist movement emerged in the mid-1990s to counter the newly established conservative regime. They had little chance of gaining power through theocratic institutions, so they focused on the electoral side. They campaigned for women’s rights, democratic rule and a civil-military divide.</p>
<p>Reformists gained power twice: from 1997 to 2005 and from 2013 – with the election of the relatively moderate president, Hassan Rouhani – until now. In these years, reformists controlled electoral institutions such as the presidency and the parliament. </p>
<p>For decades, reformers have struggled to limit the power of theocratic institutions – while still broadly complying by the laws of the clergy, and the principles set in place by Khomeini – and expand the power of republican institutions. However, they were no match for the Khamenei-led resistance, and theocratic institutions are more powerful today than they were in the mid-1990s.</p>
<p>Iran has also continually had tense relations with the international community. In addition to eight years of war with Iraq, Iran has been under sanctions for almost all of the past four decades. These have been imposed by the US, the EU, and the United Nations over claims Iran breached its nuclear obligations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-iran-nuclear-agreement-is-a-deal-worth-honouring-69132">Why the Iran nuclear agreement is a deal worth honouring</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Today, the Donald Trump-led US government is pursuing an extremely hostile approach to Iran. Crucially, the US has withdrawn from a nuclear deal negotiated with the Obama administration – under which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program. The US has reapplied previous sanctions (which were lifted under the deal) and imposed new ones. Iranians are also the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-works.html">most affected</a> of the Muslim majority countries included in Trump’s travel ban.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1092144837120405506"}"></div></p>
<p>Reformists have made some progress towards easing economic hardship, loosening social control, and initiating a temporary easing of tensions with the outside community. But the parlous nature of the political structure empowers the theocrats to manipulate the system and stymie any reform effort that promises a path to democratisation.</p>
<h2>Reformists or pro-regime opposition</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-03/who-the-iran-protesters-are-and-why-they-are-angry/9301316">protests that swept Iran</a> between December 2017 and January 2018 showed that many Iranians don’t consider the reformists capable of bringing about meaningful change. Protestors <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/iran-protests-trump-tweets">expressed their anger</a> over increasing economic hardship, as well as Iran’s support and funding for foreign conflicts, namely the civil wars in Yemen and Syria. They also chanted slogans calling for an end to the rule of clerics.</p>
<p>Rampant corruption, the failure of Rouhani to fulfil his promises – such as boosting the economy, extending individual and political freedoms, ensuring equality for women and men, and easing access to the internet – and the return of sanctions have combined to shatter hope of reform. This has been expressed in global protests by the Iranian diaspora calling for a change to the government.</p>
<p>It seems unlikely the reformists will be able to maintain their positions in the country’s electoral institutions. The sad reality is that even if they have another chance, the result will only compound their failures.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-irans-protests-matter-this-time-89745">Why Iran's protests matter this time</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These circumstances have led to another <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1146531">stream of opposition</a> – one agitating for a toppling of the Islamic Republic and regime change – gaining currency. Most members of this group are in exile, including Iran’s ex-prince and son of the Shah overthrown by the revolution, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-19/iran-s-ex-prince-pahlavi-wants-a-democratic-revolution">Reza Pahlavi</a>. </p>
<p>But there is profound disagreement between the opposition groups in exile. Although they share a similar goal, they have consistently proven unable to agree on an overarching framework. The profound divisions among the groups has drained both their resources and intellectual capacity, which has rendered them incapable of contesting the country’s ruling clergy.</p>
<p>Those advocating for regime change have also been incapable of articulating a viable alternative to the Islamic Republic. All opposition groups overuse the abstract notion of “secular democracy” without clearly explaining what exactly they have in mind.</p>
<p>Pahlavi’s desire is reportedly not to put himself back on the throne, but to let the people decide what the political system would look like. He has said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s not the form that matters, it’s the content; I believe Iran must be a secular, parliamentary democracy. The final form has to be decided by the people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While this is a legitimate statement, figures like Pahlavi ought to offer viable alternatives that would help bring opposition groups together. Potential alternatives should also be structured to appeal to the masses, a considerable segment of whom have expressed disillusionment with the ideal of an Islamic state.</p>
<p>Opposition groups are absorbed in delegitimising the Islamic Republic, questioning the way the clergy run the country. In doing so, they forget the the people who have already expressed widespread dissatisfaction with the clergy.</p>
<p>The opposition needs to skilfully craft an alternative to the Islamic Republic and a comprehensive plan for the transition to democracy. Until an alternative political system is formulated and popularised, the opposition will remain impotent and unable to initiate a transformation in the country.</p>
<p>Of course, change is not impossible. A military confrontation with Israel or the US, the departure of 79-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, or a spontaneous mass uprising could prove a game changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naser Ghobadzadeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Reformers have tried to modernise Iran for decades but have failed mainly due to the country’s powerful theocracy. And then there are those who want to overthrow the regime altogether.Naser Ghobadzadeh, Senior lecturer, National School of Arts, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1023212018-09-24T10:19:29Z2018-09-24T10:19:29ZWhy Salman Rushdie’s ‘The Satanic Verses’ remains so controversial decades after its publication<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478998/original/file-20220813-21776-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C20%2C2702%2C1787&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Author Salman Rushdie pictured in London in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Grant Pollard/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Author Salman Rushdie is in the hospital with serious injuries after being <a href="https://apnews.com/article/salman-rushdie-attacked-9eae99aea82cb0d39628851ecd42227a">stabbed by a man at an arts festival</a> in New York State on Aug. 12, 2022. The following article was published in 2018 on the 30th anniversary of the release of The Satanic Verses.</em></p>
<p>One of the most controversial books in recent literary history, <a href="http://www.salmanrushdie.com">Salman Rushdie’s</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Satanic_Verses.html?id=CSVwPG1Kdl8C">“The Satanic Verses,”</a> was published three decades ago this month and almost immediately set off <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4308642?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">angry demonstrations</a> all over the world, some of them violent. </p>
<p>A year later, in 1989, Iran’s supreme leader, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/khomeini_ayatollah.shtml">Ayatollah Khomeini</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/16/world/iranians-protest-over-banned-book.html">issued a fatwa</a>, or religious ruling, ordering Muslims to kill the author. Born in India to a Muslim family, but by then a British citizen living in the U.K., Rushdie <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/04/magazine/rushdie-in-hiding.html">was forced to go into protective hiding</a> for the greater part of a decade. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/236706/original/file-20180917-158219-nya3b0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Angry demonstrators protest against the book in 1989.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/croma/425264494">Robert Croma</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What was – and still is – behind this outrage?</p>
<h2>The controversy</h2>
<p>The book, “Satanic Verses,” goes to the heart of Muslim religious beliefs when Rushdie, in dream sequences, challenges and sometimes seems to mock some of its most sensitive tenets.</p>
<p>Muslims believe that the <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1577">Prophet Muhammed</a> was visited by the angel Gibreel – Gabriel in English – who, over a 22 year period, recited God’s words to him. In turn, Muhammed repeated the words to his followers. These words were eventually written down and became the <a href="https://universalistfriends.org/sells.html">verses</a> and chapters of the <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Qur_an.html?id=2LmsCiv8waEC">Quran</a>. </p>
<p>Rushdie’s novel takes up these core beliefs. One of the main characters, Gibreel Farishta, has a series of dreams in which he becomes his namesake, the angel <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/angel-jibreel-gabriel-in-islam-2004031">Gibreel</a>. In these dreams, Gibreel encounters another central character in ways that echo Islam’s traditional account of the angel’s encounters with Muhammed.</p>
<p>Rushdie chooses a provocative name for Muhammed. The novel’s version of the Prophet is called Mahound – an alternative name for Muhammed sometimes used during the Middle Ages by Christians who considered him <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/9523983/The-Satanic-Verses-and-me.html">a devil</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, Rushdie’s Mahound puts his own words into the angel Gibreel’s mouth and delivers edicts to his followers that conveniently bolster his self-serving purposes. Even though, in the book, Mahound’s fictional scribe, Salman the Persian, rejects the authenticity of his master’s recitations, he records them as if they were God’s. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234147/original/file-20180829-195319-v1vxrp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">British author Salman Rushdie.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/61838152@N06/14191350061">Fronteiras do Pensamento</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Rushdie’s book, Salman, for example, attributes certain actual passages in the Quran that place men “in charge of women” and <a href="https://quran.com/4/34">give men the right</a> to strike wives from whom they “fear arrogance,” to Mahound’s sexist views. </p>
<p>Through Mahound, Rushdie appears to cast doubt on the divine nature of the Quran. </p>
<h2>Challenging religious texts?</h2>
<p>For many Muslims, Rushdie, in his fictional retelling of the birth of Islam’s key events, implies that, rather than God, the Prophet Muhammed is himself the source of revealed truths.</p>
<p>In Rushdie’s defense, some scholars have argued that his <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/erea/493">“irreverent mockery”</a> is intended to explore whether it is possible to separate fact from fiction. Literature expert <a href="http://wp.ucla.edu/person/greg-rubinson/">Greg Rubinson</a> points out that Gibreel is unable to decide what is real and what is a dream. </p>
<p>Since the publication of “The Satanic Verses,” Rushdie has argued that religious texts should be <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/erea/493">open to challenge</a>. “Why can’t we debate Islam?” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/23/salman-rushdie-on-islam-we-have-learned-the-wrong-lessons">Rushdie said in a 2015 interview</a>. “It is possible to respect individuals, to protect them from intolerance, while being skeptical about their ideas, even criticising them ferociously.”</p>
<p>This view, however, clashes with the view of those for whom the Quran is the literal word of God. </p>
<p>After Khomeini’s death, <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/99/04/18/specials/rushdie-free.html">Iran’s government announced</a> in 1998 that it would <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15949285">not carry out his fatwa</a> or encourage others to do so. Rushdie now lives in the United States and makes regular public appearances.</p>
<p>Still, 30 years later, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/world/middleeast/irans-hard-line-press-adds-to-bounty-on-salman-rushdie.html">threats against his life persist</a>. Although mass protests have stopped, the themes and questions raised in his novel remain hotly debated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud is affiliated with the Parliament of the World's Religions.</span></em></p>The novel goes to the heart of Muslim religious beliefs and challenges some of its most sensitive tenets.Myriam Renaud, Affiliated Faculty of Bioethics, Religion, and Society, Department of Religious Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/928802018-03-06T22:31:23Z2018-03-06T22:31:23ZIranian women risk arrest: Daughters of the revolution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209182/original/file-20180306-146697-12lxcm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Thousands of Iranian women took to the streets to protest against the hijab law in Tehran in the spring of 1979. A women's movement has recently taken hold in Iran.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hengameh Golestan</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the lead-up to March 8, I am sometimes asked whether we really still need an <a href="http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/international-womens-day">International Women’s Day (IWD)</a>. Though my greatest hope is to see a day when gender inequity and gender injustice are social artefacts of the past, that day feels nowhere near. </p>
<p>I celebrated March 8, 2016 in Tehran by walking in the streets, riding the Metro to attend a discussion group and reading some Happy Women’s Day greetings on social media. In my heart and mind, I celebrated these Iranian women in the women-only train compartments in their colourful outfits and loose scarves, resisting the regime’s attempt to control their bodies and eliminate their choices. </p>
<p>I celebrated their incredible entrepreneurship, which has turned the women’s sections of the busy Tehran Metro into platforms for public discussion on matters that concern them and a shopping mecca full of women from all walks of life, shopping for an incredible variety of goods despite ongoing pressure from the authorities to shut down their informal and innovative methods of boarding and exiting the trains to sell their kitchen equipment, clothing, makeup, sports gear and other goods. </p>
<p>On a high note, I went to sleep that night feeling optimistic as I prepared to leave Iran on the 10th. But on the evening of March 9, as I was packing, my apartment was raided by Revolutionary Guards. I was eventually arrested and ultimately sent to Evin prison, charged with “dabbling in feminism and security matters” — a crime that does not actually exist. </p>
<p>Knowing that my incarceration was just one tiny incident amid a huge history of women’s struggles helped keep my spirits up for the 121 days I was in prison. So did the songs that played in my head: The feminist anthem of my youth, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWkVcaAGCi0"><em>Bread and Roses</em></a>, and the Iranian song <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2lOvOA0U9A"><em>Zan</em> (Woman) by Ziba Shirazi</a>, telling Ayatollah Khomeini that women are softer than flower petals and stronger than iron, do not try to veil us, reminding him that he and all other men owe their very existences to women. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209171/original/file-20180306-146645-15b1skk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women protest their lack of bodily autonomy daily in Iran. The number of women making flags out of their headscarves in public spaces is increasing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://mystealthyfreedom.net/en/">Facebook/mystealthyfreedom</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unified global voices</h2>
<p>This March 8, as we remember the struggles that have brought us closer towards gender equality, we also must consider the social and legal inequalities women continue to face worldwide. While women’s quests for gender equality, dignity and justice are arguably universal, strategies and solutions vary widely under a vast range of social, cultural and political conditions and constraints. Not recognizing this multiplicity has undermined feminist solidarity and has prevented a diversity of strategic solutions.</p>
<p>As an Iranian woman, I well know the fragility of gains women have made. I recall my pain and frustration in the weeks following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/sep/03/hengameh-golestans-best-photograph-iranian-women-rebel-against-the-1979-hijab-law">1979 revolution</a>, when Ayatollah Khomeini and others in charge passed Shari’ah laws in conjunction with practices straight out of the Middle Ages, and rendered Iranian women second-class citizens. In <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1278135">Pakistan, President Zia ul-Haq</a> soon followed Khomeini’s lead. </p>
<p>These developments encouraged <a href="http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1016/mob-violence-against-women-in-algeria-a-historical-case-analysis">Algerian Islamists who kidnapped and sexually enslaved women</a> throughout the 1980s. They harassed unveiled women, and women working and studying outside the home. A similar story <a href="https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/handle/10315/29986">unfolded in Sudan</a>. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/05/asia/gallery/afghan-women-past-present/index.html">In Afghanistan</a>, beginning in 1994, the Taliban, once considered U.S. allies and championed as freedom fighters by western media, took the oppression of women to new levels.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208955/original/file-20180305-146671-6sw5a4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mandatory hijab Laws in Iran spurred similar policies in Pakistan. In this archived photo, thousands demonstrate in Lahore, Pakistan on March 8, 2006, International Women’s Day. Placard on right reads, ‘Stop domestic violence.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Khalid Chaudary)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Throughout the 1980s, Amnesty International — then the most prominent of human rights’ organizations — refused to campaign for jailed and tortured gender activists, insisting they were not political activists and so outside their mandate. Amnesty also refused to condemn governments that ignored non-state actors’ violations against women. Among feminists and within women’s organizations, frustration and disappointment with Amnesty deepened. </p>
<p>This disappointment, spurred the emergence of a truly transnational women’s movement. At that time, I could not imagine Amnesty would one day take the lead in campaigning to free me from Iran’s Evin prison 25 years later. </p>
<p>But that was during the 1990s, and well before Amnesty’s change in mandate. The internet and social media, and even affordable international telephone connections and fax machines, were not yet a reality. </p>
<p>Determined to establish women’s rights as human rights through the development of global legal tools and political and social structures, women formed networks such as <a href="http://www.dawnnet.org/feminist-resources/about/main">Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)</a>,<a href="http://www.wluml.org/">Women Living Under Muslim Laws</a> and the <a href="http://wgnrr.org/">Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights</a>.</p>
<p>Advocates of all ages, nationalities, religions, gender orientation and political affiliations mobilized to research, and collected thousands of testimonies of violence against women: Second World War rape survivors; German women raped by Russian soldiers; <a href="http://www.history.com/news/comfort-women-japan-military-brothels-korea">Korean women used as sexual slaves for Japanese military personnel</a>; <a href="https://www.womensmediacenter.com/women-under-siege/conflicts/bangladesh">Bangladeshi women raped</a> during the 10-month Liberation War of 1971; <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bosnia-war-crimes-the-rapes-went-on-day-and-night-robert-fisk-in-mostar-gathers-detailed-evidence-of-1471656.html">Bosnian women raped</a> as part of the “ethnic cleansing strategies.”</p>
<p>The data was presented at regional meetings, national and international tribunals and finally at the UN Human Rights Committee in June 1993 that established women’s rights are human rights with the <a href="http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm">Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women</a>. The global demand for gender equity and justice is also reflected in the <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf">1995 Beijing Platform for Action</a> signed by U.N. members at the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing. </p>
<p>These declarations provided women around the world a framework for working towards gender justice and for holding their national governments accountable in the process. But even though change continues to ripple, the full achievement of the goals laid out 30 years ago are far from realized.</p>
<p>The North America-based #MeToo and #TimesUp movements are among many ongoing fights against the commodification and victimization of women as sexual objects and the gendered power differentials that persist in ways that gravely constrain the lives of girls and women everywhere. </p>
<p>Though it may seem obvious to younger generations, the ideas of “women’s rights as human rights” is only 25 years old, and is still frighteningly tenuous in many contexts.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208954/original/file-20180305-146697-6ud2o0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women’s rights need to be protected. In this photo about 1,500 people marched through heavy snowfall on International Women’s Day in Toronto on March 8, 1980.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Jann Van Horne</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1979: Imposition of the hijab</h2>
<p>As an Iranian, this is not a hypothetical issue for me. In 1979, I saw how easily the limited reforms and modest gains that Iranian women had previously struggled for were annulled within two weeks of the end of the Revolution. As post-Revolution generations of Iranians have learned, without protection and nurturing, rights perish. </p>
<p>In the early days of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), leaders decided that women would collectively symbolize the Islamicization of the nation to Iranians and the world. On March 7, 1979, the IRI imposed a compulsory hijab for women. The next morning, coincidentally the 8th of March — a day not normally marked or noticed in Iran — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/sep/03/hengameh-golestans-best-photograph-iranian-women-rebel-against-the-1979-hijab-law">thousands of women all across the country poured into city streets</a> to protest compulsory veiling. </p>
<p>The vociferous opposition took the new leaders by surprise and they temporarily retreated. Over the next two years, however, the regime used the rhetoric of patriotism to gradually reimpose veiling, first for government employees, then for any woman accessing government offices and buildings, then for students. </p>
<p>Ultimately, public veiling was imposed for all females, Muslims or not, over the age of nine. The state claimed that unveiled women caused men’s immoral thoughts – a persistent trope in the history of female diminishment and male impunity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209159/original/file-20180306-146655-i5xxou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian Revolution 1979.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.parsine.com">(photo credit: CC-BY-David Burnett)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Extreme political suppression in the early years of the IRI and the bloody and costly Iran-Iraq war (1981-88) made organized, collective action for women’s rights impossible. Yet various strategies for resistance continued. For example, many women refused to wear the all-enveloping black chador (literally <em>tent</em>) favoured by some conservative groups and promoted by the Republic, arguing that the black chador did not exist at the time of the Prophet. </p>
<p>Instead, they wore scarves and ‘<em>manteaux</em>.’ They challenged the government’s colour restriction as well, (brown, white, navy blue and gray), arguing that even the most conservative interpretation of Islamic text fails to even hint at colour restrictions, and that the Prophet’s favourite colour was pink. </p>
<p>In those early years, many women, myself included during my visits, wore the very bright and shiny colour known as Saudi green, which annoyed the regime to no end, but which the morality police were at a loss to address since green is generally considered the colour of Islam. Within a few years, women started to appear in public in other bright colours.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209169/original/file-20180306-146700-4o4sn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women walking in the streets of Isfahan, Iran, in August 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The hijab was also intended by the regime to demonstrate national pride in opposition to the alleged Western hedonism of fashion popularized by the previous government. Iranian women continued to subvert the regime’s intentions by styling “traditional” attire in new ways, donning bright-coloured ethnic patterns that nevertheless completely conformed to Islamic codes of modesty. </p>
<p>Thus the morality police and other state agents had no easy justification for arresting women for dress-code violations, and tactics for expressing agency and opposition by this first generation of women living under the IRI continued.</p>
<h2>Daughters of the revolution</h2>
<p>Over time, among many demographics, successive generations of girls born and raised in the IRI have worn increasingly shorter and tighter tunics over their leggings; their scarves have become ever smaller and looser. Older women, claiming as a result of age to no longer be seductive, have allowed their head coverings to slip lower as they moved through their cities and towns going about daily business. </p>
<p>Despite the state’s investment of massive resources to employ hundreds of thousands of paid and volunteer morality police, and almost 40 years of school curricula designed to inculcate “Islamic” values as defined by the regime, the regime has not accomplished its goals.</p>
<p>The world has been surprised recently by a new wave of women’s activism in Iran. Bareheaded Iranian women climb on platforms and benches in public spaces, white scarves tied to the ends of poles, waving their hijab flags to protest compulsory veiling. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209179/original/file-20180306-146666-yn33iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=629&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women have been climbing on platforms to protest compulsory hijab.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(White Wednesday Campaign/@masihpooyan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alone and silent, the women can hardly be charged with mobilizing against the state or disturbing the peace — the usual justifications for arresting demonstrators. While some have been arrested for baring their heads in public, often the authorities are generally looking away to avoid escalating tension, drawing attention to the women and fuelling the movement. </p>
<p>But <a href="http://mystealthyfreedom.net/en/">videos and images of these actions are shared widely on social media</a>, bringing a new sense of empowerment to women in Iran and drawing increasing <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/jmk8z3/the-iranian-women-fighting-state-censorship-one-selfie-at-a-time">interest from media</a> elsewhere. </p>
<p>The young protesters are being called “daughters of the revolution.” The movement has taken the regime by surprise; there has been no coherent response and the number of women making flags of their headscarves in public spaces is increasing. There is no organized, central orchestration of these actions, though they have attracted many supporters. </p>
<p>Rather, we see an organic civil movement manifesting the widespread dissatisfaction of large segments of both the male and female population, including many women who will wear the veil regardless but object to the compulsory hijab. </p>
<p>There has been at least one instance of a woman in full chador climbing onto a platform on a busy street and waving a scarf to protest her lack of bodily autonomy. The struggle is not about a piece of cloth on a woman’s head, it is about the gender politics that cloth symbolizes, and its use to silently and broadly communicate a rejection of state control over women’s bodies. </p>
<p>The political aspect of the struggle over the veil can be perplexing to outsiders, who wonder why some groups of women in Turkey and Europe fight for the right to wear the veil while in Iran many women — including some devout women — have fought for almost four decades for the right to remove their veils. In all cases, women are demanding state recognition of bodily autonomy as an essential step to recognition of their full personhood and citizenry rights.</p>
<p>And so, I continue to both protest and celebrate on International Women’s Day.</p>
<p>We need this day of conscious connection to the long, sometimes violent history of women’s struggles for personhood; a day to reflect on the rights we have gained; and a day to recognize the vigilance required to retain those rights — rights women of many nations and contexts have yet to achieve. This I know from personal experience.</p>
<p>The 8th of March is a day for global, collective reflection on that history and on the conditions we must continue to challenge that create barriers to women’s full, free and fearless participation in all facets of human social life.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"970010982373306369"}"></div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92880/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Homa Hoodfar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran’s young “daughters of the revolution” are protesting hijab laws and demanding equal rights. They’re the ultimate symbol of female resistance on this International Women’s Day.Homa Hoodfar, Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/903522018-01-23T19:29:38Z2018-01-23T19:29:38ZUnrest in Iran will continue until religious rule ends<p>The two-week protest movement that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/world/iran-protests-issues/index.html">rocked cities across Iran</a> earlier this year has largely subsided, but the fallout from the government’s harsh response <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html?smid=fb-share&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2F">has just begun</a>.<br>
On Jan. 14, two activists, Saro Ghahremani and Ali Poladi, <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">died in prison</a>, reportedly from torture. By early February, the detainee death toll had <a href="http://www.iranobserver.org/thousands-illegally-detained-in-iran-amidst-protests-number-of-torture-deaths-rises-to-11/">risen to 11</a>.</p>
<p>Family members have been <a href="http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/140120181">gathering by the thousands outside Iranian jails</a> since January. <a href="http://www.indiana.edu/%7Eceus/about/people/faculty/khezri.shtml">As an Iranian-born scholar</a>, I see this daily vigil as a warning to the government: Violence against dissidents will not go unnoticed. It’s also a sign that unrest in Iran is far from over.</p>
<h2>Criminalizing protest</h2>
<p>Though Iran’s Constitution enshrines the <a href="http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">right to peaceful protest</a>, dissent has historically been met with harsh reprisal. </p>
<p>More than 3,700 people were arrested and 23 were killed in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/03/tens-of-thousands-of-people-protested-in-iran-this-week-heres-why/">sometimes violent nationwide marches</a> that started on Dec. 28, 2017, in response to an austerity budget proposed by President Hasan Rouhani. </p>
<p>At first, the protests were a display of anger by working-class Iranians in the city of Mashhad, who complained of poverty and inequality. But the unrest <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-protests-spread-with-lightning-speed/">soon spread to more than 80 cities</a>. And as thousands of disenchanted citizens widened the agenda to include <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/world/middleeast/iran-protests-corruption-banks.html">corruption</a>, human rights, foreign policy and women’s empowerment, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-strategy/iran-treads-cautiously-as-protests-spread-idUSKBN1EQ136">police began to crack down</a>. Eventually, using <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/01/01/574942821/anti-government-protesters-in-iran-risk-violence-from-police">tear gas, batons and bullets</a>, police quelled the protests in early January 2018. </p>
<p>In 2009, hundreds of people were arrested during <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/19/iran-halt-crackdown">the Green Movement</a>, a mass uprising of the Iranian middle class. Many were allegedly <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8102358/Rape-in-Irans-prisons-the-cruellest-torture.html">later tortured and raped in jail</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202881/original/file-20180122-182938-l7k5vr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During and after the 2009 Green Movement uprising, hundreds of Iranian protesters were arrested and allegedly tortured in jail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Iran_election_%282%29.jpg">mangostar/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent deaths of nearly a dozen detainees have again raised fears that more activists will suffer a similar fate – concerns heightened by the hard-line rhetoric of Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<p>On Jan. 2, Khamenei called the protesters – who across the country had <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/31/574842829/2-protesters-killed-as-anti-government-protests-enter-fourth-day-in-iran">taken the bold step of calling for his removal</a> – “<a href="http://time.com/5083800/ayatollah-khamenei-iran-protests-9-dead/">enemies of Iran</a>.” </p>
<p>Two weeks later, after the protests had ended, the spokesman for the judicial system – which falls under Khamenei’s jurisdiction – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">denied</a> any government responsibility for protester deaths. He said that the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-wave-protests-prices-government-rallies-trump/28947178.html">bullets used to kill marchers</a> aren’t the type used by Iranian police. </p>
<p>Such statements have earned popular sympathy for the thousands of people now keeping daily watch at Iran’s jails. Many Iranians were outraged when the same government spokesman, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">claimed</a> that the first two activists who died in jail “were drug addicts” who had “committed suicide.”</p>
<p>The victims’ families, relatives, and even <a href="https://twitter.com/baharerahnama/status/952502396814536704">celebrities familiar with the case</a> firmly denied this assertion. </p>
<p>Though President Rouhani has on several occasions <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42531165">defended Iranians’ right to protest</a>, he seems unwilling to challenge the supreme leader on the brutality that has lead to 34 protester deaths. </p>
<p>His silence has infuriated Iranians. A few days into the protests, demonstrators began accusing the self-declared reformist president of being no different than supreme leader, chanting, “<a href="https://twitter.com/ArminNavabi/status/948013866897653760">Reformists, hardliners, your time is up</a>.” </p>
<h2>Who is Iran’s supreme leader?</h2>
<p>To understand Iranian voters’ frustration, it is key to understand just how powerful the Ayatollah Khamenei is in Iran.</p>
<p>Ever since the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/iran-1979-revolution-shook-world-2014121134227652609.html">1979 Iranian Revolution</a> created the Islamic Republic of Iran, replacing Iran’s 2,500-year-old monarchy with a clerical regime, the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2013-08-12/who-ali-khamenei">supreme leader</a> has been both the head of state and the highest ranking religious authority in Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202630/original/file-20180119-110084-1ltsupw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1979 Iranian Revolution established the supreme leader as the country’s ultimate ruler. Now many citizens say the time for clerical rule is over.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Iranian_Revolution_in_Shahyad_Square.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Constitution grants the supreme leader’s office almost unlimited power. Today, Khamenei – like his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/khomeini_ayatollah.shtml">well-known predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini</a>, whose reign ended when he died in 1989 – wields enormous control over Iran’s military, judiciary, treasury, media, foreign policy, presidential cabinet and legislative process. </p>
<p>The executive branch, in contrast, is rather weak. The president is limited to enforcing or changing the Constitution, meaning he can appoint ministers and ambassadors, for example – but he cannot, say, repeal laws that <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-iranian-women-want-rights-jobs-and-a-seat-at-the-table-77633">discriminate against women</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurdistan-earthquake-politics-creates-roadblocks-to-relief-87928">ethnic minorities</a>.</p>
<p>As a result, Rouhani, like other reform-minded presidents before him, have <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-rouhani-may-now-control-parliament-but-do-his-economic-reforms-stand-a-chance-59120">struggled to keep such campaign promises as modernizing Iran’s economy</a> and improving human rights.</p>
<p>Khamenei’s power is also financial. A major portion of Iran’s national budget goes to the office of the supreme leader and its affiliated institutions. This funding is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-setad-legal-specialreport/special-report-to-expand-khameneis-grip-on-the-economy-iran-stretched-its-laws-idUSBRE9AC0JS20131113">not subject to government oversight</a>, and no one but Khamenei himself knows how much money he receives.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=856&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202882/original/file-20180122-182976-1c99mvn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1076&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Ali_Khamenei_crop.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nor does anyone control how he spends it. Since the 1979 revolution, the office of the supreme leader has laid out billions of dollars to expand the influence of his faith, Shia Islam, across the Middle East. </p>
<p>War is a key part of that foreign policy. From 1980 to 1988, under the auspices of the Ayatolla Khomeini, Iran fought <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349">the Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein</a>, in Iraq. Since 2011, the current supreme leader has sent Iranian troops into Syria’s civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/iran-troop-deployment-syria-anti-rebel-offensive-revolutionary-guards-assad">to help keep its contested president, Bashar al-Assad, in power</a>.</p>
<p>The supreme leader is also behind Iran’s controversial nuclear program. The country’s <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran.aspx">insistence on processing nuclear-grade uranium</a> – ostensibly as a source of energy – has brought international sanctions, invasive inspections and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/heshmatalavi/2017/09/29/iran-economy-nuclear-deal/#7f8b326c3e42">global political criticism to Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, because it controls police and the judiciary, the supreme leader’s office sets the tone for government handling of protest. And, since 1979, it has <a href="https://fanack.com/iran/faces/sadeq-larijani/">appointed conservative leaders</a> who criminalize dissent.</p>
<p>As a result, for nearly four decades, both citizen dissident and reform-minded leaders who oppose Iran’s Islamic regime have been harshly suppressed. The recent protests mark seven years since three Green Movement leaders <a href="https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2016/12/karroubi-mousavi-rahnavard/">were placed under house arrest</a>. They are still awaiting trial. </p>
<h2>‘We regret Rouhani’</h2>
<p>President Rouhani has twice <a href="https://theconversation.com/rouhanis-commanding-election-victory-might-just-help-him-change-iran-78051">won election handily</a> by promising to resolve Iranian’s nuclear conflict, free the Green Movement leaders and ensure civil rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>All of these initiatives require him to go head to head with the supreme leader. In 2015, he succeeded in achieving a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">hard-fought nuclear agreement between Iran and six world powers</a>, a deal Khamenei ostensibly opposed. </p>
<p>But, in exchange, Rouhani has had to sacrifice other campaign promises like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/middleeast/un-rights-investigator-highly-critical-of-iran.html?_r=0">improving human rights</a>, fighting corruption and addressing inequality. The mass discontent on display recently reflects voter frustration with the president’s lack of progress on these important issues.</p>
<p>One recent scandal has implicated two high-level officials – judiciary head Sadeq Larijani and his brother Ali Larijani, who is speaker of the parliament – for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-politics/ahmadinejad-accuses-iran-speakers-family-of-corruption-idUSBRE9120DG20130203">using their political connections for their family’s economic gain</a>.</p>
<p>And last year, a January 2016 leak dubbed “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">Payslip-gate</a>” revealed that the top brass at state-owned companies were earning extravagant salaries of up to <a href="http://beta.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-salaries-20160622-snap-story.html">100 times the monthly wage of the lowest-paid government employees</a>.</p>
<h2>The end of the supreme leader?</h2>
<p>Between Rouhani’s ineffectiveness and Khamenei’s state-sanctioned violence, both leaders seem to have alienated Iranian voters. </p>
<p>The damage may be beyond repair. Protest slogans like “Overthrow the clerics’ regime” and “Death to Rouhani” suggest that for the first time since 1979, Iranians are demanding not incremental reform but a whole new era – one without an omnipotent, unaccountable supreme leader. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202632/original/file-20180119-110117-4n9mqk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many Iranians have pushed their government to address persistent gender inequality, to little avail.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That puts President Rouhani in an uncomfortable position. I believe Iran’s president is loyal to the principle of an Islamic republic rooted in religious authority. After all, he is a cleric, too. </p>
<p>But Rouhani – who <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-23554836">has a doctorate in constitutional law from a Scottish university</a> – is also smart enough to observe that this medieval dual-government system is struggling to survive in modern, restive Iran. </p>
<p>Time may heal all. Khamenei is 78 years old and in poor health. In my assessment, it is conceivable that his death could actually mark the beginning of the end of supreme leadership in Iran.</p>
<p>And if it doesn’t, then Iran’s uprisings will go on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>11 activists have died in prison since Iran’s mass protests were crushed in January. Now, some detainees’ families are keeping a daily vigil outside jails. It’s a sign that unrest in Iran is not over.Haidar Khezri, Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Department of Central Eurasian Studies (CEUS), Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/897452018-01-08T21:37:17Z2018-01-08T21:37:17ZWhy Iran’s protests matter this time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201230/original/file-20180108-83571-31hfeq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">University students attend a protest inside Tehran University as anti-riot Iranian police prevent them from joining other protesters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A series of urban uprisings in Iran that began on Dec. 28 in its second-largest city <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/0105/In-Iran-s-surprise-uprising-of-the-poor-dents-to-revolution-s-legitimacy">shocked the country’s Islamic regime</a>, as well as much of the world. </p>
<p>Although the Mashhad protests were spearheaded by conservative opponents of President Hassan Rouhani to discredit his economic policies, the organizers lost control of the crowd. Protesters <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/protests-threaten-irans-ascendant-role-in-the-middle-east/2018/01/04/86246e7e-994f-457b-a85b-f1eb76b71998_story.html?utm_term=.5346051e732d">angrily chanted slogans</a> – such as “Leave Syria alone, think about us” and “Death to Hezbollah” – that were aimed at not only Rouhani but the entire Islamic regime. </p>
<p>In the days that followed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies-guards/iran-guards-say-quell-unrest-fomented-by-foreign-enemies-idUSKBN1EW085">protests spread</a> to 80 cities, leading to at least 22 deaths and over 1,000 arrests. On Jan. 8, Rouhani, who won a second term last May, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-08/rouhani-challenges-iran-s-hardliners-with-call-for-more-freedoms">said they signaled</a> Iranians want not only a stronger economy but also more freedom. </p>
<p>While the government says it now has the situation under control, that doesn’t eliminate the significance of the largest protests since 2009, when <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html">millions came out to oppose</a> the outcome of that year’s presidential election. The government forcefully suppressed that uprising, and two candidates who disputed the results remain under house arrest. </p>
<p>Why have so many Iranians again taken to the streets and will these protests have a larger impact than those eight years ago? As a close observer of Iran, I believe there are several important differences between the protests today and in 2009 that can help us answer both questions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201240/original/file-20180108-83571-1jv1j8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran President Hassan Rouhani says the protests show Iranians are crying out for both economic and political change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Iranian Presidency Office via AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s behind the uprising</h2>
<p>Not surprisingly, the conservative faction of the Islamic regime <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/02/nine-dead-iran-protesters-storm-police-station-fresh-unrest/">was quick to blame</a> Iran’s adversaries, namely the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. In contrast, reformists <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-government-warns-protesters-they-will-pay-the-price-for-mass-unrest/2017/12/31/1d4abd52-edb1-11e7-956e-baea358f9725_story.html?utm_term=.47edd657fc6a">say that the protests</a> are about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/middleeast/scattered-protests-erupt-in-iran-over-economic-woes.html">economic grievances</a> such as unemployment, inequality and corruption. </p>
<p>They do have a point. While the overall economy is growing again, and many indicators <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/74009/imf-forecasts-sustained-growth-for-iran-s-economy">have turned positive</a> in the past two years, the gains haven’t been shared by all Iranians.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/publication/iran-economic-outlook-october-2017">economy grew</a> 13.4 percent in 2016 after oil and financial sanctions were lifted as part of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33521655">nuclear agreement</a> with the West, which increased the country’s oil and gas production.</p>
<p>The non-oil sector, however, expanded just 3.3 percent – a clear sign the <a href="http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930504000667">economy’s recovery</a> has been slow in visibly improving people’s living standards. Real incomes of many segments of the economy remain weak, and the housing and construction sector remains in recession. </p>
<p>Unemployment is still high, at 12 percent, particularly among young university graduates. But it is much higher in small towns and <a href="http://www.sid.ir/En/Journal/ViewPaper.aspx?ID=304096">peripheral regions</a> of the country, where many of the protests occurred, driven by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/world/middleeast/scattered-protests-erupt-in-iran-over-economic-woes.html">concerns over inequality and poverty</a>.</p>
<p>Under Iran’s Constitution the supreme leader has broad powers, and even Rouhani has a limited ability to influence key policies, including those concerning the economy. Some key policies are entirely off limits, such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-09/iran-spends-billions-to-prop-up-assad">Iran’s involvement</a> in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. These campaigns, <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/protests-put-spotlight-irans-vast-shadowy-syria-war-52156143">which are costing Iran billions of dollars</a> every year, seem to be driving at least some of the protesters’ anger.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/201239/original/file-20180108-83581-km0gd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian worshipers chant slogans during a rally against anti-government protestors in Tehran, Iran, on Jan. 5.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Key differences</h2>
<p>There are three key differences between today’s uprisings and those in 2009. </p>
<p>In 2009, the demands were political. The reformist faction of the ruling regime, which disputed the results of the presidential election, was the main actor in the protests. Current protests do not have a visible political leader and appear to be directed at the entire regime, including reformists. This is best demonstrated by one of the slogans frequently chanted by protesters, which roughly translates as, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gt-Eft0Y3hM">It is over for all of you</a>.”</p>
<p>Another difference is that the 2009 protests were centered around the capital Tehran and other major cities. While the recent demonstrations involve fewer actual protesters, they are spread over a much larger area of the country, including many small cities that suffer from underdevelopment and low incomes. </p>
<p>These primarily young protesters, <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB89.pdf">including unemployed university graduates</a> and low-income workers, are also outraged by the frequent reports of corruption and unfair accumulation of wealth among some government officials. Competing factions of the ruling elite have frequently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/40a7a75c-2ffb-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a">exposed each others’ corruption</a>, revelations that have alienated the marginalized segments of the population that are struggling with poverty and unemployment. Economic issues <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-protests-green-movement_us_5a4e4caae4b0b0e5a7ab865c">are far more important</a> today than they were for the primarily middle-class protesters of 2009. </p>
<p>Finally, the U.S. response to the current uprisings has also been markedly different. </p>
<p>The Obama administration <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/response-iranian-protests-now/">reacted with caution</a> to the 2009 uprisings and refrained from openly cheering on the protesters, motivated by a fear that overt support would provoke a harsher crackdown. </p>
<p>In contrast, President Donald Trump and his State Department have actively supported the protesters, and the U.S. is trying to mobilize an international condemnation of the Iranian government’s response. This initiative, however, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/world/middleeast/un-iran-protests-debate.html">faces strong resistance</a> from China and Russia in the United Nations. </p>
<p>Concern about a stronger reaction from the Trump administration might explain the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-security-forces-show-restraint/4191801.html">cautious and measured approach</a> of Iran’s security forces in confronting the current protesters. The response <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/23/iran-violent-crackdown-protesters-widens">was more violent</a> and brutal in 2009.</p>
<h2>What might change</h2>
<p>The protestors’ focus on economic rather than political issues enables some moderate members of the regime to meaningfully address their grievances rather than being forced to keep silent or issue outright condemnations, as they did in 2009.</p>
<p>While condemning the acts of violence by some protesters, many of Iran’s political leaders, <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/iran-khamenei-reaction-protests-shamkhani-kowsari.html">including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei</a>, have expressed sympathy for their economic concerns. </p>
<p>They have also led to some changes in fiscal budget and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/56b6eba0-4178-11e7-82b6-896b95f30f58">economic reform priorities</a>. Planned increases in prices of fuel and bread, for example, have been suspended. </p>
<p>While it’s encouraging that the government is reacting to protester concerns at all, stalling important economic reforms is not the right way to do it. These steps will surely be welcomed by lower-income Iranians, ensuring they’re politically popular, yet they may lead to more hardship down the road by worsening the budget deficit and potentially fueling inflation. </p>
<p>Instead of keeping prices of essential items artificially low, which leads to considerable waste and inefficiency in the economy, it would be more effective to offer targeted subsidies to the poor while doing more to fight corruption and political nepotism, a primary cause of rising income and wealth disparities in Iran.</p>
<h2>What won’t</h2>
<p>Will the recent unrest serve as a wake-up call for the political elite that more needs to be done?</p>
<p>Unfortunately, an inefficient populist response is probably as far as the country’s supreme leader will be willing to go – at least for now. Protesters’ more political demands, such as tackling corruption, limiting Khamenei’s powers or reducing Iran’s role in regional conflicts, are unlikely to be addressed anytime soon. </p>
<p>Iran’s political system carefully screens candidates for public office and thus remains closed to ordinary citizens, leaving Iranians with few options for influencing government policy besides the streets. And neither political faction, reformist or conservative, has yet offered any practical solution for how to change that. </p>
<p>For most Iranians, however, corruption, poverty and economic inequality can not be addressed without serious reforms. And that suggests that while the most recent uprising may be winding down, similar uprisings are likely in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89745/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although the unrest that shocked Iran’s ruling elite appears to be over, there are several reasons to think this won’t be the last time disaffected citizens take to the streets.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/591202016-05-27T02:07:08Z2016-05-27T02:07:08ZIran’s Rouhani may now control parliament, but do his economic reforms stand a chance?<p>Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his policies are set to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-parliament-idUSKCN0Y326P">get a boost</a> this week after voters elected a parliament that favors reform. </p>
<p>While Rouhani’s reformists didn’t win a majority of seats, it appears likely that the “moderate” independents also elected will side with his faction, giving the reformists an effective majority in the parliament for the first time since 2004. </p>
<p>So now that Rouhani may finally have the backing of parliament, will he be able to pursue the economic and social reforms he has promised since first taking office in 2013? And does this mean the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-europe-helped-save-obamas-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-47913">nuclear deal</a> that he helped champion will lead to an Iran that’s more open to foreign businesses and the West? </p>
<p>While a parliamentary majority helps – along with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/oct/01/iran-rouhani-popularity-misperceptions-nuclear-deal">his general popularity</a> – other power centers have enormous influence over economic policy, constraining Rouhani’s ability to implement reforms. These powerful institutions, such as the judiciary and the Revolutionary Guards, remain under the strong influence of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who also enjoys veto power over all executive and parliamentary decisions. </p>
<p>To reach these conclusions, I’ve drawn upon more than two decades of research on political and economic conditions in Iran.</p>
<h2>Inside Iran’s elections</h2>
<p>While Iran does not tolerate any formal political parties, the elite of the Islamic regime regularly create factions, which compete for influence and power in a manner that on many fronts resembles what happens in other countries. </p>
<p>During the recent parliamentary elections, two main factions competed against each other: the reformists, who are close to President Rouhani, and the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Principlism_in_Iran">principalists</a>, who are affiliated with the supreme leader and the conservative clerics who support him. These two groups are divided into smaller factions that sometimes don’t see eye to eye but generally stick together. </p>
<p>All the candidates who ran in the 2016 parliamentary elections self-identified as belonging to one of these political factions or as independents. After the second round of elections – required because the first round didn’t produce clear winners in 68 seats – the results <a href="http://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/364573/%D8%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%E2%80%8C%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%85%D9%86%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1">show that</a> neither faction won an outright majority on its own. The reformists won 119 seats (41 percent), the principalists got 81 (28 percent) and the independents won 83 (29 percent). Five seats are reserved for religious minorities. </p>
<p>With neither side in full control, that meant both factions have been jockeying ever since to attract the unaffiliated independents to their side and coalesce around a speaker.</p>
<p>A review of the political orientation of the independent members of parliament reveals that some of them have self-identified as “moderates,” and the reformist camp believes that it can count on their support in parliamentary votes. If this prediction materializes, the reformist camp will control 174 seats, <a href="http://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/366686-%D8%AA%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%84-%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B3%D9%87-%D9%82%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF">giving it a 60 percent majority</a>. </p>
<p>Based on this calculation, the next parliament, which begins its term on May 28, is expected to be more supportive of President Rouhani’s economic and social policies.</p>
<h2>Rouhani’s inheritance</h2>
<p>This is a positive development for Rouhani, who inherited a <a href="http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB74.pdf">near bankrupt economy</a> from former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. </p>
<p>Up until now, his only success has been <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35342439">getting sanctions lifted</a> – in exchange for <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-nuclear-deal-should-boost-economy-yet-unknowns-remain-39770">signing</a> the nuclear agreement – and a <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/iran-economy-management.html">significant reduction</a> in the annual inflation rate.</p>
<p>He has <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/dec/17/irans-economy-2015">failed to revitalize the economy</a>, however, despite the limited sanctions relief that Iran has received since June 2014. <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate">Unemployment</a> and poverty remain at record high levels, and nearly a fifth of industrial capacity remains idle.</p>
<p>Now things are very different as Rouhani is likely to have the support of parliament in implementing the reforms he believes would ease Iran’s economic challenges, such as the shortage of investment and high unemployment rate. That support, while necessary, is not sufficient. </p>
<p>Three other centers of power in the Islamic regime can block or interfere with his policies at any time, even after parliamentary approval: the Guardian Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) and the judiciary.</p>
<h2>Checks, balances and vetoes</h2>
<p>The 12-member <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardian_Council">Guardian Council</a>, which is in charge of vetting the political candidates and making sure all laws and regulations are compatible with the constitution, can veto any parliamentary decision if it perceives it as unconstitutional. While the Guardian Council is supposed to remain independent and impartial to political factions, the reformists have repeatedly accused it of being <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-reformists-hardliners-drawing-battle-lines-2016-11301">biased against them</a>.</p>
<p>The second check on Rouhani’s power is the Revolutionary Guards, <a href="http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB74.pdf">which acquired</a> a lot of economic assets during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, such as the Iranian Telecommunications Company. The Revolutionary Guards are likely to resist any economic reforms that might reduce their role in the economy. They are also sensitive to foreign investment in strategic economic sectors, which, from their perspective, might pose a threat to national security. </p>
<p>Lastly, the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/islamic-judiciary">judiciary</a> is firmly under the control of the supreme leader and his hardline supporters and can render an economic policy ineffective by refusing to enforce a regulation, as it has done in the past.</p>
<p>Overall, the behavior of the judiciary, the Guardian Council and the Revolutionary Guards toward Rouhani’s economic reforms will depend largely on the attitude of the supreme leader. If Rouhani can gain Khamenei’s support for an initiative, these institutions will fall in line. </p>
<h2>Little control over foreign policy</h2>
<p>In addition to these institutional threats, there are several other key factors that will have a strong influence on Iran’s economic performance in the coming years yet are partially or fully beyond the control of the president and parliament. </p>
<p>First and foremost, the supreme leader <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2013/06/13-syria-iran-elections">has almost total control</a> over the direction of foreign policy. The ability of the president to influence how Iran interacts with the outside world remains at his sole discretion. For example, it was <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-deal-supreme-leader-makes-supreme-decision">only with his blessing</a> that Iran signed the nuclear agreement in June 2015. </p>
<p>The supreme leader has made it clear, however, that there will be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ayatollah-says-nuclear-deal-will-not-change-irans-relations-with-us/2015/07/18/7470b531-ff12-4913-81e1-21101130fbdd_story.html">no significant change</a> to other key components of foreign policy. For example, Iran will remain committed to the Lebanese Hezbollah group and the Assad regime in Syria. </p>
<p>Despite Rouhani’s desire to engage with the international community, there will also be <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/iran-regional-policy-velayati.html#">no change</a> to Iran’s anti-Israeli stance and expansion of its long-range missile program, both of which will remain sources of tension with the West, particularly the U.S.</p>
<p>And that will make it harder for Rouhani to revive Iran’s economy. While the nuclear sanctions have been lifted, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2016/apr/13/untangling-irans-web-of-sanctions-after-the-nuclear-deal">other ones</a> remain in effect. And Iran’s banks are unable to engage in some types of dollar-based transactions, even as their <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-central-bank-chief-warns-banking-access-issues-jeopardize-nuclear-deal-1460745930">access to the global banking system</a> has been partially restored. As such, many foreign companies are reluctant to do business with Iran. </p>
<p>Even if Iran adopts sound economic policies and removes all the domestic obstacles to growth, these foreign policy tensions will continue to take a toll on the economy. Rouhani has little power to readjust this in favor of growth.</p>
<h2>The militarized economy</h2>
<p>The second factor limiting Rouhani is the large amount of economic assets that belong to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, the <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force">Basij</a> militia forces and former members of these organizations. </p>
<p>The economic activities of these groups expanded sharply during the sanctions era as they assisted and sometimes took over private or state-owned companies near bankruptcy, such as the Iran Telecommunications Company, in which <a href="http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/66149/%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%B2-50-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF">the IRGC acquired</a> a 50 percent stake. In addition, these military-economic conglomerates <a href="http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB74.pdf">created</a> many nonbank financial institutions when Ahmadinejad was in power. Rouhani has tried to bring these companies under the central bank’s regulatory control but so far has been unsuccessful.</p>
<p>It is unlikely that even with the support of parliament he <a href="http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB80.pdf">will be able to convince</a> the IRGC and Basij to transfer their assets to the private sector or to the executive branch and reduce their engagement in the economy. </p>
<p>The two groups also maintain significant influence over Iran’s import and export companies, which means controlling foreign trade and preventing illegal smuggling will be major challenges for Rouhani without their cooperation. </p>
<p>In this area, parliamentary support can lead to partial success by reforming the trade regulations and empowering the government to fight corruption in the customs office. But some well-connected <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/jun/09/rouhani-mixed-bag-one-year-later#What%20obstacles%20does%20Rouhani%20face%20on%20his%20domestic%20policy?%20">establishments will remain beyond Rouhani’s reach</a>. </p>
<h2>The ‘resistance economy’</h2>
<p>Another tool at the disposal of hardliners who wish to limit some aspects of Rouhani’s reforms is the supreme leader’s <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/decoding-resistance-economy-iran.html">“resistance economy” initiative</a>, which is intended to reduce Iran’s vulnerability to hostile actions by foreign adversaries. </p>
<p>Ayatollah Khamenei introduced this package of guidelines in February 2014 in response to severe economic sanctions. It calls for strengthening the industrial sector and making the economy less dependent on foreign suppliers. </p>
<p>Despite the lifting of sanctions, the supreme leader and his supporters have kept the resistance economy initiative alive. And because it is a supreme leader decree, the guidelines are essentially immune from criticism. As such, each side argues its policies are in line with them and the other’s aren’t. </p>
<p>The resistance economy has already been used to oppose Rouhani’s recent trade and investment negotiations with Western and Asian countries. His opponents argue that the government should be cautious in opening up the economy to foreign investment because Iran’s resistance economy must remain self-sufficient. That’s also the <a href="http://dana.ir/News/713641.html">reasoning</a> the leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij use to remain involved, claiming it’s their duty under the resistance economy guidelines. </p>
<h2>Room to maneuver?</h2>
<p>So even when Rouhani manages to gain parliamentary support for an economic policy, it can still be stopped or manipulated by any number of obstacles, from the supreme leader or judiciary to the military/security organizations that are now more empowered to interfere in economic affairs under the banner of “resistance.”</p>
<p>Since the president has very limited powers in Iran’s political system, if Rouhani wants to be effective in economic management, he may have no other option but to focus on policies that are compatible with Iran’s radical foreign policy and are acceptable to the supreme leader. This means, for example, that if the supreme leader prefers closer economic ties with Russian and China rather than the West, Rouhani will have to abandon his current strategy of enhanced economic engagement with the U.S. and Europe – or find a compromise, such as making Europe and Asia Iran’s primary trade partners.</p>
<p>For international investors eyeing Iran, the overwhelming influence of the supreme leader and security forces in economic affairs must also be taken into account. As such, investment projects that enjoy the approval of both Rouhani and the supreme leader have a better chance of success than those without Khamenei’s and the Revolutionary Guards’ seal of approval. </p>
<p>Still, as a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/oct/01/iran-rouhani-popularity-misperceptions-nuclear-deal">popular president</a> with the backing of parliament, Rouhani will have more leverage than he has had in the past. And that should give him some room to negotiate with the supreme leader to obtain support for some of his preferred policies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iranian president will finally get a parliament that backs his reforms. But much still stands in his way.Nader Habibi, Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/553542016-02-25T16:49:11Z2016-02-25T16:49:11ZExplainer: what’s at stake in Iran’s parliamentary elections<p>Iranians will vote on February 26 to elect both the 290-seat parliament and the 88 clerics of the Assembly of Experts, the body that chooses the supreme leader. This is the most important political moment for the Islamic Republic since the disputed 2009 presidential vote and the mass protests that followed. Here’s why it matters.</p>
<p>Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, is elected every four years. It has little influence over the supreme leader or institutions such as the judiciary and the military – including the elite <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/revolutionary-guards">Revolutionary Guards</a> – but its makeup is a crucial determinant of the government’s success. </p>
<p>The Majlis can support or block proposed legislation, including the annual budget and the <a href="http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/06/30/Iran-s-new-5-year-plan-focuses-on-defense-economy-.html">five-year development plan</a>, and it can caution and impeach ministers, a power it has used regularly.</p>
<p>The Assembly of Experts, meanwhile, can theoretically supervise and replace the supreme leader, but in practice it almost always serves as little more than a rubber-stamp for him. Its next eight-year term, however, could be unusually important as 76-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, whose health has been fragile, might soon have to be replaced.</p>
<p>Generally speaking, Iranian politics is defined by four factions: hardliners, conservatives (usually now identified as principlists), centrists, and the more liberal reformists.</p>
<p>The principlists, organised in 2002, have become the most powerful faction in both the parliament and the assembly. They have established supremacy over the reformists, who briefly led during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) but who have been suppressed for more than a decade by harassment, detentions, and crackdowns. Nonetheless, the principlists face serious challenges. </p>
<p>The discontent after principlist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “won” <a href="https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R40653.pdf">the manipulated 2009 presidential contest</a> fostered a strong centrist movement, which was propelled into power by President Hasan Rouhani’s surprise victory in 2013. Partly into reaction to that movement, as well as the “sedition” of the protests, new fundamentalist, “hardline” factions such as the Endurance Front (Jebheye Paydari) criticised the principlists for not being firm enough in shutting down social and political challenges.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the hardliners appear to have influence in the judiciary and the Revolutionary Guards, and the reformists have survived the legal, political, and social restrictions against them. </p>
<h2>A rigged process?</h2>
<p>Long before Iranians cast their ballots, the conservative hardliner and principlist factions tried to ensure that only the “right” candidates were chosen. The Guardian Council, whose 12 members are chosen by the supreme leader and the judiciary, disqualified more than half of the 12,000 prospective candidates for the Majlis, and it has only approved 166 of the 801 hopefuls for the assembly. Even the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, was banned because he’s considered too close to the centrists and reformists.</p>
<p>This purge will ensure that the assembly remains in the control of conservative clerics. Former president and relative pragmatist <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-rafsanjani-hardliners-mehdi-montazeri.html">Hashemi Rafsanjani</a> also will be blocked from regaining the chair of the assembly, which he held from 2007 to 2011, scotching his proposal to replace the supreme leader with a fixed-term five-member council after Khamenei dies.</p>
<p>But even so, the elections for parliament still matter. To maintain some veneer of legitimacy, the Guardian Council has had to allow some centrists to stand, along with 90 reformists.</p>
<p>The reformists and the centrists have responded by establishing joint lists to create <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2016/02/iran-daily-reformists-face-their-ban-from-elections/">a genuinely viable electoral bloc</a>. This alliance is a shrewd move to avoid repeating the disastrous <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/01/iran-fair-vote-impossible">boycott</a> of the 2012 elections, which simply allowed the hardliners to gain ground thanks to low voter turnout. This time, reformist voters will almost certainly participate, even if they still can’t be sure their votes will be counted.</p>
<p>The hardliners and some principlists have been concerned for months about this strong centrist-reformist challenge. The head of the Guardian Council, the head of the judiciary, and the commander of the Revolutionary Guards have all accused leading politicians, including Rafsanjani, of fostering a foreign-backed “sedition” to undermine the Islamic Republic. </p>
<p>That campaign has implicitly been <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2016/02/iran-feature-supreme-leader-issues-another-sedition-warning-about-elections/">supported by the supreme leader</a>, who has repeatedly declared that the “enemies” of the US and Britain are plotting regime change, and that Iranians must move for the right candidates to prevent this.</p>
<h2>Why this time matters</h2>
<p>Although the supreme leader and supporting institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards have most of the power in the Iranian system, they do not have complete control. Their dominance was seriously shaken after the 2009 presidential election, which was manipulated to stop reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi from winning and which sparked massive protests. The <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html">Green Movement</a>’s demonstrations for rights and reform were eventually crushed, but the problems that outraged the protesters are still there.</p>
<p>The 2013 presidential campaign showed how vulnerable the supreme leader and his supporters are. The Guardian Council thought it had ensured a hardline or principlist triumph by disqualifying Rafsanjani, but the “consolation” candidate Rouhani won nonetheless.</p>
<p>Despite the hardliners’ animosity towards him and the centrists, Rouhani is still essential, since he has the requisite technocratic skill to turn around Iran’s economy, which has been crippled by years of mismanagement and sanctions. His indispensability led the supreme leader, despite his hatred of the US government, to support the July 2015 nuclear deal.</p>
<p>But however “moderate” Rouhani has been in foreign affairs, he has done little to open up Iran’s political and cultural space. He has not tried to fulfil his promise to free Mousavi and other opposition leaders, and the judiciary and Revolutionary Guards have maintained a tight grip, with ever more artists, journalists, and activists detained since autumn 2015.</p>
<p>If the centrist-reformist bloc succeeds, it would not only embolden the government’s plan to stimulate the economy but could encourage Rouhani, Rafsanjani, and allies to push back against the post-2009 crackdown. That in turn would present the supreme leader, the judiciary, and the Revolutionary Guards with a stark choice: either allow some measure of “openness” in Iran’s post-sanctions politics, or reject it with their warnings of Western-fomented “<a href="http://eaworldview.com/2016/02/iran-daily-supreme-leader-leads-final-push-for-proper-elections/">sedition</a>”.</p>
<p>Through a combination of electoral management and those who do support hardliners and principlists, Ayatollah Khamenei will likely be able to claim another success for his model of what the Islamic Republic should be. But there is still a chance that he could be brought up short.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two of Iran’s more moderate political factions have joined together to make sure they’re not shut out of parliament.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/528782016-01-07T15:11:50Z2016-01-07T15:11:50ZThe Saudi-Iranian crisis reveals a deep power struggle in Tehran<p>Ever since Saudi Arabia’s execution of Shia dissident Nimr al-Nimr was met with violent protests at the Saudi embassy in Iran, the two already hostile countries have been at <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-years-of-proxy-war-saudi-arabia-and-iran-are-finally-squaring-up-in-the-open-52713">diplomatic loggerheads</a>. But while Saudi Arabia’s actions suggest a unity of purpose at the highest level, the Iranian reaction has not been uniform.</p>
<p>The Iranian government has severely criticised the attacks on Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic missions. President Hasan Rouhani <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/saudi-execution-call-for-west-to-condemn-killing-of-shia-cleric">attributed</a> the attacks to “rogue elements” who “want to damage the dignity of the Islamic Republic”.</p>
<p>By contrast, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and officials close to his office such as Tehran’s leader of Friday prayers, have tacitly or openly supported the protesters.</p>
<p>The official media, meanwhile, is similarly divided with reformist and pro-government newspapers and websites taking a critical but more measured line while conservative media and those close to the security and intelligence establishments have adopted a more aggressive tone.</p>
<p>These conflicting reactions stem from the deep ambivalence at the core of the Iranian state, which combines centres of power both popular and divine.</p>
<p>That contradiction is reflected in the country’s official name: the ‘Islamic Republic’ of Iran. This means that different and often competing ideological factions are constantly trying to dominate the state and its vast economic resources, and to shape Iran’s strategic direction both internally and externally.</p>
<p>Such rivalries can become particularly intense at critical domestic junctures and produce unintended consequences. The <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iran/2009/11/200911411259869709.html">massive 2009 protests</a> after the re-election of Mahmood Ahmadinejad, widely perceived as a fraudulent election, was a glaring example of how the intensified factional strife at the top of the Iranian regime can make it vulnerable to popular radicalism from below.</p>
<p>Iran might soon find itself in a similar situation. </p>
<h2>Trouble brewing</h2>
<p>Elections for both the parliament and the “<a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/assembly-experts">assembly of experts</a>” are <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/jun/15/irans-parliamentary-elections-february-2016-similar-turkey">set for February 2016</a>, and both are highly significant. If reformist candidates can enter into the parliament in large numbers, the Rouhani government will be further empowered to pursue its cautions but strategic rapprochement with the west.</p>
<p>Iranian conservatives fiercely oppose this. In fact, ever since the start of the nuclear negotiations with the US, Ayatollah Khamenei and his supporters have covertly and sometimes publicly tried to prevent the use of what he at the time described as “<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_how-the-ayatollahs-heroic-flexibility-could-save-the-iranian-nuclear-deal_378995.html">heroic flexibility</a>” as a licence for normalising relations with the US.</p>
<p>Consequently, the Rouhani government has been under constant fire from the conservative groups close to Khamenei for its “deviation” from the revolution’s anti-American path and making too many concessions to the West as part of the deal. For example, they severely criticised Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif for having had one-to-one meetings with his American counterpart John Kerry and demanded that sanctions be lifted immediately, rather than on condition of Iran’s compliance with the deal.</p>
<p>With reports suggesting the deterioration of Ayatollah Khamenei’s health, the elections for the assembly of experts, which selects the future leader, have also assumed unusual importance.</p>
<p>This is the complicated context behind the array of Iran’s divergent reactions to the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic crisis.</p>
<h2>Mixed messages</h2>
<p>Conservative factions seek to use Saudi Arabia’s provocation as a pretext to undermine Rouhani’s government and its pragmatic foreign policy as part of their broader campaign ahead of the elections. “We’ll turn America into an Islamic Republic,” read one of the placards in a recent demonstration in Tehran protesting Saudi Arabia’s execution of al-Nimr.</p>
<p>However, what is striking about the current reformist-conservative clash is that some prominent figures closely associated with the supreme leader have also criticised the attacks on Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic missions.</p>
<p>For example, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-iran-guards-idUKKBN0UK0JR20160106">harshly worded statement</a> threatening Saudi Arabia with retaliation for Nimr’s execution, the commander of the IRGC’s Tehran unit, Mohsen Kazemeini, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2016/01/160105_l39_saudi_embassy_sepah_reax">described</a> the attack on the Saudi embassy as “very wrong”, and rejected the claim that it was a “spontaneous move by the people”.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/news/inside-iran/1000000361-who-is-mostafa-pourmohammadi-a-profile-of-iranian-president-hassan-rouhanis-pick-for-minister-of-justice.html">Mostafa Pourmohammadi</a>, Iran’s justice minister, whose appointment by the president unofficially requires the approval of the supreme leader, has also <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-mystery-saudi-embassy-attack/27472372.html">said</a> that the attack could have been “planned and supported by infiltrator elements”. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the head of the police – also appointed by the supreme leader – responded to criticisms of its forces’ inability to prevent the protesters from attacking and entering the Saudi embassy by saying that “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2016/01/160105_l39_saudi_embassy_sepah_reax">sometimes we can’t beat the people</a>”. This sparked uproar on social media, where users mocked him by <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85%20%D8%B1%D8%A7%20%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF%20%D8%B2%D8%AF&src=typd">posting pictures of police brutality</a> during the 2009 protests.</p>
<p>The apparent difference of opinion within the conservative forces, the IRGC in particular, might reflect a real concern about the spread of sectarian conflict into Iran. After all, the country has a sizeable Sunni population, with plenty of grievances against state repression and discrimination. Or it might be that Rouhani and his still-influential ally, former president <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/14/rafsanjani-breaks-taboo-over-selection-of-irans-next-supreme-leader">Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani</a>, have managed to attract some prominent members of the IRGC and conservative factions into their camp.</p>
<p>At any rate, the fallout from this <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35251917">still-escalating</a> crisis proves that Iran’s political forces are still anything but reconciled – and it may turn out to be a bad omen indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52878/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kamran Matin is affiliated with UK Labour Party. </span></em></p>With parliamentary elections around the corner, Iran’s deep political conflicts are suddenly on full display.Kamran Matin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/501132015-11-16T11:10:30Z2015-11-16T11:10:30ZHow Islamic law can take on ISIS<p>The media coverage of the terrorist atrocities of Friday November 13 in Paris would seem to promote an almost mythical image of the Islamic State (ISIS). What humanity needs, however, is to demystify ISIS as a criminal organization. And that need is particularly important in my community – the Muslim community. </p>
<p>The vast majority of Muslims almost certainly (<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/10/how-to-measure-what-muslims-really-believe.html">we do not have exact figures)</a> feel moral revulsion and outrage about the violence perpetrated by ISIS. Indeed, Egypt’s top Sunni cleric, to name just one example, was quick to <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/166546/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-top-Muslim-cleric-denounces-hideous-Paris-a.aspx">denounce</a> the perpetrators of Friday’s “hideous and hateful” attacks. </p>
<p>However, the truth of the matter is that ISIS leaders and supporters can and do draw on a wealth of scriptural and historical sources to justify their actions. </p>
<p>Traditional interpretations of Sharia, or Islamic law, approved aggressive jihad to propagate Islam. They permitted the killing of captive enemy men. They allowed jihadis to enslave enemy women and children, as ISIS did with the <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2015/0814/ISIS-uses-theology-to-justify-rape-enslavement-of-Yazidi-women">Yazidi women in Syria</a>. </p>
<p>I am a Muslim scholar of Sharia. It is my contention that ISIS’ claim of Islamic legitimacy can be countered only by a viable alternative interpretation of Islamic law. </p>
<h2>Consensus leading to deadlock</h2>
<p>The key to understanding the role of Islam in politics is that there is no one authoritative entity that can establish or change Sharia doctrine for Muslims on any subject. </p>
<p>There is no equivalent of the Vatican and papal infallibility. How Sharia is interpreted by the many different communities of Muslims (from Sunni and Shia to Sufi and Salafi) is, at base, the product of an intergenerational consensus of the scholars and leaders of each community. </p>
<p>Islamic belief and practice is fundamentally individual and voluntary in its nature. A Muslim cannot be accountable for the views and actions of others. </p>
<p>One positive consequence of this absence of any one religious authority is the fact that it is possible to contest and reinterpret Sharia principles. </p>
<p>On the negative side, however, any Muslim can make any claim about Sharia if he or she can persuade a critical mass of Muslims to accept it. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayatollah Khomeini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roollah-khomeini.jpg">www.irdc.ir</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One example of this is how Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used the doctrine of <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-2980815921/khomeini-s-concept-of-governance-of-the-jurisconsult">“wilayat al-faqih”</a> (or guardianship of the jurist) to claim the authority to launch the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. </p>
<p>This was controversial because in doing so, he went against the consensus that authority for such a decision resided in the person of the 12th and last “living” Shia Imam, who disappeared (but did not die) in 874 and, it is believed, will reappear at the end of time as <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-vii-the-concept-of-mahdi-in-twelver-shiism">al-Mahdi.</a> </p>
<p>A more recent example is the <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/who-exactly-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-leader-isis-368907">creation of ISIS</a> by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his self-appointment as Caliph or successor of the Prophet Muhammed, divinely charged with resurrecting a state that ended 1,400 years ago.</p>
<h2>Things changed in the 10th century</h2>
<p>For the first 300 years of its existence, Islamic thought can be characterized as dynamic and creative, with differing interpretations of the scriptures being discussed and debated among communities and generations. Ijtihad, or independent juridical reasoning, was explicitly endorsed by the Prophet Muhammed. </p>
<p>Some modern Muslims, like the <a href="http://www.sistersinislam.org.my">Sisters in Islam</a> organization in Malaysia, are exercising ijtihad today to promote the human rights of women from an Islamic perspective. To those, then, who accept the Sisters’ interpretation, women are accorded equal rights according to Sharia. </p>
<p>But the Sisters and others like them are in a minority. </p>
<p>By the 10th century, a highly sophisticated body of Sharia principles, methodologies and schools of thought had taken shape and put down roots among Muslim communities across the ancient world, from West Africa to Southeast Asia. This phenomenon came to be known as “closing the Gate of Ijtihad,” to indicate that there is no theological space for new creative juridical thinking. </p>
<p>There was, of course, no “Gate of Ijtihad” to be closed, and nobody had the authority to close the gate even if one had existed. The metaphor, however, highlighted the contrast between the cultivation of diversity in the first three centuries of Sharia and the stalemate and rigidity of the study of Islamic law since then. </p>
<p>The “silver lining” of ISIS is that it is forcing Muslims to confront the consequences of archaic interpretations of aggressive jihad. </p>
<h2>Moving from Mecca to Medina</h2>
<p>The Prophet Muhammad was born and raised in Mecca, a town in western Arabia, where he proclaimed Islam in AD 610. In AD 622 he had to move with a small group of his early followers to Medina, another town in Western Arabia, in order to escape persecution and threats to his life. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Medina is 210 miles from Mecca.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Medina,_Saudi_Arabia_locator_map.png">NormanEinstein</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This migration not only affected <em>where</em> the revelations were made to the prophet – a fact that is noted in the Quran. It also marked a shift in the <em>content</em> of the Quran.</p>
<p>ISIS’ harsh and regressive interpretation of Sharia draws on the Quran of Medina, which repeatedly instructed Muslims to support each other and to separate themselves from non-Muslims. </p>
<p>For example, in verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=3&verse=28">3:28</a> (and 4:144, 8:72-73, 9:23, 71 and 60:1M), Muslims are prohibited from taking unbelievers (pagan or polytheist) as friends and supporters. Instead, they are instructed to look to other Muslims for friendship and support. </p>
<p>The whole of Chapter 9 – which is among the last revelations – categorically sanctions and authorizes aggressive jihad against all non-Muslims, including People of the Book or Christians and Jews (verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=9&verse=29">9:29</a>).</p>
<p>Yes, the term jihad is used in the Quran to mean nonviolent efforts to propagate Islam (see verses <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=29&verse=8">29:8</a>, 31:15 and 47:31). But that does not change the fact that the same term was also used to mean aggressive war to propagate Islam. </p>
<p>This latter interpretation was, in fact, sanctioned by the actions and explicit instructions of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Islamic-Reformation-International-Contemporary/dp/0815627068">the prophet himself</a>, and by his most senior followers, who subsequently became his first four successors and the rulers or Caliphs of Medina. </p>
<h2>Legitimate or illegitimate?</h2>
<p>A related difficulty in this whole discussion is that according to Sharia, jihad can only be launched by a legitimate state authority. </p>
<p>ISIS claims to have Islamic legitimacy, but what is the basis of that secretive claim? Who nominated them, and why and how should the Caliph of ISIS have authority over the global Muslim community? </p>
<p>Since this authority is based on an entirely open and free process of individual choice, ISIS’ claim may succeed to the extent it is supported by a critical mass of Muslims. </p>
<p>The danger is that passive acquiescence can be used by ISIS leaders as evidence of positive support. </p>
<p>After all, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/world/middleeast/as-us-escalates-air-war-on-isis-allies-slip-away.html?_r=0">only a handful of Muslim majority states </a> – and then only under Western leadership – have shown willingness to resist the military expansion of ISIS. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the masses of Muslims and their community leaders are not – tellingly – turning to Sharia to justify their opposition to ISIS claims. Many Muslims have condemned ISIS for moral or political reasons, but this, likely, is discredited among ISIS supporters as “Western” reasoning. </p>
<h2>An alternative view</h2>
<p>What then is needed is an alternative view of Sharia, one that argues that the scriptural sources that ISIS relies on must be seen in their wider historical context. </p>
<p>These principles, in other words, may have been relevant and applicable 1,400 years ago, when war – wherever it was being waged in the world – was much more harsh than it is now. Exclusive Muslim solidarity (wala’) then was essential for the survival of the community and success of their mission. </p>
<p>But today, the opposite is true. </p>
<p>Modern international law as stated in <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/principles.shtml">Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945</a> (a universally binding treaty) affirms equal sovereignty of all states regardless of religious belief, and prohibits the acquisition of territory through aggressive war. </p>
<p>While these principles have been violated by the major powers – recent examples include the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2014 – it is impossible for any state, including those with a Muslim majority, to accept being forced into a self-proclaimed Islamic state, as ISIS claims to have an Islamic mandate to do. </p>
<p>But for an alternative view of Sharia to emerge and take root through modern consensus, Muslims must first acknowledge and confront the problem of having acquiesced to a traditional interpretation of Sharia and ignored alternatives that would condemn ISIS as un-Islamic.</p>
<p>One place to start is with the writing of the Sudanese religious thinker <a href="http://www.alfikra.org/index_e.php">Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha</a>, who proposed repudiating the specific principles of Sharia authorizing aggressive jihad, slavery and subordination of women and non-Muslims by relying on the earlier revelations from Mecca. For example, verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=16&verse=125">16:125</a> says: “Propagate the path of your Lord in wisdom and peaceable advice, and argue with them in a kind manner” (see also verses 17:70,49:13 and 88:21-22).</p>
<p>As Taha explained in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Second-Message-Contemporary-Issues-Middle/dp/081562705X">The Second Message of Islam</a>, the Sharia principles based on the Medina revelations came about in response to the historical conditions of seventh-century Arabia. </p>
<p>Taha argued that today it is the earlier message of Islam based on the Mecca revelations that is applicable because humanity is ready to live up to those standards.</p>
<p>Despite – or perhaps because of – the desperate need for alternatives to traditional Sharia interpretations, Taha was executed for apostasy in Sudan in 1985, and his books in Arabic continue to be banned in most Arab countries. </p>
<p>And ISIS continues to recruit. </p>
<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State can survive only by fighting a permanent war. It is my contention that it will either implode or collapse in a total civil war because it has no viable political system for peaceful administration or transfer of power. </p>
<p>But whenever it collapses and for whatever cause, the world can only expect a new ISIS to emerge every time one disappears until we Muslims are able to discuss openly the deadlock in reforming Sharia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50113/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Muslim scholar proposes the discussion of an alternative interpretation of Sharia that will challenge ISIS’ claims to Islamic legitimacy.Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/465032015-09-14T10:15:03Z2015-09-14T10:15:03ZCan Iran’s rulers still use enemies abroad to rally nation?<p>The rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran have routinely used external conflicts to divert public attention from domestic problems, deflect attacks, promote national cohesion, and repress their opponents. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied Iran’s political development and conflicts for close to four decades, I would argue that much of the tension between Iran and the US over the past 40-odd years, including the current nuclear dispute with the international community, can be seen in this light. </p>
<p>Democratic activists in Iran may hope that <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-historic-deal-for-iran-and-the-world-44641">the signing of the international nuclear deal</a> will curb the country’s regime from further militarizing the state and repressing the opposition, but I argue that it is more likely that Iran’s leadership will continue their contentious pattern.</p>
<h2>Shia clerics and the CIA on the same side?</h2>
<p>Some may think that the origins of the clergy’s opposition to the United States date back to 1953 when a CIA-backed coup removed the liberal, democratic government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from power. That is not the case, however, <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/history-used-and-abused.html">as the archives show</a>.</p>
<p>While the majority of Iranians supported the democratic government and opposed the coup, some of the highest Shiite religious leaders in Iran welcomed Mosaddegh’s ouster. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=726&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94537/original/image-20150911-1572-148soay.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mohmmad,Mosaddegh2.jpg">www.bbcpersian.com</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Conservative religious leaders viewed Mosaddegh as too liberal and secular because he refused to ban the sale of alcohol and did not oppose women’s right to vote. What is more, he promoted <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/08/history-used-and-abused.html">agrarian reforms</a> that increased the income of the peasants in Iran’s sharecropping system and therefore undermined the interest of some of the landed clergy.</p>
<p>Leading cleric Ayatollah Behbahani, for example, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7pIZBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=ayatollah+behbahani&source=bl&ots=GJKUK8eLjW&sig=_Ju82qxMFF_XRd0yCcr91rfdN0w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwADgKahUKEwjO3Jic47rHAhWGdD4KHVMCC5Q#v=onepage&q=ayatollah%20behbahani&f=false">played an active role </a>in the overthrow of the prime minister. He actually distributed American money among conspirators, which became known as Behbahani dollars. </p>
<p>When the coup first failed and the Shah (or the king of Iran) who had (after initial reluctance) ordered the coup fled the country on August 16 1953, Ayatollah Boroujerdi, the highest religious leader in the country, sent a telegram to the Shah <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Social_Origins_of_the_Iranian_Revolution.html?id=pI9oAtnFzhAC">asking him</a> to return to the country because “Shiism and Islam need you.” </p>
<p>Ayatollah Khomeini, who would end up the leader of the revolution against the Shah in 1979, <a href="http://jahannews.com/vdcdjk0s5yt0on6.2a2y.html">also made clear</a> his dislike of the prime minister: Mosaddegh was not Muslim and had he stayed in power, he would have slapped Islam. </p>
<p>When the coup finally did succeed in removing Mosaddegh from power, conservative clerics were delighted to welcome back the Shah and his new prime minister, General Zahedi. To give just one example, Ayatollah Boroujerdi congratulated General Zahedi, wishing him luck in the responsibility he had accepted to serve Islam. </p>
<p>Many Iranian intellectuals and members of the public, however, had a different view, and this, in turn, affected the popular image of Americans. </p>
<h2>A change of attitude toward Americans</h2>
<p>For decades, Iranians had admired Americans for their work promoting Iran’s democracy and development. They knew, for example, of <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/paw/archive_new/PAW06-07/13-0509/features1_heroiran.html">Howard Baskerville</a>, a Princeton graduate who was a teacher at the American Memorial School in the city of Tabriz, one of the historic capitals of the country, who died along side Iranian freedom fighters during Iran’s <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e450">constitutional revolution of 1905-1911</a>. </p>
<p>Iranians had seen American doctors and nurses in Iran’s health care system. They credited American missionaries, such as <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/jordan-samuel-martin">Dr Samuel Martin Jordan</a>, with establishing excellent schools in the country, including <a href="http://www.alborzhighschool.com/">Alborz</a>, one of the two finest high schools still operating in Tehran. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=702&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=702&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94534/original/image-20150911-1566-ddnxk6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=702&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graffiti from 1953.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yankee_go_home_graffiti.png">Iranian Archives</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the coup, Iranian intellectuals no longer viewed Americans as missionaries, democrats, teachers, nurses and doctors, but as oilmen, spies and military men. </p>
<p>More importantly, many distrusted Americans because they probably had destroyed the country’s democracy. </p>
<h2>Khomeini’s role in fanning anti-Americanism</h2>
<p>Once Ayatollah Khomeini seized power, he capitalized on widespread popular sentiment against the United States after students took over the US Embassy on November 4 1979. </p>
<p>Through the hostage crisis, Khomeini promoted national cohesion, expelling his former allies from the government and repressing leftist and liberal dissidents who did not support the theocracy. </p>
<p>Referring to another external conflict, the Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini <a href="http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n23098/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B3_%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C_%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C/%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87/%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9_%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3_%D8%AF%D8%B1_%DA%A9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%AE%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C_%D8%B3_">declared it publicly</a> to be a godsend and blessing that promoted national cohesion and unity. </p>
<p>Using the hostage crisis and the war against Iraq, Khomeini repressed his opponents and betrayed the promises of political freedom and economic equity, for which Iranians had fought. </p>
<p>Between 1981 and 1985, the Islamic regime executed or killed approximately 12,000 leftist and liberal dissidents. The new Islamic Republic executed <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/06/iran-1988">thousands</a> of <a href="http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3158-deadly-fatwa-iran-s-1988-prison-massacre.html">political prisoners</a> in a matter of a few months in the summer of 1988. In other words, between 1981 and 1988, Khomeini and the ruling clergy executed or killed approximately 15,000 people, several times more than those killed by the monarchy during the revolutionary struggles between 1977 and 1979. </p>
<h2>Ahmadinejad pumps up volume</h2>
<p>Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005 led to another round of internal and external conflicts for Iran.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94539/original/image-20150911-1569-ou2f3c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad making a point at Columbia University.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad.jpg">Daniella Zalcman from New York City, . Website http://dan.iella.net/.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He intensified <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0625/p06s12-wome.html">anti-American</a> and <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/world/middleeast/in-iran-ahmadinejad-calls-israel-insult-to-humankind.html">anti-Israeli </a> rhetoric while, at the same time, promising to improve economic conditions for the poor, as Khomeini had done in 1979. </p>
<p>Instead, however, Ahmadinejad’s administration expanded corruption and cronyism. As a result, the Islamic Republic’s standing in the corruption rankings, according to <a href="http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009">Transparency International</a>, dropped from 79 out of 133 countries in 2004 to 168 of 180 countries in 2009. At the same time, the regime resumed repressing dissidents, labor activists, women, and religious and ethnic minorities, arresting hundreds of people before the disputed presidential elections of 2009. </p>
<p>Not surprisingly, Ahmadinejad’s policies set the stage for domestic conflicts that erupted in the aftermath of the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8505645.stm">disputed presidential election of 2009</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/94541/original/image-20150911-1566-e6941o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protesting in Tehran 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tehran_protest_(1).jpg">DSC_6990_resize</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Alleged fraud ignited the <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/iran-primer-the-green-movement.html">Green Movement</a> that challenged the foundation of the Islamic Republic. Protesters chanted slogans such as “Where is my vote?” and “Death to the Dictator.” </p>
<p>Protests quickly radicalized and targeted Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. “Khamenei is a murderer, his leadership is revoked” and “Death to the government that deceives the people” were among the rallying cries. </p>
<p>The movement endured for 20 months before being repressed by the regime at <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2009/jun/29/iran-election-dead-detained">a cost of more than 100 dissidents slain and thousands arrested</a>.</p>
<h2>The people are struggling for democracy</h2>
<p>While the ruling clergy and the Revolutionary Guard have accumulated vast fortunes and control Iran’s political system, ordinary Iranians continue to defy theocratic rule through passive resistance.</p>
<p>Despite the regime’s efforts to expand the practice of Islam, more than half of the country’s mosques are inactive during the year. In fact, according to a recent announcement by General Zia eddin Hozni, <a href="http://farsnews.com/printable.php?nn=13940615000787">only 5%</a> of the Shiite (the majority of the population) mosques are fully operational during the year. Seventy-five percent of Iranians and 86% of the students do not say the obligatory <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/822312.stm">daily prayers.</a> They are, in effect, refusing to be coerced into heaven.</p>
<p>Despite risking severe state punishment, alcohol consumption and sex have spread to the high schools. Women push back their veils at every opportunity. <a href="http://tabrizefarda.com/city-page.php?id=109">A poll in Tehran</a> found that 71% of women did not observe the proper Islamic rules regarding the hijab. </p>
<p>Such widespread resistance demonstrates Iranians’ struggles for democracy and liberty have not ended. </p>
<p>The 1979 revolution unleashed powerful forces, enabling the Islamic clergy to seize power and impose a theocracy, which none of the major constituencies in Iranian society had demanded during the revolutionary struggles.</p>
<p>The theocracy, in turn, generated new, multiple conflicts that adversely affected broad segments of the population, leading to dissent and resistance, necessitating repression.</p>
<p>While democratic forces <a href="http://inthesetimes.com/article/18230/iranian-dissidents-explain-why-they-support-the-nuclear-deal">welcome</a> the resolution of nuclear issues, the Islamic Republic’s rulers are unlikely to cease their anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric. </p>
<p>Rather, given this theocracy’s history, its leaders are more likely to focus on external conflicts in order to shore up their power base, deflect attacks, divert attention from unresolved internal problems and repress demands for democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46503/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misagh Parsa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The nuclear deal may be signed, but the history of the Islamic regime shows they will continue to rely on external conflicts to consolidate power.Misagh Parsa, Professor of Sociology, Dartmouth CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.