tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/belt-and-road-initiative-38964/articlesBelt and Road Initiative – The Conversation2024-02-09T06:38:56Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223812024-02-09T06:38:56Z2024-02-09T06:38:56ZWhoever wins the presidential election, Indonesia will remain close to China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574378/original/file-20240208-28-768nmp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C2%2C374%2C239&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>The world’s third-largest democracy, Indonesia, eagerly awaits the outcome of the presidential election on Feb. 14. </p>
<p>Speculations are <a href="https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3848517/pakar-politik-gibran-efektif-meningkatkan-elektabilitas-prabowo">rife</a> that former general Prabowo Subianto and his running mate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the son of the current President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, will secure the largest number of votes, despite the possibility of a runoff later this year.</p>
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<p>. </p>
<p>Prabowo is running against Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo for the presidency. With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-twist-in-indonesias-presidential-election-does-not-bode-well-for-the-countrys-fragile-democracy-216007">controversy over Gibran’s nomination</a> as Prabowo’s running mate, including <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-66531834">accusations his father is abusing his power</a>, the former general is expected to face fierce competition from both Anies (who is backed by Muslim conservatives) and Ganjar (who is supported by the country’s biggest political party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). </p>
<p>Regardless of the election outcome, as experts in China-Indonesia relations, we believe Indonesia’s stance towards China will likely remain steady, albeit with some minor variations depending on the victor.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574379/original/file-20240208-20-uvpmav.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Stacks of election ballot papers at a polling station in Aceh during the 2019 election.</span>
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<h2>Why China will remain a vital partner</h2>
<p>Economically, China is a significant trading partner and source of investment for Indonesia, offering considerable development funds and economic opportunities. </p>
<p>In 2022, China’s investment in Indonesia, the largest economy in Southeast Asia, <a href="https://nswi.bkpm.go.id/data_statistik">surged</a> to US$5.18 billion – the highest level in the past decade. While the number of Chinese-sponsored projects in Indonesia <a href="https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2023/01/11/investasi-tiongkok-di-indonesia-melonjak-63-pada-2022">dropped</a> from 1,800 in 2021 to around 1,580 in 2022, the monetary value of these investments skyrocketed by almost <a href="https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2023/01/11/investasi-tiongkok-di-indonesia-melonjak-63-pada-2022">64%</a>. </p>
<p>China’s major infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also aligns with Indonesia’s development goals, offering opportunities for infrastructure development and economic cooperation. According to <a href="https://docs.aiddata.org/reports/belt-and-road-reboot/Belt_and_Road_Reboot_Full_Report.pdf">a recent report</a>, Indonesia is one of the top recipients of BRI funding in the world, with its total debt to China now reaching $54.8 billion.</p>
<p>So, whoever wins the upcoming election will not drastically depart from Indonesia’s current foreign policy stance. Continuing the country’s friendly relations with China is both plausible and strategic. </p>
<p>Our latest <a href="https://celios.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CELIOS%20-%20Policy%20Brief%20Kandidat%20Calon%20Presiden%202024%20dan%20China.pdf">report</a> provides insight into the candidates’ potential approaches to China if elected, based on their engagements with Chinese officials in the past.</p>
<p>Prabowo has notably engaged extensively with China, meeting several times with Xiao Qian, the former Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, between <a href="https://celios.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CELIOS%20-%20Policy%20Brief%20Kandidat%20Calon%20Presiden%202024%20dan%20China.pdf">2018 and 2022</a>. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574380/original/file-20240208-22-2pyfww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Prabowo Subianto.</span>
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<p>He intends to continue this engagement and seek Chinese investment in the infrastructure and food security sectors. </p>
<p>His running mate, Gibran, has had limited interactions with China himself. However, he would be associated with his father’s close ties to China, which have taken precedence during his time in office.</p>
<p>Since Jokowi became president, China has evolved into Indonesia’s largest trading partner and investor, with Chinese exports to Indonesia surging to <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports/indonesia">$71.32 billion</a> in 2022, up from less than <a href="https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/research/20240114164004-128-505495/besok-diumumkan-bukti-jokowi-ri-bisa-kalahkan-china">$40 billion</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>Ganjar, when he was still the Governor of Central Java, discussed a number of investment cooperation, particularly in his region, with Chinese officials. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, his running mate, Mahfud MD, the coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs under Jokowi, has focused on sensitive geopolitical issues in his job, including legal and human rights. However, he has been <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/indonesia-election-matters-for-china-relations-environment/">critical</a> of China’s policies. </p>
<p>While Chinese investments bring opportunities for development, they have also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cw4m1k0j7vro">raised concerns</a> among some communities about environmental degradation, cost overruns and labour issues.</p>
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<p>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/report-says-southeast-asias-first-high-speed-train-project-in-indonesia-is-not-friendly-for-people-with-disabilities-what-should-the-government-do-184150">$8 billion</a> high-speed railway project in the capital Jakarta, <a href="https://bandung.kompas.com/read/2022/06/17/151631078/proyek-kereta-cepat-sebabkan-banjir-dan-rusak-sekolah-pt-kcic-minta-maaf">for instance</a>, has prompted fears over increased risks of landslides and impacts on water supplies. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574381/original/file-20240208-30-bnynb4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An officer stands beside a high-speed train linking Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, and Bandung in West Java.</span>
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<p>Several Chinese nickel mining projects in Central Sulawesi have also encountered opposition due to <a href="https://celios.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CELIOS-Debt-Trap-China-in-Indonesia-report-ENGLISH.pdf">reported</a> environmental damage and adverse effects on local communities. </p>
<p>Concerns have also been raised about the <a href="https://www.mongabay.co.id/2020/03/06/nasib-orangutan-tapanuli-dengan-kehadiran-proyek-plta-batang-toru/">Batang Toru hydropower project</a> in Sumatra, which threatens the habitat of the critically endangered Tapanuli orangutan.</p>
<p>In contrast, Anies has primarily interacted with Western countries, with limited engagement with China. His vice presidential candidate, Muhaimin Iskandar, has had more interactions with Chinese officials recently, potentially compensating for Anies’ lack of experience. </p>
<p>It is expected that leaders like Anies or Ganjar may place greater emphasis on sustainable development and community engagement in Chinese-funded projects, aiming to balance economic growth with environmental protection and social welfare.</p>
<h2>Modification of China-friendly policy</h2>
<p>Given China’s rising global power status and presence in Southeast Asia, Indonesia recognises the strategic importance of engaging with China.</p>
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<p>However, Indonesia must maintain a delicate balance between its relations with China and its alliances with other major powers, such as the United States and regional partners like Japan and Australia. </p>
<p>By engaging with China, Indonesia aims to navigate the complexities of regional geopolitics while safeguarding its sovereignty and national interests. Striking a balance between economic development and sustainable practices will also be important in shaping its future relations with China. </p>
<p>Whoever is elected must acknowledge Indonesia’s bargaining power with China.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=235&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/574383/original/file-20240208-26-ttbnrj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Panoramic cityscape of Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta at sunset.</span>
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<p>Indonesia boasts the largest economy in Southeast Asia. It also has a significant position as a member of the G20 group of major economies, reflecting international confidence in its economic strength. In addition, Indonesia’s strategic location makes it a crucial part of China’s BRI ambitions.</p>
<p>By leveraging its strategic position and engaging in meaningful dialogue with China, Indonesia can pave the way for mutually beneficial cooperation that promotes sustainable development and prosperity for both nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Para penulis tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi di luar afiliasi akademis yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia’s stance towards China is poised to remain steady, albeit with nuanced variations depending on the victor.Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, Researcher, Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS)Yeta Purnama, Researcher, Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179602023-12-13T13:35:56Z2023-12-13T13:35:56ZGrowth of autocracies will expand Chinese global influence via Belt and Road Initiative as it enters second decade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564937/original/file-20231211-23-i4omvy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Xi Jinping shakes hands with Chinese construction workers at a Belt and Road Initiative site in Trinidad and Tobago in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-shake-hands-with-chinese-news-photo/169793922">Frederic Dubray/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China currently faces <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/10/18/chinas-economy-may-be-growing-faster-but-big-problems-remain">daunting challenges</a> in its domestic economy. But weakness in the real estate market and consumer spending at home is unlikely to stem its rising influence abroad. </p>
<p>In mid-October 2023, China celebrated the 10-year anniversary of its <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-turns-10-xi-announces-8-new-priorities-continues-push-for-global-influence-216014">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, or BRI. The BRI seeks to connect China with countries around the world via land and maritime networks, with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade and stimulating economic growth. Through the expansion of the BRI, China also sought to extend its global influence, especially in developing regions.</p>
<p>During its first decade, the initiative has faced a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-of-trouble/?sh=124d92a5443d">barrage of criticism from the West</a>, mainly for saddling countries with debt, inattention to environmental impact, and corruption. </p>
<p>It has also encountered unexpected challenges – notably the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to massive supply chain issues and restrictions on the movement of Chinese workers overseas. Yet, as the BRI heads into its second decade, global economic trends suggest it will continue to play an important role in spreading Chinese influence.</p>
<p>I’m an associate professor of global studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, where I teach about <a href="https://hss.cuhk.edu.cn/en/teacher/1126">business-government relations</a> in emerging economies. In my new book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-chance-to-lead/2C88E7D955049471664120981CDF2DFB">China’s Chance to Lead</a>,” I discuss which countries have already and are now most likely to seek out and benefit from Chinese spending. Understanding this helps explain why China and the Belt and Road Initiative are poised to benefit greatly from the global economy over the next several decades.</p>
<h2>Malaysia’s unlikely prominence</h2>
<p>In October 2013, China President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the maritime portion of the BRI during a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24361172">speech in Jakarta</a>. At the time, Indonesia appeared to be an ideal candidate for Chinese infrastructure spending, yet it was Malaysia – surprisingly – that emerged as a far more avid participant. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aerial view of massive housing development in Malaysia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564350/original/file-20231207-15-siwmcd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A view of Forest City, a condominium project launched under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in Malaysia’s Johor state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-aerial-photo-taken-on-june-16-2022-shows-a-general-news-photo/1241336726">Mohd Rasfan/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>In comparison to Malaysia, Indonesia’s economy was <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">three times larger</a> and its population <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">nearly nine times bigger</a>, yet its gross domestic product per capita only was <a href="https://www.worlddata.info/country-comparison.php?country1=IDN&country2=MYS">one-third as high</a>. Indonesia also had enormous potential to increase its already substantial <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/idn/partner/chn">natural resources exports to China</a>. Taken together, these factors point to Indonesia’s far greater demand for infrastructure that would aid its economic development. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Indonesia’s democratic institutions were more conducive to attracting foreign investment. Its checks and balances enhanced policy stability and reduced political risk. By contrast, Malaysia’s government, which was dominated by a single ruling party coalition, lacked comparable checks and balances.</p>
<p>Despite Indonesia’s numerous advantages, Malaysia attracted a far larger volume of BRI spending during its first several years. Data provided by the <a href="https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/">China Global Investment Tracker</a> indicates the value of newly announced infrastructure projects in Malaysia surged from US$3.5 billion in 2012 to over $8.6 billion in 2016. Spending in Indonesia, meanwhile, rose modestly from $3.75 billion to $3.77 billion over the same period.</p>
<p>Malaysia also enthusiastically participated in the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/">Digital Silk Road</a>, or DSR, launched in 2015. The DSR is the technological dimension of the BRI that aims to improve digital connectivity in Belt and Road countries. Malaysia Prime Minister Najib Razak engaged Jack Ma, the co-founder of Chinese tech giant Alibaba, as an adviser to develop e-commerce in 2016. This led to the creation in 2017 of a <a href="https://www.nst.com.my/business/2017/11/298317/%C2%A0digital-free-trade-zone-goes-live-nov-3">Digital Free Trade Zone</a>, an international e-commerce logistics hub next to the Kuala Lumpur International Airport.</p>
<p>With this foundation in place, Malaysia’s capital went on to become the first city outside China to adopt Alibaba’s <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/alibaba-city-brain-artificial-intelligence-china-kuala-lumpur">City Brain</a> smart city solution in January 2018. City Brain uses the wealth of urban data to effectively allocate public resources, improve social governance and promote sustainable urban development. <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pivotal-year-city-brain-other-middle-east-ai-news-carrington-malin-/">Dubai and other cities in the Middle East</a> followed. </p>
<p>Digital Silk Road projects in Indonesia during that period were far fewer, slower and less ambitious. They primarily involved the expansion of <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-IndoChina-Updated.pdf">Chinese smartphone and e-commerce firms</a> in Indonesia.</p>
<p>What accounts for these contrasting responses? The short answer: their political regimes. And understanding that could be key to the global spread of Chinese influence in the coming years.</p>
<h2>State-owned business and clientelism</h2>
<p>In the lead-up to the May 2018 election, Malaysia’s ruling party and its allies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341803700307">worried they could lose power</a> after six decades of rule. Desperate to bolster support, Najib quickly identified <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/what-happened-to-chinas-bri-projects-in-malaysia/">numerous infrastructure megaprojects</a> in which Chinese state-owned businesses could partner with Malaysian counterparts.</p>
<p>Indonesia, by contrast, placed far greater emphasis on projects led by private business. For example, the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, “<a href="https://www.wired.com/story/workers-are-dying-in-the-ev-industrys-tainted-city/">the world’s epicenter for nickel production</a>,” is one of the largest Chinese investments in Indonesia and a joint venture between private Chinese and Indonesian companies. </p>
<p>As I discuss in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/chinas-chance-to-lead/2C88E7D955049471664120981CDF2DFB">my book</a>, when rulers in autocracies with semi-competitive elections, like Malaysia’s, have a weak hold on power, their desire for Chinese spending is amplified. This relates to <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095617734">clientelism</a>, or the delivery of goods and services in exchange for political support.</p>
<p>A higher level of state control in autocracies grants political leaders greater influence over the allocation of clientelist benefits, which aids leaders’ reelection efforts. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Najib Razak, prime minister of Malaysia, and Jack Ma Yun, founder of Alibaba Group, stand and clap" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/564351/original/file-20231207-27-yxvnt3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Najib Razak, left, then-prime minister of Malaysia, and Jack Ma, Alibaba Group founder and executive chairman, attend a launch ceremony of the Digital Free Trade Zone in Kuala Lumpur.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/najib-razak-prime-minister-of-malaysia-and-jack-ma-yun-news-photo/1092858894">Thomas Yau/South China Morning Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Economic trends that will benefit China</h2>
<p>Even if China’s future growth is lower than the pre-pandemic period, these four features of the global economy are poised to benefit China and the Belt and Road Initiative over the next several decades. </p>
<p><strong>1. Global rise of autocracies</strong> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf">Over 60% of developing countries</a> are autocratic, according to data provided by the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/">Varieties of Democracy Project</a>. This represented 72% of the global population in 2022, up from 46% in 2012. </p>
<p>For decades, the World Bank and affiliated regional development banks were the only game in town for development financing to low- and middle-income countries. Consequently, these global lenders could demand liberalizing reforms that were sometimes contrary to the interests of incumbent rulers, especially autocrats. </p>
<p>China’s rise has created an attractive alternative for autocratic regimes, especially since it does not impose the same kinds of conditions that often require loosening state controls on the corporate sector and reducing clientelism. Between 2014 and 2019, I find that 77% of total BRI spending on construction projects went to autocracies, and primarily to those with semi-competitive elections.</p>
<p><strong>2. Demand for Chinese infrastructure spending</strong></p>
<p>The economies of developing countries have grown <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/WEOWORLD/ADVEC/OEMDC">more than twice as quickly</a> as advanced economies since 2000 and are projected to <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/research-insights/economy/the-world-in-2050.html">outpace advanced economies</a> in the decades ahead. On the eve of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991, developing economies accounted for 37% of global GDP; by 2030, the International Monetary Fund projects they will account for <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD">around 63%</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, the global infrastructure financing gap – that is, the money needed to build and upgrade existing infrastructure – is estimated to be around <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-global-infrastructure-financing-gap-where-sovereign-wealth-funds-swfs-and-pension-funds-can-come-in/#:%7E:text=The%20global%20infrastructure%20financing%20gap%20is%20estimated%20to%20be%20around,year%20in%20the%20infrastructure%20sector.">$15 trillion</a> by 2040. To fill this gap, the world must spend just under $1 trillion more than the previous year up through 2040, with most of this spending directed toward low-income economies.</p>
<p>Because many of these fast-growing, low-income countries are predominantly semicompetitive autocracies, China is well-positioned to expand its global influence via the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p><strong>3. Emerging tech</strong></p>
<p>The advent of what is known as <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-are-industry-4-0-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-and-4ir">Industry 4.0 technologies</a>, such as artificial intelligence, big data analytics and blockchain, could enable developing countries to <a href="https://hub.unido.org/sites/default/files/publications/Unlocking%20the%20Potential%20of%20Industry%204.0%20for%20Developing%20Countries.pdf">leapfrog stages of development</a>. </p>
<p>By creating <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/setting-the-standards-locking-in-chinas-technological-influence/">new technical standards</a> to be used in these emerging digital technologies, China aims to lock in Chinese digital products and services and lock out non-Chinese competitors wherever its standards are adopted. </p>
<p>In Tanzania, for example, the Chinese company contracted to deploy the national ICT broadband network constructed it to be <a href="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Chinas%20Digital%20Silk%20Road%20and%20Africas%20Technological%20Future_FINAL.pdf">compatible only with routers</a> made by Chinese firm Huawei. </p>
<p>Incorporating digital technologies into hard infrastructure projects – digital traffic sensors on roads, for example – presents more opportunities for China to use the Belt and Road Initiative to promote adoption of its technologies and standards globally.</p>
<p><strong>4. Urbanization</strong></p>
<p>Finally, the developing world’s <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization#:%7E:text=Across%20all%20countries%2C%20urban%20shares,from%2054%25%20in%202016">urban population</a> is expected to rise from 35% in 1990 to 65% by 2050. The biggest increases will likely occur in the semi-competitive autocracies of Africa. A desire for sustainable urbanization will increase the demand for infrastructure that incorporates digital technologies – once again amplifying the opportunity for China and the BRI. </p>
<p>Understanding what drives the demand for the Belt and Road Initiative, and the trends that will propel it into the future, is vital for the West to devise an effective strategy that counters China’s rising global influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Carney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>More autocratic governments, growing urbanization and emerging technologies will bolster the spread of Chinese influence around the world, an expert on emerging economies explains.Richard Carney, Associate professor of global studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, ShenzhenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162462023-11-03T16:00:49Z2023-11-03T16:00:49ZIsrael-Hamas war puts China’s strategy of ‘balanced diplomacy’ in the Middle East at risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557344/original/file-20231102-25-h92iq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C152%2C6000%2C3817&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's President Xi Jinping meets Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas in Beijing on June 14, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-shakes-hands-with-palestinian-news-photo/1258685965?adppopup=true">Jade Gao/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Oct. 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-31/ty-article/in-the-chinese-digital-world-israel-is-no-longer-on-the-map/0000018b-8643-d805-a98f-b6db4e2f0000">reports began to circulate</a> that <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-31/ty-article/in-the-chinese-digital-world-israel-is-no-longer-on-the-map/0000018b-8643-d805-a98f-b6db4e2f0000">Israel was missing from from the mapping services</a> provided by Chinese tech companies Baidu and Alibaba, effectively signaling – or so some believed – that Beijing was siding with Hamas over Israel in the ongoing war.</p>
<p>Within hours, Chinese officials <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-map-israel-gaza-conflict-denial-1839849">began to push back</a> on that narrative, pointing out that the names do appear on the country’s official maps and that the maps offered by China’s tech companies had not changed at all since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. Indeed, the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/topic/china-foreign-policy">Chinese Foreign Ministry</a> took the opportunity to go further, emphasizing that China was not taking sides in the conflict. Rather, Beijing said it respected both Israel’s right to self defense and the rights of the Palestinian people under international humanitarian law.</p>
<p>This assertion of balance and even-handedness should have come as a surprise to no one. It has been the bedrock of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3210855/china-pulls-balancing-act-middle-east-ties-how-long">China’s strategic approach to the Middle East</a> for more than a decade, during which time Beijing has sought to portray itself as a friend to all in the region and the enemy of none. </p>
<p>But the map episode underscores a problem Beijing faces over the current crisis. The <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/26102023-new-power-polarization-in-israel-hamas-crisis-analysis/">polarization that has set in</a> over this conflict – in both the Middle East itself <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2023/10/26/israel-hamas-war-the-danger-of-political-polarization-in-france_6205255_23.html">and around</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/29/gaza-protest-demonstration-ceasefire-israel-hamas-offensive/">the world</a> – is making Beijing’s strategic approach to the Middle East increasingly difficult to sustain. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/andrewlatham/">scholar who teaches classes on China’s foreign policy</a>, I believe that the Israel-Hamas war is posing the sternest test yet <strong>of</strong> President Xi Jinping’s Middle East strategy – that to date has been centered around the <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/no-china-hasnt-shifted-its-approach-to-iran/">concept of “balanced diplomacy</a>.” Growing <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-weibo-social-media-israel-palestine-support-blame-war-gaza-2023-10">pro-Palestinian sentiment</a> in China – and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/chinas-response-to-the-israel-hamas-conflict-reflects-its-longstanding-support-for-palestine">country’s historic sympathies</a> in the region – suggest that if Xi is forced off the impartiality road, he will side with the Palestinians over the Israelis.</p>
<p>But it is a choice Beijing would rather not make – and for wise economic and foreign policy reasons. Making such a choice would, I believe, effectively mark the end of China’s decade-long effort to positioning itself as an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/">influential “helpful fixer” in the region</a> – an outside power that seeks to broker peace deals and create a truly inclusive regional economic and security order.</p>
<h2>Beijing’s objectives and strategies</h2>
<p>Whereas in decades past the conventional wisdom in diplomatic circles was that China was not that invested in the Middle East, this has not been true since about 2012. From that time onward, China has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/">invested considerable diplomatic energy</a> building its influence in the region.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men in suits shake hands in front of Chinese and Israeli flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557348/original/file-20231102-15-ujguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shakes hands with China’s President Xi Jinping in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinas-president-xi-jinping-and-israels-prime-minister-news-photo/655959948?adppopup=true">Etienne Oliveau/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Beijing’s overall strategic vision for the Middle East is one in which U.S. influence is significantly reduced while China’s is significantly enhanced.</p>
<p>On the one hand, this is merely a regional manifestation of a global vision – as set out in a series of Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-community-of-common-destiny-in-xi-jinpings-new-era/">Community of Common Destiny</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/theres-more-to-chinas-new-global-development-initiative-than-meets-the-eye/">Global Development Initiative</a>, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/">Global Security Initiative</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/19/xi-china-global-civilization-cultural-history-rebrand/">Global Civilization Initiative</a> – all of which are designed, in part at least, to appeal to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">countries in the Global South</a> that feel increasingly alienated from the U.S.-led rules-based international order.</p>
<p>It is a vision grounded in fears that a continuation of United States dominance in the Middle East would threaten China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/business/china-oil-saudi-arabia-iran.html">access to the region’s oil and gas</a> exports.</p>
<p>That isn’t to say that Beijing is seeking to displace the United States as the dominant power in the region. That is infeasible given the power of the dollar and the U.S.’s longstanding relations with some of the region’s biggest economies.</p>
<p>Rather, China’s stated plan is to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multialigned-middle-east-china-influence">promote multi-alignment</a> among countries in the region – that is to encourage individual nations to engage with China in areas such as infrastructure and trade. Doing so not only creates relationships between China and players in the region, it also weakens any incentives to join exclusive U.S.-led blocs.</p>
<p>Beijing seeks to promote multi-alignment through what is described in Chinese government documents as “<a href="https://www.sinification.com/p/chinas-middle-east-policy-by-peking">balanced diplomacy</a>” and “<a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/10/26/how-china-sees-gaza">positive balancing</a>.”</p>
<p>Balanced diplomacy entails not taking sides in various conflicts – including the Israeli-Palestinian one – and not making any enemies. Positive balancing centers on pursuing closer cooperation with one regional power, say Iran in the belief that this will incentivize others – for example, Arab Gulf countries – to follow suit.</p>
<h2>China’s Middle East success</h2>
<p>Prior to to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Beijing’s strategy was beginning to pay considerable dividends. </p>
<p>In 2016, China entered <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cesa/eng/zt/2/t1335502.htm">a comprehensive strategic partnership</a> with Saudi Arabia and in 2020 signed a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html">25-year cooperation</a> agreement with Iran. Over that same timespan, Beijing has expanded economic ties with a host of other Gulf countries including <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-01-11/Chinese-FM-holds-talks-with-Bahrain-counterpart-16JAOaORhJu/index.html">Bahrain</a>, <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/27/c_1310271095.htm">Qatar</a>, the <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/como/eng/news/t1579379.htm">United Arab Emirates</a>, <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219137.shtml">Kuwait</a> and <a href="http://arabic.news.cn/2022-04/29/c_1310578844.htm">Oman</a>.</p>
<p>Beyond the Gulf, China has also deepened its economic ties with Egypt, to the point where it is now the <a href="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/23/content_28648386.htm">largest investor</a> in the Suez Canal Area Development Project. It has also invested in <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/china-s-iraq-investments-and-its-growing-foothold-in-the-middle-east-56150">reconstruction projects in Iraq</a> and <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/01/16/syria-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/">Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Earlier this year, China brokered a deal to re-establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran – a major breakthrough and one that <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-longterm-partnership-with-us-fades-saudi-arabia-seeks-to-diversify-its-diplomacy-and-recent-deals-with-china-iran-and-russia-fit-this-strategy-202211">set China up as a major mediator</a> in the region. </p>
<p>In fact, following that success, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/netanyahu-says-hes-invited-china-emphasises-us-israels-key-ally-2023-06-27/">Beijing began to position itself</a> as a potential broker of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.</p>
<h2>The impact of the Israel-Hamas War</h2>
<p>The Israel-Hamas war, however, has complicated China’s approach to the Middle East.</p>
<p>Beijing’s initial response to the conflict was to continue with its balanced diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, China’s leaders <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/israel-china-conflict-neutrality-socialmedia-middleeast-1833150">did not condemn Hamas</a>, instead they urged both sides to “exercise restraint” and to embrace a “two-state solution.”</p>
<p>This is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing policy of “<a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/02/c_139336538.htm">non-interference</a>” in other countries’ internal affairs and its fundamental strategic approach to the region. </p>
<p>But the neutral stance jarred with the approach adopted by the United States and some European nations – which pushed China for a firmer line. </p>
<p>Under pressure from <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/26/politics/blinken-wang-yi-meeting/index.html">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken</a>, among others, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s view that <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202310/t20231031_11171195.html">every country has the right to self-defense</a>. But he qualified this by stating that Israel “should abide by international humanitarian law and protect the safety of civilians.” </p>
<p>And that qualification reflects a shift in the tone from Beijing, which has moved progressively toward making statements that are sympathetic to the Palestinians and critical of Israel. On Oct. 25, China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-china-veto-us-push-un-action-israel-gaza-2023-10-25/">used it veto power at the United Nations</a> to block a U.S. resolution calling for a humanitarian pause on the grounds that it failed to call on Israel to lift is siege on Gaza.</p>
<p>China’s U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, explained the decision <a href="http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202310/t20231026_11168489.htm">was based on</a> the “strong appeals of the entire world, in particular the Arab countries.”</p>
<h2>Championing the Global South</h2>
<p>Such a shift is unsurprising given Beijing’s economic concerns and its geopolitical ambitions.</p>
<p>China is much more heavily dependent on <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/03/20/potential-inroads-and-pitfalls-of-china-s-foray-into-middle-east-diplomacy-pub-89316">trade with the numerous states across the Middle East and North Africa</a> it has established economic ties <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/isr">than it is with Israel</a>. </p>
<p>Should geopolitical pressures push China to the point where it must decide between Israel and the Arab world, Beijing has powerful economic incentives to side with the latter.</p>
<p>But China has another powerful incentive to side with the Palestinians. Beijing <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=33516">harbors a desire to be seen as a champion</a> of the Global South. And siding with Israel risks alienating that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-global-south-is-on-the-rise-but-what-exactly-is-the-global-south-207959">increasingly important constituency</a>. </p>
<p>In countries across Africa, Latin America and beyond, the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel is seen as akin to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/27/israel-palestinians-race-colonialism-black-people/">fighting colonization</a> or <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114702">resisting “apartheid</a>.” Siding with Israel would, under that lens, put China on the side of the colonial oppressor. And that, in turn, risks undermining the diplomatic and economic work China has undertaken through its infrastructure development program, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/video/bc00595a-1198-4417-88cc-ea4bd07bf583">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, and effort to encourage more Global South countries to join what is now the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/24/world/europe/brics-expansion-xi-lula.html">BRICS economic bloc</a>.</p>
<p>And while China may not have altered its maps of the Middle East, its diplomats may well be looking at them and wondering if there is still room for balanced diplomacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing’s tone on the Middle East crisis has shifted since Hamas’s initial attack, becoming increasingly pro-Palestinian.Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161562023-10-27T11:03:49Z2023-10-27T11:03:49ZTaliban: why China wants them as a friend and not as a foe<p>The <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-talibans-economic-dreams/">Taliban’s presence</a> at the massive October jamboree in Beijiing to celebrate the 10th year of China’s ambitious trade plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is part of Beijing’s regional strategy.</p>
<p>This was one of only a handful of foreign <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/2/taliban-fm-to-meet-pakistan-china-foreign-ministers-media">visits</a> made by the Taliban since taking power after Nato’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Interim Afghan minister for commerce Haji Nooruddin Azizi even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-says-plans-formally-join-chinas-belt-road-initiative-2023-10-19/">talked about </a> the Taliban’s desire for Afghanistan to join the BRI.</p>
<p>The idea of an Islamist group such as the Taliban allying with the nominally secular and communist China might appear surprising. But this is a logical outcome of China’s strategic fears over <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/19/afghan-militants-china-imperialism-islamic-state/">Islamic militancy</a> at home and abroad. </p>
<p>It is also part of a deepening of ties between China and many Islamic nations in recent years. Historically, Beijing has had no problems working with religious groups or religious-led countries, despite its <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/23/10-things-to-know-about-chinas-policies-on-religion/">suspicion</a> of religion at home. </p>
<p>To understand Beijing’s motivations for cementing ties with Taliban-led Afghanistan, one only needs to look to Afghanistan’s recent history. With the conclusion of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Soviet-invasion-of-Afghanistan">Soviet-Afghan War</a> (1979-1989) and the collapse of the Moscow-installed Najibullah government in 1992, Afghanistan became a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan">hotbed</a> of Islamic radicalism. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24469676">became a magnet for</a> militants from all over the world, from Chechen separatists battling Yeltsin’s Russia to the Islamist Abu Sayaf, based in the Philippines.</p>
<p>China had been one of the biggest <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02634930120095349">supporters</a> of the Mujaheddin, the Islamic group which ran Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992, providing the group with training and weaponry. This was partly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-the-1980-laid-the-groundwork-for-chinas-major-foreign-policy-challenges/">motivated</a> by Beijing’s desire to bolster its ties with the United States and to strike a blow against the Soviet Union, its major communist <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-relations-2085155/The-Sino-Soviet-split">rival</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing is less worried about Russia these days. Not only does it have Russia as an ally, but is <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-and-xi-beijing-belt-and-road-meeting-highlighted-russias-role-as-chinas-junior-partner-216187">the dominant partner</a> in the relationship. But it was the assistance to the Mujaheddin that provided some of the groundwork for the security challenges that China faces today as it created a breeding ground for extremism, close to its borders.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-extending-its-dealings-with-the-taliban-as-it-increases-its-superpower-status-197664">China is extending its dealings with the Taliban as it increases its superpower status</a>
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<p>The threat of Islamic militancy from across the Afghan border has posed a very real challenge for Beijing. This was demonstrated by a wave of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45073494">attacks</a> carried out by Uighur militants in China’s western Xinjiang province throughout the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/world/asia/china-executes-3-over-deadly-knife-attack-at-train-station-in-2014.html">2014 Kunming knife attack</a>, which killed 31 and injured 141 people.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Taliban leaders were in Beijing at the Belt and Road Initiative celebrations.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Attacks such as those at Kunming led to China’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_counterterrorism_byman_saber-1.pdf">controversial</a> and repressive policies used against Uighurs in Xinjiang. They also reinforced Beijing’s fears of <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/25/chinas-reluctant-taliban-embrace/">extremism</a> spilling over the borders from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>These would threaten Chinese interests in central Asia and China’s western border regions, which have become <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/11/29/xinjiang-casts-uncertainty-over-the-belt-and-road-initiative/">pivotal</a> for the BRI. The presence of the Taliban at the BRI summit can be seen as an example of how China hopes to create an ally in an attempt to shore up its political and economic interests.</p>
<h2>China’s ties with Islamic world</h2>
<p>The Taliban’s presence at the BRI summit also demonstrates China’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/12/05/ask-the-experts-is-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-middle-east-pushing-out-the-united-states/">growing ties</a> with the Islamic world, which has drawn notable attention in recent years. </p>
<p>Beijing <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/06/iran-saudi-arabia-deal-agreement-china-meeting-beijing/">mediated</a> between Iran and Saudi Arabia over their long-standing rivalry in the region. It was also involved in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/24/analysis-wall-of-brics-the-significance-of-adding-six-new-members">agreement</a> to add several Islamic nations to the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) partnership. </p>
<p>More recently, China’s military ties with the region were further underlined by the deployment of Chinese warships as part of a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3237401/chinese-and-saudi-navies-launch-joint-counterterrorism-exercise-against-backdrop-israel-hamas-war">naval exercise</a> with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Muslim nations have been an important source of markets and natural resources for Beijing, with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/china-seizing-us-arms-markets-in-the-middle-east/">moving</a> into Middle Eastern markets that had traditionally been dominated by the United States. There has also been a growth in cultural ties, with <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3233421/mandarin-learning-boom-china-extends-its-soft-power-middle-east">interest</a> in learning Mandarin Chinese growing throughout the Middle East.</p>
<p>These developments can also be seen as a wider effort by Beijing to present China as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888248">partner</a> to Muslim nations at a time where the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2022/08/13/the-diplomatic-retreat-of-the-us-in-the-middle-east/">grip</a> of the region’s traditional power bases appears to have weakened.<br>
Such an effort can be seen in the recent tensions over Gaza, where Beijing has taken a more <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/24/israel-hamas-war-china-urges-israel-to-abide-by-international-laws.html">critical tone</a> over Israel’s conduct, which marks a notable change from its more cautious language in the past. This has also been accompanied by a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3237949/israel-hamas-war-chinese-social-media-erupts-war-words-palestine-crisis-divides-opinion">wave</a> of support for Palestine on Chinese social media.</p>
<p>The initial gains from China’s efforts to portray itself as a friend to the Islamic world could be seen in how a UK-led <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/uyghur-news-recap-oct-13-20-2023/7320010.html">statement</a> condemning China’s policies in Xinjiang, mainly attracted the support of western nations, but very few Islamic nations. This shows the diplomatic <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/china-muslim-countries-tilt-uyghur-abuses-ignored-us-influence-fades">influence</a> that China has built in the Muslim world.</p>
<p>Recent developments have shown that China continues to boost its diplomatic clout in Islamic nations, which could pose a further strategic challenge for western nations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beijing is happy to partner up with religious-led nations if it is in its strategic interests.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2160142023-10-26T11:42:59Z2023-10-26T11:42:59ZChina’s Belt and Road Initiative turns 10: Xi announces 8 new priorities, continues push for global influence<p>China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which now includes <a href="https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/?cookie-state-change=1698234725172">44 African countries</a>, got under way 10 years ago. President Xi Jinping launched it in 2013 with a <a href="https://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-09/08/content_2483565.htm">first speech</a> in Kazakhstan and a <a href="https://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-10/03/content_2500118.htm">second one</a> in Indonesia. The initiative is something of a trial-by-doing development policy enigma: it keeps China watchers chasing Xi’s next move to help define just what it is.</p>
<p>The two speeches, however, give some lasting guidance. The Kazakhstan speech <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">outlined</a> five elements of the “Belt”: strengthening policy communication; road connectivity; currency circulation; people-to-people ties; and promoting unimpeded trade. In Indonesia, the five points were more abstract and diplomacy-oriented. They were framed as pursuing win-win cooperation, mutual assistance and affinity, and remaining open and inclusive. </p>
<p>So, what’s happened since then? As an economist with a keen interest in the political economy of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Jz1DgSsAAAAJ&hl=en">China-Africa</a> relations, I have <a href="https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/maritime-order-conference/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2018/05/Lauren-Johnston-update.pdf">studied</a> the Belt and Road Initiative since its inception.</p>
<p>Among the more tangible achievements so far is fostering “road connectivity”. China has helped to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0965856419307001">finance and construct</a> highways, rail and energy projects in various countries. People, goods and commodities flow more smoothly in many places than before, within and between countries. But <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/how-china-lends">at a cost</a>. Most of these projects have been funded by loans from Chinese banks, including the China Export Import Bank and China Development Bank.</p>
<p>Marking the 10th anniversary at a forum in October, Xi <a href="https://english.news.cn/20231018/7bfc16ac51d443c6a7a00ce25c972104/c.html#:%7E:text=China%20can%20only%20do%20well,heights%20in%20their%20opening%2Dup.">outlined</a> the progress of the initiative. He also made a commitment to raise the quality of development cooperation, and provided more details on people-to-people ties and on areas of policy dialogue especially.</p>
<p>Much is made of a fall in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/rise-and-fall-bri">spending</a> on the Belt and Road Initiative. But if these promises take shape, the early big spending years may come to reflect a down payment. That down payment was made in times of <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/china-update/chinas-new-sources-economic-growth-vol-1">low interest rates</a> and kick-started some <a href="https://www.sc.com/en/feature/landmark-achievements-of-the-belt-and-road/">important and highly visible</a> infrastructural projects. </p>
<p>Xi’s announcement at this year’s forum offered old and new news for the Belt and Road Initiative and its signatories. For African signatories (and their regional organisations and development banks) to make the most of what China is now offering, they need to understand the origins of the Belt and Road Initiative and also what has and has not changed since. </p>
<p>In addition, Xi’s announcement comes at a time when China’s relationship with the African continent is changing, as I outlined in a recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-from-extraction-to-investment-driven-from-the-industry-rich-hunan-region-209044">article</a>. The change sees the China-Africa relationship move beyond a focus on oil, extractive commodities and large infrastructure projects. It shifts attention to industrial production, job creation and investments that lead to African exports, and productivity-enhancing agricultural and digital technology opportunities. This model, called the “Hunan model”, is named after the province in southern China that is leading the push. This also helps to explain why China’s lending is moving from bilateral development finance to include more commercial and trade finance lending. </p>
<h2>Comparing promises 10 years on</h2>
<p>Xi made eight major commitments at the October 2023 forum. More than half of these draw directly from the policy focus areas announced a decade ago.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Xi promised to build a multidimensional Belt and Road connectivity. He referred to roads, rail, port and air transport and related logistics and trade corridors. </p></li>
<li><p>He promised to open China’s economy more to the world. Higher trade levels would be one way. Alongside a new emphasis on the digital economy, Xi added that China would establish pilot zones for e-commerce-based cooperation. In Africa, a guide to those may be provided by the two existing digital commerce hubs set up by Alibaba in Ethiopia and Rwanda under its <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/794498/summary">electronic World Trade Platform Initiative</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>He spoke of “practical cooperation”. This seems to refer to financing for expensive infrastructure projects, smaller livelihood projects and technical and vocational training. This has an <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">aspect</a> of crossover with currency circulation, people-to-people ties, unimpeded trade and more. </p></li>
<li><p>Xi’s recent speech also promised to support people-to-people exchanges. This is a <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">direct take</a> from the first launch speech of 2013. But he added detail about establishing arts and culture alliances. Also that China would host a “Liangzhu Forum” to enhance dialogue on civilisation.</p></li>
<li><p>Finally, in line with the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.265">earlier commitment</a> to elevated policy dialogue, Xi promised to strengthen institutional building for international Belt and Road Initiative cooperation. This relates to building platforms for cooperation in energy, taxation, finance, green development, disaster reduction, anti-corruption, think-tanks, media, culture, and other fields. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Where extending sovereign lending may present a challenge at the moment while the legacy of debt sustainability issues is addressed, Chinese policy banks are continuing to lend to institutions of the global south. For example, in the lead up to the forum the <a href="https://www.afreximbank.com/afreximbank-and-china-development-bank-sign-us400-million-loan-to-support-africa-smes/">China Development Bank agreed a US$400mn loan to Afreximbank</a> to support small and medium enterprise trade efforts, with an eye on the goal of “unimpeded trade” and Africa’s own regional integration efforts under the African Continental Free Trade Area.</p>
<p>Beyond the promises made in Xi’s speech to this year’s forum, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/18/china-announces-billions-in-investments-in-developing-countries-and-pledges-market-opening">elevated funding for China’s policy banks was announced</a>. Further, agreements made between participants also signal commitment to the original principles of the Belt and Road Initiative. For example, Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan in 2013 called for elevated currency circulation. China has not only developed its mobile payments ecosystem, but is now <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/06/beijing-s-global-ambitions-for-central-bank-digital-currencies-are-growing-clearer-pub-85503">testing</a> its emerging central bank digital currency, the eCNY, at home and abroad. </p>
<h2>New promises</h2>
<p>There are three new policy promises added to those of a decade ago. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>China will promote green development, including green infrastructure, green energy, and green transportation. It will hold a Belt and Road Initiative Green Innovation Conference and establish a network of experts. China also promised to provide 100,000 training opportunities in areas of green development.</p></li>
<li><p>China will continue to advance scientific and technological innovation. It will hold a conference on Science and Technology Exchange, and increase the number of joint laboratories that support exchange and training for young scientists. Xi also promised that China would propose a Global Initiative for Artificial Intelligence Governance, and promote secure artificial intelligence development.</p></li>
<li><p>China will promote integrity-based cooperation. This would include publishing details of Belt and Road achievements and prospects, and establishing a system of evaluating compliance. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These new areas are of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8462.12325">increasing economic importance to China, amid rapid population ageing</a> especially, and competition with high-income countries. </p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>Where the <a href="https://www.sydney.edu.au/content/dam/corporate/documents/china-studies-centre/working-paper/lauren_johnston_may_2022.pdf">twin launch speeches of the Belt and Road Initiative</a> had very broad agendas, Xi’s speech at the 10-year anniversary revealed progress on earlier themes and a push to elevate the quality of development. There was more detail especially on people-to-people ties and on areas of policy dialogue to be fostered.</p>
<p>He added some new areas such as artificial intelligence governance, green development, e-commerce, and greater emphasis on scientific and tech cooperation. These new areas are becoming more economically important to China.</p>
<p>Comparing the new policy signals with the earlier ones implies that the initiative is by design adaptable. Further, since the COVID pandemic, some countries that had benefited from China’s new level of Belt and Road lending have run into debt problems and interest rates have risen. This signals China’s increased interest in lending to regional and locally present multilateral development and commercial banks that are relatively well positioned to target local entrepreneurs and development. In Africa, this offers a new chance to evolve strategies that can sustainably tap Chinese resources towards fostering the independent advance of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement and local socioeconomic development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Areas such as artificial intelligence, green development, e-commerce, and tech cooperation have been added.Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney; Affiliate Researcher, South African Institute of International AffairsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161872023-10-24T12:27:10Z2023-10-24T12:27:10ZPutin and Xi: Beijing Belt and Road meeting highlighted Russia’s role as China’s junior partner<p>The third <a href="https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/201705ydylforum/index.htm">Belt and Road Forum</a> held in Beijing recently <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/which-world-leaders-came-to-chinas-3rd-belt-and-road-forum/">attracted fewer heads of state</a> or senior officials than the previous forums in 2017 and 2019. There were 11 European presidents and prime ministers at the 2019 forum. But last week’s forum attracted only three. </p>
<p>This is understandable, given that the two-day meeting took place against the backdrop of high tension in the Middle East caused by the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as the war in Ukraine – both wars which have highlighted differences in views on regional and global order between the west and a number of non-western countries.</p>
<p>One enthusiastic participant was the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. For Putin, the forum provided an opportunity to meet other leaders without fear of arrest, given his indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes which had kept him away from September’s Brics summit in South Africa. </p>
<p>While Putin was just one among 20 or so world leaders at the Forum, he was photographed at Xi Jinping’s right hand and given a prominent place in proceedings. Delivering a speech at the forum immediately after the Chinese president and staging a press conference for the Russian media before boarding the plane to Moscow, Putin attempted to convey the message of tight cooperation with China.</p>
<p>He was keen to remind his audience of Russia’s credentials as a UN security council member, together with China, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. He also noted that he and Xi had discussed both the situation in Gaza and the events in Ukraine, describing these situations as “common threats” which strengthen Sino-Russian “interaction”. </p>
<p>Putin drew particular attention to the high bilateral trade volume between Russia and China, which has reached nearly US$200 billion (£163 billion). This sounds impressive until you remember that the bulk of this trade consists of export of Russian hydrocarbons and other raw materials to China. This is nothing new – in fact trade in hydrocarbons between Russia and China have been boosted by western sanctions.</p>
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<p>Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the visit was Putin’s explicit acknowledgement of the different roles played by Moscow and Beijing in international politics. Putin described the Russia-dominated Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) – a concept Moscow has promoted as a response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that would fuse the Eurasian Economic Union with the BRI – as a regional or “local” project. Meanwhile he happily described the BRI as “global” in scale. </p>
<p>For the past decade, Russian policymakers and experts have consistently held up the GEP as symbolising Russia’s equality with China. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has described it as “the creation of a continent-wide architecture”.</p>
<p>Putin’s words, coupled with the lack of any meaningful results of the meeting (bar a contract on food and agricultural products which has yet to be confirmed by Beijing), illustrate the extent to which Russia’s war against Ukraine has deepened the asymmetry between the two powers.</p>
<h2>Holding back?</h2>
<p>The lack of genuine progress on the issue of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-finalising-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline-route-china-novak-2023-09-06/">Power of Siberia-2 pipeline</a>, which will transport gas from Russia’s Yamal gas fields, which used to supply Europe, via Mongolia to China, was further evidence of this asymmetry. Xi was kind enough to express hope that the project could proceed quickly. But he did not outline any concrete steps in that direction. </p>
<p>China’s agreement, if confirmed by a contract, would have been the most clear signal of Beijing’s strategic support for Russia, especially given Gazprom’s shrinking European market. By prolonging negotiations, China seems to be trying to extract specific concessions from Russia, related to the price of gas, possible Chinese ownership of gas fields in Russia, or Beijing’s acquisition of shares in Gazprom. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in May 2023, China revived the prospect of building the so-called <a href="https://thepeoplesmap.net/project/central-asia-china-gas-pipeline-line-d/">section “D”</a>, enlarging the capacity of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline system, which will bring gas from Turkmenistan via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to China, emphasising China’s other sources of energy supplies.</p>
<p>While continuing to offer Moscow political support and not interfering with Chinese companies’ attempts to take advantage of the exodus of western companies to increase their presence in the Russian market, Beijing has clearly attempted to prevent any embarrassment related to Russia. A gas contract would have overshadowed the BRI summit and generated a strong reaction in the US and Europe, potentially strengthening China hawks in the west. </p>
<h2>Beijing making its move</h2>
<p>Putin’s delegation was full of ministers and CEOs of key Russian enterprises, from Rosneft and Gazprom to Novatek, so the conclusion of commercial agreements can’t be ruled out, but the probability is low. It is clear that Beijing does not want to be seen to be openly supporting Russia in resisting and bypassing western sanctions.</p>
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<p>In the 1990s, Russian officials regularly warned of the dangers of becoming a “<a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-putin-turning-russia-chinese-client-state-and-how-stop-it">raw materials appendage</a>” to China. Today the economic benefits that Russian elites gain from hydrocarbons mean this danger has now <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/04/13/russias-kowtowing-to-china-energy-and-beyond/">become a reality</a>. Russia has locked itself into an economic partnership in which it is the supplicant, a role that Moscow seems happy to play.</p>
<p>But the BRI is not just about economics. It is also a key part of Beijing’s bid to project itself as a “global responsible power”. Beijing has recently outlined what it calls its “<a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html">Global Security Initiative</a>” which explicitly rejects the Western rules-based order. This comes alongside a “<a href="http://ws.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202306/P020230627414336020074.pdf">Global Development Initiative</a>” and, nested within these, a “<a href="http://mv.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgsd/202305/t20230520_11080670.htm">Global Civilisation initiative</a>”. <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinas-new-global-initiatives-mask-an-intrusive-agenda/articleshow/104360749.cms">Taken together</a> these question western universalist ideas about human rights and democracy. </p>
<p>China’s thinking has gained traction among many countries of the global south, providing a developmental path without lectures on human rights. China speaks to these countries using its dual identity as both a rapidly developing power and a member of the UN security council. By comparison, notwithstanding its security council position, Russia has few tangible benefits to offer these countries. Last week’s BRI forum has driven this point home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216187/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The forum made it clear that Russia is increasingly becoming a client state for China.Marcin Kaczmarski, Lecturer in Security Studies, University of GlasgowNatasha Kuhrt, Senior Lecturer in International Peace & Security, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155092023-10-13T15:14:29Z2023-10-13T15:14:29ZXi-Putin meeting: here’s what it says about their current, and future, relationship<p>Vladimir Putin is expected to travel outside the borders of the former Soviet Union for the first time in 20 months to meet China’s Xi Jinping on October 17. The visit, if it happens, is likely to entrench a relationship in which Russia has become a useful tool in a broader Chinese strategy to consolidate its influence in Europe and the Americas.</p>
<p>The occasion of Putin’s likely trip to Beijing is the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an ambitious Chinese project to expand global trade routes with other nations and extend transport and infrastructure links. </p>
<p>To mark this event, China’s president, Xi Jinping, will <a href="https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2023-10-11/China-to-hold-third-Belt-and-Road-Forum-next-week-1nOTaa0zihO/index.html">host</a> representatives from some 130 countries in Beijing on October 17 and 18.</p>
<p>Putin is likely to be the star guest. According to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-g7-china-war/32599042.html">Russian sources</a> in September, Putin accepted Xi’s invitation, although Beijing has <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202310/t20231011_11159390.html">refused</a> to confirm this. </p>
<p>The two presidents would undoubtedly have lots to discuss. Since they <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing-partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/">announced</a> their no-limits partnership in February 2022, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the world has dramatically changed and keeps changing. </p>
<p>Instability has gripped the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-longest-war-in-post-soviet-space-flares-yet-again-as-russia-distracted-in-ukraine-213925">South Caucasus</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-how-could-it-change-the-middle-easts-political-landscape-expert-qanda-215473">Middle East</a> – both areas where Russia and China have interests at stake.</p>
<p>Yet their no-limits partnership has become a much more one-sided affair. Where Moscow and Beijing may once have coordinated their approaches, it is now likely that Russia aligns its policies to suit Chinese interests. The Ukraine war has weakened Russia and diminished its influence, at least for now, not only in the Middle East and the South Caucasus but also in central Asia. This has allowed China to become the dominant power there and cement its ties with the region. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-china-is-increasing-its-influence-in-central-asia-as-part-of-global-plans-to-offer-an-alternative-to-the-west-206035">How China is increasing its influence in central Asia as part of global plans to offer an alternative to the west</a>
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<p>Though now clearly a junior partner to Xi, Putin’s expected trip to Beijing still signals that Russia and China share a common agenda when it comes to ending a western-dominated international order and curtailing US and European influence in what both view as their zones of privileged interest across Eurasia. </p>
<p>Russia keeps emphasising <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-russia-close-views-us-ukraine-wang-yi-visits-moscow-2023-09-18/">alignment</a> with China, not least because it has few other options except international pariah states such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/15/vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un-summit-russia-north-korea-meeting-five-things">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-iran-ties-have-reached-new-level-russian-defence-minister-2023-09-20/">Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Western sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s war against Ukraine have severely <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/09042023-ukraine-war-impact-on-chinas-bri-to-europe-oped/">reduced</a> trade along the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/belt-road-initiative-new-eurasian-land-bridge-china-russia-poland/">New Eurasian Land Bridge</a> (an overland rail link between China and Europe), once a major transport corridor for Chinese exports to European markets. </p>
<p>Instead, transport routes avoiding Russia have gained in importance, including the <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022C64/">Middle Corridor</a> linking China across central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus to the EU. This has also dented Russian hopes of closer integration between the BRI and Moscow’s post-Soviet economic integration initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). </p>
<p>While the fact that Putin received an invitation from Xi to come to Beijing is important, it is also noteworthy that this is not a purely bilateral affair. In contrast to Xi’s visit to Moscow in March 2023, Putin’s trip will at best offer the Russian president an opportunity for talks with Xi in the margins of a summit designed to celebrate the BRI, a project closely associated with Xi personally.</p>
<p>Also, China has, and pursues, other options in its foreign relations. There is still a possibility of a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/05/politics/potential-biden-and-xi-meeting/index.html">meeting</a> between US president Joe Biden and Xi at the Apec summit in San Francisco in November. And the EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/third-times-a-charm-borrell-heads-to-china-to-talk-ukraine-taiwan-middle-east-and-human-rights/ar-AA1i4XdP">visited</a> China, possibly to prepare of an EU-China summit later this year.</p>
<h2>What Xi wants to achieve</h2>
<p>None of this implies that Xi is about to drop Putin as an ally. The key question is how Xi will balance his support for Putin with his need to stabilise relations with the US and prevent large-scale European “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c89c9472-51d6-42fc-a305-22dba159cca2">de-risking</a>” – limiting technology exports to China, scrutinising investment from China, and decreasing dependency on China-only supply chains – that would further limit the access to EU markets for Chinese goods, services and capital.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">Israel-Gaza conflict: an opportunity for Putin while the world is distracted</a>
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<p>Given the increasingly apparent conflict <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-mixed-signals-among-kyivs-allies-hint-at-growing-conflict-fatigue-213913">fatigue</a> among Ukraine’s western partners and the likely <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">benefits</a> that Putin will reap from the current violent escalation in the Middle East, Xi is unlikely to disown Putin.</p>
<p>He may, however, see an opportunity to facilitate a settlement more on Russia’s terms than on Ukraine’s – a face-saving way out for Putin to claim victory that restores a modicum of stability across a region that remains crucial for the long-term success of the BRI and ultimately for China’s superpower aspirations.</p>
<p>If Xi were to pull this off, it would also cement China’s role in a future Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian security order. </p>
<p>While this would simultaneously turn Russia into a possible permanent second-order power in China’s shadow. It might also be Putin’s best hope of avoiding the humiliation of a never-ending war. That prospect, however, remains firmly on the cards, especially if China and the west maintain their current levels of support for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, which offers just enough for either side to avoid defeat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215509/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin’s expected meeting with President Xi in Beijing is likely to cement China’s position as the most power partner.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131882023-10-02T15:07:17Z2023-10-02T15:07:17ZFive things that the west doesn’t understand about China’s foreign policy<p>China’s capacity to surprise western politicians was demonstrated recently, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unexpectedly <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/g20-lives-mistrust-between-west-and-china-hampers-progress">absent</a> from the G20 summit. There were a few reasons why this G20 might have been less important for Xi, including the rising influence of the <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/08/18/brics-expansion-would-be-a-sign-of-chinas-growing-influence-says-oliver-stuenkel">Brics</a> (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) partnership. </p>
<p>But often western reactions to a Chinese decision can come from a lack of understanding of Beijing’s motivations. A deeper knowledge of China would help the west interpret Beijing’s actions more clearly, helpful at a time where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-names-china-a-strategic-priority-for-the-first-time">many analysts</a> see China as a potential challenger to the US as the dominant world power. With this in mind, here are five things that the west often gets wrong about Chinese foreign policy.</p>
<h2>1. It’s not a grand scheme</h2>
<p>In the western media, Chinese foreign policy has often been seen as a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/hundred-year-marathon">grand scheme</a> to secure world leadership. Such an image has been popular with western politicians, such as South Dakota governor Kristi Noem, who claimed that China had a “<a href="https://twitter.com/barryeisler/status/1635058846317309954?lang=en-GB">2000-year plan to destroy the US</a>”.</p>
<p>However, Chinese policy is not quite the labyrinthine plot that it has often been presented as. An example of this can be seen in “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/18681026221079841">Wolf Warrior diplomacy</a>”, which has often interpreted as a long-term, calculated strategy of Chinese aggression to western leaders. But another way of looking at Wolf Warrior diplomacy is as an opportunistic <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2023.2205163">response</a> to the bellicose rhetoric of the former US president Donald Trump’s administration as well as a need to cater to nationalism at home. Showing Chinese leaders “talking tough” to their foreign counterparts also plays well with a domestic audience, and can divert attention from a poorly performing economy.</p>
<p>Equally, grander Chinese initiatives, such as the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), which provides aid and finance to African and South American countries to create new infrastructure, may also have been created as a response to outside developments, particularly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the US</a> <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">pivot</a> towards expanding its influence in Asia, from 2010. Chinese foreign policy has largely been devised in response to recent developments rather than being a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/11/12/chinas-grand-plan-to-take-over-the-world/">long-term scheme</a> for domination.</p>
<h2>2. China deals with democracies</h2>
<p>Another common fear is that Beijing has <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-09-16/how-china-exports-authoritarianism">encouraged</a> the rise of political authoritarianism in other countries. The <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshaping-international-development-pub-80703">Chinese model of economic development</a> has racheted up fears of China attempting to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3139351/could-chinas-model-be-its-biggest-export-world">spread</a> its political system beyond its national borders. But, some of the biggest advocates of the China model have been the <a href="https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/08/27/the-chinese-model-in-africa-and-its-wider-challenge/">political elites</a> in developing nations, many of whom have a colonial history, and who appreciate that China offers an alternative to the west in attracting investment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-brics-cooperation-accelerates-is-it-time-for-the-us-to-develop-a-brics-policy-210021">As BRICS cooperation accelerates, is it time for the US to develop a BRICS policy?</a>
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<p>Overall though, Beijing generally takes a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48615956">laissez-faire</a> approach towards the internal politics of its partners, with China being <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2091502/how-chinas-foreign-policy-non-intervention-all-about">willing</a> to deal with democracies and dictatorships, rather than forcing its partners to fall in line with its own political system.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing China's historical trade routes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550929/original/file-20230928-15-6jczhg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An historical map of the Silk Road, linking China to its trade routes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/map-ancient-silk-road-between-china-2127092582">Dimitrios Karamitros/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>3. China’s role in the world order</h2>
<p>One of the most common depictions of China in recent years has been of it as <a href="https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-607">a revisionist power</a> that seeks to overthrow the liberal rules-based world order and international bodies. Such an image was popularised by Graham Allison’s 2017 book <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/destined-war-can-america-and-china-escape-thucydidess-trap">Destined for War</a>, which warned of a China seeking to overthrow US domination. It presents the China/US relationship as the latest in the long line of great power relationships that follow the same pattern.</p>
<p>However, while China wishes to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/10/responding-to-china-s-complicated-views-on-international-order-pub-80021">amend</a> certain areas of the post-Cold War system, most notably it being centred around the US and liberal values, it does not <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.2005462">wish</a> to fully overturn the whole system. For instance, China has played a significant part in established international bodies, such as the United Nations. China was also one of the primary <a href="https://www.capitaleconomics.com/blog/china-is-one-of-globalisations-winners-it-wont-throw-that-away-for-russia">beneficiaries</a> of post-Cold War globalisation, with China’s rapid development being achieved partially through this economic model.</p>
<h2>4. China’s historical experience</h2>
<p>One of the greatest challenges posed by Chinese foreign policy is that it questions many of the dominant understandings of international relations, which have been grounded in the <a href="https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-05-11/opinion-with-asias-rise-west-must-let-go-of-eurocentrism-101248061.html">experiences</a> of the west.</p>
<p>But China draws on a different history, one that includes its own dominant position internationally, but also its defeat and occupation. Beijing references this <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/chinas-never-again-mentality/">past</a> when talking of the “<a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/modernisation-and-chinas-century-humiliation">Century of Humiliation</a>” (1839-1949), a period when China was dominated and occupied by colonial powers. This powerful image can rally the domestic population as well as building a common cause with developing nations, many of which are former colonies themselves.</p>
<p>China’s golden ages of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties (202BC-1279) has also influenced Chinese thinking. This was a time of huge cultural and economic influence, with Asia trade centred around the Silk Road. The <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/silk-road/">Silk Road</a> refers to an historical network of highly lucrative trade routes linking a powerful China to the rest of the world, and used to sell its products for centuries. Its ambitions to build a new version of this can be seen in the BRI, which gives China a “<a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/11/08/the-chronopolitics-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-its-reinvented-histories/">new Silk Road</a>”. It is by understanding the logic behind these legacies that one can see Chinese foreign policy more clearly. </p>
<h2>5. The appeal of Chinese aid</h2>
<p>China’s financial aid and investment projects in developing countries are sometimes portrayed as simply <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-10-05/fight-against-chinas-bribe-machine">bribing</a> corrupt states or ensnaring them with “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/551337-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/">debt trap diplomacy</a>”.</p>
<p>While these images have been popular in western media <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/21/china-debt-diplomacy-belt-and-road-initiative-economy-infrastructure-development/">coverage</a> of Chinese foreign policy, they overlook the role of the country receiving aid to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/">choose to accept</a> Chinese finance and how this also appeals as an alternative to western aid packages which traditionally come with many conditions relating to governance. </p>
<p>Chinese military leader and strategist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Tzu">Sun Tzu</a> once emphasised the importance of knowing one’s enemies as well as oneself; these words are especially pertinent in understanding China today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213188/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding China’s history could help western observers see its foreign policy more clearly.Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2133292023-09-18T12:21:45Z2023-09-18T12:21:45ZIndia and Vietnam are partnering with the US to counter China − even as Biden claims that’s not his goal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548470/original/file-20230915-27-7vekb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=63%2C0%2C8387%2C5549&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">United States and Chinese flags are set up before a July 8, 2023, meeting between officials of the two countries in Beijing.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/united-states-and-chinese-flags-are-set-up-before-a-meeting-news-photo/1513217178?adppopup=true">Mark Schiefelbein/Getty Images News via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This fall, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/13/us/politics/schumer-china-visit-senate.html?searchResultPosition=10">is slated to lead a bipartisan group</a> of U.S. senators to China. The planned trip, like other recent visits to China by high-ranking U.S. officials, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uss-yellen-kick-off-china-visit-with-both-sides-locked-confrontation-2023-07-06/">is aimed at improving the relationship between the U.S. and China</a>.</p>
<p>Such efforts to ameliorate U.S.-China diplomatic relations come amid growing tensions between the two economic giants. They also run parallel to U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific countries to limit Beijing’s influence.</p>
<p>Take, for example, President Joe Biden’s September 2023 trips to India for the G20 summit and to Vietnam, where U.S. competition with China was a focus of Biden’s discussions. While he was in Asia, Biden made several agreements in science, technology and supply chain security designed to bolster U.S. relations with India and Vietnam.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/10/biden-china-g20-00114892#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CI%20don't%20want%20to,not%20trying%20to%20hurt%20China.%E2%80%9D">I don’t want to contain China</a>,” the president told reporters in Hanoi on Sept. 10, 2023, shortly <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1198679450/biden-vietnam-relations">after meeting with Vietnam’s communist party leader</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. Reps. Mike Gallagher and Raja Krishnamoorthi echoed similar sentiments during an event held by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/event/us-strategic-competition-china">Council on Foreign Relations</a> think tank in New York City the following day. </p>
<p>But even if the U.S.’s stated goal isn’t to limit China’s global influence, its recent agreements with India, Vietnam and other countries may do exactly that.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A gray-haired man wearing glasses, a black vest and white shirt extends an open arm to another gray-haired man in a suit." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548432/original/file-20230914-17-x4dh8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India welcomes President Joe Biden to the opening session of the G20 summit on Sept. 9, 2023, in New Delhi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/prime-minister-narendra-modi-of-india-welcomes-us-president-news-photo/1669201296?adppopup=true">Dan Kitwood/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What US-led G20 deals mean for China</h2>
<p>The U.S. is actively looking for ways to blunt one of China’s best tools of influence: international loans.</p>
<p>During the G20 summit Sept. 9-10 in New Delhi, the U.S. pledged to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/key-takeaways-2023-g20-summit-new-delhi-2023-09-10/">help reform</a> the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to make them more flexible in lending to developing countries to finance renewable energy, climate mitigation and critical infrastructure projects. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-delivering-a-better-bigger-more-effective-world-bank/">Biden committed the first US$25 billion</a> to make those reforms possible and secured additional financial pledges from other countries totaling $200 billion in new funding for developing countries over the next decade.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-india-saudi-eu-unveil-rail-ports-deal-g20-sidelines-white-house-official-2023-09-09/">U.S. also signed onto a deal</a> with the European Union, Saudi Arabia and India that will help connect the Middle East, Europe and Asia through rails and ports. Characterizing it as a “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-modi-infrastructure-g20-europe-middle-east-eb8988dfbd6c9c6f2c411c893d548333">real big deal</a>,” Biden said the rail and ports agreement would help stabilize and integrate the Middle East. </p>
<p>These plans <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/10/politics/takeaways-joe-biden-g20-vietnam/index.html">are aimed at providing an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative</a>. Commonly referred to as BRI, the initiative is China’s international infrastructure loan program. Over the past decade, Chinese government agencies, banks and businesses <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">have loaned</a> more than <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/12/06/1140139724/china-lends-billions-to-poor-countries-is-that-a-burden-or-a-blessing">$1 trillion abroad, and 60% </a> of the recipient countries <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/12/06/1140139724/china-lends-billions-to-poor-countries-is-that-a-burden-or-a-blessing">are now in debt</a> to these Chinese entities. The U.S. and other countries have long <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48622938">criticized BRI as “debt trap diplomacy</a>.” One study suggests that the trillions of dollars in infrastructure loans to countries by the government and quasi-government bodies in China typically <a href="https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1123">lead to debt problems</a> that the borrowing countries can’t manage. </p>
<p>As China grapples with a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/21/economy/china-economy-troubles-intl-hnk/index.html">slowing domestic economy</a>, it may become more difficult for Chinese entities to keep shelling out funding for big-ticket overseas projects. The new U.S.-led agreements that come out of the G20 could fill the coming gap. </p>
<p>These G20 plans complement existing Western economic initiatives to compete with the BRI, including U.S. trade pacts for the <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity-ipef">Indo-Pacific region</a> and the <a href="https://www.state.gov/americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity/">Americas</a>, the EU’s <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en">Global Gateway</a> and the G7’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-at-the-g7-summit/">Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment</a>.</p>
<h2>What the US’s agreement with India means for China</h2>
<p>In their meeting on the sidelines of the G20, Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/08/joint-statement-from-india-and-the-united-states/">deepen collaboration</a> on developing critical and emerging technology, such as quantum computing and space exploration, as well as 5G and 6G telecommunications. This will help India compete with China in the technological arena in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>The telecommunications portion of a joint statement by Biden and Modi specifically mentions the U.S.’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/13/fcc-finalizes-program-to-rip-and-replace-huawei-zte-equipment-in-us.html">Rip and Replace</a> program. It is about helping smaller telecommunications companies rip out technology from Chinese companies like Huawei or ZTE and replace them with network equipment from the West that will protect users’ data. </p>
<p>The U.S. has banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from its telecommunication networks, deeming those companies <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/26/us/us-washington-huawei-zte-ban-security-risk-intl-hnk/index.html">national security risks</a>. The U.S. and India’s pledge to support Rip and Replace is a direct counter to China’s telecommunication technology expansion.</p>
<h2>What the US’s agreement with Vietnam means for China</h2>
<p>In Vietnam, Biden elevated the bilateral relationship to a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/">comprehensive strategic partnership</a>, expanding the relationship in everything from economics to education to technology in a country that has long counted China as its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/vietnams-2021-exports-climb-19-record-trade-surplus-with-us-2022-01-13/">top trading partner</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A gray haired man holds paper in his left hand as he raises a half-filled champagne glass in his right hand. To his left, a seated man wearing glasses raises his half-filled champagne glass." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4168%2C2775&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/548422/original/file-20230914-29-g579pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Joe Biden makes a toast with Vietnam President Vo Van Thuong during a state luncheon at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi on September 11, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-makes-a-toast-with-vietnams-president-news-photo/1658744518?adppopup=true">Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The enhanced partnership includes the U.S. providing $2 million to fund teaching labs and training courses for semiconductor assembly, testing and packaging. </p>
<p>One company in <a href="https://theinvestor.vn/amkor-technology-seeks-to-open-vietnam-factory-in-fourth-quarter-d4786.html">Arizona</a> and two in California have already pledged to set up semiconductor factories and design centers in Vietnam, and the U.S. artificial intelligence company Nvidia will help Vietnam integrate AI into automotive and health care systems.</p>
<p>All these investments will make Vietnam even more attractive to U.S. and Western companies that don’t want China to be the sole source of their supply chain. As Vietnam becomes a key player in the semiconductor market, it will shrink China’s share of the market as well as its regional technological advantage.</p>
<p>The U.S. also agreed to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/10/fact-sheet-president-joseph-r-biden-and-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-announce-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/">provide nearly $9 million</a> to help Vietnam patrol the waters around its borders and beef up port facility security, as well as boost efforts to fight illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, or IUUF. While not explicitly mentioned, China is the target of this initiative; China and Vietnam continue to be at loggerheads over disputed claims over the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/South-China-Sea/Vietnam-said-to-plan-military-buildup-on-South-China-Sea-footholds">Spratly Islands</a> in the South China Sea, and Chinese industrial fishing vessels are the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html">largest culprits</a> of IUUF around the globe.</p>
<p>By inking these agreements at the G20 in India and in Vietnam, the U.S. broadened its circle of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that can help counterbalance China.</p>
<p>Along with similar diplomatic accomplishments by Vice President Kamala Harris at the recent <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/06/readout-of-vice-president-harriss-participation-in-the-u-s-asean-summit/">ASEAN summit</a> in Indonesia; security partnerships like <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/AUKUS/">AUKUS, between the U.S., Australia and the UK</a>, and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/asia/the-quad-tokyo-summit-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html">Quad</a>, between the U.S., India, Australia and Japan; increased military sales and training to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-09-15/us-raises-munitions-equipment-aid-for-taiwan-to-480-million">Taiwan</a>; and the recent <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/18/1194220556/camp-david-biden-japan-korea">Camp David</a> meeting Biden held with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. is building partnerships all across Asia.</p>
<p>These actions are aimed at restraining China’s political, economic and military might, even if U.S. leaders don’t explicitly say that is their intention. Regardless of rhetoric, actions speak louder than words.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leland Lazarus is a Term-Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonresident Fellow of the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, and National Board Member of the Fulbright Association. </span></em></p>US foreign policy initiatives in the Indo-Pacific seem focused on containing China and its influence.Leland Lazarus, Associate Director of National Security, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060352023-05-24T17:03:33Z2023-05-24T17:03:33ZHow China is increasing its influence in central Asia as part of global plans to offer an alternative to the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527997/original/file-20230524-17-tx3b6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Kazakh port of Aktau will be useful in the expansion of trade routes in the region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Matyas Rehak/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0d2c1fed-422f-4feb-83a5-ea0befef2854">G7 leaders</a> were preparing for their recent summit in Japan, China’s president Xi Jinping hosted his central Asian counterparts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. </p>
<p>Central Asia is critical to China’s attempts to build an alternative to the US-led liberal order that is unquestionably dominated by Beijing and in which Russia will, at best, be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-might-rethink-its-alliance-with-china-after-putin-204595">junior partner</a>. </p>
<p>In his opening address, Xi <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/3180_664322/3182_664326/202305/t20230519_11079941.html">outlined</a> his “vision of a China-central Asia community with a shared future”. This will rest on four principles: mutual assistance, common development, universal security and everlasting friendship. </p>
<p>While the relationship between China and central Asia is often framed in terms of security and development, it also has a political side. This is all evident in the initiatives to create more regional cooperation launched at the summit in Xi'an. </p>
<p>These propose links between Chinese ministries and government agencies and their counterparts in central Asia, increasing educational and cultural exchanges, and creating mechanisms like the Central Asia–China Business Council. All of these are likely to further consolidate of China’s dominant regional role. </p>
<p>In return, China will insulate <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-rising-tide-of-authoritarianism-in-central-asia/">the mostly authoritarian leaders</a> of central Asia from western economic and political pressure to move towards democracy and protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity against any Russian adventurism. </p>
<h2>Summit achievements</h2>
<p>The summit resulted in a staggering 54 agreements, 19 new cooperation mechanisms and platforms, and nine multilateral documents, including the <a href="https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2023/05-19/10010552.shtml">Xi'an declaration</a>.</p>
<p>Even if one were to discount most of these as having uncertain prospects of actual implementation, there can be no doubt about China’s regional significance. According to <a href="https://comtradeplus.un.org/">UN statistics</a>, for example, the volume of trade in goods between China and the five countries of the region rose from a mere US$460 million (£370 million) three decades ago to more than US$70 billion in 2022 – a 150-fold increase.</p>
<p>Historically, Russia was the main partner for central Asia, harking back to the Soviet period and the first decade after its break-up. But Moscow can no longer match the value of Chinese investments and construction contracts in central Asia, which now totals almost US$70 billion <a href="https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/">since 2005</a>. </p>
<h2>China takes over from Russia</h2>
<p>A shift towards China is also reflected in the declining importance of Russia’s regional integration project – the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-eurasian-economic-union">Eurasian Economic Union</a> – in comparison to China’s massive global <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. This programme of infrastructure investment was launched by Xi in Kazakhstan in 2013 and has since <a href="https://osce-network.net/fileadmin/user_upload/publications/China-BRI-Report-2021-fin.pdf">drawn</a> the region closer to China not just economically but also politically. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Central Asia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527995/original/file-20230524-27-b3n9co.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>The Belt and Road Initiative featured prominently in the Xi'an declaration, explicitly linking it to national development strategies in central Asia. Transport connections remain at its heart. </p>
<p>The countries at the summit recommitted to a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, to highways from China to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and to transport infrastructure for trans-Caspian trade routes using seaports in Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan. </p>
<p>This focus on transport infrastructure in, and importantly across, central Asia highlights how important the region is for China’s attempts to diversify its trade routes to Europe away from <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/eurasian-landbridge-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative">Russia</a>. It also means that China, for now, will continue to use infrastructure development and trade to recruit more partners for its alternative international order.</p>
<p>The Russian “northern corridor” is now largely <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/with-russian-route-blocked-uzbekistan-looks-to-indian-iranian-afghan-chabahar-port-project/">closed</a> as a result of Ukraine war-related sanctions. So the route often referred to as the <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/optimization-efforts-to-improve-transit-through-the-critical-middle-corridor/">middle corridor</a> has regained importance not only for China but also, crucially, for <a href="https://www.g7hiroshima.go.jp/documents/pdf/Leaders_Communique_01_en.pdf">the G7 countries</a>.</p>
<p>However, the middle corridor, which begins in Turkey and continues via Georgia and through central Asia, would be <a href="https://www.german-economic-team.com/en/newsletter/challenges-and-opportunities-of-the-middle-corridor/">risky</a> for China as a sole alternative. Its capacity is low (currently only about 5% of the northern corridor) because goods have to cross multiple borders and switch several times between road, rail and sea. </p>
<h2>Afghanistan’s role</h2>
<p>Another alternative – with similar geopolitical significance – is transport through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea via the Pakistani port of Gwadar. In the long term, a trans-Afghan route is in the interest of both China and central Asia. </p>
<p>It would contribute to (but also depend on) stability and security in Afghanistan. And it would reduce China’s exposure to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/aug/20/water-protests-in-pakistan-erupt-against-chinas-belt-and-road-plan">risks</a> associated with the existing route along the China-Pakistan economic corridor, especially those arising from the ongoing <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/the-impact-of-political-instability-on-pakistans-internal-security/">Taliban insurgency in Pakistan</a>.</p>
<p>In light of this, China and its central Asian partners committed to developing the transport capabilities of the Uzbek city of Termez, on the border with Afghanistan. China also now has an official <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2676_663356/2677_663358/202304/t20230412_11057785.html">position on the Afghan issue</a> and Afghanistan was name-checked by Xi in his <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/3180_664322/3182_664326/202305/t20230519_11079941.html">speech</a> at the summit. So more regional engagement there is to be expected. </p>
<p>Despite the obvious risks associated with Afghanistan, China is likely to include a trans-Afghan trade route in its plans. This is also evident from the fact that Beijing appears reluctant to engage with Russia and Iran on their <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-irans-raisi-oversee-railway-deal-signing-2023-05-17/">international north–south transport corridor</a>. Both Russia and Iran face heavy international sanctions and recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/analysis-will-azerbaijan-iran-tensions-lead-to-war">tensions</a> between Iran and Azerbaijan cast further doubt on the long-term viability of this route.</p>
<p>The enthusiasm with which the five central Asian presidents have welcomed these initiatives indicates the extent to which they are keen to <a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/assets/uploads/2022/03/18750230-Security-and-Human-Rights-Chinese-Governance-Export-in-Central-Asia.pdf">embrace</a> China. It remains to be seen, however, how sustainable, or popular, an approach this is in light of the considerable and widespread <a href="https://ca-barometer.org/en/publications/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-opportunities-and-challenges-for-china">anti-China sentiment</a> in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>China’s is building a transport and trade infrastructure in central Asia.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2026452023-03-31T14:56:58Z2023-03-31T14:56:58ZLula and the world: what to expect from the new Brazilian foreign policy<p>Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was scheduled to visit his Chinese counterpart <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/brazils-lula-meet-chinas-xi-march-28-beijing-2023-02-17/">Xi Jinping</a> at the end of March. Beijing would have been Lula’s fourth international destination in less than 100 days in office.</p>
<p>Lula had to cancel his trip, which was set to include 200 business people, after catching pneumonia but it is now expected to take place in April or May. His administration had hoped the China visit would alleviate political pressure at home.</p>
<p>Since returning to the presidency (his previous term was 2003-2010), Lula has already been to visit partners in the South American trade bloc Mercosur, Argentina and Uruguay, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/11/brazils-lula-biden-vow-relationship-reboot-at-white-house-meet">recently flew to Washington DC</a> for conversations with US president Joe Biden and members of the Democratic party over infrastructure investments, trade and climate change.</p>
<p>Globetrotting seems like quite an effort for a 77-year-old, third-term president who faces a deeply divided society. But Lula does it with a smile on his face. Since he first took office 20 years ago, the former metalworker has risen to the challenge of international diplomacy as a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/lula-brazil-biden-democracy-climate/">natural negotiator with political charm</a>.</p>
<h2>Building political legitimacy</h2>
<p>As Lula kicks off his third term, foreign policy will be a tool for building his own domestic political legitimacy. His <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/10/31/brazil-elects-lula-a-global-sigh-of-relief_6002389_23.html">reputation</a> currently appears to be greater abroad than at home.</p>
<p>Always a determined player on the international stage, Lula’s administration spearheaded the construction of Unasur, a South American organisation set up to offset US economic and political power in the region. He also forged several alliances in the developing world.</p>
<p>Although Lula left office in 2010 with an impressive 83% approval rating, much of his political capital <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/he-was-the-most-popular-politician-on-earth-now-brazils-lula-could-go-to-jail/2016/10/21/1569f2c0-897f-11e6-8cdc-4fbb1973b506_story.html">waned in the years that followed</a>. This was largely thanks to his successor Dilma Rousseff’s pitiful economic performance and to the mounting accusations of graft against top figures in his Workers’ party.</p>
<p>But despite being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/10/brazils-lula-convicted-to-keep-him-from-2018-election-report">indicted and imprisoned for corruption in early 2018</a> (at which point his domestic popularity plummeted), the admiration of foreign figures has endured. <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/lula-brazil-election-noam-chomsky/">Some even visited Lula in prison</a>, protesting what they called political persecution of the former president.</p>
<p>So, at the age of 77 – and with health problems – a big diplomatic play might be his best bet of leaving a presidential legacy.</p>
<h2>Challenges of a new world order</h2>
<p>But Brazil’s capacity as a meaningful international player will depend on the administration’s ability to navigate a world that is fundamentally different from the one of the early 2000s. </p>
<p>The country is not in its best shape, either. In the years following Lula’s first two terms, <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/06/03/jair-bolsonaro-is-not-the-only-reason-his-country-is-in-a-ditch">Brazil went through a decade of decline, introspection and isolation</a>.</p>
<p>Much of this is down to his immediate predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro. On Bolsonaro’s watch, Brazil ranked second, at <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/brazil#what-is-the-cumulative-number-of-confirmed-deaths">700,000 recorded deaths</a>, in total COVID fatalities. <a href="https://www.vox.com/down-to-earth/2022/9/29/23373427/amazon-rainforest-brazil-jair-bolsonaro-lula-deforestation">Massive areas of rainforest</a> were burned, and the lands of the <a href="https://brazilreports.com/brazils-humanitarian-crisis-exposed-suffering-of-yanomami-people-under-bolsonaro-government/3885/">Yanomami indigenous people</a> were devastated by large amounts of mining.</p>
<p>So, while Lula must capitalise on any residual international popularity to relaunch Brazil as a global player, he has a lot to do to restore his own country’s economy and to heal the wounds of a divided society. </p>
<p>Lula’s first task internationally – a tough challenge – is to strike a balance in his relationships with Washington and Beijing, Brazil’s two foremost partners. So far, his new administration’s even-handed strategy has worked fine. But if tensions between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping lead to further political instability – or if a Republican with a zero-sum approach to China gets elected in 2024, Brazil could find itself in a difficult position.</p>
<p>Lula has attempted to anticipate these problems by offering to broker peace <a href="https://time.com/6258071/brazil-lula-ukraine-war/">between Russia and Ukraine</a>. It was a way to dodge criticism by western powers, who wanted Brazil to engage in military assistance to the Ukrainian government – while still preserving Brazil’s longstanding ties with Russia.</p>
<p>Lula’s take on the war is part of what researchers have dubbed “active non-alignment”. It is part of a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/2022/08/15/heine-outlines-the-doctrine-of-active-non-alignment/">broader Latin American strategy</a> to safeguard policy space and instruments for national development strategies in an increasingly polarised international order. By offering itself as a high-profile mediator, Brazil wants to maintain trade and cooperation with all sides in the conflict.</p>
<h2>Lula’s balancing trick</h2>
<p>But Russian-Ukrainian peace appears to be a long way off – and it will hardly come via mediators from the developing world. If Lula wants to create a legacy, he needs to build on Brazil’s preexisting capacity, in both multilateral and regional terms.</p>
<p>One possible way is to restore Brazil’s activism at the United Nations. He must also reestablish cooperation in issues as diverse as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/06/lula-brazil-inauguration-policy-bolsonaro-election-environment-economy/">climate change</a>, biodiversity, indigenous rights, vaccines, food security and development.</p>
<p>Another way is to rebuild South American integration. Regional organisations such as <a href="https://www.mercosur.int/en/">Mercosur</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNASUR">Unasur</a> could help bolster global supply chains in critical sectors like energy and food that have been disrupted by the war in Ukraine. To do so, Brazil must reclaim its role as the continent’s <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/how-brazil-measures-to-latin-americas-biggest-economies">centre of economic gravity</a>.</p>
<p>But there is an obstacle: Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. A persistent political, economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has exposed the dangers of left-wing authoritarianism. Lula is one of the few leaders who have <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/15678">open channels with Maduro</a> and may be able to help the country work towards a national reconciliation.</p>
<p>The question is whether Lula wants to get involved. Unlike left-wing leaders who recently <a href="https://latinamericanpost.com/41888-petro-and-boric-a-latin-american-left-different-from-the-socialism-of-the-21st-century">rose to power in Chile and Colombia</a>, Lula and the Workers’ party have been unapologetically sympathetic towards dictators such as Venezuela’s Maduro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega.</p>
<p>Overcoming the Brazilian left’s outdated views on authoritarian socialism and anti-imperialism may be as daunting a challenge for the Lula administration as leaving a sound diplomatic legacy. But both steps are necessary if Lula really wants to make a difference in the region – and the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202645/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guilherme Casarões is currently a volunteer representative of the civil society in a Working Group to Combat Hate Speech and Extremism at the Brazilian Ministry of Human Rights.</span></em></p>Brazil’s new leader is treading a fine line between China and the US in his foreign policy.Guilherme Casarões, Professor of Political Science, Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV/EAESP)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2019232023-03-24T15:49:31Z2023-03-24T15:49:31ZChina’s latest diplomatic move will extend its trade, energy, financial and maritime power<p>China’s billions of dollars in global <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-biden-united-states-geopolitics-honduras-investment-taiwan-1bf1173f167b779e209a43f9cb4bfd7a">investments and infrastructure projects</a> seem to be paying off politically and economically. </p>
<p>Just recently, Honduras signalled it is set to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan, having been one of the few <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-fears-loss-of-more-diplomatic-allies-in-latin-america/a-65048747">remaining countries</a> to recognise the island as a state. This switch of allegiances would be a coup for China, which sees Taiwan as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">part of its jurisdiction</a>, but also a sign of diminishing US power in Latin America, since the US is a <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/which-countries-recognise-taiwan-history-china-explained-1776291">long-time supporter of Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>China’s influence seems to be everywhere. Days before Chinese president Xi Jinping flew <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/22/europe/china-xi-russia-putin-talks-five-takeaways-intl-hnk-mic/index.html">into Moscow</a> to discuss the Ukraine war with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64906996">brokered a deal</a> between Iran and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>The high-profile deal sought to re-establish diplomatic, trade and security relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in an effort to de-escalate tensions and bring more stability to the Middle East. The agreement transforms the nature of China’s involvement in the region from one purely <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12549">driven by commercial interests</a> into a security-related cooperation that can protect its growing assets and expatriate population in the region.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-iran-deal-wont-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-but-will-enhance-chinas-role-as-power-broker-201692">Commentators</a> see the agreement as a positive step but wonder about the influence that Iran and Saudi Arabia can have in lessening the internal conflicts in several nearby countries. This is particularly where they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64906996">support rival</a> parties, including in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. What the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/15/world/us-saudi-china-relations-intl/index.html">deal does highlight</a> is the rising influence that China can exert and the waning of the US’s power over the Middle East regional order.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1009782809329">Studies</a> have shown that political instability in neighbouring countries negatively affects the economic performance of a nation by disrupting trade flows and increasing defence expenditures while lessening investment, for example, in education. <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/joupea/v43y2006i3p261-278.html">Under such</a> conditions, economic incentives can drive a peace-building process. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1009782809329">Peacefully resolving</a> conflicts benefits countries not directly entangled in the disputes.</p>
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<p>Since the 1990s, China has gradually become the <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2213231/business-economy">largest trade partner</a> of the Arab region overall and the top trade partner of Saudi Arabia. <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/sau">China’s exports to Saudi Arabia</a> have annually increased at 15.3% year on year on average, amounting to US$905 million (£740 million) in 1995 and US$31.8 billion in 2020. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, over the same period, China’s imports from Saudi Arabia rose from US$393 million to US$33.4 billion, an average annual increase of 19.4%. In 2019, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12549">China and Saudi Arabia</a> signed 35 trade and investments deals.</p>
<h2>Regional power plays</h2>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/irn">China’s exports to Iran</a> have increased at an average 14.7% annual rate from US$276 million in 1995 to US$8.51 billion in 2020. And its imports from Iran have also risen by 14.5% annually between 1995 (US$197 million) and 2020 (US$5.85 billion). </p>
<p><a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/02/08/chinas-2023-trade-and-investment-with-iran-development-trends/">By 2022</a>, exports totalled US$9.44 billion and continued to grow exponentially in early 2023. Russia has recently <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-29/russia-is-biggest-foreign-investor-in-iran-trade-official-says?leadSource=uverify%20wall">overtaken China</a> as the largest foreign investor in Iran, but China remains its <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/02/08/chinas-2023-trade-and-investment-with-iran-development-trends/">largest oil customer</a>.</p>
<p>China’s main exports to <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/sau">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/irn">Iran</a> include broadcasting equipment, motor vehicles and air pumps. Its main imports are crude petroleum, ethylene polymers and acrylic alcohols.</p>
<p>In the context of the Saudi Arabia and Iran reconciliation, trade with China is likely to continue to follow such increasing trends. If benefits from the agreement spread to other countries in the region, China could also gain from economic relations with those countries as regional stability increases.</p>
<p>There is already some evidence of such positive spillover. After the agreement with the Saudis, Iran is ready to expand cooperation, hopes <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65010185">rapprochement with Bahrain</a> will be possible, and is willing to improve relations with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>However it’s worth noting some commentators point out that previous efforts at reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia were unsuccessful, while others question whether they will <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/15/saudi-arabia-could-invest-in-iran-very-quickly-finance-minister.html">adhere to the terms of the agreement</a>.</p>
<h2>Belt and Road</h2>
<p>As well as investing in commercial and transport infrastructure to make trade easier, the objectives of China’s <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a> include the strengthening of its economic leadership and the improvement and creation of free trade blocks among countries along the investment route. The Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement will generate further benefits to China by boosting the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">initiative’s dividends</a>. Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/aspp.12549">strategic location</a> bordering eight countries not only provides an alternative route for energy supply to China but also makes it a vital partner for the initiative’s infrastructure investment, which deepens China’s presence in the Middle East. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20954816.2018.1498989">Iran’s strategic position</a> provides it with considerable seaport facilities and has the potential for the development of an air transportation hub. China has already invested in the development of a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20954816.2018.1498989">2,000-mile-long railway</a> from Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi to Tehran. </p>
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<p>The agreement also brings a more subtle benefit to China. With Russia at war, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/15/world/us-saudi-china-relations-intl/index.html">China needs</a> to ensure the continuity of its energy supply to boost economic performance and safeguard socio-political stability at home. Saudi Arabia and Iran provide a strong basis for the diversification of China’s energy options and also to pre-empt any potential move by the United States to constrain its access to the Gulf’s resources. </p>
<p>Iran has the world’s <a href="https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2023/02/08/chinas-2023-trade-and-investment-with-iran-development-trends/">fourth largest oil</a> and second gas reserves. <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/oil/saudi-arabia-oil/">Saudi Arabia</a> has the second largest oil reserves, accounting for 16.2% of the world’s total. Access to such vast resources in the context of a more stable region provide China with further assurances for the future flow of the energy supplies its economic growth needs.</p>
<p>The Iran-Saudi initiative has the potential to address China’s energy security issues and turn China into a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557571.2018.1480592">global maritime power</a> and a global monetary power. All of these factors will contribute to the sustainability of China’s economic growth, and add to its status as a superpower.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201923/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese leadership of a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, adds to their power in the region.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976642023-02-02T05:49:49Z2023-02-02T05:49:49ZChina is extending its dealings with the Taliban as it increases its superpower status<p>China is one of the few countries that is committed to expanding its dealings with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, where it hopes to expand its use of the vast natural resources while also improving its own geopolitical security. </p>
<p>In mid-2021 <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/afghanistan-the-west-fails-a-win-for-china-and-russia">China welcomed a Taliban delegation</a>, showing its willingness to recognise the Taliban government as the US signalled <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/withdrawal-of-United-States-troops-from-Afghanistan">its planned withdrawal</a>. In early January 2023, a Chinese firm agreed to sign a 25-year contract for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64183083">oil extraction in Afghanistan</a>. There is also the possibility that a Chinese state-owned company will be contracted to operate <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-64183083">a copper mine</a> in the country. </p>
<p>It is unsurprising that as western countries withdraw almost all their links with Afghanistan, China is willing to increase its commercial presence in the country. Although traditionally its Afghan policy has not been a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">diplomatic priority</a>, it now sees opportunities.</p>
<p>Despite being one of Afghanistan’s <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/1/1/article-p133_8.xml?language=en">largest foreign investors</a> in the past and its strategic partner, China’s involvement in the country has previously been relatively limited when compared with others such as Russia and the US.</p>
<p>Arguably, its policy in regard to Afghanistan has been driven <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/caa/1/1/article-p133_8.xml?language=en">by domestic economic interests and security issues</a>. However, in the last decade or so, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy. At the same time, commercial interests have also led to increased Chinese involvement in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Useful natural resources</h2>
<p>Greater active engagement with Afghanistan will enable China to benefit in several ways. Afghanistan is one of the world’s most <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/afghanistan-taliban-mining-resources-rich-minerals/">resource-rich countries</a>, but its security conditions have constrained the development of the sector.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.payam-aftab.com/images/docs/files/000054/nf00054424-1.pdf">Some estimates</a> set the value of Afghanistan’s untapped mineral deposits, such as copper, iron and lithium, at £811.5 billion. In terms of crude oil, it has 1.6 billion barrels. As for natural gas, Afghanistan possesses 16 trillion cubic feet, and has access to 500 million barrels of natural gas liquids.</p>
<p>However, in the past, Chinese activities in Afghanistan’s mineral sector have stalled. In the late 2010s, for example, security concerns <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-has-vast-mineral-wealth-but-faces-steep-challenges-to-tap-it-166484">hindered the activities of Chinese enterprises</a> tapping into the country’s mineral resources.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">China is becoming an ally of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Useful Afghan resources</h2>
<p>There is another related gain in working with the Afghan natural resources sector. China’s domestic <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chinas-energy-security-realities-and-cop27-ambitions/">energy supply </a> is limited both by geology and <a href="https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Energy_density">energy density</a>, and its dependence on other countries leads to “<a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chinas-energy-security-realities-and-cop27-ambitions/">energy security anxieties</a>”.</p>
<p>Access to Afghanistan’s natural resources, then, not only provides economic incentives for China to increase its commercial presence in the country. It also has the potential to help ease its growing demand for energy.</p>
<p>Increasing involvement in Afghanistan falls within China’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-prioritizes-short-term-energy-security-implications-sino-middle-east-relations">prioritisation of short-term energy security</a>. But it can become a fundamental strategic element for its long-term energy requirements.</p>
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<p>Afghanistan’s fragile internal security has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">affected China in two ways</a>. First, it worried that years of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1845228">instability in Afghanistan</a> would spill over into China’s Xinjiang autonomous territory, where there is a long history of religious and ethnic tension with Beijing. This has included <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22278037">crackdowns</a> by Beijing on the Muslim Uyghur people, and widespread accusations of extensive human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Second, the instability that stems from Afghanistan negatively affects the development of China’s <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri">Belt and Road Initiative</a> (BRI), which is building trade routes with the rest of the world, because two of its fundamental corridors run adjacent to Afghanistan. As a global infrastructure and development investment plan encompassing over 60 countries (although there is no official count), including some from east Asia and Europe, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the initiative</a> is a vehicle to expand China’s global economic and political influence. Such an expansion is paramount for China’ superpower aspirations.</p>
<p>Trade frictions with the US and other countries have increased the pressure to open other markets for China’s goods. The BRI is an effective channel to <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">develop new export markets</a> which can alleviate trade pressures. And although the Afghan consumer market is small, it is <a href="https://www.payam-aftab.com/images/docs/files/000054/nf00054424-1.pdf">an untapped market for Chinese goods</a> – particularly those produced in China’s western regions.</p>
<h2>Building superpower status</h2>
<p>An additional gain is geopolitical. After decades of hegemonic presence “next door” but a degree of reluctance to get involved in Afghan affairs, China seems to be somewhat ready to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of western countries.</p>
<p>Greater presence in Afghanistan provides China with an opportunity to strengthen its regional power and influence. In doing so, it can contribute to the stability of Afghanistan. In turn, such a role will improve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2347798916638209">China’s image</a> as a responsible rising power.</p>
<p>So far, China has been <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/afghanistan-view-china">reluctant to take on a security role</a> in Afghanistan, because this could have led to friction with other countries and increased its exposure to threats by international terrorists networks. However, a change in strategy to increase the economic stability of Afghanistan can contribute to the reduction of China’s own security vulnerabilities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jose Caballero does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is expanding its relationship with the Taliban as a way of addressing its needs for increased energy supply.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1955472022-12-08T13:33:58Z2022-12-08T13:33:58ZChina’s Belt and Road infrastructure projects could help or hurt oceans and coasts worldwide<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499597/original/file-20221207-4529-5h8xps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C0%2C4913%2C3155&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Construction in the Chinese-financed Port City complex in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Oct. 19, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-a-chinese-funded-project-for-the-port-city-news-photo/1244077947">Pradeep Dambarage/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Ocean-fact-sheet-package.pdf">one-third</a> of all people in the world live in cities, towns and villages on coasts. They rely on healthy oceans for many things, including food, income, a stable climate and ready connections to nature. </p>
<p>But as coastal populations <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118571">continue to grow</a>, governments are under increasing pressure to ramp up development for transportation, power generation and economic growth. Projects like these can have heavy impacts on lands, waters and wildlife.</p>
<p>World leaders are gathering in Montreal this week for the long-awaited <a href="https://www.cbd.int/conferences/2021-2022">Conference of Parties</a> to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, or COP15. This treaty, which was adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, is designed to protect biodiversity – the variety of life on Earth, from genes to entire ecosystems. </p>
<p>At the two-week conference, nations are expected to officially adopt the <a href="https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/abb5/591f/2e46096d3f0330b08ce87a45/wg2020-03-03-en.pdf">Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework</a>, which will guide global conservation efforts over the next decade. China is this year’s COP president and chair, which will spotlight its own impacts on the environment.</p>
<p>We study <a href="https://scholar.google.com.au/citations?user=tAYhLjUAAAAJ&hl=en">natural resource management</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Rebecca-Ray-2135726495">global development</a>, and have analyzed how China’s support for development around the world is affecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-financing-infrastructure-projects-around-the-world-many-could-harm-nature-and-indigenous-communities-168060">nature and Indigenous communities</a>. In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2022.11.002">newly published study</a>, we explore the risks that China’s development finance projects pose to coastal and marine ecosystems, and to Indigenous communities that depend on healthy oceans. </p>
<p>We find that the risks are low in some places but high in others, particularly West Africa and the Caribbean. As China presides over global conservation talks, we believe it is important to look at China’s own potential impacts on biodiversity through its lending for global development.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1008726099076046848"}"></div></p>
<h2>Belt and Road brings benefit and harm</h2>
<p>In 2013, China’s president, Xi Jinping, launched the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, China’s ambitious push to coordinate hundreds of billions of dollars in finance, investment and trade to better connect its economic partners. </p>
<p>Today, China is the world’s <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/09/20/geolocated-dataset-of-chinese-overseas-development-finance/">largest bilateral creditor</a>. Since 2008, it has lent nearly half a trillion dollars to finance more than 800 overseas development projects. Its highlights include networks of roads, railways, ports and power plants across Latin America, Africa and Asia. Argentina’s massive <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/energy/11117-china-builds-latin-america-s-largest-solar-plant/">Cauchari solar farm</a>, Kenya’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-standard-gauge-railway-contracts-what-released-documents-say-and-what-they-dont-194354">single-gauge railway</a>, and the Central Asia-China <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/gasPipeline.html">pipeline</a>, which is designed to carry natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China, are examples. </p>
<p>Belt and Road projects are intended to help emerging economies grow, but they also can have negative impacts – including environmental damage that hurts local communities or livelihoods. In Mauritania, for example, a Chinese-financed port brought a fishing deal with a Chinese fishing fleet. The fleet <a href="https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/609279">out-competed</a> traditional small-scale fishermen, <a href="https://www.change.org/p/stop-the-china-fishing-deal-disaster-in-mauritania">raising alarm</a> amid allegations of <a href="https://www.asso-sherpa.org/mauritania-china-fisheries-agreement-civil-society-appeals-eu-mauritanian-government">unsustainable overfishing</a>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_JJSImnF03o?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">China has built 11 hydropower dams on Asia’s Mekong River as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Critics say the dams are altering river flow and reducing fish catches.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mapping risks to biodiversity and people</h2>
<p>To analyze how the Belt and Road Initiative could affect oceans and coasts, we located 114 development projects across 39 low- and middle-income countries financed by China’s two most active development finance institutions – China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China. Collectively, these loans constitute nearly US$65 billion in financing commitments from Chinese development lenders between 2008 and 2019. The projects include many different types of coastal infrastructure, such as ports, roads, bridges, power plants and airports.</p>
<p>Different types of infrastructure projects pose varying risks to marine habitats and species. Ports create the most serious threats, including habitat destruction, pollution and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14634988.2015.1027129">spread of invasive species</a> from ships that pass through.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men wearing masks bump elbows on a pier" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499605/original/file-20221207-11795-dex00z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, left, greets China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi during an inspection tour of the New Kipevu Oil Terminal at Mombasa Port on Jan. 6, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyan-president-uhuru-kenyatta-greets-chinas-foreign-news-photo/1237565793">AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bridges, roads, power plants and other facilities also threaten nearby coastal waters. These projects can stress aquatic species and habitats with bright lights, loud noises or vibrations, and discharges of toxic heavy metals from <a href="https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/nps_urban-facts_final.pdf">urban runoff</a>. These risks are mostly concentrated in small areas around development sites.</p>
<p>In total, we identified 324 <a href="https://www.iucn.org/resources/conservation-tool/iucn-red-list-threatened-species">threatened species</a> of fish, marine mammals, marine reptiles, sea birds and sharks and rays that could be affected by Chinese coastal development projects. The size of the risk depends on exposure levels and different species’ vulnerabilities. For example, power lines present low risk to marine habitats – but if they are accompanied by bright lights, they threaten sea birds, which are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1890/130281">highly sensitive to light pollution</a>. </p>
<p>Overall, we found that Africa and the Caribbean constitute the greatest risk hot spots. Countries with the largest expanses of territorial waters at risk include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cameroon, Mozambique and Sri Lanka. </p>
<p>We estimate that risks may encroach upon important seas for at least 55 coastal Indigenous communities around the world, particularly in Western and Central Africa. For example, marine habitats adjacent to several Indigenous communities in Ivory Coast that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0166681">consume more than 1,000 tons of seafood yearly</a> face relatively high risks from nearby development projects.</p>
<h2>Sustainable ‘blue’ development</h2>
<p>Experts widely agree that the Earth is <a href="https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/news/spotlight-nature-and-biodiversity">losing species at an alarming rate</a> and that habitat loss and pollution from development are major drivers of this decline. If China is serious about <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-ready-to-lead-on-protecting-nature-at-the-upcoming-un-biodiversity-conference-it-will-preside-and-set-the-tone-193681">taking a leadership role in conservation efforts</a>, we believe the Belt and Road Initiative is the place to start.</p>
<p>Sustainable development will define the future of society and the environment, but planning models often struggle to address how development on land <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.13331">affects the oceans</a>. The United Nations aims to bridge this gap by changing humans’ relationship with the ocean during what it has designated the <a href="https://www.oceandecade.org/">Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development</a>. And we see reason for hope.</p>
<p>Our study shows that many development risks to coastal and marine ecosystems could be tackled at the local level if communities and governments work to prioritize their own development and investment needs and scrutinize how proposed projects will affect the environment. Even seemingly small changes in the siting of ports, coastal highways and other projects can protect ecosystems and the communities that depend on them.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Mangrove trees with roots extending into tropical seawater" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499608/original/file-20221207-16-1mfs67.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mangrove forests like this one in the Bahamas provide natural protection against tropical storms and flooding, but they often are destroyed for development projects.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/SZHorA">Sterling College/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>China is starting to address some of these concerns. In 2021, its Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Ecology and Environment <a href="http://en.brigc.net/Media_Center/BRI_Green_Review/2021/202107/P020210729465376906569.pdf">issued joint guidance</a> urging Chinese investors and lenders to take a “whole lifecycle” approach to project management, beginning with early considerations such as where to site a project. </p>
<p>In 2022, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission instructed lenders to <a href="http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-06/03/content_5693849.htm">develop complaint mechanisms</a> for addressing local environmental concerns and minimizing environmental risks. An important test will come in the next few years, as the World Trade Organization will begin <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2022/06/wto-finally-nets-deal-curbing-fisheries-subsidies-but-tables-key-bits-for-later/">negotiating</a> specific rules to curb overfishing. If China <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/fish_23nov22_e.htm">shows leadership</a> on this issue through transparency and knowledge sharing, it can limit environmental and economic damage from the development of future ports in countries like Mauritania. </p>
<p>As COP15 spotlights global biodiversity, we believe it is important to note that even the world’s largest bilateral creditor needs the cooperation of local governments in order to get projects approved and built. In our view, transparency and public participation can help make global investment both green and blue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Ray received funding for this work from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Climate and Land Use Alliance, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blake Alexander Simmons does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s international lending projects have big potential impacts on oceans and coasts. By cooperating more closely with host countries, Beijing can make those projects more sustainable.Blake Alexander Simmons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Colorado State UniversityRebecca Ray, Senior Academic Researcher in Global Development Policy, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1926152022-12-02T01:44:42Z2022-12-02T01:44:42ZA China-backed dam in Indonesia threatens a rare great ape – and that’s just the tip of the iceberg<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498412/original/file-20221201-18-oka9d4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4272%2C2845&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> James Askew/SOCP handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2017, scientists <a href="https://www.cell.com/current-biology/fulltext/S0960-9822(17)31245-9">described</a> a new species of great apes – the Tapanuli orangutan. The species, found in the Batang Toru ecosystem of North Sumatara, Indonesia was listed as <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2017/12/the-worlds-newest-great-ape-revealed-a-month-ago-is-already-nearly-extinct-iucn/">critically endangered</a> soon after.</p>
<p>The population of the species has declined by <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2017/12/the-worlds-newest-great-ape-revealed-a-month-ago-is-already-nearly-extinct-iucn/">83% over the past 75 years</a>, largely due to hunting and habitat loss. Just 800 Tapanuli orangutans remain – and their last known habitat is <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2019/02/new-species-of-orangutan-threatened-from-moment-of-its-discovery/">threatened</a> by a slew of infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>Chief among them is the Chinese-funded Batang Toru hydropower dam, which threatens to fragment and submerge a large chunk of the orangutan’s habitat. The project is just one of a staggering 49 hydropower dams China is funding: mostly across Southeast Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America.</p>
<p>In new <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2590332222004328">research</a>, my colleagues and I show the substantial risk to biodiversity posed by the sheer number of Chinese-funded dams. And yet, environmental regulation of these projects has serious flaws. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A river in mountain landscape" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498416/original/file-20221201-20-2c0qx9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China is funding 49 overseas hydropower dams, including on Pakistan’s Indus River, pictured.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.diamerbhasha.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Big dams, big risks</h2>
<p>Hydropower is expected to be an important part of the global renewable energy transition. But the technology brings environmental risks. Dams disrupt the flow of rivers, altering species’ habitat. And dam reservoirs inundate and fragment habitats on land.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.aimspress.com/article/10.3934/GF.2020009">Traditionally</a>, financing of hydropower projects in low-income countries was the preserve of Western-backed multilateral development banks. China has now emerged as the biggest international financier of hydropower under its overseas infrastructure investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>Yet little is known about the scale of China’s hydropower financing or the biodiversity risks it brings. Whether adequate safeguards are applied to the projects by Chinese and host country regulators is also poorly understood. Our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2590332222004328">research</a> attempted to remedy this. </p>
<p>We found China is funding 49 hydropower dams in 18 countries including Myanmar, Laos and Pakistan.</p>
<p>The dams are likely to impede the flow of 14 free-flowing rivers, imperilling the species they harbour. The first dam on a free-flowing river is akin to the proverbial “first cut” of a road into an intact forest ecosystem, causing disproportionate harms to biodiversity. </p>
<p>We also found Chinese-funded dams overlap with the geographic ranges of 12 critically endangered freshwater fish species, including the iconic Mekong Giant Catfish and the world’s largest carp species, the Giant Barb. The dams exacerbate the threats to these species and may push them closer to extinction. </p>
<p>Almost 135 square kilometres of critical habitat on land is also likely to be inundated and fragmented by the dams and their reservoirs. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hydropower-industry-is-talking-the-talk-but-fine-words-wont-save-our-last-wild-rivers-168252">The hydropower industry is talking the talk. But fine words won't save our last wild rivers</a>
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<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="man looks at giant catfish" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498418/original/file-20221201-16-nwhp8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese-funded dams overlap with the geographic ranges of the critically endangered Mekong Giant Catfish.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zeb Hogan/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lax environmental rules</h2>
<p>Despite the biodiversity risks, we found serious gaps in the environmental rules applied to Chinese-funded dams.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-020-0528-3">previous analysis</a> found six Chinese state-owned banks – which together contribute most financing for Belt and Road projects – had no safeguard standards to limit biodiversity damage. </p>
<p>Complementing this analysis, our investigation found Chinese regulators also did not require hydropower projects to mitigate environmental damage. Some regulator policies, however, contained non-binding guidelines.</p>
<p>A number of Chinese government policies defer to host country laws on environmental protection. But our investigation found in most countries where the dams are being built, regulation to limit environmental harms was absent or still developing. </p>
<p>This poor governance leaves species and ecosystems in these countries vulnerable to environmental damage from dams.</p>
<h2>A spotlight on Sumatra</h2>
<p>The Batang Toru dam aims to bolster North Sumatra’s energy supplies. Its proponents say the dam uses environmentally-friendly technology that requires only a small area to be flooded.</p>
<p>Two multilateral development banks, however, <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2020/07/batang-toru-hydropower-dam-tapanuli-orangutan-delay-nshe/">distanced themselves</a> from the project after concerns were raised about potential impact on the Tapanuli orangutan. The Chinese state-owned Bank of China also <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/dam-threatening-world-s-rarest-great-ape-faces-delays">withdrew</a> its finance offer after international protests. Chinese financier SDIC Power Holdings then <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b15d75ea-cced-4204-8540-912f9e693a5e">stepped in</a> to fund it.</p>
<p>Habitat destruction has confined the few remaining Tapanuli orangutans to a fragmented 1,400 square kilometre tract of rainforest in North Sumatra. Scientists say the Batang Toru dam further threatens this habitat.</p>
<p>Constructing the dam <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/new-great-ape-species-found-sparking-fears-its-survival?adobe_mc=MCORGID%3D242B6472541199F70A4C98A6%2540AdobeOrg%7CTS%3D1669850712&_ga=2.265727115.508268207.1669850712-1483009232.1669850712">requires digging</a> a tunnel in an area where most Tapanuli orangutans live. Experts also <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/dam-threatening-world-s-rarest-great-ape-faces-delays">say</a> the project will permanently isolate sub-populations of the species, increasing the risk of extinction. </p>
<p>The case illustrates the potential destruction hydropower projects can cause in the absence of appropriate planning and safeguards.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/orangutans-could-half-earth-conservation-save-the-red-ape-192529">Orangutans: could 'half-Earth' conservation save the red ape?</a>
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<img alt="small house on riverbank at night" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/498421/original/file-20221201-18-7vak8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Batang Toru dam aims to bolster North Sumatra’s energy supplies. Pictured: a house on a riverbank near the project.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/DEDI SINUHAJI</span></span>
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<h2>Need for holistic planning</h2>
<p>The sheer number of Chinese-funded dams presents significant biodiversity risks. It also presents an opportunity. </p>
<p>China is funding several hydropower projects in single river basins. This puts it in an advantageous position to carry out “basin-scale planning”. </p>
<p>This involves making decisions about dams not based solely on an individual project, but by considering it in the context of other projects within the basin, as well as in the broader context of communities and the environment.</p>
<p>This type of planning also means dams can be configured to have the least impact on critically endangered species, and other irreplaceable and vulnerable biodiversity elements.</p>
<p>Such “system scale” planning is a key recommendation of international initiatives such as the World Commission on Dams and the European Union’s Water Framework Directive. </p>
<p>It also involves determining whether a proposed dam is the best way to meet energy needs, or if alternatives – such as wind or solar – could do so with lower environmental risks. </p>
<p>In the case of the Batang Toru dam, a 2020 <a href="https://www.mightyearth.org/wp-content/uploads/Batang_Toru_Analysis_English-final.pdf">report</a> by a leading international consulting firm found the dam would not “materially improve access to nor the regularity of power supply” in North Sumatra, which in fact had a power surplus. </p>
<p>Given the huge damage dams can cause to biodiversity, it is crucial that only those dams that are really needed get built – and any associated damage is minimised.</p>
<p>The many Chinese-funded dams on the horizon must undergo rigorous vetting if serious biodiversity damage is to be averted. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-conservation-areas-are-not-living-up-to-their-potential-in-indonesia-130463">Why conservation areas are not living up to their potential in Indonesia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Divya Narain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sheer number of Chinese-funded dams pose a substantial risk to biodiversity. And yet, environmental regulation of these projects has serious flaws.Divya Narain, PhD Candidate, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1936812022-11-29T13:34:23Z2022-11-29T13:34:23ZIs China ready to lead on protecting nature? At the upcoming UN biodiversity conference, it will preside and set the tone<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497108/original/file-20221123-12-d0smj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C2977%2C2070&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Four Père David's deer (_Elaphurus davidianus_), also known as milu deer, on a wetland near the Dafeng Milu National Nature Reserve in Jiangsu Province, China. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/herd-of-milu-deer-are-seen-on-a-wetland-near-the-dafeng-news-photo/1269804369">He Jinghua/VCG via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the world parses what was achieved at the U.N. climate change conference in Egypt, negotiators are convening in Montreal to set goals for curbing Earth’s other crisis: loss of living species.</p>
<p>Starting on Dec. 7, 2022, 196 nations that have ratified the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity will hold their 15th <a href="https://www.cbd.int/cop/">Conference of the Parties</a>, or COP15. The convention, which was adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, is <a href="https://www.cbd.int/convention/guide/">designed to promote sustainable development</a> by protecting <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/science/climate-issues/biodiversity">biodiversity</a> – the variety of life on Earth, from genes up to entire ecosystems. </p>
<p>Today, experts widely agree that biodiversity is at risk. Because of human activities – especially overhunting, overfishing and altering land – species are disappearing from the planet at <a href="https://www.cbd.int/convention/guide/?id=changing">50 to 100 times the historic rate</a>. The United Nations calls this decline a “<a href="https://www.unep.org/facts-about-nature-crisis">nature crisis</a>.”</p>
<p>This meeting was originally scheduled to take place in Kunming, China, in 2020 but was rescheduled because of the COVID-19 pandemic, with some negotiations held online. China will lead the deliberations in Montreal and will set the agenda and tone. This is the first time that Beijing has presided over a major intergovernmental meeting on the environment. As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2TJfBOgAAAAJ">wildlife ecologist</a>, I am eager to see China step into a global leadership role.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Biodiversity matters, because having more ecosystems, species and genes makes nature more resilient and able to weather stresses like diseases and climate change.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Biodiversity in China</h2>
<p>If you ask people where on Earth the greatest concentrations of wild species are found, many will assume it’s in rainforests or tropical coral reefs. In fact, China also is rich in nature. It is home to nearly <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17520/biods.2022397">38,000</a> <a href="http://chertnews.de/Higher_Plants.html">higher plant</a> species – essentially, trees, shrubs and ferns; more than <a href="http://dx.doi.org/%2010.17520/biods.2021214">8,100</a> species of vertebrate animals; over 1,400 bird species; and 20% of the world’s fish species. </p>
<p>Many of China’s wild species are <a href="https://www.biologyonline.com/dictionary/endemic">endemic</a>, meaning that they are found nowhere else in the world. China contains parts of four of the world’s <a href="https://www.conservation.org/priorities/biodiversity-hotspots">global biodiversity hot spots</a> – places that have large numbers of endemic species and also are seriously at risk. <a href="https://www.cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/indo-burma">Indo-Burma</a>, the <a href="https://www.cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/mountains-southwest-china">Mountains of Southwest China</a>, <a href="https://www.cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/himalaya">Eastern Himalaya</a> and the <a href="https://www.cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/mountains-central-asia">Mountains of Central Asia</a> are home to species such as the giant panda, Asiatic black bear, the endangered Sichuan partridge, Xizang alpine toad, Sichuan lancehead and golden pheasant.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A panda walks on all fours through snow" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497728/original/file-20221128-11895-tbc86t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Giant panda in southwest China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Hull</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<h2>China’s conservation record</h2>
<p>Western media coverage of environmental issues in China often focuses on the nation’s severe urban air pollution and its role as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57018837">world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter</a>. But China has a vision for protecting nature, and it has made progress since the last global biodiversity conference in 2018. </p>
<p>In that year, Chinese leaders coined the term “<a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aar3760">ecological civilization</a>” and wrote it into the nation’s constitution. This signaled a recognition that development should consider environmental impacts as well as economic goals.</p>
<p>At that point, China had already created <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-019-01307-6">over 2,750 protected areas</a>, covering nearly 15% of its total land area. Protected areas are places where there is dedicated funding and management in place to conserve ecosystems, while also allowing for some human activities in designated zones within them. </p>
<p>In 2021 President Xi Jinping announced that China was formally augmenting this system with a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-12-11/inside-china-s-new-massive-national-park-system">network of five national parks</a> covering 88,000 square miles (227,000 square kilometers) – the largest such system in the world. </p>
<p>China also has the fastest-expanding forest area in the world. From 2013 to 2017 alone, China reforested <a href="https://chm.cbd.int/database/record?documentID=241353">825 million acres</a> (334 million hectares) of bare or cultivated land – an area <a href="https://www.fs.usda.gov/about-agency/newsroom/by-the-numbers">four times as large</a> as the entire U.S. national forest system.</p>
<p>At least <a href="https://chm.cbd.int/database/record?documentID=241353">10 of China’s notable endangered species</a> are on the path to recovery, including the <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/712/121745669">giant panda</a>, <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/fr/species/22697548/132069229">Asian crested ibis</a> and <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/22679325/92810598">Elliot’s pheasant</a>.</p>
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<h2>More to do</h2>
<p>Still, China has major areas for improvement. It has <a href="https://chm.cbd.int/database/record?documentID=241353">underperformed</a> on four of the original Aichi Targets – goals that members of the Convention on Biodiversity adopted for 2011-2020 – including promoting sustainable fisheries, preventing extinctions, controlling invasive alien species and protecting vulnerable ecosystems. </p>
<p>For example, nearly <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ddi.12961">50% of amphibians in China</a> are threatened. Notable species have been declared extinct, including the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/26/science/china-dugong-sea-cow-extinct.html">Chinese dugong</a>, the <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/digest/chinese-paddlefish-and-sturgeon-officially-extinct">Chinese paddlefish and Yangtze sturgeon</a>, and the <a href="http://www.primate-sg.org/whitehand_gibbon_extinct_china/">white-handed gibbon</a>. </p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic spotlighted China’s central role in legal and illegal wildlife trade, which threatens many endangered <a href="https://news.mongabay.com/2022/10/a-fast-growing-pipeline-the-amazon-to-southeast-asia-wildlife-trade/">mammals, fish, reptiles and birds</a>. In response, China updated its <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383926.htm">Wildlife Protection Law</a>, originally enacted in 1989. </p>
<p>On Feb. 24, 2020, the law was expanded to impose a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-00677-0">near-total ban</a> on trading wildlife for use as food. Now, however, the ban is <a href="https://chinadialogue.net/en/nature/second-draft-revision-of-chinas-wildlife-protection-law-a-big-step-backwards/">being revised</a> in ways that could weaken it, such as easing restrictions on captive breeding. </p>
<p>Around <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolind.2017.08.019">90% of China’s grasslands </a>are degraded, as are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.06.003">53% of its coastal wetlands</a>. China has lost 80% of its coral reefs and 73% of its mangroves <a href="https://cdn.chinadialogue.net/content/uploads/2020/10/29175445/Sustainable-seafood-report-29-Oct-2020.pdf">since 1950</a>. These challenges highlight the need for aggressive action to protect the nation’s remaining biodiversity strongholds.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Satellite image of the Three Gorges Dam in 2009." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/497111/original/file-20221123-24-zrsld9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Three Gorges Dam on China’s Yangtze River, visible at lower right, was built to supply electricity and help control flooding. It altered habitats for thousands of plants, animals and fish, including endangered species.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://eoimages.gsfc.nasa.gov/images/imagerecords/38000/38879/ISS019-E-07720_lrg.jpg">NASA Earth Observatory</a></span>
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<h2>Goals for COP15</h2>
<p>The central goal of the Montreal conference is adopting a <a href="https://www.cbd.int/conferences/2021-20220">post-2020 global biodiversity framework</a>. This road map expands on frameworks put forth in past meetings, including the <a href="https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/">2010 Aichi Targets</a>. As the U.N. has reported, nations <a href="https://www.cbd.int/gbo5">failed to meet any of the Aichi Targets</a> by 2020, although six goals were partially achieved. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/abb5/591f/2e46096d3f0330b08ce87a45/wg2020-03-03-en.pdf">The proposed new framework</a> includes 22 targets to meet by 2030 and four key long-term goals to meet by 2050. They include conserving ecosystems; enhancing the variety of benefits that nature provides to people; ensuring fairness in the sharing of genetic resources, such as digital DNA sequencing data; and solidifying funding commitments. </p>
<p>Many people will be watching to see whether China can successfully lead the negotiations and promote collaboration and consensus. One central challenge is how to pay for the ambitious efforts that the new framework lays out. Environmental advocates are urging wealthy countries to provide up to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-01430-7">US$60 billion annually</a> to help lower-income nations pay for conservation projects and curb illegal wildlife trafficking.</p>
<p>China moved in this direction in 2021 when it launched the <a href="https://www.cbd.int/doc/press/2021/pr-2021-10-13-cop15-hls-en.pdf">Kunming Biodiversity Fund</a> and contributed $230 million to it. Pledges from other countries currently total some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-022-01430-7">$5.2 billion per year</a>, mainly from France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the European Union. </p>
<p>China is likely to face questions about its <a href="https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, a massive infrastructure project that is building railways, pipelines and highways across more than 60 countries. Critics say it is causing deforestation, flooding and other <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-financing-infrastructure-projects-around-the-world-many-could-harm-nature-and-indigenous-communities-168060">harmful environmental impacts</a> – including in global biodiversity hot spots like Southeast Asia’s <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/what-is-the-coral-triangle/">Coral Triangle</a>, which contains one of the world’s most important reef systems.</p>
<p>China has pledged to “<a href="https://green-bri.org/">green” the Belt and Road Initiative</a> going forward, and in 2021, Xi announced <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/24/chinas-pledge-to-stop-building-coal-plants-abroad-helps-bri-aiib.html">a ban</a> on financing new coal power plants overseas, which so far has led to cancellation of <a href="https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/china-coal-ban-anniversary/?module=inline&pgtype=article">26 plants</a>. This is a start, but China has more to do in addressing Belt and Road’s global impacts.</p>
<p>As home to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN">18% of Earth’s population</a> and the producer of <a href="https://www.worldeconomics.com/Share-of-Global-GDP/China.aspx#:%7E:text=China's%20share%20of%20Global%20GDP%20in%202021%20was%2018.4%25%20once,year%20and%20informal%20economy%20size.">18.4% of global GDP</a>, China has a key role to play in protecting nature. I hope to see it provide bold leadership in Montreal and in the years ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193681/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vanessa Hull receives funding from the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p>China has rich natural resources and is seeking to play a leadership role in global conservation, but its economic goals often take priority over protecting lands and wildlife.Vanessa Hull, Assistant Professor of Wildlife Ecology and Conservation, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1897802022-11-18T03:58:45Z2022-11-18T03:58:45ZChina’s influence in Myanmar could tip the scales towards war in the South China Sea<p>The fate of Myanmar has major implications for a free and open Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China, which is consolidating its economic and strategic influence in its smaller neighbour in pursuit of its <a href="https://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-indian-ocean/">two-ocean strategy</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<p>Since the coup China has been – by far – the main source of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-economy-idUSL4N2U721T">foreign investment</a> in Myanmar. </p>
<p>This includes <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/junta-approves-25bn-power-plant-project-backed-by-chinese-companies">US$2.5 billion</a> in a gas-fired power plant to be built west of Myanmar’s capital, Yangon, that will be 81% owned and operated by Chinese companies.</p>
<p>Among the dozens of infrastructure projects China is funding are high-speed rail links and dams. But its most strategically important investment is the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-myanmar-economic-corridor-and-chinas-determination-see-it-through">China-Myanmar Economic Corridor</a>, encompassing oil and gas pipelines, roads and rail links costing many tens of billions of dollars. </p>
<p>The corridor’s “jewel in the crown” is a deep-sea port to be built at Kyaukphyu, on Myanmar’s west coast, at an estimated <a href="https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kyaukphyu-deep-sea-port-poses-challenges-maday-islanders-and-local-fisheries">cost of US$7 billion</a>.</p>
<p>This will finally give China its long-desired “back door” to the Indian Ocean.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495784/original/file-20221117-23-chh7pu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=679&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: Vivekananda International Foundation</span></span>
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<p>Natural gas from Myanmar can help China reduce its dependence on imports from suppliers such as Australia. Access <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/myanmar-chinas-west-coast-dream">to the Indian Ocean</a> will enable China to import gas and oil from the Middle East, Africa and Venezuela without ships having to pass through the contested waters of the South China Sea to Chinese ports. </p>
<p>About <a href="https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/">80% of China’s oil imports</a> now move through the South China Sea via the Malacca Strait, which is just 65 kilometres wide at its narrowest point between the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra. </p>
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<p>Overcoming this strategic vulnerability arguably makes the Kyaukphyu port and pipelines the most important element of China’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-financing-infrastructure-projects-around-the-world-many-could-harm-nature-and-indigenous-communities-168060">Belt and Road initiative</a> to reshape global trade routes and assert its influence over other nations.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-south-china-sea-threatens-90-of-australias-fuel-imports-study-188148">Conflict in the South China Sea threatens 90% of Australia's fuel imports: study</a>
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<h2>Deepening relationship</h2>
<p>Most of China’s infrastructure investment was planned before Myanmar’s coup. But whereas other governments and foreign investors have sought to distance themselves from the junta since it overthrew Myanmar’s elected government in February 2021, China has deepened its relationship.</p>
<p>China is the Myanmar regime’s most important international supporter. In April Foreign Minister Wang Yi said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wang-yi-aung-san-suu-kyi-china-myanmar-diplomacy-d68de69436c1462f647f6475b6315c92">China would support Myanmar</a> “no matter how the situation changes”. In May it used its veto power on the United Nations Security Council to thwart <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/russia-china-block-un-statement-034542265.html">a statement expressing concern</a> about violence and the growing humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Work continues on projects associated with the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. New ventures (such as the aforementioned power station) have been approved.
More projects are on the cards. In June, for example, China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the completion of <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2022/06/08/feasibility-study-completed-for-myanmar039s-wan-pong-port-improvement-project">a feasibility study</a> to upgrade the Wan Pong port on the Lancang-Mekong River in Myanmar’s east.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-myanmar-suffers-the-military-junta-is-desperate-isolated-and-running-out-of-options-187697">As Myanmar suffers, the military junta is desperate, isolated and running out of options</a>
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<h2>Debt trap warnings</h2>
<p>In 2020, before the coup, Myanmar’s auditor general Maw Than <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/costly-borrowing-06102020151951.html">warned of growing indebtedness</a> to China, with Chinese lenders charging higher interest payments than those from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank. </p>
<p>At that time <a href="https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Forty-per-cent-of-Myanmar%E2%80%99s-government-debt-held-by-China-46071.html">about 40%</a> of Myanmar’s foreign debt of US$10 billion was owed to China. It is likely to be greater now. It will only increase the longer a military dictatorship, with few other supporters or sources of foreign money, remains in power, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/06/23/how-the-coup-is-destroying-myanmars-economy/">dragging down Myanmar’s economy</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts to restore democracy in Myanmar should therefore be seen as crucial to the long-term strategic interests of the region’s democracies, and to global peace and prosperity, given the increasing belligerence of China under Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Xi, now president for life, this month told the People’s Liberation Army to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/09/xi-jinping-tells-chinas-army-to-focus-on-preparation-for-war">prepare for war</a>. A compliant and indebted Myanmar with a deep-sea port controlled by Chinese interests tips the scales towards that happening. </p>
<p>A democratic and independent Myanmar is a counter-strategy to this potential. </p>
<h2>Calls for sanctions</h2>
<p>Myanmar’s democracy movement wants the international community to impose <a href="https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/cut-the-cash/">tough sanctions</a> on the junta. But few have responded.</p>
<p>The United States and United Kingdom have gone furthest, banning business dealings with Myanmar military officials and state-owned or private companies controlled by the military. </p>
<p>The European Union and Canada have imposed sanctions against a more limited range of individuals and economic entities.</p>
<p>South Korea has suspended financing new infrastructure projects. Japan has suspended aid and postponed the launch of Myanmar’s first satellite. New Zealand has suspended political and military contact. </p>
<p>Australia has suspended military cooperation (with some <a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/myanmar-sanctions-regime">pre-existing restrictions</a> on dealing with military leaders imposed following the human rights atrocities committed against the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561">Rohingya</a> in 2017. </p>
<p>But that’s about it. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<p>Myanmar’s closest neighbours in the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations are still committed to a policy of dialogue and “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/will-asean-finally-change-its-approach-toward-myanmar/">non-interference</a>” – though <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/malaysian-fm-says-asean-envoy-welcomes-idea-of-engaging-myanmars-nug/">Malaysia</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/indonesian-fm-says-myanmar-military-to-blame-for-countrys-crisis/">Indonesia</a> are increasingly arguing for a tougher approach as the atrocities mount. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://myanmar.iiss.org/">Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project</a> says the only country now more violent than Myanmar is Ukraine. </p>
<p>Given its unique geo-strategic position, self-interest alone should be enough for the international community to take greater action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Htwe Htwe Thein receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery grant. </span></em></p>An undemocratic Myanmar serves no one’s interests except China.Htwe Htwe Thein, Associate professor, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1912412022-10-18T16:50:57Z2022-10-18T16:50:57ZUS needs to rebuild Latin American alliances as Russia grows global pro-war power base<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489790/original/file-20221014-26-ard7xh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A closer alliance between the US and Latin America could bring political and economic benefits for both.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SERGIO V S RANGEL/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Russia builds a <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-building-a-closer-alliance-with-the-worlds-autocracies-the-west-should-beware-190708">closer alliance with China, Iran and North Korea</a>, a new alliance in the western hemisphere seems overdue. The US, however, faces a two-pronged challenge: how to balance first Russia in Europe, and second, China in Latin America and the Caribbean. </p>
<p>The US should be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/biden-targets-latin-america-reset-summit-marred-by-invite-tension-2022-06-05/">looking at alliances</a> with its near neighbours in Latin America, a region with which it has a long and rocky relationship. </p>
<p>Bolstering its relationships with key nations such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina would also provide some healthy competition for China and additional regional investment, but because of its history the US needs to tread carefully. US president Joe Biden has indicated he wants to pursue a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/biden-targets-latin-america-reset-summit-marred-by-invite-tension-2022-06-05/">new regional strategy</a>, but so far little action has been taken.</p>
<p>Throughout the 20th century, increasing interactions between the US and Latin America led to a complex interdependence, which exacerbated the power and development gap that divided them. For instance, there were cases of US involvement in regime changes in Latin American such as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24483554">1973 coup</a> against Chilean socialist president Salvador Allende. </p>
<p>There was also economic involvement that culminated with the “<a href="https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1381&=&=&=&context=lbra&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.google.com%252Furl%253Fsa%253DD%2526q%253Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fscholar.smu.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%25253Farticle%25253D1381%252526amp%25253Bcontext%25253Dlbra%2526ust%253D1665842520000000%2526usg%253DAOvVaw3HebihvnRvHkHEkL1TgdO8%2526hl%253Den%2526source%253Dgmail#search=%22https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.smu.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1381%26context%3Dlbra%22">Washington consensus</a>” in the late 1980s. This was a series of Washington-prescribed economic reforms such as financial and trade liberalisation, which were adopted by many countries beyond Latin America.</p>
<p>A degree of complacency settled in Washington DC after Latin America’s move towards <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02687137">democratisation</a> in the 1980s and 1990s which led to less focus on the region as a partner. More recently, the US has been preoccupied with Nato’s expansion and the parallel objective of containing Russia.</p>
<h2>Declining relationship</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/16/latin-americas-vicious-circle-is-a-warning-to-the-west">Observers</a> believe that Latin America, considered a natural ally of the west in general, is at severe risk of democratic decay and that there is a strong probability it could return to dictatorship-dominated regimes, ultimately drifting out of the west’s orbit. </p>
<p>In this context, the US has progressively neglected its own backyard. In fact, some commentators suggest that it has handed Latin America “<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carol-Wise-5/publication/322141532_Conceptualizing_China-Latin_America_relations_in_the_twenty-first_century_the_boom_the_bust_and_the_aftermath/links/5a57ef580f7e9bbacbdfad57/Conceptualizing-China-Latin-America-relations-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-boom-the-bust-and-the-aftermath.pdf">over to China on a silver platter</a>”.</p>
<p>The results of the US-backed <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782">UN general assembly vote</a> on Russia’s suspension from the human rights council earlier this year highlights a waning of its diplomatic weight in its traditional sphere of influence. Out of the 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries present, 13 either abstained or voted against the resolution.</p>
<p>Next, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nicaragua-gives-permission-for-russian-troops-to-enter-country/">Nicaragua</a> expanded its relationship with Russia by authorising Russian troops, planes and ships to deploy in its territory. The decree allows Russian troops to carry out activities related to law enforcement, humanitarian aid and emergency responses. This is a subtle challenge to the <a href="http://maihold.org/mediapool/113/1132142/data/Gilderhus.pdf">Monroe doctrine</a> which opposed European expansion into Latin America.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A coloured map of Latin America." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489785/original/file-20221014-18-j1e8lr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>Historically, when another power has challenged the US, Latin America has <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/29849A6D5022DFB9C8B021FED71A420E/S0305741011001469a.pdf/china_united_states_and_hegemonic_challenge_in_latin_america_an_overview_and_some_lessons_from_previous_instances_of_hegemonic_challenge_in_the_region.pdf">mitigated US dominance</a> by engaging with its challenger. China’s case is no different. It has increased its presence in the region by becoming the main trade partner for much of Latin America. </p>
<p>Between 2000-2016, the region’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carol-Wise-5/publication/322141532_Conceptualizing_China-Latin_America_relations_in_the_twenty-first_century_the_boom_the_bust_and_the_aftermath/links/5a57ef580f7e9bbacbdfad57/Conceptualizing-China-Latin-America-relations-in-the-twenty-first-century-the-boom-the-bust-and-the-aftermath.pdf">trade with China increased 20-fold</a>, representing 9% and 16% of the region’s exports and imports, respectively. Studies conclude that the higher the volume and importance of Latin American countries’ trade with China, the more likely it is that their <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381613000066">foreign policies will converge</a> with China’s.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-belt-and-road-initiative-chinas-vision-for-globalisation-beijing-style-77705">The Belt and Road Initiative: China's vision for globalisation, Beijing-style</a>
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<p>A good example of China’s diplomatic muscle in the region is its campaign to halt diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Regional countries including Costa Rica were among the few that established such relations with the island, over which China claims ownership. By increasing investment – mainly through financing infrastructure projects – China gradually persuaded various countries to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan. </p>
<p>In 2007, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-costarica-idUSPEK14344320070607">Costa Rica</a> cut ties with Taiwan and in 2017 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40256499">Panama</a> did likewise. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/asia/taiwan-el-salvador-diplomatic-ties.html">El Salvador</a> followed in 2018, leaving just 17 countries (globally) maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan. By 2021, after <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-10/taiwan-s-last-diplomatic-friends-make-up-0-2-of-global-gdp-map?leadSource=uverify%20wall">Nicaragua</a>’s withdrawal, only 14 countries remained.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness/">IMD World Competitiveness Ranking</a>, which measures how well governments encourage and support the prosperity of their people, shows today’s great divide between the US and Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2022, the US ranked 10th out of 63 countries, while Chile – the closest regional country in the sample – ranks 45th. Brazil (59th) and Argentina (62nd) sit at the bottom of the ranking.</p>
<h2>The XY swing</h2>
<p>In recent decades, attempts to resolve their endemic socio-economic and political issues have seen Latin American countries turn to right-wing administrations, then to left-wing and back to right-wing. Within this cycle, some countries have turned to political parties upholding what we call “XY populism”: one that oscillates between inclusiveness (government of the people) and exclusion (protects or excludes the interests of particular groups), purporting itself to be anti-establishment.</p>
<p>XY regimes undertake a balancing act to keep the wealthy and, at least rhetorically, the poor happy. They also create perilous conditions for democracy. XY leaders are democratically elected but, once in office, progressively erode the power of democratic institutions. They show proclivity toward authoritarianism with hints of potential dictatorship.</p>
<p>Central to creating the new hemispheric alliance needed is an intensification of those efforts already under way to solve the root cause of those problems in Latin America (and the Caribbean) that significantly concern the US. For instance, poverty causing an estimated 3.5 million children to be affected <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/latin-america-and-caribbean-about-3.5-million-children-to-be-affected-by-migration-next-year">by migration in 2023</a>.</p>
<p>A new alliance would provide a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions throughout Latin America, to provide economic stimulus for the region, and increase global security while bolstering US and Latin American diplomatic ties.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With Russia building new partnerships to gain support for its war, the US should re-engage with allies in its backyard, experts say.Jose Caballero, Senior Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Arturo Bris, Professor of Finance, International Institute for Management Development (IMD)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1890932022-08-31T10:20:20Z2022-08-31T10:20:20ZThe world’s democratic recession is giving China more power to extend authoritarianism<p>Over the last decade, <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf">the number of countries</a> considered to be liberal democracies has contracted from 41 to 32, back to the same level as in 1989. In the same period, <a href="https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf">87 other countries</a> were labelled as closed autocracies or elected autocracies. </p>
<p>A 2021 survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit showed that only 8.4% of the world’s population lived in a fully functioning democracy, this shift is being referred to as a <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/02/02/global-democracy-has-a-very-bad-year">“democratic recession”</a>.</p>
<p>To many, leaders such as Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán, Turkey’s president Recep Erdoğan and former Philippines’ president Rodrigo Duterte have typified this trend. They have <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">weakened their domestic</a> political systems and undermined elections by closing down critical media. Such leaders are also reducing, or attempting to reduce, the independence of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/abs/toward-a-new-political-regime-in-turkey-from-competitive-toward-full-authoritarianism/76DDFD46CFDD20B15E2908A9BECBEAEC">their judiciaries</a>.</p>
<p>The gradual erosion of democratic values and freedoms, such as recent restrictions on the <a href="https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/advice_information/pcsc-policing-act-protest-rights/">right to protest</a> in the UK, and this slide towards authoritarianism, is opening up more space for China to dominate the global agenda with its values.</p>
<p>Crucially, such an authoritarian tilt is now starting to epitomise politics in democratic countries, such as the US, India and the UK. As these countries become less democratic, they are in effect giving more space for authoritarianism to flourish.</p>
<h2>Trump, Modi and Johnson</h2>
<p>Populist former US president Donald Trump openly questioned the foundations of US democracy. His attacks upon members of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2056305118776010">“fake news” media</a> rejected the role of a free press, weakening the constitution and human rights. In turn, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/13/trump-confesses-voter-supression/">policies on voter suppression</a> that discourage specific groups of people from voting, <a href="https://www.politico.com/interactives/2022/congressional-redistricting-maps-by-state-and-district/">redistricting</a> (changing the boundaries of a constituency to favour the party in government) and the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3706545">politicisation of the justice system</a> by openly attacking judges <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-ideological-judges-led-politicized-courts/">who ruled against his administration’s policies</a>, all undermined democracy.</p>
<p>Under Trump there was also a major upswing in reported <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102652">hate crimes</a> against minority groups. After Trump, by mid-2021, the US had more than 400 bills pending on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/13/joe-biden-republicans-voting-rights-philadelphia">voter suppression</a> in mainly Republican-controlled state legislatures, and more than 230 bills pending on <a href="https://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/">criminalising protest</a>. </p>
<p>In turn, many members of the Republican Party have refused to accept the result of the <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/at-least-120-republicans-who-deny-the-2020-election-results-will-be-on-the-ballot-in-november/">2020 presidential election</a>. In doing this, the Republican Party goes some way to eroding public trust in the whole political system.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also shifted India in an authoritarian direction. He has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/18/indias-democracy-is-under-threat/">used anti-terrorism laws</a> to silence political opponents, journalists and academics, and to limit public protests against his government’s policies.</p>
<p>Since 2014, violence and discrimination against India’s 200 million Muslims <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy">has also increased</a>. One example of this, is the National Register of Citizens and the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019, which excluded Muslims from the same rights enjoyed by the Hindu majority. </p>
<p>In the UK, the populist government of prime minister Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/24/uk-supreme-court-rules-parliament-suspension-unlawful-void">unlawfully suspended parliament in 2019</a>. His government also introduced <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9187/">compulsory voter ID</a>, which has been criticised as a way of restricting voting. Other laws are limiting the ability of the media and judiciary to provide <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/the-thin-end-of-the-wedge-the-uk-and-escalating-global-authoritarianism/">independent oversight</a> and to hold the powerful to account.</p>
<p>Authoritarian leaders revelled in the chaos of the 2020 US presidential election. Colombia’s Publimetro <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/whos-the-banana-republic-now-world-reacts-to-us-election/GBUFN5HYBGMHDAHQGFG3ON3OAA/">newspaper</a> ran a piece headlined: “Who’s the banana republic now?” And <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/05/what-a-spectacle-the-uss-enemies-revel-in-the-post-election-chaos">Chinese state media noted</a> that the US looked a “bit like a developing country”.</p>
<h2>What does this mean for China?</h2>
<p>China’s economic, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military">military</a> and diplomatic ascent is allowing Beijing to increasingly promote its style of politics on <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263300375_The_rise_of_the_'China_Model'_and_'Beijing_Consensus'_Evidence_of_authoritarian_diffusio">the global stage</a>. Its foreign policy provides <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41267-021-00435-0">up to US$8 trillion (£6.7 trillion) in investment</a> to developing countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America, through its <a href="https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html">Belt and Road Initiative</a>.</p>
<p>The strategy’s name echoes the historic Silk Road from 2,000 years ago, a series of powerful trading routes connected to China. This series of investments in ports, bridges and major infrastructure around the world has given China enormous influence.</p>
<p>China has also built up a strong portfolio by <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism">selling intelligent monitoring systems</a> (which can be used to censor negative public opinion online) and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/poi3.183">surveillance technology</a> to other countries. It also exported its <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/exporting-chinas-social-credit-system-to-central-asia/">social credit system</a> to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. </p>
<p>These are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Mirror">Black Mirror</a>-style systems where governments can score people for taking actions that officials approve of. This development is worrying as China is now exporting <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/china-social-credit-system-explained">the technological means</a> (through which it has achieved its near-total social and political control) to other authoritarian-minded countries.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-how-populist-politicians-use-religion-to-help-them-win-187742">Brazil: how populist politicians use religion to help them win</a>
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<p>For the last several years, Beijing has questioned the idea of universal <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42738-019-00035-9">human rights at United Nations’</a> meetings. In 2018, it requested that the phrase “human rights defender” <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/china-starts-to-assert-its-world-view-at-un-as-influence-grows">be removed from the UN lexicon</a>. If it is able to erode the idea of these rights then it will open up more room to expand authoritarian practices across democracies.</p>
<p>Democratic backsliding only appears to <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal">perpetuate this</a>. It also limits the ability of the west to criticise China, Russia and others for increasingly ignoring the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353147789_The_Term_Rules-based_International_Order_in_International_Legal_Discourses">“rules-based” international order</a>, for example, in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/search-results?page=1&q=south%20china%20sea&fl_SiteID=5151&allJournals=1&SearchSourceType=1">South China Sea</a> or in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066115601200">Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Beijing is currently creating an alternative way of ordering the world. China’s successful <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28354/chapter-abstract/215201502?redirectedFrom=fulltext">authoritarian-capitalist model</a> underpins this vision. China is also creating competing international institutions (such as the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0974928416643582">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> and the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1016/j.euras.2018.08.001">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Together with wider democratic decline, there is a mounting global convergence around authoritarianism. If these trends come to dominate global politics, the remaining democratic rights enjoyed in the west will be deeply threatened. At worst, they may be entirely replaced by repressive governments, heralding a new China-centric world order and the beginnings of an <a href="https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/the-authoritarian-century">authoritarian century</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Ogden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China is challenging the idea of democracy, but western leaders are eroding democratic rights too.Chris Ogden, Senior Lecturer in Asian Affairs, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1873092022-08-08T13:43:17Z2022-08-08T13:43:17ZChinese private security firms are growing their presence in Africa: why it matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476343/original/file-20220727-13-o052ct.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese and Ivorian workers at the site of a container terminal at the port of Abidjan. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese private security companies have found a profitable niche market in Africa: guarding Chinese executives and construction sites. They’re also securing Chinese vessels at sea against piracy.</p>
<p>The growing presence of Chinese private security companies in Africa comes against the backdrop of a global security architecture that’s in transition. </p>
<p>These changes reflect the US moving away from being the world’s sheriff to its <a href="https://www.geopolitica.info/us-offshore-balancing/">offshore security balancer</a>. America is using its strategic alliances and intervening to protect its interests abroad only when necessary. </p>
<p>Today, regional recalibration is the name of the game.</p>
<p>The demand for Chinese security services in Africa has <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5e7a733475a31172316a05d5/1585083189926/WP+35+-+Arduino+-+Chinese+Private+Security+Companies.pdf">increased significantly</a> since the 2013 launch of China’s <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>. This is the country’s blueprint for its engagement with the continent. </p>
<p>But private security companies have captured less attention than the rise of private military companies and mercenaries like the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/23/russia-putin-wagner-group-mercenaries-africa">Wagner Group</a>. </p>
<p>The growth of Chinese private security companies comes as Beijing increases its investment in large infrastructure projects in Africa. China is also investing in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources#:%7E:text=Metals%20including%20gold%2C%20iron%2C%20titanium,commodity%20for%2013%20African%20countries.">mining projects</a> across the continent. However, in nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan, ongoing political unrest means government security services are wanting.</p>
<p>China’s reliance on these countries for resources explains why it’s become more anxious about security in Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-and-security-in-africa-how-china-can-help-address-weaknesses-156219">Peace and security in Africa: how China can help address weaknesses</a>
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<p>This highlights the need for bilateral and multilateral agreements on the private security sector between China and African nations. They need to agree on codes of conduct for oversight, regulation and cooperation. Increased sector scrutiny, based on best practices, would also help prevent the growth of unregulated private security firms. </p>
<p>Failing to establish these regulations could lead to <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-10-05-threat-to-security-five-chinese-nationals-arrested-in-lavington/">negative spillovers</a>. Private security companies could abuse authority or fail to operate along clear guidelines. It could also lead to unaccountable mercenaries and rogue foreign militia. This would affect African populations and the viability of the Belt and Road Initiative.</p>
<h2>Three pecularities</h2>
<p>Africa’s private security sector is characterised by three peculiarities. </p>
<p>First, the continent still carries the stigma associated with <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13688.doc.htm">mercenaries’ actions</a> during post-colonial conflicts. The kind of heavily armed soldiers that wrought havoc over the last three decades may no longer be the norm. But the stigma persists.</p>
<p>Second, well before the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing’s focus on private security companies, several Chinese companies operating in Africa organised a sort of armed militia. These were established to <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/12/25/6-illegal-miners-shot-breaking-chinese-owned-mine/">protect Chinese interests</a> from criminal or political violence. These ranged from natural resource extraction to small businesses.</p>
<p>Third, Africa is witnessing the return of well-structured groups of international private military companies. These companies support local governments and international interests, such as <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/beyond-syria-and-ukraine-wagner-pmc-expands-its-operations-to-africa/">Moscow’s muscular return</a> to the African continent. </p>
<p>As a result, the expansion of Chinese private security companies – and their implications for the continent’s security landscape – has drawn less scrutiny.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-chinas-role-in-africa-say-about-its-growing-global-footprint-49474">What does China's role in Africa say about its growing global footprint?</a>
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<p>Private security companies are not new to Africa. However, the Chinese ones are still <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/602ab2f4750e046ac9620127/1613411061832/WP+44+Zheng+and+Xia+PSCs+in+Kenya.pdf">establishing themselves</a>. In response to increasing criminal and militant violence <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/chinese-nationals-have-become-targets-violence-china-deepens">against Chinese individuals and infrastructure abroad</a>, their role is expanding from securing fixed structures to providing high-tech surveillance.</p>
<p>In the last decade, China has recognised that sole reliance on the economic development of African countries isn’t enough to protect its workers and projects. Bursts of violence and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/30/20-years-after-9-11-jihadi-terrorism-rises-in-africa/">terrorist expansion</a> from the Sahel to Somalia are putting Chinese workers and investments in the cross-hairs. </p>
<h2>China’s regulatory response</h2>
<p>In 2018, the Chinese government drew up a set of security regulations for companies operating overseas. These are detailed in the <a href="http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/201803/20180323112639296.pdf">Security Management Guideline for Overseas Chinese-Funded Companies, Institutions and Personnel</a>. </p>
<p>The document outlines training requirements, security assessments and risk mitigation procedures. Companies, for instance, need to provide the Chinese government with risk assessments to get the green light to invest abroad. It also addresses procedures on data sharing and reporting on local security developments. </p>
<p>These guidelines have been well received among the dozens of Chinese private security companies already operating efficiently abroad. But it’s yet to be seen how the estimated 10,000 local Chinese companies with limited knowledge of international security requirements will operate if they want to work in Africa.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s important to consider how Chinese private security companies interact with local government security forces and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467">substantial Chinese peacekeeping presence</a> on the continent. </p>
<p>Proper integration of foreign private security services will benefit host governments, especially as security threats rise. But, in China, it’s not easy to know where the public ends and the private starts. Checks and balances are needed to prevent private security firms from becoming political pressure tools.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-approach-to-peace-in-africa-is-different-how-and-why-129467">China's approach to peace in Africa is different. How and why</a>
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<p>As it is, China’s private security companies are still evolving. This increases the likelihood of private firms moving overseas without proper training, operational capabilities or an understanding of the threats. </p>
<p>Prepared or not, Chinese companies are <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/5f689c0adc971b471088a419/1600691210873/WP+40+-+Benabdallah+%26+Large+-+Dev+Security+China+Role+in+Mali.pdf">extending feelers</a> in African countries to establish security business partnerships. This has been seen in Mali, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa and Tanzania. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, the race for the cheapest contract still plagues the internationalisation of the Chinese security sector. To counter this, it’s necessary to partner efficient Chinese private security companies with local security providers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>China’s need for private security services in Africa has grown significantly as Beijing increases its investment in the continent.Alessandro Arduino, Principal Research Fellow, National University of SingaporeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1784862022-03-11T13:21:46Z2022-03-11T13:21:46ZUkraine war and anti-Russia sanctions on top of COVID-19 mean even worse trouble lies ahead for global supply chains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451425/original/file-20220310-23-1tvu4vo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C45%2C3805%2C2506&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supply chains were already in disarray thanks to overcongested ports, as in Los Angeles.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CaliforniaOverloadedPorts/d30c08f37b2b4de5979e4ca5a7723a41/photo?Query=cargo%20ships&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3190&currentItemNo=29">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Francis Fukuyama, the American political scientist who once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “end of history,” <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d0331b51-5d0e-4132-9f97-c3f41c7d75b3">suggested that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a> might be called “the end of the end of history.” He meant that Vladimir Putin’s aggression signals a rollback of the ideals of a free Europe that emerged after 1991. Some observers suggest it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/opinion/russia-ukraine-cold-war.html">may kick off a new Cold War</a>, with an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/09/ukraine-russia-iron-curtain/">Iron Curtain separating the West from Russia</a>.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://tinglongdai.com/research/#covid-related">expert in global supply chains</a>, I think the war portends the end of something else: global supply chains that <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-06/why-global-supply-chains-will-be-rewritten-in-coming-years/100875330">Western companies built</a> after the Berlin Wall fell over three decades ago.</p>
<p><a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/2021/11/01/supply-chain-issues-dai/">Supply chains</a> – often vast networks of resources, money, information and people that companies rely on to get goods or services to consumers – <a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/2021/11/01/supply-chain-issues-dai">were already in disarray</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in massive shortages, disruptions and price inflation. The war and <a href="https://correctiv.org/en/latest-stories/2022/03/01/sanctions-tracker-live-monitoring-of-all-sanctions-against-russia/">resulting sanctions against Russia</a> have immediately put further strains on them, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/08/americans-are-paying-the-most-at-the-pump-on-record-amid-a-surge-in-energy-prices.html">prompting skyrocketing energy prices</a> and <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/putin-war-russia-ukraine-risks-global-catastrophe-wheat-prices-middle-east-africa-famine-1504866">even fears of famine</a>. </p>
<p>But beyond these short-term effects, I believe the war in Ukraine could drastically reshape global supply chains in a way the pandemic never did.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A person pumps gasoline into the fuel tank of a car" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C109%2C3713%2C2443&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451158/original/file-20220309-22-17bm353.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The cost of filling up a car with gas soared after the U.S. banned imports of Russian oil.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/CaliforniaRussiaUkraineWarEnergyPrices/8e2c932606284c2c93d38246fa05c834/photo?Query=gas%20prices&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=4756&currentItemNo=33">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes</a></span>
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<h2>Immediate effects: Fuel and famine</h2>
<p>Russia accounts for less than <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/">2% of global gross domestic product</a>, while Ukraine accounts for only 0.14%. As a result, they have little direct impact on global supply chains – except in a few very important areas. </p>
<p>Let’s start with the most obvious one: energy. Russia supplies nearly 40% of Europe’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/09/1079338002/russia-ukraine-europe-gas-nordstream2-energy">natural gas supply</a> and 65% of Germany’s. It is the third-largest oil exporter in the world, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-does-the-u-s-still-buy-russian-oil-11646151935">accounting for 7% of all crude oil</a> and petroleum product imports into the United States. After the Biden administration signaled it would stop importing Russian oil, the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CL1:COM?sref=Hjm5biAW">price of crude topped US$130</a> per barrel for the first time in 13 years, and consumers in some parts of the U.S. have seen average gasoline prices <a href="https://ktla.com/news/local-news/l-a-gas-prices-surge-past-5-average-for-1st-time/">rise above $5</a> per gallon. </p>
<p>Less obviously, Russia and Ukraine account for nearly <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/457ba29e-f29b-4677-b69e-a6e5b973cad6">one-third</a> of all global wheat exports. Several countries, including Kazakhstan and Tanzania, import more than 90% of their wheat from Russia. The war has the potential to disrupt the still-recovering <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-and-covid-19">global food supply chain</a> and endanger the livelihoods of millions of people.</p>
<p>Even less obviously, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/ukraine-war-flashes-neon-warning-lights-chips-2022-02-24/">Ukraine produces 90%</a> of the semiconductor-grade neon used in the United States. Russia, on the other hand, provides the United States <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/white-house-tells-chip-industry-brace-russian-supply-disruptions-2022-02-11/">more than a third</a> of its palladium, a rare metal also required to make semiconductors. Although companies have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/limited-impact-chips-yet-russia-invades-ukraine-future-uncertain-2022-02-24/">enough inventory</a> to fulfill immediate needs and may find alternative suppliers, some disruptions are inevitable. And this comes at a time when the world is <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/ford-stock-price-car-production-chip-shortage-51646399837">still suffering from a severe chip shortage</a>, which has slowed auto production and sent <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/business/car-prices-easing-2022/index.html">new and used car prices soaring</a>.</p>
<p>It is also worth noting that <a href="https://www-forbes-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.forbes.com/sites/willyshih/2022/03/06/the-titanium-supply-chain-for-the-aerospace-industry-goes-through-russia/amp/">Russia is a dominant</a> exporter of titanium and titanium forgings, which are popular in the aerospace industry because of their light weight. This war <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-says-us-russia-relations-weighing-business-2022-01-31/">will further stress</a> the aerospace supply chain.</p>
<h2>Snarling trade</h2>
<p>While the direct effects of the war on supply chains are relatively limited, the impact on the global movement of goods and services has been significant – I believe even greater than from COVID-19. </p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/map-shows-countries-that-closed-airspace-russia-over-ukraine-war-2022-3">36 countries</a>, including EU members, the U.S. and Canada, closed their airspace to Russian aircraft, <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-attack-on-ukraine-has-closed-airspace-and-disrupted-airline-routes-but-its-also-impacted-the-transportation-of-air-cargo-11646416225">Russia retaliated with the same restrictions</a>. As a result, goods transported by air freight from China to Europe or the Eastern U.S. may need to be rerouted or use slower or more expensive modes of transportation. The China-Europe rail freight route that goes through Russia, which <a href="https://qz.com/2102636/supply-chain-chaos-spurs-china-europe-rail-freight-revival/">was experiencing a boom</a> in 2021 because of congestion in major ports, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3169239/what-china-europe-railway-express-and-how-much-pressure-it">now faces mounting cancellations</a> from European clients. </p>
<p>The war has also had a devastating impact on global trade movements, with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-middle-east-global-trade-12ba42660a05c0b3ff533aec4e73bbac">hundreds of tankers and bulk carriers</a> stranded at ports as a result of sanctions imposed on Russian-connected ships. It has also resulted in severe travel and transport restrictions imposed on Russia and Belarus in an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-middle-east-global-trade-12ba42660a05c0b3ff533aec4e73bbac">unprecedentedly rapid and broad</a> manner that has been coordinated among multiple nations.</p>
<p>In addition, the disruption of the route from China to Europe and the U.S. could do severe damage to China’s “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belts and Roads</a>” initiative. That’s the ambitious trillion-dollar project aimed at reshaping global trade and affirming the dominance of a China-centric global supply chain, especially in Europe and Asia. Because both Russia and Ukraine are critical links in the initiative, it will almost certainly need to scale back in size and scope.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly white Russian woman with a pink and white hat eats a hamburger with McDonalds bags and a drink on a table in front of her" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451427/original/file-20220310-19-1u3hnw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia went to war against Ukraine – even though both countries had McDonald’s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USSRMOSCOWMCDONALDS/a17efc70aae4da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo?Query=McDonald%27s%20moscow&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=36&currentItemNo=32">AP Photo/Rudi Blaha</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A supply chain Iron Curtain</h2>
<p>The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, a true believer in globalization, in 1996 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-affairs-big-mac-i.html">famously theorized</a> that no two countries that both have a McDonald’s would ever fight a war against each other. McDonald’s has about 850 restaurants in Russia and 100 in Ukraine, all of which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/mcdonalds-to-temporarily-close-all-russian-locations-in-response-to-ukrainian-war">have now been temporarily closed</a>.</p>
<p>His point was that countries with economies and middle classes big enough to support a McDonald’s “don’t like to fight wars; they like to wait in line for burgers.” It was also based on the belief that rational economic calculations will always triumph over geopolitical conflicts – that is, leaders in such countries wouldn’t let their differences get in the way of trade and making money.</p>
<p>And the supply chains that <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-06/why-global-supply-chains-will-be-rewritten-in-coming-years/100875330">companies erected</a> in the decades since then have crisscrossed the globe, ignoring old enemy lines for the sake of efficiency and higher profits. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/25/opinion/putin-russia-ukraine.html">Friedman now concedes</a> Russia’s action has shattered that theory. I agree, and in fact the world may now be on the cusp of a new type of supply chain Iron Curtain with Russia and its allies on one side and the West on the other. Companies will no longer be able to separate business from geopolitics.</p>
<p>And those allies include China, which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/business/economy/supply-chain-reshoring-us-manufacturing.html">remains pivotal to most Western companies’ supply chains</a>. Despite China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/08/briefing/china-russia-xi-jinping-vladimir-putin.html">ambiguous</a> stance on the invasion, the war will likely serve as a catalyst to reduce that dependence, at least for <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/24/the-biden-harris-plan-to-revitalize-american-manufacturing-and-secure-critical-supply-chains-in-2022">critical products</a> such as materials used for semiconductor manufacturing, medical supplies and electric batteries. </p>
<p>Moreover, the growing emphasis of shareholders and regulators on <a href="https://theconversation.com/esg-investing-has-a-blind-spot-that-puts-the-35-trillion-industrys-sustainability-promises-in-doubt-supply-chains-170199">environmental, social and governance</a> issues means how a company does in each category can affect its <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/%7E/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/high%20tech/pdfs/shaping_the_future1.ashx">daily operations</a> and <a href="https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/esg-and-the-cost-of-capital/01726513589">cost of capital</a>. On the issue of Ukraine, the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/08/after-russia-exit-moves-corporations-face-a-much-trickier-end-game.html">push to be more socially responsible</a> is one reason companies have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-middle-east-global-trade-12ba42660a05c0b3ff533aec4e73bbac">overcomplied with sanctions</a>. It’s also prompting them to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/08/after-russia-exit-moves-corporations-face-a-much-trickier-end-game.html">proactively avoid geopolitical risks</a>, which can involve <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/08/after-russia-exit-moves-corporations-face-a-much-trickier-end-game.html">retreating from an entire economy</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s war against Ukraine is still ongoing, and there’s no way to know for certain how long the sanctions will remain in place or whether <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-apple-disney-ikea-and-hundreds-of-other-western-companies-are-abandoning-russia-with-barely-a-shrug-178516">companies that have chosen to leave Russia</a> will return. But I believe one thing is certain: Global supply chains, like the rest of the world, will never be the same again as a result of this war.</p>
<p>[<em>More than 150,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150K">Join the list today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinglong Dai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the short term, the war is causing energy prices to soar and prompting fears of famine in some countries. In the long term, it could remake the modern global supply chain.Tinglong Dai, Professor of Operations Management & Business Analytics, Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1773772022-02-28T14:37:24Z2022-02-28T14:37:24ZAfrican states need a vision for relations with the Indo-Pacific<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448508/original/file-20220225-27-o4dv80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year sees the 25th anniversary of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Nine of the organisation’s member states are African, ranging from Somalia in the north west to South Africa in the south. It also includes islands, such as Mauritius, off the western seaboard. It brings together governments, business and academics and researchers across the Indian Ocean Region.</p>
<p>Set up to <a href="https://www.iora.int/en">strengthen regional cooperation</a> and sustainable development, the association has grown from 14 member states initially in 1997 to 23 in 2022. It has adopted the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvgc60f0">‘Blue Economy’</a> as a focus area. It is also increasingly paying attention to climate change and environmental issues as well as the regulation of fishing and other threats of growing importance to the maritime realm.</p>
<p>In recent years the organisation’s member states have increasingly been confronted by the geopolitical <a href="https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry-east-asia">rivalry</a> between China and the US in the mega-region, referred to as the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>The Indo-Pacific is home to more than half the world’s population and <a href="https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/">seven</a> out of the 15 biggest economies in the world are located here. </p>
<p>For the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/what-does-free-and-open-really-mean-for-the-indo-pacific/">US</a> and its allies, who have largely appropriated the Indo-Pacific concept, the region is first and foremost of geo-economic concern. The economic interaction is crucial, as seen by the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/">Build Back Better World</a> initiative, although it remains vague on practicalities. </p>
<p>For China, the Indian Ocean forms an important part of the maritime component of its Belt and Road Initiative. This emphasises economic development over geopolitics.</p>
<p>That China is increasingly taking note of developments in the Western Indo-Pacific is reflected in the January 2022 Africa <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-to-appoint-horn-of-africa-special-envoy/6385449.html">visit</a> of foreign minister Wang Yi. His tour focused on Africa’s eastern seaboard. It included Eritrea, Kenya, and the Comoros (and even further afield to the Maldives and Sri Lanka).</p>
<p>The Indo-Pacific is crucial for the interests of all these states and their regional organisations or informal forums and alliances. The two oceans have been at the heart of world trade for centuries. An estimated <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-indian-ocean-region-might-soon-play-a-lead-role-in-world-affairs-109663">80%</a> of the world’s oil is moved across the Indian Ocean.</p>
<p>In addition, oceans and coastal environments are becoming the next frontier of expansion for sustainable development. Fishing, mineral and energy sources and tourism are drawing investment as countries realise the potential in ocean and coastal resources.</p>
<p>And ownership of these resources may turn contentious. This was illustrated recently in the maritime boundary <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/icj-draws-the-line-in-kenya-and-somalias-troubled-waters">dispute</a> between Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<p>Another reason for the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific is related to increased transnational organised crime. This includes human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing and harvesting and trafficking of wildlife and timber and the illicit trade in electronic waste.</p>
<p>Africa has been a long-time supporter of the idea of the Indian Ocean as a ‘zone of peace’. This was first confirmed in a <a href="https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210579872s005-c003">UN resolution in 1971</a>. But the current geopolitical contention in the Indo-Pacific is reminiscent of <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/gunboat-diplomacy/">gunboat diplomacy</a> and is raising many concerns.</p>
<p>What is clear, though, is that Africa and the littoral states in the western Indo-Pacific don’t have a vision for the super-region. The African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/33832-wd-african_union_3-1.pdf">2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy</a> could serve as a starting point. But even then, those states that are on the western Indo-Pacific need to think through their own interests in such a continental approach to this evolving super-region.</p>
<h2>Growing importance of the region</h2>
<p>The past few years have seen a spate of policy and strategy documents setting out the positions of organisations and states for the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p>The ‘Quad’ – the informal alliance of the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF">US</a>, <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html">Japan</a>, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/DefendAust/2013">Australia</a> and <a href="https://business.inquirer.net/312056/indias-indo-pacific-vision">India</a> – has already developed and formalised individual state strategic perspectives. Although their geographic imaginations of the Indo-Pacific <a href="https://www.indianarrative.com/opinion-news/in-india-and-japan-s-vision-kenya-is-key-to-the-indo-pacific-119450.html">vary</a>. India and Australia are also big players in the Indian Ocean Rim Association.</p>
<p><a href="https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/">ASEAN</a> (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Indonesia, France and the European Union all have policy documents relating to the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>One logical explanation for Africa’s silence might lie in the fact that the focus of the Indian Ocean Rim Association from the start was economic development. Security concerns are a much more recent development. Yet, this is the organisation that perhaps best lends itself to African agency in developing common positions on the Indo-Pacific based on shared interests and principles.</p>
<p>Relations with external powers outside of the association are mostly bilateral. This is particularly true at the level at which infrastructure projects – including military bases – are negotiated.</p>
<p>Using the association for the development of a vision that reflects the African agenda would be ideal. This is because it provides a platform with global reach. More than half the members are from the central and eastern Indian Ocean, while several are members of ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organisation. In addition, the association’s dialogue partners include the US, China, Russia, the UK, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Turkey and South Korea.</p>
<p>But it all starts with a national vision. Since 2021, for instance, <a href="https://www.indianarrative.com/opinion-news/in-india-and-japans-vision-kenya-is-key-to-the-indo-pacific-26216.html">Kenya</a> has began to formulate a position on the Indo-Pacific and explored the opportunity to work with partners such as India. But it has yet to put out a clear foreign policy statement or strategy document. Neither has South Africa.</p>
<p>The year ahead offers an excellent opportunity for states such as South Africa to develop its approach to the Indo-Pacific. How to steer a position that would serve the country and the continent’s interests in the context of these developments, has become a serious challenge. At the same time, it could promote a broader multilateral discussion within the African Union. </p>
<p>Failing to do so will mean that Africa will be running the risk, yet again, of being an onlooker while others make policy for the continent.</p>
<p>A developmental agenda remains important, yet there is an increasing realisation that there is no escaping the reality of an increasingly politicised and militarised region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177377/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yu-Shan Wu receives research support from the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIHSS), South Africa.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxi Schoeman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Africa runs the risk, yet again, of being an onlooker while others make policy for the continent.Yu-Shan Wu, Research fellow, University of PretoriaMaxi Schoeman, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1757512022-01-27T12:05:52Z2022-01-27T12:05:52ZChina’s plans for Xinjiang, and what it means for the region’s persecuted Uyghurs – podcast<p>When the Beijing Winter Olympics open on February 4, diplomats from a number of countries, including the US, UK, Canada and Australia, will not be there to watch. Their diplomatic boycott hinges on concerns about human rights abuses in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, we talk to three experts about China’s long-term vision for Xinjiang, and what its strategy there means for the region’s persecuted Uyghurs. </p>
<p>We also look at the toxic heavy metals are lingering in people’s homes. A researcher, who receives vacuum cleaner dust in the mail from around the world and tests it, reveals what she found. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/61f18bf592f41600137a37fe" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="190px"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>International pressure is mounting on the Chinese government over the situation in Xinjiang. In December, soon after news of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-59556613">diplomatic Olympic boycott emerged</a>, the unofficial, London-based Uyghur Tribunal found that the People’s Republic of China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-responsible-uyghur-genocide-unofficial-tribunal-says-2021-12-10/">had committed genocide</a>, crimes against humanity and torture against Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other minority groups in the Xinjiang region. The tribunal is independent and its verdict has no force under international law. China <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/09/uyghurs-subjected-to-genocide-by-china-unofficial-uk-tribunal-finds">dismissed its verdict</a> and said allegations of forced labour and genocide were “vicious rumours”. However, in the aftermath, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/un-publish-xinjiang-findings-soon-2021-12-10/">said it would soon publish an assessment</a> of the situation in the Xinjiang region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-independent-tribunal-came-to-rule-that-china-is-guilty-of-genocide-against-the-uyghurs-173604">How an independent tribunal came to rule that China is guilty of genocide against the Uyghurs</a>
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<p>It’s difficult for researchers to get a full picture of what’s happening today in the region. Darren Byler, a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at Simon Fraser University in Canada, who has lived in Xinjiang and last visited in 2018, says he gets his information from news passed to members of the Uyghur diaspora by family and friends. Byler says it appears fewer Uyghurs are now being detained by the authorities in internment camps than they were a few years go. However, he says there’s widespread family separation and “hundreds of thousands of people are still missing”. Those outside the camps live under <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-researched-uighur-society-in-china-for-8-years-and-watched-how-technology-opened-new-opportunities-then-became-a-trap-119615">a repressive surveillance system</a> in “sort of an open air prison”, he says. </p>
<p>Several camps have been closed or abandoned, others turned into pre-trial detention centres, while others have been turned into factories. “It does appear as though the state was maybe acting more re-actively to international pressure and wanting to close them more quickly than they were at least intending at the outset,” says Byler. </p>
<p>David Tobin, a lecturer in east Asian studies at the University of Sheffield in the UK, explains the longer history of China’s relationship with Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. “The underlying problem in how Xinjiang is is governed in China is the notion that Uyghurs were barbarians and became human by becoming Chinese in 1949,” says Tobin. “And then when they start to be seen as human it’s only because they have to be integrated into China.” While this history is vital to understand what’s happening in Xinjiang today, he says the repression against Uyghurs wasn’t inevitable. “We could have had a different turn of events, different leaders with some different ideas,” he says. </p>
<p>Xinjiang’s position in north-west China gives the region added economic importance in the country’s plans to boost trade with its neighbours. “Xinjiang sits in a strategic and pivotal location for the Belt and Road Initiative,” says Anna Hayes, a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at James Cook University in Australia. It’s China’s gateway to the Middle East, central Asia and Europe, she says. “There’s a real hope that Xinjiang will be massively transformed into a hub of manufacturing and natural resource extraction,” Hayes explains, with the southern city of Kashgar as the region’s economic centre of gravity. But underlying this strategy, she warns, is a settler-colonial mindset that sees the indigenous Uyghur population as the “grunt labour force” in this economic transformation. </p>
<p>In our second story in this episode, we talk to Cynthia Isley, postdoctoral research fellow in environmental science at Macquarie University in Australia about her <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.1c04494">recent study of house dust</a> from around the world. Isley and her colleagues sifted through more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/house-dust-from-35-countries-reveals-our-global-toxic-contaminant-exposure-and-health-risk-172499">3,000 samples from 35 countries</a> to understand what toxic trace metals lurk inside our homes – and how to make your home safer. (Listen from 35m40s)</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/house-dust-from-35-countries-reveals-our-global-toxic-contaminant-exposure-and-health-risk-172499">House dust from 35 countries reveals our global toxic contaminant exposure and health risk</a>
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<p>And finally, Matt Williams, breaking news editor at The Conversation based in New York, recommends his picks of recent analysis on the buildup of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-8201">Russian troops on the Ukrainian border</a>. (From 46m15s)</p>
<p>This episode of The Conversation Weekly was produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a> or <a href="mailto:podcast@theconversation.com">via email</a>. You can also sign up to The Conversation’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">free daily email here</a>. A transcript of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-plan-for-xinjiang-plus-whats-lurking-in-your-household-dust-the-conversation-weekly-podcast-transcript-175862">episode is available here</a>. </p>
<p>Newsclips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mIhmoyHz-fo">Sky News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_s4D8XvKINE">WION</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bg21r1Nr4eo">BBC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTtEBM7GakU">7News Australia</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBYZgGTMTLI">ITV News</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b3OMXXlGQd0">CNA</a>.</p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Darren Byler's research has been funded by the Social Science Research Council, Luce Foundation, American Council of Learned Societies and the Carnegie Corporation. Anna Hayes is a research fellow of the East Asia Security Centre, a joint initiative of Bond University, the University of New Haven and the Chinese Foreign Affairs University. David Tobin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cynthia works on the DustSafe program at Macquarie University as a postdoctoral researcher. The DustSafe program received funding from an Australian Government Citizen Science Grant, CSG55984 to M.P. Taylor. </span></em></p>Plus, what toxic heavy metals are lingering in household dust around the world? Listen to The Conversation Weekly podcast.Gemma Ware, Editor and Co-Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationDaniel Merino, Assistant Science Editor & Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The ConversationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1686142021-09-28T11:56:26Z2021-09-28T11:56:26ZChina will no longer build overseas coal power plants – what energy projects will it invest in instead?<p>Chinese President <a href="https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210921/AT2JoAvm71nq/KaLk3d9ECB53_en.pdf">Xi Jinping recently announced</a> at the UN General Assembly that China “will not build new coal-fired power projects abroad”. </p>
<p>Chinese banks have already swung into gear. Three days after Xi’s speech, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/bank-china-stop-financing-new-coal-mining-power-projects-overseas-q4-2021-09-24/">Bank of China declared</a> it would no longer provide financing for new coal mining and power projects outside China from the last quarter of 2021. </p>
<p>Xi’s statement is expected to affect <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/22/china-pledge-to-stop-funding-coal-projects-buys-time-for-emissions-target">at least 54 gigawatts</a> of proposed China-backed coal plants that are not yet under construction. Shelving these would save CO₂ emissions equivalent to three months of global emissions. </p>
<p>This pledge from <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/07/GCI_PB_008_FIN.pdf">the world’s largest public financier</a> of overseas coal plants could usher in a new era of low-carbon development. But that depends on what happens in the countries where China had funnelled money into coal power. Many of these places urgently need new energy infrastructure. Will China’s investments here be redirected to renewable energy – or simply disappear?</p>
<h2>Chinese support for renewables abroad</h2>
<p>One positive sign came in the same speech to the UN, when Xi indicated that “China will step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energy”. </p>
<p>China’s overseas energy investments grew as part of the <a href="https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm">belt and road initiative</a>. Launched in 2013, Xi’s signature foreign-policy effort increased China’s cooperation with the rest of the world through infrastructure development, unimpeded trade, financial integration and policy coordination. China has <a href="https://www.nbr.org/publication/adapting-or-atrophying-chinas-belt-and-road-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/">continued</a> to provide finance for the belt and road initiative during the pandemic, and <a href="https://green-bri.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2020/">investment in renewables</a> made up most (57%) of the country’s financial support for overseas energy projects in 2020 – up from 38% in 2019.</p>
<p>Beijing has supported wind and solar projects in more than 20 developing countries since 2013, including <a href="https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202107/31/WS6104cdc7a310efa1bd665b55.html">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://ieefa.org/chinese-firm-completes-construction-of-50mw-garissa-solar-farm-in-kenya/">Kenya</a>. And Chinese banks and companies have also expanded their overseas investments in renewable energy over the last decade.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A line graph showing Chinese solar and wind energy investments abroad." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=357&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423236/original/file-20210926-125184-9j1o4j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s overseas renewable energy portfolio has grown with the belt and road initiative.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.bu.edu/cgp/">China's Global Power Database/Boston University</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>While the trends are positive, challenges remain. China’s overseas investment policy remains guided by <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm">the non-interference principle</a>. This means that Beijing is supposed to let host countries determine the type of energy projects, and only requires Chinese firms to comply with <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12952">host-country regulations</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-investment-why-the-buck-stops-with-african-governments-51531">Chinese investment: why the buck stops with African governments</a>
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<p>Research shows that China’s finance for coal in Asia was largely driven by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629620304023">demand in recipient countries</a>. This is because the domestic policies of these countries prioritised improving energy access over reducing emissions, and coal was a cheap and proven source. Inadequate grid infrastructure and politicians sceptical of renewable energy in countries receiving Chinese investment have also hampered development. In <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629620301699">Indonesia</a>, business leaders and politicians formed pro-coal lobby groups to influence the design of China-backed projects.</p>
<p>China’s new pledge tells prospective recipient countries that coal finance is no longer an option. China must now promote its offer of investment in renewables. Drawing on its domestic experiences, Beijing should provide <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-18/china-raises-renewable-power-subsidies-7-5-to-13-billion">subsidies or tax cuts</a> to companies willing to build renewable energy projects outside China. </p>
<p>Chinese energy developers are often wary of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1199262">investment risks</a> in developing countries due to their unfamiliarity with local politics. The Chinese government can help by <a href="https://sais-isep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ISEP-BSG-BRI-Report-.pdf">increasing coordination</a> between Chinese companies and local governments, businesses, and communities in host countries. </p>
<p>Over the past decade, China has supported many developing countries to increase their energy generating capacity with financing, affordable technology and quick project delivery. China has taken the first step to stop funding coal. It’s now time to adopt policies that support the overseas activities of its renewable energy developers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yixian Sun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s Belt and Road initiative offers advantages and drawbacks for renewable energy development worldwide.Yixian Sun, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in International Development, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1680602021-09-20T15:02:37Z2021-09-20T15:02:37ZChina is financing infrastructure projects around the world – many could harm nature and Indigenous communities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421988/original/file-20210919-47336-xvl5i4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C0%2C2169%2C1446&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese engineers pose after welding the first seamless rails for the China-Laos railway in Vientiane, Laos, June 18, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/june-18-2020-workers-from-china-railway-no-2-engineering-news-photo/1221809225">Kaikeo Saiyasane/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is shaping the future of economic development through its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, an ambitious multi-billion-dollar international push to better connect itself to the rest of the world through trade and infrastructure. Through this venture, China is providing over 100 countries with funding they have long sought for roads, railways, power plants, ports and other infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>This mammoth effort could generate <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors">broad economic growth</a> for the countries involved and the global economy. The World Bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors">estimates</a> that recipient countries’ gross domestic product could rise by up to 3.4% thanks to Belt and Road financing.</p>
<p>But development often expands human movement and economic activity into new areas, which can promote <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aao0312">deforestation</a>, illegal <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-019-0963-6">wildlife trafficking</a> and the spread of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.12.036">invasive species</a>. Past initiatives have also sparked conflict by <a href="https://ejatlas.org/">infringing on Indigenous lands</a>. These projects were often approved without the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2013.780373">recognition or consent</a> of local Indigenous communities.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01541-w">newly published study</a>, our team of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Rebecca-Ray-2135726495">development</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=e3-sujUAAAAJ&hl=en">economists</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com.au/citations?user=tAYhLjUAAAAJ&hl=en">conservation scientists</a> mapped the risks Chinese overseas development finance projects pose for Indigenous lands, threatened species, protected areas and potential critical habitats for global biodiversity conservation. We found that more than 60% of China’s development projects present some risk to wildlife or Indigenous communities. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/j8zzL2aBo2M?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Belt and Road Initiative is designed to connect China to the world.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Diverse projects and risks</h2>
<p>Our study examines 594 development projects financed by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. We created a <a href="http://www.bu.edu/gdp/codf">database</a> to track the characteristics and locations of projects that these two “policy banks” supported between 2008 and 2019. During this period, the banks committed more than US$462 billion in development finance to 93 countries – roughly as much as the <a href="https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-home">World Bank</a>, the traditional global leader in development finance, committed in that time. </p>
<p>Nearly half of all projects financed by these two banks are located within potential <a href="https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/endangered-species-conservation/critical-habitat">critical habitats</a>. These are areas that might be essential for conservation and require special protection considerations, <a href="https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/performance-standards/ps6">according to the International Finance Corporation</a>, a unit of the World Bank that promotes private investment in developing countries. </p>
<p>One in three of the projects fall within existing protected areas, and nearly one in four overlaps with lands owned or managed by Indigenous peoples. In total, we calculate that China’s development finance portfolio could impact up to 24% of the world’s <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/">threatened amphibians, birds, mammals and reptiles</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Global map of China-financed development risks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=263&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421883/original/file-20210917-13-1d700zh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Selected risks to biodiversity and Indigenous lands within countries receiving Chinese overseas development loans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adapted from Yang, et al., 2021</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The greatest risks lie in South America, Central Africa and Southeast Asia. All of the projects that China’s policy banks are financing in Benin, Bolivia and Mongolia overlap with existing protected areas or potential critical habitats. More than 65% of Chinese development projects in Ethiopia, Laos and Argentina are located within Indigenous lands. </p>
<p>On average, risks to Indigenous lands are greatest from extraction and transportation projects, such as mines, pipelines and roads. The greatest threats to nature are energy projects, including dams and coal-fired power plants. For example, a cascade of seven hydropower dams along the the Nam Ou River in Laos has <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/EPoverty/Lao/InternationalRivers.pdf">displaced Indigenous communities</a> that depended on local ecosystems for their livelihoods. </p>
<h2>How the World Bank addresses these risks</h2>
<p>China may be the world’s <a href="https://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/IzumiOhno/lectures/2018_Lectures_texts/S13_fp_20171109_china_development_finance.pdf">largest country-to-country development lender</a>, but it’s not the only funding source for emerging economies. The World Bank, an <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/world-bank-definition/">international organization funded mostly by wealthy nations</a>, has been a <a href="https://worldbank.org/projects">leading source</a> of development finance over the last 40 years – but its approach is markedly different from China’s.</p>
<p>In the 20th century, critics <a href="https://islandpress.org/books/mortgaging-earth">assailed the World Bank</a> for funding projects that caused environmental damage and social conflict. But in the past 30 years it has enacted a series of <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework">environmental and social reforms</a> that are designed to steer lending toward more inclusive and sustainable development projects. Just this year, the bank <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-worldbank-exclusive/exclusive-world-bank-revises-climate-policy-but-stops-short-of-halting-fossil-fuel-funding-idUSKBN2BN3HC">committed</a> to aligning its lending with the <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">Paris Agreement on climate change</a> by 2023.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1439280583415369736"}"></div></p>
<p>China’s rapid economic growth since the 1980s has made it <a href="https://phys.org/news/2021-04-china-environmental-world-biggest-polluter.html">one of the world’s top polluters</a>. Now its leaders are working to improve their country’s environmental performance.</p>
<p>China has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-01563-2">created a national system of protected areas</a> and has pledged to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-10/how-china-plans-to-become-carbon-neutral-by-2060-quicktake">make its domestic economy carbon-neutral</a> by 2060. But it has made no such reforms in its foreign lending. </p>
<p>Comparing projects financed by the World Bank from 2008-2019 with our list of Chinese loans, we found that on average China’s projects pose significantly greater risk to nature and Indigenous lands, primarily in the energy sector.</p>
<p>The World Bank also has a concerning proportion of loans in high-risk areas. Notably, the roads, railways and other transportation projects that it financed during this period pose risks to biodiversity that are nearly equivalent to those posed by similar projects financed by China. </p>
<p>For example, in 2016 the World Bank financed a major road project across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Indigenous peoples’ territory, opening them up to the loss of property and livelihoods, as well as violence. A formal internal <a href="https://www.inspectionpanel.org/panel-cases/high-priority-roads-reopening-and-maintenance-2nd-additional-financing-p153836">investigation</a> found that “serious harm” had occurred and directed the World Bank to manage future projects more carefully.</p>
<h2>Making development finance sustainable</h2>
<p>China has an opportunity with the Belt and Road Initiative to improve infrastructure networks around the world in a way that is both sustainable and inclusive. Recently it published the inter-ministerial “<a href="https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/news/mediarusources/202108/t20210810_1293453.html">Green Development Guidelines for Overseas Investment and Cooperation</a>,” a set of voluntary guidelines produced by Chinese experts from universities, governmental and non-government organizations and international experts, including two of us (Kevin Gallagher and Rebecca Ray). This report urges Chinese investors to respect host country environmental standards. When those standards are lower than China’s, the guidelines recommend using international environmental standards. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two diplomats hold portfolios." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422015/original/file-20210920-17-13xq9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Visiting Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi L and his counterpart Lemogang Kwape at a signing ceremony for cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative in Gaborone, Botswana, Jan. 7, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jan-7-2021-visiting-chinese-state-councilor-and-foreign-news-photo/1230474930">Xinhua/Tshekiso Tebalo via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>In a promising step, President Xi Jinping announced on Sept. 21, 2021 at the U.N. that China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/09/21/world/un-general-assembly#china-coal-un-general-assembly">would not build new coal-fired power plants abroad</a>. Just as importantly, he announced that China will “step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energy.” </p>
<p>Such a powerful shift can open renewable energy access across the developing world. However, our study shows that investments in low-impact sectors can still carry risks to vulnerable ecosystems and communities. We believe these climate commitments should be complemented with similar social and environmental performance standards that take into account local risks to biodiversity and Indigenous peoples.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 110,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Currently China is preparing to host the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the <a href="https://www.cbd.int/article/new-dates-cop15-october-2021">Convention on Biological Diversity</a> – the main global agreement that commits nations to protect species and ecosystems around the world. Sessions will take place online in October 2021 and in person in Kunming in the first half of 2022. This event is a unique opportunity for China to address social and environmental risks from its global development activities.</p>
<p>We believe that China would be wise to adopt <a href="https://cciced.eco/research/special-policy-study/green-bri-and-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-2/">new recommendations</a> set forth by its Ministry of Ecology and Environment, in collaboration with international experts, including two of us (Kevin Gallagher and Rebecca Ray), that would require compulsory environmental management systems for projects supported by public Chinese banks to prevent and mitigate risks. This would raise the bar for Western lenders, who also need to improve their standards but <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.12.007">fear losing business to Chinese lenders</a>. </p>
<p>By minimizing harmful impacts from the projects it funds, we believe China could make the Belt and Road Initiative a win-win for itself, host countries and the global economy.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to include President Xi Jinping’s Sept. 21 announcement that China will stop building coal-fired power plants abroad.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Gn84xRsAAAAJ&hl=en">Hongbo Yang</a>, a former Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, was joint lead author of the study described in this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Gallagher serves as the International Co-Chair for the Green BRI and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, administered by the foreign cooperation office of the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and the Environment.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Ray was a member of the team of international experts that produced the report for the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development discussed in this article.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blake Alexander Simmons does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China has become the world’s largest country-to-country lender. A new study shows that more than half of its loans threaten sensitive lands or Indigenous people.Blake Alexander Simmons, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Boston UniversityKevin P. Gallagher, Professor of Global Development Policy and Director, Global Development Policy Center, Boston UniversityRebecca Ray, Senior Academic Researcher in Global Development Policy, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.