tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/boeing-737-max-67853/articlesBoeing 737 Max – The Conversation2024-01-19T13:41:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210692024-01-19T13:41:11Z2024-01-19T13:41:11ZBoeing door plug blowout highlights a possible crisis of competence − an aircraft safety expert explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569659/original/file-20240116-21-w7tewc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C24%2C5439%2C3612&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An investigator examines the frame of a Boeing aircraft whose door plug blew out in flight.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BoeingEmergencyLanding/390bb7248d0f4069b1b987492afbc254/photo">National Transportation Safety Board via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In the wake of the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/08/us/what-happened-alaska-airlines-flight-1282/index.html">in-flight blowout of the side of a Boeing 737 Max 9</a>, federal regulators have grounded planes and are stepping up scrutiny of Boeing’s manufacturing process.</em></p>
<p><em>The Jan. 5, 2024, explosive decompression after takeoff was related to a component called a “door plug” being ejected from the fuselage of the aircraft. This was after <a href="https://apnews.com/article/alaska-airlines-portland-oregon-emergency-landing-aab8ee1e594369ab48fa3ce60f3acdc6">three prior flights of that plane</a> had registered warning signals about cabin pressurization. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating that incident.</em></p>
<p><em>In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration has launched an investigation into Boeing’s manufacturing process. Other incidents have raised concerns about other 737 Max aircraft – not just <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-airplane-crash-investigations-work-according-to-an-aviation-safety-expert-113602">fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019</a>, but more recent examples of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67919436">bolts or other fittings or fasteners</a> not being up to standards.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. asked <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=I0IMxAkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Daniel Kwasi Adjekum</a>, an aviation safety expert and professor of aviation at the University of North Dakota, to explain the significance of the incident, the government’s response and what it all means for the flying public.</em></p>
<h2>Why is Boeing – not the airline – responsible for the door plug being secure?</h2>
<p>Under U.S. federal requirements, the number of occupants in an aircraft and the seating arrangements determine the <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-25/subpart-D/subject-group-ECFR88992669bab3b52/section-25.807">number and placements of emergency exit doors</a>. Airplane manufacturers build fuselages with enough openings to accommodate all the doors that might be needed. If airlines choose to use the highest-density seating arrangements, they need to use all of the openings for actual exit doors. But not all airlines pack the seats in that tightly; on those planes, some emergency doors are not needed. Those spaces are filled by door plugs.</p>
<p>In the case of the Boeing 737 Max 9 aircraft, the door plugs are fitted by Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas, which is the supplier of the airframe to Boeing. The final assembly of the aircraft is carried out at the Boeing plant in Renton, Washington. Quality control checks are done at Spirit AeroSystems, and then another round of quality checks is done by Boeing. These include a high-pressure test to ensure that the cabin can be pressurized safely and to ensure the integrity of the fuselage and pressure bulkheads.</p>
<p>Normally, the plugs are not removed during those tests at the Boeing facility, though they are checked to ensure they are correctly aligned with the rest of the fuselage. Overall, it is Boeing’s responsibility, as the original equipment manufacturer, to ensure the components conform to the FAA’s design, manufacturing, installation and performance requirements. </p>
<h2>Do the airlines have any reason to inspect the bolts that fasten the plugs in place?</h2>
<p>Under normal circumstances, once they are delivered and initially inspected, door plugs and their components are not adjusted by the airline maintenance team, though their integrity is checked as part of stipulated maintenance checks. Records from Alaska Airlines suggest that on previous flights before this incident, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/alaska-airlines-portland-oregon-emergency-landing-aab8ee1e594369ab48fa3ce60f3acdc6">pilots had received cockpit alerts</a> indicating a failure of the aircraft’s cabin auto-pressurization system.</p>
<p>In a situation like that, where there are suspected cabin pressurization issues, it may be possible for airline maintenance crews to check all cabin doors, windows, seals and potentially door plugs as part of a thorough troubleshooting process, but they would be subject to Boeing’s procedures for inspecting a door plug.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Airline seats sit next to an opening in the side of an aircraft." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569658/original/file-20240116-23-6pkv4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of the opening in the side of a Boeing aircraft that lost a door plug in midflight.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BoeingEmergencyLanding/d6bae2b392f74ac88efa0f8f7ffbb5af/photo">NTSB via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What do FAA investigations involve?</h2>
<p>The design, testing, certification and approval process for any new aeronautical product is supposed to be in compliance with strict <a href="https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-25?toc=1">legal and FAA regulatory standards</a>.</p>
<p>As part of the investigations in this case, the FAA will <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/12/1224444590/boeing-faa-737-max-9-alaska-airlines-door-plug">review the engineering and manufacturing processes</a> for the Boeing 737 Max 9, including the processes for vendors and suppliers, to determine if those standards were met. The <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-reviews-data-from-preliminary-inspections-of-boeing-737-max-9/">FAA will review documentation</a> on quality control and assurance processes and analyze components. </p>
<p>The FAA has said it is <a href="https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-increasing-oversight-boeing-production-and-manufacturing">considering bringing in a third party</a> to conduct an audit of the engineering and manufacturing processes for the Boeing 737 Max 9. The findings and recommendations from the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/01/08/1223427243/boeing-flight-door-plug-alaska-airlines">National Transportation Safety Board incident investigation</a> may also provide valuable information.</p>
<h2>How do airlines deal with having so many airplanes that are now out of service pending their various inspections?</h2>
<p>With all these aircraft grounded, you need hangars and parking places for temporary storage. And it costs. In the U.S. alone we’re talking about <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/list-airlines-boeing-max-9-1858436">171 airplanes</a> on the ground. </p>
<p>That is a huge financial loss to airlines, which are otherwise benefiting from a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/12/business/alaska-and-united-flights-canceled-737-max/index.html">surge in air service demand and increased passenger interest</a>.</p>
<p>Airlines’ fleet plans – entailing which aircraft they send on which routes and in what sequence – will be disrupted. Some high-traffic routes normally served by these aircraft will have to be done by other aircraft with limited seat and load capacities. That can reduce expected revenue.</p>
<p>The current scenario will also affect flight crew scheduling. Some crew members may have their work hours reduced or eliminated, at least for a period of time.</p>
<p>Once investigators have determined what went wrong, and how to fix whatever it was, that corrective action will also take a lot of maintenance work, in addition to the normal maintenance work for keeping the rest of the planes fit for flying.</p>
<p>It also appears that the <a href="https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/updates-grounding-boeing-737-max-9-aircraft">FAA may want to inspect each plane</a> after it is fixed before certifying it to return to service. That will require significant amounts of inspection time.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two planes sit parked on the tarmac at an airport." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569660/original/file-20240116-21-b90elk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two Boeing 737 Max 9 aircraft sit on the ground at an Oregon airport on Jan. 9, 2024, awaiting approval to take to the skies once again.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/alaska-airlines-boeing-737-max-9-aircrafts-n705al-and-news-photo/1913163434">Mathieu Lewis-Rolland/Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>How does an airliner manufacturer regain public confidence? Have other companies dealt with this before?</h2>
<p>In the 1970s, McDonnell Douglas had airworthiness issues with the DC-10 aircraft. Its <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/book-excerpt-flight-981-disaster-180967121">cargo door sometimes opened midflight</a>, resulting in injuries and <a href="https://mitpressbookstore.mit.edu/book/9781588345608">fatalities</a>.</p>
<p>The incidents were a big public relations problem for McDonnell Douglas, but using recommendations from the accident investigations, the company managed to redesign the door. </p>
<p>In the 1990s, ATR had its own issues with the <a href="https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/N401AM">ATR 72’s de-icing system</a>. The company completely redesigned the system and gradually came back into the market.</p>
<p>Airbus has also faced similar challenges: Some <a href="https://simpleflying.com/a320neo-engine-troubles/">Airbus A320neos using Pratt and Whitney 1100G engines</a> had vibration problems that required review with engine manufacturers and regulators.</p>
<p>Most aircraft manufacturers are aware technical issues can surface after deploying a product into the market. That is why it’s important for them to get continuous feedback from operators on reliability and safety. </p>
<p>Boeing’s situation is difficult in part because of previous problems with other 737 Max models, including fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019. In my view, the company will need a lot of transparency and leadership to address these hits to its reputation.</p>
<p>To me, the company’s best chance for surviving this crisis would be to take full responsibility for what has happened and avoid blaming its suppliers. Boeing could involve airline executives, pilots, engineers, cabin crew, media and others in a wide-ranging discussion of quality and safety. If Boeing could win the confidence of these key stakeholders who operate its aircraft, that could help reestablish credibility for its brand with the traveling public.</p>
<p>In early 2023, Boeing was planning to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-add-737-max-line-it-boosts-production-2023-01-30/">ramp up production of the 737 Max line</a>. My suggestion would be that the company make product safety and quality an immediate priority and worry later about maximizing production goals and profits, after Boeing’s reputation is restored.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221069/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Kwasi Adjekum has previously received funding from the National Academies of Sciences Gulf Research Program. </span></em></p>Boeing is under increased public and government scrutiny in the wake of dangerous events that have people worried about the safety of air travel.Daniel Kwasi Adjekum, Assistant Professor of Aviation, University of North DakotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2212632024-01-18T13:29:47Z2024-01-18T13:29:47ZWhy did Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 have a sealed-off emergency exit in the first place? The answer comes down to money<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569625/original/file-20240116-29-1acz42.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=90%2C38%2C8536%2C5703&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The door plug area of an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft awaits inspection on Jan. 10, 2024. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BoeingEmergencyLanding/f0eebc33866f4efd9f75429155b4d229/photo">Lindsey Wasson/AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The aviation industry is still in shock from a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/us/alaska-airlines-boeing-passengers.html">near disaster</a> on Jan. 5, 2024, in which a 60-pound “door plug” blew out from a nearly new Boeing 737 MAX 9 in flight at 16,000 feet, leaving a gaping hole in the fuselage. </p>
<p>In response, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/alaska-airlines-portland-oregon-emergency-landing-b522e36ff228b5ea9a89ea13ee24f597">the Federal Aviation Administration grounded</a> all 737 MAX 9 planes with such plugs, and aviation authorities in other countries have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesia-temporarily-grounds-three-boeing-737-max-9-planes-transport-ministry-2024-01-08/">followed suit</a>. </p>
<p>The industry is watching closely. </p>
<p>A lot of news coverage has emphasized the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/09/opinion/alaska-airlines-safety.html">impressive safety record</a> of the global airline industry, particularly since an Alaska Airlines crew managed to land the plane with no fatalities. I commend the outstanding performance of airline employees, air traffic controllers and emergency responders who achieved this impressive feat.</p>
<p>However, as a former United Airlines pilot <a href="https://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/faculty-directory/amy-fraher">now lecturing in Yale University’s School of Management</a>, I believe the wrong questions are being asked about what happened on Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. As the <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA24MA063.aspx">National Transportation Safety Board</a> and numerous <a href="https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/airplane-plug-door-door-plugs-explainer/283-2f5d3371-fec8-409c-86e4-88658d0acd02">news outlets</a> have explained, door plugs are commonly used to seal unused exits on commercial airliners. The question we need to ask is: Why wouldn’t an airline use all of an aircraft’s emergency exits? Wouldn’t that make passengers safer?</p>
<p>It’s all about money.</p>
<h2>Safety isn’t free</h2>
<p>Airlines have lots of expenses. Some, such as <a href="https://www.iata.org/en/publications/economics/fuel-monitor">jet fuel</a>, are easier to calculate. Others, such as emergency exits, are more opaque to travelers. </p>
<p>Believe it or not, every functioning emergency exit comes at a price for an airline. Each requires routine maintenance and frequent inspections – for example, to make sure that emergency evacuation slides work properly – and flight attendants must staff emergency exits during takeoff and landing for safety reasons.</p>
<p>In other words, every working exit comes with associated costs in salaries, health benefits, pension plans, training and related expenses. Sealing off an emergency exit cuts costs.</p>
<p>But is every one of those emergency exits crucial? From the U.S. government’s perspective, not necessarily.</p>
<h2>Why you get more emergency exits in Indonesia</h2>
<p>In the U.S., airlines must comply with federal aviation regulations, which dictate aircraft maintenance procedures and in-flight personnel assignments – and minimum standards for emergency exits.</p>
<p>The issue is that Boeing sells the same airplane to different airlines with different needs.</p>
<p>Boeing notes that its 737 MAX 9 can carry up to 220 passengers, which, under U.S. regulations, requires it be built with a specific number of emergency exits. This <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ALASKAAIR-BOEING/klvydkrlopg/">dense seating configuration</a> is common among lower-cost global airlines such as Jakarta-based Lion Air.</p>
<p>However, given Americans’ desire for legroom, most U.S. carriers are equipped with considerably fewer than 220 seats – and when there are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ALASKAAIR-BOEING/klvydkrlopg/">fewer than 190</a> seats, the rules allow fewer emergency exits to be in service. The Alaska Airlines Max 9 had just <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ALASKAAIR-BOEING/klvydkrlopg/">178 seats</a>.</p>
<p>Under these conditions, the federal rules allow air carriers to disable these exits and plug the openings. That’s precisely what happened with Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 – and how “door plug” suddenly entered the American vernacular.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZqVCDpF-k_0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A Portland-area science teacher found the missing door plug in his backyard.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Although this sort of workaround is authorized, it’s unclear to me that this is in the best interest of air safety. Wouldn’t it be better for the FAA to require that all exits are available for use in an emergency, regardless of aircraft seating capacity, even if it required some additional expense for airlines?</p>
<h2>A worrying safety record</h2>
<p>The 737 MAX is a plane of many firsts – not all of them positive.</p>
<p>The MAX is the latest addition to Boeing’s 737 family of aircraft. The 737 family has far eclipsed all rivals as the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-timeline-history-full-details-2019-9">most popular commercial airliner ever built</a>, with over 10,000 sold worldwide since its introduction in 1967.</p>
<p>Some carriers, such as Southwest Airlines in the United States and Ryanair in Ireland, fly only 737s; it’s a critical element of their low-cost business strategy. By flying just one type of aircraft, these airlines significantly improve scheduling flexibility while cutting maintenance and training costs.</p>
<p>That’s all to say that demand for the latest 737 was high. In 2017, when the FAA certified the 737 MAX safe for flight, Boeing <a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2017-03-09-Boeing-737-MAX-8-Earns-FAA-Certification">had already received</a> more than 3,600 new orders from 83 customers. </p>
<p>But very shortly afterward, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/nov/11/boeing-full-responsibility-737-max-plane-crash-ethiopia-compensation">two crashes</a> that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/indonesia-report-finds-fatal-lion-air-jet-crash-due-boeing-n1071796">together killed 346 people</a> grounded the 737 MAX for nearly two years – another first as <a href="https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/boeing-737-max-investigation">the longest airline grounding in aviation history</a>. Destined to profit US$12 million on the sale of each $121 million MAX, there was <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/heres-how-much-boeing-is-estimated-to-make-on-each-737-max-8-plane/articleshow/68399220.cms">significant incentive</a> for Boeing to press on with MAX development even though it had already proved to be a dangerously problematic aircraft design.</p>
<p>In 2020, <a href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Return%20to%20Service%20Final%20Report%5E4.26.2023_revised.pdf">the FAA recertified the MAX as “safe for flight”</a>; by 2023, Boeing had logged more than 7,000 total orders for the MAX, <a href="https://www.boeing.com/commercial/orders-deliveries">far eclipsing</a> the sale of any other type of airliner. This fact alone ought to raise safety concerns. It may soon prove impossible to avoid flying on a 737 MAX, particularly in the U.S. domestic market. United, American, Southwest and Alaska airlines <a href="https://simpleflying.com/boeing-737-max-airlines/">all currently fly the MAX</a>. </p>
<p>When airplane parts and passengers’ cellphones are <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iphone-sucked-out-alaska-airlines-plane-fell-16000-feet-found-still-works/">raining from the sky</a>, it could be a sign that the industry needs to think harder about unintended costs – and consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy Fraher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A commercial pilot turned management expert and author of ‘The Next Crash: How Short-Term Profit Seeking Trumps Airline Safety,’ explains the economics behind the near-deadly disaster.Amy Fraher, Lecturer in Management, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208052024-01-10T16:34:08Z2024-01-10T16:34:08ZPost Office will struggle to rebuild brand trust – as Boeing and Facebook scandals show<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568654/original/file-20240110-16-jk1eme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4207%2C3246&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/people-line-outside-post-office-cambridge-1865055061">Edward Crawford/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Post Office, once an <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/EJM-11-2014-0691/full/html">iconic British brand</a> has fallen from grace following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-post-office-scandal-is-possibly-the-largest-miscarriage-of-justice-in-uk-history-and-its-not-over-yet-211217">Horizon IT Scandal</a>. With over 11,500 branches, it’s the <a href="https://corporate.postoffice.co.uk/#:%7E:text=With%20over%2011%2C500%20branches%2C%20we,retail%20franchise%20network%20in%20Europe.&text=An%20anchor%20of%20UK%20communities,people%20who%20rely%20on%20us.">largest retail franchise</a> network in Europe, offering a variety of products – not just postal, but cash and banking, foreign exchange and government services. Post offices are also often an important social hub for communities, not to mention offering a chance to run a vital local business for people around the UK.</p>
<p>The Horizon system, developed by Fujitsu, was introduced in 1999 to help branches manage transactions, accounts and stocktaking. It has since been revealed as faulty, causing account shortfalls often initially blamed on those people running the branches (known as sub-postmasters and mistresses). As a result of the system’s errors, these workers were accused of fraud and theft, and wrongly prosecuted. A <a href="https://www.itv.com/watch/mr-bates-vs-the-post-office/10a0469/10a0469a0001">new ITV four-part drama</a> has put a spotlight on the scandal, renewing pressure on the government Post Office to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-67926661">exonerate and compensate</a> hundreds of former workers.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mr-bates-vs-the-post-office-depicts-one-of-the-uks-worst-miscarriages-of-justice-heres-why-so-many-victims-didnt-speak-out-220513">Mr Bates vs The Post Office depicts one of the UK's worst miscarriages of justice: here’s why so many victims didn’t speak out</a>
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<p>One of the <a href="https://www.onepostoffice.co.uk/secure/latest-news/our-business/brands-we-trust-where-we-sit-in-the-rankings/">UK’s most trusted brands</a> only a few years ago, the Post Office has since drawn near-universal ire
<a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2021-04-23/post-office-postmasters-horizon-court-of-appeal">for its treatment of its sub-postmasters and mistresses</a>. The ITV show has only reignited the controversy.</p>
<p>Trust is crucial to the relationship brands develop with consumers. These connections help attract new customers, but also create long-term buying habits. It takes time and effort to build this kind of trust, but it can crumble in an instant, as major brands like Facebook, Boeing and Volkswagen – and now the Post Office – have found. Rebuilding this trust after a scandal takes even more time and effort and the results can be mixed.</p>
<p>Brand trust is multifaceted but can be thought of as the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257541748_Does_Having_an_Ethical_Brand_Matter_The_Influence_of_Consumer_Perceived_Ethicality_on_Trust_Affect_and_Loyalty">confidence, reliability and credibility</a> that consumers and other stakeholders – such as investors, suppliers, employees and even competitors – associate with a brand. It reflects the belief that a brand is competent, consistent, honest and takes responsibility for delivering on its promises and acting in the best interest of consumers. </p>
<p>People can <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209515">develop strong emotional attachments to brands</a> and trust is typically <a href="https://hbr.org/2019/07/the-trust-crisis">at the core</a> of these relationships. Trust underpins people’s commitment and <a href="https://business.columbia.edu/sites/default/files-efs/pubfiles/593/The_Chain_of_Effects.pdf">loyalty</a> to a brand. And when a brand earns people’s trust, it can be rewarded with more sales, positive word of mouth, and long-term custom, <a href="https://www.adobe.com/content/dam/cc/uk/aboutadobe/newsroom/pdfs/051121-future-of-marketing.pdf">according to research</a>. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227895249_Examining_the_Antecedents_and_Consequences_of_Corporate_Reputation_A_Customer_Perspective">Academic studies also show</a> the importance of trust to corporate reputation. </p>
<h2>From hero to zero</h2>
<p>So, when this trust is broken, it can be highly damaging for a brand, as big names have found in the past. </p>
<p>In 2018, social media platform Facebook was at the centre of a major data breach. Governments around the world questioned the company’s commitment to data privacy after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/08/facebook-to-contact-the-87-million-users-affected-by-data-breach">87 million users</a> were confirmed to have had their personal data shared with Cambridge Analytica. The political consultant was using the data to target voters during the 2016 US presidential election. </p>
<p>Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg apologised in a Facebook post acknowledging “a breach of trust between Facebook and the people who share their data with us and expect us to protect it”. But his initial response – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/21/mark-zuckerberg-response-facebook-cambridge-analytica#:%7E:text=The%20Facebook%20CEO%20broke%20his,expect%20us%20to%20protect%20it%E2%80%9D.">deafening silence for five days</a> – probably didn’t help shore up consumer trust in the brand. </p>
<p>The scandal had huge implications for data privacy and governments acted swiftly to pass laws and regulations to protect consumers, including the EU’s <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package">Digital Services Act</a>. In the aftermath of scandal, Americans were also <a href="https://theconversation.com/cambridge-analytica-scandal-facebooks-user-engagement-and-trust-decline-93814">less likely to trust</a> Facebook. </p>
<p>More recently, aeroplane maker Boeing’s reputation for quality has been decimated. First, a damning <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt11893274/">Netflix documentary</a> examined the 2018 and 2019 crashes of two 737-MAX jets and the company’s choices about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2022/feb/22/downfall-the-case-against-boeing-netflix-documentary-737-max">passenger safety</a>. Boeing spent <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-regain-trust-one-aircraft-at-a-time-says-boeing-boss-dave-calhoun-998fwztnv#:%7E:text=of%20Alba%202023-,We%20regain%20trust%20one%20aircraft%20at%20a,says%20Boeing%20boss%20Dave%20Calhoun&text=Boeing%20has%20spent%20four%20long,its%20bestselling%20737%20Max%20aircraft.">four years rebuilding trust</a> after <a href="https://www.boeing.com/737-max-updates/official-statements/">the two fatal crashes</a>. But the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67915771">mid-air cabin panel blow out</a> of a 737 MAX 9 has seen Boeing hit the headlines again, further damaging the company image and leaving customers, pilots, crew and regulators asking why they should trust the company. </p>
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<p>At an all-staff meeting shortly after the incident, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/09/business/boeing-safety-meeting-737-max-factory/index.html">CEO Dave Calhoun told employees</a> that Boeing must acknowledge “our mistake” and has promised total transparency. A video of <a href="https://www.boeing.com/737-9-updates/index.page#:%7E:text=hosted%20a%20meeting%20with%20all%20employees">his opening statement</a> was also posted on the company website.</p>
<p>Volkswagen experienced similar trust issues after a scandal dubbed “emissionsgate” or <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34324772">“the diesel dupe”</a>. The car company is still struggling after the US environmental regulator <a href="https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations">accused the company</a> of cheating on vehicle emissions tests. Customers <a href="https://www.thedrum.com/news/2015/09/23/has-volkswagen-s-emissions-scandal-smashed-brand-beyond-repair">lost trust</a> in the brand and the company, after admitting fault, also had to pay billions of dollars in fines and compensation claims. </p>
<p>“Our most important task in 2016 is to win back trust,” Volkswagen CEO Matthias Mueller said in a January 2016 speech at an auto industry event.</p>
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<h2>Rebuilding trust in a brand</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of a brand crisis, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13527266.2023.2172601">communication</a> in the form of this kind of brand apology is key. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-is-doing-crisis-management-all-wrong-heres-what-a-company-needs-to-do-to-restore-the-publics-trust-114051">Boeing</a> is still being accused of doing crisis management “all wrong”, and Facebook has also been <a href="https://insigniacrisis.com/2019-facebook-a-lesson-in-crisis-management">criticised</a> for its scandal response. </p>
<p>The speed of the response matters. An effective crisis management approach typically involves company leaders issuing swift public statements – often filmed – acknowledging responsibility and full transparency about the mistakes that lead to the scandal and the remedial steps.</p>
<p>Trust can be rebuilt but it’s a long-term process. Some <a href="https://fabrikbrands.com/brands-and-companies-that-have-repositioned-themselves/">companies</a> such as Starbucks and Gucci have successfully <a href="https://press.farm/brand-repositioning-strategies-rebuild-trust/">repositioned their brands</a> to alter the perceived image held by consumers. This involves changing marketing elements such as prices or promotional methods to attract new customers and refresh the brand image. In some cases, it involves a complete rebrand with a new logo and tagline.</p>
<p>The latest headlines have reignited debate about what the Post Office and the government should do to address the Horizon IT scandal. The Post Office must find the right kind of crisis management strategy if it wants to weather this storm and regain its position as a trusted British brand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220805/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sameer Hosany does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Companies like Facebook, Volkswagen, Boeing – and now the Post Office – have seen how easy it is to destroy brand trust. But communication and transparency are key to rebuilding efforts.Sameer Hosany, Professor of Marketing, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1770002022-02-17T13:59:26Z2022-02-17T13:59:26ZEthiopian Airlines is flying 737 Max again: here are the lessons learnt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445970/original/file-20220211-15-i43idg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Airlines’ Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft crashed on 10 March 2019 killing all 157 people aboard. Mas Agung Wilis/NurPhoto via</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ethiopian-airlines-as-the-oldest-airlines-on-the-world-news-photo/1138067527?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ethiopian Airlines has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/ethiopian-airlines-to-resume-737-max-flights-3701196">announced</a> that it plans to put its Boeing’s 737 Max back to service for the first time since the aircraft model was involved in a crash that claimed 157 lives three years ago. Chrystal Zhang has studied the business models of airlines. We asked her to make sense of the source of Ethiopian Airlines’ confidence</em>.</p>
<h2>When, and why was Boeing’s 737 Max grounded?</h2>
<p>By 12 March 2019, two days after Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed, civil aviation authorities in China, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Malaysia, Mongolia, Oman and Singapore had already grounded the 737 Max. </p>
<p>This was in addition to airlines in Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Norway, India, Turkey and other countries. On March 13, 2019, the US Federal Aviation Administration <a href="https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-08/Emergency_Order.pdf">grounded</a> the entire 737 Max fleet. </p>
<p>The decision was made following the fatal crash of Ethiopian Airlines’ <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/10/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash-no-survivors-among-157-on-board">302 flight</a> enroute from Addis Ababa to Nairobi. The accident killed all 157 passengers and crew members on board. </p>
<p>This wasn’t the Boeing 737 Max aircraft’s first incident. </p>
<p>On 29 October 2018 there was a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46121127">fatal crash</a> of a flight operated by Lion Air, an Indonesian low-cost carrier. The airline was enroute from Jarkata to Pangka Pinang and the crash resulted in 189 casualties. </p>
<p>Two years earlier, in March 2017, the US Federal Aviation Administration had granted an <a href="https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/amend_tc/">amended-type</a> certificate to Boeing for the 737-8 aircraft, the first of the 737 Max family. An amended type certificate approves modification, and how such modification affects the original design. The Max is the fourth generation of the 737 model airplane, and is the successor to the company’s 737 Next Generation family of aircraft.</p>
<p>The 737 Max was the 12th derivative model of the 737 aircraft, which was first certified half a century earlier in 1967. Two months after the US Federal Aviation certification, the first 737 Max <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/orders-and-deliveries/malindo-operates-worlds-first-737-max-flight/124109.article">entered</a> revenue passenger service with Malindo Air, a Malaysian air carrier. Seventeen months later the 737 Max suffered its first fatal crash.</p>
<h2>Is there a consensus on the cause of the accidents?</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-020-00252-y">study</a> has analysed the cause of the 737 Max crashes. The model had a new feature in its flight control computer – the manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system – that has become the centre of scrutiny for Max crashes. </p>
<p>The new system had an ability to trigger flight control movements that challenged the pilots’ command of the aircraft. In addition, the software operated on input from one of the two sensors externally mounted on either side of the aircraft’s fuselage (main body).</p>
<p>For Ethiopian flight, the system triggered four times as a result of false sensor readings, forcing the airplane into a nose down from which the pilots were unable to recover. Faulty sensor data that erroneously triggered the system to repeatedly activate landing played critical roles in the Max crashes.</p>
<p>Given significant advances in aviation safety over the last two decades it was extraordinary for two new airplanes, of a new derivative model, to crash within five months of each other.</p>
<p>While certain facts and circumstances surrounding the accidents differed, a common component in both was the new flight control feature. </p>
<p>Boeing developed the system to address stability issues in certain flight conditions induced by the plane’s new larger engines and their relative placement on the 737 Max aircraft compared to the engines’ placement on the 737 NG.</p>
<h2>Is Ethiopian Airlines jumping the gun?</h2>
<p>So far, <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/737-max-two-years-on/which-airlines-have-returned-the-boeing-737-max-to-service/142791.article">13 airlines</a> have resumed flying Boeing’s 737 Max. These include The Ryanair Group of Ireland, Air Canada, American Airlines, Alaska Airlines and India-based SpiceJet. </p>
<p>In the case of Ethiopian airlines, the reasons for <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ethiopian-airlines-resumes-flights-boeing-737-max-82601195">resuming</a> its flights include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The action taken by both Boeing and the US Federal Aviation Administration in terms of product redesign, pilot training requirements, commitment to corporate culture change and certification. These seek to ensure that the aircraft model satisfies all regulatory requirements.</p></li>
<li><p>Boeing’s 737 Max has its unique market positioning to serve the short-medium haul market</p></li>
<li><p>The aircraft is more economically viable for airlines to use to serve their target market</p></li>
<li><p>The airline had made financial commitment to aircraft procurement</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Have the crashes been fully analysed and resolved?</h2>
<p>The US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure conducted an 18-month investigation into design, development, and certification of the 737 Max aircraft, and related matters. </p>
<p>The Committee’s investigation has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116hhrg37476/CHRG-116hhrg37476.pdf">revealed</a> multiple missed opportunities that could have turned the trajectory of the Max’s design and development toward a safer course. The model resulted from flawed technical design criteria, faulty assumptions about pilot response times, and production pressures. </p>
<p>Boeing failed in its design and development of the Max. The US Federal Aviation Administration, on the other hand overlooked its aviation safety mission. It failed in its oversight of Boeing and its certification of the aircraft. </p>
<p>At the direction of Committee Chair Peter DeFazio and Subcommittee on Aviation Chair Rick Larsen, the 245-page report is being released to help inform the public’s understanding of what went so horrifically wrong and why.</p>
<h2>What are the lessons learnt?</h2>
<p><em>Never be complacent:</em> Boeing is renowned for its disruptive innovation and novel products. It has served the global aerospace and aviation markets throughout its one-century history. But the company has become more of a financially successful business than a great engineering firm. It was the intent of <a href="https://www.boeing.com/history/pioneers/harry-c-stonecipher.page">Harry Stonecipher</a>, its President and Chief Operation Officer in 2004, who championed the corporate culture change. But past glory does not warrant future success. Staying competitive in the market requires innovation, but more importantly, respect and protection of customers and stakeholders. </p>
<p><em>Do things right, and do the right things:</em> These are the fundamental ethical values that a good engineer upholds to be accountable for the safety, health, and welfare of the public. Driven by the desire to outpace its rivals - in the course of designing, developing and introducing B737 Max to the market - Boeing failed to meet both criteria. Boeing, and any other business, need to adhere to these fundamental values and be accountable for its conduct. </p>
<p><em>Improve safety cultures:</em> There is an ongoing debate that upholding highest safety standards and nurturing safety culture jeopardises a business’s financial success and operational efficiency. However, safety is the foundation of aerospace and aviation business. A safety culture ensures trust, accountability and responsibility. It eventually leads to a firm’s sustainability.</p>
<p><em>Face the truth and act honestly, and with integrity:</em> When in a crisis, the most effective way to win trust from the public and society is to face the truth and act honestly and with integrity. Any attempts to cover up the truth or mislead the public are doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chrystal Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Industry has renewed confidence after Boeing made commitments to redesign aircraft and train pilotsChrystal Zhang, Associate professor, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1526702021-05-18T12:24:54Z2021-05-18T12:24:54ZEngineers and economists prize efficiency, but nature favors resilience – lessons from Texas, COVID-19 and the 737 Max<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400844/original/file-20210514-19-jy5kl9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C12%2C8409%2C5576&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The power grid in Texas provides a stark lesson in the balance between efficiency and resilience.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TexasBlackoutsInmates/b71dd8075a6a4c80bbad12d50dd93d8d/photo?boardId=6576eeb175bb4623a6e17828de4a73e8&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=9&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/David J. Phillip</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Takeaways:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>The damage from Winter Storm Uri, the economic devastation from the COVID-19 pandemic and the fatal Boeing 737 Max accidents show the price society pays for a relentless pursuit of efficiency.</strong></p></li>
<li><p><strong>Modern society has prioritized free-market economics and efficient computer systems to the detriment of other priorities.</strong></p></li>
<li><p><strong>Studies of algorithms show that efficiency can come at a high cost.</strong></p></li>
<li><p><strong>Sexual reproduction and car insurance highlight the benefits of resilience.</strong></p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>There is a trade-off between efficiency and resilience. Efficiency requires optimal adaptation to an existing environment, while resilience is an <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/efficiency-isnt-the-only-economic-virtue-11583873155">ability to adapt to large or sudden changes in the environment</a>. Society’s <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-thought-efficiency-versus-sustainability-by-robert-skidelsky-2020-12?barrier=accesspay">emphasis on short-term gains</a> has long tipped the balance in favor of efficiency.</p>
<p>However, the relentless pursuit of efficiency removes hurdles to the speed and reach of transactions, hurdles that also serve as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-globalization.html">buffers against shocks</a>. Buffers provide resilience in the face of ecological, geopolitical and financial crises.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DQaARsgAAAAJ&hl=en">computer scientist</a>, I look at how algorithms provide a way to test assumptions about resilience, even as the field of computing itself shares the bias toward efficiency. Three recent crises – the 2021 winter storm in Texas, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Boeing 737 Max software failure – highlight the cost of valuing efficiency over resilience and provide lessons for bringing society into balance. </p>
<h2>Economists and engineers ❤️ efficiency</h2>
<p>Economics has long been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-thought-efficiency-versus-sustainability-by-robert-skidelsky-2020-12">obsessed with efficiency</a>. <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic_efficiency.asp">Economic efficiency</a> means that goods and production are distributed or allocated to their most valuable uses and waste is eliminated or minimized. </p>
<p>Free-market advocates argue that through individual <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/invisiblehand.asp">self-interest and freedom of production and consumption</a>, economic efficiency is achieved and the best interests of society, as a whole, are fulfilled. But this conflates efficiency with the best outcome.</p>
<p>The intense focus on efficiency at the expense of resilience plagues not only business and economics but also technology. Society has educated generations of computer scientists that analyzing algorithms, the step-by-step instructions at the heart of computer software, boils down to measuring their computational efficiency. </p>
<p><a href="https://www-cs-faculty.stanford.edu/%7Eknuth/taocp.html">“The Art of Computer Programming,”</a> one of the founding texts of computer science, is dedicated to the analysis of algorithms, which is the process of figuring out the amount of time, storage or other resources needed to execute them. In other words, efficiency is the sole concern in the design of algorithms, according to this guide.</p>
<p>But what about resilience? Designing resilient algorithms requires computer scientists to consider in advance what can go wrong and build effective countermeasures into their algorithms. Without designing for resilience, you get efficient but brittle algorithms.</p>
<h2>A storm, a plague and some bad software</h2>
<p>Brittle systems are more likely than resilient systems to break down when crises strike. Cold temperatures and blackouts during <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/texas-winter-storm-uri/">Winter Storm Uri</a> killed <a href="https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/texas-cold-storm-200-died-analysis-winter-freeze-16070470.php">nearly 200 people</a> in February 2021 in Texas. The storm damaged the power grid and water systems, which lacked the weatherproofing features common to utility infrastructure in much of the rest of the country. </p>
<p>The harsh economic consequences of failing to prepare for a pandemic, despite many <a href="https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hr157ml.pdf">early warnings</a>, provoke questions about whether the obsessive pursuit of efficiency, which has dominated standard business orthodoxy for decades, has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/efficiency-isnt-the-only-economic-virtue-11583873155">made the global economic system more vulnerable</a> to disruptive changes. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A twin-engine jetliner with its landing gear partway down and the name Boeing on the side descends through the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400846/original/file-20210514-23-5shuna.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Boeing 737 Max fiasco resulted from engineering and business decisions that put efficiency ahead of resilience.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/FAABoeing/9ca52000db8d439e8daf2ec17450cb6f/photo?boardId=6576eeb175bb4623a6e17828de4a73e8&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Elaine Thompson</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A stark example of a system designed for efficiency and not resilience is the flight-control algorithm for the Boeing 737 Max. Boeing retrofitted the 737, a passenger aircraft first produced more than half a century ago, with more efficient engines. This retrofitting caused some <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/04/02/mit-expert-highlights-divergent-condition-caused-by-737-max-engine-placement/?sh=a0aa1140aabe">flight instability</a>, which the flight-control algorithm was designed to overcome. </p>
<p>But the algorithm <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/politics/boeing-sensor-737-max-faa/index.html">relied on data from a single sensor</a>, and when the sensor failed, the algorithm incorrectly determined that the plane was stalling. In response, the algorithm caused the plane to dive as an emergency measure to recover from a stall that wasn’t happening.</p>
<p>The result was two horrific crashes and hundreds of the aircraft being <a href="https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/the-boeing-737-max-grounding/">grounded for nearly two years</a>. In retrospect, the engineers overly optimized for fuel economy and time to market <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/sunday-review/boeing-737-max.html">at the expense of safety</a>.</p>
<h2>The price of anarchy</h2>
<p>If brittle systems are prone to disasters, why is society filled with them? One explanation is that, short of disasters, systems that emphasize efficiency can achieve a kind of stability. A fundamental theorem in economics states that under certain assumptions a market will tend toward a competitive balance point, known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pareto-optimality">Pareto-optimal equilibrium</a>, in which economic efficiency is achieved. </p>
<p>But how well does such an equilibrium serve the best interests of society? A team of computer scientists studied <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2009.04.003">how beneficial or detrimental equilibria can be</a> from a computational perspective. The researchers studied systems in which uncooperative agents share a common resource, the mathematical equivalent of roadways or fisheries. </p>
<p>They came up with a ratio between the worst possible equilibrium – traffic congestion or overfishing – and the social optimum, a ratio dubbed the “<a href="http://www.ams.org/publicoutreach/feature-column/fcarc-anarchy">Price of Anarchy</a>” because it measures how far from optimal such uncooperative systems can be. They showed that this ratio can be very high. In other words, economic efficiency does not guarantee that the best interests of society are fulfilled. </p>
<p>Another team of researchers asked <a href="https://doi.org/10.1137/070699652">how long it takes until economic agents converge to an equilibrium</a>. By studying the <a href="http://www.esi2.us.es/%7Embilbao/complexi.htm">computational complexity</a> of computing such equilibria, the researchers showed that there are systems that take an exceedingly long time to converge to an equilibrium. </p>
<p>The implication is that economic systems are very unlikely ever to be in an equilibrium, because the underlying variables – such as prices, supply and demand – are very likely to change while the systems are making their slow way toward convergence. In other words, <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-equilibrium.asp">economic equilibrium</a>, a central concept in economic theory, is a mythical rather than a real phenomenon. This is not an argument against free markets, but it does require a pragmatic view of them.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="an older man holding a large cloth bundle under his arm walks along the sidewalk in front of the metal grate of a closed pawn shop" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/400845/original/file-20210514-17-ei6956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Free markets can be efficient and at the same time bad for society as a whole.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/EconomyJobsReport/79fc99505312438584edfad8b2e42448/photo?boardId=6576eeb175bb4623a6e17828de4a73e8&st=boards&mediaType=audio,photo,video,graphic&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=8&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/Lynne Sladky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When sex is best</h2>
<p>It is interesting to consider how nature deals with the trade-off between efficiency and resilience. This issue was addressed in a computer science paper titled “<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2934662">Sex as an Algorithm</a>.” Computer scientists know that search techniques <a href="https://mathworld.wolfram.com/SimulatedAnnealing.html">allowing individual steps that are less than optimal but could lead to an overall better solution</a> are, in general, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018538202952">computationally superior</a> to search techniques that mimic <a href="https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evo_25">natural selection</a> by creating “offspring” of previous solutions and adding random mutations.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-corona-important">The Conversation’s most important coronavirus headlines, weekly in a science newsletter</a></em>]</p>
<p>Why, then, has nature chosen sexual reproduction as the almost exclusive reproduction mechanism in animals? The answer is that sex as an algorithm <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2934662">offers advantages</a> other than good performance. </p>
<p>In particular, natural selection favors genes that work well with a greater diversity of other genes, and this makes the species more adaptable to disruptive environmental changes – that is to say, more resilient. Thus, in the interest of long-term survival, nature prioritized resilience over efficiency.</p>
<h2>Car insurance and climate change</h2>
<p>The bottom line is that resilience is a fundamental but underappreciated societal need. But both computing and economics have underemphasized resilience. In general, markets and people are quite bad at <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Black-Swan-Improbable-Robustness-Fragility/dp/081297381X">preparing for very low-probability or very long-term events</a>. </p>
<p>For example, people have to be forced to buy car insurance, because buying insurance is not efficient. After all, in the aggregate, the insurance business is profitable for the insurers, not for the insured. The purpose of insurance is increased resilience. This example shows that ensuring resilience requires societal action and cannot be left to markets. </p>
<p>The economic impact of the pandemic shows the cost of society’s failure to act. And COVID-19 may be just the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3114641/covid-19-only-dress-rehearsal-transformations-coming-climate-change">warmup act</a> for the much bigger impending climate crisis, so focusing on resilience is becoming more and more important. </p>
<p>There seems to be a broad recognition that the incalculable suffering and trauma of COVID-19 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/06/fareed-zakaria-lessons-post-pandemic-world/">offers societies</a> ways to <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/who-will-we-be-when-the-pandemic-is-over/">change for the better</a>. Similar lessons can be drawn from Winter Storm Uri and the Boeing 737 Max. </p>
<p>Focusing on resilience is a way for societies to change for the better. In the meantime, the steady flow of news events – like a pipeline company that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/05/15/energy-cost-cutting-price/">appears to have underinvested in security</a> – continues to underscore the cost of prizing efficiency over resilience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Moshe Y. Vardi is affiliated with the Baker Institute for Public Policy.</span></em></p>Disasters highlight the cost of society’s love of efficiency. Nature, in contrast, favors resilience. Being more like nature offers benefits for society, especially in the face of the climate crisis.Moshe Y. Vardi, Professor of Computer Science, Rice UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1506882020-11-27T18:19:38Z2020-11-27T18:19:38ZBoeing 737 Max: why was it grounded, what has been fixed and is it enough?<p>The Boeing 737 Max began flying commercially in May 2017 but has been grounded for over a year and a half following two crashes within five months. On October 29 2018, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46014463">Lion Air Flight 610</a> took off from Jakarta. It quickly experienced problems in maintaining altitude, entered into an uncontrollable dive and crashed into the Java Sea about 13 minutes after takeoff. Then on March 10 2019, <a href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/what-passengers-experienced-on-the-ethiopian-airlines-flight.html">Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302</a> from Nairobi suffered similar problems, crashing into the desert around six minutes after leaving the runway.</p>
<p>In total, 346 people lost their lives. After the second crash, US regulator the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) decided to ground all 737 Max planes, of which around 350 had been delivered at the time, while they investigated the causes of the accidents.</p>
<p>Now, 20 months later, the FAA <a href="http://news.aa.com/news/news-details/2020/Return-of-the-Boeing-737-MAX-to-service-OPS-DIS-11/default.aspx#:%7E:text=Today%2C%20the%20Federal%20Aviation%20Administration,its%20grounding%20in%20March%202019.&text=This%20includes%20investing%20in%20extensive,it%20returns%20to%20commercial%20use">has announced</a> that it is rescinding this order and has set out steps for the return of the aircraft to commercial service. Brazil has responded quickly, <a href="https://simpleflying.com/brazil-boeing-737-max-recertification/amp/">also approving</a> the 737 Max. So, what went wrong – and can we be confident that it has been fixed?</p>
<p>The causes of the two accidents were complex, but link mainly to the 737’s <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/">manoeuvring characteristics augmentation system</a> (MCAS), which was introduced to the 737 Max to manage changes in behaviour created by the plane having much larger engines than its predecessors.</p>
<p>There are some important points about the MCAS which we must consider when reviewing the “fixes”. The MCAS prevented stall (a sudden loss of lift due to the angle of the wing) by “pushing” the nose down. Stall is indicated through an angle of attack (AoA) sensor – the 737 Max is fitted with two, but MCAS only used one. If that AoA sensor failed, then the MCAS could <a href="https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/news/blog/accidental-autonomy/">activate when it shouldn’t</a>, unnecessarily pushing the nose down. The design meant that there was no automatic switch to the other AoA sensor, and MCAS kept working with the erroneous sensor values. This is what happened in both crashes.</p>
<p>The design of the MCAS meant that it was repeatedly activated if it determined that there was a risk of a stall. This meant that the nose was continually pushed down, making it hard for pilots to keep altitude or climb. The system was also hard to override. In both cases, the flight crews were unable to override the MCAS, although other crews had successfully managed to do so in similar situation, and this contributed to the two accidents.</p>
<h2>The fixes</h2>
<p>Have these things been fixed? The FAA has published an <a href="https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_room/media/737_RTS_Summary.pdf">extensive summary</a> explaining its decision. The MCAS software has been modified and now uses both AoA sensors, not one. The MCAS also now only activates once, rather than multiple times, when a potential stall is signalled by both the AoA sensors. Pilots are provided with an “AoA disagree warning” which indicates that there might be an erroneous activation of MCAS. This warning was not standard equipment at the time of the two accidents – it had to be purchased by airlines as an option. </p>
<p>Importantly, pilots will now be trained on the operation of the MCAS and management of its problems. Pilots claimed that initially they were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-48281282">not even told</a> that MCAS existed. This training will have to be approved by the FAA.</p>
<p>So, is all well? Probably. As the 737 Max accidents put Boeing and the FAA under such intense scrutiny, it is likely that the design and safety activities have been carried out and checked to the maximum extent possible. There is no such thing as perfection in such complex engineering processes, but it is clear that this has been an extremely intensive effort and that Boeing found and corrected a few other potential safety problems that were unrelated to the accidents. </p>
<p>Of course, we are not there yet. The more than 300 aircraft already delivered have to be modified, and the 450-or-so built but not delivered also need to be updated and checked by the FAA. Then the pilots need to be trained. And the airlines need passengers – but will they get them? That is an issue of trust.</p>
<h2>Safety culture and trust</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ep7oLR1xCW0">US Congressional Enquiry</a> was scathing about the culture at both Boeing and the FAA and the difficulty of the FAA in overseeing Boeing’s work. <a href="https://fisher.osu.edu/blogs/leadreadtoday/blog/a-textbook-case-for-disaster-psychological-safety-and-the-737-max">Some commentators</a> have also referred to an absence of psychological safety: “The assurance that one can speak up, offer ideas, point out problems, or deliver bad news without fear of retribution.” We have evidence that the engineering problems have been fixed, but safety culture is more nebulous and slow to change. </p>
<p>How would we know if trust has been restored? There are several possible indicators. </p>
<p>Due to the effects of COVID-19, airlines are running a reduced flight schedule, so they may not need to use the 737 Max. If they choose not to do so, despite its reduced operating costs compared to earlier 737 models, that will be telling. Certainly, all eyes will be on the first airline to return the aircraft to the skies. </p>
<p>Some US airlines <a href="https://simpleflying.com/how-to-tell-if-youre-flying-on-the-boeing-737-max/">have said</a> they will advise people which model of aircraft they will be flying. If passengers opt to avoid the 737 Max, that will speak volumes about public trust and confidence. </p>
<p>The FAA <a href="https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206">press release</a> also says there has been an “unprecedented level of collaborative and independent reviews by aviation authorities around the world”. But if the international authorities ask for further checks or delay the reintroduction of the aircraft in their jurisdictions, that will be particularly significant as it reflects the view of the FAA’s professional peers. Brazil’s rapid response is a positive sign for this international engagement.</p>
<p>Hopefully, the first few years will prove uneventful and trust can be rebuilt. But only time will tell.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John McDermid receives, or has received, funding from government research agencies, industry including in the aerospace sector and the Lloyd's Register Foundation, relevant to the safety of aircraft and autonomous systems. He has not received any funding directly relevant to the Boeing 737 Max.</span></em></p>Almost two years after crashing twice within five months and being pulled out of service, the Boeing 737 Max’s return to the skies has now been approved.John McDermid, Director, Assuring Autonomy International Programme, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1471572020-10-01T12:24:16Z2020-10-01T12:24:16ZThe 737 MAX is ready to fly again, but plane certification still needs to be fixed – here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360638/original/file-20200929-22-12u1blg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3594%2C2392&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Boeing 737 MAX is expected to take to the skies again following a review of the MCAS system which was responsible for two crashes in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/boeing-737-max-jet-comes-in-for-a-landing-following-a-news-photo/1223465937">Jason Redmond / Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>After being grounded in March 2019 following two fatal crashes, the Boeing 737 MAX is expected to be certified by the Federal Aviation Administration to fly again later this fall. Investigations pointed to a problem with the aircraft’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/automated-control-system-caused-ethiopia-crash-flight-data-suggests-113688">automated control system</a> was designed to stabilize the plane and compensate for the more powerful engines used on the 737 MAX compared to previous versions.</em> </p>
<p><em>The <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/internal-faa-review-saw-high-risk-of-737-max-crashes-11576069202?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=2">FAA’s certification</a> of the plane has <a href="https://komonews.com/news/nation-world/lawmakers-upset-over-boeing-max-approval-propose-new-rules">come under fire</a> because manufacturers can speed up the process by having only enhancements to a preapproved aircraft reviewed and certified. Ronnie R. Gipson Jr., an expert in aviation law and visiting professor at the University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, whose work was cited in the House Committee on transportation and infrastructure’s report on this issue, explains what happened and ways to improve these safety regulations.</em></p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/N_7s01_gDk4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>What are the criticisms of the FAA certification process stemming from the 737 MAX crashes?</h2>
<p>The process for the certification of a transport category aircraft is a very involved and costly process. The aircraft manufacturers that go down this path have to be committed to spending hundreds of millions of dollars. It starts with an initial design, and the aircraft that is produced is then subjected to dynamic flight testing for compliance with all of the Federal Aviation Administration regulations. Once the airplane satisfies all those requirements, the aircraft is given an original type certificate by the FAA. The aircraft manufacturer is then allowed to produce aircraft and sell them.</p>
<p>As time goes on, technology advances and the manufacturer identifies ways to improve on that original design. So the manufacturer goes back to the FAA and says, “We want to take this initial design that we have and amend it because we made some changes.” At this point, the aircraft manufacturer files what’s called an amended type certificate application for a derivative aircraft from the baseline aircraft. For example, the original type certificate for the first 737 design was submitted to the FAA in 1967. That original design has had multiple derivative aircraft approved by the FAA, with the 737 MAX being the 13th version. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="a timeline showing the certification approval dates and models of the original 737 design and its derivatives." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=191&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=191&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=191&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360883/original/file-20200930-24-h3w89e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=240&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Certification timeline of the Boeing 737 series of aircraft.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification%20Timeline%20Final%20Report.pdf">US Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the amended type certification process, the regulatory authority focuses only on what’s changed. Another thing to keep in mind is that the FAA just doesn’t have the manpower to oversee all the tests that go with an amended type certificate approval. Therefore, the FAA reviews most of the critical changes related to safety and delegates the noncritical changes for review to the manufacturers – in this case to <a href="https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/Final_JATR_Submittal_to_FAA_Oct_2019.pdf">a body in Boeing</a> which consists essentially of Boeing employees. </p>
<p>And that’s what happened here. MCAS wasn’t necessarily presented as a change in the design impacting control in flight. As a result, the MCAS was not a priority for the FAA in the amended certificate approval process. The MCAS capabilities and what it was supposed to control <a href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification%20Timeline%20Final%20Report.pdf">were never fully revealed</a>. That’s really where the problem started. It was with the narrative that was being presented to the FAA, and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/faas-handling-of-boeing-737-max-issues-faulted-in-transportation-department-review-11593619195?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=12">the lack of oversight in the amended type certificate process</a>. The result was that the MCAS system that was initially presented to the FAA at the beginning of the amended type certificate process was not the same system that ended up in the aircraft.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A diagram showing how the MCAS system forces the nose of the aircraft downwards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/360881/original/file-20200930-16-11w9416.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A diagram showing how the MCAS system forces the nose of the aircraft downwards.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Boeing%20737%20MAX%20Certification%20Timeline%20Final%20Report.pdf">US Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>How will the recent recertification for the 737 MAX ensure that the model is now safe?</h2>
<p>The FAA has had to backtrack and give the MCAS system the intense level of scrutiny that it deserved. The FAA has required the manufacturer to go back and make significant adjustments to the software, in addition to changes to the operator’s manual, which is what the pilots would see.</p>
<h2>How can the certification process be improved?</h2>
<p>I see two paths to take. First, for a transport category aircraft, regulations are changed so that the manufacturer can receive amended type certificates for only 20 years after the original type certificate has been issued by the FAA.</p>
<p>Here’s how that would work: An aircraft manufacturer designs an aircraft for certification in the transport category and applies for the original type certificate in 2020. Once the original type certification is awarded in, say, 2025, then the manufacturer should have 20 years. That means that the manufacturer would have until the year 2045 to seek an amendment to that original type certificate. Beginning in 2046, if the aircraft manufacturer wants to make subsequent design changes, they have to start over and get a new original type certificate.</p>
<p>The second component to resolving this problem would be to step in and review what areas the FAA can delegate oversight authority for system changes in an amended aircraft certification application review.</p>
<h2>What are the obstacles to making these changes?</h2>
<p>One would be money. The FAA has a budget, and these are very costly measures because the FAA will need more engineers and administrators. And for that to happen, Congress has to be prepared to spend the money to make that happen by increasing the FAA’s budget.</p>
<p>There’s also going to be a cost to the industry. Implementing the proposal of a 20-year cap on the validity of that original type certificate is going to impose a greater financial cost on the aircraft manufacturers of transport category aircraft. They’re not going to have as much time to get a return on their investment for the aircraft that they produce. So the aircraft are going to end up costing more, which means the airlines are going to end up paying more for those planes. And that cost is going to trickle down to the flying public in those seats.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147157/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronnie R. Gipson Jr. provides policy advice to the Experimental Aircraft Association as a member of this organization's Legal Advisory Council. </span></em></p>The Boeing 737 MAX, which has been grounded since 2019 following two fatal crashes, is expected to be cleared to fly again. An aviation law expert proposes a way to improve the certification process.Ronnie R. Gipson Jr., Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of MemphisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1307602020-02-04T18:26:07Z2020-02-04T18:26:07ZDisasters foretold: Boeing 737 Max 8 and Lac-Mégantic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312940/original/file-20200130-41495-fp00rh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C0%2C3500%2C2122&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this March 2019 photo, rescuers work at the scene of an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max crash south of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Deregulation is playing a role in transportation disasters. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Mulugeta Ayene</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Canada has <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-airlines-flying-grounded-boeing-737-max-airlines-1.5449405">reportedly still allowed</a> Boeing 737 Max 8s to fly, albeit without passengers, after they were grounded almost a year ago. This news emerges despite the fact that crashes involving the plane — <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/business/boeing-737-crashes.html">Lion Air in Indonesia</a> in October 2018 and, five months later, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5041236/ethiopian-airlines-crash-canadian-victims">Ethiopian Airlines in Addis Ababa</a> — killed 346 people, including <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/5041236/ethiopian-airlines-crash-canadian-victims/">18 Canadians</a>.</p>
<p>There are some disturbing similarities between the Boeing Max 8 scandal and the July 2013 <a href="https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/lac-megantic-rail-disaster">Lac-Mégantic rail disaster</a>. Both reveal a predictable pattern.</p>
<p>In Lac-Mégantic, a runaway train laden with volatile Bakken shale oil from North Dakota crashed in the heart of the small Québec community, killing 47 people, orphaning 26 children, spilling an unprecedented six million litres of oil and incinerating the town centre. It was the worst industrial disaster on Canadian soil in a century.</p>
<p>Both disasters were the deadly consequence of a decades-long trajectory of deregulation in the aerospace and railway industries. Safety precautions were systematically eroded to the point where the likelihood of an accident became a game of Russian roulette: not <em>if</em>, but <em>when</em>.</p>
<p>In both cases, regulatory agencies were captive to their regulated industries. A revolving door of senior agency officials — moving from industry to regulator and back to lucrative industry lobbyist positions — aided and abetted the deregulation process.</p>
<p>In both cases, lower-level regulatory staff opposed regulatory outsourcing measures, warning against the fox guarding the henhouse. They were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/politics/boeing-faa.html">ignored or reprimanded for speaking out</a>.</p>
<h2>Oil by rail</h2>
<p>With Canadian railways, the implementation of a safety oversight regime, called <a href="https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/rail/operating-federal-railway/safety-management-systems-industry-guide.html">safety management systems or SMS</a>, sealed the transition to company self-regulation. </p>
<p>This happened at a time of looming danger posed by the exponential increase in the transportation of oil by rail. There were multiple critical evaluations of the system, including by the Auditor General of Canada, <a href="https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201311_07_e_38801.html">who concluded in a 2013 report</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The Department’s level of oversight was not sufficient to obtain assurance that federal railways have implemented adequate and effective safety management systems.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In both Canada and the United States, regulatory agencies have also experienced major budget cuts, <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/">layoffs and an exodus of trained personnel,</a> eroding their ability to do independent evaluations of company practices.</p>
<p>In both the railway and aerospace industries, safety was increasingly subordinated to shareholder value as Wall Street investment funds — focused on short-term returns — came to dominate corporate decision-making. This was aggravated at Boeing by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html">competition pressure from Airbus</a>. </p>
<p>Both the Canadian and U.S. governments implemented red-tape reduction regulatory policies, which have forced regulatory agencies to offset each proposed new regulation by removing one (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/">two in the U.S.</a>) or more existing regulations that constitute a cost to business. This serves to further sideline safety.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312946/original/file-20200130-41532-7h2zvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Air Canada Boeing 737 Max aircraft arriving from Toronto prepares to land at Vancouver International Airport in Richmond, B.C., in March 2019. The U.S. and Canada were the last countries to ground the planes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The primary cause of the Boeing crashes was faulty stall-prevention software and malfunctioning sensors. The 737 Max 8 pilots’ manual contained no information regarding its new software. This was done to convey <a href="https://www.newsbreak.com/news/0No0zVuT/boeing-internal-emails-reveal-chaos-and-incompetence-at-737-max-factory">(falsely, as it turned out)</a> to airlines that they didn’t have to engage in costly pilot training for the Max 8. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/business/boeing-737-max-faa.html">Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)</a> also allowed Boeing to self-certify its aircraft. Within Boeing, engineers criticized the software, which was developed offshore by inexperienced, low-wage designers. In the words of one Boeing engineer, the 737 Max 8 was “<a href="https://fortune.com/2020/01/10/designed-clowns-supervised-monkeys-internal-boeing-messages-slam-737-max/">designed by clowns … and supervised by monkeys</a>.”</p>
<h2>Obsessed with cost-cutting</h2>
<p>In Lac-Mégantic, in the wake of a railway-drafted loophole in the operating rules, Transport Canada granted permission to Montréal Maine and Atlantic — a company obsessed with cost-cutting with a <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/07/10/lac_megantic_disaster_mma_railway_had_poor_safety_record_in_us.html">poor safety record</a> that later went bankrupt — to operate its massive oil trains with a single crew member. </p>
<p>It was granted and aggressively supported by the railway lobby over opposition within Transport Canada, including the inspectors’ union. Furthermore, <a href="https://www.tc.gc.ca/en/services/rail/rail-safety-canada.html">Transport Canada</a> ignored warnings of its own commissioned <a href="http://www.lorimer.ca/adults/Book/3067/The-LacM233gantic-Rail-Disaster.html">National Research Council report</a> stressing the need for numerous safety precautions before allowing single-person crews. </p>
<p>Canadian Pacific, which was contracted to haul the volatile cargo to the Irving oil refinery, chose to subcontract with Montréal Maine and Atlantic, with a line running through Lac-Mégantic, rather than choosing a safer but less profitable route in conjunction with Canadian National.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/312945/original/file-20200130-41554-1df3f3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smoke and flames rise from railway cars that were carrying crude oil after derailing in downtown Lac-Mégantic, Que., in July 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Paul Chiasson</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the aftermath of both the Boeing and Lac-Mégantic disasters, industry executives blamed the pilots and the locomotive engineer respectively. In both cases, the decks were stacked so heavily against these employees that catastrophe was a foregone conclusion.</p>
<h2>Criminal investigation</h2>
<p>Canada and the United States were the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-boeing-urges-us-regulators-to-ground-global-fleet-of-737-max-jets/">last countries to ground</a> the Boeing 737 Max 8. In the U.S., a <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/boeing-plane-certification-probe-began-before-second-crash-1.1230474">criminal investigation</a> of the FAA approval is underway. A <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/senate-boeing-muilenberg-testimony-1.5339200">congressional investigation</a> into the crashes is also ongoing. </p>
<p>Despite pleas from the victims’ families, Canada has so far declined to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-transportation-minister-to-meet-with-families-of-canadian-737-max/">hold an independent public inquiry</a> into the Boeing crashes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-air-safety-market-pressures-and-cockpit-technology-113580">Boeing 737 Max: air safety, market pressures and cockpit technology</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Transport Canada was obligated to double-check the U.S. certification of the aircraft. Did it exercise due diligence, or did it simply rubber-stamp the FAA certification? Why was it not given information regarding the existence of the stall prevention software system on the Max 8? Why was it not provided the risk analysis done by U.S. Department of Transport experts who determined that the Max 8 had a vastly greater likelihood of crashing than other aircraft?</p>
<p>In Canada, criminal charges were laid against three front-line railway workers in the Lac-Mégantic disaster; <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/lac-megantic-criminal-negligence-verdict-1.4474848">they were subsequently acquitted</a>. No company executives or owners were charged, despite substantial evidence of corporate criminality. No senior government officials or politicians have been held responsible.</p>
<p>Two parliamentary investigations into the Lac-Mégantic disaster had limited mandates. The Transportation Safety Board investigation left many unanswered questions, foremost among them: Why did <a href="https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-r-es.html">the final report</a> erase six causes in the original investigatory report related to the decision to allow a delinquent company to operate with a single-person crew? </p>
<p>Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, and more recently Justin Trudeau’s Liberals, have repeatedly refused to hold an <a href="https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2019/06/07/a-public-inquiry-into-the-lac-megantic-rail-disaster-is-essential/#.XjgerhNKg1I">independent judicial inquiry</a> into the tragedy.</p>
<h2>Families deserve answers</h2>
<p>Responding to the recent shooting down of the Ukraine Airlines plane in Iran, which claimed the lives of 57 Canadian citizens, Trudeau rightly stated: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The families of the victims want answers. I want answers. That means closure, transparency, accountability and justice. We will not rest until we get that.”</p>
</blockquote>
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<p>The 737 Max 8 victims’ families also deserve justice. The Lac-Mégantic victims’ families are still waiting for justice, seven years after the tragedy. Canadian Pacific is still in court refusing to acknowledge its role and responsibility. More recently, CP has also refused to investigate its own <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cp-rail-crash-call-investigation-1.5441955">alleged criminal negligence into the runaway crash in the Rockies</a>, which killed three workers a year ago this week.</p>
<p>The pattern of corporate negligence and regulatory failure that produced these disasters is clear. Repeating the promise, as made by <a href="https://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/in-committee-from-the-senate-of-canada/episodes/61176157/">Transport Minister Marc Garneau</a>, that “safety is my No. 1 priority,” doesn’t mean much unless it is accompanied by concrete government actions. If not, more tragedies are all but a certainty.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130760/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In his former career as executive director of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Bruce Campbell was a co-investigator or collaborator on several SSHRC grants, most recently with York University, Adapting Work and Workplaces to Climate Change, Carla Lipset Mumme lead investigator.
</span></em></p>High-profile rail and aerospace disasters of recent years have been the deadly consequence of the systematic erosion of safety precautions due to deregulation.Bruce Campbell, Adjunct professor, Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1309172020-01-31T17:08:50Z2020-01-31T17:08:50ZHow Boeing’s new boss could rebuild the firm’s damaged reputation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313053/original/file-20200131-41507-mpji7a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/boeing-737-jet-aeroplane-landing-through-105724190">Shutterstok/travellight</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Boeing expects the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/29/boeing-puts-cost-of-737-max-crashes-at-19bn-as-it-slumps-to-annual-loss">economic cost</a> of its two fatal plane crashes to be as high as US$19 billion, and has confirmed its first annual loss in 20 years. As well as losing US$636m in 2019, the company also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/23/business/Boeing-ceo-muilenburg.html">said goodbye</a> to its president and CEO, Denis Muilenburg, at the end of the year. </p>
<p>But investors and regulators may well be concerned about the arrival of his successor, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/what-to-know-about-new-boeing-ceo-david-calhoun.html">company insider Dave Calhoun</a>. For if there is one lesson that we can take from the 737 Max scandal, it is that as a company, Boeing clearly believed itself to be more competent than it actually was. </p>
<p>Boeing’s responses to the various disclosures of safety shortcomings have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/29/boeing-dennis-muilenburg-congress-testimony-737-max-mcas">widely seen</a> as arrogant, dismissive and, eventually, begrudging. Appointing someone who has been on the company board for the last ten years as a replacement CEO is hardly a recipe for fresh thinking, or anything resembling an independent appraisal of what needs to change. </p>
<p>Indeed it was only last week that <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorials/boeing-needs-to-show-commitment-to-deep-overhaul/">Calhoun seemed to express</a> total confidence in Boeing employees when it comes to safety – a remarkable position given recent events.</p>
<p>But it is easy to become institutionally arrogant like this if you are one of only a handful of large players in an industry. The long-haul aircraft market only has two suppliers, Boeing and Airbus. </p>
<p>Commercial airline companies find themselves locked into purchasing schedules with one manufacturer, not least to ease the integration of new aircraft and the necessary training that comes with it.</p>
<p>This environment breeds complacency. When customers are so locked in that changing supplier would require a massive amount of work, company managers become lazy, unresponsive, and – most damaging – deaf to concerns about product quality. </p>
<p>In the case of Boeing, the fact that the product concerns related to safety showed just how far the company’s internal standards had lapsed.</p>
<p>Boeing needs to balance the need for continuity with the need to be seen to be responding seriously to the largest crisis in the company’s history. That job falls directly to the new CEO, who should do three things if he is to succeed in rebuilding the reputation of the organisation.</p>
<h2>Three steps to change</h2>
<p>As an insider, Calhoun could be motivated to try to brush past failings under the carpet. Instead, to begin with, he needs to conduct a complete review and overhaul of Boeing’s operations.</p>
<p>After all, this is an organisation that systematically ignored safety concerns, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/18/politics/boeing-737-max-faa-documents/index.html">withheld critical documentation</a> from regulators, and whose immediate internal response to two catastrophic crashes was to blame others. </p>
<p>Calhoun’s first priority must be to examine every aspect of how Boeing operates – and to be seen to be doing so. If it is to be credible, such a review should have a wide mandate and be overseen by an independent party reporting into the non-executive directors. Ideally, its findings should be made available to regulators, shareholders and the general public.</p>
<p>Second, he needs to restore internal pride. One of Boeing’s greatest assets is its technical engineers, designers and production staff. Despite the failings of the 737 Max, this is a company with a proud history of manufacturing excellence. </p>
<p>But this is a marketplace where the best talent can move quickly, and in Boeing’s case it seems clear that they are now extremely vulnerable to losing talent. Rebuilding pride takes time, but it starts with the basics: showing respect for the work that is being done by the workforce under what must be very intense conditions; communicating clearly that this is a pivot point when it comes to the standards that the company will in future hold itself to; and leading from the front by example. </p>
<p>Managers who talk of change while acting the same way that they have always done fatally undermine other actions designed to improve morale.</p>
<p>Lastly, he needs to restore confidence, principally with regulators and customers but also, beyond that, with shareholders and other external stakeholders including the local communities where Boeing operates. </p>
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<p>Confidence builds trust, which facilitates all aspects of business. When trust is low, there are more demands on a business, which often leads to greater inefficiency and cost. </p>
<p>Regulators will want to see a commitment to a more proactive oversight regime, one that builds partnership rather than just compliance. Investors will need to believe that Calhoun is sufficiently independent to get to the bottom of why Boeing allowed itself to get into this position on one of its flagship products, and also how it is changing its culture to react differently to challenges – internally or externally.</p>
<p>It is possible for insiders to achieve success after a crisis. Oil giant BP’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/04/bp-boss-bob-dudley-to-step-down-next-year-after-four-decades">outgoing CEO Bob Dudley</a> is a good example of an insider who balanced the importance of being able to act quickly after a crisis, leveraging internal knowledge and networks while also signalling a clear recognition of the need to learn from mistakes and to be humble. </p>
<p>But success stories like this are rare. Boeing’s board needs to step up its oversight of its insider appointee to ensure that it joins the ranks of those companies who have emerged stronger after a crisis, not weaker.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rupert Younger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With planes grounded, and money lost, the firm is at a pivotal point in its history.Rupert Younger, Director, Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295952020-01-17T13:59:52Z2020-01-17T13:59:52ZAirbus again becomes the world’s leading aircraft manufacturer<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309165/original/file-20200108-107231-y5h1jt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C86%2C3626%2C2420&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Airbus A321 XLR, one of Airbus' centerpieces.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.airbus.com/aircraft/passenger-aircraft/a320-family/a321neo.html">Airbus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After eight years of Boeing leadership, Airbus has again become the world’s leading aircraft manufacturer. The European group surpassed <a href="https://www.aerospace-technology.com/comment/airbus-boeing-aircraft-top/">1,000 aircraft orders in 2019</a> and broke its record of aircraft delivered with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbus-deliveries-exclusive/exclusive-airbus-beats-goal-with-863-jet-deliveries-in-2019-ousts-boeing-from-top-spot-idUSKBN1Z01Q8">863 units</a>. By comparison, Boeing delivered a <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/01/02/boeinhttps://www.aerospace-technology.com/comment/airbus-boeing-aircraft-top/g-surrenders-crown-worlds-biggest-plane-maker-airbus-737/">mere 345</a>. </p>
<p>The A320, launched in 1988, became the bestselling aircraft of all time, outnumbering the Boeing 737, which is 20 years older. In addition, from January 2020, Boeing suspended production of the 737 Max, once a bestseller but currently banned from flying because of <a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-air-safety-market-pressures-and-cockpit-technology-113580">two crashes in October 2018 and March 2019</a>.</p>
<p>According to Airbus commercial director Christian Scherrer, Boeing’s difficulties are <a href="https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airbus-not-benefiting-boeings-max-crisis-exec-says">not benefiting its European competitor</a> – the firm’s production capacity does not allow it to deliver new customers before four years. However, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-deliveries/boeing-orders-sink-as-customers-opt-to-swap-max-idUSKBN1XM24M">Airbus continues to accumulate orders</a>, including from customers once loyal to Boeing. In addition, it is likely that the 10% tax on aircraft imports into the United States is a <a href="https://www.tourmag.com/Christian-Scherrer-Airbus-Passer-de-la-batterie-a-la-production-d-electricite-embarquee-_a101632.html">direct result of Boeing’s troubles</a>.</p>
<p>Suppliers General Electric and Safran have been heavily affected by the 737 Max crisis, an aircraft exclusively equipped with the LEAP engine that they co-developed. The joint subsidiary CFM International has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-agrees-on-deal-to-build-more-airbus-engines-to-help-offset-max-shutdown-11576860015">negotiated with Airbus</a> to increase the percentage of A320neo aircraft that use this engine to compensate for the losses associated with the 737 Max. Hundreds of European suppliers that also work for Airbus are also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/016189b4-6dac-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d">financially affected</a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Presentation of the LEAP (Leading Edge Aviation Propulsion) high-bypass turbofan that power A320neo airplanes.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Relative successes for Airbus</h2>
<p>Although 2019 was marked by the end of the A380, considered a <a href="https://theconversation.com/airbus-a380-from-high-tech-marvel-to-commercial-flop-112086">commercial flop</a>, Airbus has exceeded the symbolic mark of the 20,000 planes sold since its creation. The company also won many battles against Boeing last year. The A320, A320neo, A321, A321neo and A350 models are particularly popular with airlines. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/samuelengel1/2019/12/18/uniteds-new-aircraft-order-nudges-boeing-and-airbus-toward-environmental-sustainability/#624f31304199">The A321 XLR is part of a sustainable development strategy</a>: it consumes a third less of kerosene, which gives it a much greater radius of action and reduces costs per passenger.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The A321 XLR will replace the A380 on the aircraft market.</span></figcaption>
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<p>United Airlines ordered <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2019/12/04/united-airlines-to-buy-50-ultra-long-range-airbus-a321xlr-aircraft-in-estimated-6-billion-deal/">50 ultra-long-haul Airbus A321 XLRs</a> for about $6 billion. These aircraft are intended to replace Boeing 757s and are expected to enter service in 2024. Thanks to this innovative plane, which as presented by Airbus at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/aeronautique-la-menace-sino-russe-plane-sur-le-duopole-airbus-boeing-118638">2019 Paris Air Show</a>, the company will be able to reduce significantly its carbon footprint and <a href="https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/12/05/united-airlines-buying-airbus-a321xlrs-replace-boeing-757-fleet/">benefit from the long-range capabilities to add new destinations</a>.</p>
<p>Cebu Pacific Air, the leading airline in the Philippines, confirmed an order for <a href="https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/philippines--cebu-air-orders-15-a320neo-jets--pushing-airbus-toward-sales-milestone-12196784">five A320neo and ten A321 XLR on December 19</a>, after having finalized another of 16 A330neo, which makes a total of 21 aircraft for approximately $6.8 billion in 2019. This is nothing compared to the <a href="https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2019/10/indigo-signs-for-300-a320neo-family-aircraft.html">record order from one of the fastest-growing airlines in the world</a>: the low-cost Indian company IndiGo. In October, it ordered 300 A320s, including several A321 XLRs, worth $33 billion. When delivered, IndiGo will reach a total of 730 A320s, making it the <a href="https://www.aerotime.aero/rytis.beresnevicius/24127-indigo-300-airbus-a320-aircraft-order">largest customer for this model</a>.</p>
<p>Airbus has also been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50753718">selected by Quantas</a> to operate the longest flight in the world: 20 hours to cover the 10,500 miles (17,000 km) between London and Sydney. In December 2019, after launching a tender to the two manufacturers, Quantas announced that it was choosing the A350-1000 rather than the Boeing 777X.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">New touch-screens cockpit displays in Airbus A350 XWB.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Airbus’s situation seems solid and the future looks bright. The group may hire between 1,500 and <a href="https://www.en24.news/2020/01/toulouse-airbus-expected-to-hire-nearly-2000-people.html">2,000 people in France, and potentially 5,000 worldwide</a>. The group has exceeded US$100 billion in market valuation, Airbus shares rose 59% in 2019](https://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/ces-entreprises-qui-font-flamber-le-cac-40-20191229) and the company begins 2020 at the top of the French stock market index CAC40. </p>
<p>Still, Airbus’s leadership position <a href="https://www.aerospace-technology.com/comment/airbus-boeing-aircraft-top/">remains fragile</a>. If <a href="https://www.aerospace-technology.com/comment/airbus-boeing-aircraft-top/">the symbolic threshold of 1,000 aircraft ordered</a> may seem satisfactory, it is already the sixth time that the group has exceeded it, and this remains well below <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/10580384/How-Britain-lifts-Airbus-to-record-sales-high.html">the record set in 2013 with 1,503 orders</a>. Production is <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbus-slashes-delivery-target-as-it-struggles-with-production-woes-11572417894">struggling to keep up with sales</a>, as the most popular models are victims of their success. Some current deliveries are late and the increase from 60 to 63 aircraft per month between 2019 and 2021 will not significantly improve things.</p>
<h2>A multidimensional crisis for Boeing</h2>
<p>Boeing is currently going through the <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/analysis/why-boeing-faces-worst-crisis-in-its-history/135000.article">worst crisis since it was founded</a> in 1916. This crisis is deep, lasting and multidimensional. Above all, it is a reputational crisis, the group having entered a spiral of failures and an era of suspicion. Multiple charges of negligence and willful intention to deceive the authorities could be confirmed by <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/12/24/boeing-reveals-new-very-disturbing-documents-737-max-jetliner-faa-house/2743402001/">internal documents transmitted to the US Congress</a> in December 2019.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Boeing to halt 737 Max production after damaged reputation.</span></figcaption>
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<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-air-safety-market-pressures-and-cockpit-technology-113580">After two 737 Max crashes</a> that left 346 dead, many passengers have completely lost confidence in the plane: 40% of travelers are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/when-will-boeing-737-max-fly-again-and-more-questions/2019/12/16/251d2b02-2039-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html">ready to pay more or take less practical flights</a> to avoid it. New theories question the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/business/boeing-737-max.html">safety of other software-independent parts</a> of the aircraft. </p>
<p>The crisis is also technological, Boeing has had <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/the-year-that-changed-boeing-airplane-maker-struggles-to-regain-footing-since-first-737-max-crash.html">significant difficulties finding reliable solutions</a> to the various <a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-air-safety-market-pressures-and-cockpit-technology-113580">dysfunctions</a> of its planes. This in turn led to an industrial crisis: after severely <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-studies-737-max-output-slowdown-among-scenarios-source-2019-4">slowing down the production</a> of the 737 Max, <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/16/21025081/boeing-737-max-production-halt-stop-crash-faa-airplane">Boeing stopped it completely</a> in January 2020. Although 12,000 people work directly in the production of the 737 Max, Boeing <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/06/boeing-reassigs-thousands-of-737-max-workers-while-supplier-spirit-mulls-layoffs.html">does not plan to lay off</a> workers for the time being. The consequences may be particularly difficult for the suppliers most dependent on Boeing to bear.</p>
<p>Boeing also faces a legal crisis: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-lawsuit-board/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-737-max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3">lengthy and costly lawsuits</a> from victims and airlines could well further tarnish the company’s image. The financial consequences are already considerable with 10 billion euros of cash provisioned to deal with the direct and indirect consequences of the crashes. If the manufacturer had <a href="https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/boeing-debt-raise-737-max">US$20 billion in funds a few months ago</a>, it would consider <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-considers-raising-debt-as-max-crisis-takes-toll-11578308401">increasing its debt by at least US$5 billion</a> to meet expected costs in the first half of 2020.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Turkish Airlines reach 737 Max aircraft compensation deal from Boeing.</span></figcaption>
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<p>To cope with the managerial dimension of the crisis, a financial expert, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2019/12/23/why-david-calhouns-onboarding-as-ceo-of-boeing-is-a-work-in-progress/#66ed9d754a32">David Calhoun, was chosen to succeed the engineer Dennis Muilenburg</a> as CEO of Boeing from January 13, 2020. Muilenburg was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/457dfcf2-25dc-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134">severely criticized for his handling of the crisis</a> and had to resign. Among other things, he was accused of not respecting the independence of air-transport regulatory authorities and not reacting quickly enough.</p>
<h2>Major geopolitical issues</h2>
<p>Naturally, Boeing’s difficulties and Airbus’ success are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/06/business/boeing-airbus-world-trade-organization.html">not to the liking</a> of US president Donald Trump, who saw a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/18/economy/boeing-gdp-impact/index.html">large part of the GDP of the United States evaporate</a>. The competition between the two has fueled the trade war between EU and US, which in October 2019 decided to apply a 10% tax on imports of European aircraft. Airbus management denounces an unfair decision directly linked to the current fragility of the Boeing group.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">WTO sides with US in Airbus subsidy case, allowing US to target $7.5B in EU imports.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Airbus and Boeing must prepare for <a href="https://theconversation.com/aeronautique-la-menace-sino-russe-plane-sur-le-duopole-airbus-boeing-118638">the entry into the market of a strong competitor</a>. In 2017, the Chinese group Comac (Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China) and the Russian consortium UAC (United Aircraft Corporation) created the joint venture CRAIC (China-Russia Commercial Aircraft International Corporation) in order to launch aircraft they claim are as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZzbgfidzvI">efficient as those of Airbus and Boeing, but less expensive</a>.</p>
<p>For presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, this alliance is part of a major strategic move toward <a href="https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2019-06-14/sino-russian-cr929-has-room-high-tech-input-west">Sino-Russian collaboration</a>. The friendship between the two presidents has led them to join forces against the United States and the trade policy of the government of Donald Trump. The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZzbgfidzvI">CR929</a> will be a direct competitor to the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGIIGQPUecg">A350 and the B787</a>. With a budget of US$20 billion, this aircraft is scheduled to enter service between 2025 and 2028.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oihab Allal-Chérif ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>If Airbus has once again become the world’s leading aircraft manufacturer, it is mainly thanks to a favorable economic context and Boeing’s 737 Max crisis.Oihab Allal-Chérif, Business Professor, Neoma Business SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1290772019-12-19T00:22:07Z2019-12-19T00:22:07ZGrounded: what’s behind Boeing’s production shutdown of MAX aircraft<p><a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-12-16-Boeing-Statement-Regarding-737-MAX-Production">Boeing has announced it will halt production of the beleaguered B737-MAX series</a> from January. Boeing’s announcement this week follows the grounding of the aircraft after two fatal crashes. </p>
<p>After the first crash, of Lion Air in Indonesia in October 2018, people blamed poor maintenance and insufficient pilot training. When a second airliner, of Ethiopian Air, crashed in March 2019, similarities quickly transpired. There was no apparent external influence such as poor weather. Neither was there any interference with the flight decks, as in a hijacking. </p>
<p>In both cases the pilots could not keep the <a href="http://avherald.com/h?article=4c534c4a/0065&opt=0">aircraft from nose-diving</a>. Airlines and regulators around the world started grounding the MAX indefinitely. Australia’s Civil Aviation Authority <a href="https://www.casa.gov.au/media-release/boeing-737-max-operations-temporarily-suspended">prohibited any B737MAX aircraft in its airspace</a>, followed by New Zealand’s Civil Aviation Authority. </p>
<p>Surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-737-max-8-ethiopia-crash-faa-ground-safety/">last authority to clamp down</a> was the US Federal Aviation Administration, the governmental body in charge of certifying aircraft. </p>
<p>At first, Boeing was optimistic the aircraft would re-enter service by the end of this year, but recertification has been delayed several times. Globally, 387 delivered and about 400 undelivered MAX aircraft are grounded. The production <a href="https://leehamnews.com/2019/12/17/minimum-3-6-month-737-max-production-shutdown-seen/">shutdown is expected to take several months</a>, with ramifications for suppliers and thousands of jobs at risk.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-the-faa-wanted-a-safe-plane-but-didnt-want-to-hurt-americas-biggest-exporter-either-113892">Boeing 737 Max: The FAA wanted a safe plane – but didn't want to hurt America’s biggest exporter either</a>
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<h2>Aircraft computer system likely at fault</h2>
<p>The suspected cause of the problems on board the two doomed airliners was a system new to the latest iteration of the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/airbus-beats-worlds-most-popular-plane-a320-737-2019-11?r=US&IR=T">previously best-selling commercial aircraft</a> – the B737. The MAX series, the fourth generation of the aircraft, entered service in 1968 in its first version (B737-100). The 737MAX is the latest version and started flying in 2018. </p>
<p>Boeing’s main competitor, Airbus, developed the A320 family in the same category of the B737, but <a href="https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/20/boeing-didnt-want-to-re-engine-the-737-but-had-design-standing-by/">included new, more fuel-efficient engines</a>. Boeing was under <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/">pressure to counter this</a> when it developed the MAX series. </p>
<p>It shifted its larger new engines to provide more ground clearance, but this changed the balance of the aircraft and it tended to pitch up. Boeing created a computer system called Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (<a href="https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/">MCAS</a>), which would detect any unwanted upward pitch and automatically force the nose down. </p>
<p>Shortly after take-off, the Lion Air 737MAX pilots struggled to stay in the air. The aircraft kept pulling down despite the nose not pitching up. Similarly, the pilots of the Ethiopian flight were not able to control the continuous forcing down of the nose. </p>
<p>Crash investigations are yet to be completed, but <a href="http://avherald.com/h?article=4c534c4a/0065&opt=0%5D%5Bhttp://avherald.com/h?article=4bf90724/0009&opt=0">information released so far</a> points to Boeing’s computer system and a faulty gauge that measures the angle at which the aircraft is flying.</p>
<p>Since the grounding, Boeing has worked tirelessly on a software fix, but regulators found other issues. This includes problems with software affecting flaps and other flight-control hardware, and <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/us-congress-raises-new-serious-concerns-with-787-and-737-max/135225.article">issues with rudder cables</a> potentially affected by a so-called uncontained engine failure. In the latter, parts of the engine blades detach and may fly at high speed into the fuselage, severing these cables. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/boeing-737-max-air-safety-market-pressures-and-cockpit-technology-113580">Boeing 737 Max: air safety, market pressures and cockpit technology</a>
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<h2>Cutting corners at cost of safety</h2>
<p>It is becoming increasingly clear <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/11/politics/fatally-flawed-737-max-had-significantly-higher-crash-risk-faa-concluded/index.html">Boeing has cut corners</a>, presumably under pressure from the performance of its Airbus competitor. Boeing has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5ce97f8a-fb28-11e9-98fd-4d6c20050229">accused of delivering the aircraft before it was ready to fly safely</a>. </p>
<p>It has transpired that Boeing may have been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/000bba0e-f1c7-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195">aware of computer system problems even before the Lion Air crash</a>, but delivered the aircraft without modification or information to airlines. Even after the crash, Boeing <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48174797">did not halt deliveries</a>. Instead it worked to fix the software and told pilots there was a potential problem. </p>
<p>The Federal Aviation Administration did not intervene either, despite its own analysis showing that, without intervention, the plane was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/11/boeing-737-max-plane-faa-regulators-crash-risk">likely to crash about one or two times a year</a>. Equally astonishing is that the pilot manual for the MAX did <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-737-manual-mcas-system-plane-crash-1.5065842">not mention the new system</a>. Instead, <a href="https://albertaviation.com/pilot-explains-it-takes-a-56-minutes-ipad-lesson-to-fly-the-boeing-737-max-8/">training for pilots</a> moving from the previous 737NG to the new 737MAX consisted of a 56-minute iPad video, but no training in flight simulators. </p>
<p>A Joint Authorities Technical Review <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-report-idUSKBN1WQ0H8">found</a>:</p>
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<p>The lack of a unified top-down development and evaluation of the system function and its safety analyses, combined with the extensive and fragmented documentation, made it difficult to assess whether compliance was fully demonstrated. </p>
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<h2>Boeing taking on part of aircraft certification</h2>
<p>In a hearing by the US House Transportation Committee, a whistleblower revealed he <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/11/politics/fatally-flawed-737-max-had-significantly-higher-crash-risk-faa-concluded/index.html">urged Boeing managers to halt production</a> because of mistakes, errors and corner cutting, as well as an overworked workforce. </p>
<p>Of further concern is that the Federal Aviation Administration has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-report-idUSKBN1WQ0H8">shifted some of its work to the manufacturer</a>. Boeing now does parts of the certification process. This is not in the interest of safety. Overseas regulators, such the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-boeing-airplane-faa/faa-failed-to-properly-review-737-max-jet-anti-stall-system-jatr-report-idUSKBN1WQ0H8">criticised this approach</a>.</p>
<p>The MAX disaster has already <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2019-12-17/boeings-european-suppliers-fall-as-us-planemakers-crisis-deepens">cost Boeing billions of dollars</a>. Prior to the grounding, it produced 52 aircraft per month. It has since reduced production to 40, all of which are now parked. </p>
<p>The production halt will have <a href="https://media.arkansasonline.com/img/photos/2019/10/05/resized_272427-2d1-spirit-1005_59-27251_t800.jpg?90232451fbcadccc64a17de7521d859a8f88077d">ripple effects on US suppliers</a>, with tens of thousands of jobs at risk. The fallout is likely to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/443d08fa-f1d0-11e9-a55a-30afa498db1b">affect the wider US economy</a> and many <a href="https://www.bing.com/amp/s/www.wsj.com/amp/articles/ges-737-max-problem-just-got-bigger-11576587194">suppliers in Europe and in China</a>.</p>
<p>I have flown on many Boeing aircraft and never felt unsafe. But with recent problems with the Dreamliner, the MAX and most recently the 777X, I question if Boeing has shifted from a safety first philosophy to prioritising profits and dividends for its shareholders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Lueck does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Boeing MAX disaster has already cost the company billions of dollars and will have ripple effects on suppliers and the wider US economy, with tens of thousands of jobs at risk.Michael Lueck, Professor of Tourism, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1262682019-11-05T03:22:36Z2019-11-05T03:22:36ZShould you worry about Boeing 737s? Only if you run an airline<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-01/qantas-says-three-boeing-737-found-with-cracks/11661320">cracks found in three Qantas-owned Boeing 737s last week</a> led to calls that it should ground its 33 aircraft with a
similar service record.</p>
<p>Although the three planes have been grounded and will require complex repairs, the cracks – in a component called the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-31/pickle-fork-graphic/11660462">pickle fork</a>, which helps strengthen the join between the aircraft’s body and wing – do not threaten the plane’s airworthiness.</p>
<p>This makes it more of a threat to consumers’ confidence in Boeing and the airlines that fly its planes, rather than a direct risk to passenger safety, especially after the tragedies over a <a href="https://theconversation.com/flights-suspended-and-vital-questions-remain-after-second-boeing-737-max-8-crash-within-five-months-113272">poorly thought out automatic control system</a> installed on the Boeing 737 MAX 8. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flights-suspended-and-vital-questions-remain-after-second-boeing-737-max-8-crash-within-five-months-113272">Flights suspended and vital questions remain after second Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash within five months</a>
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<p>More broadly, however, the pickle fork defects highlight a problem that aviation engineers have been contending with for decades: component fatigue.</p>
<p>The world’s first commercial jet airliner, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170404-the-british-airliner-that-changed-the-world">de Havilland Comet</a>, launched in 1952 but suffered two near-identical crashes in 1953 in which the planes broke up shortly after takeoff, killing all on board. A <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140414-crashes-that-changed-plane-design">third fatal breakup in 1954</a> triggered an investigation and threatened to end the era of mass air travel almost as soon as it had begun. </p>
<p>The crashes were all ultimately blamed on “fatigue failure”, caused by a concentration of stress in one of the passenger windows which resulted in a rapidly growing crack.</p>
<p>Almost any metal structure can potentially suffer fatigue failure, but the problem is that it is very hard to predict before it happens. </p>
<p>It begins at an “initiation area”, often at a random point in the component, from which a crack gradually grows each time the part is loaded. In the case of aircraft, the initiation area may be random, but from there the crack generally grows at a predictable rate each flight cycle. </p>
<p>One solution instituted after the Comet investigation was to subject all aircraft to regular inspections that can detect cracks early, and monitor their growth. When the damage becomes critical – that is, if a component shows an increased risk of failure before the next inspection – that part is repaired or replaced. </p>
<p>The current damage to the Qantas aircraft is a long way short of critical, as highlighted by the fact that Qantas has pointed out the next routine inspection was not due for <a href="https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/incidents/qantas-southwest-airlines-checking-boeing-737-planes-for-structural-cracks/news-story/565826954fd9151b51896ae905642421">at least seven months</a> – or about 1,000 flights. This is normal practice under the official <a href="https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/search/?q=737">airworthiness directives</a> for Boeing 737s.</p>
<p>Obviously, given the public relations considerations also involved, Qantas has nevertheless taken the three planes out of service immediately.</p>
<h2>Why aren’t the pickle forks a threat?</h2>
<p>It might sound strange to say the cracks in the pickle forks aren’t a threat to the aircraft’s safety. Does that mean aircraft can just fly around with cracks in them?</p>
<p>Well, yes. Virtually all aircraft have cracks, and a monitored crack is much safer than a part that fails without warning. Bear in mind that all aircraft safety is reinforced by multiple layers of protection, and in the case of the pickle fork there are at least two such layers. </p>
<p>First, the pickle fork is secured with multiple bolts, so if one bolt should fail as a result of cracking, depending on the location there will be another five or six bolts still holding it in place.</p>
<p>Second, should the unthinkable occur and a pickle fork totally fail, there is still another “structural load path” that would maintain the strength of connection between the wing and body, so this would not affect the operation of the aircraft. </p>
<p>On this basis, it seems strange that the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-10-31/cracks-discovered-on-second-qantas-boeing-737/11657146">called for the entire fleet to be grounded</a>, especially given that this union has no official role in the grounding of aircraft. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is the only agency in Australia with a legal obligation to make such a ruling, and has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/31/business/qantas-australia-union-737-scli-intl/index.html">assured passengers it is unnecessary</a>. </p>
<p>Aircraft maintenance procedures are drawn up by the manufacturer’s design engineering team. Before the aircraft obtains a permit to fly, the designer has to demonstrate to a regulator – in Boeing’s case, the <a href="https://www.faa.gov/">US Federal Aviation Administration</a> – that is has fully accounted for all airworthiness issues. This has to be proved by both engineering calculations and physical models. The result is an extensive maintenance manual for each aircraft model. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/all-boeing-737-max-flights-grounded-and-travellers-could-feel-it-in-the-hip-pocket-113456">All Boeing 737 MAX flights grounded – and travellers could feel it in the hip pocket</a>
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<p>Before each flight the aircraft must be demonstrated to conform to the maintenance manual, which is the role of the maintenance engineers who work directly for airlines. While the maintenance engineers’ union is right to bring any safety concerns or maintenance issues to the attention of the airline and possibly the regulator, only the regulator is in a position to rule on whether a fleet, or part of it, should be grounded.</p>
<p>Boeing and Qantas, and the many other airlines that fly 737s, are right to be concerned by this latest development because of the potential for it to harm them commercially. But while the cracked pickle forks will be giving executives headaches, passengers should rest easy in their seats.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126268/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Page has previously supervised a part-time PhD student who worked for Qantas. The student graduated and left Qantas three years ago.</span></em></p>Qantas has faced calls to ground its entire fleet of Boeing 737s after cracks were found in three aircraft. But the incident is a threat to airlines’ reputations rather than a real risk to passengers.John Page, Senior Lecturer with the School of Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1150342019-04-16T10:47:35Z2019-04-16T10:47:35ZBoeing crashes and Uber collision show passenger safety relies on corporate promises, not regulators’ tests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269076/original/file-20190412-76859-gv4t4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=163%2C465%2C2322%2C955&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Automation can often get ahead of safety regulators' efforts.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/running-business-people-chasing-robot-humanoid-1101214268">Tarikdiz/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Advanced technologies deliver benefits every day. But, sometimes interactions with technology can go awry and lead to disaster. </p>
<p>On March 10, the pilots aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/25/anti-stall-system-was-in-play-on-ethiopians-boeing-737-max">unable to correct a failure</a> in one of the Boeing 737 Max 8’s automated systems, resulting in a crash and the deaths of all passengers and crew. A year earlier, almost to the day, another automated vehicle – not an airplane but an Uber self-driving car – struck and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html">killed Elaine Herzberg</a> in Tempe, Arizona. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://ifis.asu.edu/content/cscr-people">experts in how humans</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=VX2EqQgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">technologies interact</a>, we know that it is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/6596.html">impossible to completely eliminate risk</a> in complex technological systems. These tragedies are the result of regulators and industry experts overlooking the complexities and risks of interactions between technologies and humans and increasingly relying on companies’ voluntary self-assessment, rather than objective, independent tests. Tragically, that appears to have happened <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/with-its-ties-in-washington-boeing-has-taken-over-more-and-more-of-the-faas-job/2019/03/24/6e5ef2c6-4be8-11e9-9663-00ac73f49662_story.html">with Boeing’s aircraft</a> and the Uber car.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LVOwxV9dVmg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Inside the cockpit of a Boeing 737 Max 8.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Risky business</h2>
<p>The crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, as well as that of <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-consumer-worries-the-future-of-aviation-will-be-more-automated-113807">Lion Air Flight 610</a> in 2018, happened despite oversight from one of the most technologically capable regulators in the world. Air travel is <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/aviation_stats.aspx">remarkably safe</a> in light of the potential risks. </p>
<p>Before the 737 Max 8 took to the air, it had to pass a series of Federal Aviation Administration inspections. Over the course of that process, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-tracked-aircraft-certification-pushed-by-boeing-comes-under-the-spotlight-11553428800">Boeing convinced the FAA</a> that the <a href="https://gizmodo.com/aviation-experts-have-been-warning-us-of-the-dangers-of-1833419813/">automated system was safer than it actually was</a>, and that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-simulator-exclusive/ethiopia-crash-captain-did-not-train-on-airlines-max-simulator-source-idUSKCN1R20WD">pilots would need very little training</a> on the new plane. </p>
<p>The FAA cleared the 737 Max 8 and its flight control system to fly – and retained that clearance not only after the Lion Air crash, but also for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/business/canada-737-max.html">three days after</a> the Ethiopian Airlines tragedy.</p>
<h2>From airplanes to automobiles</h2>
<p>As airplane automation is increasing, the same is true for cars. Various companies are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.org/program/government-innovation/bloomberg-aspen-initiative-cities-autonomous-vehicles/">testing autonomous vehicles on roads all around the country</a> – and with far less oversight than the aviation industry. Local and <a href="https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a23602511/self-driving-cars-requirements-loosened/">federal rules are limited</a>, often in the name of promoting innovation. Federal <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2662.html">safety guidelines</a> for autonomous vehicles require them to pass only the same performance tests as any other car, like minimum fuel economy standards, seat belt configurations and how well they’ll protect occupants in a rollover crash. </p>
<p>There’s no reliability testing of their sensors, much less their algorithms. Some states do require companies to <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/13/18223356/california-dmv-self-driving-car-disengagement-report-2018">report “disengagements”</a> – when the so-called “safety driver” resumes control over the automated system. But mostly the self-driving car companies are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/technology/arizona-tech-industry-favorite-self-driving-hub.html">allowed to do what they want</a>, so long as there is a person behind the wheel.</p>
<p>In the months before the March 2018 collision, <a href="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/waymo-now-has-a-serious-driverless-car-rival-gms-cruise/">Uber was under pressure</a> to catch up with GM Cruise and Waymo. Uber’s cars had a sensitive object-recognition system, which at times would be deceived by a shadow on the road and brake to avoid an obstacle that wasn’t actually there. That resulted in a rough, stop-and-start ride. To smooth things out, Uber’s engineers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-crash/uber-disabled-emergency-braking-in-self-driving-car-u-s-agency-idUSKCN1IP26K">disabled the car’s emergency braking system</a>. The company appears to have assumed the single safety driver would always be able to stop the car in time if there was really a danger of hitting something.</p>
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<p>That’s not what happened as Elaine Herzberg crossed the road. The Uber self-driving car that hit and killed her <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-crash-arizona-ntsb-report/">did see her with its sensors and cameras</a>, but was unable to stop on its own. The safety driver appears to have been <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/22/17492320/safety-driver-self-driving-uber-crash-hulu-police-report">distracted by her phone</a> – in violation of Uber’s policies, though it’s unclear how the company briefed its safety drivers about the change to the automated system.</p>
<h2>Policing themselves</h2>
<p>Regulators are relying on safety self-assessment practices, whereby private companies vouch for their own products’ compliance with federal standards. The best assurances they – and members of the public – have for the safety and reliability of these vehicles are the guarantees of the companies who intend to sell them. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nhtsa.gov/automated-driving-systems/voluntary-safety-self-assessment">What reports companies do provide</a> can be slim on hard evidence, touting the number of <a href="https://www.govtech.com/fs/Self-Driving-Cars-See-Less-Human-Intervention-in-California.html">real and simulated miles driven</a>, without details of how the cars are performing under various conditions. And car companies are constantly releasing new models and <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/2/17413732/tesla-over-the-air-software-updates-brakes">upgrading their software</a>, forcing human drivers to learn about the new features. </p>
<p>This is all the more unnerving because there are far more cars on the roads than there are planes in the air – <a href="https://hedgescompany.com/automotive-market-research-statistics/auto-mailing-lists-and-marketing/">270 million cars registered</a> in the U.S. alone, compared with <a href="https://www.planestats.com/mro1_2018jan">25,000 commercial aircraft worldwide</a>. In addition, self-driving cars have to handle not just weather conditions but also close-range interactions with other cars, pedestrians, cyclists and e-scooters. Safety drivers don’t get nearly the amount of training that pilots do, either.</p>
<p>Arizona, where we’re based, is a popular place for public testing of autonomous vehicles, in part because of <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/20/595115055/arizona-governor-helped-make-state-wild-west-for-driverless-cars">looser oversight</a> than in other states. In the Phoenix area, however, there is growing public concern about safety. Some citizens are <a href="https://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/tech/2018/12/11/waymo-self-driving-vehicles-face-harassment-road-rage-phoenix-area/2198220002/">harassing autonomous vehicles</a> in efforts to discourage them from driving through their neighborhoods. As one Arizona resident told The New York Times, the autonomous vehicle industry “said they need real-world examples, but I don’t want to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/us/waymo-self-driving-cars-arizona-attacks.html">their real-world mistake</a>.” </p>
<iframe title="AZCENTRAL- Embed Player" width="100%" height="350" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" allowfullscreen="true" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" src="https://uw-media.azcentral.com/embed/video/2314126002?placement=snow-embed"></iframe>
<h2>Connecting with the public, innovating responsibly</h2>
<p>In the absence of federal safety standards for autonomous vehicles, states and local governments are left to protect the public – often without the expertise and resources to do so effectively. In our view, this doesn’t mean banning the technology, but rather insisting on corporate transparency and true regulatory oversight.</p>
<p>Engaging the public about what’s happening and who is – and isn’t – protecting their safety can help officials at all levels of government understand what their citizens expect, and push them to ensure that technological innovation is done responsibly. </p>
<p>Universities can play an <a href="https://meetingoftheminds.org/self-driving-ride-share-service-waymo-one-has-launched-whats-next-for-cities-29661">important role</a> in supporting responsible innovation on these issues. The Arizona State University Center for Smart Cities and Regions is working with the Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes to host <a href="http://themobilitydebate.net/find-a-debate/">public forums on self-driving cars in cities across the U.S. and Europe</a>. </p>
<p>Airplane and car passengers need to trust their vehicles and understand what risks are unavoidable – as well as what can be prevented. Relying on industry to self-regulate when lives and public trust are at stake is not a viable path to ensure that rapidly emerging innovations are developed and deployed responsibly. To the riders, customers and others sharing the road and the skies, there is only one bottom line – and it doesn’t have a dollar sign attached to it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Government regulators and industry experts often overlook the complexities and risks of human-technology interactions and increasingly rely on companies’ voluntary oversight and self-assessments.Adam Gabriele, Ph.D. Student in Sustainability, Arizona State UniversityThaddeus R. Miller, Assistant Professor, School for the Future of Innovation in Society and The Polytechnic School; Co-Director Center for Smart Cities and Regions, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143942019-04-08T10:42:55Z2019-04-08T10:42:55ZToo many airplane systems rely on too few sensors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267199/original/file-20190402-177175-6046gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=291%2C0%2C4700%2C1661&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Planes have many sensors, supplying all kinds of useful data.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/business-jet-airplane-gear-down-landing-1310559680?src=unD8nxhH5kTmylCMzugfLg-1-92">vaalaa/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/boeing-simulation-error.html">apparent connection</a> between fatal airplane <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/13/world/boeing-737-crash-investigation.html">crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia</a> centers around the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sensor-cited-as-potential-factor-in-boeing-crashes-draws-scrutiny/2019/03/17/5ecf0b0e-4682-11e9-aaf8-4512a6fe3439_story.html">failure of a single sensor</a>. I know what that’s like: A few years ago, while I was flying a Cessna 182-RG from Albany, New York, to Fort Meade, Maryland, my airspeed indicator showed that I was flying at a speed so slow that my plane was at risk of no longer generating enough lift to stay in the air.</p>
<p>Had I trusted my airspeed sensor, I would have pushed the plane’s nose down in an attempt to regain speed, and possibly put too much strain on the aircraft’s frame, or gotten dangerously close to the ground. But even small aircraft are packed with sensors: While worried about my airspeed, I noticed that my plane was staying at the same altitude, the engine was generating the same amount of power, the wings were meeting the air at a constant angle and I was still moving over the ground at the same speed I had been before the airspeed allegedly dropped.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267200/original/file-20190402-177175-m0aof4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Cessna 182 in flight.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/131806380@N05/17246847205">Rob Hodgkins/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>So instead of overstressing and potentially crashing my plane, I was able to fix the problematic sensor and continue my flight without further incident. As a result, I started investigating how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2017.150242">computers can use data from different aircraft sensors</a> to help pilots understand whether there’s a real emergency happening, or something much less severe.</p>
<p>Boeing’s response to its crashes has included designing a software update that will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/business/boeing-simulation-error.html">rely on two sensors instead of one</a>. That may not be enough. </p>
<h2>Cross-checking sensor data</h2>
<p>As a plane defies gravity, aerodynamic principles expressed as mathematical formulas govern its flight. Most of an aircraft’s sensors are intended to monitor elements of those formulas, to reassure pilots that everything is as it should be – or to alert them that something has gone wrong.</p>
<p>My team developed <a href="http://wcl.cs.rpi.edu/pilots/">a computer system</a> that looks at information from many sensors, comparing their readings to each other and to the relevant mathematical formulas. This system can detect inconsistent data, indicate which sensors most likely failed and, in certain circumstances, use other data to estimate the correct values that these sensors should be delivering.</p>
<p>For instance, my Cessna encountered problems when the primary airspeed sensor, called a “<a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-a-pitot-tube/">pitot tube</a>,” froze in cold air. Other sensors on board gather related information: GPS receivers measure how quickly the aircraft is covering ground. Wind speed data is available from computer models that forecast weather prior to the flight. Onboard computers can calculate an estimated airspeed by combining GPS data with information on the wind speed and direction.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266148/original/file-20190327-139341-ufpu9u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Using information on ground speed and the current wind conditions, a computer can estimate the plane’s airspeed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shigeru Imai and Carlos Varela</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If the computer’s estimated airspeed agrees with the sensor readings, most likely everything is fine. If they disagree, then something is wrong – but what? It turns out that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2017.150242">these calculations disagree in different ways</a>, depending on which one – or more – of the GPS, wind data or airspeed sensors is wrong.</p>
<h2>A test with real data</h2>
<p>We tested our computer program with real data from the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447. The post-crash investigation revealed that <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/07/05/156303873/crash-report-confirm-air-france-447-crashed-due-to-faulty-sensors-pilot-error">three different pitot tubes</a> froze up, <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/death-in-the-atlantic-the-last-four-minutes-of-air-france-flight-447-a-679980.html">delivering an erroneous airspeed reading</a> and triggering a chain of events ending in the plane plunging into the Atlantic Ocean, killing 228 passengers and crew.</p>
<p>The flight data showed that when the pitot tubes froze, they suddenly stopped registering airspeed as 480 knots, and instead reported the plane was going through the air at 180 knots – so slow the autopilot turned itself off and alerted the human pilots there was a problem.</p>
<p>But the onboard GPS recorded that the plane was traveling across the ground at 490 knots. And computer models of weather indicated the wind was coming from the rear of the plane at about 10 knots.</p>
<p>When we fed those data to our computer system, it <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2017.150242">detected that the pitot tubes had failed</a>, and estimated the plane’s real airspeed within five seconds. It also detected when the pitot tubes thawed again, about 40 seconds after they froze, and was able to confirm that their readings were again reliable.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7G9FLFIdnx8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">When one sensor fails, other equipment can provide data to detect the failure and even estimate values for the failing sensor.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A different sort of test</h2>
<p>We also used our system to identify what happened to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuninter_Flight_1153">Tuninter Flight 1153</a>, which ditched into the Mediterranean Sea in 2005 on its way from Italy to Tunisia, killing 16 of the 39 people aboard.</p>
<p>After the accident, the investigation revealed that maintenance workers had mistakenly <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/tuninter-atr-72-had-been-fitted-with-wrong-fuel-gaug-201462/">installed the wrong fuel quantity indicator</a> on the plane, so it reported 2,700 kg of fuel was in the tanks, when the plane was really carrying only 550 kg. Human pilots didn’t notice the error, and the plane ran out of fuel.</p>
<p>Fuel is heavy, though, and its weight affects the performance of an aircraft. A plane with too little fuel would have handled differently than one with the right amount. To calculate whether the plane was behaving as it should, with the right amount of fuel on board, we used the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-017-1291-8">aerodynamic mathematical relationship between airspeed and lift</a>. When a plane is in level flight, lift equals weight. Everything else being the same, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MAES.2017.150242">heavier plane should have been going slower</a> than the Tuninter plane was. </p>
<p>Our program models only cruise phases of flight, in which the plane is in steady, level flight – not accelerating or changing altitude. But it would have been sufficient to detect that the plane was too light and alert the pilots, who could have turned around or landed elsewhere to refuel. Adding information about other phases of flight could improve the system’s accuracy and responsiveness.</p>
<h2>What about the Boeing 737 Max 8 crashes?</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=185&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=185&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=185&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266135/original/file-20190327-139371-1x1l6r9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=232&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The angle of attack describes how the wings meet the oncoming air.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Airfoil_angle_of_attack.jpg">J Doug McLean/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The full range of data about Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 is not yet available to the public, but early reports suggest there was a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/world/asia/ethiopia-crash-boeing.html">problem with one of the angle-of-attack sensors</a>. My research team developed a method to check that device’s accuracy based on the plane’s airspeed.</p>
<p>We used aerodynamics and a flight simulator to measure how variations in the angle of attack – the steepness with which the wings meet the oncoming air – changed the horizontal and vertical speed of a Cessna 172. The data were consistent with the performance of an actual Cessna 172 in flight. Using our model and system, we can distinguish between an actual emergency – a dangerously high angle of attack – and a failing sensor providing erroneous data.</p>
<p><iframe id="J35Sz" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/J35Sz/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The actual numbers for a Boeing 737 Max 8 would be different, of course, but the principle is still the same, using the mathematical relationship between angle of attack and airspeed to double-check each other, and to identify faulty sensors.</p>
<h2>Better still</h2>
<p>As my team continues to develop flight data analysis software, we’re also working on supplying it with better data. One potential source could be <a href="https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1816307&HistoricalAwards=false">letting airplanes communicate directly with each other</a> about weather and wind conditions in specific locations at particular altitudes. We are also working <a href="https://news.rpi.edu/approach/2019/01/31/grant-awarded-to-increase-intelligence-in-aerospace-systems/">on methods to precisely describe safe operating conditions</a> for flight software that relies on sensor data.</p>
<p>Sensors do fail, but even when that happens, automated systems can be <a href="https://theconversation.com/your-next-pilot-could-be-drone-software-92330">safer and more efficient than human pilots</a>. As flight becomes <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-consumer-worries-the-future-of-aviation-will-be-more-automated-113807">more automated and increasingly reliant on sensors</a>, it is imperative that flight systems cross-check data from different sensor types, to safeguard against otherwise potentially fatal sensor faults.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114394/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos Varela currently receives funding from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (DDDAS Grant No. FA9550-19-1-0054) and the National Science Foundation (CISE Grant No. CNS-1816307).</span></em></p>A pilot and researcher knows that airplanes are full of sensors – and finds a way onboard computers can use the data to detect equipment failure and tell pilots what’s a real emergency and what’s not.Carlos Varela, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148632019-04-04T10:08:04Z2019-04-04T10:08:04ZBoeing 737 MAX: how much could the grounded fleet cost the company?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267540/original/file-20190404-123413-ofkiyz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grounded.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/STR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Boeing’s 737 MAX fleet has been grounded by airlines around the world for the last three weeks. First flown commercially in 2017, the 737 MAX is the fourth generation of Boeing’s 737 series and it is actually not unusual for new aircraft to go through technical issues in the early years of operation. Both Airbus’ A380 airliner and Boeing’s Dreamliner were grounded in the past due to technical problems (the A380 had <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/sixteen-qantas-trent-900s-require-modification-or-re-350489/">engine trouble in 2010</a> and the Dreamliner had <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-lithium-ion-batteries-grounded-the-dreamliner/">battery issues in 2014</a>). But the current situation is different on several fronts and could prove costly for Boeing.</p>
<p>First, the scale of the problem is much larger. Only a handful of A380s and Dreamliners were in operation at the time their problems surfaced. Boeing has already delivered nearly 400 of its 737 MAX series aircraft and <a href="http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardreport.cfm?cboCurrentModel=737&optReportType=AllModels&cboAllModel=737&ViewReportF=View+Report">has orders for about 5,000 more</a>. This is a lot compared to rival Airbus, which has <a href="https://www.airbus.com/aircraft/market/orders-deliveries.html">delivered just 234 A380 aircraft since 2007</a>, and the <a href="http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardreport.cfm?cboCurrentModel=787&optReportType=AllModels&cboAllModel=787&ViewReportF=View+Report">1,400 orders of Boeing’s Dreamliner since 2004</a> (around 800 have been delivered already).</p>
<p>Second, previous cases did not involve fatal crashes – although there have been a couple of serious incidents, such as <a href="https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-advice/flights/inside-the-cockpit-on-qf32-how-the-worlds-worst-aviation-disaster-was-averted/news-story/62f3b73db38751b6ae0b3769058a48da">Qantas flight 32 in 2010</a>. In that case, the Qantas plane’s A380 aircraft suffered engine failure but nobody was hurt in the emergency landing that ensued.</p>
<p>The crash of Ethiopians Airlines Flight 302, however, which led to the grounding of 737 MAX planes around the world, killed 157 people. The Lion Air 737 MAX that crashed in October 2018, and which reports indicate had similar issues to the Ethiopian Airlines tragedy, killed 189 people.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267544/original/file-20190404-123426-y89cjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Lion Air 737 MAX crashed in October 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fikrinoor738/45920858011/in/photolist-YptiLH-ZE5rgV-2cXSpee-23hjtqk-Yxxa6Q-24UrdQ1-Y1xZDb-21dKwvP-232cQQH-ZkxSdJ-21dKz18-2cWzmzg-22T54Mi-EyKe1K-EjmCXx-24frnzc-2cWzj5X-CYFszD-22QAAqQ-2eyHrzY">Gusti Fikri Izzudin Noor / flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/how-did-the-faa-allow-the-boeing-737-max-to-fly">serious questions are being asked</a> of Boeing’s software and the automated flight control feature that investigators suspect caused the two fatal crashes. Boeing has promised a software fix for this, but its roll out <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/01/politics/boeing-737-max/index.html">is delayed</a> and airlines around the world are keeping their 737 MAX planes grounded.</p>
<h2>Costly situation</h2>
<p>This is a costly situation for the airlines. If we assume that an airline operating in the US uses its 737 MAX aircraft for three round trips a day and carries 145 passengers on an average flight, we can estimate some of the losses involved.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.transtats.bts.gov/AverageFare/">US Department of Transportation</a>, the average airfare in the US is US$343.28. Under the assumption that this is for a round trip, a 737 MAX aircraft will generate around US$150,000 of revenue for the airline per day. Of course, about 10-15% of this is taxes, but then the US transport department data does not account for any revenues the airlines may get for ancillaries such as checked luggage. </p>
<p>Southwest Airlines – the largest 737 MAX operator in the US – currently has 34 of these aircraft grounded. This means that a day of all these planes not flying might be costing the airline as much as US$5m in lost revenue. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267532/original/file-20190404-123400-1eqft3x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">e cbc f o.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wbaiv/31118821257/in/photolist-2egN7h1-2bBird2-23r7ah6-QPFuCA-2bTCduQ-KmAujk-2bXZG8w-2bMnXEr-2aG2RMN-PpS6oZ-2dKvRx5-2cjJ5br-2dFWnKg-2dstE6m-2bMnM8K-2bMn9Lg-R3bZfL-2c4VDEY-2aptHxb-2dM7ra9-2bMnBqt-ZbnXZJ-WkZQ1b-D6D1vC-2ab4WD9-287Mjna-R1PPhN-XUpD77-2dKvRBJ-26vYSiL-YJ5CaS-22YefEw-28cERNA-27TPr2g-23EoabA-23iUTDL-2aeoMxL-R3c1v1-YRPP67-2c4WPDo-27rUwe6-KjHhBa-2d1JXRC-22AVLDs-24eYuhM-2dhxRa7-244YdY2-2d6wSfm-Hid34o-2cZUvna">Bill Abbott / flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For all the 737 MAX planes now grounded, the total revenue airlines are losing per day might be close to US$60m. And these calculations only account for the potential lost revenue – airlines are bound to bear additional costs associated with the mitigation planning involved, rescheduling, and potential longer-term loss of business due to routes being suspended as a result. </p>
<p>Of course, the US$60m figure above is to be viewed with caution. It may not be entirely appropriate to extrapolate the figures for the US market to calculate a number for the rest of the world, and at best one tenth of the above amount is profit. Nevertheless, we can easily foresee Boeing facing lawsuits from the airlines amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, should the planes remain grounded for any extensive time period. There is no international convention to limit the amount of liability that aircraft manufacturers may face if they are found to be at fault.</p>
<h2>A manageable amount?</h2>
<p>Hundreds of millions of dollars may seem like a manageable amount for a company that earned <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeings-2018-profit-hits-105bn-as-production-soar-455407/">US$10.5 billion profit in 2018 alone</a>. But longer term costs to Boeing due to lost business will likely be in the billions of dollars. For instance, the order of 50 planes, which was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/business/boeing-737-max-garuda-cancel/index.html">cancelled by Indonesian airline Garuda</a> was worth US$4.9 billion.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267537/original/file-20190404-123410-yajy0v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Garuda have cancelled a big Boeing 737 MAX order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/wbaiv/31118821257/in/photolist-2egN7h1-2bBird2-23r7ah6-QPFuCA-2bTCduQ-KmAujk-2bXZG8w-2bMnXEr-2aG2RMN-PpS6oZ-2dKvRx5-2cjJ5br-2dFWnKg-2dstE6m-2bMnM8K-2bMn9Lg-R3bZfL-2c4VDEY-2aptHxb-2dM7ra9-2bMnBqt-ZbnXZJ-WkZQ1b-D6D1vC-2ab4WD9-287Mjna-R1PPhN-XUpD77-2dKvRBJ-26vYSiL-YJ5CaS-22YefEw-28cERNA-27TPr2g-23EoabA-23iUTDL-2aeoMxL-R3c1v1-YRPP67-2c4WPDo-27rUwe6-KjHhBa-2d1JXRC-22AVLDs-24eYuhM-2dhxRa7-244YdY2-2d6wSfm-Hid34o-2cZUvna">Christian Juncker / flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Boeing’s long-term viability as a manufacturer is not really in doubt, however. Airbus forecasts that the global commercial aviation industry will require 37,400 <a href="https://www.airbus.com/newsroom/press-releases/en/2018/11/china-will-need-more-than-7-400-new-aircraft-in-the-next-20-year.html">new aircraft over the next 20 years</a> – and Airbus cannot build all of those planes alone. Even with the entry of Comac – the nascent Chinese aircraft manufacturer – there will still be a lot of market left for Boeing, which currently shares the market for narrow body aircraft nearly equally with Airbus. </p>
<p>The US manufacturer will no doubt learn lessons from all this. The 737 MAX disasters may remain a dark spot in Boeing’s history, and a cautionary tale for the future. But ultimately, it is impossible to put a price on the lives of the 346 victims of the two recent crashes, as well as the pain and suffering inflicted on their loved ones.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Volodymyr Bilotkach is an external instructor for the International Air Transport Association (IATA), involved in IATA training. </span></em></p>With all Boeing 737 MAX planes now grounded, airlines could be losing close to US$60m a day.Volodymyr Bilotkach, Senior Lecturer in Economics, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1140512019-03-25T20:52:36Z2019-03-25T20:52:36ZBoeing is doing crisis management all wrong – here’s what a company needs to do to restore the public’s trust<p>In a crisis, time is not on your side. </p>
<p>A crisis creates a vacuum, an informational void that gets filled one way or another. The longer a company or other organization at the center of the crisis waits to communicate, the more likely that void will be filled by critics.</p>
<p>That’s exactly what’s happening to Boeing.</p>
<p>On March 10, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 <a href="https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash/index.html">crashed outside Addis Ababa shortly after takeoff</a>, killing all 157 passengers on board. This was the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/asia/live-news/lion-air-plane-crash-updates-intl/index.html">second Boeing 737 Max</a> to crash in fewer than four months, putting the total death toll at almost 350 people.</p>
<p>I’ve been both a manager and teacher of <a href="http://prosintraining.com/about/">crisis communications</a> for more than a decade. One thing I know for sure is that in crises in which there’s loss of life, it’s important to be compassionate, empathetic and careful. </p>
<p>However, in the two days after the Ethiopian Air crash, Boeing made crisis communications missteps that may have a long-term effect on its reputation and credibility.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>The key problem with Boeing’s approach is that its response was initially too defensive, slow and passive, suggesting a lack of openness and accountability.</p>
<p>For two days, <a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130403">Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg insisted</a> the 737 Max planes were safe, even as country after country <a href="https://www.apnews.com/64698c6e79be4e6ca109f9c9d3e5e86a">grounded the aircraft</a>. Then on March 13 when the Federal Aviation Administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/canada-grounds-boeing-737-max-8-leaving-us-as-last-major-user-of-plane/2019/03/13/25ac2414-459d-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html">eventually followed suit</a>, Boeing <a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130404">again maintained</a> that its planes were safe. </p>
<p>But other than these statements and <a href="https://twitter.com/BoeingCEO">two tweets from Muilenburg</a>, Boeing’s leadership has been silent.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222805535_Apologies_and_public_relations_crises_at_Chrysler_Toshiba_and_Volvo">Silence is passive</a> and suggests that an organization is neither in control nor trying to take control of a situation. Silence allows others to frame the issues and control the narrative. </p>
<p>As a result, Boeing has found itself playing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/boeing-is-in-crisis-is-it-still-a-good-investment/2019/03/15/3375bd54-44e8-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html">defense to a storyline</a> that suggests the company was more interested in profits than people in the rush to produce an aircraft that accounts <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/13/737-max-groundings-put-a-major-source-of-boeings-revenue-at-risk-wall-street-warns.html">for about a third of its revenue</a>.</p>
<p>That narrative is being pushed by other <a href="https://twitter.com/flyethiopian/status/1108700486016946178/photo/1">airlines</a>, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/03/18/704373869/seattle-times-questions-certification-process-of-boeings-737-max">media</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html">employees</a> and airplane safety advocates like <a href="https://twitter.com/Captsully/status/1108139085485539329">Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1108139085485539329"}"></div></p>
<h2>Being proactive</h2>
<p>Boeing could have adopted a proactive approach, such as by taking the initiative to ground its own planes.</p>
<p>Instead, Boeing hesitated, wasn’t transparent and didn’t shoulder any responsibility for what had happened, leaving it to airlines, countries and regulators to ground the 737 Max. </p>
<p>According to crisis communications scholar Timothy Coombs, <a href="https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/ongoing-crisis-communication/book245663">corporate openness</a> is defined by a company’s availability to the media, willingness to disclose information and honesty. Boeing failed in all three regards.</p>
<p>And the <a href="https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=130404">few statements</a> it has issued are chock-full of platitudes – such as “safety is a core value” – and lack meaningful information. In its statement after the FAA grounded the 737 Max, Boeing suggested it was complying “out of an abundance of caution.” But Boeing didn’t have a choice. The decision was made. </p>
<p>Boeing is now on the defensive and, going forward, will have to counter the damaging narrative circulating in the court of public opinion. It has its work cut out for it. Research shows that people <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-14467729/prepare-for-business-related-crises">are quick to believe the worst about organizations</a>, which feeds negative speculation.</p>
<h2>Turbulence ahead</h2>
<p>The challenge Boeing faces is serious. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/business/737-grounding-airplane.html">Many of its planes</a> continue to be grounded, which could cost Boeing as much as US$5 billion, according to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/investing/boeing-max-737-grounding/index.html">early estimates</a>. Boeing has paused delivery on the 737 Max and orders for future planes are at risk – it recently <a href="https://interestingengineering.com/boeing-receives-first-public-order-cancellation-request-for-737-max-8">received its first public cancellation</a>. The company has about 4,500 of the airplanes on order. </p>
<p>Boeing does have one thing in its favor. The company has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/12/politics/boeing-capitol-hill-lobbying/index.html">built strong relationships</a> with government officials in Washington over the years. </p>
<p>But those relationships, which could be useful and shield the company to some degree, are now under stress as <a href="https://www.registerguard.com/news/20190321/defazio-pledges-full-inquiry-into-boeing-737-max-crashes">Congress</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/20/business/boeing-justice-department-subpoenas/index.html">Justice Department</a> investigate how Boeing got the 737 Max certified to fly. </p>
<h2>Turning things around</h2>
<p>So is it too late to turn things around? </p>
<p>I believe it isn’t, but Boeing must immediately change its strategy from passive and closed to active and open. Rather than wait for lawmakers or investigators to get to the bottom of things, which could be devastating for Boeing, the airplane manufacturer should collect all the relevant information and disclose as much as possible, however damaging. </p>
<p>Boeing should be able to answer questions like what happened, who is responsible and why did it happen. The best way to demonstrate its commitment to safety is not with platitudes but concrete actions that reveal openness and accountability. <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Crisis-Communication-Theory-and-Practice/Zaremba/p/book/9780765620521">Research has shown</a> that transparency and honesty are key to effective communication in a crisis. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the company needs to show that the lives of passengers on its planes are more important than profits or its reputation. And in the long run, doing so <a href="https://www.sagepub.com/hi/nam/effective-crisis-communication/book246198">will help it recover</a> and regain trust that’s been lost. </p>
<p>We all expect airplanes to be safe. Boeing has violated that expectation. </p>
<p>The decision about whether and when the 737 Max is back in the air – and how much this will ultimately cost Boeing – will be made by airlines, regulators and legislators. And, in turn, they will listen to their customers and constituents. </p>
<p>If the court of public opinion finds Boeing guilty of putting their lives and their families’ lives at risk, those decision-makers will find it hard to support the company.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114051/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kelli Matthews does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Boeing’s response to the crisis over its 737 Max planes has made the company seem defensive and passive. A crisis management expert explains how Boeing could reclaim the narrative.Kelli Matthews, Senior Instructor of Journalism and Communication, University of OregonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1138332019-03-20T06:36:28Z2019-03-20T06:36:28ZBoeing 737 MAX: after two fatal crashes, an expert explains the issues<p>The Boeing 737 is <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-history-photos-2018-3?r=US&IR=T#in-1981-boeing-launched-the-second-generation-737-dubbed-the-classic-the-new-planes-would-come-with-cfm56-high-bypass-turbofan-engines-that-were-quieter-more-efficient-and-more-powerful-than-the-units-found-on-the-dash-100200-13">the most produced commercial aeroplane in history</a>: over 10,000 have been built since it first flew in 1967, with thousands more on order. Even the UK’s Royal Air Force is to put them into service <a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/aircraft/p-8a/">as the P8a Poseidon</a>.</p>
<p>An aeroplane which flies that much will have accidents. The 737 has had over 200 that have led to the loss of the aeroplane, <a href="https://aviation-safety.net/database/types/Boeing-737-series/index">resulting in over 5,000 fatalities</a> over its 51 years. </p>
<p>But statistically, this nonetheless is a very safe aeroplane. In the newer “Next Generation” 737, you’d have to take about a million flights to reach a 25% chance of being present at a “hull loss” accident (“hull loss” doesn’t even mean fatalities, just that the aeroplane is <a href="https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20081220-0">beyond economic repair</a>).</p>
<p>By comparison, the British annual average for road traffic fatalities <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Road_accident_fatalities_-_statistics_by_type_of_vehicle#Ratio_per_inhabitants:_the_Netherlands.2C_Sweden_and_the_United_Kingdom_appear_safest">is 13 per million inhabitants</a>. In Britain, which has some of the world’s safest roads, your chance of dying as a car passenger per year are about four times greater than being in a serious accident if you fly in a Boeing 737 every month. </p>
<h2>Evolution</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, the Boeing 737, which has been with us for nearly half the time powered flight has existed, has seen many upgrades. The first model – the 737-100 – arrived in 1967, while the 737 MAX series entered service in 2016. So far, nearly 400 of the MAX aircraft have been delivered and over 5,000 ordered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264589/original/file-20190319-60982-1gilmo9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the earliest models, a Boeing 737-200, when it was in service with Ryanair.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guy Brian Gratton</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Over its lifetime, the 737 has stretched from 29 metres to 44 metres long, fuel capacity has risen from 14.7 tonnes to 21.3 tonnes, and passenger seats have increased from 118 to 230. With these developments have come demands for <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-history-photos-2018-3?r=US&IR=T#in-1981-boeing-launched-the-second-generation-737-dubbed-the-classic-the-new-planes-would-come-with-cfm56-high-bypass-turbofan-engines-that-were-quieter-more-efficient-and-more-powerful-than-the-units-found-on-the-dash-100200-13">greater safety</a>, reduced noise, particulate and <a href="https://www.aerosociety.com/get-involved/specialist-groups/air-transport/greener-by-design/">greenhouse gas emissions</a>, and lower running costs. So while all 737s are <a href="https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgMakeModel.nsf/0/179cdacd213801658625832a006b2e37/%24FILE/A16WE_Rev_64.pdf">certified as a single aeroplane type</a>, the changes have been massive.</p>
<p>Most recently, the big push has been to reduce fuel consumption. For both economic and environmental reasons, this led to the <a href="https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/">latest 737 MAX 8</a> models – <a href="https://www.airbus.com/aircraft/passenger-aircraft/a320-family/a320neo.html">along with the competitor Airbus A320 Neo</a> – being fitted with new, larger and more efficient <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CFM_International_LEAP">CFM Leap</a> engines. These must be mounted higher and further forward than previously, creating a handling problem that wasn’t unique to this aeroplane, but had to be addressed.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=313&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264590/original/file-20190319-60964-10sf1vx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the newer Boeing 737s, a 737-800 ‘Next Gen’ model ironically showing off a much older heritage livery for Dutch Airline KLM.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guy Brian Gratton</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Safety</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_12/whatisaoa.pdf">Angle of attack</a> is the angle between the wing chord (an imaginary line between the leading and trailing edges of the wing) and the airflow. To generate lift, this is typically around two degrees in cruising flight. But to create lift at low airspeeds during take-off, landing and some manoeuvres, it must be much higher – often more than ten degrees.</p>
<p>If the angle of attack is too great, the aeroplane loses control – <a href="http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/spacecraft-design/what-is-a-stall/">or “stalls”</a>. This has nothing to do with stalling an engine and will usually cause a sudden descent. The larger, repositioned engines initially created a handling problem at a high angle of attack, particularly at low speeds, which could pitch the aeroplane nose-up into an even greater angle of attack, potentially worsening the loss of control.</p>
<p>Boeing addressed this by introducing an automated system called <a href="https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/">Manoeuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)</a>. This automatically forces the nose down from high angles of attack, removing the aeroplane from the stall condition. It does this by rotating the tailplane, effectively changing the shape of the aeroplane. This was necessary – stalling under these circumstances has been a serious, even fatal, problem in some <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1963/1963%20-%201939.html">previous airliners</a>.</p>
<p>So far so good. But then we hit a problem which is alleged to have contributed to the October 2018 <a href="https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20181029-0">Lion Air 737 MAX 8 crash in Indonesia</a>. While this aircraft had the MCAS system, <a href="https://www.nola.com/business/2019/03/at-tense-meeting-with-boeing-pilots-angry-about-company-not-disclosing-737s-software.html">the pilots allegedly didn’t know about it</a>. It has been said a decision had been made <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-pilots-flying-737-max-werent-told-about-new-automatic-systems-change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/">not to include the system in pilot training</a>, in particular that if the system received incorrect signals from the aeroplane’s angle of attack sensors the aeroplane could pitch steeply nose-down into a potentially unrecoverable dive.</p>
<p>All pilots train to recognise and deal with a wide range of instrument and equipment failures. On my own commercial pilots licence test, I had several real and simulated instrument failures, and was expected to deal with them while continuing the flight; all commercial pilots are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcB0i7FpmBY">reassessed on this regularly</a>.</p>
<p>But pilots can best deal with failures they’ve been trained for. We don’t yet have full reports on the Lion Air crash, nor on the more recent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/world/africa/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash.html">Ethiopian Airlines crash</a> of another 737 MAX. But <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-13/lion-air-crash-more-pilot-training-needed-on-boeing-737-max/10493470">there is growing evidence</a> that the crew didn’t fully understand the MCAS system, and that the system could malfunction <a href="https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/11/20/lion-air-boeing-737-investigation-places-flight-controls-focus/">when a single instrument feeding it information fails</a>. The aeroplane could allegedly put itself into a steep dive due to an instrument failure, and the pilots perhaps weren’t fully trained to <a href="https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/11/20/lion-air-boeing-737-investigation-places-flight-controls-focus/">recognise and correct for that</a>.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>In a very new aircraft type, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/world/africa/boeing-737-max-8-crash.html">339 people have died in two, apparently similar, accidents</a> – this is intolerable. Fortunately, the aviation industry, that’s mindset often goes back to <a href="https://richardedwards.info/2013/02/24/the-de-havilland-comet-air-disasters-revealed/">the 1950s Comet disasters</a>, is extremely prompt in dealing with serious safety issues.</p>
<p>Around the world, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ethiopia-crash-countries-that-have-grounded-the-boeing-737-max-2019-3?r=US&IR=T">aeroplanes of this type were grounded</a> within a few days, and will remain so until <a href="http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-update.page">Boeing and its stakeholders</a> find and certify solutions to both the aircraft control software and the pilot training issues.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264591/original/file-20190319-60975-izhw7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">American budget airline giant Southwest has built its business model around the Boeing 737, currently operating 750 of them. The FAA has grounded their 35 737 MAX aeroplanes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guy Brian Gratton</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These events show the aviation industry at both its best, and worst. It’s right that manufacturers and airlines should be seeking more efficient, safer aircraft. But making progress at an acceptable cost could potentially risk corners being cut.</p>
<p>In the US, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been accused in the past <a href="http://fortune.com/2019/03/18/boeing-safety-vetting-faa/">of delegating too much oversight of their own work to Boeing</a>, and those of us in this community are concerned that when governments seek to reduce budgets, aviation authorities may not be well enough resourced to adequately do their jobs.</p>
<p>Additionally, any aviation company may necessarily suffer conflict between engineers and pilots, whose objective is to create the best and safest product, and business managers, who must ensure profitability. </p>
<p>So what now? The 737 MAX will remain grounded while Boeing develops a “software fix” that eliminates this potential problem, and then works with the FAA and international authorities to certify it. There should also be new MCAS training that all 737 MAX pilots around the world will receive before they fly the aeroplane again. Indeed, this will hopefully also lead to a broader debate about the level of training provided to airline pilots.</p>
<p>After these two tragedies there will likely be a number of court cases. The families will rightly want closure. But we also need to ensure that similar disasters don’t happen in the future – and this involves aviation professionals working to find new safety solutions. Focusing too much on legal outcomes could <a href="https://airlines.iata.org/analysis/safety-the-blame-game">potentially prevent the best safety outcomes from being pursued</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Gratton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Boeing 737 is the most produced commercial aeroplane in history – so what might have gone wrong?Guy Gratton, Visiting professor, Cranfield UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136022019-03-19T10:43:48Z2019-03-19T10:43:48ZHere’s how airplane crash investigations work, according to an aviation safety expert<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash/index.html">fatal crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302</a> has resulted in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/canada-grounds-boeing-737-max-8-leaving-us-as-last-major-user-of-plane/2019/03/13/25ac2414-459d-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html">worldwide grounding of Boeing 737 Max aircraft</a>. Investigators are probing the crash and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/report-on-airline-crash-that-killed-189-people-draws-few-conclusions/2018/11/27/a07b833c-f274-11e8-80d0-f7e1948d55f4_story.html">another like it that occurred less than five months earlier</a> in Indonesia. </p>
<p>As an experienced airline pilot, aircraft accident investigator and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=I0IMxAkAAAAJ&hl=en">professor of aviation</a>, I know that such major crash investigations are an enormous effort often involving many countries’ governments and input from dozens of industry partners. The inquiries can take months of painstaking work. They often yield important insights that improve flight safety for everyone long into the future. Here’s how an investigation generally goes.</p>
<h2>A massive collaboration</h2>
<p>The accident investigation process is laid out by the standards and recommended practices in an international agreement called <a href="https://store.icao.int/index.php/annexes/13-aircraft-accident-and-incident-investigation.html">Annex 13</a> of the <a href="https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx">Convention on International Civil Aviation</a>. That document outlines the <a href="https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/aig/pages/documents.aspx">process of gathering and analyzing information</a> and drawing conclusions – including determining the causes of a crash and making safety recommendations.</p>
<p>The government of the country where the crash occurred takes the lead in the investigation. Also involved are investigators from the countries where the aircraft is registered, where the airline’s headquarters is, where the aircraft designer is based and where the aircraft was assembled. Countries where the engines or other major aircraft components were designed and assembled and those with citizens killed or seriously injured in the crash may also take part in the investigations. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian Airlines crash is under investigation by Ethiopian authorities, with the assistance of members of the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/10/ethiopian-airlines-flight-302-no-survivors-in-crash-of-boeing-737.html">National Transportation Safety Board</a>. Other countries – including Kenya, France, Canada, China, Italy and the U.K., which all <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/world/africa/ethiopian-airlines-plane-crash-victims.html">lost several citizens in the crash</a> – may ask to be part of the process.</p>
<p>Ethiopian investigators can seek technical advice not only from participating countries’ representatives, such as the NTSB, but also from the companies that made the plane and its engines – in this case, Boeing and CFM international, respectively.</p>
<h2>From emergency to inquiry</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the inquiry, the investigator-in-charge, usually an investigator from the lead country’s aviation safety board, coordinates with local first responders to determine what hazards may be present at the crash site, and ensures safe access for investigators to visit the wreckage. Dangerous debris could include hazardous cargo, flammable or toxic materials and gases, sharp or heavy objects and pressurized equipment. Human remains or blood from injured victims may also pose dangers of disease, meaning investigators must protect themselves against viruses, bacteria or parasites.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/pages/default.aspx">investigators on the scene</a> take photos and videos of the wreckage and collect as much physical evidence as they can. They also conduct interviews with eyewitnesses and draw charts showing the debris field and any indications of how the aircraft hit the ground, such as the angle of impact, the distribution of debris and other details. </p>
<p>If parts of aircraft can be salvaged, they can be moved to a secure facility such as a hangar for wreckage reassembling. This can assist in determining missing or damaged components, and gaining a fuller idea of what happened. </p>
<p>Investigators also collect all the documents related the plane, its crew and its recent flights for forensic analysis.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263952/original/file-20190314-28505-1sy1mf7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Investigators reconstructed almost the entire fuselage of the TWA Flight 800 aircraft after its crash in Long Island Sound in 1996.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-Domestic-News-New-York-United-/50504d729ee5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/8/0">AP Photo/ Ed Betz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>An early priority is locating the crucial evidence in what are often called the plane’s “black boxes.” There are two kinds. The flight data recorders keep track of flight parameters such altitude, heading, instrument readings, power settings and flight control inputs. The cockpit voice recorders store all communications with the aircraft, including from air traffic controllers, and record any conversations among cockpit occupants and other audible cockpit sounds for the two hours leading up to the crash. All that information lets analysts reconstruct, and even create video simulations of, the last moments of the plane’s flight.</p>
<p>If either of those devices is damaged, authorities may ask the aircraft’s manufacturer to verify the salvaged data. Ethiopian investigators have asked for foreign help to analyze the black-box data. They originally asked Germany’s Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation, but that agency said it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-germany/germany-says-will-not-analyse-ethiopian-airlines-black-box-idUSKCN1QU2HG">didn’t have the technical know-how</a> either. France’s Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety, one of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane/ethiopian-crash-black-boxes-arrive-in-paris-for-analysis-idUSKCN1QV0UF">most experienced crash investigation agencies</a> in the world, is handling them instead.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/263955/original/file-20190314-28512-1q9v62.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aircraft’s ‘black box’ is really bright orange.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Indonesia-Plane/a18a8de920184c3eb555b68af6876eee/38/0">AP Photo/Adek Berry</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the early stages of an investigation, there are a lot of people working on different aspects of the inquiry all at once. As the preliminary lead accident investigator for the <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Helicopter-Crash-at-Adukrom-117151">Ghanaian MI-17 helicopter crash</a> in Adukrom, Ghana, in January 2007, I had to coordinate the securing of the crash site and do field interviews of witnesses while charting the debris and recovering the “black box” for further analysis. </p>
<h2>Technical groups assemble</h2>
<p>Other teams look at technical aspects that might have contributed in any way to the crash. They look at air traffic control activity and instructions, weather, human performance issues like crew experience and training, maintenance records, emergency response, safety equipment, aircraft performance and subsystems. </p>
<p>They may disassemble the crashed plane’s engines or other components and use flight simulators to attempt to experience what the pilots were dealing with. Analysts even study the metals used to make components to see how they should perform – to later compare that information with what actually happened during the crash.</p>
<p>A team also interviews any survivors, rescue personnel and subject-matter experts. Forensic teams and medical examiners will analyze victims’ remains to identify them for family members and to examine the injuries they suffered, and test for any drugs, alcohol or even carbon monoxide in their bodies that might have impaired their judgment or performance.</p>
<p>In some cases, especially high-profile crashes, investigators will hold public hearings, at which they gather more evidence and make public some of what they have found. This helps assure the public that the process is open and transparent, and is not covering up the responsibility of any guilty party.</p>
<h2>Findings and conclusions</h2>
<p>After they rigorously analyze all the data, devise, test and evaluate different hypotheses for what could have happened, the investigative team must determine causes and contributing factors. The goal is to identify anything – acts someone did (or didn’t) do, properties of a materials, gusts of wind, and so on – that had any role in the crash. </p>
<p>The report should include both immediate causes – such as active failures of pilots or maintenance crew – and underlying reasons, like insufficient training or pressure to rush through a task. </p>
<p>Within 30 days after the crash, the investigation team must release a preliminary report to the <a href="https://www.icao.int/">International Civil Aviation Organization</a>, the U.N.-related global agency overseeing commercial air travel. A final report is normally expected to follow before a year has passed. In cases where a <a href="http://www.mh370.gov.my/en/">final report can’t be issued</a> on that timeline, the team should release an <a href="http://www.mh370.gov.my/en/442-4th-interim-statement-mh370-safety-investigation-8-march-2018">interim report on each anniversary</a> of the event, detailing the progress so far. </p>
<h2>Improving safety</h2>
<p>At any point during the investigation, investigators can recommend any preventative action that it has identified as necessary to improve flight safety. In the wake of the Lion Air crash, Boeing was reportedly working on <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-to-make-key-change-in-max-cockpit-software-11552413489">a fix to a software system</a>, but it didn’t get released before the Ethiopian Airlines crash.</p>
<p>The final report, including all the safety recommendations, is
released by the country that conducted the investigation to the public
and is aimed at improving aviation safety and not to apportion blame.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113602/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Kwasi Adjekum is affiliated with Flight Safety Foundation, Aircraft Owners Pilots Association (AOPA), Board of Certified Safety Professionals, Ghana Air Force, Ministry of Aviation Ghana, University Aviation Association (UAA), and Association of Ghanaian Professional Pilots.
I am also the consultant for AeroProSafe Consult, a private aviation safety consultancy in Grand Forks, North Dakota, U.S.</span></em></p>The inquiries can take months of painstaking work, but often yield important insights that improve flight safety for everyone long into the future.Daniel Kwasi Adjekum, Assistant Professor of Aviation, University of North DakotaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136882019-03-15T20:23:50Z2019-03-15T20:23:50ZAutomated control system caused Ethiopia crash, flight data suggests<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264167/original/file-20190315-28483-ks4bzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=932%2C764%2C6056%2C3887&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wreckage from Ethiopia Airlines Flight 302 lies near the crash site outside Addis Ababa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Ethiopia-Plane-Crash/ed5a500617ea440ca8aed9511e1d85f7/151/0">AP Photo/Mulugeta Ayene</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emerging evidence from the recent crash in Ethiopia suggests that malfunctioning automatic control systems overwhelmed the crew and doomed the flight. Based on my analysis, it appears that the Ethiopian Airlines crew followed the standard procedures found in the <a href="http://www.b737.org.uk/fcom.htm">Boeing 737 pilots operating handbook and flight crew operations manual</a>.</p>
<p>A typical flight starts with manual control of the plane. The pilot and co-pilot will personally steer the aircraft onto the taxiway, configure the flaps for takeoff, actively control the aircraft as it accelerates down the runway, and smoothly pull back on the control yoke to lift the plane off the ground and into flight. The flight’s altitude and speed data, <a href="https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flightradar24-data-regarding-the-crash-of-ethiopian-airlines-flight-302/">transmitted from the plane in real time</a> and made available to the public by FlightRadar24.com, shows that happened normally as Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 left the runway.</p>
<p>Everything appears to have gone as usual on the initial climb away from the takeoff, too. Normally, the pilot will retract the landing gear and maintain a relatively steady speed as the aircraft climbs. The plane might accelerate slightly until it’s going fast enough that the flaps – extended to increase lift at lower speeds – can be safely retracted, letting the wings themselves generate the necessary lift. This process usually takes place in the first minute after takeoff. Once the aircraft has climbed to 1,000 feet above the ground, the pilot will engage the autopilot system.</p>
<p>That’s the point at which the computer takes over – and where, my analysis of the data suggests, things went wrong for Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. A modern autopilot system gives the computer command of the engine throttles, rudder, elevators and ailerons – basically full control over the aircraft.</p>
<p><iframe id="dnMVP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/dnMVP/9/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Simulating the expected flight</h2>
<p>Using <a href="https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2018-0284">modeling tools developed by my research team</a>, I recreated a hypothetical flight profile to simulate the Ethiopian Airlines 737 departure based on the handbook procedure for an identical plane carrying a similar amount of weight. The simulation timing, key speeds and altitudes all follow my best estimate of the procedure that a trained pilot would be expected to follow.</p>
<p>Comparing this data to the actual flight data, I was able to see where the ideal predicted performance differs from the actual motions of the lost flight. My simulation closely matches the actual speeds of the aircraft on its takeoff roll, and recreates its first few miles of airborne flight. The pilot let the aircraft accelerate gently during initial climb, which isn’t specifically called for or prohibited in the official manual. </p>
<p>The flight paths between a typical flight and the actual course sharply diverge only after the aircraft reached an altitude of 1,000 feet above the runway.</p>
<p>Immediately after flap retraction, the pilot should have engaged the autopilot, leaving the computer to command a climb at constant airspeed. Instead, the ill-fated flight began to dive and accelerate, losing altitude and gaining speed until it struck the ground a few miles away from the airport.</p>
<p><iframe id="Thot7" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Thot7/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>There are several possible reasons a plane could crash like this. One is that an engine could malfunction. But the telemetry data doesn’t indicate the loss of acceleration that an engine failure would cause. Another reason could be that some part of the fuselage, wings or tail broke or collapsed. The data doesn’t show the sort of change in speed or climb rate that would result from such a loss of stability.</p>
<p>The crash does not appear to be due to pilot error, either. I’ve studied <a href="https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2018-3500">pilot overreactions during developing emergencies</a>, and see no evidence of that before the initial dive; the pilots seem to fly an otherwise typical takeoff. If there was some other mechanical failure, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/world/boeing-737-max-ethiopian-airlines.html">pilots didn’t report it</a> to the control tower. There is no indication that they overreacted or overcompensated to some emergency: The radar track shows no evidence of a condition called “wallowing,” characterized by periodic fluctuations in speed and altitude, nor any accidental stall, where airspeed drops sharply before the plane loses altitude.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264172/original/file-20190315-28471-1vlqmz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Key parts of an aircraft.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aircraft_Parts_eng.jpg">Dtom/Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Therefore, it appears that the various automatic control systems conspired to prevent the pilots from asserting direct control over the <a href="https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/alr.html">ailerons</a>, <a href="https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/elv.html">elevators</a> and <a href="https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/airplane/rud.html">rudder</a> that keep the aircraft aloft and on course.</p>
<h2>How long on the ground?</h2>
<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190315184912/http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/displaystandardreport.cfm?cboCurrentModel=737&optReportType=AllModels&cboAllModel=737&ViewReportF=View+Report">More than 300</a> Boeing 737 Max aircraft have been <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/malindo-operates-worlds-first-737-max-flight-437454/">flying since 2017</a>, with thousands of safe takeoffs and landings. That suggests the problem for Ethiopian Airlines – and possibly the <a href="https://qz.com/1574441/a-warning-signal-that-could-have-prevented-the-lion-air-crash-was-optional/">2018 Lion Air crash</a> too – is one of the difficult sort of engineering troubles that happen intermittently, or even seemingly randomly, in very complex systems. </p>
<p>Boeing has already said it will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/business/boeing-737-software-update.html">update the aircraft’s software</a>. Any fixes will have to be checked not only to ensure that they handle whatever the exact problem is that’s identified by crash investigators, but also to make sure they don’t cause other unexpected errors. That will take its own amount of time. In the meantime, all the Boeing 737 Max aircraft in the world are on the ground, waiting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Takahashi received funding from Dragonfly LLC to model aircraft takeoff performance. He is an Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) and member of the Society of Aircraft Performance & Operations Engineers (SAPOE).
</span></em></p>An analysis of flight data shows that problems began at a point when the pilot would normally have engaged the autopilot system.Timothy Takahashi, Professor of Practice for Aerospace Engineering, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.