tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/catalonia-3828/articlesCatalonia – The Conversation2024-01-03T20:54:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194752024-01-03T20:54:55Z2024-01-03T20:54:55ZAlberta sovereignty push: Learning from the economic fallout of similar separatist movements<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/alberta-sovereignty-push-learning-from-the-economic-fallout-of-similar-separatist-movements" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, while not explicitly advocating for outright independence, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/danielle-smith-sovereignty-act-judge-power-company-executive-1.7041743">continues to promote increased provincial autonomy.</a> </p>
<p>A shift from a theoretical discussion to actively pursuing an independence referendum by Smith or her successors could have <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-danielle-smith-veer-back-to-the-right-and-towards-alberta-separatism-207195">dramatic economic consequences for Alberta and Canada</a> similar to the impact separatist movements have had in other parts of the world, including in Spain and the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>In Canada, western alienation has persisted for <a href="https://centre.irpp.org/research-studies/the-persistence-of-western-alienation/">more than a century</a>, and polls show that <a href="https://biv.com/article/2023/07/even-albertans-arent-favour-separatism-survey-shows">27 per cent of Albertans</a> aged 18 to 34 support the concept of an independent Alberta. </p>
<p>Conventional wisdom holds that Alberta separation is unlikely to ever happen. But the stakes are too high to ignore the possibility of Alberta breaking away.</p>
<h2>‘Alberta Agenda’</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061224170836/http://www.albertaresidentsleague.com/letter.htm">Alberta Agenda letter</a>, written in 2001, has influenced Alberta’s approach to federal relations over the last two decades. Among other changes, the letter proposed replacing the Canada Pension Plan with an Alberta Pension Plan and establishing an Alberta police force. </p>
<p>In line with the Alberta Agenda, the provincial government under then-premier Jason Kenney <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8326174/kenney-equalization-daylight-saving-time-referendum-results/">held a referendum in 2021</a> on the question of whether provisions requiring equalization payments should be eliminated from Canada’s Constitution. </p>
<p>While the majority (61.9 per cent) <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/referendum-alberta-equalization-daylight-time-senate-1.6225309">voted yes</a>, such a Constitutional change cannot be made without support from six other provinces. </p>
<p>Kenney’s referendum did not fully satisfy Alberta separatists and “Freedom Convoy” supporters, <a href="https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Policy-Papers/Social-Cleaveges-Alberta-Separatism-and-the-Freedom-Convoy-Wesley.pdf">two groups that share a number of similarities</a>, leading to an <a href="https://www.readtheorchard.org/p/how-to-take-back-alberta-and-influence?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2">internal party rebellion</a> that resulted in Smith replacing Kenney as premier in 2022.</p>
<p><a href="https://macleans.ca/longforms/unsteady-reign-danielle-smith/">Smith has kept key elements</a> of the Alberta Agenda front and centre during her first year as premier. </p>
<p><a href="https://edmontonjournal.com/news/politics/pure-magical-thinking-albertans-filled-premiers-inbox-with-emails-opposing-provincial-pension-plan">She’s advocating</a> for the Alberta Pension Plan, even though <a href="https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/full/10.3138/cpp.2023-044">experts have deemed it risky</a> and polls indicate <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/most-albertans-don-t-want-the-province-to-pull-out-of-cpp-survey-finds-1.6682653">weak support for the proposal</a>.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, it’s likely Alberta separatist groups will keep pressuring Smith to pursue this agenda item — and Smith has suggested she won’t back down. During the provincial election campaign, she vowed to defend Alberta in the face of alleged unfair treatment by Ottawa.</p>
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<p>She soon introduced the Alberta Sovereignty Act, which the NDP labelled a step <a href="https://edmonton.ctvnews.ca/alberta-ndp-says-premier-s-rejection-of-federal-authority-lays-separation-groundwork-1.6187240">towards separation</a>. Even Kenney criticized its potential to lead Alberta to the <a href="https://www.nationalobserver.com/2022/09/07/news/kenney-separation-plan-pitched-possible-successor">brink of separation, which he said would damage the rule of law and the economy</a>.</p>
<h2>Similarities to Spain</h2>
<p>Canada’s current experience of separatist movements mirrors Spain’s to some extent. Traditionally, the province of Québec in Canada and the Basque region in Spain have been the primary regions pushing for independence. </p>
<p>However, Catalonia’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9f2477f0-9eec-11e7-8cd4-932067fbf946">separatist movement</a> in Spain, which has now surpassed the Basque movement, represents a rapid rise of the kind that could conceivably be seen in Alberta.</p>
<p>In Catalonia, the rise in separatist sentiment was triggered by perceived <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12412">unfair economic treatment</a> from Spain’s central government. </p>
<p>The Catalan independence movement reached its pinnacle in 2017 when an <a href="https://time.com/4951665/catalan-referendum-2017/">unauthorized independence referendum was held</a>. The political leaders who participated in it <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/spanish-supreme-court-sentences-catalan-separatists-to-jail/2019/10/14/a0590366-ee59-11e9-89eb-ec56cd414732_story.html">were eventually imprisoned</a>. These events led to significant economic disruption, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.07.024">a negative impact on the Spanish business environment</a>. </p>
<p>Today, support for Catalonia’s independence has fallen to <a href="https://www.elperiodico.com/es/politica/20230113/encuesta-independencia-catalunya-icps-uab-81112066">less than 50 per cent</a>, although <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/18/large-protests-against-catalan-amnesty-deal-in-madrid-after-pm-sworn-in">the political impact lingers on</a> as two small Catalan separatist parties currently wield <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/who-are-catalonias-separatist-parties-why-do-they-matter-2023-09-29/">signficant influence over Spanish politics</a>.</p>
<p>The decline in Basque separatism and the rise in similar Catalan sentiment in the last two decades may relate to the two regions’ relative economic performance.</p>
<p>The Basque region has experienced <a href="https://www.elcorreo.com/economia/euskadi-comunidad-mayor-crecimiento-economico-2024-segun-bbva-20230628123809-nt.html">strong economic growth</a>, while the fallout from the events of 2017 seems to have <a href="https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20230910/9217134/cataluna-seria-segunda-region-menor-crecimiento-pib-crisis-2017-airef.html">dampened Catalonia’s economic prosperity</a> compared to other regions in Spain.</p>
<h2>Brexit parallels</h2>
<p>The U.K. offers other similarities to the rise of Albertan separatist sentiments.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/europe/david-cameron-brexit-european-union.html">The Brexit referendum, driven by the U.K. Independence Party and conservative factions under David Cameron</a>, prime minister at the time, was intended to quell separatist sentiments. However, it defied poll predictions, leading to the U.K.’s breakaway from the European Union. </p>
<p>Brexit has been a <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/impact-brexit-uk-economy-reviewing-evidence">major factor in the U.K.’s poor economic performance in recent years</a>, and <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/07/19/brexit-was-wrong-say-57-of-british-voters">57 per cent of the British public now want to rejoin</a> the EU. </p>
<p>In the case of both Catalonia and Brexit, it hasn’t just been regional economies that have suffered. The movements also negatively <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/01/26/spains-economy-is-recovering-from-the-pandemic-but-problems-persist">affected Spain</a> <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/08/31/europes-economy-looks-to-be-heading-for-trouble">and the EU</a> more broadly. </p>
<p>Likewise, even just a referendum on Albertan independence could affect both the Alberta and Canadian economies.</p>
<h2>‘No plan’</h2>
<p>Former European Council President Donald Tusk famously asked “<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/__trashed-21/">what that special place in hell looks like for those who promoted Brexit without even a sketch of a plan how to carry it out safely.</a>” </p>
<p>Before ramping up calls for independence, Alberta must rigorously analyze the real costs and time frames <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pmj.21409">of such a momentous undertaking</a>. </p>
<p>An independent Alberta would face numerous challenges, including its landlocked geographical position and heavy reliance on the volatile oil and gas market, which is <a href="https://fortune.com/2023/10/24/global-oil-demand-peak-2030-iea-predicts-first-time/">expected to peak by 2030</a> before consumption begins to drop significantly. </p>
<p>Additional challenges include restructuring trade relationships, establishing an independent financial system and addressing potential investor dissent. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-spectre-of-alberta-separatism-means-for-canada-186897">What the spectre of Alberta separatism means for Canada</a>
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<p>Such a move could also deepen <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423921000792">urban-rural divisions</a>, raising questions about the fate of urban voters who prefer to remain in Canada and further complicating issues related to citizens’ rights, mobility and <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/alberta-sovereignty-act-saskatchewan-first-1.6677493">Indigenous opposition</a>. </p>
<p>Catalonia and post-Brexit U.K. illustrate the dangers of radicalization, separatism and divisive rhetoric. </p>
<p>Both the Alberta and federal governments must act to address western alienation and prevent a catastrophic scenario. That requires not just policy adjustments but a commitment to constructive dialogue and inclusive efforts to resolve these issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219475/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carlos Freire-Gibb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Catalonia and post-Brexit U.K. illustrate the dangers of separatism and divisive rhetoric. Both Alberta and Ottawa must act to address western alienation and prevent a catastrophic scenario.Carlos Freire-Gibb, Assistant Professor, School of Business, MacEwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185472023-11-28T14:18:04Z2023-11-28T14:18:04ZThe four challenges faced by Spain’s new government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561924/original/file-20231127-21-kqh3fu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C2%2C2000%2C1326&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The President of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sánchez, makes a statement at La Moncloa to detail the composition and priorities of the new Executive.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/multimedia/galeriasfotograficas/presidente/Paginas/2023/201123-sanchez-declaracion-institucional.aspx">Pool Moncloa/José Manuel Álvarez. La Moncloa, Madrid</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pedro Sánchez’ <a href="https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/Paginas/2023/20231116_investiture-session.aspx">investiture</a> marks the beginning of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cgep52vpv5xo">the third consecutive parliamentary term led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE)</a>. After a fraught period of negotiations, Sánchez now leads a broad coalition government along with seven other parties.</p>
<p>The new government faces enormous challenges, not least the fallout from the controversial <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-spanish-amnesty-law-for-catalonia-separatists-explained-217705">Amnesty Law pardoning hundreds of Catalan separatists</a> which has been dominating headlines. This will continue to shape public discourse over the coming months and determine the continuity of the government.</p>
<h2>Turning weakness into strength</h2>
<p>The PSOE has formed a coalition government by making agreements with a raft of other parties: the left-wing party Sumar, Catalan separatist parties ERC and Junts, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and their left-wing rivals EH Bildu, and Coalición Canaria in the Canary Islands. </p>
<p>This diversity may, paradoxically, be the biggest source of strength for the new government. The coalition encompasses a number of regional parties, while both opposition parties – the right-wing People’s Party (PP) and the far-right Vox – take a hard stance against regional devolution. None of the coalition partners will want to side with them in parliament to oppose the initial budget proposals which will form the backbone of Spain’s political landscape over the coming years.</p>
<p>Against this tense backdrop, Pedro Sánchez’s government faces structural challenges in four key areas: territorial organisation, coexistence, foreign policy, and the digital transformation. </p>
<h2>Territorial organisation</h2>
<p>Catalonia is at the forefront of territorial debate, and its relation to Spain affects the nation’s coexistence and the rule of law. The constitutionality of the future amnesty law is still being questioned, as well as its potentially opportunistic passing to gain votes for Sánchez’ investiture. However, the issue goes beyond the <a href="https://theconversation.com/una-distincion-entre-la-consulta-popular-y-el-referendum-a-la-vista-del-proces-126077">Catalan push for independence</a>, and covers the broader topics of national identity and the distribution of economic resources. </p>
<p>One example of this is taxes, as Catalonia has, in the past, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-politics-catalonia-tax/from-new-tax-office-catalonia-hopes-to-grab-billions-from-madrid-idUSKCN1BW10A/">attempted to wrest control of its finances away from the central government</a>. Were the region to have its own treasury it would weaken the national tax, pensions and benefits systems, and this would undoubtedly further fuel anti-Catalan sentiment. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) may likewise try to leverage their support at the start of next year to demand an improvement of the region’s treatment, possibly in an attempt to squeeze out EH Bildu who seem set to conquer the Basque government. </p>
<p>Regional disputes are reaching other regions such as Galicia, Valencia and Andalucia, but here the question is one of financing as opposed to separatist politics. Giving favourable treatment to Catalonia will also reinforce the narratives being pushed by populists such as the PP President of the Madrid region <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/isabel-diaz-ayuso-profile-spain-madrid-pop-polarizer-unlikely-rise/">Isabel Díaz Ayuso</a>.</p>
<p>The amnesty law may well be accepted by a political majority for the sake of coexistence. However, unequal or unfair handling of different territories will open the way to political instability and fuel inequality and resentment. The progressive coalition will have to be very careful to maintain a coherent party line in this respect.</p>
<h2>Coexistence</h2>
<p>The ongoing culture war will form a crucial part of Spain’s political landscape. First on social media, then in the press and on the streets, polarisation has taken root in Spanish society, as demonstrated by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9FQdA3UnJw">the widespread protests in Madrid against the proposed amnesty law</a>. These protests took place across the country, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biggest-protest-spain-against-catalan-amnesty-law-draws-170000-2023-11-18/">drew crowds of 170,000 in Madrid</a>. They were organised by both the PP and Vox, with the leaders of both parties addressing crowds at the demonstrations. </p>
<p>The opposition whipping up street protests such as these – several of which descended into <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-10/inside-the-violence-behind-spains-anti-amnesty-demonstrations.html">riots and clashes with the police</a> – feeds into polarisation that makes life very difficult for the PSOE and its partners.</p>
<p>The new government faces the daunting task of establishing coexistence based on respect for difference and the rule of law, and they will have to ensure that even handed justice is provided where necessary. This is made all the more difficult by recent events, which have included a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spain-shooting-madrid-vox-catalonia-b2444667.html">a far-right politician being shot in Madrid</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/08/dozens-injured-in-protests-at-spanish-socialist-party-madrid-headquarters">violent protests against the amnesty law outside the PSOE’s offices</a>. </p>
<p>Fighting corruption and the modernising the public administration will also be on the agenda, but creating national harmony and gaining the public’s trust while passing legislation will be a delicate balancing act. </p>
<h2>Foreign policy</h2>
<p>Spain’s international affairs have already been in the spotlight just a few days into the government’s term. While in Israel, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/palestinian-state-is-best-chance-for-security-and-peace-says-spanish-pm">Sánchez made a direct plea to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza</a>. He also said the number of Palestinians killed was “truly unbearable”, and stated Spain’s openness to recognising a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>Within the European Union, the government has now most likely missed its opportunity to use the rotating presidency to push directly for measures such as an agreement with Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. But there remains an opportunity for Spain, with its influence in Ibero-America, North Africa and the Mediterranean, to play a much needed role in breaking the dominant role played by France and Germany in European politics.</p>
<p>Spain’s foreign policy will be successful as long as its coalition partners behave predictably and it is able to consolidate its historical role as a reliable partner and ally. It has the potential to act as a friendly, intermediary power to more powerful nations.</p>
<h2>The digital transformation</h2>
<p>The digital transformation touches on many areas, and seems to have become something of a priority for the government, with an <a href="https://espanadigital.gob.es/en">allocated budget of €20 billion</a> and counting.</p>
<p>The overall aim of the transformation is to provide infrastructure and funding that will help businesses and public services to digitalise over the coming years. It presents a challenge not only for legal regulation, but also for industry, job creation, taxation, judiciary cooperation and external relations. The transition will affect the very way that Spain understands the state, the provision of public services and the emerging economic transformation. </p>
<h2>An uncertain future for Spain</h2>
<p>These challenges encompass many of the difficulties that lie in Spain’s near future. Support from the coalition government is delicate and conditional. It brings with it diversity of opinion and interests, and may well ensure that many long term needs are met across the country.</p>
<p>However, the opposite is also possible. Without a suitable solution to territorial issues that satisfies a social, rather than merely numerical, majority instability could send us back to the polls. If this happens, the results will, once again, be extremely unpredictable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juan Luis Manfredi no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Pedro Sánchez faces a series of challenges after his party’s controversial investiture.Juan Luis Manfredi, Prince of Asturias Distinguished Professor @Georgetown, Universidad de Castilla-La ManchaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2090522023-07-20T08:46:54Z2023-07-20T08:46:54ZDoes Spanish nationalism exist?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535483/original/file-20230704-25-5q2shi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C8%2C1911%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/spanish-flags-sky-confetti-1496384390">Negro Elkha/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the last two decades, the Spanish political scene has been characterised by <a href="https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-resiliencia-democratica-espanola-tras-una-decada-convulsa/">convulsion</a>. Among the many variables that shape this reality, one of them is the confrontation between the centre – Madrid – and the peripheral areas, some of which have their own distinct identity.</p>
<p>In Spain there are <a href="https://gredos.usal.es/bitstream/handle/10366/80052/Aproximacion_al_nacionalismo_espanol_con.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">different nationalisms</a>, including Catalan or Basque nationalism. There is also a Spanish nationalism of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castilian_nationalism">Castilian origin</a>. This nationalism has been deeply rooted in Spanish politics from the time of the Restoration in the second half of the 19th century.</p>
<p>In fact, allusions to peripheral nationalisms and their claims are constant, while there is hardly any reference to Spanish nationalism.</p>
<p>Does this “invisibility” mean that in Spain there is no feeling of identity to the whole nation that opposes regional nationalisms? To discover the answer to that question, we just need to review a little history.</p>
<p>In the fifteenth century, the Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile had been unified and the process of expansion to America, led by the Crown of Castile, had begun. At that time, we can only identify a certain “pre-national” identity that is more related to loyalty to the Spanish Monarchy and to the Spanish Empire than to a line of thought having to do with a national concept of Spain.</p>
<h2>When did the idea of Spain as a single nation arise?</h2>
<p>It was in the nineteenth century when a school of thought that promoted the unity and identity of Spain as a single and indivisible nation really emerged. This came about in a context of social unrest after the domestic <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peninsular_War">Peninsular war</a> and the traumatic loss of the American colonies. It was put forward by figures such as Spanish politicians <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_C%C3%A1novas_del_Castillo">Antonio Cánovas del Castillo</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juan_Donoso_Cort%C3%A9s">Juan Donoso</a>, among others.</p>
<p>Ideas of centralism and the territorial unity of Spain were a significant part of this ideology. Patriotism and the defence of the nation were also central, as was Catholicism and traditionalism, reinforced by an opposition to more liberal currents that promoted the modernisation of Spain. These were perceived as a threat to Spanish identity and traditionalism.</p>
<p>This feeling of Spanish identity was reinforced <a href="https://e-revistas.uc3m.es/index.php/hispnov/article/view/1874">during the Franco dictatorship</a> of 1939-1975. Francoism used the ideological concepts of Spanish nationalism to justify its authoritarian and centralist regime, as well as harsh repression against any form of political dissent or claim for regional autonomy.</p>
<p>As was to be expected, during the transition to democracy (1976-1982), there was a strong resurgence of regional identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country. This demanded greater amounts of autonomy and self-government. In opposition to this, there wasn’t a significant reaction by Spanish nationalism, which had been weakened by its ideological proximity to Franco’s regime. </p>
<p>However, the consolidation of democracy and the overcoming of the Franco dictatorship – starting in the 1980s – entailed the strengthening of new political currents. These began to claim the national identity and territorial unity of Spain more vehemently, doing so in opposition to the peripheral nationalist movements.</p>
<h2>Is nationalist sentiment always right wing?</h2>
<p>Among the political parties that defend Spanish nationalism with great intensity is the People’s Party of Jose María Aznar, as well as several extreme right-wing groups. </p>
<p>But it is important to point out that Spanish nationalism is not an exclusive phenomenon of the political right. <a href="https://letraslibres.com/politica/izquierda-y-nacionalismo-teoria-historia-y-estrategia/">There are nationalist lines of thought on the left</a> that also defend the identity and unity of Spain. However, they do it from a broader perspective of dialogue.</p>
<p>Aznar’s tenure (1996-2004) was characterised by placing Spanish nationalism at the centre of the political scene. His government implemented initiatives that entailed a substantial change in the Spanish political context. </p>
<p>Among the most noteworthy is the breaking, by the Spanish government, of the balance established by <a href="https://app.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=137&fin=158&tipo=2">Title VIII of the Constitution</a>, which set <a href="https://app.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/sinopsis/sinopsis.jsp?art=151&tipo=2">different levels of competence</a>
between historical autonomous communities (Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country) and <a href="https://app.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=143&tipo=2">the rest of the Spanish autonomous communities</a>. The Constitution of 1978 differentiated between those communities that had a statute of autonomy prior to the Spanish Civil War and those that did not. And gave these three more power to decide over their territories.</p>
<p>But the application of <a href="https://app.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=152&tipo=2">article 152</a> culminated in a policy of transfer of power that practically equated the competences of all communities.</p>
<p>Likewise, some other political initiatives have brought about a feeling of unfair treatment and contributed to a spiral of demands by the Catalan and Basque governments, which wish to maintain special status within the Spanish autonomous framework. These initiatives include the consolidation of a Spain that spreads in a radial manner out from Madrid, the tax policy of the Community of Madrid – more lax than in other communities – and the lack of investments in the Mediterranean region.</p>
<p>Finally, starting in 2010 and coinciding with the <a href="https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentencia_del_Tribunal_Constitucional_sobre_el_Estatuto_de_Autonom%C3%ADa_de_Catalu%C3%B1a_de_2006">Constitutional Court’s ruling on the Catalan Statute</a>, a very turbulent stage of Spanish politics began, characterised by strong political confrontation between the various nationalisms.</p>
<h2>The feeling of identity of recent years</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2RdsKh0N9Rc">The “Procès”</a> (Catalan Process for Sovereignty; 2010-2017) became a spiral of confrontation between Catalan nationalism and Spanish nationalism. The first one wanted to be recognised as a political player with the right to self-determination. Whereas the second one denied any possibility of negotiation, using all the State’s mechanisms available to prevent the referendum being held on October 1 2017.</p>
<p>It is within this context of “response to the Catalan independence movement” that we must note the significant growth of a feeling of Spanish identity in recent years. The implementation – from Spain’s right-wing conservative, liberal, and radical parties (PP, Cs, and Vox) – of policies and campaigns aimed at confrontation with peripheral nationalisms were also born after that event.</p>
<p>They intend to reinforce the principles of centralisation, national identity, and territorial unity – principles so typical of <a href="https://aragondigital.es/politica/2019/11/03/vox-considera-a-aragon-un-muro-de-contencion-de-los-nacionalismos-vasco-y-catalan/">Spain’s sense of identity</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Víctor Climent Sanjuán no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.</span></em></p>Spanish history recounts the existence of various peripheral nationalisms (Catalan and Basque), while, in many cases, the existence of a Spanish nationalism of Castilian origin is ignored.Víctor Climent Sanjuán, Profesor Titular de Sociología, Universitat de BarcelonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1734562022-01-06T12:44:11Z2022-01-06T12:44:11ZThe Sagrada Familia: how Gaudí’s masterpiece became a myth and a divisive political tool<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439680/original/file-20220106-27-cwqd9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The new tower stands completed, to the left, with its summit star in place.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/sagrada-familia-basilica-barcelona-antoni-gaudi-2101137517">Petr Tran | Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Sagrada Familia, Antoni Gaudí’s Catalan masterpiece, recently celebrated the completion of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/29/huge-star-atop-sagrada-familia-rekindles-residents-complaints">Mare de Déu tower</a> by hoisting a giant, 12-pointed star of metal and textured glass to its summit. After 140 years of construction on the church, this is the first of its six main towers to be finished and its outsized decoration now lights up the Barcelona nightscape. </p>
<p>Not everyone is pleased though. The installation has been met with criticism about the ongoing building works and the adverse impact of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-i-could-go-anywhere-the-dizzying-spectacle-of-gaudis-basilica-de-la-sagrada-familia-159532">tourism</a> it generates on the local area.</p>
<p>The Sagrada Familia has been a magnet for controversy since well before Gaudí was commissioned to build it in 1883. <a href="https://eprints.ncl.ac.uk/262978">As my research shows</a>, the Sagrada Familia has become both a <a href="https://diumenge.ara.cat/diumenge/preservant-gaudi-del-mite_1_1617290.html">myth</a> and a tool co-opted by different political movements and ideological campaigns. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437316/original/file-20211213-21-1c5eeem.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When Homer Simpson visits the Sagrada Familia in a 2013 episode of The Simpsons, the façades depicted are not those built by Gaudí, but the ones that better fit within the architect’s myth.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Conservative roots</h2>
<p>The Sagrada Familia was originally conceived in 1881 by philanthropist and bookseller Josep Maria Bocabella as an expiatory temple – a place of atonement – devoted to the cult of the Holy Family (the child Jesus, his mother, the Virgin Mary and his father, St Joseph). In buying entry tickets, visitors, still today, effectively atone for their sins. </p>
<p>The decline of the Spanish empire in the 19th century had given rise to powerful ideological and political debates across Spain. The late 1870s saw the emergence of left-wing and anarchist movements, against which Bocabella aimed to make a stand with a new basilica. </p>
<p>To that end, in 1882, he bought a plot of land just outside the Eixample district of the city. He created a foundation to manage the works and appointed the architect Francisco de Paula Villar y Lozano. They envisaged an edifice in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323628098_Como_nacio_el_Templo_de_la_Sagrada_Familia">Gothic revival style</a>. </p>
<p>Lozano, however, only got as far the building’s foundations and the crypt before public disagreements about its construction system and finances led the foundation to ask Gaudí to take over.</p>
<p>Gaudí attuned his designs to both Bocabella’s ideals and the rightwing political and ideological movements sweeping through Catalonia at the time. He referenced the local Montserrat mountain range – which lies inland from Barcelona – in his radical new designs for the building’s sculptural mass and its elevation. </p>
<p>He also proposed that the church be built as a succession of single façades, each replete with a carefully curated, baroque medley of sculptures. In this way, even while under construction, the basilica would instruct visitors in the Catholic values associated with the Holy Family.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437315/original/file-20211213-19-1fdrxwg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sagrada Familia under construction in 1920.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A myth is born</h2>
<p>Until this moment the Lliga Catalanista, the main rightwing, nationalist party in Catalonia, had seen Gaudí as an <a href="https://library.ccny.cuny.edu/c.php?g=950858&p=6907396">outsider</a>. Its leaders had labelled his architecture disgusting. But as he became ever more popular and his work more powerful, the Sagrada Familia appeared as a useful means for spreading their message.</p>
<p>The Lliga started presenting Gaudí as “the genius of Catalonia”, claiming that his basilica was a classical temple that belonged to all Catalans. It urged the public to contribute financially to its construction, belabouring the fact that in doing so, they would be buying forgiveness. </p>
<p>When Gaudí passed away in 1926, Barcelona was at the centre of the anarchist and left-wing movements in Europe. In 1936, at the outbreak of the Spanish civil war, the construction site was vandalised by anarchist groups. Gaudí’s studio was burned down and all the drawings and models it contained were <a href="https://www.editorialtenov.com/en/books/antoni-gaudi-ornament-fire-and-ashes-juan-jose-lahuerta/">destroyed</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437339/original/file-20211213-25-15pknzk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1002&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gaudí’s plan for the basilica was first published in the January 20, 1906 edition of <em>La Veu de Catalunya</em>, a newspaper with close links to the <em>Lliga</em>.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The post-war period saw construction resume and the myth of Gaudí take shape. In the absence of the plans and archival materials lost in the fire, architects and historians began to interpret Gaudí’s ideas to suit their own agendas. In 1964, an international group of architects and intellectuals called for work on the basilica to be halted. Most of them deplored the quality of these post-Gaudí additions. </p>
<h2>Tourist destination</h2>
<p>Tourism has placed ever greater strains on the site, with neighbourhood associations also bemoaning the lack of planning permits and payment of building permit fees. Inscribing the basilica into the surrounding urban context remains a primary challenge. </p>
<p>For the temple’s main façade and its staircase to be built, a series of housing blocks is set to be demolished, as defined in the unique leasehold terms under which they were built during the second half of the 20th century. At the time the completion of the temple seemed too far in the future. Now, with an end date set – just before the pandemic outbreak – for 2026, it’s a very real problem.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437326/original/file-20211213-27-508t7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">With this 2002 collage showing the Sagrada Familia as Barcelona’s high speed train station, architect and landscaper Beth Galí aimed to spark debate about the building site.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Until COVID brought the industry to a halt, ever-increasing visitor numbers ensured a vast and steady stream of income to keep construction underway. In 2019 alone, <a href="https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20210529/7490507/sagrada-familia-reabre-sabado-visitantes-fines-semana.html">4.5 million people</a> came to the site.</p>
<p>The pandemic has of course been a major impediment. Visitors dropped to only 810,000 in 2020 and work on the church has been put on hold until 2024. However, if the church’s history is anything to go by, the Sagrada Familia will endure. It has become a myth equalled only by that of its creator, Gaudí. And like any myth, it is impervious to historical fact.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Josep-Maria Garcia Fuentes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Barcelona’s fabled basilica recently celebrated the completion of its first tower with a giant star. But as at every stage in its history, not everyone is pleased.Josep-Maria Garcia Fuentes, Senior Lecturer in Architecture, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1324032020-08-05T10:56:55Z2020-08-05T10:56:55ZWhat makes a state a state? Why places like Kosovo live in limbo<p>If we look at a map, the world appears neatly organised into a patchwork of states. They are clearly named and have clear borders. Yet, a closer looks reveals a much more complicated picture. Across the globe, groups are in various stages of claiming and gaining independence and recognition. As <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/palestine-google-apple-maps-removal-israel-gaza-strip-a9624251.html">recent controversy</a> surrounding Palestine’s place in Google and Apple navigation tools shows, the map is far from finished. </p>
<p>Take <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/17/twelve-years-in-dependence-leave-kosovo-facing-foggy-future/">Kosovo</a>, which declared independence in 2008 having separated from Serbia following a devastating war in the late 1990s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. More than 20 years after the war – and a decade since the declaration – Kosovo’s statehood continues to divide politicians and the public alike. Recently, Dua Lipa, the famous singer born in London to parents who left Kosovo during the 1990s, sparked controversy when <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-53483451">she tweeted</a> a map of “greater Albania” that included Kosovo.</p>
<p>Separating from another sovereign is the default way in which states are born. This is what the independence movement in Scotland seeks to do. It is also how the United States became independent in 1776 and, according to their declaration, “absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown”. The pacific island of Bougainville last year <a href="https://theconversation.com/bougainville-has-voted-to-become-a-new-country-but-the-journey-to-independence-is-not-yet-over-128236">voted in favour of separation from Papua New Guinea</a> paving the way to what is predicted to be a long road towards independence.</p>
<p>While managing to claim control of a territory and its people from a previous sovereign is important, being internationally recognised as the sovereign of that area is also crucial for functioning like other states. </p>
<p>The value of recognition becomes apparent when we look at the way in which the status of states is often based on their participation in internationally recognised families of states, such as the United Nations. South Sudan, which declared independence in 2011, is seen by many as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/24/south-sudan-civil-war-refugees-families-flee-murder-rape-arson-nyal-global-development">the youngest state in the world</a>, because it is the most recent state accepted into the UN. Other declarations of independence since then, such as that of Donetsk and Lugansk in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 or <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-and-kurdistan-find-the-road-to-statehood-filled-with-obstacles-85768">Catalonia in 2017</a> have been ignored internationally and so are not considered to have resulted in new states.</p>
<p>But not everything is black and white. Unlike what many might think, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 is not recognised by almost half of the UN’s members. Crucially, these countries include China and Russia, which are on the UN Security Council and can effectively veto any membership. And yet, Kosovo is a member of the World Bank, the IMF, UEFA and FIFA. It also made <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37009927">a joyous debut</a> at the Rio Olympics. For years – and in order to boost its statehood credentials – Kosovo has been trying to join the Eurovision song contest, but it is <a href="http://esctoday.com/176579/kosovo-rtk-full-ebu-membership-reportedly-blocked/">blocked by Serbia</a>, which is already a member of the European Broadcasting Union – the organiser of the event.</p>
<p>Kosovo is not the only state that seems in a state of limbo. Palestine is also only an observer to the UN, despite being recognised by the majority of the members, as well as being part of other international organisations such as the Arab League. Taiwan is not fully recognised, despite being one of the world’s leading economies. This lack of recognition often creates important problems. For example, the fact that Taiwan is not a member of the World Health Organisation because of its lack of recognition meant that the island was not able share with others potentially valuable knowledge at the early stages of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Kosovo has also had to face a recent trend of states <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=11&dd=07&nav_id=105462">withdrawing their recognition</a>, following an orchestrated effort by Serbia which still refuses to recognise its former province as an independent state. There was <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/09/11/czech-president-stirs-anger-after-asking-if-he-can-withdraw-recognition-of-an-independent">a brief diplomatic crisis when the Czech president</a>, Milos Zeman, suggested that his country might do the same. Serbia has also successfully lobbied against Kosovo’s membership of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-serbia-fights-unesco-membership/27320037.html">UNESCO</a> and <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-scores-victory-as-interpol-rejects-kosovo-membership/">Interpol</a>. </p>
<p>This tactic is being used by several states that see independence movements as undermining their sovereignty. China has used its diplomatic clout to convince states to<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/china-extends-influence-in-pacific-as-solomon-islands-break-with-taiwan">de-recognise Taiwan</a>. Morocco makes trade deals with other states on the condition they <a href="http://www.sahara.gov.ma/en/zambia-confirms-withdrawal-recognition-called-rasd/">de-recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara</a>, which Morocco considers as part of its territory.</p>
<p>This trend of de-recognition illustrates very well that what we think of as sovereignty is neither static nor absolute. People in places such as Palestine are halfway to having control of their territories. Some, like Kosovo, have one foot in the international system and one foot out. But, at the same time, independence struggles – such as those in Scotland or Bougainville – or competitions over who has more recognition – like those between Kosovo and Serbia or Taiwan and China – show that sovereignty, a buzzword for politicians, continues to be a prize worth fighting for. It is what defines our world of states and who gets to be a member of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article has been prepared as part of wider research and advocacy efforts supported by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society in the context of the project ‘Building knowledge about Kosovo’.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agon Demjaha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kosovo, Taiwan, Palestine, Catalonia and Bougainville are all seeking independence, with varying levels of success.George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of BirminghamAgon Demjaha, Associate Professor of Political Sciences and International Relations, State University of TetovaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1257762019-11-05T12:34:21Z2019-11-05T12:34:21ZThe future of protest is high tech – just look at the Catalan independence movement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298338/original/file-20191023-119463-vn83is.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Quique Garcia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>People across the world are demonstrating their discontent in increasingly creative and disruptive ways. </p>
<p>The past year has seen schoolchildren across the world join the <a href="https://theconversation.com/i-stand-with-the-climate-striking-students-its-time-to-create-a-new-economy-123893">Fridays for Future</a> strikes, witnessing mass walkouts from schools across the globe. In Chile, coordinated fare-dodging protests on public transport – also led by school pupils – has now grown into <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-protests-escalate-as-widespread-dissatisfaction-shakes-foundations-of-countrys-economic-success-story-125628">mass unrest</a> against the rising cost of living. During the past two weeks, <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanon-uprising-unites-people-across-faiths-defying-deep-sectarian-divides-125772">protests have erupted</a> across Lebanon in opposition to rising taxes, involving road blockades and a human chain across the country to illustrate the unity of the people. </p>
<p>Something notable about these protests, from Chile to Lebanon to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50194846">Catalonia</a>, is that protesters are mobilising around far more than single issues. Their primary demands – from economic issues to climate change – are set against a backdrop of questioning the status quo more broadly. And it’s not just demands that are expanding: the ways in which civil disobedience and direct action are carried out is also becoming increasingly novel.</p>
<p>A closer look at the continuing demonstrations in Catalonia illustrates the significance of this.</p>
<h2>Tsunami Democràtic</h2>
<p>In September, a new initiative was created in Catalonia: Tsunami Democràtic. Nobody fully seems to know where it came from or who was the organising force behind it. Those initially sharing its tweets came from different political families, including all three pro-independence parties, as well as some of those who had been imprisoned as a result of their involvement in the Catalan independence movement.</p>
<p>Following its initial announcement, little was heard from Tsunami Democràtic besides occasional tweets highlighting the effectiveness of peaceful civil resistance. This changed on October 11 – the day the Supreme Court sentence against the Catalan leaders was expected – when Tsunami Democràtic released a song: “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtBbeoIiePg"><em>La Força de la Gent</em></a>” (The Strength of the People). This echoed the spirit of the song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2pEx7PAb30"><em>Agafant l’Horitzó</em></a>” (Let’s take the Horizon), which was released prior to the independence <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-referendum-unmasks-authoritarianism-in-spain-84901">referendum</a> of October 1 2017. The group then started organising protests.</p>
<p>So far, Tsunami Democràtic has only called three of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/catalan-separatist-leaders-given-lengthy-prison-sentences">countless protests</a> we’ve witnessed since Monday October 14, when sentences were announced against the seven government ministers as well as the speaker of the House and two civil society leaders. </p>
<p>The first – and largest – protest was the occupation of Barcelona airport on the same day the sentences were announced. Some 155 flights were cancelled and the disruption caused to the airport was considerable, as the blocking of roads and of one of the terminals lasted well over six hours. On October 21 Tsunami Democràtic called another protest, with only a few hours’ notice, prompted by a surprise visit to Barcelona by Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sanchez. The protest had a simple demand – #SpainSitandTalk – following the weekend’s refusal by Sanchez to answer the Catalan president’s calls.</p>
<h2>High-tech protests</h2>
<p>The group’s great success in calling and enacting enormous protests at the drop of a hat has been enabled, to a large degree, by technology. It has used the messaging app <a href="https://telegram.org/">Telegram</a> with particular success, gathering over 385,000 subscribers. Telegram channels (which are designed to send information from a single source to subscribers) have become crucial sources of information and organising around the world.</p>
<p>Tsunami Democràtic has also developed a new app designed to coordinate protests in real time depending on people’s locations. This proved so popular that its systems collapsed during the first few hours, as so many people tried to download it.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/barcelonia-riots-catalonia-protests-news">The app</a>, which has not been put to use yet, is accessible using QR codes that are shareable among up to ten users. This means that if one of the codes (or nodes) is acting suspiciously, the whole chain can be removed. It is designed to organise users (called water drops) into actions to create a “tsunami”. This could include the occupation of transport hubs (such as train stations or aiports), but also the coordination of demonstrations against specific events. The idea is quite a novelty, and has already gathered interest among <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/17/catalan-separatists-have-tooled-up-with-a-decentralized-app-for-civil-disobedience/">tech communities</a>. </p>
<p>Tsunami Democràtic has already made waves. The Spanish Home Office has labelled it a terrorist organisation. Last week, the <em>Guardia Civil</em> (Spain’s paramilitary police force), closed down the Tsunami Democràtic website, and the home office minister announced that they are investigating who is behind it. So far, except for the musicians that appear in the song, and football manager <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHgyu_xX-RY">Pep Guardiola</a>’s video reading Tsunami’s manifesto, there are no other public faces.</p>
<h2>Changing seas</h2>
<p>We live in a time when <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-this-is-the-age-of-dissent-and-theres-much-more-to-come-52871">protests are growing</a> on a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/08/complexities-of-global-protests/iint">worldwide basis</a>, often in response to undemocratic actions of governments. </p>
<p>In this light, the actions of Tsunami Democràtic are notable: they demonstrate a tendency for a growing proportion of people to turn to creative forms of disruptive protest. These methods are typically open, fluid, without rigid structures. They represent novel attempts to articulate a voice when it appears that those in power are increasingly uninterested in listening.</p>
<p>The rise in mass civil disobedience movements such as Tsunami Democràtic is often talked about in relation to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190513-it-only-takes-35-of-people-to-change-the-world">the idea</a>, put forward by the political scientists Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, that a campaign which attracts 3.5% or more of the population will bring about change. This is in no small part thanks to Extinction Rebellion’s popularisation of this claim. </p>
<p>Whether or not this is true, in the case of Catalonia, the proportion of the population engaging in protest is already much higher than 3.5%. Conservative local police <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50098268">estimates</a> indicate that there were more than 500,000 people participating in the marches for freedom during the last general strike: about 14% of the Catalonian population. </p>
<p>Enabled by technology, such movements are becoming more organised and creative than ever. While there is no guarantee that these novel forms of protest will be successful, the recent news that fracking will be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/02/fracking-banned-in-uk-as-government-makes-major-u-turn">banned in the UK</a> highlights the way that persistent, ongoing, coordinated and novel efforts to challenge those in power can result in surprisingly positive outcomes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125776/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Clua Losada is a member of Omnium Cultural, and in the 2019 municipal election she was an independent member on the CUP-Alternativa per Llagostera electoral list for the town of Llagostera. She is also a member of the international advisory board to the Critical Political Economy Research Network of the European Sociological Association.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David J. Bailey is on the Executive Board of the Conference of Socialist Economists, a committee member for the University of Birmingham branch of UCU, chair of the Critical Political Economy Research Network of the European Sociological Association, on the steering group of the British Universities Industrial Relations Association, and a member of the Labour Party.</span></em></p>A new group – Tsunami Democràtic – are using technology to create civil disobedience that is more organised and creative than ever.Monica Clua Losada, Associate Professor in Global Political Economy, University of Texas Rio Grande ValleyDavid J. Bailey, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136282019-09-19T17:11:39Z2019-09-19T17:11:39ZTaking back the hills: a tale of women rights and lands in the Catalan Pyrenees<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290741/original/file-20190903-175682-ih2e0q.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C177%2C4898%2C3076&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Montse Barado, casa Armengol (Sorpe). In summer, once a week, cattle ranchers and shepherds climb to the communal lands to have a look at the animals and give them some salt.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Tarrasón i Cerdá, </span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I met Meritxell and Laia one bright sunny day in April, in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pallars_Sobir%C3%A0">Pallars Sobirà</a>, a mountainous county in the Catalan Pyrenees. Both are women farmers and work in livestock management – Meritxell is a cattle rancher, while Laia herds goats and makes cheese. </p>
<p>Unlike most women in the region, both have made a conscious choice to live and work in the Pallars’ hills, despite the harsh conditions. Even as spring unfolds, from their houses they can watch the flakes of snow still covering the mountain pastures. Soon the foothills are slowly revealed, uncovering green meadows and flowers, with bees popping out from the white winter coating.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292408/original/file-20190913-8661-dqzvp9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=696&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Catalunya Pallars Sobirà.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pallars_Sobir%C3%A0#/media/Fichier:Catalunya_Pallars_Sobir%C3%A0.png">Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I met Meritxell and Laia through the <a href="http://www.agata.cat">AGATA research project</a> on the social and agricultural dynamics in the Pallars Sobirà region. I am trying with my colleagues to understand the threats to agricultural and pastoral systems in mountainous areas, including environmental and socio-economic changes, with a specific look at gender issues. In addition to Pallars Sobirà, we are also looking at two other case studies in Spain, in the mountains near the Mediterranean. </p>
<p>In our research, we found that traditional farming is not acknowledged and that people like Meritxell and Laia, who through their activities take care of the mountain ecosystems, have become largely invisible. Yet they fight back, in particular trying to make a difference to adapt to and mitigate climate change.</p>
<h2>The choice of a rural life</h2>
<p>Meritxell is from an old <em>casa</em> (household in Catalan) in the countryside. Historically, the <em>casa</em> was at the productive and reproductive core of the Pyrenees society. Originally, only the <em>hereu</em> and the <em>pubilla</em> (the first man or woman of the family) were in charge of the transmission of the socio-economic heritage. In an unequal society, women were in charge of chores, children, activities close to the house. They also helped in all the other farming activities. A triple burden of work, often invisible.</p>
<p>But times have changed. Meritxell is not the <em>pubilla</em>, but she “always wanted to be a woman rancher, to live in the mountain and manage animals”. After studying and working away from the farm, she ultimately decided to come back to preserve the traditional activity of her family. For Laia, she studied arts and moved from the city because she, like many other newcomers, was seeking a different life and wanted to “reconnect with nature and silence”. The economic crisis and “love” eventually led to this choice.</p>
<p>Both women believe that mountains and villages are the gatekeepers of an ancestral rural culture to which they gave birth. Combined with new socio-economic models, this culture may offer responses that can help mitigate climate change.</p>
<h2><em>Matança</em> for breakfast</h2>
<p>Laia rises at 6 a.m. every day. After helping her husband milk the goats, she attends to their children and then prepares the tools she needs to make cheese. Today she will be making a typical cheese from the Pyrenees, <em>el Serrat</em>, whose recipe she learned from the oldest women of the village, known as <em>las padrinas</em>.</p>
<p>In the afternoon Laia will take over from her husband working with the shepherd dogs. She will walk with them and a hundred of goats to the communal lands, where the animals have been grazing, generation after generation, spring after spring, maintaining this cultural landscape.</p>
<p>Meritxell also wakes up early. She quickly finishes her chores, feeds chickens and waters the home garden. She wakes up her 10 year-old daughter, home for Easter holidays. Their breakfast is made of handmade cheese and <em>xulís</em>, a salami prepared during the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1HtaAXpxxA">traditional slaughter of pigs</a> (<em>matança</em> in Catalan) in every house.</p>
<p>After, they will walk a few kilometres to the <em>granja</em> (farm), where they will have a look at the new-born calves and their mothers. After, they will have to move the cows from one field to the other. Meritxell’s daughter is eager to accompany her today and learn how to take care of the vegetable garden and the animals.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290745/original/file-20190903-175691-gai6g3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Victòria Vilalta, casa Serraire (València d'Àneu). The animals have been grazing communal lands for generations, conserving the cultural landscape.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Tarrasón i Cerdá</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Villages are emptying</h2>
<p>Meritxell is one of the few women in her family to pursue the traditional agropastoral activity. Her sisters were not interested and believe that a job in the city would earn them a better livelihood. Besides, they feel that hill life was too hard for women. But to Meritxell, traditional activities and local knowledge are precious and perhaps the only way to save the mountains.</p>
<p>In recent decades, local economics and Pyrenees society have been transformed drastically. This is due to the <a href="https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecoru_0013-0559_1991_num_202_1_4184">progressive urbanisation and the modernisation of agriculture</a> that started in the 1960s and continued through the 1990s, progressively depopulating rural areas.</p>
<p>This process has been amplified by the economic crisis and the European agrarian policies in the last two decades. They prioritise intensive production <a href="https://www.agriculturejournals.cz/publicFiles/318_2016-AGRICECON.pdf">in the plains</a> and tourism or conservation-based policies in the hills. Such policies reflect a certain “colonisation” of the mountains and how its imaginary has been captured by the urban.</p>
<h2>Transmission of traditional farming culture weakens</h2>
<p>Such changes have encouraged farmers to leave their local livelihoods, migrate or look for other work. Women were particularly interested by such shift from the agropastoral system to tertiary activities. In return, their transmission of traditional farming culture and knowledge to children weakened.</p>
<p>In Meritxell’s village, only three families remain today, compared to the 25 that lived and worked here in the 1960s. Many young people have left, others are unemployed and disdain “traditional jobs and ways” of <em>pagès</em> (farmer in Catalan). Many fields in the region have been progressively abandoned, starting with less accessible lands, where mechanisation was not possible. Others gradually followed, due mainly to the shortage of youth and specialised employees, progressively increasing the rewilding of mountain pastures.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292784/original/file-20190917-19055-1xdh6h1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many scenic villages of the Catalan Pyrenees, such as Gavàs (Vall d'Àneu), could disappear or empty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Tarrasón i Cerdá</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Without <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0217847">human presence and activities of animals</a>, this hilly cultural landscape is at risk of disappearing, with stark consequences. It can directly affect key ecosystem services such as healthy food, provision of water and <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/soil-carbon-storage-84223790/">soil carbon storage</a>. Rewilding can also disturb biodiversity and its associated ecological functions, such as pollination, dispersion and the protection of lands, animals and people against destructive fires. Such dynamics leave the land vulnerable, a process that can be accelerated by <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/">climate change</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing control over resources</h2>
<p>Current EU environmental and agrarian policies have not been designed to protect small families and producers of livestock or these cultural Mediterranean landscapes. European decisions have also tampered with traditional livelihoods. </p>
<p>As the stock market defines food value, small producers become dependent of its fluctuations. <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540374/IPOL_STU(2015)540374_EN.pdf">Unfair pricing and an unequal distribution of subsidies</a> within a complex bureaucracy deepen the <a href="http://indicadors.arrandeterra.org">wealth gap</a> between agriculture and herding and other professions. In the process, farmers lose control over lands and resources, as transformation, distribution and consumption patterns are being dictated by institutions and markets.</p>
<p>Mind-sets are also increasingly urbanised, leading to new dietary and consumption habits. Many Catalonians, including farmers, now buy cheap products of poor quality they find in supermarkets rather than looking to their own lands for high-quality meat and produce. As such pressure and changes grown, women have suffered collateral damage.</p>
<h2>Fighting invisibility and stereotypes</h2>
<p>In Catalonia’s rural areas, the culture is conservative and centred around work, and women still have few rights. <a href="https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/athdig/athdig_a2014m11v14n3/athdig_a2014m11v14n3p3.pdf">Studies indicate</a> that only 26% of women in Catalonia own land in their own names. While this is better than in Spain as a whole – the <a href="http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/data-map/statistics/en/">rate is 21%</a> – many women who run farms are not even registered as farmers.</p>
<p>The numbers would rise if underprivileged and migrant women were fully accounted for. Often invisible, they can become the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604966/IPOL_STU%282018%29604966_EN.pdf">victims of abuse and exploitation</a> in intensive farming. </p>
<p>On the top of such discriminations, Meritxell, Laia and other rural women farmers also have to fight against stereotypes that affect their daily lives. They denounce the negative social image that can paint them as secondary players, the ones who “help” the man, or are the “wife of”, “mother of” or “daughter of”.</p>
<p>Sexist and paternalistic views within society and the livestock-management sector undermine the value of such women’s work. They usually hear the same unsolicited advices over and over again:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Nena (baby), this is not a work for a woman”</p>
<p>“A girl should not drive a tractor”</p>
<p>“A woman should not walk alone in the mountain”.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>When they hear such comments, Meritxell and Laia usually shrug. They dismiss the idea that they should conform to gender stereotype of being “feminine” while working as farmers. “I have neglected my hands because they take care of the animals and the earth” says Laia. Meritxell adds: “People are surprised because I drive a truck, wear boots and still use makeup”.</p>
<h2>Women-only farmers Facebook groups</h2>
<p>Despite so many obstacles, Meritxell and Laia are striving to make a difference. Like other women I have met, they are demanding a voice in the decisions made within the household, the community and society. They ensure that responsibilities between the houses and the farm are shared, and they’re becoming more involved in traditional organisations such as trade unions, shepherds associations and communal institutions.</p>
<p>Today, two young cattle ranchers from the county head the “Association of the <em>Vaca Bruna</em>” (an native breed of Pyrenees cow) and other women are part of the “Association of the Pyrenees Horse”. In this way, they ensure that roles are not defined on a gender line, and work to establish a better and more equitable production. They expect empathetic behaviour toward animals (and individuals), which they want to nurture through a more respectful, patient and less “macho” approach. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292268/original/file-20190912-190007-zv8qkl.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=644&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ramaderes Facebook page.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Personal-Blog/Ramaderescat-787838001413853">Facebook</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They also organise themselves online, using social networks to connect with other women shepherds and farmers. Networks include the site <a href="https://donesmonrural.wordpress.com/">Dones Mon Rural</a> and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Personal-Blog/Ramaderescat-787838001413853/">Ramaderes Facebook page</a>.</p>
<p>These women-only groups prove safe spaces beyond the boundaries of traditional farming communities to express emotions, lobby for gender equality among farmers, or simply exchange information and knowledge. Women can also access information and join public debates and panels with governmental and non-governmental institutions. It also allows them to take part in decisions on key policies and measures for the sector, give voice their concerns for women or other marginalised groups in rural areas and campaign for alternative economical models.</p>
<h2>Blending traditions and innovations</h2>
<p>In their communities, Laia and Meritxell try to fight the economic constraints of the agrobusiness model, mixing traditions and innovations. They promote their products based on the way they are conceived: respectful of the nature, the seasonal migration of animals, and mindful of the hills’ resources and their own bio-cultural heritages.</p>
<p>Meritxell learned from her parents and ancestors. She went to the fields with her father, worked with in the garden with her mother. Her grandmother taught her the use of natural therapies for animals and local names of plants and flowers. Names of the rocks she learned from her grandfather, who would take her to the mountains in summer like all the other cattle ranchers and shepherds.</p>
<p>Meritxell keeps up the tradition. Every Sunday she and her family meet with groups of other farmers. Together they manage the shared communal lands. It is important for her to spend time in the community, discussing and making decisions together, and one day she will pass on all her knowledge to her daughter.</p>
<h2>“Adopt” a sheep</h2>
<p>In the case of Laia, she studied at a specialised school. The Shepherds School works toward saving the intangible heritage of local farming to transmit it to new generations, as well as introducing new agro-ecological principles.</p>
<p>A few years ago she started making artisanal cheeses. She prefers direct selling or farmers market so she can build new relationships with consumers and within the rural-ecological touristic sector. Other local creative initiatives sprouted, such as the <a href="http://www.xisqueta.cat/en/">Xisqueta Obrador</a>, which was establish to valorise the use of the wool from a native breed of sheep, as well as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecomuseum"><em>ecomuseos</em></a>. They allow visiting families to “adopt” a sheep or a goat, spend a day in the mountains with a shepherd, or visit a farm and taste cheese.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/292250/original/file-20190912-190035-1oecw18.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Clara Ferrando, Casa Mateu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Tarrasón i Cerdá</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Laia isn’t afraid of innovation – last year her French-style cheese won several national competitions – but she always prepares the traditional cheeses to ensure that local taste and traditions live on. Along with other shepherds, she feels that “a culture of quality and restraint”, “based on rescuing the commons” can maintain the extensive livestock management and keep small farmers alive. In fact, four of her friends, two men and two women, recently funded the first cooperative in the area of ecological goats.</p>
<h2>Where are mountains and women going?</h2>
<p>Yet many questions remain to be answered. How do we envision the future in such Mediterranean mountainous regions among traditions, rural abandonment and alternative innovations? As we observed <a href="http://www.agata.cat">during our project</a>, saving the mountains and their key ecological functions requires defending livestock management, preserving local knowledge and pioneering local socioeconomic and agri-food models. To do it, social inclusion and gender equality play a key role.</p>
<p>Will Meritxell be able to interest her older daughter in the way she has been working with animals and seeds at home and in her fields? Will Laia be able to face up to the risks involved, defend traditions while continuing to innovate, connect with other sectors to defend a close, sustainable and alternative economic model? Will that be enough to deal with global environmental challenges ahead?</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The “Meritxell” and “Laia” stories and names have been intertwined with real-life accounts of women farmers and cheese makers we interviewed in the Pallars Sobirà in 2018-2019. They are archetypes of women in the area we can find among old families and newcomers.</em></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund has been supporting nearly 600 projects around the world conducted by researchers from 54 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the <a href="https://www.axa-research.org/en/">Axa Research Fund</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Federica Ravera is a member of the Chair of Agroecology and Food Systems at the University of Vic - UCC and a member of the FRACTAL collective (<a href="http://fractalcollective.org">http://fractalcollective.org</a>), a collective of women researchers who work in a space of collaboration, mutual support and feminist activism. She also receives funding from AXA Research Fund.</span></em></p>In the Catalan Pyrenees, women shepherds and cattle ranchers try to valorise the ancestral agropastoral culture to save the mountains from climate change.Federica Ravera, Postdoctoral researcher, Chair in Agroecology and Food systems, Universitat de Vic – Universitat Central de CatalunyaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170522019-05-21T19:55:36Z2019-05-21T19:55:36ZIs there such thing as a ‘European identity’?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275431/original/file-20190520-69192-18csgul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=42%2C39%2C2002%2C1306&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is there such a thing as an European identity?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://foto.wuestenigel.com/screwed-up-european-union-flag-on-black-background/?utm_source=47318179001&utm_campaign=FlickrDescription&utm_medium=link">Marco Verch/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The outcome of the UK’s 2016 referendum on EU membership has sent shockwaves across Europe. Among other impacts, it has prompted debates around the issues whether a <a href="http://euroacademia.eu/presentation/european-culture-as-a-mirage/">“European culture”</a> or a “European identity” actually exist or whether national identities still dominate.</p>
<p>It would be wrong, in my opinion, to write off the identification of various people with “Europe”. This identification has been the outcome of a long process, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, involving both the policies of the European Economic Community (EEC) and EU institutions and grassroots initiatives. Cross-border youth mobility since 1945 is a key example of the former: it was often developed by groups that were not formally linked to the EEC/EU. They still helped develop <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/B/bo25400340.html">an attachment to “Europe”</a> in several countries of the continent.</p>
<p>As political scientist Ronald Inglehart <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-5965.1971.tb00641.x">showed in the 1960s</a>, the younger people were, and the more they travelled, the more likely they were to support an ever-closer political union in Europe. More recently, <a href="https://www.esn.org/erasmus">Erasmus exchange programmes</a> have also helped develop forms of identification with Europe.</p>
<h2>Feeling “European”</h2>
<p>Simultaneously, feeling “European” and subscribing to a national identity have been far from mutually exclusive. Numerous West Germans in the 1980s were passionate about a reunified Germany being part of a <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/in-europes-name-germany-and-the-divided-continent/oclc/28375767">politically united Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Attachment to “Europe” has also been a key component of regional nationalism in several European countries in the last three decades, such as the Scottish or the Catalan nationalism. A rallying cry for Scottish nationalists from the 1980s on has been <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-modern-snp.html">“independence in Europe”</a>, and it continues to be the case today. Indeed, for the 2019 European Parliament elections, the primary slogan of the centre-left Scottish National Party (SNP), currently in power, is <a href="https://www.snp.org/eu/">“Scotland’s future belongs in Europe”</a>.</p>
<h2>Diverse agendas</h2>
<p>What requires further attention is the significance attached to the notion of European identity. Diverse social and political groups have used it, ranging from the far left to the far right, and the meaning they attach varies. For the SNP, it is compatible with the EU membership of Scotland. The party combines the latter with an inclusive understanding of the Scottish nation, which is open to people who have been born elsewhere in the globe, but live in Scotland.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LXV127hQehI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Speech by SNP leader and first minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, on July 2, 2016.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By contrast, Germany’s far-right AfD party (<em>Alternative für Deutschland</em>, Alternative for Germany) is critical of the EU, yet identifies with “Europe”, which it explicitly contrasts with Islam. A clear example is a one of the <a href="https://www.apnews.com/e4a3dca3c7464ca3925e4fe67afda5a6">party’s posters for the upcoming elections</a> that asks “Europeans” to vote for AfD so that the EU doesn’t become “Eurabia”.</p>
<p>Identification with Europe does exist, but it is a complex phenomenon, framed in several ways. and does not necessarily imply support for the EU. Similarly, European identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive with national identities. Finally, both the former and the latter identities may rest upon stereotypes against people regarded as “non-European”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nikolaos Papadogiannis ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Does an “European culture” or a “European identity” actually exist?Nikolaos Papadogiannis, Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary History, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1103822019-03-28T11:14:56Z2019-03-28T11:14:56ZScandinavia may not be the happiest place on Earth after all<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266153/original/file-20190327-139361-1730l98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4592%2C3244&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/abstract-human-meditator-chakra-universe-power-1035238432?src=NdH_t9Flbxqxtq7ktlCqtQ-1-56">BenStudioPRO/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nordic countries are consistently ranked as the happiest countries in the world according to <a href="http://worldhappiness.report/download/">World Happiness Reports</a> published since 2012. Because of this, other countries often look to them for guidance when it comes to nurturing the well-being of their people.</p>
<p>However, in our recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517811831134X#bib0001">study</a>, we found that people living in parts of southern Europe had higher mental well-being than those living in the north.</p>
<p>We used a <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/sci/med/research/platform/wemwbs/">scale</a> which asks to what extent a person has felt good and functioned well over the past two weeks. “Feeling good” can mean feeling relaxed, optimistic or energetic, and “functioning well” can mean being able to think clearly, deal with problems and socialise. </p>
<p>We recently applied the scale in Denmark and compared the national mental well-being estimates of Danish people with people living in Iceland, Catalonia and England. We found that people in Catalonia scored considerably higher on mental well-being than people in all three northern European countries – challenging the prevailing idea that <a href="https://www.umu.se/en/news/swedes-are-healthier-and-happier-than-southern-europeans_5816527/">places in northern Europe are typically happier than those in southern Europe</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266144/original/file-20190327-139371-1tawvo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Togetherness: a human tower in Viladefranca, Catalonia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/espanacatalonia1882018-castellers-de-vilafranca-cultural-sporting-1158971479">Beka31/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the World Happiness Reports, which tend to show the Nordic countries as leading, happiness is measured using Cantril’s ladder of life evaluation. This asks people to rate how they currently view their life on a ladder scale in which zero is the “worst possible life for you” and ten is the “best possible life for you”. But such measures are strongly influenced by <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/happiness-report/2017/HR17-Ch2.pdf">economic conditions</a> and are <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-016-1429-8">poor proxies</a> for mental health and well-being.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/107/38/16489">Research</a> has shown that while life evaluation rises proportionately with income, emotional well-being – measured by an individual’s experience of pleasant and unpleasant emotions – rises with income only to a certain point. If people are below a certain economic threshold, they are more likely to be emotionally unwell and have low life evaluations. Above this threshold, life evaluations continue to improve, but ratings of emotional well-being do not. </p>
<p>In other words, high income may buy better life evaluations, but this is not the same as positive mental health and well-being. <a href="http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1236906&dswid=-3320">A recent report</a> also showed that inequalities in life evaluation appear to be rising in several places in Scandinavia, and that a considerable amount of people in the Nordic countries appear to be struggling, contrary to what these countries are famous for.</p>
<p>The “happiest place in the world” label may therefore be misleading, given its rather simplistic focus on life evaluation. As our research shows, using more sophisticated measures of well-being can tell a different story.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266149/original/file-20190327-139380-sj6hww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Copenhagen, Denmark. The Nordic countries usually dominate World Happiness Report rankings.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tourists-enjoying-scenic-summer-view-nyhavn-1151332223">Studiolaska/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New approaches to mental health</h2>
<p>While there is widespread consensus that a “good” society is one that <a href="http://www.oecd.org/statistics/measuring-well-being-and-progress.htm">maximises human well-being</a>, how to measure and promote this is controversial. In the words of the philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The answers you get depend on the questions you ask.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There may be particular features of Catalonian culture and lifestyle that promote mental well-being more readily than in other places. It is now increasingly recognised that there can be <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)31612-X/fulltext">“no sustainable development without mental health”</a>, so Catalonia’s secrets might be valuable for learning more about what really matters for mental well-being.</p>
<p>So far, the <a href="https://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/action_plan/en/">conventional approach</a> to mental health in Europe focuses on the treatment and prevention of mental illness, as well as efforts to destigmatise poor mental health. While these are valid, they are reactive and focus on risk factors for poor mental health rather than on how to promote and maintain positive mental health and well-being.</p>
<p>This approach does not account for the fact that mental health is <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mental-health-strengthening-our-response">more than just the absence of mental illness</a>. To quote the medical historian Henry E. Sigerist, health is “something positive”. The absence of pessimism does not automatically produce optimism, the absence of sadness does not automatically produce joy. So it goes with the entire spectrum of human thoughts and emotions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266150/original/file-20190327-139371-ulkwnv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mental health means more than the absence of mental illness and requires more proactive measures.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/man-positive-power-universe-light-watercolor-588972479">BenStudioPRO/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Rather than just focusing on what causes and protects against mental illness, society must also consider <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK435854/">the causes of positive mental health</a>, and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/eurpub/article/25/2/249/491448">prioritise it</a>. </p>
<p>Positive mental health and well-being is <a href="https://www.fph.org.uk/media/1644/better-mental-health-for-all-final-low-res.pdf">associated</a> with better physical health, positive interpersonal relationships and socially healthier societies. Positive mental health and well-being is, in other words, <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-au/Wellbeing%3A+A+Complete+Reference+Guide%2C+Volume+VI%2C+Interventions+and+Policies+to+Enhance+Wellbeing-p-9781118608357">desirable</a> in its own right and may further help <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpsy/article/PIIS2215-0366(18)30057-9/fulltext">prevent</a> common mental health problems occurring in the first place and help people during <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0924933811001763?via%3Dihub">recovery from mental illness</a> . </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092493381100160X?via%3Dihub">Promoting mental health and well-being</a> throughout a population can mean encouraging active lifestyles, providing opportunities for people to interact and feel they belong within a community, or fostering a sense of purpose by increasing contribution to society or meaningful causes. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-a-mental-health-workout-thats-as-simple-as-abc-98124">Here's a mental health workout that's as simple as ABC</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It can also include efforts focused on individuals, such as encouraging self-care and opportunities to hone personal and social skills and pursue creative endeavours. The combination of universal and individual approaches has <a href="https://www.fph.org.uk/media/1644/better-mental-health-for-all-final-low-res.pdf">proved important</a> in many different settings.</p>
<p>There is still plenty to learn about positive mental health and how to promote it, and our results suggest people should not only look to the Nordic countries for guidance. Asking the right questions could enable a better understanding of what drives positive mental health, and how it can be promoted. While reducing poor mental health is necessary to make life bearable, positive mental health makes life worth living.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110382/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We assume that people in Nordic countries have a better standard of mental health than anywhere else, but that assumption is based on a limited way of measuring it.Ziggi Ivan Santini, Postdoctoral associate, University of Southern DenmarkSarah Stewart-Brown, Chair of Public Health, University of WarwickVibeke Jenny Koushede, Senior researcher, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064112018-11-13T12:24:50Z2018-11-13T12:24:50ZCatalonia: a year on, political prisoners go unnoticed by the rest of the world<p>After an unofficial referendum in October 2017, the pro-independence political parties in the Catalan parliament unilaterally declared independence from Spain. In response, the Spanish government invoked Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution which effectively suspended the region’s autonomy.</p>
<p>More than a year on from these events, ousted Catalan leader <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/carles-puigdemont">Carles Puigdemont</a> remains in exile in Belgium. Another six pro-independence leaders remain in exile, including Clara Ponsati, former education minister in the Catalan government who has returned to her employment as an economics professor at the University of St Andrews, in Scotland. Although not formally charged, like the other exiled leaders, were she to return to Spain she would likely be arrested on charges of rebellion and misuse of public funds. She has been critical of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/clara-ponsati-exiled-catalan-minister-eu-spain-separatist-hostages-a8256466.html">Europe’s leaders for their silence</a> on the Catalan question and has claimed that Catalan political prisoners are being used as pawns to deactivate the pro-independence movement. </p>
<p>Two activists and seven politicians remain in custody. They have been charged by Spain’s attorney general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/02/catalan-politicians-charged-a-year-after-independence-vote-referendum">with rebellion</a> and misuse of public funds. This ignores an earlier decision by Spain’s solicitor general, who recently downgraded the charge of rebellion <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/11/02/inenglish/1541146388_493726.html">to sedition</a> because the former charge requires the use of violence. The available evidence suggests that violence was not used by any of those in jail. Nevertheless, if the attorney general continues his hardline stance, those in jail could face up to 25 years behind bars. Many will be surprised to hear that Spain’s legal system allows people to be held on precautionary, pre-trial detention for such a long time.</p>
<p>The group facing charges of rebellion includes two civil society activists Jordi Sanchez, president of the campaign group Catalan National Assembly (ANC), and Jordi Cuixart, president of the campaign group Omnium Cultural. Both are facing up to 17 years in jail. Both have been detained since October 2017 in connection with protests in Barcelona on September 20 and 21 that year. The protests were aimed at obstructing police raids to seize material related to the referendum from Catalan government buildings.</p>
<p>Yet Amnesty International’s director in Europe, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/amnesty-calls-for-immediate-release-of-jordi-sanchez-jailed-catalan-leader">Gauri Van Gulik</a>, noted that “although calling protests to obstruct legitimate police operations can – if proof is produced of their commission – constitute a public order offence, it does not constitute a serious crime such as sedition or rebellion”. Amnesty has called for the immediate release of the “two Jordis”, as they have become known across Catalonia.</p>
<p>Amnesty avoids using the term “political prisoner” as there is no accepted definition in international law. However, <a href="https://www.eldiario.es/politica/Juristas-politicos-Espana-inmediata-liberacion_0_710430160.html">over 1,000 legal experts</a> have signed a manifesto arguing that the Catalan leaders in jail are effectively that. They say the accused have not been given time to prepare their defence, making a farce of the legal proceedings. Similarly, <a href="https://www.eleconomista.es/politica/noticias/8800071/12/17/El-53-de-los-catalanes-considera-presos-politicos-a-los-soberanistas-encarcelados.html">53.4% of Catalans</a> consider that those in jail are political prisoners. And 60% feel that the judicial proceedings against them are unjustified. It’s worth noting that that’s a higher percentage than the estimated number of Catalans who support independence. </p>
<p>Others, connected with the <a href="https://malarrassa.cat/2018/10/22/sorganitza-la-solidaritat-amb-en-cesc-del-cdr-terrassa-i-les-altres-encausades-per-laccio-davant-el-tsjc/">Committees for the Defence of the Republic</a> – groups campaigning for the unofficial referendum result to be upheld – were charged with public disorder offences following a protest in Barcelona on February 23 2018. They could face two and a half years in prison.</p>
<p>In their resistance to the Spanish authorities, Catalans are drawing on a long tradition. Today’s political prisoners, whether accurately labelled or not, are the latest in a long line who have fought against the perceived injustices of the Spanish state. Foremost among these is Lluis Companys, the president of the generalitat who was arrested for declaring the Catalan republic on October 6 1934 and was executed by firing squad on October 15 1940. The historic parallel is not lost on the Catalan people. Nor it seems was the parallel lost on the right-wing Popular Party’s spokesperson, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-referendum-independence-spain-jail-carles-puigdemont-threat-leader-latest-a7991191.html">Pablo Casado</a>, who threatened Puigdemont, ahead of the unilateral declaration of independence, with the same fate as Companys.</p>
<p>Spain’s <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/10/25/inenglish/1540464607_998634.html">Supreme Court</a> has ordered that 18 former Catalan leaders stand trial for their role in the unilateral declaration of independence in 2017. The charges against them include rebellion, sedition, the misuse of public funds and disobedience. The trial is likely to take place in early 2019.</p>
<p>The issue of Catalan independence will not be solved by judicial actions. Politics is required. Pedro Sanchez, the socialist prime minister, has certainly taken a softer line than his predecessor, Mariano Rajoy. Nevertheless, the political negotiations necessary to solve the crisis will require a stronger government than the current minority socialist administration. It will also require the Catalan pro-independence parties to present a more united front than is currently the case. And ultimately, it will be hard to have any meaningful negotiations while there are political prisoners. Carla Ponsati’s lawyer in Scotland,<a href="https://www.elnacional.cat/en/politics/anwar-interview-spain-gangster_285804_102.html"> Aamer Anwar</a>, has said that ‘Talking to Spain now is like sitting down with a gangster holding hostages’. A long road lies ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The questions raised by the region’s failed bid for independence remain unanswered. And key figures remain in prison.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/985102018-06-29T13:44:38Z2018-06-29T13:44:38ZBoogie noches: how erotic cinema boom in 1970s helped shape modern Spain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225315/original/file-20180628-117374-1e88z9n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From poster of The Marvellous World of Sex. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>Madrid, June 1978. A sweltering heatwave is matched by the tensions bubbling through newspaper headlines. Nearly three years since the death of dictator Francisco Franco, politicians are intensely debating the new constitution at the Palacio de las Cortes. Will the Left accept the monarchy or demand a republic? Will the Right accept abolishing the death penalty and omitting any reference to the Catholic church? Will regions such as the Basque Country and Catalonia receive the sovereignty they demand? </p>
<p>Around the corner, people queue for the latest hit film. Is it Grease, newly premiered in New York and on its way to becoming a global colossus? No. Spanish audiences won’t be introduced to Danny, Sandy and the gang until September. Today’s crowd awaits a much more explicit celebration of cinematic sexuality: <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077513/">Las eróticas vacaciones de Stela</a> (Stela’s Erotic Vacations).</p>
<p>Played by Azucena Hernández, the reigning Miss Catalonia, Stela has returned from her strict Catholic boarding school and is set on disrupting this peaceful Castilian town. Unlike the negotiators in the congress, Stela is not diplomatic towards the guardians of Catholic morality. She sexualises everything – even a banister becomes an erotic toy as she slides down in ecstasy. She seduces a priest, a maid and her stepfather – she even flashes her own mother.</p>
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<p>Such films became possible after Spain <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2013/12/30/inenglish/1388413211_320751.html">abolished censorship</a> in December 1977. This was monumental – it is hard to convey how much censorship shaped public consciousness during the dictatorship. It created such hunger for erotic images that many made pilgrimages to France to see <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0070849/">Last Tango in Paris</a> (1972), among other films. Group tours of x-rated cinemas were even organised.</p>
<h2>Rated ‘S’ for sexual</h2>
<p>In Franco’s day, some Spaniards believed the world outside was freer than it was. When audiences saw Rita Hayworth’s famous scene in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038559/">Gilda</a> (1946), where she provocatively removes a long white glove onstage, many in Spain assumed she did a full striptease in the uncut version. </p>
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<p>Occasionally censorship even made things more lurid. In <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0046085/trivia">Mogambo</a> (1953), Spanish censors changed the script to conceal the adulterous relationship between Grace Kelly and Clark Gable’s characters, turning Kelly’s husband into her brother. When she later shares a bed with him, they appear to be committing a much greater sin. </p>
<p>Ending censorship gave free rein to what was known as the <em>destape</em>, literally “the undressing”. The “S” rating was created, allowing films with soft porn elements to infiltrate the mainstream. </p>
<p>S-rated films were generally cheap and big money makers. Stela’s Erotic Variations alone sold 600,000 tickets, and was followed by other great successes such as <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077910/">El mundo maravilloso del sexo</a> (The Marvellous World of Sex), <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078414/">Trampa sexual</a> (Sexual Trap) and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0076505/">La orgía</a> (The Orgy). The 17 S-rated films screened in 1978 probably attracted more customers than the four million people that went to see Grease. </p>
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<p>Neither was the <em>destape</em> limited to cinema. The magazine Interviú, formed in 1976, was creating waves with revealing covers of famous actresses, including a nude photo of Franco-era child star Marisol – sadly without her permission. </p>
<p>In February 1978 another iconic photograph appeared. It shows future Madrid mayor Enrique Tierno Galván giving actress/stripper Susana Estrada – star of El mundo maravilloso del sexo – a prize for being the most popular actress of the year. Her jacket has moved, revealing a breast, while she smiles unconcerned. The picture became an emblem of Spain’s transition to democracy, showing it was much more than a political process. </p>
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<span class="caption">Susana Estrada (right) and Enrique Tierno Galván (left)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marisa Flórez</span></span>
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<p>The S rating endured until 1983, when it was replaced by the more permissive but more marginalised X rating. Where the 1970s releases often included good scripts and serious social commentary, the <em>destape</em> was becoming more purely gratuitous by the early 1980s. </p>
<p>Since then the genre has often been considered an embarrassing footnote in Spanish cinema. But that risks missing something important. As one writer has <a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9780719062834/">put it</a>, Stela, like other young S-rated protagonists, “embodies the myriad ironies of the transition to democracy, for she does not merely awaken the village sexually, but reveals what was always simmering under the surface of franquista repression”. </p>
<p>Sex and nudity have been especially pervasive in the nation’s cinema over the past four decades. A recent book, <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-spanish-erotic-cinema.html">Spanish Erotic Cinema</a>, argues convincingly that sensual pleasure on Spanish screens is bound up with historical, political and social issues.</p>
<h2>Priests and politics</h2>
<p>A good example is <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078192/">El sacerdote</a> (The Priest), another S-rated success during that sultry summer of ‘78. It shows a priest torn between conservative ideology and sexual desires, awakened by a billboard of a woman in a bikini and the steamy confessions of an unhappy housewife. His inner turmoil reaches such a frenzy that he eventually castrates himself. </p>
<p>Director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0407061/">Eloy de la Iglesia’s</a> films are often criticised for being heavily didactic. Yet some <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-spanish-erotic-cinema.html">argue that</a> movies such as El sacerdote helped broaden the moral horizons of the audience. In October 1978, de la Iglesia premiered <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077438/">El diputado</a> (Confessions of a Congressman), one of many films that featured gay characters and arguably contributed to Spain’s widespread acceptance of homosexuality.</p>
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<p>The same summer also saw <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0077236/">Bilbao</a>, a landmark in the genre by director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000940/">Bigas Luna</a>. His work over the next two decades would blur erotic and art-house cinema. Penélope Cruz and Javier Bardem were launched to stardom in his 1992 send-up of Spanish stereotypes, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104545/">Jamón jamon</a> (Ham Ham), where they famously make love under one of the country’s emblematic bull-shaped highway billboards.</p>
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<p>More recently, the popular films <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0339806/">Torremolinos 73</a> (2004), <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1129422/">Los años desnudos</a> (The Naked Years, 2008) and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4922692/">Kiki, el amor se hace</a> (Quickie, Love is So, 2016) all pay homage to the genre. In this #MeToo era, many might prefer it was buried instead. Yet in contrast with the female sexual objects of the original <em>destape</em>, it has been <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-spanish-erotic-cinema.html">argued that</a> the women in Kiki, for example, are “utterly in control of their sexuality, well informed about various practices, open-minded and confident in their pursuit of their preferences and desires”. </p>
<p>The Spanish people <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402387908424239?journalCode=fwep20">approved</a> today’s constitution in the referendum of December 1978, founding a political order that now appears in disarray. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-new-government-in-spain-means-for-catalonia-97724">Catalan conflict</a> is rooted in that constitution’s negation of the right of Spanish regions to self-determination. The former president, Mariano Rajoy, <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-prime-minister-loses-no-confidence-vote-what-next-97564">was recently forced out</a> of office over party corruption. </p>
<p>Many now question the entire political culture that was forged in the transition years after dictatorship. If we consider the conscientious undressing of old morals and sexual hang-ups another of the founding acts of democratic Spain, this parallel process is arguably in much better health. To give just one example, Spain was one of the first countries <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/30/gayrights.spain">to legalise</a> same-sex marriage, preceded only by Holland and Belgium. While the difficulties with the <em>destape</em> are obvious, we should concede it has played an important role in creating the culture we see today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jesse Barker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Soon after the death of Franco, Spain began an experiment with censorship that brought graphic sex and nudity to mainstream cinemas.Jesse Barker, Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/977242018-06-07T10:52:36Z2018-06-07T10:52:36ZWhat a new government in Spain means for Catalonia<p>Spain’s new prime minister Pedro Sanchez rose to office against a backdrop of <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-prime-minister-loses-no-confidence-vote-what-next-97564">unprecedented drama</a>. But now he could capitalise on the circumstances that landed him the top job to resolve the conflict with Catalonia.</p>
<p>Sanchez successfully ousted his predecessor Mariano Rajoy by passing a motion of no confidence against the Partido Popular government. Seizing on the unique opportunity offered by the sentencing of several prominent PP officials in a long-running corruption trial, the opposition leader moved quickly. </p>
<p>Sanchez needed at least 176 votes but his Socialist party (PSOE) only had 84 seats and Ciudadanos, a centrist-liberal formation with a strong Spanish nationalist rhetoric, wouldn’t endorse a new left-wing government. So, Sanchez needed to muster the support of all other parties in the Spanish parliament. This included the left-wing party Podemos, and several nationalist parties from the Basque country and Catalonia, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). </p>
<p>At the same time, in Barcelona, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44109500">Quim Torra</a> – a Catalan nationalist hand-picked by the exiled former president Carles Puigdemont – was elected leader of a new Catalan government. This came after months of protracted negotiations that followed the extraordinary <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-snap-election-how-to-understand-a-confusing-result-89547">regional elections</a> of December 2017. These were called by the Spanish central government immediately after it suspended the Catalan government for having symbolically issued a unilateral declaration of independence after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-independence-referendum-how-the-disputed-vote-led-to-crackdown-82277">referendum</a> held on October 1.</p>
<p>But any hope from Madrid that these elections would quell nationalist fervour backfired. The three parties in favour of Catalan independence (JuntsPerCat, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Candidatura d’Unitat Popular) returned to parliament with a majority (albeit a slim one), determined to pursue their cause, setting them on a collision course with Madrid. </p>
<p>To avert this collision, Sanchez must now make good on the promise he made to his Catalan parliamentary allies to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Catalan government on how to resolve the ongoing conflict. </p>
<h2>The basis of a deal</h2>
<p>At the basis of the deal between these parties was the common goal of ousting Rajoy from power. The Catalan parties will offer stability for the Spanish government: support for the continuation of a minority PSOE administration until the end of the legislature in 2020 and support on the party’s economic and social policies. </p>
<p>In exchange, the PSOE will need to make progress dealing with Spain’s unsolved national and territorial conflict since its transition to democracy in the late 1970s. </p>
<p>In the short term, Sanchez must de-escalate the conflict by putting an end to the acrimonious relationship between Spain and Catalonia. That means being willing to listen and to talk. There is already a ring of cautious optimism on that front. Sanchez seems prepared to engage in dialogue – unlike Rajoy. </p>
<p>Then Sanchez must restore the Catalan government’s authority, restoring devolved powers to the regional parliament. He will also have to deal with the trickier matter of the nationalist leaders who were jailed last autumn. This is a fundamental demand among many Catalans, who see them as political prisoners. But it may not be easy for the party to intervene in a judicial process without it looking like obvious political meddling.</p>
<p>In the longer term, Sanchez will need to think creatively about how to engage the Catalan government over Catalonia’s constitutional future within Spain. He will be treading a thin line, either side of which stand staunch opponents. On one side are the dyed-in-the-wool Catalan republicans, who harbour a seemingly irrepressible will to assert Catalonia’s right to decide its future. They will almost certainly demand a new, legally sanctioned referendum on self-determination. On the other side are the defenders of national unity, the PP and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/05/why-spains-top-populist-is-a-centrist/">Ciudadanos</a>, which may well soon take over the mantle of Spanish nationalism. They hold an equally firm view that any concession on the issue of self-determination is not permissible. That view is shared by an important portion of Spanish public, many of which vote for the PSOE. With a dwindling basis of electoral support, Sanchez can’t afford to alienate them.</p>
<h2>Federal reform</h2>
<p>So Sanchez will have to remain committed to accommodating Catalonia within the framework of the constitution. What that eventually looks like will depend on what is made possible by the political coalition that supports reform. One potential strategy available to the PSOE is to (re)capitalise on its ties with the Catalan Socialist Party to reach out to moderate nationalist forces in the Catalan parliament. They could hash out an agreement over potential federal constitutional reform. </p>
<p>At the heart of any reform are two major longstanding demands that will have to be addressed. The Catalan government wants a new fiscal settlement and for Catalonia to be recognised as a distinct nation within Spain. These reforms can be achieved through a revision of Catalonia’s statute of autonomy and would need to be ratified in a referendum by Catalan voters.</p>
<p>National recognition would represent an acknowledgement of Catalans’ sovereignty and their “right to decide” their constitutional future – albeit within the parameters set by the Spanish constitution. A referendum on a new statute could also open the door to a democratic option on independence. However, at this point, that’s unlikely to happen. The main difficulty will be to ensure this new statute can’t be overturned by future judicial challenges that may water it down.</p>
<h2>A narrow chance for success</h2>
<p>The deal brokered to support the socialist minority government is still fresh and there isn’t a huge amount of trust between the parties. There’s even some lingering hostility. So while there is a chance to solve the conflict with Catalonia, it’s narrow. The deal may yet break down. </p>
<p>But if parties on all sides are prepared to listen to divergent political views – and if Sanchez’s party can show creative spirit – there is hope that a political change in Spain could bring about a constructive dialogue. That, in time, could form the basis of a renewed relationship between Catalonia and Spain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97724/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pere Almeda receives funding from different Spanish and Catalan public administrations. I'm affiliated with the Think Tank Fundació Catalunya Europa </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Toubeau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A strange coincidence of historical circumstances in Spain could, taken together, help to bring about a resolution to the crisis in Catalonia.Simon Toubeau, Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, University of NottinghamPere Almeda, Adjunct Lecturer, Universitat de BarcelonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/939792018-03-27T11:03:13Z2018-03-27T11:03:13ZArrest of Carles Puigdemont closes another chapter in Catalonia’s bid for independence<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43519438">detention</a> of five leading Catalan pro-independence politicians, followed 48 hours later by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/26/catalan-leader-carles-puigdemont-remanded-in-custody-in-germany">arrest and detention</a> of deposed Catalan President Carles Puigdemont in Germany, brings the extraordinary and tumultuous events of Spain and Catalonia since September 2017 closer to an end point. </p>
<p>Puigdemont had been living in self-imposed exile in Belgium, and was arrested in Germany on his return from a trip to Finland after a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43532217">European Arrest Warrant</a> was reissued for him. German authorities have 60 days to respond to Madrid’s request to extradite him back to Spain, where he and his colleagues are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-court-charges-13-catalan-independence-leaders-rebellion/">charged with</a> rebellion and misuse of public funds. </p>
<p>The attempted unilateral secession of Catalonia from Spain dramatically failed, as Puigdemont was the last remaining figure of significance who still stood by the notion of an independent Catalan Republic <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">declared on October 27, 2017</a>. </p>
<p>The Catalan process for secession, or independence, began in a political sense in 2012, though its root causes are much deeper. The turn in support for independence, reaching polling support as high as <a href="https://www.ara.cat/politica/Centre_d-Estudis_d-Opinio-CEO-independencia-si-no_0_941306030.html">55% in 2013</a>, occurred at the height of Spain’s greatest economic crisis since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonias-cultural-struggle-against-madrid-goes-back-centuries-89403">Catalonia's cultural struggle against Madrid goes back centuries</a>
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<p>Opinion polls aside, there has never been a majority support for independence in any regional election held since 2012, leading to a questionable legitimacy. This was compounded by Catalonia’s decision to try to break from Spain unilaterally from September 2017, based on the support of <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-separatist-parties-win-the-catalan-election-international-law-doesnt-provide-a-right-to-independence-86900">the 48%</a> of voters for Catalan separatist parties obtained in the election of September 2015.</p>
<p>The Spanish authorities, the main political parties and the government have repeatedly declared that the separation of a part of Spain from the national territory is illegal. Here lie the origins of legal mechanisms being used again now against Puigdemont and his colleagues to confront the independence movement: the state declares independence is “illegal” hence it is simply a matter for the courts. </p>
<p>From 2012 and with more intensity from 2014, Catalan institutions embarked on an intense international lobbying campaign to obtain international support and achieve the aim of becoming a new member state of the European Union. But five months after the proclamation of the independent Catalan Republic in October 2017, not one country in the world has recognised Catalonia’s independence.</p>
<p>These three elements, ambivalent social and political support, a state explicitly hostile to any attempt at separation and a complete absence of international support, have led to the almost complete defeat for Catalan independence. The capture and imprisonment of Puigdemont symbolically closes this phase.</p>
<h2>Independence never an inevitability</h2>
<p>Between 2012 and 2017, the Catalan movement for independence displayed extraordinary capacity for mobilisation, managing to bring a million people onto the streets of Barcelona almost every year. The movement was peaceful, optimistic and celebratory, confident that separation from Spain was eminently achievable and imminent. However, this relentlessly upbeat outlook seemed to prevent recognition of hard political reality. </p>
<p>In spite of the repeated warnings from the Spanish political and legal authorities regarding the impossibility of secession, the movement’s leaders seemed oblivious to it. In spite of public statements from a range of international leaders, including the European Union, supporting the continued unity of Spain, the movement told itself that when the time came, recognition for Catalonia was inevitable.</p>
<p>While arguably it had little choice, the EU has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-the-world-reacted-to-catalan-independence-declaration/">backed Spain</a> in the Catalan dispute. One consequence has been a eurosceptic turn within the Catalan independence movement over perceived betrayal by Brussels.</p>
<p>The Catalan movement for independence, as well as a number of internal and strategic errors, seriously misjudged the interest and willingness of the EU to countenance the break up of Spain. Yet, the EU is an alliance of states. Its <a href="http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html">2009 Lisbon Treaty</a> explicitly stated that member states must respect others’ territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The EU has been through repeated crises since 2008 and it seems astonishing that the leaders of Catalan independence thought the bloc might be supportive of further disruption. While accommodation might have been made for Scotland, this was because the British state was prepared to accept the separation of 5m Scots from a Britain of almost 65m should they vote for it in a referendum. Catalonia comprises a much higher proportion of the overall Spanish population (16%), while the Catalan economy is <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-spain-and-the-economic-consequences-of-a-split-85557">almost 20% of Spain’s overall</a> GDP. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-independence-movements-in-scotland-and-elsewhere-are-tongue-tied-over-catalonia-86669">Why independence movements in Scotland and elsewhere are tongue-tied over Catalonia</a>
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<p>With Spain hostile, any separation of Catalonia could only be highly destabilising, with potential knock on effects in a Europe gradually recovering from the financial crisis. </p>
<p>Since the autumn of 2017, there has been a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/spain/2018-02-05/why-spanish-nationalism-rise">dramatic resurgence</a> of Spanish nationalist sentiment in both Catalonia and Spain and a receding possibility of reforms of the 1978 Spanish constitution to adopt real federalism. </p>
<p>The Catalan independence movement is deeply divided between pragmatists and idealists and the optimism inherent in the movement since 2012 has been shattered. However, the grievances that produced the turn to secession in Catalonia have not even begun to be addressed and no meaningful resolution of the Catalan question will occur until the Madrid government recognises that it is a political problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dowling does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The former president of Catalonia is in a German prison, awaiting possible extradition to Spain where he faces charges of rebellion.Andrew Dowling, Senior Lecturer in Hispanic Studies, Cardiff UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/895472017-12-22T16:04:20Z2017-12-22T16:04:20ZCatalonia’s snap election: how to understand a confusing result<p>It wasn’t supposed to turn out like this. When the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, dismissed the Catalan government in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">October</a> and called a snap election, he anticipated that anti-independence parties would obtain a majority. The plan was to return Catalonia – and Spain – to “normality”.</p>
<p>Given that several prominent pro-independence figures, including former president Carles Puigdemont, spent the campaign in self-imposed exile or in prison (the former deputy prime minister Oriol Junqueras remains behind bars) the gamble appeared justified. Instead, the pro-independence bloc retains its overall majority, obtaining 70 of the regional parliament’s 135 seats – only two fewer than in the last regional election in 2015.</p>
<p>Puigdemont and Junqueras decided at the start of the campaign not to repeat their 2015 alliance Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes). This now appears shrewd. Their total number of seats increased by four to 66. The weak link in the pro-independence chain was the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy – CUP), the uncompromising anti-capitalist party which has enjoyed considerable influence during its five-year existence. It now has just four representatives, six fewer than in 2015.</p>
<p>Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) obtained its worst result in Catalonia, losing eight of the 11 seats obtained in 2015 and haemorrhaging more than 165,000 votes.</p>
<p>However, the anti-independence Ciudadanos (Citizens), led by <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/22/ines-arrimadas-darling-catalonias-silent-majority/">Inés Arrimadas</a> was the party that actually fared best. The centre-right party obtained more seats (37) and votes (1,100,000) than any other party, having benefited most from the collapse in PP support. Arrimadas’s presidential hopes were only dashed by the relative failure of the other parties opposed to independence. The Catalan Socialists (PSC) won a disappointing 17 seats (one more than in 2015).</p>
<p>Podemos’s Catalan variant, Catalunya en Comú–Podem (Catalunya in Common - We Can), was punished for an ambiguous position on independence which verged on cognitive dissonance. Its calculation that it could be a power broker after the election seems to have been misguided as the party retained just eight of its 13 seats. A geographical divide within Catalonia was also reaffirmed as support for independence was much lower in Barcelona than in the region’s other three provinces.</p>
<h2>A leader in exile</h2>
<p>Shortly after the results were announced, Puigdemont, speaking in Brussels, claimed – with some justification – that Rajoy had designed the election to take place in such a way as to assist the anti-independence cause. Instead, the overall majority in favour of independence has been reaffirmed.</p>
<p>Puigdemont’s own position in the aftermath of the election will now be the focus of speculation. He might understandably regard himself as the obvious candidate to be Catalan president but he is likely to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-a-lawyer-explains-the-charges-brought-against-carles-puigdemont-86715">arrested</a> should he return to Spain. Another key issue is the continued application of Article 155 of Spain’s constitution, suspending devolved powers. Whether it remains in force until the formation of a government in Barcelona remains to be seen.</p>
<p>Arrimadas has reminded her pro-independence opponents that her party actually won the election and indicated that she would strive to form a pro-unionist coalition. She nevertheless conceded that the electoral arithmetic meant that such a coalition would be difficult to achieve. The anti-independence bloc will nevertheless be relieved that its opponents once again fell short of 50% of the vote despite a remarkably high turnout of just under 82%.</p>
<h2>Rajoy’s next move</h2>
<p>Given the blow dealt to his credibility, Rajoy may now even consider bringing forward a general election – which is not officially due until mid-2020. The campaign would inevitably be dominated by the Catalan question and, beyond Catalonia, Rajoy’s uncompromising stance has been popular. An early vote would also provide him and those in favour of maintaining Catalonia’s status within Spain with a mandate from the electorate.</p>
<p>But early elections are not without risk. The shift from Rajoy’s Popular Party to Ciudadanos in Catalonia may spread to Spain. It might be argued that Catalonia was never a stronghold for the Popular Party in the first place, but the scale of the party’s collapse at the hands of Ciudadanos raises questions about Rajoy’s credentials. Is he really the figure best-placed to solve the constitutional crisis in the long term?</p>
<p>A further concern for Rajoy is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-european-unions-hands-are-tied-over-catalonia-85661">European Union</a> might even begin to reconsider its stance on Catalonia in the light of the election result. Thus far, the EU has unambiguously backed his anti-independence stance. The fact that those parties wishing to break free from Spain undeniably attract significant support may cause as much unease in Brussels as it does in Madrid.</p>
<p>For the pro-independence bloc, there is solace in the fact that it won most seats even if it failed to break through the crucial 50% threshold across the region. Within the anti-independence ranks, Ciudadanos obtained more than a quarter of the vote and more seats than any other party. Arrimadas has established herself as a key political figure who is more capable of attracting support in the region than the Popular Party, the Catalan Socialists, or the Catalan branch of Podemos, all of whom have been left with much to ponder.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, no party or bloc can claim outright victory. Whereas Rajoy hoped that the election would ultimately serve to catch the independence bloc on the wrong foot, he has instead entrenched further division. The absence of a clear way forward is of concern. Catalonia and Spain remain in crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89547/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The single biggest party was anti-independence but together, the pro-independence bloc is stronger.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathDavid Cutts, Professor of Political Science, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/894032017-12-20T14:36:40Z2017-12-20T14:36:40ZCatalonia’s cultural struggle against Madrid goes back centuries<p>Like all constitutions, the <a href="http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/ispania.pdf">1978 Spanish constitution</a> is a product of a very specific historical moment. General Francisco Franco <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/20/newsid_4421000/4421636.stm">had died</a> in 1975 and his political heirs understood the need for change: Francoism without Franco in a rapidly modernising country was not sustainable. </p>
<p>The democratic parties, including the Catalan nationalists, recognised they were too weak to impose a clean break and bring Franco’s henchmen to justice. The constitution was a pact between the most forward-looking Francoists and a heterogeneous opposition prepared to turn a blind eye to <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9055231/Franco-victims-relatives-relive-the-horror.html">atrocities</a> committed by Franco’s so-called nationalists during the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/spancivil/revision/1/">Civil War</a> and nearly four decades of dictatorship. </p>
<p>It is from this uneasy compromise that all recent political upheaval in Catalonia stems – including the latest instalment, the region’s election on December 21. To understand the conflict, however, you have to go back much further than 1978. Neither can you confine yourself to politics; everything is underpinned by the rise of Catalan culture and its battle to express itself. </p>
<h2>Renaissance years</h2>
<p>Today’s Catalan nationalism has its origins in the 19th-century Renaixença (Renaissance). This movement sought to revitalise Catalan culture and the language. It <a href="https://www.barcelonas.com/generalitat-of-catalonia.html">followed</a> a century of cultural and political repression by Spanish rulers, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Decree-of-Nueva-Planta">starting in</a> 1716. These included abolishing the Generalitat – the Catalan government – in favour of central control. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=836&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200189/original/file-20171220-4954-m5yah2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1050&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Joaquim Rubió i Ors.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.enciclopedia.cat/EC-GEC-0057242.xml">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>By the early 19th century, Catalonia <a href="https://www.barcelonas.com/cultural-renaixenca.html">had become</a> a major economy, with a sizeable cotton industry and export specialisms like shoes and glass bottles. The accompanying Renaixença sought to turn the Catalan language into the language of culture. It had various prominent intellectuals publishing works in Catalan; and later poets like <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ACRBDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT29&lpg=PT29&dq=Joaquim+Rubi%C3%B3+i+Ors+biography&source=bl&ots=lYAiH2bYnP&sig=mjQOYqLUUezXuXiq3yyxHfk5UNM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjNtvHmt5jYAhWhIMAKHRSiBbQ4ChDoAQhSMAc#v=onepage&q=Joaquim%20Rubi%C3%B3%20i%20Ors%20biography&f=false">Joaquim Rubió i Ors</a>, who helped build a literary movement by reviving a <a href="http://lameva.barcelona.cat/jocsflorals/ca/">medieval poetry festival</a> that continues today. </p>
<p>The Renaixença flowed into the Modernisme of the late 19th century and early 20th century – not to be confused with Anglo-Saxon Modernism or Spanish Modernismo. Modernisme was a broad church, from anarchists to conservatives, united in a genuine effort to Europeanise Catalan culture on all artistic fronts. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=883&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=883&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=883&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1110&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1110&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200191/original/file-20171220-4985-1ix1akp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1110&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Gaudi’s Sagrada Familia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sagrada_Fam%C3%ADlia._Façana_del_Naixement.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>The new generation had come to see the Renaixença as too parochial for the approaching century. Their focal point, after all, was Barcelona, by now a major European city. Leading lights included the writer <a href="http://www.visat.cat/traduccions-literatura-catalana/eng/autor/4/2/fiction/victor-catala.html">Caterina Albert i Paradís</a>, writing under the male pen name Víctor Català; the painter <a href="http://www.spainisculture.com/en/artistas_creadores/ramon_casas.html">Ramon Casas</a>; and the celebrated artist and architect <a href="https://www.barcelona.de/en/barcelona-modernisme-art-nouveau.html">Antoni Gaudí</a>. </p>
<p>On the back of these movements, a separate identity steadily grew. Catalan culture and politics came together after the Spanish election of 1901, which <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=trKvCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA44&lpg=PA44&dq=Catalonia+election+1901+Lliga+Regionalista&source=bl&ots=G2adN1bxo_&sig=p1klTbjjTsKjTHGED38B7YpHKEw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2uYPWupbYAhXFKMAKHVzeDXsQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=Catalonia%20election%201901%20Lliga%20Regionalista&f=false">was won</a> by the new Catalan regionalist party. In 1914 this led to the creation of the Mancomunitat, the first attempt at Catalan self-government since the 1700s. </p>
<p>The Mancomunitat (or Commonwealth) had limited powers but managed to harness the energies generated by Modernisme. It created a cultural infrastructure that included a standardised language and a network of libraries. The language was outlawed during Spain’s <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/12/scars-catalonia">dictatorship</a> under General Miguel Primo de Rivera in the mid-1920s, but the Mancomunitat paved the way for the Generalitat to be restored during the <a href="http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/history/second-spanish-republic">Second Spanish Republic</a> in the 1930s. </p>
<p>When the Civil War ended in 1939 with Franco’s victory, he launched a cultural and linguistic genocide against Catalonia. The Catalan language was banned; institutions were suppressed; Catalan names were not accepted. Every manifestation of Catalan culture and language was to be eradicated. This resumed and exacerbated the repression that had begun in the early 18th century.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/200192/original/file-20171220-4965-2d61lz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=523&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Spain’s strongman: Franco in 1959 (front).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Franco_eisenhower_1959_madrid.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>After 1978, Catalonia enjoyed some 30 years of relative contentment as one of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities, with its own parliament and statute of autonomy. The linguistic situation improved considerably, enabling Catalan culture to flourish once again. Yet crucially the language has always been officially subordinate to Spanish, a constant reminder of the potential for future conflict.</p>
<p>This arrived abruptly in 2010 after the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/">set aside</a> the region’s second statute of autonomy. Because the Spanish constitution says there is only one nation in Spain – the Spanish nation – the court held that references to Catalonia as a nation had no legal effect. </p>
<p>So began the process that led to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/oct/01/catalan-independence-referendum-spain-catalonia-vote-live">referendum</a> on October 1, 2017. Some 2.2m of 5.3m registered Catalans voted overwhelmingly for independence – nearer 3m if <a href="https://theintercept.com/2017/10/01/spanish-police-beat-catalan-voters-deepening-divide-threatens-spain/">claims about</a> police removing ballot boxes with 700,000 votes are accurate. The vote was despite Madrid declaring the whole process illegal <a href="https://theconversation.com/spanish-government-crushes-catalan-independence-dreams-at-a-high-price-85014">and countless scenes</a> of police brutality.</p>
<p>The new election took place with regional autonomy <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">suspended</a> and pro-independence leaders either in jail or self-imposed exile. The pro-independence parties <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/dec/21/catalonia-voters-results-regional-election-spain-live">held on</a> to their parliamentary majority, despite the fact that the unionist Citizens party won more votes than any other. </p>
<h2>Nationalist impulses</h2>
<p>Many people are understandably wary of nationalisms, yet it is vital to make distinctions. The Catalan version, for example, is not race-related. It is a civic phenomenon that revolves around cultural values, above all the language. This arguably explains the systematic attempts by the Spanish state to undermine, marginalise or eradicate it: the Other can only be tolerated if they speak Spanish; that is, if they can be assimilated. </p>
<p>Catalan nationalism may not even be the driving force behind the recent push for independence: it is the narrow-mindedness of Spanish nationalism, its inability or unwillingness to accept the Other, that has persuaded a substantial proportion of Catalans that their future would be brighter with independence. </p>
<p>Now that pro-independence parties have again an overall majority in the parliament, they will have to rethink their strategy vis-à-vis the uncompromising Spanish government. As a nation state, Spain has a huge repressive apparatus at its disposal; Catalonia is a stateless nation that’s only strength lies in citizens determined to plough the independence furrow peacefully. The contest is extremely uneven, but then nobody ever said the road to independence would be smooth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordi Larios does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Want to understand the Catalan election? You need to go back a long way.Jordi Larios, Professor of Spanish, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/869002017-12-18T13:08:57Z2017-12-18T13:08:57ZEven if separatist parties win the Catalan election, international law doesn’t provide a right to independence<p>Voters in Catalonia will go to the polls on December 21 in an election triggered by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">recent crisis</a> over the region’s declaration of independence from Spain. </p>
<p>If separatist parities <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/05/pro-catalonia-independence-parties-seen-winning-election-poll.html">succeed at the ballot box</a> it’s likely they will claim this as a legitimate mandate for independence. But this is not a sound interpretation of the international law of self-determination – and the result of the election cannot be seen as a proxy for independence.</p>
<p>Both those for and against the region’s right to claim independence from Spain argue that their position is grounded in international law. The Catalan government, prior to being <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">deposed</a> on October 27, claimed that the international right of all peoples to <a href="http://legal.un.org/avl/ls/states.html#self-determination">self-determination</a> afforded the region the “right to independence” and the international legitimacy of their expectations – an argument supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/self-determination-is-legal-under-international-law-its-hypocritical-to-argue-otherwise-for-catalonia-86558">by some commentators</a>. </p>
<p>But self-determination and “a right to independence” are not synonymous. International law supports independence as a legitimate outcome of self-determination only under <a href="http://www.un.org/Docs/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/2625%20(XXV)">limited circumstances</a>. There are three circumstances:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The self-determining territory is under foreign colonial rule.</p></li>
<li><p>The territory is subject to gross violations of human rights and humanitarian atrocities committed by the state. </p></li>
<li><p>The territory is excluded from the political process of the state.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Given that Catalonia is not a colony, post-Franco Spain has not committed gross human rights violations in the region, and Catalonia enjoys <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii793/1998canlii793.pdf#page=70">political inclusion at every level of government in Spain</a>, it fails to meet these three circumstances. That means international law does not support Catalonia’s claim of an international “right to independence” under the current circumstances. </p>
<h2>Quebec and Scotland</h2>
<p>In the bids for independence of Quebec and Scotland, domestic political negotiation resulted in the Canadian and UK governments authorising referenda to be held over independence in each place. Holding a referendum does not necessarily give a region the right to secede if voters opt for independence, rather it creates an obligation on the parent state to act in good faith. There is no “automatic” right to secede created. </p>
<p>A landmark 1998 ruling in Canada on the issue of Quebec’s secession is a useful reference point here. For any independence referendum to be effective, the Canadian Supreme Court <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii793/1998canlii793.pdf#page=4">stated</a> that where there is a clear answer to a clear question with a clear majority, a government cannot ignore the result. However, the extent of that obligation is for the government to enter into good faith negotiations with the region on the terms of departure – and these negotiations may not mean necessarily lead to independence. </p>
<p>Prior to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, the <a href="http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102230945/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Agreement-final-for-signing.pdf">Scottish and UK governments agreed</a> to legally respect its outcome, and the appropriate constitutional powers were transferred to Scotland. Both sides accepted as a matter of law the consequences attached to the result. </p>
<p>In Catalonia, the independence referendum on October 1 was held outside the powers of the Catalan parliament – a <a href="http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/docs/BOE/BOE-A-2017-8475.pdf">position confirmed</a> by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This is not to say that it was rebellion or sedition to pursue a referendum, rather it was beyond the Catalan government’s legal powers to unilaterally enact its consequences. Therefore, the result – which was in favour of independence – was not recognised either domestically or internationally. </p>
<h2>Beyond the ballot box</h2>
<p>Self-determination in democratic states is normally fulfilled within the <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii793/1998canlii793.pdf#page=66">constitutional framework of an existing state</a>. The failure of separatist political parties to achieve constitutional amendments or agreements is <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1998/1998canlii793/1998canlii793.pdf#page=71">not a denial of this right</a>. Except in the extreme circumstances outlined above, relying on self-determination to provide an “automatic right to independence” is a dangerous misrepresentation of international law that threatens those states which adhere to democratic principles.</p>
<p>The electoral success of separatist parties at the ballot box does not give a legitimate mandate for independence. If separatist parties do win on December 21, it will not give Catalonia the right to secede. At best, it will require Madrid to engage in good faith dialogue with Barcelona on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41913520">potential constitutional change in Spain</a>. </p>
<p>None of this foregoes the possibility of the emergence of an independent Catalonia. There may be several compelling political or social concerns for fulfilling self-determination rights of the Catalans that could be presented as part of negotiations with Madrid. But there cannot be an ultimatum from the Catalan separatists that independence must be on the table in future negotiations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Revel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why the international law of self-determination does not support Catalonia’s claim of an international right to independence from Spain.George Revel, PhD Candidate in International Law, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/856882017-11-23T12:36:37Z2017-11-23T12:36:37ZFour things the Catalan crisis can teach us about social unity<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41551466">Catalan crisis</a> has made headlines numerous times around the world over the past few months. It has sparked heated arguments between pro-independance and anti-independence supporters. And in many of the reports, the Catalan people – especially pro-independants – have been referred to as “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/meet-the-two-jailed-activists-behind-catalonias-independence-movement/2017/10/20/a0a10e4a-b4e0-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.1cf6739b184c">troublemakers</a>” and “nationalists”. </p>
<p>While some Catalan people might indeed be nationalists, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/catalan-crisis-nationalism-171019101108496.html">not everyone</a> is. And in this way, accepting a simplistic representation of individuals limits our understanding of complex human beings, and complex societies. Not only is this unfair, it is also dangerous, as it puts social cohesion at risk. </p>
<p>As a researcher of intercultural communication and education, I spend a lot of my time investigating how people can learn to accept and respect cultural diversity. I also look into how people can interact peacefully with those who are different from themselves. These are important skills to have, because all of us encounter people who are culturally different to us on a daily basis. This can either be in the immediate reality or mentally – through things like newspapers, TV, books and films.</p>
<p>The Catalan crisis has shown how people living in the <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/10/06/catalan-independence-divides-families-on-whatsapp">same country can have strongly opposing views</a> – which are sometimes different to friends, <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/10/01/families-divided-over-catalan-independence">family members or neighbours</a>. And for some of these people, inflamed passions and lack of understanding have led to violence and misunderstandings, protests and the severing of personal relationships.</p>
<p>It is clear then that being able to accept and respect other people’s views and cultures helps people to live harmoniously in multicultural societies. And in this way, there is a lot that can be learnt from what has happened in Spain.</p>
<h2>1. No two people are the same</h2>
<p>In the midst of the current <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41704759">political conflict in Spain</a>, it is important to attempt to understand what may unite the Catalan people, but also to develop an understanding of the unique complexity of each person. Catalan people do not make up a homogeneous group – based on their shared (national) culture. Nor does any given group of people. </p>
<p>The contemporary societies we live in are multicultural. And a broad understanding of culture involves differences among the citizens of such societies in terms of nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, gender, sexual orientation, abilities and disabilities. In this way, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14708470903267384">we all belong to multiple cultural groups</a> and as a result have multiple cultural identities.</p>
<h2>2. It’s time to ditch the stereotypes</h2>
<p>To coexist peacefully in any multicultural society, we need to resist the human tendency of thinking in stereotypes and of ascribing imaginary identities to others. Thinking in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stereotype">stereotypes</a> prevents people from grasping individual complexity. Stereotypes reduce individuals to a prevalent characteristic – which can be real or imaginary. Even when an attribute is real, it might not be stable over time and across different situations. This is because <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Researching-Interculturality-Routledge-Intercultural-Communication/dp/0415739128">culture</a> is something that is fluid, dynamic and context-specific – it is ever changing and always evolving, just like us. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195862/original/file-20171122-6016-1dr1lr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spain is reportedly ‘ready to discuss’ greater fiscal autonomy for Catalonia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. It’s not just enough to have an opinion</h2>
<p>Everyone has the right to agree or disagree with the fight of some Catalan people to gain their <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-spain-and-the-economic-consequences-of-a-split-85557">independence from Spain</a>. In fact, in democratic societies, we are all free to hold and respectfully support our own opinion on any matter. But this right comes with a responsibility: to learn as much as possible about the matter at hand and about the people involved. For example, many people still don’t know that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20345071">Catalunya</a> is an autonomous region of Spain, with its own language, its own historical and cultural heritage. </p>
<h2>4. Walking in someone else’s shoes pays off</h2>
<p>One of the most powerful ways of understanding others is by stepping into their shoes, to see the world through their eyes. Empathy can be <a href="https://www.thefreedictionary.com/empathy">defined</a> as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The ability to identify with or understand the perspective, experiences, or motivations of another individual and to comprehend and share another individual’s emotional state. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>No doubt, empathising with others takes an effort and requires people to step-out of their comfort zone. But caring for others is a social investment – because everyone will ultimately benefit from a spirit of mutual understanding and care.</p>
<p>Thinking and acting in these ways – with more knowledge and with greater empathy, without prejudice, and without leaning on stereotypes – would allow people to value those who think and feel differently. And it would also make it easier for the voices of the “smaller”, the “weaker”, or simply the “other” to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-disregard-for-catalan-press-freedom-is-setting-a-dangerous-precedent-84922">heard and respected</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85688/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eva Polymenakou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>We need to educate ourselves daily if we aspire to live peacefully in a multicultural society.Eva Polymenakou, PhD candidate in Intercultural Communication and Education,, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866692017-11-03T16:51:04Z2017-11-03T16:51:04ZWhy independence movements in Scotland and elsewhere are tongue-tied over Catalonia<p>Catalonia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">unilateral declaration of independence</a> already seems so long ago. It’s hard to believe it is only a week since the provocative move by Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont unleashed a chain of events including Madrid resuming direct rule of the region, Puigdemont retreating to Belgium and Spanish premier Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-the-prospect-of-an-election-has-everyone-nervous-86631">calling</a> snap Catalan elections for December. </p>
<p>Whether the ringleaders of the UDI will be allowed to stand is unclear at the time of writing: eight <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">have been jailed</a> by a Madrid court pending an investigation over charges of sedition, rebellion and misuse of public funds. An international arrest warrant has been issued against Puigdemont to extradite him from Brussels. </p>
<p>Leaders of Europe’s other independence and autonomy movements, particularly in Scotland but also in Corsica, Flanders and the Basque Country, are doubtless following every twist and turn. So how are these events likely to impact on their ambitions? </p>
<p>At the outset, it is worth remembering these separatist surges tend to have roots in common. They are often less about nationalism for its own sake than part of the anti-establishment insurgency following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/six-charts-that-show-how-much-the-world-has-changed-since-the-2007-08-financial-crisis-83477">financial crash of 2007/08</a>. Even though Spain has been caught in a perfect storm that included the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17549970">eurozone crisis</a>, radical and populist parties on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/31/podemos-revolution-radical-academics-changed-european-politics">left</a> and <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/05/15/meet-ciudadanos-the-party-dreaming-of-a-spanish-remake-of-macrons-success">right</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-corruption-pp-rajoy-never-ending-problem-graft-ignacio-gonzalez/">corruption scandals</a> and high youth unemployment, there are sufficient parallels with movements elsewhere to make events in Catalonia seem of much broader importance. </p>
<p>In Scotland, there’s an additional similarity. The rise of the Ciudadanos party in Catalonia was partly due to its anti-independence stance – much like the revival of the Scottish Conservatives under Ruth Davidson. On the other hand, the Basque Country may share all the Spanish context but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/europe/spain-catalonia-basque-independence.html">was weary</a> of separatism at the time of the crash after decades of division over the issue. In that part of Spain it was the anti-establishment pro-Madrid Podemos that won the most votes in the last national election.</p>
<h2>Bullets or ballots?</h2>
<p>The non-violent tactics of the Catalan separatists are among the most notable characteristics of the crisis. They contrast sharply, of course, with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11183574">separatist terrorism</a> in the Basque Country before ETA gave up arms <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/basque-separatist-eta-historic-weapons-mariano-rajoy">in 2014</a>. This has probably helped the Catalan separatists to win more sympathetic coverage in the international media. </p>
<p>Puigdemont, a former journalist, is generally considered to have played a subtler and more reasonable game than Rajoy – particularly after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/03/catalonia-tensions-rise-as-strikes-held-over-police-violence-during-referendum">obstructive actions and violence shown by</a> the Guardia Civil on October 1, the day of the independence referendum. Appealing over the heads of EU leaders, repeatedly making statements in English to the international media, has not been a bad strategy when trust in the political establishment is at an all-time low.</p>
<p>If this is <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/catalan-threat-to-unleash-mass-civil-disobedience-8vgf9w65b">followed by</a> successful use of peaceful mass civil <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-civil-disobedience-and-where-the-secession-movement-goes-now-86425">disobedience</a> in the wake of Spain revoking Catalonia’s autonomy, it could inspire other independence movements. Such tactics were famously effective in the US against racial discrimination <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/nonviolencekey-to-civil-rights-movement/1737280.html">in the 1960s</a>, albeit Catalans neither appear to have the law on their side nor the ability to shame the government to intervene on their behalf. Whether this ultimately means such disobedience would fail, however, is far from certain. </p>
<h2>Europe snub</h2>
<p>The EU presents opportunities and challenges for its minority nations. Like the Catalans, Scotland’s SNP is deeply wedded as a party to the EU – even if some of its supporters <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14950013.36__of_SNP_and_Labour_supporters_backed_Brexit__finds_survey/">are not</a>. But with the EU broadly seen to be siding with Spain against the Catalans, it could be increasingly difficult for the party to maintain its current policy. </p>
<p>If the price of independence is for Catalans to be ejected from the EU, for example, where does this leave the SNP strategy of pursuing independence inside the EU? And where does it leave the Flemish nationalists’ aim of increasing the powers of Flanders within Belgium until it is independent?</p>
<p>These fault lines have already been visible since the Catalan UDI. Scottish first minister Nicola Sturgeon and her government have been <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nicola-sturgeon-snp-catalonia-the-scottish-nationalists-catalan-dilemma/">careful to</a> call for dialogue rather than for the declaration of independence to be recognised. Perhaps fearful of Spain blocking a potential bid for EU membership by an independent Scotland in years to come, the Scottish government has left it to a group of members of the parliament <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/msps-call-for-independent-republic-of-catalonia-to-be-recognised-1-4601309">to welcome</a> the declaration instead. Contrast this with the president of the Corsican assembly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-28/corsican-assembly-president-hails-birth-of-catalan-republic">welcoming</a> the birth of a new republic, for instance. </p>
<p>Meanwhile in Belgium the Flemish nationalist party N-VA, which is part of the ruling coalition, has been put in an awkward position with the arrest warrant. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-28/belgium-s-nationalists-keep-their-distance-from-catalan-campaign">So far</a>, at a national level, the party line <a href="https://sceptr.net/2017/11/catalaanse-ministers-gevangenis-vlaamse-n-va-ministers-ontzet/">has been that</a> this is a legal, not a political, matter and that it is inappropriate to intervene. In contrast, at a regional level Geert Bourgeois, minister-president of Flanders, has <a href="https://sceptr.net/2017/11/catalaanse-ministers-gevangenis-vlaamse-n-va-ministers-ontzet/">condemned</a> the Spanish government and has been tweeting in opposition to the latest moves by the Spanish courts. </p>
<h2>Events, dear boy</h2>
<p>Overall, the Catalonia crisis may lead to a rise in minority nationalism around Europe in the short-term. But what happens in the longer term is likely to depend on how events in Spain play out. A peaceful and prosperous Republic of Catalonia within the EU would greatly encourage other minority nations to assert themselves – just like the independence of the Baltic states did in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Equally a descent into chaos would have the opposite effect, as would a decisive victory by pro-Spanish parties in the Catalan election on December 21. In this scenario, the analogy would be the break-up of the former Yugoslavia <a href="https://www.petergeoghegan.com/2014/09/02/what-scotland-can-learn-from-balkanisation/">putting independence movements</a> on the defensive about the dangers of nationalism. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/193203/original/file-20171103-1032-1jv3538.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Forward march!</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/madrid-spain-october-7-2017-manifestation-731383261?src=1wNqzlk6wRxCRjH390l0TQ-1-45">Lord Kuernyus</a></span>
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<p>A sobering and crushing defeat for Catalan separatists would reinforce the view in the SNP that they should tread carefully. It would perhaps convince the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/happened-catalonia-happen-scotland-171030134957987.html">Flemish</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/europe/spain-catalonia-basque-independence.html">Basque</a> separatists that their gradualist approaches are the right ones. </p>
<p>Despite this uncertainty around the lessons from Catalonia, central governments in London, Paris and Madrid will be in no doubt about the challenge facing them. They have to find a way of rebuilding support for their centralised countries while continuing to retrench their welfare states. Whatever happens in Catalonia, that looks like being one of the key conundrums for decades to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William McDougall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Barcelona has become the test case for separatists Europe over.William McDougall, Lecturer in Politics, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/867152017-11-02T14:41:40Z2017-11-02T14:41:40ZCatalonia: a lawyer explains the charges brought against Carles Puigdemont<p>For many weeks the situation in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">Catalonia</a> had been extremely delicate. The Catalan government took the nuclear option when it issued a <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">unilateral declaration of independence</a>. For the Spanish government the retaliation was simple: using the <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">constitution</a> to take direct control of some competences of the Catalan government and parliament – usually devolved from Madrid. Cold war logic might have suggested that the potential reciprocal damage that each party could inflict on the other would lead them to avoid using either nuclear option. But this did not happen. Keep weapons out of reach of children.</p>
<p>Now, the Catalan authorities who issued the unilateral declaration of independence face criminal charges in Spain – adding another layer of uncertainty and confusion.</p>
<p>The Spanish public prosecutor has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/spanish-prosecutor-calls-for-rebellion-charges-against-catalan-leaders">filed a lawsuit</a> before the Supreme Court and the Audiencia Nacional (a Spanish high court) against members of the former Catalan government and parliament. The charges are the crimes of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement.</p>
<p>Several Catalan parliamentarians have attended court in Madrid to hear the charges but ousted president Carles Puigdemont has not so far been among them. He is believed to be in Brussels. The president of the supreme court has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/02/spanish-court-question-catalonia-separatists-except-puigdemont">warned</a> that an arrest warrant could be issued to bring Puigdemont in. </p>
<p>The first two of the above mentioned charges are particularly important. They are the most politically charged matters. The offence of rebellion refers to the act of violently and publicly uprising with the aim of fully or partially repealing, suspending or amending the constitution, or of declaring independence on behalf of part of the national territory. The maximum punishment for this offence is 25 years in prison.</p>
<p>The unilateral declaration of independence of the Catalan Parliament is the core element of the claimed offence in this case. This was clearly a public uprising to declare independence for part of the territory.</p>
<h2>Jail time</h2>
<p>The only question is whether this particular uprising could be described as “violent”. Whether or not this was an offence of rebellion hinges on that point. That’s why the Spanish public prosecutor also accused the former Catalan authorities of the offence of sedition. That refers to those individuals not covered by the felony of rebellion who rise up tumultuously to prevent the application of laws. </p>
<p>In case the courts consider that the unilateral declaration of independence did not exactly fit the requirements for the application of the felony of rebellion, it is very likely that they will consider that at least an offence of sedition took place. Those who commit sedition can be punished with up 15 years of imprisonment. This adds to the potential offence of embezzlement, punished with up to eight years of imprisonment and the temporary deprivation of the exercise of the right of passive suffrage – the right to stand as a candidate in elections. </p>
<p>All this will probably add more trauma to the trauma. The idea of independence has already polarised Catalan society to dramatic levels. The potential imprisonment of the former Catalan authorities might further fuel that division. </p>
<p>The trial might also play a prominent role in the Catalan elections to be held on December 21. The political framing of the judicial proceedings will be among the major topics for political discussion during the campaign, and it’s unclear whether the former Catalan authorities now facing charges will choose to stand as candidates in the elections. If they are found guilty by a court after they have been elected, they will automatically lose their seats in parliament.</p>
<p>All of these are major political issues, but ones that courts are not expected to take into account. The judicial logic, strictly speaking, is one of application of law to the case, ideally without regard to political considerations. And from a legal perspective it’s very difficult to argue that the unilateral declaration of independence did not involve any criminal offence – be it either rebellion or sedition. The shocking result is that we might soon see a former president of the Catalan government facing a jail sentence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86715/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pablo José Castillo Ortiz is currently funded by the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Sheffield to carry out a Strategic Secondment at Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid. </span></em></p>After declaring independence, regional leaders stand accused of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement. But what does that mean?Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, Lecturer in Spanish Law, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864252017-11-02T09:57:30Z2017-11-02T09:57:30ZCatalonia: civil disobedience and where the secession movement goes now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192866/original/file-20171101-19853-1x6y1x7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/68637044@N05/23628067908/in/photolist-BZW2pb-Cey3S1-Z2UxJS-Y2rRPj-YnNj9G-oTFVc9-pKDLzd-Z4qrX1-Z2R5yf-fPhFVk-Z6Zfqz-a4yMJw-C17BNm-YDuLJe-fbkZ3F-Z6Ym14-Z77EZa-BZV3oC-YDuMfK-C16yQE-nz5SVJ-YHjcyS-Y2pumJ-Z2QuXC-ZUwD7t-Z4qWj1-d9VTfw-Z2SqoJ-YLAn2U-fG5ui4-Z2W3Cw-YCh2bs-Z4psVW-feLPot-Y2oUPy-Z4gjpU-YHcXMW-Y1ybXT-YDPzV3-Z2LtGu-Z2YrHf-9axmrJ-Z2TcpL-Y5ZktB-Z2KQym-Y2qiB5-Z7azhT-Y5QLaP-BZUN6E-Z7JPBi">Sasha Popovic/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As tension increases in Catalonia, there have been <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-spanish-direct-rule-civil-disobedience-police-teacher-firefighters-public-sector-catalan-a8016766.html">calls for widespread civil disobedience</a> against the Spanish government. Even the recent referendum itself, along with its <a href="http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/11/18/catalan-democratic-rebellion/">2014 precursor</a>, have been described as acts of civil disobedience. </p>
<p>This popularity of gathering en masse in disobedience to the central government has been inspired in large part by the anti-austerity efforts of one group: the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca or <a href="http://afectadosporlahipoteca.com/">Platform for the Mortgage-Affected</a> (PAH). The outgoing disobedient Catalan government is a peculiar mix of anti-austerity parties, which have supported the PAH’s fight for people’s housing rights, and the Catalan establishment party that has generally opposed it.</p>
<p>The PAH was founded in Barcelona in 2009 in the aftermath of the financial crisis, which burst the Spanish housing bubble. It now has around 200 groups across Spain. Barcelona’s mayor, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/26/ada-colau-barcelona-most-radical-mayor-in-the-world">Ada Colau</a> was the movement’s spokesperson before moving into institutional politics. The PAH is famous for its innovative protests, which it calls acts of civil disobedience. This includes physically stopping evictions, organising sit-ins in banks and squats in empty buildings that belong to banks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/192871/original/file-20171101-19889-14nc07l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">PAH has mobilised a large portion of the Catalan population.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/imagenenaccion/8481858349/in/photolist-dVvJZ4-dVvK3z-ebRB6Z-bWk5iJ-aqukVK-dVBkoJ-dVrGMG-bWk421-dVm7uX-ebRAvR-bWk52y-bWk4UG-bWk4wY-dVrGFy-dUwryA-bWk4P7-dVvJAP-ngnYFA-dYA28b-aqx1Ls-arDqVw-e19ryF-dVm7Ex-dYuj96-aqx1GU-ebRzJa-ebXfvG-aqx1Mq-dKvbbs-bWk4FQ-e6xEpY-eiKquC-ebXfiS-V55zSE-dVnunJ-dMoW3o-oQvnbD-e6s2Ek-arAMyz-nxSyot-aqx1J9-ebRzxB-dNNpcJ-dWmMC4-auAbkK-eiJWAE-dVKcob-ebRAnv-auCHp9-e19tcV">Imagen en Acción/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
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<p>The movement arose as a response to hundreds of thousands of Spanish households facing mortgage defaults, <a href="http://time.com/4007349/spain-evictions-housing-crisis/">evictions</a>, homelessness and lifelong debt. Unlike many other countries, Spain lacks personal bankruptcy legislation. This leaves people in negative equity with large debts even after having their homes repossessed and becoming homeless. In contrast to all the evictions and homelessness, Spain has more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/23/europe-11m-empty-properties-enough-house-homeless-continent-twice">3m empty homes</a>, mainly in the hands of banks, vulture funds and other financial institutions.</p>
<p>Through the PAH, people <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=caD17RKJfbc">collectively put pressure</a> on both the banks and the state to cancel people’s debts and provide social housing. The movement campaigns for legal changes to eradicate mortgage debt for repossessed families and increase social housing by using the empty housing stock. Alongside this, the PAH practices civil disobedience, both to support the campaign and to solve the homelessness and indebtedness of individual households. </p>
<h2>In action</h2>
<p>The PAH stops evictions everyday across Spain by gathering dozens of people at short notice to block the doorway of families due to be evicted. In most cases, bailiffs and police refrain from forcing their way in and the eviction is suspended or postponed. Through sit-ins, the PAH puts pressure on the bank to negotiate and to pardon mortgage debt and provide social housing. In many cases, usually after years of struggle, families achieve these aims in full or in part. </p>
<p>The PAH also runs a social housing project called <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TkrM-zBGjBQ">Obra Social</a> by taking control of empty properties that are owned by banks. Here, the PAH occupies entire empty apartment blocks and carries out a needs-based assessment of which families should be allowed to move in. </p>
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<p>The aim is to turn the buildings into official social housing where the households pay an affordable rent based on their income. Most households in Obra Social buildings remain, some have been granted permission to stay, and only in very few cases have people been evicted from them. </p>
<p>These seemingly radical methods of political activism have gained widespread legitimacy. <a href="http://metroscopia.org/sentencia-escraches-y-burbuja/">Most Spanish people</a> now think that housing and mortgage legislation illegitimately favours the banks and that adequate housing should be a right, as <a href="http://www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=47&tipo=2">article 47</a> of the Spanish constitution states.</p>
<h2>Legitimacy vs the law</h2>
<p>Civil disobedience is a liberal concept, which (unlike anarchism) does not mean a general disregard for the law. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. claimed to have <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/martin-luther-kings-letter-from-birmingham-jail/274668/">“the very highest respect for the law”</a>, while disobeying illegitimate discriminatory segregation laws. For the practitioners of civil disobedience, legitimacy comes from a higher sense of morality or justice than the law that they protest.</p>
<p>This separation between the legal and the legitimate lies at the heart of civil disobedience. And over the last eight years, the PAH has made civil disobedience acceptable to a large part of the Catalan population.</p>
<p>Nobody disputes that the Spanish law and <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">constitution</a> leave no room for secession. For the Spanish government, the buck stops with the constitution (though not when it comes to housing apparently). </p>
<p>For the <a href="http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/politica/sondeo-GAPS-preve-participacion-referendum_0_691531939.html">majority of Catalans</a>, who want a proper referendum, this position lacks legitimacy because they see their right to decide their future as a higher form of morality and justice than the constitution. For many observers outside of Spain, a legal and orderly referendum also seems like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/spains-hard-line-on-catalonia-is-no-way-to-handle-a-serious-secession-crisis-86243">reasonable solution</a>.</p>
<p>So the situation is ripe for widespread civil disobedience against the Spanish government in Catalonia. <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/27/spanish-government-demands-special-powers-could-remove-catalan/">Unilateral declarations of independence</a>, without a proper referendum, are unlikely to gain legitimacy for the Catalan government internationally. But, equally, more repression from the central government will likely reduce its legitimacy. </p>
<p>Catalan institutions may now become laboratories for how to disobey state policies. For many Catalans, it will mean a form of resisting occupation. And if this disobedience remains civil and non-violent, it could well win the battle for international legitimacy, too.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Berglund received funding from ESRC. </span></em></p>The situation in Catalonia is ripe for widespread civil disobedience against the Spanish government.Oscar Berglund, Senior Teaching Associate in Public Policy, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/865282017-11-02T02:54:04Z2017-11-02T02:54:04ZHow the crisis in Catalonia is helping Rajoy consolidate power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/192706/original/file-20171031-18738-j12wxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rajoy leaves the Spanish Parliament in Madrid on Oct. 25, 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Francisco Seco</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The news from Catalonia is alarming and confusing. How did things come to this, in a European Union member state, in 2017?</p>
<p>First came <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/oct/01/catalan-independence-referendum-spain-catalonia-vote-live">a referendum vote in favor of secession</a> with <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-41463955/catalonia-referendum-violence-as-police-block-voting">police blocking voters from balloting</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41780116">a declaration of independence</a>.</p>
<p>The backlash swiftly followed: <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-19/spanish-government-to-proceed-with-suspending-catalan-autonomy-j8y73fog">The autonomous government of Catalonia was suspended by the Spanish government in Madrid</a>, huge crowds demonstrated in Barcelona <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41794087">against</a> Catalan independence and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/spanish-prosecutor-calls-for-rebellion-charges-against-catalan-leaders">independence leaders were threatened with arrest</a> <a href="http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20171031/432503997774/lamela-investigacion-rebelion-puigdemont-declarar.html">for sedition and rebellion</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=9KJ4VN4HxosC&printsec=frontcover&dq=greer+nationalism+and+self-government&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-sunhj5nXAhXCPZoKHXa7AKIQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q&f=false">a student of the political history</a> of Catalonia, especially the region’s relationship with Spain, I’m alarmed by these unprecedented events. The key question is: Why now?</p>
<h2>Changing the rules</h2>
<p>After all, Catalan nationalism and the Spanish state are not new. Catalonia has been a nation with a distinctive culture for centuries. It was the center of the Crown of Aragon, then united with Castille in 1492 to create Spain as we know it. Spain and Catalonia also have a long history of pragmatic accommodation. Spanish political culture is marked by memories of the nation’s Civil War and the dictator Francisco Franco. That means there is little popular support for conflict, unilateral declarations of independence or police action. </p>
<p>And yet, I don’t find the test of wills surprising. What’s surprising is the extent to which leaders are breaking “rules” of conflict between the Spanish government and Catalan nationalists. Under the old rules, the game would start with dramatic claims, divert into dialogue and end in complex pacts. One example of such an approach is the democratic Spanish constitution adopted in 1978 after Franco’s death and Spain’s democratic transition. </p>
<p>But now key players have stopped playing by these rules. A previous Spanish government, led by the Socialists, agreed to give Catalonia <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=h0sECbWJrfEC&lpg=PA81&ots=OXgawDoVnt&dq=catalan%20statute%20of%20autonomy%202006&lr&hl=sv&pg=PA81#v=onepage&q&f=false">more autonomy</a> in 2006. The current ruling party – Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s Partido Popular – contested this agreement to the Constitutional Tribunal in 2010 and won. The move fit with the traditional view of the Partido Popular as supporting Spanish unity. Then came a nonbinding vote in Catalonia, sponsored by the Catalan government, which led to the president of Catalonia, Artur Mas, being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/13/catalan-ex-president-artur-mas-barred-from-holding-public-office">removed from office</a> by Spanish courts. </p>
<p>Frustration in Catalonia – frustration with a Spanish state that first agreed to autonomy, then repudiated the agreement, and finally elected the Partido Popular – set in motion the events of this year. </p>
<p>Catalonia’s nationalist leaders, including President Carles Puigdemont, have tried to abide by the old rules. They do something dramatic that shores up their base and might strengthen their hand in negotiations, and then they wait for the government in Madrid to enter negotiations. If Madrid played its expected role, there would be dialogue and a pact and business would then continue as normal, with everybody’s dignity intact.</p>
<p>Instead, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-02/spain-can-blame-only-itself-for-catalonia-s-resistance">keeps choosing</a> a strategy of confrontation. Each time he ignored or rejected a Catalan offer to negotiate, he boxed the Catalan nationalists into going further. Even now, it is not clear that most Catalan nationalists actually want independence. <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-spain-and-catalonia-out-with-them-all/a-40776495">No survey has shown</a> a majority support it. Nationalist leader Artur Mas, the same leader who was banned from politics and fined for his nationalism, has said Catalonia is not ready for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7347414c-aa6f-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c">“real independence.”</a> That is a signal he still wants negotiations.</p>
<p>But Rajoy continues to escalate the situation. </p>
<h2>Why this, why now?</h2>
<p>I see two plausible reasons Rajoy is doing this, and they both lie in party politics. </p>
<p>One is the heritage and beliefs of his party, the <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=WTjRA4cDP4gC&lpg=PA166&dq=partido%20popular%20historia&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q=reinvention&f=false">Partido Popular</a>. Founded by Francoists, senior officials of the old dictatorship, its ideology has authoritarian tones and focuses on order and Spanish unity. They don’t recognize a Catalan national right to self-determination, and believe all of Spain would have to agree on Catalan secession since Catalans are Spanish. </p>
<p>The other reason is that Rajoy’s Partido Popular is weak, which makes him weak. No party received a majority in the 2015 elections. During snap elections in 2016, the Partido Popular won only a small plurality and had to depend on temporary support from other parties to enter office. </p>
<p>Conflict with Catalonia strengthens Rajoy and the Partido Popular. It frames political conflict around national issues rather than inequality, unemployment and the structural, long-term decline of the Spanish economy. It also puts every one of his three big rival parties in a fix by forcing them to choose sides between Spanish unity or Catalan nationalism. </p>
<p>Unike its rivals, the Partido Popular doesn’t have many voters to lose in Catalonia – its Francoist past already significantly limits its appeal there.</p>
<p>It’s a different story for the center-right Ciudadanos, or the Citizens Party, which is the new alternative to a Partido Popular badly damaged by corruption and the economic crisis. Ciudadanos now looks like an annex of the Partido Popular. Weakening them strengthens the Partido Popular position as the party of the Spanish right - voters who value Spanish unity might come to see the Partido Popular as their champion. The Partido Popular’s historic but declining rivals, the Socialists, will also likely be badly damaged in the next election. The Socialists have supported the Partido Popular against Catalan nationalism, costing them their credibility as supporters of Catalan nationhood. </p>
<p>Outside of Catalonia, the conflict has sucked the oxygen from the issues of corruption and economic decline that had fueled the rise of Ciudadanos, the new left party Podemos and given the Socialists some hope. Podemos, which has supported the referendum, might lose Spanish nationalist voters to the Socialists. It will now be associated not just with left-wing anger at Spain’s inequality and economic underperformance, its preferred issues, but also with its sympathy for Catalan nationalism.</p>
<p>Rajoy and Spain are winning in the sense that a state which refuses to negotiate can defeat any peaceful challenge. But the political leaders in Barcelona and Madrid who created this confrontation have done great damage by creating a fracture between Spain and Catalonia.</p>
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<h2>Consequences of the rupture</h2>
<p>These events have also fractured society within Catalonia.</p>
<p>As a result of huge migratory waves from rural Spain over the last century, only about half of people in Catalonia identify as Catalan. For decades, Catalan politics has been about <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2014.995098">managing that division</a> – promoting Catalan autonomy, language and identity without sparking a backlash by people who feel Spanish. The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a2517cb4-bca8-11e7-9836-b25f8adaa111">big demonstrations in favor of Spanish unity in Barcelona </a> mark the destruction of much of that work. </p>
<p>Catalan elites have a long tradition, at this point in crisis, of leaving their radical leaders out on a breaking limb and retreating. They tend to cut off support for nationalist politics, assert their fealty to Spain and perhaps put money into less visibly confrontational Catalan civil society. We have seen them do this during almost every political transition in modern Spanish history. Some might see this as the reputed pragmatism of Catalans, withdrawing from a conflict they can’t win into nation building that will serve them well in the future. Some will say it is the pragmatism of bankers and businesspeople who prefer not to face the turbulence of secession followed by the prospect of life in a small left-wing country. That is what is happening now, with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e91df296-b00d-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4">almost 2,000</a> businesses switching their corporate registrations out of Catalonia. There is no such clear sense of what other elites are doing behind the scenes, but most elites in Catalonia, however sentimentally nationalist, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nationalism-Self-Government-Politics-Catalonia-Identities/dp/0791470482">value stability more than nationalist adventures</a>. </p>
<p>The Spanish government, which has suspended the Catalan government, has called elections on Dec. 21 to elect a new Catalan legislature. It is hard to predict what will happen. Maybe Spanish-identified voters who often abstain will be roused to put an end to the independence movement. Maybe Rajoy has so alienated moderate Catalans as to turn them into nationalists. Maybe the two sides will continue to remain about equal with votes shifting around between parties within each camp. Maybe police action and life without self-government in Catalonia will create new forms of radicalism.</p>
<p>Two things are certain: The damage to society and politics in Spain and Catalonia will be hard to mend – and fewer people will want to try. That is a shame, since a majority of people in Catalonia and Spain never wanted any of this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Greer received funding from the Social Science Research Council and Nuffield Trust.</span></em></p>Why the Spanish Prime Minister keeps choosing a strategy of confrontation.Scott L. Greer, Professor, Global Health Management and Policy and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/866312017-10-31T14:23:21Z2017-10-31T14:23:21ZCatalonia: the prospect of an election has everyone nervous<p>Mariano Rajoy, the prime minister of Spain, has called a potentially explosive regional election in Catalonia on December 21. This follows his decision to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution to impose <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-declares-independence-and-spain-enters-uncharted-territory-86489">direct rule</a> over Catalonia, dissolving its parliament in the process.</p>
<p>Catalan leaders rejected the validity of this move and, by association, the election itself. They argue that Madrid has no right to intervene in their declaration of independence from Spain in the wake of a disputed referendum on October 1. </p>
<h2>Rajoy’s gamble</h2>
<p>Rajoy’s decision to send Catalan voters back to the polls is not without risk. His own political fate is now inextricably linked to the Catalan standoff.</p>
<p>He may have calculated that in calling an election, he is presenting supporters of independence with a dilemma. If they participate in the vote, are they tacitly acknowledging his right to trigger Article 155 in the first place? Just as those opposed to Catalan independence chose to boycott the unofficial referendum on the grounds that their participation would lend it further legitimacy, some pro-independence activists may similarly wish to stay at home on December 21. Splits within the Catalan independence camp will be worth looking out for in the run up to the election. </p>
<p>Rajoy must also be carrying out a risk assessment. A clear majority for pro-independence parties in December would perhaps make his position untenable. Alternatively, his authority will be reinforced should those parties opposed to independence emerge victorious. </p>
<p>Now ousted Catalan president Carles Puigdemont’s centre-right Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT) and former deputy president Oriol Junqueras’s Republican Left (ERC) have, for now, indicated that they will take part in the election. However, Puigdemont’s parliamentary majority also depended on support from ten representatives of the far-left, anti-capitalist Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP). The CUP has been uncompromising in its support of independence and it has played an influential role in ensuring that Puigdemont was not tempted to backslide towards a more pragmatic stance on the matter by entering into negotiations with Madrid.</p>
<p>The CUP also played a key role in forcing the resignation of Artur Mas, Puigdemont’s predecessor as president. Given its rejection of the central government’s authority, it is by no means certain that the CUP will put forward candidates for the December elections.</p>
<p>One of the central government’s concerns is that the shift towards independence witnessed in Catalonia since 2012 has served to weaken the more moderate, centre-right PDeCAT. The party dominated Catalan regional politics for the greater part of four decades. Seeking to retain popularity during a time of severe austerity and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-catalan-president-jordi-pujol-to-be-stripped-of-his-titles-after-admitting-to-more-than-30-9636343.html">corruption scandals</a>, the PDeCAT has found the reductionist narrative of Madrid “robbing” Catalonia politically useful.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the PDeCAT has struggled with the dilemmas inherent in its belated adoption of a pro-independence stance. Prior to its shift towards advocating outright independence in 2012, the party, in its previous incarnation as Convergence and Union (CiU), found a subtler approach towards Madrid to be more productive. It may fear that elements within its middle-class support base will be horrified by the current crisis.</p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20151116/business-leader-says-1000-firms-have-left-catalonia-over-separatist-drive">1,000 companies</a> are moving their headquarters out of Catalonia amid the recent instability, which may also further dent support for the avowedly pro-business PDeCAT. It’s possible that its radical left bedfellows the ERC will emerge as the dominant pro-independence force in the December election.</p>
<h2>The pro-Spain camp</h2>
<p>The parties in favour of Catalonia remaining within Spain are confronting their own set of dilemmas. Rajoy’s Popular Party (PP) has always struggled in Catalonia, where moderate, centre-right voters have instead been drawn to the CiU/PDeCAT. The Catalan branch of the Socialist Party, the PSC, has experienced its own quandaries on the issue of independence.</p>
<p>And Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias has recently had to <a href="https://www.thespainreport.com/articles/1250-171030121434-pablo-iglesias-orders-take-over-of-podemos-catalonia-after-anticapitalist-sector-recognises-catalan-republic">admonish</a> leading figures within the Catalan incarnation of his party for flouting the agreed party line by unambiguously supporting independence. Podemos supports Catalalonia’s right to hold a legal referendum but does not want it to break away from Spain. Iglesias did not back Puigdemont’s unilateral declaration of independence and has called for further dialogue between the two sides. He is in a difficult position in that his party may lose support in the region to the unambiguously pro-independence CUP, whose clarity on the issue throws into relief the uncomfortable hedging which has characterised Podemos’s position. </p>
<p>Albert Rivera’s centre-right Ciutadans (Citizens), whose raison d’être is opposition to Catalan independence, has the luxury of an unambiguous stance on the issue and may be well-placed to do well in December.</p>
<h2>Keeping it calm</h2>
<p>It is to be hoped that the election campaign will be a peaceful one. Madrid is at least aware that repeating the scenes of police violence which marred the October referendum would play into the hands of Puigdemont and attract yet more international consternation.</p>
<p>Whatever the result of the election, though, it’s unlikely to put an end to Spain’s worst political crisis in four decades. For that, what may be needed is reform of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonia-referendum/541611/">Catalonia’s Autonomy Statute</a>, which may enable Catalonia to obtain a more favourable financial settlement akin to that enjoyed by the Basque Country. An imaginative re-writing of the 1978 constitution may even be necessary. Only then can Catalan grievances be addressed and some degree of normality be re-established.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Kennedy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An ousted leader, a divided electorate and the risk of further violence pile on the tension ahead of the December vote.Paul Kennedy, Lecturer in Spanish and European Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/865582017-10-30T15:44:24Z2017-10-30T15:44:24ZSelf-determination is legal under international law – it’s hypocritical to argue otherwise for Catalonia<p>One of the main arguments against Catalonia’s claim to independence is that it is illegal under the Spanish constitution. The Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">described</a> the declaration of independence as “a criminal act because it is intended to declare something that isn’t possible – Catalan independence”. </p>
<p>International opposition to the move has also centred on the constitution. The German chancellor, <a href="http://catalannews.com/politics/item/eu-leaders-back-spain-in-catalan-crisis">Angela Merkel, declared</a>: “We hope there are solutions found on the basis of the Spanish constitution,” while NATO’s secretary general <a href="https://twitter.com/jensstoltenberg/status/923959757777534976">Jens Stoltenberg said</a> the issue “must be resolved within Spain’s constitutional order”.</p>
<p>Whether the Spanish government acted according to the constitution is a matter of some debate. Carles Puigdemont, Catalonia’s president – ousted by Madrid on October 27 – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/26/catalonia-crisis-deepens-president-carles-puigdemont-rules-out-snap-election">rejected the legality of Rajoy’s</a> imposition of direct rule. Nonetheless, even if the Spanish government abides by its constitution, to suggest that this alone disqualifies Catalonia’s claims is a deeply flawed argument.</p>
<p><em><strong>Read more: <a href="https://theconversation.com/catalonia-crisis-shows-spains-constitution-is-no-longer-fit-for-purpose-86281">Catalonia crisis shows Spain’s constitution is no longer fit for purpose</a></strong></em></p>
<h2>The inherent right to self-determination</h2>
<p>In an ideal world, a region’s secession should take place with the host state’s consent. If the central government allows a region to initiate a process of self-determination then of course the issue is relatively straightforward. But allowing a region to initiate a process does not automatically mean the end result is secession. Referendums on independence in both Scotland and Quebec resulted in a no vote. </p>
<p>In recent years, a number of states have declared independence with the consent of the host state – albeit reluctantly given after an initial refusal. These include <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17847681">Slovenia</a> in 1991, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14919009">East Timor</a> in 2002 and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14069082">South Sudan</a> in 2011, when the results of a referendum on independence were eventually accepted by the host state. In a similar vein, Czechoslovakia peacefully <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Czechoslovakia">separated into the Czech Republic and Slovakia</a> in 1993 with the agreement of both regions.</p>
<p>Clearly, Catalonia is different given the Spanish government’s refusal to allow a referendum to take place. But this poses a fundamental question: is a host state’s approval essential if a country is to declare independence? The answer must be no, because to argue otherwise is contradictory – and clashes both with international law and common sense. </p>
<p>Article 1.2 of the UN Charter <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/">recognises</a> the principle of self-determination – making this a right which transcends any state’s domestic laws. A fundamental principle of international law is that the provisions of a state’s constitution cannot be deemed inherently legal – they must equate with international law. For example, a constitution may sanction racial discrimination or genocide, but this is superseded by the international laws which prohibit both. To claim that a state’s constitution is the sole determinant on the legality of action taken within that state is to essentially reject the very idea of international law.</p>
<p>By definition, self-determination presents a challenge to the host state. To accept that there is a right of self-determination under international law but then claim that this right is conditional on host state consent – as is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/05/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-warns-of-greater-harm-from-catalonia-independence-plans">currently being argued</a> by Spain and its allies with respect to Catalonia – is simply illogical. This is akin to saying that all women have the right to divorce their husbands but only if their husbands agree.</p>
<p>Spain’s refusal to accept the possibility of Catalan independence manifestly negates the very idea of self-determination. This position essentially denies self-determination is an inherent right by ceding all power to the host state. If applied globally, this principle would sanction the immutability of borders, and sentence millions of people across the world to remain permanently trapped under the jurisdiction of governments that they do not recognise. </p>
<h2>Kosovo and hypocrisy</h2>
<p>The championing by Western liberal democracies of the Spanish constitution over the Catalonians’ right of self-determination is also clearly hypocritical. This state-centric approach violates core principles of liberalism related to freedom and liberty – and it also jars with the approach taken towards Kosovo.</p>
<p>Kosovo <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html">unilaterally declared independence</a> from Serbia in 2008. While Spain has not recognised Kosovo, <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-the-west-built-failed-state-kosovo-17539?page=2">82% of EU states and 86% of NATO states</a> have done so. That the <a href="https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm">US</a>, UK, Germany, France and many others recognise the unilateral secession of Kosovo, but deny Catalans the same right, obviously has much more to do with alliances and power politics than any adherence to legal or theoretical principles. Spain’s membership of both the EU and NATO means that it is being treated differently, and this lays bare a selective approach to international law.</p>
<p>References to Kosovo in the Catalan case invariably provoke the <a href="http://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/catalonia-cannot-compared-kosovos-fight-independence/">counter-argument</a> that Kosovo “deserved” independence because its people suffered greatly at the hands of the Belgrade government. While the claims regarding oppression are certainly true, this too is an unconvincing argument. Making the legitimacy of self-determination conditional on oppressive behaviour by a host state does not make sense. It would be like telling independence activists that they have to stay within their existing state until they are killed in large numbers. This is an obviously ridiculous principle and one which certainly has no place in international law.</p>
<p>By defending Catalonia’s right to self-determination, I am not necessarily arguing that self-determination is the right thing for Catalonia. The legitimacy of any group’s secessionist claim has to be determined by an array of factors. These include the political coherence of the entity seeking independence and the degree of support the move has among citizens of the region that would secede. The viability of the entity as an independent state and the impact of secession on regional and international peace and stability are also key questions. So while opposition to Catalan independence based on these factors may be credible, arguing that is it impermissible because it is illegal under the Spanish constitution cannot be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86558/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Just because the constitution says secession is illegal, it doesn’t mean it is under international law.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/864892017-10-27T15:19:14Z2017-10-27T15:19:14ZCatalonia declares independence – and Spain enters uncharted territory<p>Shortly after Catalonia’s parliament in Barcelona voted to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41780116">declare independence</a> from Spain on October 27, the senate in Madrid voted to trigger Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, removing Catalonia’s autonomy. </p>
<p>In his speech to the senate requesting that deputies approve the proposal, the Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy <a href="https://www.thelocal.es/20171027/breaking-catalan-parliament-passes-resolution-declaring-independence">justified his request</a> in the face of “a continuous process of anti-democratic decisions” in Catalonia. </p>
<p>One of the first measures required by Article 155 will be the sacking of the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, which would pave the way for Rajoy to call elections within six months. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Catalan parliament, parliamentarians voted in secret on a proposal from the ruling coalition Junts Pel Sí (Together for Yes) and the far-left Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) to begin a constituent process in order to proclaim the independent Republic of Catalonia. The final vote in the 135-seat chamber was 70 deputies in favour, 10 against and two abstentions. Dozens of deputies from the opposition Catalan Popular Party, the Catalan Socialist party (PSC) and the Ciudadanos party <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/27/spanish-pm-mariano-rajoy-asks-senate-powers-dismiss-catalonia-president">abandoned the plenary session</a> ahead of the vote.</p>
<p>In response to the Catalan parliament’s vote, Rajoy went on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/marianorajoy/status/923904575509327872">to ask all Spaniards</a> for calm and to note that the rule of law would be restored in Catalonia.</p>
<p>The vote closed down the one conciliatory amendment which had been proposed by the Socialists in the Madrid senate to freeze the triggering of Article 155 if elections were called in Catalonia. Instead, the vote in favour of independence was seen as a slap in the face for dialogue. </p>
<p>There was little in the way of conciliation present in the senate. Various deputies from Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP) jubilantly applauded parts of the premier’s speech in a manner that seemed overly triumphal and expressly designed to trample upon Catalan sentiment. Rajoy repeatedly criticised Puigdemont for appearing to turn down any offer of dialogue with the Spanish government. Puigdemont, on the other hand, had viewed the request to appear before the senate less as a desire for negotiation and more as an imposition.</p>
<h2>What the people think</h2>
<p>As the two elected assemblies went head-to-head, the rallying cry <em>No nos representan</em> “they don’t represent us” seems as relevant today as when it became the defining <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/15/spain-15-m-movement-activism">cry of the indignant movement</a>, or 15-M movement, which erupted in Spain in 2011 in a challenge to the political status quo. </p>
<p>While the political elites in both Catalonia and Madrid have both been calling the shots, it is not clear what support they have behind them to do so. The Catalan referendum on October 1 was not an accurate representation of the support for a declaration of independence. At 42%, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/dozens-injured-as-riot-police-storm-catalan-ref-polling-stations">turnout was suppressed</a> – in part because of a heavy police presence and the best efforts of the Spanish government to disrupt the vote. But also because only those in favour of independence were likely to turn out to vote. </p>
<p>Nor was there any time for a proper campaign before the referendum in which the arguments for and against independence could properly be aired and discussed. </p>
<p>There was barely a month between the Catalan parliament <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41177428">passing a law</a> to approve the referendum and the vote itself. It is therefore hard to gauge either the level of public support for independence or the level of public understanding which might underpin such a move.</p>
<p>The most recent elections in both Catalonia and Spain are also an unreliable indicator of public sentiment on the independence question. Rather, they lay bare the divisions which exist in Catalonia and Spain on a whole variety of issues. The June 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-is-a-third-election-in-a-year-on-the-horizon-63681">general election</a> – a re-run of December 2015’s election – reaffirmed the reluctance of voters to give any party an absolute majority. Although Rajoy’s PP strengthened its position <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36632276">with 33% of the vote and 137 seats</a>, this was still short of the 176 seats needed for an absolute majority.</p>
<p>The picture is also fragmented in Catalonia where the ruling coalition Junts pel Sí fell short of an absolute majority in the 2015 elections. Gaining 62 seats with 39.6% of the vote, it was forced to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/catalan-separatists-win-election-and-claim-it-as-yes-vote-for-breakaway">form a minority government</a> with the CUP lending confidence and supplying support. Together these separatist political formations garnered 44.3% of the popular vote.</p>
<p>In both Catalonia and across Spain, voters did not give any political party the mandate to govern with an absolute majority. This is a message that politicians should have heeded. It denotes an electorate which wants compromise and negotiation between parties rather than the adoption of maximalist positions by any single political formation.</p>
<p>In all political processes, choices are made at the mass level as well as the elite level. Elite figures should take their cue from voters and the behaviour of groups in civil society who in turn often adapt their behaviour and choices in light of the actions of elites. </p>
<p>The ability to find a negotiated solution to the crisis in Catalonia then depends on both the elites and the general population. While Catalan leaders obviously felt they were fulfilling their historic duty in the face of protesters calling for independence outside the Catalan parliament, those cheering the loudest should not be confused with the views of all in Catalonia. </p>
<p>Although already weary of voting, it is likely that the electorate could once again be called to the polls in Catalonia as one way out of this current impasse. It is time all of the people had their say.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgina Blakeley has previously received funding from the British Academy and a Santander mobility grant.</span></em></p>Move by the senate in Madrid came just after the Catalan parliament voted for independence.Georgina Blakeley, Senior Lecturer in Politics, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/862812017-10-26T15:15:32Z2017-10-26T15:15:32ZCatalonia crisis shows Spain’s constitution is no longer fit for purpose<p>Amid reports swirling that Catalonia’s president, Carles Puigdemont, was either set to call new elections to the Catalan parliament or declare full independence from Spain, he abruptly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41760832">cancelled a scheduled press conference</a> on October 26. When he did speak, he did not call elections and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-41760832">said it was up to</a> Catalonia’s parliament to decide how to act. </p>
<p>For Puigdemont, calling new elections would be a high-risk tactic. Even though many have come to deeply dislike the government’s violent response to Catalonia’s independence referendum on October 1, there is also dissatisfaction among Catalans who do not want independence. Puigdemont cannot guarantee that another poll will deal him a stronger hand. It could be seen as a tactic to remove the threat of an imposition of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, which would revoke Catalonia’s powers of autonomy – although the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has not officially confirmed that this would be the case. </p>
<p>Following Puigdemont’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/10/catalan-government-suspends-declaration-of-independence">semi-declaration of independence</a> on October 10, he called for an opening of negotiations with Rajoy. But due to errors on both sides, the possibility for constructive dialogue remains feeble.</p>
<p>The decision of Catalan nationalists to commit to a legally binding referendum, despite the Constitutional Court ruling it to be illegal, was a statement intended to draw a line in the sand. The Rajoy government, however, fanned the fire rather than put it out. By bringing the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/catalonia-independence-referendum-civil-guard-riot-violence-rubber-bullets-a7977046.html">Civil Guard onto the streets of Barcelona</a>, and using every little bit of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/spains-ominous-gag-law.html">crowd control legislation passed in July 2015</a>, the government succeeded in turning an increasing amount of Catalans against them. The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/16/two-catalan-independence-leaders-taken-custody-spanish-government/">arrests</a> of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez, the leaders of the two main nationalist organisations in Catalonia, also sparked further outrage.</p>
<p>If, against the current tide, the parties do manage to open negotiations, there would immediately be pressure for a new referendum that has the support of the Spanish parliament. But, after a turbulent period with <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-steels-itself-for-another-election-after-months-with-no-government-60675">two general elections</a> in the span of six months in 2016, the Spanish parliament is highly divided and fragmented. The two main parties, Rajoy’s Partido Popular (PP) and the socialist Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), are facing a rising challenge from the newcomers Podemos, on the left, and the centre-right Cuidadanos party. </p>
<p>The current circumstances could spur calls for new elections to the Spanish central parliament too. Rajoy, who is in a weak position and presides over a minority government, technically has little interest in causing a great political stir. At the same time, he is afraid of being seen as weak in a term which has seen prominent members of his party on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/68d7b4a0-6e09-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa?mhq5j=e6">trial for corruption</a> and Rajoy called as a witness. </p>
<p>The electoral base of Rajoy’s PP, which has some <a href="http://www.eldiario.es/zonacritica/franquismo-PP_6_410918913.html">uncomfortable connections to the Francoist past</a>, has little patience for the nationalities question and has often resisted increased autonomy for Spain’s regions. However, even the PSOE – led by the newly re-elected Pedro Sanchez – is largely unwilling to make great concessions to the nations: Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia. The GAL scandal of the 1990s, when it emerged that the PSOE government had <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/141720.stm">funded a death squad</a> against the Basque-separatist group ETA, is a reminder of how toxic the issue of national independence remains, both on the left and on the right.</p>
<h2>Revoking autonomous powers</h2>
<p>Rajoy’s government plans to invoke Article 155, a paragraph of the <a href="http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf">Spanish constitution</a> which allows the central government to revoke the powers of autonomous communities if the: “autonomous community does not fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way seriously prejudicing the general interests of Spain.” </p>
<p>This article has only ever been seriously considered once before, when the Gonzalez government in the late 1980s required the Canary Islands to <a href="http://www.abc.es/espana/canarias/abci-farol-casi-cuesta-canarias-articulo-155-201710052341_noticia.html">comply with new fiscal rules as per EU regulation</a>. In this instance, Article 155 was never actually imposed since the Canary Islands complied with the request and the government did not suspend the powers of the autonomous community. Its imminent invocation is <em>terra incognita</em> for Rajoy. </p>
<p>Article 155 does not enable a complete elimination of the autonomous community, simply a circumscription of its powers, be that political or economic. These powers could be related to the fiscal autonomy of the region, effectively rendering the Catalan parliament superfluous. Rajoy might also opt to take charge of the Catalan police force, the Mossos d’Esquadra. If the Mossos choose to remain loyal to the region, further intervention by the Guardia Civil, which answers to the central state, may seem necessary to Rajoy. </p>
<h2>Need for constitutional reform</h2>
<p>When Franco died in 1975, there were high hopes that Spain would successfully transition to democracy. In many ways, this is what has happened, and Spain consistently <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/spain">performs well in Freedom House rankings</a> on the quality of democracy. But the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/catalonia-3828">crisis in Catalonia</a> has raised questions about whether Spain has really moved on from its violent past – and whether the Spanish constitution remains fit for purpose. It has proved rigid and out of touch with people’s lives, and is losing legitimacy. </p>
<p>The Constitutional Court is a heavily politicised body, and several of its members <a href="https://www.elplural.com/los-genoveses/2017/03/14/el-tribunal-constitucional-gira-mas-la-derecha">have strong ties to Rajoy’s PP</a>. Of its 12 members, eight are chosen by parliament, two by the government, and two by the Consejo General del Poder Judicial, the highest judicial body in Spain. With a third of the members on the Constitutional Tribunal being renewed every three years, this gives a government with a parliamentary majority ample room to influence the membership of the court.</p>
<p>The Spanish constitution is being read through a particular political prism, reflecting the hostility of the Spanish right towards the nationalities. Constitutional reform is necessary, but will be impossible to realise without support from both the PP and PSOE.</p>
<p><em>This piece was commissioned in collaboration with the <a href="https://campaignforsocialscience.org.uk/">Campaign for Social Science</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/86281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmy Eklundh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Bid for Catalonian independence brings return of a divided Spain.Emmy Eklundh, Lecturer in Spanish and International Politics, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.