tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/chinese-trade-48087/articlesChinese trade – The Conversation2022-06-03T02:17:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1841472022-06-03T02:17:38Z2022-06-03T02:17:38ZWhat does China want in the Pacific? Diplomatic allies and strategic footholds<p>By the time Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s ten-day tour of the Pacific is over in early June, he will have met with leaders from all ten Pacific island countries that have diplomatic relations with China. </p>
<p>This tour is the second of its kind since 2006 (his predecessor Li Zhaoxing visited the region that year). It follows a meeting of Pacific foreign ministers with China <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202110/t20211021_9604831.html">last year</a>.</p>
<p>But what does China want from the region and why is it showing such strong interest in the Pacific?</p>
<h2>China wants two main things</h2>
<p>China seeks two main things from the region – one diplomatic and one strategic.</p>
<p>Diplomatically, it needs the voting support of Pacific islands at the United Nations. These countries, most of which are small, have an equal vote at the UN. </p>
<p>Their support – on <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26457717?seq=1%22%22">issues</a> such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, South and East China Seas, and human rights – matters to China. </p>
<p>For example, during Wang’s visit, Pacific leaders pledged to stick to the “One China” policy. This means they will recognise the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China (Taiwan).</p>
<p>However, the China-Taiwan diplomatic battle is far from over. In the Pacific, Palau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru still recognise Taiwan.</p>
<p>Strategically, China sees Pacific islands as a target of what’s known as “<a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/intergovernmental-coordination/south-south-cooperation-2019.html">South-South co-operation</a>” – partnerships between developing countries. </p>
<p>China’s mistrust of developed countries is deep rooted and has persisted since the founding of the communist regime in 1949. To reduce the strategic pressure from developed countries, China strives to forge close ties with the developing world.</p>
<p>In this sense, Wang’s Pacific visit is largely prompted by recent heightened competition between China and the US-led traditional powers. </p>
<p>The Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) recently released a <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-joint-leaders-statement">joint leaders statement</a> promising to increase their support to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.</p>
<p>It is hardly a coincidence that on the same day, China’s ministry of foreign affairs revealed the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202205/t20220524_10692075.html">itinerary</a> for Wang’s Pacific visit. Details of concrete <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202205/t20220525_10692550.html">achievements</a> arising from the provinces of Chinese Guangdong, Fujian and Shandong’s engagement with Pacific islands were released the following day.</p>
<p>China is signalling it will not recede in its competition with traditional powers. It also wants to send a message that a closer relationship with China will benefit Pacific islands.</p>
<h2>Security significance for China</h2>
<p>In the long run, the Pacific islands have great security significance for China. </p>
<p>China’s People’s Liberation Army, especially the navy, has aimed to break the “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/barriers-springboards-and-benchmarks-china-conceptualizes-the-pacific-island-chains/B46A212145EB9D920616650669C697F0">island chains</a>” (in particular, there are a series of military bases on islands near China and in the Pacific, which Beijing believes the US and its allies are using to encircle China). </p>
<p>The Pacific islands sit along one of these island chains. Little wonder, then, the Chinese military is keen to gain a foothold in the Pacific in the long run – this would be crucial if competition between China and the US deteriorates into rivalry and even military conflict. </p>
<p>This is why traditional powers are alarmed by the China-Solomon Islands security pact – despite clarification from <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220526_10693195.html">Beijing</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/solomon-islands-tells-japan-it-will-not-allow-china-military-bases-2022-04-26/">Honiara</a> China will not establish a military base in Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>To achieve these objectives, China has worked hard to foster a closer relationship with Pacific islands. In particular, it has highlighted its respect of Pacific islands as equal partners, economic opportunities for Pacific commodities to enter the massive Chinese market, and the benefits of Chinese aid for the region.</p>
<h2>Proposed agreements</h2>
<p>In this context, China proposed two broad <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-25/china-seeks-pacific-islands-policing-security-cooperation/101099978">agreements</a> to be signed by all its Pacific partner countries during Wang’s visit. </p>
<p>However, this plan was shelved due to the lack of consensus among Pacific leaders on the nature of these agreements and potential negative implications for regional security.</p>
<p>For example, prior to Wang’s visit, President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/467955/fsm-president-warns-pacific-leaders-over-china-documents">wrote</a> to leaders of all Pacific island countries and territories warning that signing these agreements may drag Pacific islands into conflicts between China and the US in future.</p>
<p>This may have taken China by surprise; President Panuelo paid a successful <a href="https://gov.fm/index.php/component/content/article/35-pio-articles/news-and-updates/229-great-friendship-taken-to-a-new-high-president-panuelo-meets-president-xi-jinping-premier-li-china-state-visit-day-two">state visit</a> to China in 2019 and lauded his country’s relationship with China as “great friendship taken to a new high”.</p>
<p>This was a clear setback for China. As a suboptimal solution, China’s ministry of foreign affairs turned the two agreements into a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220531_10694923.html">position paper</a> and published it on May 30. </p>
<p>A main difference is that in the position paper, China only briefly states its readiness to co-operate with Pacific islands to promote regional security, combat transnational crimes and tackle non-traditional security threats. </p>
<p>By contrast, the original two agreements had more details on security co-operation such as providing police training for the region and strengthening co-operation on cyber security.</p>
<p>Apparently, China has learnt to downplay its planned co-operation with Pacific islands on security, an increasingly sensitive area amid the competition.</p>
<p>Looking into the near future, it is likely China will be more cautious in expanding its engagement with the Pacific region.</p>
<p>It will likely focus on pragmatic co-operation in less sensitive areas like climate change, poverty reduction, agriculture and disaster relief. </p>
<p>China will lobby for more support from Pacific islands before it is willing to reintroduce the broad agreements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denghua Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China seeks two main things from the region – one diplomatic and one strategic.Denghua Zhang, Research fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1388292020-06-04T14:24:39Z2020-06-04T14:24:39ZWe wanted to know if Chinese migrants in Africa self-segregate. What we found<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337607/original/file-20200526-106848-16c9zke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese language teacher speaks with students at the Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past 20 years there’s been remarkable growth in China-Africa links because of increased trade and investment. As a result there’s also been a great deal of movement of people between China and African countries. It’s estimated that there are now <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14631369.2020.1761246">about</a> 500,000 Africans in China, while the the number of Chinese in the 54 African countries ranges between <a href="https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_4198345">one</a> and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14631369.2020.1761246">two</a> million. </p>
<p>Though Chinese people can now be found in most African countries, there’s a claim that some commentators and <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/01/15/one-among-many">media outlets</a> make: that they hold themselves apart from their host societies. </p>
<p>For instance, a US commentator <a href="http://whchronicle.com/the-chopstick-invasion-of-africa-continues-apace/">writes that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(They) have no experience in the world outside of China; no curiosity about these strange African lands and their people and a morbid indifference to Africa’s long-term future. (Most) are poorly educated and ill-equipped to live in different cultures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To some, the claim of Chinese self-isolation might resonate due to the physical evidence of Chinatowns, such as those in the US, Canada and South Africa. However, the reverse is true. </p>
<p>Chinatowns in these countries are not products of Chinese voluntary self-isolation, but of forced exclusion policies of white settler societies and governments. For instance, the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/05/527091890/the-135-year-bridge-between-the-chinese-exclusion-act-and-a-proposed-travel-ban">Chinese Exclusion Act in the US</a> and the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902014000100006">Chinese Exclusion Act in South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>These exclusionary measures were driven by the fear of Chinese as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/oct/30/yellow-peril-dr-fu-manchu-rise-of-chinaphobia-christopher-frayling-review">“Yellow Peril”</a>: a racial construct used extensively in Western countries against Asians who were viewed as a threat to Western civilisation, with <a href="https://jonlsullivan.com/2018/08/20/fu-manchu-yellow-peril-and-sinophobia/">images of expansion, takeover and appropriation</a>. Today <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/fu-manchu-versus-dr-livingstone-dark-continent">depictions of</a> African weakness, Western trusteeship and Chinese ruthlessness are continuations of these stereotypes. I believe that these myths persist because of bias in the media and because Chinese relations and people are sometimes used as political pawns.</p>
<p>My colleagues and I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631369.2018.1511370">set out</a> to examine the claims of Chinese self-segregation in various African countries. Based on surveys, interviews, and academic literature we examined the varied lives of Chinese people over the past 10 years. Our primary research site was Zambia, although we conducted research in many African countries including Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa and Sudan.</p>
<p>Our research examined where Chinese migrants lived, their knowledge of local languages and socialisation patterns. We found that – like all migrants – factors affecting Chinese integration include local political environment, recentness of migration, language barriers, and corporate policies to mitigate crime and conflict. In addition Chinese are also affected by host bias – such as anti-Chinese campaigns. </p>
<p>These have all made Chinese integration varied processes and supports <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/african-perspectives-on-chinaafrica-links/294FDC51C8124084A51C9A69C8D76E63">previous</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2016.1139156">research</a> my colleagues and I have done.</p>
<p>The accusations of Chinese self-isolation in Africa does not mesh with the reality: the lives of Chinese people in Africa are varied and cannot be reduced to a single category. The accusations are also damaging as they are racist, undermine African-Chinese relations, misrepresent the global Chinese presence, and fosters suspicion of Chinese migrants as perpetual “others”.</p>
<h2>Contract employees</h2>
<p>One group of Chinese migrants are contract employees. They usually work with large Chinese companies as expatriate engineers, managers, and skilled workers. From our research we found that contract employees usually stay for one or two contracts (with one contract lasting between one and three years), but a small number may work as long as a decade. </p>
<p>Of all contract employees, contract employees working on infrastructure projects often had the most interaction with locals. This is because they lived and sometimes ate with their local colleagues. </p>
<p>For instance, we interviewed teams of Chinese and local drillers from a Chinese water well firm in Sudan. One Sudanese interviewee said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Chinese live like locals. If the locals have brick houses, they’ll stay in them, but if not, they’ll stay in grass huts or tents.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In China it’s not uncommon for construction and mining workers to live collectively in compounds. They now do the same in Africa. This helps to save the company time and money, but it’s also a precaution to reduce their exposure to crime.</p>
<p>Company policies can also affect how much workers interact socially. For instance, our field research in Zambia found that the Chinese mine construction firm TLZD had policies whereby Chinese employees were not allowed out at night for their safety, but also because – due to language barriers – misunderstandings can lead to fights. Most Chinese in Africa, like first-generation migrants everywhere, are hampered by a language barrier. </p>
<p>Some company policies encourage integration because they make learning a language a requirement for the job. For instance, one Kenyan journalist based in Beijing <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058753.shtml">observed that</a> some large firms only hire Chinese “with a solid understanding of local African languages.” </p>
<p>Wall Street Journal correspondent Te-Ping Chen <a href="https://chinaafricaproject.com/podcasts/te-pingchen-china-africa-aid-development/">also observed</a> that “Chinese immigrants that have come to Africa tend to live side by side with Africans (and) tend to speak local dialects.” By contrast, we found that white people <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/20/tongues-under-threat">have lived</a> in South Africa for more than three centuries and Indian people for 150 years. But unless brought up on a farm, few white people speak an African language, <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/01/20/tongues-under-threat">while most</a> young Indians speak only English or are bilingual in English and Afrikaans.</p>
<h2>Migrant entrepreneurs</h2>
<p>For the Chinese people that aren’t contract workers, they typically work in small and medium businesses as either owners, employees, or family dependants. Some will bring their nuclear family to Africa while others straddle two continents. </p>
<p>They tend to live in small groups all over cities, depending on their economic status. For instance in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41059534?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Luanda, Angola</a>, less affluent Chinese groups have sprung up in informal settlements.</p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://www.zedbooks.net/shop/book/chinese-migrants-and-africas-development/">find that</a> how much they mix and integrate depends on the nature of their business. For instance, Chinese retailers have much more engagement, with a variety of people such as local employees, customers, or partners. </p>
<p>As expected, the longer they stay the more localised they become – for instance their children go to local schools allowing them to integrate more. As many Chinese are traders, they are also active in learning local African languages. </p>
<p>Our research shows that even though there’s plenty of evidence that Chinese don’t self-segregate, it’s a myth that has been hard to confront because some people have examples of Chinese non-interaction and may be politically invested in generalising that tale.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yan Hairong receives funding from Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, China. </span></em></p>Claims of Chinese self-isolation reflect a longstanding, global “Yellow Peril” discourse that persists despite discrediting evidence.YAN Hairong, Associate Professor, Hong Kong Polytechnic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1305642020-01-25T09:42:28Z2020-01-25T09:42:28ZCoronavirus does not look like a ‘black swan’ event – here are some reasons to be cautiously optimistic<p>The alarm is sounding again. The Asia financial markets were reasonably calm about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mystery-china-pneumonia-outbreak-likely-caused-by-new-human-coronavirus-129729">new coronavirus</a> until the news of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-51217455">the lockdown</a> of the whole city of Wuhan in China on January 23, where the first and most cases have been reported so far. After that, markets started tumbling. Everything from stock markets to Brent crude <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/23/financial-markets-china-coronavirus-outbreak-economy">drifted down by</a> several percentage points as all eyes were on ticker screens for the latest news. </p>
<p>Markets steadied and rose a little on January 24 as <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/07e751b2-3e83-11ea-a01a-bae547046735">investors appeared to</a> suspect that the fears were being overdone, but the situation remains on a knife edge. The worry is that this could be a <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blackswan.asp">black swan event</a>, one that is so unpredictable and grave that it can bring about a severe downturn in the global economy. The September 11 attacks in 2001 are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-tale.html">the most obvious example</a>. </p>
<p>The big question is whether we are facing another situation on the scale of, if not bigger than, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/fs-sars.html">Sars in 2002-03</a>. Caused by a similar airborne virus that originated from China, that global outbreak infected more than 8,000 people and killed nearly 800 before it was contained. So what can we learn from that crisis about the potential financial implications this time around?</p>
<h2>The government response</h2>
<p>If we look back at Hong Kong, the city that was most badly hit by Sars, the data shows that the negative impact was short-lived. Its financial market, tourism, consumption and GDP all plummeted initially <a href="https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/88855/1/content.pdf">but bounced back</a> quickly to previous levels within a few months. Similar patterns were found for mainland China.</p>
<p>There are a few reasons to be at least as optimistic this time around. First, the central and local governments in China are more experienced and seem to be acting more responsively than during the Sars outbreak. Although there has been <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6996d92a-3ce2-11ea-a01a-bae547046735">much public criticism</a> that the government and public health authorities were slow in determining the risk and severity of the virus, they stepped up the pace once they had decided the situation was sufficiently serious. </p>
<p>They quarantined Wuhan, a mega city and transport hub in China with a population of nearly 9 million and an economy roughly the size of Hungary. They extended <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1434a7ae-3d92-11ea-b232-000f4477fbca">travel curbs to many more cities</a>. They also took other nationwide measures such as temporarily closing cinemas and calling off many pre-scheduled outdoor shows across the country. This showed the ability and determination of the country to fight an epidemic using all possible resources at their disposal. </p>
<p>Second, although the massive amount of travel for the Chinese New Year made it tricky to contain the spread of disease, the national holidays also offset some of the negative impacts. The fact that most manufacturing and other business activities across the country have been completely switched off for about a week during the lunar new year break means that the economic impact – if there was any – will have been limited during this period. </p>
<p>If the country manages to get the coronavirus under control, treat most patients before the holiday period ends on February 8 and get people back to work, there is no obvious reason to believe the disease will have a persistent effect for a significant period of time.</p>
<h2>Wiser public</h2>
<p>At the same time, the public in China are now more experienced and rational in tackling infectious diseases than when they saw Sars, which was the first time most people would have experienced something like that. In 2003, vinegar <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1155640/when-sars-first-spread-guangzhou-residents-sought-out-vinegar">was sold out</a> in many cities in China as people believed it could kill an airborne virus, which turned out to be a superstitious misconception. </p>
<p>This time, the government-authorised public health guidelines have been disseminated very quickly now that we are in the age of social media. My sense on the ground, since I am visiting China at the moment, is that the public seem to have been reacting in a much more rational way, following state instructions such as wearing protective face masks, being extra diligent with their personal hygiene, and restraining themselves from unnecessary outdoor activities. </p>
<p>Yet while this all makes me reasonably optimistic that financial disaster can be avoided, the clock is certainly ticking. The country needs to make every effort to contain the spread of the virus and get as many people treated as soon as possible, especially before February 8. </p>
<p>Another concern is that while the government tries to restore the public’s faith in handling a public crisis like this, many people still distrust the government data about the number of infections. In other words, it is both a fight against the virus and a test for the capability of the authorities in dealing with a public health crisis in a country where people only have access to censored information. Everyone will be watching closely to see if the case for optimism starts to deteriorate in the days ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130564/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zheng Wang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How China appears to have learned from its response to the SARS crisis of 2003.Zheng Wang, Associate Professor and Reader in Economics, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1007952018-07-31T10:41:45Z2018-07-31T10:41:45ZAmerican farmers want trade partners not handouts – an agricultural economist explains<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229869/original/file-20180730-106517-rpoxh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Farmer Michael Petefish walks through one of his soybean fields in southern Minnesota.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/China-Tariffs-Farmers-Hope-for-Truce/2fe66a14c3824e049a2d536c4750d0e7/25/0">AP Photo/Jim Mone</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Trump administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/us/politics/farmers-aid-trade-war.html">plans to give</a> American farmers and ranchers hurt by the current trade war US$12 billion in emergency relief to mitigate the impact of tariffs on their exports. </p>
<p>While this may lessen the blow of an <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/highlights-from-the-farm-income-forecast/">already struggling agricultural economy</a> in the short run, it is only a Band-Aid. As an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rToS2UYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">agricultural economist</a>, I know that no one really wins in a trade war. As someone who grew up on a cotton and alfalfa farm in rural Arizona, I know firsthand that producers want access to markets – not government handouts. </p>
<p>If the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/trade-wars-50746">trade conflict</a> with China continues much longer, it will likely leave lasting scars on the entire agricultural sector as well as the overall U.S. economy. </p>
<h2>A tit-for-tat trade war</h2>
<p>How did we get here? </p>
<p>In January, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/01/22/trump-imposes-tariffs-on-solar-panels-and-washing-machines-in-first-major-trade-action/?utm_term=.911baac43055">placed tariffs</a> on Chinese solar panels and washing machines to protect U.S. manufacturers. It <a href="https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide">followed</a> that in March with tariffs on all imports of steel and aluminum – citing national security concerns. Though many countries were subsequently exempted from the U.S. import tariffs on steel and aluminum, China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trump-will-hit-china-with-trade-measures-as-white-house-exempts-allies-from-tariffs.html">was the primary target</a>. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/01/china-announces-new-tariffs-on-us-meat-and-fruit-amid-trade-war-fears.html">responded</a> by imposing tariffs on U.S. exports worth $3 billion in April as countermeasures to U.S. tariffs. Another <a href="https://www.cmtradelaw.com/2018/04/section-301-update-ustr-releases-proposed-tariffs-on-chinese-products-china-publishes-retaliatory-list/">round of U.S. duties</a> on Chinese products prompted additional retaliation from China in July on $34 billion worth of U.S. goods, furthering a <a href="https://piie.com/system/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf">tit-for-tat trade conflict</a> with <a href="https://ig.ft.com/us-china-tariffs">no end in sight</a>. </p>
<p>China is the <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx">second-largest export market for U.S. agriculture</a> behind Canada, which means it’s no surprise that such goods made up the <a href="https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/China%20Imposes%20Additional%20Tariffs%20on%20Selected%20U.S.-Origin%20Products_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_4-2-2018.pdf">vast majority</a> of the more than 600 products that have been <a href="https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/list_of_chinese_retaliatory_tariffs_on_the_united_states_-_june_15_2018.pdf">targeted</a> by China with tariffs of 15 percent to 25 percent in two rounds of retaliation. Among them are cotton, wheat, dairy, wine, fruits, nuts, soybeans and pork – to name just a few.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229914/original/file-20180731-102485-reiwii.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">National Pork Board 2016 America’s Pig Farmer of the Year Brad Greenway and his wife, Peggy Greenway, feed pigs in one of their wean-to-finish pig barns on their farm in Mitchell, South Dakota.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Images for National Pork Board/Jay Pickthorn</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Caught in the crossfire</h2>
<p>Since China’s tariffs only recently took effect and more retaliation could happen, it’s still too early to fully understand the potential damage. But U.S. farmers and ranchers are bracing for the worst. </p>
<p>For example, China is the <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/1201/">world’s largest consumer of soybeans</a>, gobbling up about 65 percent of all trade of the commodity. The Chinese bought more than $12 billion in American soybeans in 2017, or 57 percent of all U.S. exports of the crop.</p>
<p>Thanks to the 25 percent tariff on U.S. soybeans, Chinese importers <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-soybeans-china/u-s-soybean-exports-scrapped-as-china-shifts-to-brazilian-beans-idUSKCN1IJ2SG">have been canceling</a> contracts with American farmers for later in the year and buying more from Brazil – which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-soy-usa/brazil-to-pass-u-s-as-worlds-largest-soy-producer-in-2018-idUSKBN1IC2IW">is expected</a> to soon be the world’s top soybean producer.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1106&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1106&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229873/original/file-20180730-106517-1gxbe6r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1106&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A soybean plant blossoms on a farm in Renfrew, Pennsylvania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Soybean-Plants-Blossom/9dc717b95ede43e09a03d9a33ab40e65/13/0">AP Photo/Keith Srakocic</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A <a href="http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/us-china-trade-dispute-and-potential-impacts-to-agriculture/impacts-of-possible-chinese-25-tariff-on-us-soybeans-and-other-agricultural-commodities">recent study</a> suggests that if the tariffs stay in place, U.S. exports of soybeans could fall 24 percent to 34 percent, while production could decline 11 percent to 15 percent. </p>
<p>The extent of the impact depends on whether U.S. soybean farmers are able to find new markets for their crops. In addition, because China consumes so many soybeans – which it primarily uses for livestock feed – it probably can’t cut out U.S. producers entirely. Chinese importers will simply have to pay more for U.S.-sourced soybeans to meet domestic demand. </p>
<p>The pork industry, which <a href="https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/China%20Imposes%20Additional%20Tariffs%20on%20Selected%20U.S.-Origin%20Products_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_4-2-2018.pdf">was already subject</a> to tariffs before the trade war began, has been especially hard hit. After successive rounds of tariffs, U.S. pork is now subject to Chinese duties of as high as 70 percent. </p>
<p>Pork sales to China <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx">account for 10 percent of total U.S. exports</a> of that product category. Since China already produces about 97 percent of the pork it consumes, it should be relatively easy for the Chinese to simply substitute domestic and other foreign production for the U.S. imports. </p>
<p>While many U.S. pork producers may be able to find new markets for their goods, that probably won’t be the case for offal, which are pig parts such as organs and entrails. Chinese consumers <a href="https://www.eater.com/2015/6/16/8786827/where-to-find-offal-organ-meat-international-cuisine">consider offal a delicacy</a>, while it is just used an input for pet food in the U.S. The tariffs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-pork/trade-war-puts-the-hoof-into-u-s-pig-part-exports-to-china-idUSKBN1K71EA">have already eroded</a> U.S. exports of pig parts to China.</p>
<p>Some of my own research focuses on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8489.12029">Chinese demand for Western wine</a> and how retaliatory tariffs <a href="http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/us-china-trade-dispute-and-potential-impacts-to-agriculture/chinese-trade-retaliation-may-diminish-us-wine-export-potential">could hurt</a> the U.S. wine industry, which sees China as a very important growth market at a time when others are stagnating. My collaborator and I estimate that the new 15 percent tariff on American wine could cause a 10 percent drop in imports to China. </p>
<p>If the trade war escalates, the harm could get even worse. For example, China <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx">is the biggest buyer</a> of U.S. exports of animal hides – which haven’t yet been hit by retaliatory tariffs but could be in another round. And the impact is being felt across the U.S., with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/04/09/how-chinas-tariffs-could-affect-u-s-workers-and-industries/">at least some workers</a> in pretty much every state affected by agricultural and other tariffs. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229871/original/file-20180730-106517-1kvpwvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cotton farmers are also worried about losing access to the Chinese market.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Cotton-Mississippi/07672337150e4b4eac73bdbfbb5de464/8/0">AP Photo/Rogelio V. Solis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Trade conflict’s long-term impact</h2>
<p>The consequences of a prolonged trade war could be severe for U.S. agricultural producers. </p>
<p>As the tariffs make the cost of U.S. crops and meat go up for Chinese customers, <a href="http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/us-china-trade-dispute-and-potential-impacts-to-agriculture/impacts-of-possible-chinese-25-tariff-on-us-soybeans-and-other-agricultural-commodities">they’ll begin to import</a> products that are relatively cheaper from other countries such as Brazil.</p>
<p>China might also drive up their own domestic production of certain products – such as pork – thus depriving American farmers of the export market. Or in the case of wine, U.S. producers were already at a disadvantage to their French and Australian rivals. A prolonged trade dispute could limit American winemakers’ exports to a promising market. </p>
<p>If American agricultural producers can’t increase exports to other countries to make up for lost sales to China, farm incomes would most certainly fall. And even if they do manage to find new markets, perhaps with the help of the new government aid package, it’ll be hard to make up for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/china-biggest-grocery-market-world">world’s largest market</a> for food imports.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229872/original/file-20180730-106502-1bu02ra.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brazil is the world’s second-largest soy producer after the U.S., which may soon change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Latin-America-Economy-Finance/1a5605d06bd94d86ba0c3bffff55f564/5/0">AP Photo/Andre Penner</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Will the aid help?</h2>
<p>As for the Trump administration’s promised aid package, the U.S. Department of Agriculture said on July 24 that it would divide $12 billion <a href="https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/07/24/usda-assists-farmers-impacted-unjustified-retaliation">among three programs</a> that will: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>provide payments to producers of soybeans, sorghum, corn, wheat, cotton, dairy and hogs</p></li>
<li><p>purchase surplus commodities such as fruits, nuts, rice, legumes, beef, pork and milk for distribution to food banks and other nutrition programs</p></li>
<li><p>develop new export markets for farm products. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>While key details about the aid package still need to be worked out, fundamentally it is an attempt by the administration to soften the blow of how other countries are responding to its protectionist trade policies. It may provide some short-term relief for U.S. farmers and ranchers at a time when net farm incomes are at a <a href="https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-sector-income-finances/farm-sector-income-forecast/">12-year low</a>. The effort is futile, however, if the trade conflict is not resolved soon because of the lasting damage to trade relationships. </p>
<p>Furthermore, the aid package may violate U.S. commitments to the World Trade Organization, adding to the <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_23mar18_e.htm">list</a> of <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_28mar18_e.htm">concerns</a> of <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/good_03jul18_e.htm">potential</a> <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/ds548_550rfc_06jun18_e.htm">violations</a> of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rules-based-trade-made-the-world-rich-trumps-policies-may-make-it-poorer-97896">rules-based trading system</a> the U.S. has agreed to adhere to. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229870/original/file-20180730-106521-7aeg2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Farmers testify before the House Subcommittee on Trade about the effect of foreign tariffs on American agriculture.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Congress-Trade/395fb792801b41b4a55c5b0ebb821ad4/30/0">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Damage to a market</h2>
<p>In the last decade, China has become an incredibly important market for American agriculture. U.S. producers would like to not only maintain, but grow China as a market, given its large consumer base and rising incomes, which afford increasing per capita consumption and demand for U.S. agricultural products. </p>
<p>In my experience as an economist rooted in agriculture, U.S. farmers and ranchers prefer to be able to sell their goods to consumers around the world rather than receive government aid because of a trade war in which they’ve been caught in the crossfire. They want their government to help them find more consumers, not turn them away.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100795/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanda M. Countryman has received funding from the United States Department of Agriculture.
</span></em></p>The Trump administration’s promise of $12 billion in aid to offset losses from retaliatory tariffs will not make up for the long-term consequences of a prolonged trade war.Amanda M. Countryman, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/999602018-07-22T14:07:36Z2018-07-22T14:07:36ZThe prospects for Chinese leadership in an age of upheaval<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228501/original/file-20180719-142435-1atdr9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China's aspirations of global dominance will hit a snag given the world's other major powers identify democratic values as central to their national identies. Only China and Russia do not. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in June 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Dake Kang)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts to dismantle the so-called liberal order through challenges to NATO, NAFTA, the WTO and the Paris climate accord raise the question of whether the prospects for Chinese global dominance have <a href="http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2017/10/xi-jinpings-china-international-order">improved</a> markedly. </p>
<p>While American allies are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-nato-summit-could-deal-a-major-blow-to-the-international-order-99340">riding out the storm for now</a>, the tumult Trump <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-trump-putin-summit-hired-hand-at-work-100083">leaves in his wake wherever he goes</a> is already creating space for Chinese leadership on a host of issues.</p>
<p>It’s no secret that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees China as the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/xi-jinping-just-made-it-clear-where-chinas-foreign-policy-is-headed/?utm_term=.7de46f6cc58a">natural leader</a>. Since taking office in late 2012, he has pushed forward the massive <a href="http://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/index.html">Belt and Road</a> project and dozens of new economic and diplomatic deals. </p>
<p>Xi has <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2017/10/26/as-xi-sets-his-sights-on-the-world-the-ruse-is-dispensed-with.html">also vowed</a> to make China fully developed by 2035 so that it can take the lead for the new “community of the common destiny of humankind” by 2050.</p>
<p>Does Trump’s “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/america-abidcation-trump-foreign-policy/549296/">abdication</a>” mean we are headed for a world run by the Chinese?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-xi-sets-his-sights-on-the-world-86441">China’s Xi sets his sights on the world</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>International relations scholarship is dominated by materialist <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/96785652.pdf">theories of hegemony,</a> the political, economic or military predominance or control of one state over others. These theories suggest that the rise of an economically powerful state is sufficient to trigger a hegemonic transition. The most powerful states set the rules of the game. The rise of China’s economy will lead to Chinese military dominance and ultimately to Chinese leadership of international order. </p>
<h2>A cultural dimension to world domination</h2>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=18744">some scholars</a> have <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/a-tale-of-two-hegemons-the-anglo-american-roots-of-the-postwar-international-system/">argued that hegemony</a> has a cultural dimension. This implies that the strength and stability of hegemonic orders also depends on the values and identities of the world’s most powerful states, that is, among all the great powers.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/f8hwe">new</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000267">research paper</a>, we rethink hegemony to include this cultural dimension. In our view, hegemony is leadership of an order. Leadership requires followers. So hegemony is based on securing a <a href="https://books.google.ca/books?id=c8qn0iyer8UC&lpg=PR9&ots=5oJTF9KRbL&dq=cox%20%22measure%20of%20consent%22&lr&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q=%22measure%20of%20consent%22&f=false">measure of consent</a> from the governed. </p>
<p>In this case, the governed are the other great powers. The measure of consent they are willing to offer the hegemon depends on whether those powers share the values and identities of an existing or rising hegemon.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228217/original/file-20180718-142417-w3kvoq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Xi Jinping speaks at the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing on July 10, 2018. He’s pledged billions to Arab countries in a major push for influence in the region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In today’s world, that means we have to look at whether Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom support Western hegemony, or whether they might join a Chinese challenge to the global dominance throne.</p>
<p>To get at this, we conducted a study of national identity in each of these countries. We led a multinational team of analysts who coded political speeches, newspapers, high school history textbooks, novels and movies. We instructed our analysts to count and code all phrases that invoked the country’s identity or defined what it means to be a member of the country.</p>
<h2>A major obstacle to Chinese hegemony</h2>
<p>Our main finding is that the values and identities of the great powers present a barrier to a Chinese hegemony. To begin with, in seven out of nine of the great powers, democratic governance is seen as central to national identity. Only China and Russia do not identify as democratic. </p>
<p>Furthermore, while support for neoliberal economic beliefs is mixed, there is no clear alternative that many states support.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-exactly-is-neoliberalism-84755">What exactly is neoliberalism?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>These findings suggest that the cultural basis of Western hegemony is stronger than many believe. The U.S.-led order might remain stable in the face of a Chinese challenge or an American decline. </p>
<p>China’s ability to form a hegemonic order is also deeply constrained on a social-cultural level. China is excluded from the order because its authoritarian, socialist identity is at odds with democratic neoliberalism. Thus it’s unlikely to join and transform the order from within.</p>
<p>China is also unlikely to be able to draw powerful followers into anti-Western coalition. Its national identity discourse is insular and propagandistic, and so it’s hard to see how it could craft an ideology or vision that would motivate followers. </p>
<h2>Partnerships largely trade-oriented</h2>
<p>China has lots of partners in today’s world, but these relationships are transactional. They are not grounded in the shared values and identities necessary to secure the consent of the governed. While China may seek to cultivate a favourable set of beliefs and values among the other great powers, this process is likely to take decades. </p>
<p>In short, we would not bet on China’s hegemonic prospects just yet.</p>
<p>Given that Chinese hegemony may be foreclosed for the foreseeable future, what are the prospects for international order in the next 50 years? There are, broadly speaking, three other possibilities:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Continued American hegemony of the liberal order.</p></li>
<li><p>The maintenance of the liberal order under a coalition of democratic states.</p></li>
<li><p>The dissolution of the liberal order without its replacement.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>Many in the West hope for the first, but if Trump succeeds in shifting the Republican party and U.S. foreign policy away from internationalism, then the latter two become the most likely possibilities.</p>
<p>Our data suggest that a democratic coalition of Europe, Brazil and India could reinvigorate the order. But at this juncture, it appears that the anti-globalist right is winning what Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist philosopher and politician, calls <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08854300.2014.1001559?src=recsys&journalCode=csad20">the war of position</a>, not liberals or progressives. This makes the dissolution of the order far more likely.</p>
<p>It is true that dissolution may lead to a <a href="https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/">“multiplex” order</a>. This vision is pretty uplifting: cooperation might continue à la carte without total chaos. </p>
<p>But we shouldn’t rule out the likelihood of <a href="https://www.amazon.ca/U-S-Power-Multinational-Corporation-Investment/dp/0465089518/ref=sr_1_1/140-3196325-3534521?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1531504116&sr=1-1&keywords=9780465089512">a fragmented order</a> built around a handful of neo-mercantilist centres. That would mean the international system is about to enter an age without hegemonic leadership that will be marked by confusion — and vigorous disputes over the rules of the game.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99960/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This study was part of a larger research project that is being funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Singapore’s Ministry of Education and the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Details available at <a href="https://nationalidentitydatabase.wordpress.com/">https://nationalidentitydatabase.wordpress.com/</a></span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bentley B. Allan and Ted Hopf do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New research suggests the values and identities of the world’s great powers present a major barrier to China’s aspirations of global domination. Do not bet on China’s hegemonic prospects just yet.Srdjan Vucetic, Assoc. Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaBentley B. Allan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins UniversityTed Hopf, Provost Chair Professor of Political Science, National University of SingaporeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/993602018-07-04T23:04:07Z2018-07-04T23:04:07ZLessons in Chinese history as America shuts off from the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226184/original/file-20180704-73329-1b5mg98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=298%2C190%2C1462%2C1494&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 1792 painting by artist James Gillray portrays the Macartney Embassy mission to China, when the British ambassador was rebuffed by the emperor after offering western goods. There are parallels in Chinese history to Donald Trump's isolationism.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1477402&partId=1&images=true">British Museum/1868,0808.6228</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Those who have studied history understand the importance of being engaged in the global economy. </p>
<p>Two thousand years ago, China represented nearly 25 per cent of the global economy. In 1600, it was 30 per cent, and a third in 1820. The country was <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-chinese-economy-1200-2017-2017-1">a global powerhouse, to say the least.</a></p>
<p>There is a famous story from 1792 <a href="https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/collection/themes/trails/the-macartney-embassy-gifts-exchanged-between-george-iii-and-the-qianlong">when King George III’s ambassador led a trade mission to China</a> with a cargo of the latest European technologies to present to the Chinese emperor — telescopes, globes, barometers, lenses, clocks, carriages, and other such things. </p>
<p>Historians report <a href="http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/China/208/READINGS/qianlong.html">the Chinese emperor said</a>: “There is nothing we lack — we have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects, nor do we want any more of your country’s manufactures,” thus reflecting his insular view.</p>
<p>A complicated set of factors, including weak Chinese leadership, internal conflict and a rejection of Western technology led to China turning inward and <a href="https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/china-missed-the-industrial-revolution-but-it-wont-miss-the-digital-one.563082/">missing out on the Industrial Revolution</a>. This left China significantly weakened, and subject to invasion and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2015/09/17/century-of-humiliation-complicates-us-china-relationship/&refURL=https://www.google.ca/&referrer=https://www.google.ca/">Western humiliation.</a> </p>
<h2>China down and out for more than a century</h2>
<p>China’s demise in the 1800s lasted for more than 100 years. It was not until the 1978 Chinese Communist Party <a href="http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat2/sub7/item79.html">reforms under Deng Xiaoping</a> that China re-emerged, allowing it access to Western markets and technology, thus providing economic growth and prosperity for the Chinese people. </p>
<p>Today, on a PPP (purchasing power parity) basis, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-18/who-has-the-world-s-no-1-economy-not-the-u-s">China is the largest economy in the world</a> — as it was 200 years ago. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226086/original/file-20180704-73300-1wtxjzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People monitor stock prices in Beijing in June 2018. China is back as a global economic powerhouse after an insular era spent in the shadows.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andy Wong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interestingly, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/07/brief-history-of-china-economic-growth/">China’s growth was driven by exports in industries that saw the most significant liberalization</a>. Going forward, China’s growth will likely slow as it will need to increasingly compete in industries in which there is much more protection.</p>
<p>This experience provides clear lessons for the United States.</p>
<p>The U.S. has been the world’s largest economy for the past 150 years. As journalist and author Farid Zakaria noted in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/books/chapters/books.html">his 2008 book</a> <em>The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest</em>, it’s now a post-American era, where the U.S. is not falling, but other countries are closing the gap. </p>
<p>But Zakaria’s book was published before the rise of Donald Trump and the insular and protectionist sentiment sweeping America.</p>
<h2>Trump rejects access to global economy</h2>
<p>The first tangible action of the Trump administration that pushed the U.S. towards an isolationist stance was his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html">rejection of the Trans Pacific Partnership</a>, a trade agreement that would give the U.S. access to an enormous share of the global economy. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226095/original/file-20180704-73329-ighqfr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Donald Trump would be wise to heed the lessons of Chinese history as he shuts off the United States from the rest of the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Trump has also ordered a <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nafta-renegotiations-what-you-need-know">renegotiation of NAFTA</a>, and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-trump-set-to-impose-steel-aluminum-tariffs-on-canada/">has imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports</a> into the U.S., prompting swift retaliatory action from the Europeans and Canadians. And now there is a very real possibility of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/19/donald-trump-tariffs-us-china">further round of tariffs.</a> An all-out trade war seems increasingly likely, with dangerous economic and political ramifications for the United States and the world economy. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-trumps-tariffs-are-much-bigger-than-trump-97761">How Trump's tariffs are much bigger than Trump</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Also, and remarkably amid tensions with North Korea, Trump has also forced more protectionist dimensions into the U.S.’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/us/politics/trump-south-korea-trade-deal.html">free-trade agreement with South Korea</a>. </p>
<p>Trump’s views that such agreements allow the rest of the world to benefit at the expense of the U.S. is so very wrong — these are not zero sum agreements. His moves to limit immigration are another dimension in his insular and protectionist vision for the U.S.</p>
<h2>Reminiscent of China</h2>
<p>Closing the U.S. off to the rest of the world is reminiscent of China more than 200 years ago. Of course, the circumstances are very different and it’s a different age. Nevertheless, leading economies of the world must be fully engaged in the global economy, both economically and politically. </p>
<p>It’s time for Trump and his supporters to understand that it is inconsistent to be a global power and protectionist. </p>
<p>The United States must remain open to trade, investment, immigration and the free flow of ideas. It must remain fully engaged in international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — being a superpower is about both hard and soft power.</p>
<p>There is a clear contradiction between “make America great again” and closing off from the world. If the U.S. closes itself to the world, its future as a world leader in every way is at significant risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99360/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Walid Hejazi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China turned inward during the Industrial Revolution after being a economic powerhouse for thousands of years. There are lessons about the dangers of Donald Trump’s isolationism in Chinese history.Walid Hejazi, Associate Professor of International Business, Rotman School of Management, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973612018-05-29T22:58:41Z2018-05-29T22:58:41ZCanada’s disturbing lack of vision on dealing with a rising China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220838/original/file-20180529-80661-1lhznkf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ambassador of China to Canada Lu Shaye is photographed at the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ottawa on May 24, 2018, following the announcement that Canada had turned down China's takeover bid for Aecon.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Canadian government’s <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-23/trudeau-blocks-chinese-takeover-of-aecon-on-security-grounds">rejection</a> of the proposed takeover by a Chinese company of the Toronto-based construction giant Aecon on the grounds of “national security” reflects Canada’s vulnerability in an increasingly complicated era that’s been dubbed the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/are-we-living-in-a-chinese-century/"><em>China Century</em></a>.</p>
<p>Canada’s construction industry went to great lengths to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/construction-group-warns-of-price-cutting-if-aecon-sold-to-china/article37850620/">lobby Ottawa</a>, even <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/news-polls/cccc-acquisition-of-aecon-group">commissioning opinion polls</a>, in the hopes of influencing the fate of the proposed $1.5 billion bid. For good reason, segments of the Canadian private sector are terrified that their Chinese competitors will outperform, undercut and win favour with Canadian political leaders.</p>
<p>Corporate activists, backed by a stream of opinion from ex-national security officials, political opportunists and academic ideologues, have weighed in. To their credit, the campaign worked on Innovation Minister Navdeep Bains, who rejected the deal in a <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2018/05/minister-bains-statement-on-cccis-proposed-acquisition-of-aecon.html">noticeably vague statement</a>.</p>
<p>The stakes are high for many of Canada’s special interest groups, and Ottawa’s decision was therefore a welcome one to those stakeholders.</p>
<p>This of course is unsurprising, and in some ways Canadians are lucky to have officials publicly going to bat to defend their interests. Yet this discussion must evolve. Those who rejected the Aecon bid on grounds of national security, environmental threats and labour rights amid a modern-day <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/red-scare">Red Scare</a> need to be more honest about what’s happening.</p>
<p>The truth is Canadian businesses simply can’t compete against Beijing’s giant state-backed corporations.</p>
<h2>China excels at infrastructure</h2>
<p>Canada’s construction industry is particularly vulnerable given China’s long history of expertise in engineering and infrastructure development. In fact, China is so good at building infrastructure that it’s become a principle export strategy within the Chinese government’s trillion-dollar <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-belt-and-road-china-infrastructure-project-2018-1">One Belt One Road</a> policy.</p>
<p>The failed Aecon deal represents a difficult and structural challenge for Canada and its Western allies. How do liberal trading nations work with a politically socialist state that has ironically become a <a href="https://www.policyforum.net/china-is-reshaping-the-liberal-order-and-its-for-the-better/">champion of the liberal trading order</a>?</p>
<p>This is a question Ottawa has yet to answer.</p>
<p>As Canadians debate on how to engage a rising China, Beijing has been aggressively positioning itself as a viable and pragmatic alternative to the West’s development model. The past five years has seen China take leading roles in multilateral institutions such as the <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html">Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</a> and the <a href="https://www.ndb.int/">New Development Bank</a> while investing heavily in the developing world.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220843/original/file-20180529-80640-e7zht1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping is seen here in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in August 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andy Wong, Pool)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And despite Western fears around President Xi Jinping’s so-called <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream.html">China Dream</a> philosophy and a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43361276">constitutional amendment</a> that allows him to hold on to power indefinitely, Beijing still needs friends. And it’s actively pursuing investment partners, including those in Canada.</p>
<p>But the most recent attempt via the Aecon takeover goes well beyond any one company. </p>
<p>Beijing is scouring the planet for resources and opportunities to meet its domestic consumption needs. Chinese state-owned enterprises will continue to seek out large-scale takeovers, business partnerships and resource accumulation investments. </p>
<p>How then does Canada operate in an increasingly relevant liberal trading system that is taking on some distinct Chinese characteristics?</p>
<h2>Anti-China rhetoric doesn’t accomplish much</h2>
<p>To start, the anti-China investment narrative found in some public policy circles does little to address this question. While takeover bids will continue, rejecting them on unclear grounds of threats and national security can only go so far. Pundits and think tanks need to drop the anti-China rhetoric and give serious thought to how the global trading order has evolved.</p>
<p>Second, Ottawa must develop a clear non-partisan policy, one that can cut across party lines, on how to work with a rising China that still aligns with Canada’s national interests. This will be difficult, something no federal government has yet to achieve. Still, developing a national task force on building and advocating a clear long-term China policy has never been more important.</p>
<p>Finally, Canadians need to have an honest conversation on what type of trading nation we want to build. Canada has significant investments in China, including a recent <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/cppib-china-longfor-property-1.4508416">$800 million venture</a> by our state-owned Canada Pension Plan in Chengdu. Beijing has options to retaliate should they believe Canada is behaving unfairly. </p>
<p>Although rejecting the Aecon bid may have been in our national interest, Canadians must find a way to cut through the anti-China cacophony. As talks on possible <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/obstacles-ahead-canada-china-trade">Canada-China free trade deal</a> move forward, there must be a sophisticated understanding of how global trade networks are evolving.</p>
<p>Indulging in Red Scare rhetoric and continuing to ignore the new global trade realities is a bigger threat to Canada’s economic security than China itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J. Hanlon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the wake of the Canadian government’s rejection of a Chinese takeover bid for construction company Aecon, Canada must drop the ‘Red Scare’ rhetoric and figure out how to engage with a rising China.Robert J. Hanlon, Assistant Professor of International Relations and Asian Politics, Thompson Rivers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/942582018-04-02T22:18:13Z2018-04-02T22:18:13ZWhat Xi Jinping’s power grab means for Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212803/original/file-20180402-189824-1pfm3q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping waves as he leaves a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank <a href="https://twitter.com/AIIB_Official/status/976398132610138113?s=19">tweeted last week</a> that Canada is now officially a full member, it hasn’t exactly made headlines. </p>
<p>Yet this is ostensibly a prelude for trade talks with China in an increasingly protectionist global landscape. And admission wasn’t cheap: Chinese sources say <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html">Ottawa committed more than a billion dollars to the Beijing-based bank</a>.</p>
<p>But China-watchers are more fixated on the dramatic changes rolling out after the <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/">just-completed National People’s Congress</a>.</p>
<p>Among other moves, the annual Congress voted 2,970-to-0 to give President Xi Jinping a second five-year term and repealed a regulation barring him from seeking a third.</p>
<p>They also rubber-stamped the creation of a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-corruption/china-defends-controversial-detention-measure-of-new-anti-graft-ministry-idUSKCN1GB0KY?il=0">National Supervision Commission</a> (NSC), empowered to detain people for months at secret locations without access to lawyers or due process. </p>
<p>This NSC ranks above even China’s judiciary in the newly amended Constitution. Its establishment would certainly make Chinese Congress members pause before entering a symbolic protest vote against Xi’s Machiavellian restructuring of institutions to consolidate his own power.</p>
<h2>Xi calls all the shots</h2>
<p>After last week, any charade that state institutions are somehow independent from China’s Communist Party (read: presidential) diktat is now abandoned. <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/xi-jinping-engineers-change-to-make-himself-president-for-life/news-story/d2a6f49dcf9de96a5edb5a3d1b996502">Whatever Xi says, goes</a>. </p>
<p>He chairs six top-level “leading small groups” and numerous other committees and commissions, covering every major area of policy, and has taken direct command of China’s security and intelligence apparatus. (The “authority” of Chinese State Council Premier Li Keqiang is so debased that there is little point in our prime minister meeting with him again.)</p>
<p>Xi’s <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138112/xi-jinping-tries-rally-support-chinese-dream">closing address to Congress</a>, intended to be heard around the world, was a rousing paean to the greatness of China’s civilization across its dynastic history. </p>
<p>The inventions of paper and printing, dynamite and the compass were cited, as were China’s contributions to literature and philosophy and the construction of the Great Wall. It all underscored the point that Xi will oversee the “great restoration of the Chinese nation” by 2050. The characters <em>wei da</em> — meaning “great” — were heard 35 times in the 38-minute speech.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/212805/original/file-20180402-189821-ajo5pl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, his wife Sophie Gregoire and daughter Ella-Grace walk along a section of the Great Wall of China, in Beijing in September 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Where does Canada’s massive financial contribution to the AIIB fit in? It’s in Xi’s promise that “China will continue to actively engage in reconstruction and transformation of the systems of global governance by contributing more Chinese wisdom, Chinese redesigns and Chinese strength.” </p>
<p>This is part and parcel of Beijing’s massive <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world">One Belt One Road</a> global infrastructure program, which China expects will lead to its development of the Canadian North and polar waters in years ahead. </p>
<p>China has already declared itself a “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/14/china-we-are-a-near-arctic-state-and-we-want-a-polar-silk-road.html">near-Arctic nation</a>,” regardless of the strictures of geography.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-all-eyes-on-china-singapore-makes-its-own-arctic-moves-92316">With all eyes on China, Singapore makes its own Arctic moves</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Most alarming for Canada was the news that the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, responsible for promoting China’s influence around the world, will be restructured and beefed up. Xi characterizes the UFD as the Party’s “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4">magic weapon</a>,” and indeed, its activity in Western countries has increasingly been seen as a covert, coercive or corrupt tool for China’s foreign interests.</p>
<p>China’s 2015 hack of the U.S. government’s Office of Personnel Management — <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html">exposing personal data of 21 million government employees or their spouses to China’s sophisticated super-computers</a> — was likely a glimpse of a Chinese social engineering behemoth intended to induce naïve Canadians to take actions that serve Beijing’s purposes more than Canada’s own sovereign interests.</p>
<h2>‘Useful idiots’</h2>
<p>It uses up-to-the-minute cyber-technology to cultivate the equivalent of Lenin’s “useful idiots” in nations of strategic interest to China — nations like Canada.</p>
<p>Beneath all the win-win rhetoric, and sops to Canadian greed, the real goal is buttressing the rise to power of a new global order, where liberal democratic principles are eclipsed by Xi Jinping’s determined, authoritarian passion to restore China’s lost greatness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="http://www.international.gc.ca/protocol-protocole/reps.aspx?lang=eng">diplomatic lists maintained by Global Affairs Canada</a>, the United States has 138 accredited foreign representatives at its embassy and consulates in Canada. </p>
<p>But China has 169. </p>
<p>As a onetime official in the Canadian embassy in Beijing, this begs some questions. Why does China need so many more people stationed in Canada than our much more predominant economic partner and closest ally? </p>
<p>And what are the Chinese diplomats doing here that the American diplomats aren’t?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada has reportedly committed more than $1 billion to a Chinese investment bank. Is Canada unwittingly serving as a ‘useful idiot’ in Xi Jinping’s grand plans to restore China’s lost greatness?Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/890682017-12-20T23:48:34Z2017-12-20T23:48:34ZCanada drops charade of progressive trade with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199091/original/file-20171213-27580-1ekit38.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau walks with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang during a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China in December 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Besides skewering Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s China strategy, Beijing’s gruff <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21732144-canadian-prime-minister-wants-trade-deals-address-human-rights-and-environment-china">recent refusal</a> to factor labour, gender or environmental rights into free-trade talks was significant in other ways.</p>
<p>It likely marks Canada’s last gasp in a futile, decades-long effort to engage China in global institutions on Western terms.</p>
<p>In the early 1980s, after “Red China” abandoned its Maoist revolutionary agenda to pursue strength and prosperity through international trade, <a href="https://www.oise.utoronto.ca/cidec/UserFiles/File/Research/CIDEC_Projects/Conference2014/Wilson_s_paper_2001.pdf">Canada began transferring hundreds of millions</a> of taxpayer dollars to China’s post-Mao regime through the Canadian International Development Agency, the World Bank and other UN agencies.</p>
<p>Basically, China named a request and Canada signed a cheque.</p>
<p>We paid the cost of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119906431204358677">feasibility studies</a> for the Three Gorges Dam, <a href="https://www.power-technology.com/projects/qinshan-nuclear-power-china/">we sold China CANDU nuclear reactors</a> on highly favourable terms, we funded projects to <a href="http://www.agriteam.ca/en/projects/archive/category/agriculture-et-agrobusiness/P10/">improve the quality of Chinese wheat and pork production</a>. </p>
<p>Most importantly, <a href="http://china.usc.edu/calendar/how-canadian-universities-contributed-chinas-transformation">we paid for Chinese scientists, engineers and technicians</a> to come to Canada to acquire Canadian advanced technologies.</p>
<p>These programs were always characterized as “exchange,” but the money was all Canadian, with nothing given back beyond duck dinners and Great Wall tourism.</p>
<p><a href="http://nationalpost.com/opinion/kelly-mcparland-twenty-five-years-of-courting-china-has-canada-shouldering-a-46-billion-trade-deficit">Prime ministers from Jean Chrétien on</a> claimed this goodwill would eventually lead to China’s democratization and implementation of rule of law. And when that happened, they reasoned, Canada would engage in highly productive fair trade in a huge new market, building our prosperity on China’s rise. </p>
<p>To this end, Chrétien led his <a href="http://en.people.cn/english/200012/02/eng20001202_56727.html">memorable</a> Team Canada
missions to China.</p>
<h2>Few benefits, lost Canadian jobs</h2>
<p>In hindsight, we now know that any economic benefits were mostly limited to a few large Canadian companies with the sophistication to navigate complex relationships with Chinese Communist business networks. Over time, untold thousands of Canadian workers lost good union jobs to China’s “reform.”</p>
<p>After the failed 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement led to massive death and political repression, pressure grew for Ottawa to emphasize <a href="https://www.oise.utoronto.ca/cidec/UserFiles/File/Research/CIDEC_Projects/Conference2014/Wilson_s_paper_2001.pdf">human rights, democratization and good governance</a> in its China policy. </p>
<p>CIDA’s counterpart in China, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, reluctantly accepted this as a cost of keeping Canada’s “hard” technology transfer funds flowing. So China agreed to loosely structured <a href="https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/12/05/prime-minister-justin-trudeau-meets-chairman-national-peoples-congress-china-zhang">programs designed to turn its National People’s Congress into a democratic parliament</a>, to <a href="http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/cooperation/china-chine-eng.html">train judges</a> to serve in some future independent judiciary, to <a href="http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/acdi-cida/CD4-52-2008E.pdf">encourage citizen activism on social issues</a>, to <a href="http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/acdi-cida/CD4-47-2007-eng.pdf">raise awareness of gender rights</a>, and so on. </p>
<p>We began a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/rights-dialogue-in-china-blasted-as-futile/article710807/">“confidential,”</a> government-to-government human rights dialogue. China even <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/08/china-ratify-key-international-human-rights-treaty">signed the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>, promising to set the stage for a free press, democratic elections and protection of Indigenous and minority rights.</p>
<p>None of this led anywhere beyond lip service on the part of our Chinese counterparts. Politicians involved from both countries knew that these were <a href="http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/%7Ecburton/Assessment%20of%20the%20Canada-China%20Bilateral%20Human%20Rights%20Dialogue%2019APR06.pdf">public relations exercises</a> intended to soothe Canadian human rights concerns.</p>
<p>Ottawa’s cynical hypocrisy with regard to appeasing Canadians on Chinese rights and freedoms played out again during Trudeau’s visit to China. One would have to be naive to believe that genuine labour, gender or environmental reforms could be incorporated into a trade deal with a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. </p>
<p>This is a nation where <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/10/16/xi-jinpings-quest-to-revive-stalins-communist-ideology/?utm_term=.b4a6a478c29b">Stalin is still revered</a> as a significant forefather of Chinese Communism under current President Xi Jinping — with whom our prime minister dined just a couple of weeks ago.</p>
<h2>‘Western bourgeois false ideologies’</h2>
<p>It seems the Prime Minister’s Office assumed the Chinese premier would sign a joint statement making reference to labour, gender and environmental rights while Trudeau flew home to celebrate his squaring the circle on the conundrum of trade versus protecting Canadian values in Canada-China relations.</p>
<p>And by the time negotiations were completed in the years to come, any labour, gender and environment clauses would have been relegated to irrelevant statements of principles with no binding effect.</p>
<p>But, evidently unknown to Trudeau and his advisers, Xi Jinping made it crystal clear at the October Communist Party Congress that it was his predecessors’ pandering to “Western bourgeois false ideologies” that had led to their “<a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/17/c_136758372_3.htm">lack of drive, incompetence,</a> disengagement from the people, inaction, and corruption.” The days of Chinese lip service to Canadian political wishes have definitely come to an end.</p>
<p>But as one era ends, a new one begins. </p>
<p>Canada’s “progressive trade agenda” might have died in the Great Hall of the People earlier this month. But there’s now an opportunity for a serious, non-partisan reconsideration of how Canada should manage our role in China’s comprehensive rise to power in the years and decades ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Burton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s “progressive trade agenda” with China might have died in the Great Hall of the People earlier this month. But there’s now an opportunity for a serious reconsideration of the relationship.Charles Burton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.