tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/coloured-28814/articlesColoured – The Conversation2021-08-12T14:52:52Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1651912021-08-12T14:52:52Z2021-08-12T14:52:52ZMen unpick South African racial stereotyping in bid to reclaim their identity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415807/original/file-20210812-19-1lp0ldg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C678%2C5136%2C3864&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men spoke of how crime in the area affected their everyday lives and how they constantly had to stay safe and out of trouble.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simone Peters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Racial segregation in South Africa began with colonialism, but became an official policy in 1948 <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/apartheid-1948-1994/">under apartheid</a>. When the National Party came into power, it imposed apartheid onto the social, economic and political life of South Africans for almost 50 years. </p>
<p>To do so, the government had to create racial categories and make them part of legislation. One of the categories it created was “coloured”. In this article, the term “coloured” has been placed in inverted commas to acknowledge the fact that it is a constructed and contested term. </p>
<p>The racial category of “coloured” was a difficult one to create because it covered a diversity of physical appearances, accents and geography. This was the result of “coloureds” being the descendants of the sexual relationships between colonists, slaves from all over the globe and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2005.9627597">indigenous Khoe and San people</a>.</p>
<p>The apartheid-era <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/archive-files2/leg19500707.028.020.030.pdf">Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950</a> defined a “coloured” person as someone who was not white or “native”. Later, the group was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/11/world/south-africa-s-coloreds-a-group-torn-between-black-and-white-worlds.html">further divided</a> into classifications of the Cape “coloured”, “Cape Malay”, Griqua, Indian, Chinese, other Asiatic, and other.</p>
<p>In South Africa today, “coloured” people continue to actively participate in accepting, rejecting and remaking <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/31443/628130.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">this racial identity</a>. But the term is still sometimes associated with negative stereotypes.</p>
<p>Academic literature has depicted “coloured” men as being unskilled, having minimal education, and at risk <a href="https://theconversation.com/paper-by-south-african-academics-raises-spectre-of-racism-in-the-academy-116612">of perpetrating violence</a>. And some media tend to reinforce this view. In my <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/33729/thesis_hum_2021_peters%20simone%20maxine.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">research</a> I wanted to look at how “coloured” men see and talk about themselves and their experiences of being “coloured” in post-apartheid South Africa. </p>
<p>The men in my <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/33729">study</a> challenged the stereotypes and also told me about the impact of these stereotypes on their lives. These narratives matter because they show the dire consequences of stereotypes and how people can speak back against them. </p>
<h2>Widening the lens</h2>
<p>The academic literature on “coloured” men has focused predominantly on the risk they pose to others and themselves. This often results in particular kinds of representations of them. For example, studies have looked at “coloured” men as perpetrators of domestic abuse and rape. Violence in their communities, and experiences of gang membership and imprisonment, have also been the subject of studies.</p>
<p>This research is necessary as it shows how violence shapes the lives of people. But violence is not the only narrative on “coloured” communities and among “coloured” men. </p>
<p>In my work I wanted to take a more holistic and historical approach and show the complexities of “coloured” men’s experiences.</p>
<p>My study collected data by asking participants, aged 18 to 60, to show their experiences in the form of photo narratives and through interviews. I used data from 20 men who were historically classified as “coloured” and lived and worked in Bishop Lavis. Bishop Lavis is a “coloured” community created <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/cape-flats-cape-town">under apartheid</a>, about 20 km from central Cape Town, and is often in the news for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-09-26-gang-violence-mother-of-slain-bishop-lavis-woman-doesnt-have-much-faith-in-the-army/">incidents of crime</a>. The questions were about what it meant to be “coloured”, what it meant to be a man, and their experiences of living in Bishop Lavis.</p>
<p>I found that the participants used the research process as a way of claiming a positive self-image and constructing alternative narratives about themselves and their communities. </p>
<p>In telling their stories, the men renegotiated power by reasserting their versions of self and community. They resisted the dominant stories that are constantly told about the community of Bishop Lavis and how dangerous the place is. They constructed the space as “lekker” (“nice”), and as home, where they belonged. </p>
<p>The participants challenged the picture of “coloured” men as drunkards, violent, gangsters, and absent fathers. They positioned themselves as respectable men who took responsibility for their children, provided their children with love and support, and were not thieves or gangsters. The old and young men shared similar stories about what it meant to be a “real man”. A “real man” provides, protects and takes responsibility for his family. He does not abuse women and children. He is not a gangster.</p>
<p>Their photographs also spoke back to negative stereotypes about their community and their racial identity. They took pictures of their communities showing how vibrant it is but also showing the run-down parks and lack of resources. There were pictures of their friends, children and family and their businesses and sports.</p>
<p>Throughout the research process, the men spoke of how crime in the area had affected their everyday lives and how they constantly had to take care to stay safe and out of trouble. They all emphasised their lack of freedom and how they felt unsafe in the area. When looking for work, men from areas such as Bishop Lavis, who are stereotyped as violent and gangsters, have to deal with employers seeing them as untrustworthy and a threat to people’s safety. These stereotypes also result in “coloured” men being stopped and searched by police officers, which strips them of their dignity.</p>
<h2>Redefining identity</h2>
<p>My research contributes to work on “colouredness” by understanding how people define and renegotiate their racial identity, how they challenge stigmatising characteristics and present alternative ways for imagining “colouredness”. </p>
<p>These marginalised men, despite their situation of high unemployment, a lack of resources and opportunities and despite gangsterism, are refusing to be violent and are choosing to “do masculinity” differently. </p>
<p>A more balanced picture of these men’s experiences and lives allows society to see them as more than just criminals. This has a profound impact on these men’s lives. They are often racially profiled and searched by the police. They miss out on job opportunities because of the stereotypes attached to their racial identities and communities.</p>
<p>As researchers we have a big responsibility to avoid reproducing or reinforcing stereotypes in the work that we do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165191/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simone Peters received funding for the PhD from the National Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences.</span></em></p>A more balanced picture of “coloured” mens’ experiences and lives allows society to see beyond negative stereotypes.Simone Peters, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1184042019-06-11T13:38:45Z2019-06-11T13:38:45ZStudy shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278534/original/file-20190607-52758-ow8gch.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many young South Africans see no point in voting. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the eve of South Africa’s sixth democratic elections on 8 May, thousands of young people took to Twitter to state reasons for why they had no intention to cast their votes. They used the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/iwanttovotebut?lang=en">hashtag #IWantToVoteBut</a>.</p>
<p>The trending topic at the time of the elections provides some insight into why young people opted out of casting their vote. At the time, pollsters and commentators were already touting the power of the youth (people under 29 made up <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Voters-Roll/Registration-statistics/">21% of eligible voters</a>) as well as the threat of non-participation. </p>
<p>The Electoral Commission of South Africa has revealed that about <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/About-Us/News/Over-700-000-new-voters-added-to-the-voters--roll-ahead-of-elections/">nine million </a> people eligible to vote were not registered to vote. Of these about six million were young people. Alarmingly, less than 20% of eligible first-time voters (those who turned 18 since the last national election) registered to vote. The election was ultimately held with the <a href="https://www.news24.com/elections/news/2019-vs-2014-what-the-numbers-tell-us-about-the-general-elections-20190512">lowest voter turnout</a> since 1994.</p>
<p>Looking at the trends over the last few years, there’s been a systematic decrease in youth participation in elections. Does this reflect youth apathy or lack of confidence in the system of democracy to meet their needs?</p>
<p>The Centre for Social Development in Africa, at the University of Johannesburg, did a <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Voter%20Report%20A4%20Mar%202019%20Web.pdf">study</a> – “The 2019 Elections: Socio-economic performance and voter preferences”. It shows that young South Africans place socio-economic well-being above democratic rights. Simply put, the vast majority of young people believe that it is more important for the country to cater for their needs than to vote. This is a worrying trend indicating a loss of faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The findings were drawn from a survey conducted in the fourth quarter of 2018. The study asked to what extent are government performance in the delivery of socio-economic rights, perceptions of corruption and issues of governance likely to influence voter preferences in the 2019 national general elections? It consisted of 3431 respondents (representative of more than 38 million potential voters), the majority of whom are youth between the ages of 18 and 34 years. </p>
<h2>Livelihood trumps the vote</h2>
<p>The study found that young people were more distrustful of political parties and governmental organisations than older people. While all potential voters put more value on socio-economic well-being than democratic rights, this was more pronounced among young people.</p>
<p>Specifically, 58% of youth in South Africa view meeting their basic needs (such as finding jobs, income, housing) as more important than voting, and having access to courts, freedom of speech and expression. Only 27% (less than three out of ten) of the young respondents believed democratic rights were more important. The remaining 15% said they didn’t know which was more important. Respondents also reported a lack of faith in democracy to deliver socio-economic transformation that can meet their needs.</p>
<p>Placing socioeconomic rights above democratic rights is understandable given the multiple struggles that young people face. 25 years since the end of apartheid, the country is still arguably the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview">most unequal</a> in the world. The most recent <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2019.pdf">workforce figures</a> show a 55.2% joblessness rate among the country’s youth –- almost twice the general (already shocking) national unemployment rate of 27.6%.</p>
<p>Young people are also grappling with the <a href="http://www.ci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/367/Child_Gauge/South_African_Child_Gauge_2015/Child_Gauge_2015-Schooling.pdf">well-documented failings of the education system</a> which has left many school-leavers unprepared for (or unable to access) tertiary education or become entrepreneurs.</p>
<p>As our <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Unemployment%20exec%20summary%20FINAL%20interactive.pdf">research</a> on youth unemployment shows, there are multiple barriers keeping many of the country’s young people locked out of labour market opportunities. These include a mismatch between their education and the skills needed in the economy. The particularly low level of skills among young people constrains their ability to enter the labour market. Another problem is that the costs of work seeking are particularly high for young people.</p>
<h2>Lack of faith in government</h2>
<p>A qualitative study the Centre for Social Development in Africa conducted among young people aged on average 17.5 years old in 2015, called <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Transition%20in%20SA%20communities_new%20colour_print.pdf">“Youth transitions in South African communities”</a> shows that young South Africans do care about politics and their role as citizens, but were not convinced that the government would or could address their concerns.</p>
<p>Across the focus groups we observed young people who were surprisingly well-informed about current affairs. They held passionately expressed opinions about various political issues – from xenophobia to the government’s failure to provide basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation. </p>
<p>They also had real concerns about the problems facing their communities; including crime and unemployment. Perhaps it was this awareness that informed their views on formal political processes. The <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/csda/Documents/Youth%20Transition%20in%20SA%20communities_new%20colour_print.pdf">report</a> also found that “most of the participants indicated an unwillingness to vote”. Furthermore, the report said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A common thread in all the focus groups was the notion that young people felt voting would not bring about meaningful change to their lives.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>All of the participants said they generally had no trust in political structures and processes – like voting, demonstrations, and political party membership. They reflected a deep cynicism about formal political processes, indicating distrust of leaders. </p>
<p>They were well aware of the failures of the then President Jacob Zuma’s ruinous administration. But, more broadly, they felt that political leaders wanted their vote but then did not deliver on promises. They believed that political leaders were selfish and had no interest in the well-being of their communities. Many of the participants reported feeling alienated from all of South Africa’s political leaders.</p>
<h2>Need for urgency</h2>
<p>Tackling youth unemployment and social exclusion requires bold strategies and decisive action. Evidence-based strategies are needed that tackle the structural barriers to youth unemployment and the persistent educational and socioeconomic disadvantage that they face. These should include quality and relevant education that will prepare them for the changing world of work; smoother pathways to vocational and technical education; and access to employment services that link them with labour market opportunities. </p>
<p>These strategies are crucial to counteract their persistent marginalisation and restore their confidence in democracy. Only in this way will South Africa be a politically stable, just and peaceful society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from Department of Science and Technology and the National Research Foundation for the South African Chair in Welfare and Social Development. She also received funding for this research from the Faculty of Humanities Research Committee and the University Research Committee, University of Johannesburg</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Graham receives funding from the National Research Foundation, the University of Johannesburg's University Research Committee and the Government Technical Advisory Centre. She has previously been funded by the Ford Foundation and the British Academy. </span></em></p>After recent elections, South Africa are grappling with what the reasons are for the declining trend in youth participation in the 2019 elections.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1172122019-05-16T13:48:21Z2019-05-16T13:48:21ZFears of extremism live in the minds of South Africans, not in reality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274934/original/file-20190516-69195-171ghf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Glen Mashinini, the head of South Africa's electoral commission announces the 2019 elections results.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africans hate to miss out on global disasters. This explains why last week’s national election is being touted as a victory for <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/columnists/2019-05-13-ayabonga-cawe-reflections-on-a-white-election">extremism</a>.</p>
<p>In many countries, right-wing parties have made <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006">unexpected gains</a>. Some have seen a similar South African trend in the performance of the Freedom Front Plus (<a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/">FF+</a>), whose vote increased from 0,9% in the last general election in 2014 and 0,8% in the 2016 local elections to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">2,4%</a> in 2019. This makes it the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">fifth biggest</a> party in the new Parliament.</p>
<p>Much reporting and analysis has been devoted to this 250% increase which was achieved at the expense of the official opposition, the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">Democratic Alliance (DA)</a>.</p>
<p>Although the FF+ nominated a conservative <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Coloured">“Coloured”</a> politician, Peter Marais, as its <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/04/09/ff-plus-premier-candidate-wants-wc-to-split-from-sa">candidate</a> for the Western Cape province in an attempt to gain from disenchantment at majority rule among a section of this community, in reality it is the party of the white right-wing. All ten of the members of parliament who will represent it after its gains are white. </p>
<p>It has championed <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-who-why-and-what-of-south-africas-minority-afrikaner-party-116913">white interests</a> in general and those of Afrikaans speakers in particular. For example, it has campaigned for a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Analysis/the-return-of-the-right-and-the-coming-of-the-volkstaat-20190123"><em>volkstaat</em></a>, a separate territory for whites only.</p>
<p>Given all this it is, not surprisingly, associated with opposition to majority rule.</p>
<p>So, it is surely not surprising that some see the sharp rise in the vote of a party committed to salvaging as much of apartheid as it can as a sign that whites are not prepared to accept nonracial democracy. But a closer look reveals that a molehill is being turned into a mighty mountain.</p>
<p>The same is true of fears triggered by the rise in support for the militant nationalist Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="http://www.effonline.org/Home">(EFF)</a>.</p>
<h2>Freedom Front Plus</h2>
<p>A 250% rise sounds dramatic but two and a half times very little is still not very much. The FF+’s vote is not only a tiny fraction of the electorate – it is a very small minority of white voters, probably less than one in ten.</p>
<p>In theory, a big swing to a small party could signal that it is on its way to becoming a big party. But there is no way the FF+ is on its way to becoming a big party. It is impossible to tell exactly how many members of any “race” voted a particular way, but we know that just about all its voters are white, which means a relatively small and declining section of the electorate. The 4,5 million whites in South Africa make up only <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022018.pdf">7,8%</a> of the population of 57,7 million people.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274914/original/file-20190516-69186-219ywi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pieter Groenewald, leader of the FF+.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Business Day/Trevor Samson</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The FF+ is also, for cultural reasons, not attractive to white English speakers so its potential voters are the 60% of the white electorate which is Afrikaans-speaking. Even if it won every single white Afrikaner vote – and it has no prospect of coming even close – its percentage of the vote would be trapped firmly in the single digits.</p>
<p>Nor does it make much sense to claim that the FF+ vote shows that a growing number of whites don’t like black majority rule. Many whites resent majority rule and more than a few of these belong to – or support – the DA. </p>
<p>Although it started life as a liberal party, the DA has long been a catch-all for a variety of opponents of the ANC including white voters who do not even pretend to respect black people. Some DA members and public representatives have been caught making <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-17-dianne-kohler-barnard-in-new-racism-scandal/">racist statements</a>. So being a DA member is not a guarantee of liberal tolerance.</p>
<p>The growth in the FF+ vote shows only that a section of the right-wing holdouts who thought the DA would speak for them have decided that it is neither white nor right-wing enough, and have moved to a more openly intolerant option. There is symbolism in the fact that the FF+ campaign slogan, <a href="https://www.fightbacksa.org.za/">Fight Back</a>, was coined by the DA’s predecessor, the Democratic Party, in 1999.</p>
<p>That white holdouts now trust the FF+ more than they trust the DA is a problem for the DA more than it is for the country.</p>
<h2>Economic Freedom Fighters</h2>
<p>A second source of alarm in some quarters is the growth of the EFF, whose more militant African nationalism alarms a wide spectrum of opinion. It won 10,8%, a 70% increase on its 6,35% in 2014. Some see this as a worrying sign of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2019-05-13-poll-reveals-recession-of-anc-da-and-rise-of-racialised-fundamentalist-parties/">growing black voter support for extremism</a>.</p>
<p>But again, the story is more complicated than it seems. The EFF has contested three elections. It received <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/lgedashboard2016/leaderboard.aspx#">8,19%</a> in the 2016 municipal elections. This means that it added two percentage points to its vote at each election. If it carries on doing this, it will take another 20 elections, local and national, for it to challenge for power, which means that it would have to wait around 60 years.</p>
<p>The DA vote provides evidence that a couple of modest increases in support do not necessarily show that a party is heading for anything like a majority. This election was the first since 1999 at which its share of the vote declined – it did better at every poll for two decades. But, despite these gains, it has never come close to the 30% which it set as a target years ago.</p>
<p>The EFF has shown that it is likely to remain a presence until and unless it decides to return to the ANC. But it is still nowhere near challenging for a majority in a single municipality, let alone in a province or the entire country.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=700&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/274918/original/file-20190516-69199-lfrc0d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=880&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Economic Freedom Fighters leader Julius Malema.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Kim Ludbrook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nor does a growth in the EFF vote necessarily show greater racial polarisation. People support the EFF for a variety of reasons, including a desire to protest against the ANC. The claim that EFF votes show the sort of polarisation seen in many other democracies misses more than it explains.</p>
<h2>Realism wins the day</h2>
<p>So, despite much of the hand-wringing, the recent election has shown again that the extremism which worries democrats in much of the world has little traction in South Africa. </p>
<p>This seems to fly in the face of common sense. Twenty-five years of democracy in South Africa have not ended <a href="https://theconversation.com/race-still-colours-south-africas-politics-25-years-after-apartheids-end-115735">racial division</a> or seriously dented <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-africa-should-seriously-consider-taxing-its-wealthy-citizens-116073">inequality</a>. Economic times are <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/review/Chapter%202.pdf">hard</a>. Crime is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-wont-become-less-violent-until-its-more-equal-103116">high</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Tags/Topics/protests">protests are routine</a>.</p>
<p>The country’s liberal Constitution hides a deep social conservatism which prompts repeated complaints that traditional values and respect for order are crumbling. The country seems like an almost <a href="https://www.academia.edu/13617646/Extremist_Political_Parties_A_View_From_South_Africa">textbook candidate for extremism</a>.</p>
<p>Why, despite that, does the centre seem to hold? There’s no simple or quick answer. Suffice it to say that, despite a history stained deeply by intolerance and violence, South Africans are resigned to living with realities – and people – they resent.</p>
<p>There is no sign that this is likely to end soon. As long as it survives, the extremes will exist more as fears in people’s heads than as political realities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The recent election has shown again that the extremism which worries democrats in much of the world has little traction in South Africa.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105112019-02-03T09:18:00Z2019-02-03T09:18:00ZA South African case study: how to support young job hunters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/256351/original/file-20190130-108367-4tkpgl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soweto in South Africa. Apartheid's spacial planning still affects people's lives.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/karmor/6087853175/in/photolist-agXQDM-ah1GS1-ah1xfY-agXWvp-agXSfe-agXHK2-6qzcPT-ajtBk-arFHM9-7qiKeX-arCYwx-arFHrh-arFFZA-arD1Qp-6SqXj-arD3oT-eg7Vc-eg7Ud-eg7W4-85cjJh-9P5WyP-KGGDB-n1not-9vy8CT-n1jeo-Yr7ARM-eg7Ta-eg7Wi-eg7WV-eg7SB-6qz72a-9vTNxL-eg7UZ-eg7R6-eg7Sj-k7Vq4-eg7Rp-eg7RF-eg7SR-9vFTFj-eg7S5-6qDh4b-eg7UJ-ZpvMoL-eg7Vs-eg7VR-eg7U2-eg7WD-eg7Th-9P5S7F">Flickr/John Karwoski</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Young South Africans spend on average R938 (US$85) a month looking for work. This astronomical cost includes transport at R558 ($41) and an additional R380 ($28) for internet access, printing, application fees, agent’s fees and even money for bribes.</p>
<p>The picture is even more alarming when you consider the unemployment statistics. Over the last decade unemployment in South Africa has increased from 21.5% to <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate">27.2%</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps most concerning is that it’s especially high for South Africa’s almost 10 million young people between <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2018.pdf">the ages of 15 and 24</a>. For this group unemployment sits at 50%. Not only do young people struggle to find work but the process of getting a job in South Africa is expensive.</p>
<p>The data on the cost of looking for work has been collected by the <a href="https://www.uj.ac.za/faculties/humanities/Documents/Humanities%20HD%20Procedures%201-pager%20-%202016.12.02.pdf">Siyakha Youth Assets for Employability Study</a>. The ongoing study launched in 2013 to assess whether government programmes designed to help young people is actually making a difference in their efforts to <a href="https://afrikatikkun.org/">find work</a>. </p>
<p>The programmes offer some form of skills training – usually a combination of technical and general workplace skills, along with some advice and <a href="http://harambee.livedigital.co.za/">support on finding work</a>. The study is looking at whether youth employability programmes – improve employment for youth and what elements help them in their job search. </p>
<p>The study participants were predominantly African, women and from poor backgrounds. The average age of the participants when they completed their training was 23.5 years. Three-quarters of the sample were between 18 and 25 years of age. This demographic is the most affected by unemployment. </p>
<p>The reasons most often given for youth unemployment are limited skills, lack of work experience, and high wage expectations. But our findings show that over half of the sample had prior work experience and did not report unrealistic wage expectations, suggesting there were other factors keeping young people locked out of the labour market. </p>
<p>We conclude that one reason contributing to the continued inability of young people to break into the jobs market is the cost of seeking a job. </p>
<h2>The survey</h2>
<p>The survey has involved a sample of 1 986 young people who participated in eight of these programmes at 48 training sites across the country. The vast majority of the participants were young – with an average age of 23 – black (94,4%) and unemployed (78%). </p>
<p>A key reason that those surveyed gave for not looking for work is the <a href="http://www.redi3x3.org/sites/default/files/Mlatsheni%20%26%20Ranchhod%202017%20REDI3x3%20Working%20Paper%2039%20Youth%20labour%20market%20dynamics.pdf">cost of doing so</a>. </p>
<p>The reason for this is that apartheid era spatial planning, in which townships were established far away from economic hubs, continues to affect the ability of people to look for work in a <a href="http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/DPRU%20WP02-065.pdf">cost effective way</a>. </p>
<p>Two-thirds of the participants in the study live in townships often located on the periphery of urban areas. This means they have to travel long distances to the urban economic hubs to access job opportunities. </p>
<p>The remaining third were based in far flung rural areas, meaning they needed to travel even further than their urban counterparts in search of jobs.</p>
<p>In addition to the burden of travel costs, the study found that over half (51%) of young people live in households that are classified as severely food insecure. This meant that they, or another member of the household, had gone without food to eat more than once in the 30 days that preceded the baseline study.</p>
<p>This means that households had to make difficult decisions between funding the costs of seeking work and affording basic necessities. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our research found that close to two-thirds (61.6%) of participants relied on family members to fund their costs of searching for work, which puts a huge strain on their personal relationships and often made these young people feel like a burden.</p>
<p>Blessing, a young mom of two with a diploma in tourism management said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>[I experience] financial challenges in the case of going to drop my CV, so I have been asking my mum and even my husband, to drop my CV on my behalf on their way to work to save on costs.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nevertheless, 15% of youth in the study showed real initiative and commitment to finding work. They funded the costs from their own savings. A smaller number (6.2%) reported using the stipends they received from the various programmes helping youths find employment.</p>
<p>The study found that 87.2% of those interviewed used the internet to look for work, but there was still a reliance on newspaper adverts, which often required applicants to submit physical applications.</p>
<p>The research found that 83% of young people spent money on printing their CVs, and that one of their biggest expenses was for mobile data. The youth employment programmes helped in alleviating some of the financial costs. </p>
<p>Support for work seekers is crucial, especially if South Africa is going to address the needs of the millions of young people that remain unemployed. Failure to provide this support means that young people’s potential will not be realised and significant human capital will be lost to society.</p>
<p><em>Leilanie Williams, a researcher at the University of Johannesburg, contributed to the research and this article</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leila Patel receives funding from DST/NRF for her Research Chair in Welfare and Social Development. She also received funding for this research from the Ford Foundation, the National Treasury’s Jobs Fund and the University of Johannesburg’s Research Committee. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Graham received funding from The Government Technical Advisory Committee (GTAC), the Ford Foundation, The British Academy's Newton Advanced Fellowship Programme, and the University of Johannesburg's Research Committee to support this research. She also receives funds from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>The high costs of finding work make it difficult for young South Africans to get jobs.Leila Patel, Professor of Social Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLauren Graham, Associate professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/617582016-06-28T19:26:06Z2016-06-28T19:26:06ZAdam Small, South Africa’s poet, prophet and man of the people, has gone home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128507/original/image-20160628-7815-1is7iwa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Celebrated South African poet Adam Small passed away at the age of 79.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cape Argus/Independent Newspapers</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/uwc-saddened-by-death-of-professor-adam-small-20160626">death</a> on June 25 2016 of Adam Small, the South African Black Consciousness activist, Afrikaans poet and revered academic, was not unexpected. In the twilight of his years, in his public interactions, he came across as alert but increasingly frail, often teary-eyed. In his last creative writings such as “<a href="http://www.tafelberg.com/Books/15868">Klawerjas</a>” (2013) and “<a href="https://www.behance.net/gallery/31750529/Maria-Moeder-van-God">Maria, Moeder van God</a>” (Mary, Mother of God, 2015) he often referenced impending death or retraced the vagaries of a life lived.</p>
<p>Small always had an air of compassionate consideration, of thoughtfulness, of critical engagement. He treated ideas seriously and death, like life, was something to be explored. At the death of his mother, of Muslim Indian heritage, he thanked her “for everything and thinking of Goree / for reading and writing … / /… your sense of humour…”</p>
<p>He was <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/love-at-centre-of-prof-smalls-life-1873802">born</a> on December 21 1936 in the small town of Wellington, about 70km northeast of Cape Town. He grew up in a village called Goree where his father, a slave descendant and a <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/dutch-reformed-church-south-african-history-online">Dutch Reformed</a> Protestant, was a primary school teacher. </p>
<p>The family later moved to Cape Town where Small completed his secondary schooling and later an <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/18043">MA thesis</a> at the University of Cape Town on “Nicolai Hartmann’s appreciation of Nietzsche’s axiology”. He completed most of his schooling through the medium of English. Small however found his artistic niche in liberal intellectual thought, and Afrikaans literary, cultural and linguistic association.</p>
<h2>Afrikaners aren’t only white</h2>
<p>From early on he confessed a close kinship with Afrikaans. He even identified himself as an Afrikaner. It was a very controversial statement at a time when the appellation “Afrikaner” was reserved for Afrikaans-speaking white people. Small’s association was cultural and linguistic. </p>
<p>Throughout his life, from his long essay “<a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/mayor/Pages/Adam-Small.aspx">Die Eerste Steen</a>” (The First Stone, 1961) to his play “<a href="http://www.nb.co.za/Books/15865">The Orange Earth</a>” (or “Goree”, 1978; 2013), he maintained that one of the greatest injustices that <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/apartheid-and-reactions-it">apartheid</a> brought about was that people who spoke the same language and shared the same cultural heritage were arbitrarily divided on the basis of skin colour. </p>
<p>For him apartheid was an abomination that denied people the experience of their most basic humaneness and humanity. The very basis of monochromic apartheid was anathema to him: he grew up in a house that was defined by its syncretism, its multiculturalism and its multilingualism.</p>
<p>As a young writer and a keen polemicist he became a controversial figure, often taking positions that people on the right and the left, or the side of the apartheid regime and their opposition found unpalatable. For Small was his own man, not given to groupthink or the unearned graces of political masters. </p>
<p>His first collections of poetry “<a href="http://www.tafelberg.com/authors/524">Verse van die Liefde</a>” (Love Poems, 1957) and “<a href="http://www.nb.co.za/authors/524">Klein Simbool: Prosaverse</a>” (Little Symbol: Poetry in Prose Form, 1958) were acknowledged as the beginnings of a budding poet.</p>
<h2>Small finds his voice</h2>
<p>He found his voice in “<a href="http://www.litnet.co.za/adam-small-1936/">Kitaar my Kruis</a>” (Guitar my Cross, 1961). Here, he writes with sure-footedness. Small expressed himself in an idiom of which few of his fellow Afrikaans writers had intimate knowledge or had regular access to.</p>
<p>In a foreword to a reprint of “Kitaar” he defended his use of the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0041-476X2012000100009">vernacular</a> at a time when (white) Afrikaner nationalists promoted “pure Afrikaans” as “civilised or standard Afrikaans”. The argot of the Cape Peninsula’s coloured working class, often ridiculed as “Gamattaal” or “Capey”, was regarded as the abject speech of deficient beings who could barely aspire to the lofty speech of “civilised Afrikaans”. </p>
<p>Small named this vernacular, creolised urban Afrikaans, <a href="https://shouldbetold.wordpress.com/tag/adam-small/"><em>Kaaps</em></a>. He became its most persistent <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/Voices/afrikaans-is-not-the-enemy-on-campus-20160401">defender and promotor</a>: “<em>Kaaps</em> is a language … people live their whole lives ‘with everything in it’ … <em>Kaaps</em> is not a joke or funny … it is a language.”</p>
<p>Thereafter, most of his better known works such as the poetry collections, “<a href="http://repository.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/10566/1167">Sê Sjibbolet</a>” (Say Shibboleth, 1963) and “<a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=eYhgf_Y90soC&pg=PA305&lpg=PA305&dq=Oos+Wes+Tuis+Bes+Distrik+Ses&source=bl&ots=eGc5UYcvML&sig=733ag5VWTGx1e1YQAxUGAmGNpZY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJ8sDhrsrNAhWIDsAKHVjZDycQ6AEITTAM#v=onepage&q=Oos%20Wes%20Tuis%20Bes%20Distrik%20Ses&f=false">Oos Wes Tuis Bes Distrik Ses</a>” (East West Home Best, 1973, with Chris Jansen) were written in <em>Kaaps</em>. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Sx06YlPfU-k?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An excerpt from Adam Small’s drama, ‘Krismis van Map Jacobs’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He also valorised this language variety in his plays “<a href="http://www.ajol.info/index.php/tvl/article/view/73547">Kanna Hy Kô Hystoe</a> (Kanna, He Comes Home, 1965)”, “<a href="http://www.broadwayworld.com/south-africa/regional/Joanie-Galant-Hulle-160700">Joanie Galant-hulle</a>” (Joanie Galant-them, 1978) and “<a href="http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/17447150-krismis-van-map-jacobs">Krismis van Map Jacobs</a>” (Christmas of Map Jacobs, 1983) or the novella, “<a href="http://www.poetryinternationalweb.net/pi/site/poet/item/18033/10/Adam-Small">Heidesee</a>” (1979). In those works he gave voice to the downtrodden, those marginalised by the imposition of the apartheid policies of spatial and social separation, and political repression. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PuBX2Ko7dss?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Adam Small’s play, ‘Kanna Hy Kô Hystoe’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The introduction of <a href="http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/HIST/Apartheid%20Legislation%20in%20South%20Africa.htm">formalised apartheid</a> in 1948 caused a generation of black professionals, particularly those classified as <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/full-citizenship-coloured-people-called">coloured</a> or mixed race, to emigrate to Britain, North America and Europe. The absent character in Small’s best-known play, “Kanna Hy Kô Hystoe” is Kanna.</p>
<h2>Foremost literary work</h2>
<p>Kanna is one of those emigrants who found a new, welcoming world elsewhere and left a struggling family behind. The play is universally considered one of the foremost Afrikaans literary works. It’s not only for its profound social message, and its linguistic and textual plurality, but also for its theatrical experimentation.</p>
<p>One of the pernicious, enduring consequences of the apartheid policy is its destruction of social life. The demolition of the old inner city area of Cape Town, <a href="http://www.saha.org.za/news/2010/February/district_six_recalling_the_forced_removals.htm">District Six</a>, was emblematic of this legacy. Increasingly during the 1960s and 1970s Small wrote in his newspaper columns and open letters against apartheid broadly, especially against the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts. </p>
<p>His voice was most strident in the Afrikaans newspapers, and he was often described as “embittered”. To the apartheid authorities Small was an irritant. The security police at times made his life miserable. Perhaps his fame as an Afrikaans writer insulated him from possible terrible outcomes such as unlawful incarceration or preventive detention.</p>
<p>During the 1970s he found himself at odds with his place of work, the <a href="https://www.uwc.ac.za/Pages/default.aspx">University of the Western Cape</a>, where he in solidarity with protesting anti-apartheid students, resigned as a senior lecturer in philosophy. He later returned, under vastly different circumstances, and became <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/uwc-saddened-by-death-of-professor-adam-small-20160626">professor of social work</a> until his retirement in 1997.</p>
<h2>Black Consciousness</h2>
<p>From a writer who closely associated with Afrikaans literature, and even the luminaries of its tradition, Small’s thinking and writing had evolved and took a different turn in the 1970s.</p>
<p>Small became an important campaigner for the <a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/mayor/Pages/Adam-Small.aspx">Black Consciousness</a> movement. He even testified as an expert witness in the famous South African Student Organisation <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/iii-black-consciousness">trial</a> where he said that “the coloureds were part of the greater black community”. He added that “a violent war between black and white was a distinct possibility”. During this period he wrote the first of a number of English medium works, but most of his English plays and poetry remain unpublished. </p>
<p>Although Small is acknowledged as one of the foremost Afrikaans writers, literary award committees often found ways of not awarding his outstanding works. Recognition mostly came belatedly. In 1993 Small accepted the South African <a href="http://whoswho.co.za/adam-small-4351">Order</a> for Meritorious Service (Gold) from the last National Party administration under FW de Klerk. </p>
<p>He was awarded four honorary degrees – from the universities of Natal (1981), Port Elizabeth (1996), the Western Cape (2001) and Stellenbosch (2015) – and a number of cultural and literary awards in later life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hein Willemse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Black Consciousness activist, Afrikaans poet and revered academic Adam Small has passed away. In his large volume of work he gave voice to the downtrodden – those marginalised by apartheid.Hein Willemse, Professor of Afrikaans, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.