tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/communal-violence-34917/articlescommunal violence – The Conversation2023-08-08T19:26:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107852023-08-08T19:26:14Z2023-08-08T19:26:14ZManipur violence: Why has India’s government been slow to respond?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540908/original/file-20230802-23-fhyvfk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=25%2C90%2C8601%2C5652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists protesting ethnic violence in northeastern Manipur state shout slogans in Mumbai, India, on July 24, 2023. Violence between tribal communities in the state has flared up in recent months.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/manipur-violence-why-has-indias-government-been-slow-to-respond" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>A mass burial for 35 people from the Kuki tribe killed in ethnic violence in India’s Manipur state <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/postponed-mass-burial-of-35-kukis-delayed-as-ethnic-clashes-continue-in-manipur-meitei-groups-criticize-conglomerate-101691053524061.html">was recently put on hold</a> after opposition from the state’s Meitei community. </p>
<p>The dispute over the burial site is the latest episode in an ethnic conflict that has rocked Manipur. For months, Manipur in northeastern India has seen <a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/manipur-violance-explained-what-triggered-and-why-is-peace-yet-to-return-528010">ethno-religious violence</a> between the majority Hindu Meitei community and the Kuki and Naga <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/INDIA-VIOLENCE/movakzwygva/">tribal communities</a> who are predominately Christian. </p>
<p>Since May, the stream of violence has <a href="https://www.telegraphindia.com/north-east/manipur-bearing-brunt-of-violence-kukis-make-up-two-thirds-of-the-victims-says-reuters-analysis/cid/1955181">claimed the lives</a> of over 180 people and has displaced thousands. Despite the violence, the central government only responded with statements after images of a shocking attack on two women were shared online.</p>
<p>In late July, a <a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/manipur-video-two-kuki-women-paraded-naked-gang-raped">harrowing video</a> emerged of two Kuki women being paraded naked through the streets of a small Manipur village by a group of men. One of the women was then allegedly gang-raped. News reports stated the men were allegedly from the Meitei community.</p>
<h2>Government inaction</h2>
<p>Opposition Members of Parliament have brought a <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/asia/india-s-modi-faces-a-no-confidence-vote-over-silence-on-ethnic-violence-tearing-at/article_17541698-0883-527e-8b52-351450d565fa.html">no-confidence motion</a> against Prime Minister Narendra Modi, citing his government’s failure to respond to the violence. </p>
<p>After the video was widely shared online, and more than two months after the violence first broke out, Modi finally made a statement. He called it a “<a href="https://thewire.in/politics/seventy-nine-days-after-violence-broke-out-narendra-modi-finally-talks-about-manipur">shameful incident</a>,” and said state governments should strengthen their legal systems to protect India’s “mothers and sisters.”</p>
<p>However, his statement also <a href="https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/manipur-violence-video-narendra-modi-bjp-nirbhaya-moment/3184842/">included examples</a> of violence in states run by the opposition, and did not condemn the violence more broadly. The parliament has been in session since July 20, <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ask-pm-to-speak-in-parliament-on-manipur-give-roadmap-for-bringing-peace-in-state-opposition-urges-president/article67149804.ece">but the prime minister has yet to make an appearance to discuss the situation in Manipur</a>.</p>
<p>Many of India’s political elite have remained deafeningly silent or have <a href="https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-manipur-response-humanity">engaged in whataboutism</a>. When the Minister of Women and Child Development, Smriti Irani, was questioned in parliament about the violence against women in Manipur, she <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/when-smriti-irani-shouted-at-opposition-over-manipur-in-parliament/articleshow/102181242.cms?from=mdr">evaded responsibility</a> and pointed to violence in opposition ruled states.</p>
<p>This most recent incident is yet another indication of India’s indifference towards violence against women. The current administration has also been clear and consistent in its apathy towards marginalized and minority communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and woman pull a cart down a road lined with debris and damaged buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540912/original/file-20230802-25-2d6d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A couple pulls a cart loaded with scavenged items from the debris of burnt houses following ethnic clashes and rioting in Sugnu, in the northeastern Indian state of Manipur, on June 21, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>The women in the video have since filed a petition with the Supreme Court of India. Lawyers representing them have <a href="https://thewire.in/law/we-cant-justify-what-happened-in-manipur-by-saying-this-happened-elsewhere-sc">alleged</a> that police collaborated with the perpetrators. In a statement, the Indian Supreme Court said violence against women in Manipur has reached an “<a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/supreme-court-says-violence-against-women-in-manipur-unprecedented-refuses-to-hear-cases-of-other-states/articleshow/102284901.cms?from=mdr">unprecedented magnitude</a>.”</p>
<h2>What’s behind the violence</h2>
<p>Manipur is a small state of around three million people in the northeast of India bordering Myanmar. Manipur’s proximity to international borders with Myanmar has made it prone to insurgency and conflict. Instances of ethnic violence are often attributed to decades of unresolved strife between various tribal and non-tribal groups. </p>
<p>This ongoing violence was triggered by the <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/manipur-high-court-directs-state-to-consider-inclusion-of-meitei-community-in-scheduled-tribes-list/article66756719.ece">Manipur High Court’s decision in April 2023</a> to include the state’s majority Meitei community in the list of <a href="https://ncst.nic.in/content/frequently-asked-questions">Scheduled Tribes</a>. Categorizing a group as a Scheduled Tribe provides members of the group with special constitutional safeguards — at least on paper. </p>
<p>The Meitei community <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/INDIA-VIOLENCE/movakzwygva/">performs better</a> than other ethnic groups in Manipur on many social indicators, such as access to employment and educational opportunities.</p>
<p>Kuki and Naga tribal communities <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/national/intricacies-of-meitei-s-st-status-demand-and-the-hill-valley-divide-in-manipur-news-290275">fear</a> that if the Meitei are categorized as Scheduled Tribes, that would strengthen their already greater political influence in the state. The tribal communities also fear it would allow Meiteis to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66260730">buy land and settle</a> in Kuki areas. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/08/01/modi-india-manipur-violence-rape/">strife</a> has led to churches being burned, sexual violence, killings and other atrocities.</p>
<p>In response to the outbreak of violence in May, the Manipur state government <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/an-internet-ban-will-not-restore-peace-in-manipur/article67106942.ece">shut down internet services</a>. The <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lV8EIpCIk0QausqzjphWvcNk4ejFujMi/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in">order</a> issued by the government read that “anti-social elements” were using social media to incite the “passions of the public” and it was a necessary measure to stop the spread of disinformation. </p>
<p>Arbitrary internet shutdowns for a wide variety of reasons have become <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/india-internet-shutdown-idINL8N2YZ245">all too common</a>, despite a <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82461587/">2020 Supreme Court of India ruling</a> that declared suspending the internet a “drastic measure” that state governments must employ only if “necessary and unavoidable.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of people at a protest carry a banner that reads: Women against rape culture." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/540911/original/file-20230802-8013-2ag4le.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists protesting against ethnic violence and the assaults of two women, who were paraded naked in northeastern Manipur state, walk in a procession in Kolkata, India, on July 24, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bikas Das)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why has Manipur been ignored?</h2>
<p>The states of northeastern India have long been seen as developmentally and geographically peripheral by the central government. States like Manipur have been subjected to “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/15366936-8913107">neocolonial governance</a>” and have not benefited from social, political or economic development because they are often viewed as “amorphous shadowlands” within India.</p>
<p>People in the region have often been <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-neglected-states-of-the-nation/220206">neglected</a> and positioned as outsiders by the rest of India. Successive central governments have often viewed those in the northeast as objects to be militarized, policed and disciplined. Manipur has also been subjected to abusive laws such as the <a href="https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/armed_forces_special_powers_act1958.pdf">Armed Forces Special Powers Act</a>, which grants the Indian Armed Forces special powers to maintain order in “disturbed areas.” This militarization has contributed to <a href="https://www.outlookindia.com/national/intricacies-of-meitei-s-st-status-demand-and-the-hill-valley-divide-in-manipur-news-290275">perpetual violence</a> in the region.</p>
<p>India’s democratic veneer has helped it evade international scrutiny for the ongoing ethnic violence in Manipur. International outrage at what has happened in Manipur has been minimal. </p>
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Read more:
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<p>In fact, Modi received a red carpet welcome in the so-called bastions of democracy, namely the United States in late June and France in mid-July.</p>
<p>In response to a question from a reporter about declining respect for human rights and democracy, Modi responded that <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/democracy-runs-in-our-veins-says-pm-to-question-on-rights-of-muslims-4144923">democracy is in India’s DNA</a> and has been delivered for all regardless of caste, creed, religion and gender. </p>
<p>Modi’s visit to France in July to pen new <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/military-deals-in-focus-as-france-rolls-out-red-carpet-for-modi">defence deals</a> coincided with European Parliament’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2023-0335_EN.html">adoption of a resolution</a> urging Indian authorities to take action to stop the violence in Manipur. However, there was no push back from the French president. </p>
<p>If states like the U.S. and France truly believe in human rights, they must take a much stronger stance on India’s draconian shift towards authoritarianism and illiberalism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Ramasubramanyam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Indian central government has done little thus far to quell the ongoing ethnic violence in the state of Manipur.Jay Ramasubramanyam, Assistant Professor, Law & Society Program, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900432022-09-06T13:16:45Z2022-09-06T13:16:45ZKenya’s elections are proof of change since 2007 violence, but more reform is needed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482941/original/file-20220906-24-9rrrcy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan President-elect William Ruto at a press conference after the Supreme Court decision.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Irungu/EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s Supreme Court has confirmed William Ruto’s election as president in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XttYp6JsLSU">unanimous ruling</a> following the submission of eight <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-08-30-nine-key-issues-supreme-court-will-determine-in-presidential-petition/">petitions</a> seeking to annul the result. The court dismissed all the petitions, including that submitted by the losing candidate, Raila Odinga. It found that some of the claims “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-62785434">were based on forged documents and ‘sensational information’</a>.”</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/RailaOdinga/status/1566751566178263041/photo/1">Odinga responded by saying that</a> he had “respect for the opinion of the court”. But he “vehemently disagreed with the decision” and “would be communicating in the near future on our plans to continue our struggle for transparency, accountability and democracy”.</p>
<p>The court ruling followed weeks of uncertainty which began with a six-day wait for the presidential outcome after a <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/07/26/three-critical-questions-will-determine-the-kenyan-election/">close race</a>. On 15 August four Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission commissioners <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/four-iebc-commissioners-disown-chebukati-presidential-results-3915420">disowned</a> as “opaque” the results about to be announced. But the electoral commission chairman, Wafula Chebukati, went ahead and announced that William Ruto of Kenya Kwanza was the country’s president elect with 50.5% of the popular vote. </p>
<p>Raila Odinga of Azimio la Umoja got 48.8%. <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/list-of-2022-elected-governors-announced-by-iebc/en1zj05">Governors</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-62444316">senators and members of parliament</a> were <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2022/08/25/will-the-supreme-court-send-kenyans-back-to-the-ballot/">initially</a> fairly evenly split between the two alliances.</p>
<p>Azimio <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/raila-we-reject-presidential-results-3916530">rejected the results</a> and challenged Ruto’s election in the Supreme Court. It argued, among other things, that some of the polling station-level forms (specifically 34A forms) had been changed on the elections commission portal by hackers associated with Ruto; that Ruto had failed to secure 50% plus one vote and so did not secure a first round victory; and that the gubernatorial races in Kakamega and Mombasa had been postponed with the ulterior motive of reducing turnout in Odinga strongholds.</p>
<p>Many Kenyans feared the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/b182-kenyas-2022-election-high-stakes">possibility of violence</a>. But the campaigns and post-election period were relatively calm and peaceful. This was despite vigorously contested, close, disputed and at times tense polls. </p>
<p>Notable incidents include limited protests in <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/elections/2022-08-15-chaos-rocks-kibera-after-ruto-declared-president-elect/">Nairobi</a> and <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/nyongo-kisumu-residents-protests-145030/">Kisumu</a> following the announcement of the results, and the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001453343/missing-embakasi-east-returning-officer-daniel-musyoka-found-dead">tragic murder</a> of a Nairobi electoral returning officer.</p>
<p>Based on research conducted around Kenyan elections since 2007, I would argue that the country is very different to that which stood on the “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/On_the_Brink_of_the_Precipice.html?id=Z1RDAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">brink of a precipice</a>” in 2008. Nevertheless the shadow of – and potential for – violence still lingers, and the road ahead remains a difficult one. Key institutions are in need of further reforms, the country remains divided, and the new president is faced with large economic challenges.</p>
<h2>New reforms, old fears</h2>
<p>But what explains the disjuncture between fears of violence and reality?</p>
<p>It can in part be explained by uncertainty. Particularly important in this regard is uncertainty about how the elections would unfold and whether certain parties would try to manipulate the elections. And, if so, what evidence would exist of the same? Also important is uncertainty about how key players would react to events, and how die-hard supporters might respond to their reactions. </p>
<p>However, this disjuncture can also be explained by the fact that much of the fear that I came across as I travelled around the Rift Valley and its borders in the months prior to the elections stemmed from memories of election-related violence and nervousness about a recurrence. This history includes the ethnic clashes of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi.Rift%20Valley.pdf">1990s</a> and the post-election crisis of 2007/8 when over <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240903346194?journalCode=crea20">1,000 people were killed and almost 700,000 displaced</a>. </p>
<p>But a great deal has changed since then. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_2010.pdf">new constitution</a> was introduced in 2010. This devolved powers and resources to 47 new county governments, and prompted other reforms, including changes to the electoral system. These made the <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Kriegler_Report.pdf?ver=2013-02-12-095936-503">problems</a> of multiple voting and interference with vote tallying reported in 2007 far less likely. They also made the process far more transparent.</p>
<p>These changes were in place for this poll. They were what lay behind unprecedented <a href="https://forms.iebc.or.ke/#/">transparency</a> in the record of votes at each of Kenya’s 46,299 polling stations – better known as form 34A. Various <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/62724762">actors</a> could check whether the forms on the electoral commission’s portal matched those seen by party agents and posted outside polling stations. </p>
<p>This paper trail provided vital evidence that proved <a href="https://twitter.com/m_mumo/status/1566746091420323842/photo/2">central to the court’s upholding</a> of Ruto’s election.</p>
<p>There was also far more confidence in the judiciary following judicial reforms and the Supreme Court’s <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/supreme-court-quashes-uhuru-kenyatta-s-re-election-445282">annulment</a> of the 2017 presidential election. The changes meant that, as in 2013 and 2017, the losing presidential candidate brought an electoral petition before the court.</p>
<p>In addition, the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Patrick-Mutahi/publication/331793528_Violence_security_and_the_policing_of_Kenya%27s_2017_elections/links/5dd234e74585156b351bc8c3/Violence-security-and-the-policing-of-Kenyas-2017-elections.pdf">police</a> are better trained and organised, and were more visible on the ground. And various monitoring, early warning and conflict resolution mechanisms <a href="https://www.nscpeace.go.ke">have been established</a>.</p>
<p>Just as importantly, the political atmosphere has changed.</p>
<h2>Change in tone</h2>
<p>In 2007, politicians mobilised quite openly along ethnic lines. The opposition Orange Democratic Movement, for example, cast its call for reform as a contest of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/252232/summary">41 tribes against one</a>.</p>
<p>In 2022, in contrast, both of the main alliances – Odinga’s Azimio la Umoja and Ruto’s Kenya Kwanza – mobilised across ethnic divides. The result is that <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/07/26/three-critical-questions-will-determine-the-kenyan-election/">most areas</a> were divided in terms of support.</p>
<p>The rise of social media has also ensured that, while misinformation is rife, what is said in one area can quickly spread across the country. This has led to most politicians being much more careful about what they say.</p>
<p>Finally, the majority of Kenyans clearly do not want violence and – as reflected by relatively low voter turnout rates – are much more sceptical of politicians as a class and not greatly excited about <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/blogs/not-business-as-usual-what-the-low-turnout-reveals-about-kenyans-and-their-leaders-3909284">either of the frontrunners</a>. In this context – and in a very difficult economic environment in which people are struggling to make ends meet – it is clear from interviews that many simply want the economy to pick up and to get back to work.</p>
<h2>More work to be done</h2>
<p>While Kenya has changed, the road ahead is a difficult one. </p>
<p>Time will tell what Odinga’s plans will involve, and how the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, will respond to events. Kenyatta has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNyAzPOE3T0">said</a> that he will execute the orders of the Supreme Court, but also invited Kenyans “to hold all institutions to account”.<br>
This close and disputed election has gone hand-in-hand with much <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/237697/kenya-2022-lies-damn-lies-and-statistics/">misinformation</a> and followed a vigorous campaign period. It also followed concerns voiced about the electoral commission by the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/editorials/iebc-must-deliver-fair-transparent-elections-3884286">media</a>, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/211286/kenya-2022-raila-ruto-agree-iebc-not-ready-to-hold-free-and-fair-polls/">political parties</a> and <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/dci-raid-ruto-office-amid-kinoti-chebukati-row-3890714">the police</a> in the weeks prior to the poll, and <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-07-31-were-coming-for-you-kibicho-warns-against-election-threats-leaflets/">reports of leaflets</a> circulating online and offline, warning certain communities in parts of the Rift Valley to vote in a particular way.</p>
<p>The incoming government also inherits an economy characterised by a cost of living crisis and massive debt burden. And the president elect has made many promises to the Kenyan electorate, alliance partners, and those who <a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2022/05/27/who-won-kenyas-nominations/">agreed to accept party nomination results</a>. </p>
<p>A series of <a href="https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/78615-blow-azimio-udm-joins-kenya-kwanza">defections</a> to Kenya Kwanza has also weakened the political opposition, which has a vital role to play in holding the government to account. </p>
<p>Many of the country’s key institutions also suffered from a credibility crisis going into the polls and have been further tainted by the allegations of electoral malpractice raised. This includes the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/">police</a> and electoral commission. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XttYp6JsLSU">Supreme Court</a> in its ruling was blunt in its assessment of the commission, saying that it suffered from a “serious malaise” and was in need of “far-reaching reforms”.</p>
<p>Finally, inter-communal relations remained poor in places going into the polls. This was true, for example, in parts of the Rift Valley where little has been done to address past grievances and injustices, or to provide accountability.</p>
<p>The fact that presidential power is still believed to bring benefits to particular areas ensured that the stakes were high. Unfortunately, the elections – and the allegations and counter-allegations made, and the “<a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/237697/kenya-2022-lies-damn-lies-and-statistics/">monsoon of misinformation</a>” – will only leave the country further divided. Ruto’s pledge to “make Kenya a country of everybody” is thus welcome. It will be important for the opposition and other actors to hold him to that promise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190043/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch received funding from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC): ES/L002345/1, 'The impact of elections in sub-Saharan Africa', and from the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office of the UK.</span></em></p>The 2022 election proved that the country’s situation and its people have changed since the violence that marred past elections.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1807032022-05-01T08:29:42Z2022-05-01T08:29:42ZDrivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458136/original/file-20220414-25-u6yaws.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man flees from teargas fired by anti-riot police in Nairobi after Kenya's 2017 elections.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s National Cohesion and Integration Commission recently <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/MEDIABRIEF.pdf">listed</a> 23 counties that are considered potential violence hotspots ahead of the country’s August 2022 elections. </p>
<p>This mapping is part of the commission’s <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/ncic-at-a-glance#:%7E:text=Mission%3A,for%20diversity%20among%20Kenyan%20communities.">mission</a> to ensure a peaceful election. Several of Kenya’s past polls have seen high levels of violence. The violence that broke out after the 2007 elections stands out in particular. It caused <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459D-Full_Report.pdf">over a thousand fatalities</a> and led to a national crisis. This was eventually resolved through a coalition government and constitutional reform.</p>
<p>Election-related violence in Kenya often takes the form of inter-communal violence. This involves groups – without formal organisation – clashing along identity lines. Violence between ethnic groups aligned with Kenya’s main political parties has erupted in connection to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">1992, 1997, 2008 and 2017 elections</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902950290">Existing research</a> indicates that patronage politics, a history of violent conflict and high-stakes elections increase the risks of poll violence. These studies have mainly focused on national-level drivers of violence. <a href="https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1291339/FULLTEXT01.pdf">My research</a> has explored the causes of communal violence at a more local level. Much of my work has focused on Kenya. </p>
<p>I highlight a few key drivers of communal conflict that could inform efforts to predict and prevent election violence in Kenya.</p>
<h2>Drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Communal violence erupts in connection with elections for different reasons. Firstly, some of it is directly election-related. For instance, politicians may instigate violence to frighten opponents. They may also use <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-message-to-violence-what-to-watch-for-in-the-media-ahead-of-kenyas-elections-177459">hate speech</a>, which makes groups more hostile to each other and increases the risk of violence. </p>
<p>Secondly, violence may erupt due to local conflicts that aren’t directly election-related. The uncertainty and re-negotiation of power relations during the election period causes conflict to intensify. To understand local risks of violence, it’s therefore important to look at local-level conflict dynamics and what is at stake in the elections.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-government-bias-can-fuel-communal-conflicts-in-africa-121640">How government bias can fuel communal conflicts in Africa</a>
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<p>While analyses of past episodes of election violence in Kenya have often focused on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02589000903187024">national-level political actors</a>, the current devolved system of governance matters for <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096262981630049X">local violence risks</a>. </p>
<p>The 2010 constitution <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#KE/CON/Const2010/chap_11">allocates</a> significant financial and political power to Kenya’s 47 counties. In part, devolution was aimed at decreasing the risks of large-scale election violence by diminishing the importance of national power. </p>
<p>However, it increased the importance of which political bloc wins at the county level. This has implications for who has access to local resources and patrimonial networks. </p>
<p>The fact that elections in Kenya often heighten inter-communal tensions <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-political-violence-colonialism-vigilantes-and-militias-83888">has roots</a> in political developments during and after colonial rule. Successive political leaders and aspirants have used group-based grievances to mobilise voters and, at times, violent militias. </p>
<p>Importantly, land tenure has remained closely connected to communal identity in Kenya. Land is important for livelihood but also for belonging. Narratives about ancestral land and first-comer status have often played a role in political mobilisation. For example, former President Daniel Moi <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0002018022000032956">threatened</a> his constituents in the Rift Valley that they would lose access to their ancestral land if they voted for the opposition.</p>
<p>Regions where land conflicts are prominent – and politicians are mobilising based on these conflicts – are <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343315580145">areas to watch</a> for signs of violence. Such conflicts may be very localised, with relatively small geographic areas contested along group lines. If such conflicts are perceived as intertwined with election outcomes, the risk of election-related violence increases.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-history-of-election-violence-is-threatening-to-repeat-itself-76220">Kenya's history of election violence is threatening to repeat itself</a>
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<p>The risk of violence also depends on perceptions of vulnerability and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414019830734">state bias</a>.
If local communities don’t trust the government to impartially protect their interests and basic needs, they are more likely to support violence to ensure that political candidates who claim to represent them win. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388421?seq=1">Research</a> by others has shown how people who felt their ethnic community had long been neglected by the government turned to violence when they perceived ‘their’ candidate was robbed of victory in the 2007 election. </p>
<p>Conflict may also erupt in reaction to changed local boundaries. Redrawing boundaries or creating new constituencies can affect local election outcomes, and has been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1065912916653476?casa_token=zNUrjQQUnuQAAAAA%3AX7y2GMct5Pw0ygI5vbPLFdkT5IFh1jmKfrZF_GPLFUjaZRABVVZ2AIJAZxpzgt9r2vnAoU241d8t6A">frequent in Kenya since the 1990s</a>. Such shifts may change the balance of power and local election outcomes. This can spark a violent response in cases where inter-group tension is high. For example, in <a href="https://www.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Amani%20Papers/AP_Volume1_n2_May2010.pdf">Mandera</a>, the creation of new districts fuelled tensions that erupted into major inter-clan violence in 2005.</p>
<p>Finally, drivers of communal violence can differ between urban and rural areas. Cities have high density and mobilisation potential. They also have the starkest inequality between the rich and poor. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2019.1640493">These factors</a> can be used to instigate violence. </p>
<p>After the 2007 elections, Nairobi and other cities saw <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">high levels</a> of violence, particularly in informal settlements. Kenya’s cohesion commission points to informal settlements as a risk factor for election violence. Not all informal settlements become violent, however. </p>
<p>Mobilisation strategies and connections between political aspirants and local violent gangs are important factors to consider when analysing which urban settlements are at risk. It’s also necessary to consider local violence prevention and conflict resolution strategies. </p>
<h2>Strengthening solutions</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/peace-from-below-governance-and-peacebuilding-in-kerio-valley-kenya/DC9F3ED151B11970B8AC4E64EC730E99">My research in Kerio Valley</a> illustrates how mediation and dialogue can yield peaceful solutions to local conflicts. More generally, local dialogue can reduce tensions between communal groups and increase perceptions of security. </p>
<p>It’s, therefore, important to pay attention to local dialogue and prevention efforts when predicting local risks of violence. However, the mere presence of dialogue or agreement may not be sufficient. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/151532644/05_2020_Report_ASPR_No_5_EN_kl_2.pdf">Others have found</a> that local peace agreements are more likely to be effective if they are facilitated by trusted and legitimate mediators. They also need to include clear implementation and enforcement stipulations.</p>
<p>Sometimes, communities agree on how to share local power after elections, for instance by nominating different county positions from different groups. A study from <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343315614999">Nigeria found</a> that such arrangements promote inter-group tolerance, reduce fears of exploitation and make politicians less likely to use divisive rhetoric. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-next-election-is-in-view-the-struggle-between-elites-and-rule-of-law-is-intensifying-167378">Kenya's next election is in view: the struggle between elites and rule of law is intensifying</a>
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<p>In the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2019.1583483">Kenyan context</a>, a comparison of two violence-affected areas indicated that the presence of such an arrangement in Nakuru County decreased hostility and confrontation during the gubernatorial race in 2017. Political discourse in Uasin Gishu, which had no such agreement, was more antagonistic and intimidating. </p>
<h2>Risks in ‘mapping hotspots’</h2>
<p>Kenya’s cohesion commission uses a <a href="https://cohesion.or.ke/images/docs/downloads/MEDIABRIEF.pdf">13-point risk matrix</a> to identify areas at high risk of election violence. Many of the variables it uses resonate with existing research on communal violence. It is also encouraging that the commission pays attention to prevention strategies, as well as risk factors. </p>
<p>However, a note of caution. While the approach of mapping risk areas may help prevent violence – for instance by devoting more resources to certain counties – there are risks in this. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629817304717">Research in Haiti</a> has highlighted that the mapping of risk areas can have adverse effects on the local economy. In the worst case, it can become a self-reinforcing prophecy as it increases threat perceptions. </p>
<p>Given that antagonistic political rhetoric in Kenya has often played on communities’ fears of victimisation, this risk needs to be kept in mind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>To predict - and prevent - election-related violence, it’s important to first understand the key drivers of conflict.Emma Elfversson, Associate professor, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1216402019-08-18T08:15:22Z2019-08-18T08:15:22ZHow government bias can fuel communal conflicts in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287991/original/file-20190814-136222-16ujbod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman shelters in a church in the Central African Republic after deadly 2014 attacks involving Muslim and Christian fighters.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tanya Bindra</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Each year, violent communal conflict between groups is witnessed in a number of African countries. It is often organised along identity lines. The fights are typically over local territory, natural resources or political power. Although they usually remain localised and aren’t directed against the central state, these conflicts are a major threat to human security and development. </p>
<p>In 2018, the <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">Uppsala Conflict Data Program</a> recorded 30 in Africa. The programme collects and distributes systematic information on violent conflicts worldwide. The affected states in Africa included Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Libya. In the most destructive, fighting between the Banunu and Batende communities in the Mai-Ndombe province of the DRC resulted in <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343319856046">around 900 casualties</a>. </p>
<p>In other cases, less intensive sporadic clashes resulted in lower death tolls but nevertheless destabilised large regions. The conflicts disrupted livelihoods and created acute insecurity for local residents.</p>
<p>Communal conflicts, such as pastoralist violence and conflicts between indigene and settler communities, are often portrayed as ‘traditional’ and associated with areas beyond the state’s control. But my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343315597968">research</a> shows that in fact they tend to be deeply intertwined with national politics. </p>
<p>State policies and electoral campaigning <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175220?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">politicise group identities</a> and shape the incentives for violence. In addition, ethnic ties between executive politicians and groups in conflict <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343315597968">affect how the central government responds</a> when a conflict erupts. So do state interests in natural resources or other assets.</p>
<p>My research suggests that governments need to support legitimate local peace initiatives. They also need to ensure equal provision of security and other services to citizens to mitigate communal violence.</p>
<h2>Governments and communal conflicts</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.1003811">Recent research</a> has shed new light on how bad governance and political manoeuvring increases the risk of communal violence. For instance, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4417364">politicians may exploit and provoke animosities</a> along ethnic or other identity lines to mobilise political support. Or intergroup hatred is fuelled because <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jae/article/15/suppl_1/62/707092">certain groups gain preferential access</a> to state resources and economic opportunities. </p>
<p>In other situations the failure to provide services, including security, to certain regions increases the risk that local communities take up arms to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/12/1/69/1796517">fight over control of scarce resources</a>.</p>
<p>A common characteristic of communal conflicts is that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/introduction-land-politics-in-africa-constituting-authority-over-territory-property-and-persons/45EFEF04AA7C5262EC9C4369C5021416">ethnic or tribal identity is closely intertwined with land control</a> as well as political power and access to rights and opportunities. These dynamics are not only present in rural areas, but also in Africa’s rapidly growing cities. </p>
<p>A case in point is <a href="http://urbanstudiesjnl.blogspot.com/2017/04/home-of-last-resort-fighting-over-land.html">the Nubian community in Kibera</a>, Nairobi. Unlike most of Kenya’s recognised tribes, the Nubians lack a rural homeland. </p>
<p>As a result they have been seeking recognition as Kibera’s original settlers. But this has put them in conflict with other communities living in Kibera. During political campaigns, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388421">politicians have exacerbated these conflicts</a> by appealing to one or the other side in order to gain votes.</p>
<p>In turn, the government’s role in relation to the conflict parties also affects prospects for addressing and resolving conflict. My research has focused on the effects of bias. These are cases where one of the groups in a conflict has close ties with those in power at the national level, or where the government for other strategic reasons <a href="http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:677431/FULLTEXT01.pdf">favours one side in the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Such bias can, for instance, affect whether or not the government chooses to intervene. In <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343315597968">a study covering sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2010</a>, I found that governments were more likely to deploy security forces to conflicts involving their ethnopolitical support base, and conflicts in areas of high economic importance. </p>
<p>A potential explanation is that intervention can be used to contain violence as well as to affect the power dynamics between the groups and to influence the outcome of the conflict. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414019830734">another study, focusing on four cases in Kenya</a>, I found that bias makes it more difficult for the conflict parties to reach an agreement on how to resolve their conflict. That study suggests that the parties will find it difficult to trust each other if they believe that those in power have vested interests in the conflict. And even if they were able to agree on a solution, they would find it difficult to trust the government’s willingness to respect the agreement. </p>
<p>However, new opportunities for peacemaking can be opened up by political transitions that involve new national and local political leaders who are not perceived as biased.</p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>Overall, my research suggests that governments can rarely function as a neutral arbiter in cases of communal conflict. When conflict erupts, political leaders can usually be implicated as part of the cause. This can be either directly through active bias or incitement or indirectly through bad policies and a failure to provide services equally to citizens. </p>
<p>This implies that, if possible, policymakers should try and identify and support conflict resolution mechanisms that have local legitimacy. This could include traditional leaders, community-based organisations and NGOs. </p>
<p>But policymakers should take care not to fuel <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/107/427/243/30417">a cynical ‘peace industry’</a>. This happens when short-term funding goes to ‘briefcase NGOs’ and local leaders with varying degrees of legitimacy for peace workshops that have little connection to the conflict dynamics. </p>
<p>In addition, supporting customary actors may come at the cost of reinforcing patriarchal systems and excluding women. This is bad news for equality in general and <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/can-gender-equality-prevent-violent-conflict">peace in particular</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, states should not scale back on their duty to protect their citizens from violence. They should support local peacemaking processes and strengthen state provision of security. This should include ensuring that security forces treat all citizens equally. They should also improve service delivery and decrease <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2014.917373">socioeconomic inequality</a>. All can help reduce the risk of communal conflict and diminish the appeal of divisive political rhetoric.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121640/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Bad governance and political manoeuvring increase the risk of communal conflictsEmma Elfversson, Post-doctoral Researcher, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144422019-03-29T14:09:19Z2019-03-29T14:09:19ZMali’s volatile mix of communal rivalries and a weak state is fuelling jihadism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266350/original/file-20190328-139364-v685n0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A weak Malian state prompted local ethnic communities to organise armed self-defence groups.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mali’s Mopti region has seen a drastic rise of violence since 2015. Last year at least <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/09/04/mali-fulani-dogon-extremism-stirs-intercommunal">202 civilians were killed</a> in 42 incidents. In March this year more than 150 were <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/maliNews/idAFL8N21D74X">killed</a> in attacks against two villages in this central Malian region. </p>
<p>The attack on the Mopti region was launched by <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/09/04/mali-fulani-dogon-extremism-stirs-intercommunal">alleged Dogon hunters</a>. The Dogon are one of the largest ethnic groups in the region.</p>
<p>Most of those killed in Mopti were from the Fulani ethnic group. Also <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/ocha-mali-flash-update-1-attack-village-ogossagou-mopti-region-25-march-2019">among the targets</a> were staff involved in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of local “self-defence groups” stationed in one of the villages.</p>
<p>The killings highlight the age-old conflict between the nomadic and predominantly Muslim Fulani and the generally polytheistic and sedentary Dogon and Bambara ethnic groups, in this region. The conflict has an element of the classical pastoral-sedentary conflict and an element of religious friction built into it. </p>
<h2>Contributory factors</h2>
<p>Yet, there are other factors contributing to what is an increasing tension between the ethnic groups. Pastoral-sedentary conflicts are not new. A weak Malian state prompted local ethnic communities to organise armed self-defence groups that also at times acted offensively. In a situation of mutual distrust, fear could easily lead to violence and aggressive action. </p>
<p>Other factors have fuelled tension and violence. Human geographer Tor Arve Benjaminsen and others <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022343311427343">suggest</a> that agricultural expansion has limited pastoralist mobility and access to some of the Fulani’s traditional pastures. For example, rice cultivation has encroached on traditional Burgu pastures (semi-aquatic tropical grass used for food). Additionally, new dams on the Niger River have changed the flood pattern leading to the decline of the Burgu pastures. </p>
<p>Land disputes within communities are also fuelling conflict. This can be seen in the light of the weakening of traditional mediation structures that is less and less successful in ending such conflicts. And the influx of small arms from the 1990s and onwards has made land conflicts more deadly, leading to a cycle of retribution between ethnic groups.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-the-brink-why-2019-may-be-another-bad-year-for-beleaguered-mali-107444">On the brink: why 2019 may be another bad year for beleaguered Mali</a>
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<p>To make matters worse, the central government is either unwilling or unable to punish communal violence. The central Malian government previously used local militias as agents when unable or unwilling to provide local security. This has contributed to local insecurity and led to distrust between locals and the government. In this setting local militias are easily tempted to bring in new allies – including jihadists.</p>
<p>Government delegation of power to local militias, combined with communities in need of allies in local conflicts and the absence of local security, present opportunities for jihadists to enter a new area and gain success, finances and recruits. </p>
<p>The setting also creates difficulties for international actors trying to stem their influence. The West, for instance, almost never engages in local reconciliation and rural security. It focuses mostly on the destruction of jihadist affiliated militias.</p>
<p>As I argue in <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">my new book</a>, dynamics like these are similar to those in other areas in Africa that have provided fertile breeding grounds for jihadists in the past.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266345/original/file-20190328-139380-1aap44k.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mopti region in central Mali.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Source: bbc.co.uk</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Fulani and jihadists</h2>
<p>The Fulani started joining the jihadists when they gained control of the north of Mali in 2012 and 2013. For example, nomadic Fulani from the Douentza region joined Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa training camps in Gao. Others joined Ansar Dine. But many returned to Mopti from Northern Mali when the jihadists lost territorial control. </p>
<p>Today, the Dogon and Bambara routinely accuse the Fulani of allying with the Makina Liberation Front, also known as the Katiba Macina, which forms part of the wider al Qaeda affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-mali-livestock-herders-joining-jihadist-groups-105589">What's behind Mali livestock herders joining jihadist groups</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>On the other hand, Fulanis claim they are stereotyped by their enemies as jihadists. But it’s important to note that the Macina Liberation Front, led by the charismatic Amadu Koufa, routinely uses pro-Fulani rhetoric. Koufa also refers to a Fulani golden age, and a reestablishment of the historic Macina caliphate. He also recently reemerged in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjQr4OrM6v4">jihadist video</a> mocking France and Mali for claiming he was dead.</p>
<p>Further north, outside Mopti in the Menaka region, the Islamic State in greater Sahara has also injected itself in local conflicts supporting Fulani sub-tribes. Islamic State forces in Menaka, engage in cattle rustling and cattle “protection” for locals. Further south this element is also there in Ibrahim Dicko, the leader of the Burkina Faso-based Ansarul Islam. He similarly plays on the Fulani’s grievances against the central government. </p>
<p>This picture is further <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/horn-sahel-and-rift/">complicated</a> by conflicts among the Fulani and by the Islamic State at times choosing allies who are rivals of the Fulani. </p>
<h2>Downward spiral</h2>
<p>For the locals in Mopti, the jihadists are very real. Not all of them are from Macina and some sign their attacks in the name of other jihadist partners. Many attacks have no groups taking responsibility for them. </p>
<p>The labels are fluid and the borders between jihadism and self-defence are blurred. Ethnic groups often provide recruits to many different armed groups. These groups actively undermine the state’s already weak justice system, and the increased insecurity hinders both business, general travel and farming.</p>
<p>This contributes to the downward spiral by increasing the impact of the root causes of Mopti’s problems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114442/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The absence of a strong government in Mali
allows jihadists to enter new areas and flourish.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/973002018-06-21T12:31:45Z2018-06-21T12:31:45ZNigeria is not ready to hold free and fair elections next year. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/223995/original/file-20180620-137741-t2n3ul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of Nigeria's All Progressives Congress party protest the 2015 elections. More trouble is likely ahead of the 2019 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Tife Owolabi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2019 presidential elections in Nigeria will be the country’s sixth since 1999, when it shifted to democracy after a long period of military rule. Most of these elections have been tarnished by acts of violence – including attacks on politicians – and vote rigging <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/nigeria">often influences the results</a>. </p>
<p>In the past, election violence has been blamed on a lack of education among citizens, poverty, the long history of military rule and <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928417749639">corruption</a>. However, political patronage is also to blame in a country where power and state resources are often <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1403744?needAccess=true">exploited for personal use by office holders</a>. The <a href="https://www.stearsng.com/article/scramble-for-the-national-cake">scramble for the “national cake”</a> by the political elite is often the real reason for many politicians’ do-or-die attitude. </p>
<p>Such was the case when the former president, General Olusegun Obasanjo declared in 2007 that the April elections would be a <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200702110015.html">do-or-die affair</a> for the country and his ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The election was marred by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/04/25/nigeria-presidential-election-marred-fraud-violence">fraud and violence</a>.</p>
<p>With the 2019 elections less than a year away, Nigeria’s ability to hold free and fair elections is open to question. Of particular concern are the security threats posed by the Boko Haram insurgency and clashes between farmers and herdsmen in northern Nigeria. There is also a threat posed by the arming of rival political supporters. Finally, there is the lack of election financing regulations which leaves the door open for patronage networks to fund campaigns using public funds.</p>
<h2>Boko Haram problem</h2>
<p>Although the government claimed to have <a href="http://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/technically-defeated-boko-haram-carried-out-135-attacks-id7837805.html">“technically defeated”</a> Boko Haram in December 2015, the armed group was still able to carry out 135 attacks in 2017, five times higher than the 2016 number of attacks. The insurgents most recently killed at least <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/dozens-killed-suspected-boko-haram-attack-nigeria-180617105120520.html">31 people</a> in twin bomb blasts targeting people returning from Eid celebrations in Borno state. </p>
<p>The insurgency, which has <a href="http://www.nan.ng/news/boko-haram-insurgency-affects-14m-people/">affected 14 million </a> Nigerians, resulting in 1.7 million being displaced, still poses a significant threat in the north-east. In 2015 elections, the Boko Haram threat affected elections in many parts of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/28/millions-vote-in-nigeria-elections-hit-by-islamist-attacks-and-technology-issues">northern Nigeria</a>. If the threat is not significantly contained, it poses a threat to free and fair elections next year. </p>
<h2>New threats</h2>
<p>Apart from the Boko Haram insurgency, several states in Nigeria, such as Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa, have witnessed violent clashes between herdsmen and farmers in recent years. Although this was not an issue in previous elections, the intensity of the clashes has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-clashes-are-on-the-rise-between-farmers-and-herdsmen-in-the-sahel-95554">increased tremendously</a>. There have been 716 clashes and thousands of deaths recorded in the country since 2012. </p>
<p>In the same way Boko Haram was the primary campaign issue prior to 2015 elections, the clashes between herdsmen and farmers pose an election risk. Several opposition political parties have already seized on the insecurity as a campaign rallying point. Violent clashes could potentially ensue if the security situation is not addressed before the elections.</p>
<p>The proliferation of arms prior to elections also remains a huge threat. Since the 2003 elections, the <a href="http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Conference-Paper-by-Gani-Yoroms.pdf">arming of supporters</a> has become an election tool. </p>
<p>As seen in previous elections, political patronage is often behind the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2018.1403744?needAccess=true">formation of insurgent groups towards the time of elections</a>. Politicians have been known to arm youths prior to elections in order to <a href="http://punchng.com/blame-politicians-police-for-arms-proliferation-group/">seek undue advantage</a> over their political opponents. </p>
<p>Indeed, former Nigerian vice president Atiku Abubakar claimed to have <a href="https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/politics/i-warned-governors-against-giving-youth-guns-atiku/96660.html">personally warned</a> some state governors against arming youths prior to elections. </p>
<h2>Campaign finance</h2>
<p>Political patronage extends to the crucial factor of election funding. Previous elections have been marked by allegations of <a href="https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/political-party-financing-and-corruption-in-nigerias-fourth-republic-thecase-of-2015-general-elections-2151-6200-1000298.pdf">mismanagement of public resources</a> to fund campaigns. It was estimated that the total amount spent by the electoral commission, political parties and candidates for the 2015 elections was about one trillion naira (USD$4 billion). A large percentage of these were <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/2015-election-cost-n1-trillion-inec/">“untraceable” public funds</a>. </p>
<p>About half of this amount was allegedly <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/exclusive-dasuki-got-jonathans-approvals-collect-2-1bn-nnpc-9-months">siphoned out of the Nigerian National Petroleum Commission</a> by the former national security adviser Sambo Dasuki to finance the 2015 election campaign of President Goodluck Jonathan. The implication of using public funds to finance personal ambition is that it often gives the incumbent an unfair advantage over their opponents and creates a cycle of corruption which hinders development. </p>
<p>Although the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has called for the <a href="http://www.nan.ng/news/2019-inec-calls-for-regulation-of-campaign-funds/">regulation of campaign finance</a> towards the 2019 elections, it is unclear how this will be done. </p>
<h2>Towards a credible election</h2>
<p>The sum of all these challenges is that Nigeria is far from ready to hold a credible ballot in 2019. In order to conduct a credible election in Nigeria, four key issues are very important. First, the government needs to completely defeat Boko Haram. Second, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers must be addressed and third, electoral commission must strengthen the electronic voting system introduced in 2015 and finally the formation of insurgent groups for the purpose of the election must be prevented. </p>
<p>An election that is not free and fair risks negatively compromising Nigeria’s already fragile economy, and sparking further conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97300/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria is far from ready to hold a credible ballot in 2019.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/955542018-05-02T12:56:36Z2018-05-02T12:56:36ZWhy clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/216634/original/file-20180427-96707-8toqbt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pastoralists on a dry plain in central Mali, one of the seven Sahel countries hit by a wave of deadly attacks.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As fireworks were lighting up the skies to usher in the New Year across the world, gunfire was echoing out in Nigeria’s Benue State. On this night alone, <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2018/01/11/benue-state-buries-73-killed-fulani-herdsmen-0">73 people were killed</a> and hundreds were injured after herdsmen unleashed terror in two local government areas mostly populated by farmers. </p>
<p>Clashes between farmers and nomadic herdsmen <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/39421">date back to the pre-colonial era</a>. But they reached an alarming level in 2017 when <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2017">1,000 people were killed in more than 50 clashes</a>. This followed a rise in clashes since 2011 in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast and Senegal.</p>
<p>The dramatic rise in the number, frequency and intensity of attacks in recent years is increasingly been seen as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44148597?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">major source of concern </a> in the region. A 2017 Global Terrorism Index report said that over 2 500 deaths were recorded between 2012 and 2016 in sub-Saharan Africa with <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2017">majority of the deaths</a> recorded in Nigeria. And while there were 67 clashes between farmers and herdsmen in Nigeria between 2007 and 2011, <a href="http://www.nigeriawatch.org/">there were 716 clashes between 2012 and 2018</a>. </p>
<p>Access to land and water, grazing paths, drought, desertification and ethnicity all <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-conflict-is-a-result-of-environmental-devastation-across-west-africa-91694">contribute to the violence</a>. Attacks often happen when cattle stray into farmland and destroy farm products. But the sudden increase in the number of attacks and casualties suggests that the conflict goes beyond access to natural resources and climate change. </p>
<p>There’s growing evidence that conflicts in the region are contributing to the dramatic rise in the number of attacks as well as casualties. For example, violence is being fuelled by the unrest in Libya – which has been on going since 2011 – as well as the six-year long conflict in Mali. These regional conflicts have resulted in proliferation of weapons – for example herdsmen are often armed with weapons, including some <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/02da0292-3268-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498">sourced from Libya</a>, as well as new trends in cattle rustling and animal trafficking in the entire region.</p>
<h2>Arms proliferation</h2>
<p>The 2011 conflict in Libya has led to <a href="http://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1171858/brothers-came-back-with-weapons-the-effects-of-arms-proliferation-from-libya/">unprecedented levels of arms proliferations</a> in the Sahel Sahara as well as sub-Saharan Africa and contributed to the conflict in Mali. Terrorist organisations such as AQIM and Boko Haram have also benefited from the arms bazaar, with the region <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20121031%20Libya%20Weapons%20Update_final.pdf">flooded with thousands of light weapons</a>.</p>
<p>The growing illegal weapons market in the region has coincided with a tremendous increase in cattle rustling in the region since 2011. This is being driven by what has come to called <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21731191-owning-cattle-excellent-way-hide-ill-gotten-wealth-too-african-herders">neo-pastoralism</a>, a trend that involves cartels using illegally acquired wealth to arm young men to steal cattle from nomads. The cattle are then moved to large ranches or across several national boundaries for sale. The cartels have been driven by rising prices for beef, with an adult cow <a href="http://nigerianobservernews.com/2015/03/prices-of-cattle-go-up-survey/">selling for $1,000</a> in the region.</p>
<p>Neo-pastoralism has led to an <a href="http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2016/05/fulani-national-leader-why-our-herdsmen-carry-ak47s/">increase in the numbers of herdsmen bearing arms</a>. These same weapons are used against farmers at the slightest provocation as anyone seen to hinder their nomadic activities is regarded an enemy. </p>
<p>While the clashes between farmers and herdsmen have sometimes been branded as ethnic or religious in nature, the economic perspective is also a source of concern. There have been <a href="http://www.nigerianmonitor.com/lawmaker-says-helicopter-delives-supplies-to-fulani-herdsmen-in-delta-desert/">reports of an unmarked helicopter</a> dropping supplies for herdsmen in far-flung areas. Community leaders in Taraba State recently made a similar claim: that <a href="https://www.thetrentonline.com/taraba-elders-military-chopper-weapons/">helicopters were seen dropping weapons for herdsmen</a>.</p>
<p>Herdsmen argue that they now carry weapons to protect themselves and their cattle due to the increased threats they face. For their part, farmers have started forming armed vigilante groups to protect themselves from attacks by herdsmen. The result has been a rising cycle of violence.</p>
<p>On top of this, disputes and clashes that would previously have been resolved through dialogue between the local community leaders and the herdsmen now play out in all out warfare.</p>
<h2>Too slow and ineffective</h2>
<p>The response from governments in the region has been mixed. Nigeria has been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/01/nigeria-dozens-killed-as-military-launches-air-attacks-on-villages-beset-by-spiralling-communal-violence/">criticised</a> for its lackadaisical approach. In an effort to prove that it’s serious about ending the clashes, the <a href="http://www.punchng.com/air-force-sends-fighter-jets-to-adamawa-bombs-villages/">air force recently launched attacks</a> on several villages killing innocent people. This response <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/01/nigeria-dozens-killed-as-military-launches-air-attacks-on-villages-beset-by-spiralling-communal-violence/">was roundly criticised</a> Amnesty International for being:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>totally inadequate, too slow and ineffective, and in some cases unlawful. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>For its part, the Ghanaian government sees the herdsmen as the aggressors. Police officers have orders to <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/herdsmen-beg-ghana-police-boss-gives-personnel-shoot-kill-sight-order/">shoot encroaching cattle on sight</a>, adding a new twist to the conflict. </p>
<p>Niger, meanwhile, has taken a different approach, using Islamic teaching to warn people about the consequences of cattle rustling and murder. This has led to herdsmen <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/herdsmen-surrender-30-guns-to-police-in-niger/">surrendering of 30 guns to the police</a>.</p>
<h2>A regional multi-national approach?</h2>
<p>The menace is fast spiralling out of control and requires an urgent regional response. The porous nature of the borders coupled with large ungoverned spaces show that this is a regional problem that must be addressed collectively, mirroring the response to the Boko Haram insurgency. </p>
<p>Some governors in Nigeria including the governor of Benue state believe <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201611010413.html">‘ranching’</a>- rearing cattle in ranches rather than moving them around the country for graving is the only solution to the crises. Although ranching is a good idea, it might not resolve the problem as it negates the culture and tradition of nomads. Instead, grazing routes that are acceptable to both farmers and herdsmen should be marked out as a matter of urgency.</p>
<p>In addition, a multi-national initiative to curb arms trafficking should be top of the agenda in addressing this incessant loss of lives and property.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A big rise in armed attacks in the Sahel - and the intensity of the attacks in recent years - is now seen as a major source of concern.Olayinka Ajala, Associate Lecturer and Conflict Analyst, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/651312017-01-16T07:51:40Z2017-01-16T07:51:40ZEurope must open up to new ideas about the secular state<p>Religion is one of the <a href="http://accept-pluralism.eu/Research/ProjectReports/NationalDiscourses.aspx">toughest challenges</a> facing modern secular societies in their search for identity, equality and cohesion. It’s increasingly a stronger source of identity than nationality or ethnicity for minorities and migrants while majorities appear to grow more and more <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values-gap/">religiously indifferent</a>. </p>
<p>The paradigms of republicanism, as practised in France, or multiculturalism as implemented in a number of Western democracies, such as the UK and the US, or indeed employment-based integration models of <a href="https://theconversation.com/taking-on-the-challenge-of-getting-refugees-into-the-job-market-in-sweden-67869">Sweden</a> or Germany, are all in crisis. </p>
<p>This can be seen in the <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/08/economist-explains-19">banning</a> of Islamic clothing, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/pork-school-dinners-france-secularism-children-religious-intolerance">kosher or halal meals</a> and “burkinis” in France; the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/nando-sigona/can-fabric-of-diverse-society-be-undone-diary-of-eu-citizen-in-uk">backlash against migrants</a> following the UK’s decision to leave the EU; and the rejection of Angela Merkel’s pro-migration policy by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/04/mecklenburg-vorpommern-german-anti-immigrant-party-strong-regional-election-exit-polls-merkel">portion of the German population</a>.</p>
<p>Europe has not yet found a middle way between secularism and state religion that combines national and religious identity, and where ethnic and religious minority groups can co-exist within a state’s institutions. But other countries’ experiences can perhaps shine a light.</p>
<h2>Accommodating difference</h2>
<p>First, some key questions: in accommodating religious diversity should we encourage more religion in public life, for both majorities and minorities, or move towards a more radical secularism? If the former is the way to go, what are the obstacles that a more egalitarian religious pluralism would face in liberal Western societies? </p>
<p>All sorts of problems could arise from minority groups making special requests for accommodation, including powerful majority churches finding it difficult to <a href="http://accept-pluralism.eu/Research/ProjectReports/NewKnowledge.aspx">accept pluralism</a>, feeling that their historically privileged position is threatened. </p>
<p>What about those who oppose the presence of religion in public life, let alone an increase of it? Will all minority religious groups be equally easy or difficult to accommodate? <a href="http://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/intolerance-western-europe.html">Recent rises in Islamophobia in Europe</a> would suggest such moves would face significant opposition. </p>
<p>While most governments turn inwards to look at what went wrong in their own version of secular republicanism or multiculturalism, perhaps <a href="http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/the-governance-of-religious-diversity-more-or-less-secularism/">the answer is to be found in more radical views, beyond secularism</a>, such as those in the large multi-religious and multi-ethnic democracies of Asia. </p>
<h2>Looking for alternatives</h2>
<p>India is a relevant case in point. The country faced a tough challenge at its creation in 1947. Divided at first along religious lines, the communal riots that followed its partition into India and East and West Pakistan signalled the trust deficit that existed between its majority Hindu and the Muslim communities. </p>
<p>Bringing people together under these circumstances required something more than the promise of state neutrality. The nation’s diverse communities, the victims of communal violence and the Muslims who stayed on in India needed to be assured that they would be equal partners in the emerging democracy and that they would be treated in a fair and just manner.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152704/original/image-20170113-11828-10vcxi9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jawaharlal Nehru signs the Indian Constitution in 1950.</span>
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<p>A commitment to secularism – namely, that the state would not be aligned with any one religion – was an important first step. But it was not enough. In a society where religion was, and remains, an important <a href="https://theconversation.com/breathing-without-living-the-plight-of-christians-in-pakistan-70892">anchor of personal identity</a>, deeply valued by individuals and closely tied to notions of self-worth and dignity, the state had to make space for plurality of religious observances and cultural practices. </p>
<p>For members of different communities to have a sense of equality, the state needed to create a public culture that was hospitable to religious differences – one that allowed individuals to enter and participate in public life despite their religious beliefs. </p>
<p>Indifference towards matters of religion by the state, or complete neutrality and promise of non-intervention, were simply not the right answer.</p>
<h2>Beyond secularism</h2>
<p>To create a comfortable and non-alienating public culture, the <a href="http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/welcome.html">Indian constitution</a> gave each individual the right to observe their religious practices, and gave minorities the right to set up their own religious and educational institutions. </p>
<p>Minority educational institutions could receive funds from the state, if they so desired. Although no firm obligation was placed on the state, this allowed subsequent governments to support minority schools. </p>
<p>The government put together a list of <a href="http://www.officeholidays.com/countries/india/">public holidays</a> that gave due consideration to different religious communities. At least one holiday was given for a major festival or event of religious importance, for each community. And it made an effort to design national symbols (such as the flag, and the national anthem) in a way that included different communities. </p>
<p>The colours of the flag and the symbols on it were carefully chosen. Orange was chosen because <a href="http://cs.mcgill.ca/%7Erwest/wikispeedia/wpcd/wp/f/Flag_of_India.htm">saffron was associated with the Hindu community</a>, green was included for its <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/islamic_greenwashing.html">significance for the Muslim community</a>. White was added to represent all other communities. </p>
<p>When it came to the national anthem, <em>Jana Gana Mana</em> was preferred to <em>Vande Mataram</em>. Although the latter had been used at different moments in the struggle for independence, it invoked spiritual symbolism from the Hindu religion, and this was to be avoided.</p>
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<p>As India was embarking on its journey as a democracy, it had the opportunity to deliberately opt for inclusive symbols. But of course, this option is not available to most countries of Europe today. So what is there to be learned from the Indian state?</p>
<p>The lesson is the importance of creating a diverse public sphere that is inclusive and welcoming to all. And, most of all, one where cultural choices – in dress codes, food habits, and modes of address in social interaction – are not shaped entirely by the culture of the majority. This is the opposite to what we see in modern-day France, for instance. </p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>India’s founding framework went far beyond the idea of liberal secularism; it made a deliberate effort to give minorities the space to continue with their distinct religious and cultural practices and to pass them on. Culture and religion-related anxieties can be exploited to nurture resentment, and this had to be avoided.</p>
<p>Visible differences that marked the bodies of citizens in different ways were not seen as threatening. One could get past them, or at least see them as markers of identity instead of prejudging them as liberal or anti-liberal.</p>
<p>This was an important starting point but it had to be supplemented by government policies that ensured equal opportunity and security for all. Governments at the political centre and in different states failed to perform these tasks. Repeated incidents of inter-community violence, such as the 2013 <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24172537">Muzaffarnagar</a> and 2002 <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/06/world/asia/modi-gujarat-riots-timeline.html?_r=0">Gujarat</a> riots, and the failure to punish the perpetrators of such violence have pushed vulnerable minorities into the arms of their community for solace and legitimised the hold of religious leadership. </p>
<p>These could have been avoided. The state could have given a stern message that such forms of violence and community targeting would not be tolerated. But in case after case, governments let their citizens down. Political parties were divided, choosing to stand with different communities at different times but always with an eye on electoral gains. </p>
<p>In an effort to curb such communitarian politics, the Supreme Court has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-38487409">recently prohibited</a> appeals to religion and caste during elections. This is being seen as a landmark judgment by some, but even though it aims to force parties to think of all citizens, and not merely one community, it does not address all concerns. </p>
<p>It has not, for example, forbidden reference to <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8560.html"><em>Hindutva</em></a> – the founding principle of Hindu nationalism. The courts claim it <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/SC-declines-to-go-into-Hindutva-verdict/article16081556.ece">denotes a way of life</a> rather than a religious doctrine used as part of a campaign for cultural homogenisation.</p>
<h2>Space for dissent</h2>
<p>The point is that, in a democracy, it is not religion per se but efforts to stigmatise and intimidate people or groups that is a matter of concern. This is what India has yet to tackle effectively. When political parties can reach out to religious communities, take up their concerns and show that they give representation to candidates from different religions, they give a voice to minorities. This stems the sense of alienation and neglect that radicalisation so often taps into. </p>
<p>The most serious challenge today is to make space for individual dissent and autonomy and protect a person from those who wish to enforce the diktats of the community or the nation. India has focused so heavily on equality between groups that it has neglected to protect individual liberty – something that is pursued more effectively in Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152709/original/image-20170113-11837-110n0ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">European countries foster a stronger sense of personal liberty.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/sylke_ibach/16319003371/in/photolist-qS4aa6-4QQLrt-nxp4tp-7gCN4T-nGGpfW-cxDG5A-gV9nLB-qtSyPo-bVhK2S-dyyU1g-4SkxRX-tjMCTQ-tZdYHs-u3qoT-4QQReD-tZeBq3-ugQu9k-dGQ8eZ-bzGAwV-86Bq9H-7kDtGB-6FzSzF-NLWvw-cNsWnE-NMorP-ndB9TA-9AauTr-oqM2eg-4QV2SU-NMorn-7i7423-9Tgseo-p5Wpu-3MhKnT-4UcLKD-2MdLaZ-JZwtT-pHc4Sv-8zzbYo-irubR-7RMJE2-ekF9U9-4vXgH3-4QQMMi-4QQTNi-a38Q49-5urUCg-4QQX18-6JZDpF-918twJ">Sykle Ibach</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>India has much to learn on this subject from Western Europe. But its own journey shows that the presence of religion or its markers are not, and should not be, seen as the most important threat. It is not a case of more religion or less of it. </p>
<p>Anxieties about religion and the lack of respect for it can be tapped to create a rigid and more closed identity along with a politics of resentment. The focus must therefore be on creating a stake in democratic politics, involving different communities at different levels of institution functioning and extending avenues for equal opportunity.</p>
<h2>The pluralised public sphere</h2>
<p>It should go without saying that no state’s approach to religion is perfect, and India faces its own significant problems with diversity and integration, from religious violence to the persistence of the caste system. But that doesn’t mean there is nothing for Europe to learn.</p>
<p>Put simply, integrating religious differences is easier when religious freedom goes hand-in-hand with an understanding of the nature of religious commitments, and the creation of a pluralised public sphere. </p>
<p>Neutrality is insufficient when communities already see religion as an important part of their personal identity, one they want to hold on to along with their civic identity. It should be possible to have both. </p>
<p>Current political debates in the West need to open up to solutions that go beyond secularism, from places like India and from elsewhere. They need to embrace differences with policies for integrating minorities into education, the labour market and overall public life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Europe is at a crossroads in how it integrates religious minorities. But there are lessons to be learned beyond liberal secularism.Anna Triandafyllidou, Chair professor, European University InstituteGurpreet Mahajan, Professor of Political Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.