tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/corruption-1852/articlesCorruption – The Conversation2024-02-18T07:06:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217792024-02-18T07:06:55Z2024-02-18T07:06:55ZCorruption and clean energy in South Africa: economic model shows trust in government is linked to takeup of renewables<p>South Africa <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/south-africa-energy#:%7E:text=Current%20Status%3A,from%20renewables%20will%20grow%20rapidly.">relies heavily</a> on energy from coal-fired power stations, which emit large quantities of carbon. But making the transition to greater use of renewable energies, such as solar, is being hampered by a number of factors. Chief among them is corruption, which is affecting the quality of institutions.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15567249.2023.2291433">a recent paper</a> I set out how perceptions of corruption in the country’s institutions have had a huge impact on the country’s transition to clean energy. This is particularly true of institutions involved in energy, such as the state power utility Eskom.</p>
<p>My findings were based on an econometric model we developed, based on economic theory. It highlighted how perceptions of corruption and the effectiveness of government institutions influenced attitudes towards the country’s energy transition efforts. </p>
<p>Econometrics combines statistics, mathematical models and economic theories to understand and model economic problems. It uncovers the relationships and effects of various economic elements. </p>
<p>The model showed that greater trust in institutions would make people, policymakers and businesses more inclined to adopt renewable energy practices. </p>
<p>The study also found that the quality of the regulatory framework and government’s effectiveness shaped people’s views. This in turn affected decisions around adding renewable energy to the supply mix.</p>
<p>These findings matter because South Africa’s energy transition faces <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-south-africa-pioneered-plans-to-transition-to-renewable-energy-what-went-wrong-218851">a host of challenges</a>. These range from technical and financial challenges to broader political, socioeconomic and institutional hurdles. The key to a successful energy transition is policy that’s aligned with what the environment and the society need. It’s essential to improve institutional quality, put anti-corruption procedures in place and have clear rules. </p>
<h2>Energy mix and vision</h2>
<p>The energy situation in South Africa has changed significantly <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-energy-source-sub?time=earliest..2022&country=%7EZAF">since the mid-1990s</a>. Then, coal made up 73%-76% of the primary energy mix. Oil made up 21%-22%.</p>
<p>By 2022, coal’s share had fallen to almost 69%. The share of renewable energy sources had increased to roughly 2.3%. </p>
<p>Our study supports <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421520306145?casa_token=DpHWzhI7uCUAAAAA:leZ-aq2qmkX6h2AJbtSY5QN-0p9nlTC59L7gMJJgNRHUoJb1qEqY3bvKWt_83rXQhJ_PPe-BwQ">others</a> which show that 2008 was a turning point for the South African economy, particularly the energy sector. The factors involved included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the global financial crisis</p></li>
<li><p>changes in government policies, such as <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar092509a">monetary policies</a> </p></li>
<li><p>leadership changes in the country and at Eskom</p></li>
<li><p>power cuts and rising electricity prices </p></li>
<li><p>a downturn in the economy. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Institutions and economic implications</h2>
<p>This research was designed to understand the impact of national policies, governmental efficiency and past dependency on fossil fuel. I based the models on historical data about the energy mix and governance scores.</p>
<p>The analysis focused on the share of renewable energy in South Africa’s total final energy consumption. I used this as a proxy for the nation’s shift to cleaner energy. </p>
<p>Institutional quality is a complex concept. In our modelling exercise we therefore used three of the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators">World Governance Indicators</a> to stand for institutional quality: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>corruption perception index </p></li>
<li><p>regulatory quality – perceptions of government’s ability to make regulations that support private sector development </p></li>
<li><p>government effectiveness – perceptions of the quality and trustworthiness of public services. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The first model confirmed a positive relationship between perceptions of corruption-free institutions and the rollout of renewable energy. More renewable energy has been produced when governance scores have been highest.</p>
<p>The second model showed that transparent and effective regulation potentially hindered the adoption of cleaner alternatives. This can be explained by the fact that regulatory decisions have mostly supported the country’s energy dependence on fossil fuels. The energy markets, especially those for electricity, are doing better because of more sensible, open, and high-quality rules. As a result, this reduced the desire to switch to more environmentally friendly, renewable options.</p>
<p>Finally, the third model indicated a negative relationship between higher government effectiveness and the share of renewable energy. Close ties between stable governments and the conventional energy sector are common. This can influence policy choices. If these well-established businesses oppose reforms that jeopardise their interests – much like the fossil fuel sector does – the promotion of renewable energy sources may suffer. </p>
<p>I also saw that there had been a slow rate of change in renewable energy share. That can be attributed to slow procurement processes, coupled with potential lobbying and corruptive practices. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>South Africa has a new <a href="https://www.dmr.gov.za/Portals/0/Resources/Documents%20for%20Public%20Comments/IRP%202023%20%5BINTEGRATED%20RESOURCE%20PLAN%5D/Publication%20for%20comments%20Integrated%20Resource%20Plan%202023.pdf?ver=2024-01-05-134833-383">Integrated Resource Plan 2023</a> which proposes a near-term (2023-2030) plan that combines gas, solar, wind and battery storage. </p>
<p>But to boost the adoption of cleaner energy, South Africa needs to take urgent action to fight corruption and improve confidence in the country’s institutions. </p>
<p>Policymakers should focus first on making regulatory changes. Efficient procurement procedures and honest practices would speed up the shift to renewables. What’s needed are streamlined procurement, greater transparency and more competition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221779/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roula Inglesi-Lotz receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF).</span></em></p>The key to a successful energy transition away from coal is good institutional quality supported by anti-corruption procedures and clear rules.Roula Inglesi-Lotz, Professor of Economics, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229952024-02-12T02:20:48Z2024-02-12T02:20:48ZA slide in global corruption rankings is bad for ‘Brand NZ’ – what can the government do?<p>In 2010, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/clinton-nz-punches-way-above-its-weight/IIL2CO557CQ7WFK7WVJHJRFH7U/">famously described</a> New Zealand as a country that “punches way above its weight”. She was referring to our role in international relations, global security and natural disaster responses. But she was also talking about the country’s international reputation for being clean, green, safe and honest.</p>
<p>New Zealand has long enjoyed the economic and reputational benefits of these attributes. But recent rankings measuring the country’s international influence, transparency and corruption have started to tell a different story.</p>
<p>Between 2021 and 2023, New Zealand dropped ten places – from 16 to 26 – on the <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2023/03/new-zealand-takes-another-plunge-in-global-soft-power-rankings.html">Global Soft Power Index</a>. This measures a country’s influence abroad (among nation states, societies and international corporations) through its use of non-coercive measures.</p>
<p>Also, for the first time in a decade, New Zealand has <a href="https://www.transparency.org.nz/blog/new-zealands-score-slips-in-latest-corruption-perceptions-index-now-ranked-third">dropped to third place</a> in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">measures perceived levels</a> of corruption in the public sector. </p>
<p>That puts New Zealand five points below Denmark in first spot, and two below Finland. What’s going on, and what are the political and economic implications?</p>
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<h2>Brand New Zealand</h2>
<p>According to the 2023 Anholt-Ipsos <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en/nation-brands-index-2023">Nation Brand Index</a>, New Zealand is the 14th most valuable country brand in the world, valued at close to <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/130054566/new-zealands-brand-worth-440-billion-but-what-exactly-is-brand-nz">half a trillion New Zealand dollars</a> in 2022 by brand valuation and strategy company Brand Finance.</p>
<p>Indeed, “Brand New Zealand” – a carefully crafted and closely curated mix of national storytelling, strategic marketing and cross-sector investment – was a key driver behind the NZ$68.7 billion in exports of goods in 2023. On top of that, it drives a large part of the NZ$15 billion spent by tourists, and NZ$6 billion generated by overseas students.</p>
<p>Brand New Zealand is a precious commodity in its own right, which has taken many decades to build. But it can be quickly squandered, particularly through poor governance.</p>
<p>Enjoying levels of trust in public institutions <a href="https://ogp.org.nz/latest-news/ogpnz-26-july-2022-update-latest-trust-and-confidence-results">above the OECD average</a> has meant New Zealand takes pride in being recognised among the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/these-are-the-20-least-corrupt-countries-on-earth/">least corrupt countries</a> around the world.</p>
<p>The corruption ranking in turn affects the cost of accessing finance by countries, which eventually trickles down to household mortgages. It also influences public policies, public and private investment decisions, and market entry decisions by international firms (such as Ikea and Amazon).</p>
<p>Since 2014, New Zealand has dropped six points in its CPI score, three times more than Denmark or Finland. That’s not a trend we’d want to see continue.</p>
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<h2>Perceptions matter</h2>
<p>Corruption, defined as the misuse of authority for personal or organisational gain, reflects illegal activities which are purposefully hidden from the public and uncovered only through investigation, persecution or when a scandal erupts.</p>
<p>The CPI is based on expert assessment and opinion surveys from many different corruption studies by reputable global institutions, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.</p>
<p>A higher CPI score implies a lower level of perceived corruption. The aggregation of different indices makes the CPI more reliable than any single source.</p>
<p>New Zealand’s country credit risk rating – measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and which represents the single largest component of a country’s CPI score – has not dropped (yet). </p>
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<p>But its two-point CPI slide from 87 to 85 is driven by perceptions among business leaders, as captured by the most recent World Economic Forum’s executive opinion survey taken in August 2023.</p>
<p>The survey asks those leaders to report on any pressures to make undocumented extra payments or bribes, and instances of untoward diversion of public funds to groups, firms or individuals.</p>
<p>CEO of Transparency International New Zealand, Julie Haggie, <a href="https://www.transparency.org.nz/blog/new-zealands-score-slips-in-latest-corruption-perceptions-index-now-ranked-third">attributes the 2023 drop</a> in business leaders’ confidence to three specific factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>several high-profile cases of COVID-19 subsidy fraud and tax evasion by businesses</p></li>
<li><p>the government’s insufficient response to a rise in scamming, as well as a lack of transparency around government spending on outside consultation contracts and infrastructure projects</p></li>
<li><p>and a heightened focus on appropriate spending of public funds during a cost-of-living crisis when most New Zealanders are doing it tough.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Trust in government</h2>
<p>New Zealand’s CPI score (85) still warrants an A grade. But the long-term slide should not be ignored. We need to understand it as part of a <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2023-asia-pacific-stagnation-due-to-inadequate-anti-corruption-commitments">wider trend</a> of stagnation across the Asia Pacific. </p>
<p>In 2023, the region received a failing grade, with an average CPI score of just 45 – dragged down by North Korea (CPI: 17), Myanmar (20) and Afghanistan (20). </p>
<p>Transparency International also highlighed the “slow decline” of top performing countries in the region – New Zealand, followed by Singapore (CPI: 83), Australia and Hong Kong (both 75). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-ranking-in-global-anti-corruption-index-remains-steady-but-shows-we-cannot-be-complacent-222259">Australia's ranking in global anti-corruption index remains steady – but shows we cannot be complacent</a>
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<p>New Zealand’s latest CPI score may not yet reflect any erosion of public trust brought on by the coalition government’s <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/programmes/the-detail/story/2018923991/the-treaty-of-waitangi-articles-principles-changes">policies around revisiting</a> the Treaty of Waitangi principles. But it must still be mindful of the fragility of general trust in public institutions and the government. </p>
<p>Damaging that trust can have unintended consequences for our international reputation. It could <a href="https://theconversation.com/perceptions-of-corruption-are-growing-in-australia-and-its-costing-the-economy-176562">potentially cost</a> the country thousands of jobs, drive away talent, and dampen export growth.</p>
<p>There is a tension here, too. Cutting public spending by between 6.5% and 7.5%, as government agencies have been <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/507659/the-public-service-agencies-asked-to-cut-spending">told to do</a>, may be viewed positively by business leaders. But it can also erode public trust in government.</p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/artificial-intelligence-and-corporate-social-responsibility-can-strengthen-anti-corruption-efforts-177883">Artificial intelligence and corporate social responsibility can strengthen anti-corruption efforts</a>
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<h2>Turning the trend around</h2>
<p>To halt or reverse the slide, New Zealand might look to Australia. While it placed 14th in the latest Transparency International ranking (with a CPI score of 75), Australia has gained two points under the Albanese Labor government.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-decade-of-decline-australia-is-back-on-the-rise-in-a-global-anti-corruption-ranking-198305">marked a turnaround</a> in previously declining CPI scores. It was driven by the establishment of a new federal anti-corruption commission, and significant changes to whistle-blowing protection.</p>
<p>As New Zealanders learn about the sometimes messy inner power dynamics of a three-way coalition, one thing is clear: the government would be wise to assure the domestic and international public that there is no risk of state capture by specific interest groups, such as tobacco, the military industrial complex, or foreign property developers.</p>
<p>State capture by vested interest groups is a form of public corruption and would likely significantly affect New Zealand’s declining CPI score. Again, public perceptions count as much as reality in such cases.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222995/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matevz (Matt) Raskovic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand has dropped six points on the main global index of perceived corruption. To turn that around, the government must guard against state capture by vested interests.Matevz (Matt) Raskovic, Associate Professor of International Business & Strategy, Auckland University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227302024-02-04T16:23:16Z2024-02-04T16:23:16ZHage Geingob: Namibian president who played a modernising role<p>Hage Gottfried Geingob <a href="https://www.namibian-studies.com/index.php/JNS/article/view/113/113">served as the third president of Namibia</a> from 2015 until his death on February 4 2024. He was Namibia’s first prime minister from 1990 to 2002, and served as prime minister again from 2012 to 2015.</p>
<p>Geingob was born on <a href="https://www.parliament.na/dt_team/geingob-hage/">3 August 1941</a>. He joined the ranks of the national liberation movement South West African People’s Organisation (<a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-west-africa-peoples-organisation-swapo">Swapo</a> during its formation in 1960.</p>
<p>As the official statement <a href="https://twitter.com/NamPresidency/status/1753963884828823682">declared</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The Namibian nation has lost a distinguished servant of the people, a
liberation struggle icon, the chief architect of our constitution and the pillar of the Namibian house.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As Swapo’s candidate he was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hage-Geingob">elected</a> as Namibia’s president for 2015 to 2020 in November 2014. In 2017 he replaced Hifikepunye Pohamba as party president. As head of state with <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibia-badly-needs-refurbishment-after-32-years-under-the-ruling-party-179205">far reaching executive powers</a>, he remained in control over party and government since then. </p>
<p>Geingob’s political career differed from that of his predecessors Sam Nujoma and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hifikepunye-Pohamba">Hifikepunye Pohamba</a>. <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/200904240652.html">Nujoma</a>, the founding president of Swapo, served as president for three terms (1990-2005). Pohamba (2005-2015) was his designated successor. </p>
<p>Geingob personified a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44508019">“changing of the guard”</a>. His advanced formal education left an imprint on the way of governance during his terms in office. A younger generation moved gradually into higher party and state ranks. He successfully modified the heroic struggle narrative and turned it into a more inclusive, patriotic history. </p>
<h2>Geingob’s career</h2>
<p>Geingob had his cultural roots in the Damara community. This made him different from the mainstream Swapo leadership, which is mainly from the Oshiwambo-speaking population. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/namibia-badly-needs-refurbishment-after-32-years-under-the-ruling-party-179205">Namibia badly needs refurbishment after 32 years under the ruling party</a>
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<p>Geingob’s different background counted in his favour among many Namibians when campaigning for presidency. People welcomed a leader with origins in an ethnically defined minority group as a sign of multi-cultural plurality.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.parliament.na/dt_team/geingob-hage/">Studying</a> at the US American Temple University in Philadelphia, the Fordham University (BA) and The New School (MA), both in New York, Geingob was representing Swapo since the mid-1960s at the United Nations. In 1975 he became the head of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/160803">United Nations Institute for Namibia</a> in Lusaka. </p>
<p>He returned to Namibia in mid-1989, leading the Swapo election campaign in the transition to independence under <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40175168">supervision of the United Nations</a>. He played a <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5fa370c-004f-c92d-0ba3-7b3ca48aab38&groupId=252038">decisive role as chairman of the elected Constituent Assembly</a>. </p>
<p>He was appointed Prime Minister in 1990. </p>
<p>In 2002 he fell into disgrace for not supporting <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/legacies-of-power">Sam Nujoma’s presidency-for-life ambitions</a>. Instead of accepting his demotion to Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing, he became executive secretary of the <a href="https://gcacma.org/AboutGCA.htm">Washington-based Global Coalition for Africa</a>. </p>
<p>In 2004 he obtained a PhD at the University of Leeds for a <a href="https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/21090/">thesis</a> on state formation in Namibia.</p>
<p>He returned the same year to Namibia. Thanks to Pohamba’s reconciliatory approach, he made a remarkable comeback. Minister of Trade and industry from 2008 to 2012, he again became Prime Minister (2012-2015). </p>
<p>His clever politically strategic mind paved the way to be elected as president of the party and state. </p>
<h1>Geingob’s presidency</h1>
<p>In the Presidential and National Assembly elections of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2014-12-02-namibias-swapo-win-elections-geingob-voted-as-president/">November 2014</a> Geingob and Swapo scored the best results in the country’s history. While Nujoma was termed the president for stability and Pohamba the president for continuity, Geingob campaigned as <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC-5ae9d1ff3">president for prosperity</a>. </p>
<p>But this made him the president of unfulfilled promises. </p>
<p>Geingob’s rhetoric disclosed a stronger contrast between what was said and what was done than that of his predecessors. He used more <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056244.2018.1500360">populist</a> rhetoric as his style of governance and leadership, coining the metaphor of the “Namibian House. </p>
<p>As he <a href="https://www.namibiaembassyusa.org/sites/default/files/statements/Inaugural%20Speech%20by%20HE%20Hage%20%20Geingob%201.pdf">declared in his inaugural address</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>All of us must play our part in the success of this beautiful house we call Namibia. We need to renew it from time to time by undergoing renovations and extensions. … Let us stand together in building this new Namibian house in which no Namibian will feel left out.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But over the years many felt left out. The November 2019 parliamentary and presidential election <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2020.1717090">results</a> were the worst for Swapo since independence. A 2020 Afrobarometer survey confirmed <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/trust-political-institutions-decline-namibia-afrobarometer-survey-shows/">a decline of trust</a>.</p>
<p>In all fairness, Geingob entered office at a difficult time. The country faced fiscal constraints and a period of serious droughts, followed by the traumatic impact of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2020.1790776">Covid</a>. Consequently, the socio-economic track record under him was at best mixed. On balance, his governance was characterised by a considerable gap between <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/namibia-2024-promises-or-delivery/">promises and delivery </a>. </p>
<p>Under Geingob a decline of ethics became visible, manifested spectacularly in a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FJ1TB0nwHs">corruption scandal</a> in the <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/timely-and-engaging-fishrot/">fishing industry</a>. It became the synonym of state capture. Fighting <a href="https://africa.cgtn.com/namibias-president-geingob-pledges-stronger-fight-against-corruption/">corruption</a> became Geingob’s mantra. But it had little credibility in the eyes of the wider public. </p>
<h1>The moderniser</h1>
<p>Geingob was first married (1967-1992) to a strong-minded African-American woman. Fondly called "Auntie Patty”, Priscilla Geingos was <a href="https://www.namibiansun.com/news/auntie-patty-laid-to-rest-in-windhoek">laid to rest in Windhoek in 2014</a>. </p>
<p>Before entering office, Geingob (divorced for a second time from Loini Kandume in 2008) married the businesswoman Monica Kalondo in 2015. Strong, loyal, and independent-minded, Monica Geingos became an <a href="https://www.unaids.org/en/aboutunaids/unaidsambassadors/MonicaGeingos">active and internationally recognised First Lady</a>.</p>
<p>Among Geingob’s most laudable achievements <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/06/experts-committee-elimination-discrimination-against-women-congratulate-namibia">is a gender-aware policy</a>. It elevated Namibia into the league of countries with the highest proportion of women in leading political offices.</p>
<p>He <a href="https://namibia.unfpa.org/en/topics/gender-based-violence-3">took a stand against</a> gender-based violence and the country progressed in closing the gender inequality gap.</p>
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<p>He was also reluctant to give in to <a href="https://www.washingtonblade.com/2023/06/14/landmark-namibia-supreme-court-ruling-sparks-anti-gay-backlash/">homophobia</a> prevalent among parliamentarians. In May 2023 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/on-same-sex-relationships/">equal treatment</a> of two foreign same sex spouses married to Namibian citizens. While the vast majority of members of the National Assembly pushed through a law amendment seeking <a href="https://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2023/07/20/namibias-proposed-amendment-of-the-marriage-act-an-attack-on-the-rule-of-law-and-the-judiciary/">to invalidate the verdict</a>, Geingob did not sign the bill into law. </p>
<h1>Geingob’s legacy</h1>
<p>One of the last official statements by Geingob, on 13 January 2024, testified to his strong views. Upset over Germany’s taking side with Israel at the International Court of Justice, he <a href="https://twitter.com/NamPresidency/status/1746259880871149956">fumed</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The German Government is yet to fully atone for the genocide it committed on Namibian soil. Germany cannot morally express commitment to the United Nations Convention against genocide, including atonement for the genocide in Namibia, whilst supporting the equivalent of a holocaust and genocide in Gaza.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Geingob was ambitious to enter Namibian history as the president who did more to promote the welfare and advancement of citizens. But he struggled to turn that vision into reality in office. Namibia remains among the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/namibia/overview#:%7E:text=Namibia%20ranks%20as%20one%20of,services%20are%20large%20and%20widening">most unequal countries</a> in the world. </p>
<p>As he reiterated in his <a href="https://twitter.com/NamPresidency/status/1741615241614508304">New Year Address 2024</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In order to seize the opportunities that are in line with our ambitions and expectations, we should redouble our efforts to make Namibia a better country. I call on each one of you to work harder for our collective welfare. I call on all of you to hold hands and to ensure that no one feels left out of the Namibian House.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>His legacy as a moderniser will live on despite all the contradictions and unfulfilled promises. </p>
<p>Hamba kahle (Rest in peace).</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber is a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>Hage Geingob’s legacy as a moderniser will live on despite contradictions and unfulfilled promises.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2222592024-01-30T06:02:59Z2024-01-30T06:02:59ZAustralia’s ranking in global anti-corruption index remains steady – but shows we cannot be complacent<p>Successfully tackling corruption is more than catching greedy public servants and politicians, miscreants and manipulators. It involves government at the highest level advancing a culture of integrity and setting up institutions that celebrate and facilitate good governance – in addition to catching the bad guys.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023">latest Corruption Perceptions Index</a> – an annual survey from Transparency International that tracks how corrupt governments are perceived to be – shows Australia still has a way to go on this front.</p>
<p>Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Singapore came out on top in the latest survey of 180 countries, while South Sudan, Venezuela, Syria and Somalia were at the bottom. </p>
<p>Australia came in at 14th place with a score of 75 out of 100, which is the same score as last year. Zero is considered highly corrupt, while 100 is very clean.</p>
<p>In 2012, Australia had ranked an impressive seventh in the world with a score of 85. By 2021, however, we had fallen to 18th with a score of 73. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1752209838413910286"}"></div></p>
<p>The election of the Albanese government with its commitment to establish a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-national-anti-corruption-commission-faces-high-expectations-and-a-potential-mountain-of-work-208019">National Anti-Corruption Commission</a> brought a boost to our anti-corruption reputation last year, vaulting us back up to 13th position. But we’ve levelled off in this year’s report.</p>
<p>While Australia is still ranked ahead of countries like Japan, Iceland, the UK, France and the US, it appears those who assess our anti-corruption efforts are still waiting to ensure we are truly turning the corner. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-and-norway-were-once-tied-in-global-anti-corruption-rankings-now-were-heading-in-opposite-directions-174966">Australia and Norway were once tied in global anti-corruption rankings. Now, we're heading in opposite directions</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The anti-corruption commission is just the first step</h2>
<p>The Corruption Perceptions Index is not a measure of corruption, but is a perceptions index. It is globally used and respected. Using rigorous <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_CPI_methodology.pdf">methodology</a>, the index compiles independent assessments of a country’s efforts to prevent and control corruption by business leaders and experts. It then scores and ranks countries.</p>
<p>Twenty-five years ago, when I was director of the Australian Institute of Criminology, I was berated by a senior official who said, “You have been director of the AIC for five years and crime is still a serious problem in our community. What a hopeless performance. You have failed miserably!” </p>
<p>Turning around a long-term trend is not something that occurs overnight, and of course, there are many factors that contribute to a country’s corruption score.</p>
<p>The National Anti-Corruption Commission, for example, is not the magic bullet that alone will restore Australia’s good standing on the global stage. Its establishment sends a signal that the government is serious about stamping out corruption, but it will take time to see results. </p>
<p>The previous government had been embroiled in a number of scandals, including “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jul/21/sports-rorts-coalition-approved-at-least-six-grants-without-an-application-form-documents-reveal">sports rorts</a>”, “<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-car-park-rorts-story-is-scandalous-but-it-will-keep-happening-unless-we-close-grant-loopholes-164779">carpark rorts</a>”, <a href="https://theconversation.com/amateurish-rushed-and-disastrous-royal-commission-exposes-robodebt-as-ethically-indefensible-policy-targeting-vulnerable-people-201165">Robodebt</a>, the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-21/federal-government-western-sydney-airport-audit-office/12686208">Leppington triangle land purchase scandal</a>, and workplace accountability and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-30/sexual-haassment-report-parliament-brittany-higgins/100660894">sexual harassment</a> issues. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1751008136163660152"}"></div></p>
<p>While it’s important to investigate these allegations of wrongdoing, the National Anti-Corruption Commission cannot stop every bad policy or practice. The real challenge is how to make sure those in government do the right thing – not because they are told to, but because they want to, and see it as a mark of ethical and responsive government.</p>
<p>Promoting integrity is bigger than the National Anti-Corruption Commission. It is part of the job of every political and public service leader and manager, and it trickles down to the lowest levels of government. This is where the Australian Public Service Commission can be effective – it has taken on board the challenge of creating a framework to better promote integrity within government.</p>
<p>Some sectors are more prone to corruption than others, such as those that engage in significant procurements, extend discretionary benefits to clients, or issue licences and permits. A mapping exercise could better identify these sectors, along with the associated red flags and risks.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/perceptions-of-corruption-are-growing-in-australia-and-its-costing-the-economy-176562">Perceptions of corruption are growing in Australia, and it's costing the economy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Election financing and whisteblower reforms</h2>
<p>We also need to look at the bigger picture beyond government services. I wrote last year about a <a href="https://transparency.org.au/australias-national-integrity-system/">blueprint for action</a> emanating from a research team led by A J Brown, an anti-corruption and whistleblowing expert. </p>
<p>While the National Anti-Corruption Commission is a first step, we still need to implement reforms on <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/major-overhaul-looms-to-keep-big-money-out-of-politics-20230608-p5df77.html">election financing</a>, foreign bribery and <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-awash-with-dirty-money-heres-how-to-close-the-money-laundering-loopholes-206606">anti-money laundering regulations</a>, and <a href="https://consultations.ag.gov.au/integrity/pswr-stage2/">protections for whistleblowers</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-national-anti-corruption-commission-faces-high-expectations-and-a-potential-mountain-of-work-208019">The new National Anti-Corruption Commission faces high expectations – and a potential mountain of work</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Australian Electoral Commission was <a href="https://www.apsc.gov.au/initiatives-and-programs/workforce-information/research-analysis-and-publications/state-service/state-service-report-2023/agency-benchmarking/trust-and-satisfaction-australian-public-services#:%7E:text=The%20Australian%20Electoral%20Commission%20had,service%20provided%20through%20Services%20Australia.">listed</a> in the latest Australian Public Service Commission survey as the nation’s most trusted public service. However, there is more the commission should be able to do if the government makes the appropriate policy decisions on election reform. </p>
<p>If trust in the electoral system is eroded, then our democracy is in real trouble and integrity will fly out of the window. </p>
<p>Three areas need attention: </p>
<p>1) We need limits on campaign financing and better regulation of political donations. It is essential for our government’s integrity that a campaign donation is a donation, not a transaction. </p>
<p>2) Donations need to be disclosed in real time. We need to know who is cosying up to the parties as it happens, not months later. </p>
<p>3) We need stronger regulations to monitor truth in political advertising, in particular on social media. </p>
<p>Ranking 14th on the latest Corruption Perceptions Index is pretty good, but it should absolutely not be a reason to be complacent. Australia can do better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222259/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Graycar has received funding from the Australian Research Council. He is a member of Transparency International. </span></em></p>After rising five places in last year’s influential Corruption Perceptions Index, Australia has levelled off this year. This shows much work remains to be done.Adam Graycar, Professor of Public Policy, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219002024-01-27T06:07:13Z2024-01-27T06:07:13ZJacob Zuma, the monster South Africa’s ruling ANC created, continues to haunt it<p>Former South African president Jacob Zuma is <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=23cde356c2361300JmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTI0Ng&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=uMhkonto&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2FiY25ld3MuY29tL3NhYmNuZXdzL3p1bWEtdXJnZXMtc291dGgtYWZyaWNhbnMtdG8tdm90ZS1mb3ItbmV3bHktZm9ybWVkLXVta2hvbnRvLXdlc2l6d2Uv&ntb=1">endorsing</a> the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party, the latest rival to the governing African National Congress (ANC) for the <a href="https://www.eisa.org/election-calendar/">upcoming national elections</a>. By doing so, he not only challenges the ANC politically, but also claims its heritage.</p>
<p>The new party – which media reports say is <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2024-01-07-zuma-exposed-as-brains-behind-establishment-of-mk-party/">Zuma’s brainchild</a> – uses the name of the ANC’s former military wing. The party’s launch coincided with the 62nd anniversary of the real <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk">uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK)</a>, formed on <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=04fd21d4aee3a8f1JmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTI3Mw&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=uMhkonto&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuc2FoaXN0b3J5Lm9yZy56YS9hcnRpY2xlL3Vta2hvbnRvLXdlc2l6d2UtbWs&ntb=1">16 December 1961</a> to fight the apartheid government. </p>
<p>Zuma could not have been more daring. Yet the ANC obfuscates, criticising him instead of acting decisively and expelling him. Meantime, he actively campaigns to unseat it. Why?</p>
<p>I have studied and written extensively about the politics of the ANC and its alliance partners – the Congress of South African Trade Unions (<a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Cosatu</a>) and the South African Communist Party (<a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">SACP</a>). I was also one of the editors of the <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">book</a> The Zuma Administration: Critical Challenges. </p>
<p>In my view, the reason the ANC is cagey about taking him on, is because the party tied itself in knots <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0fc7bb4c-b027-11e3-b0d0-00144feab7de">defending Zuma’s bad behaviour</a> in the past. The ANC created the Zuma problem. The party and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a> abetted his kleptocracy and facilitated his <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">capture of the state</a>. They created Zuma as a <a href="https://www.rusi.org/publication/jacob-zuma-after-battle-polokwane">populist with a penchant for rabble-rousing</a>. Now they are paralysed and can’t act against him.</p>
<p>The ANC also <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=ce02ce879565061cJmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTE3NA&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=support+for+zuma&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuY2l0aXplbi5jby56YS9uZXdzL3NvdXRoLWFmcmljYS9wb2xpdGljcy9hbmMtd29udC1hY3QtYWdhaW5zdC16dW1hLWZvci1ub3ctcmVwb3J0Lw&ntb=1">fears</a> that if it expelled him, he could portray himself as a victim.</p>
<p>Decisive action against him would require the party to face up to its own demons. It would be exposed as having enabled him. </p>
<p>The ANC’s reluctance to take him on or fire him is rooted in the events of 2005. Then South African president Thabo Mbeki <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-thabo-mbeki-sacks-deputy-president-jacob-zuma">fired Zuma as his deputy</a> after the latter was mired in corruption allegations. Zuma’s use of this to build a case that he was a victim still haunts the ANC. It fears a repeat so close to the 2024 elections. </p>
<p>Zuma’s political pursuits now depend on a new party whose electoral strength is yet to be tested. It pales in comparison with the support he got in the past. </p>
<p>My arguments is that the political cost of not expelling him – in terms of lost votes – is greater than the cost of expelling him. By not acting against him, the ANC is failing to “renew” itself as it has <a href="https://renewal.anc1912.org.za/">promised</a> to do. This makes the party look weak and may cost it electoral support.</p>
<h2>Zuma and the ANC</h2>
<p>The ANC knew Zuma was likely to turn out this way, from as early as 1997, when it elected him deputy president to Thabo Mbeki, paving his way to the highest office in the land.</p>
<p>South African author and journalist Mark Gevisser <a href="https://www.everand.com/book/641542878/Thabo-Mbeki-The-Dream-Deferred">writes</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Mbeki and those around him began to worry that Zuma possessed a dangerous combination of unhealthy ambition and poor judgment.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>They were right.</p>
<p>Because of this fear, he was at first not considered for the position of deputy president. Instead, Mbeki offered the position to Inkatha Freedom Party leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/mangosuthu-buthelezi-was-a-man-of-immense-political-talent-and-contradictions-181081">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>. However, through Zuma’s machination, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00344890902944387">this was foiled</a>. He eventually became the deputy president. But he was bitter that he had been initially overlooked for the position.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">Mbeki’s presidency</a>, relations between the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a> became frosty. </p>
<p>The contestation was around the Mbeki government’s free market economic policies, which Cosatu and the SACP <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/04d23130-a8dc-11dc-ad9e-0000779fd2ac">condemned</a> as a neo-liberal agenda that deviated from the ANC’s aim of <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm">socio-economic transformation and empowerment</a> of those previously marginalised when it came to power in 1994.</p>
<p>Zuma exploited this to position himself as the centre around which <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-03-coalition-of-the-wounded-turn-on-zuma/">those allegedly wounded by Mbeki</a> could coalesce.</p>
<h2>The rise of Zuma the populist</h2>
<p>In Zuma, the <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/the-zuma-administration">alliance</a> saw someone who could represent its ideological position in the country’s policy choices. Yet, he was part of the ANC leadership that adopted Mbeki’s economic strategy and was never known to espouse leftist politics. To their dismay, he proved not to be their <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-04-20-replacing-mbeki-with-zuma-did-not-solve-our-problems-nzimande/">ideological ally in office</a>.</p>
<p>Later the same year Zuma was <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-decade-on-a-new-book-on-zumas-rape-trial-has-finally-hit-home-85262">accused of raping</a> the daughter of a friend. He was acquitted but was tainted as immoral.</p>
<p>This alone should have disqualified him from any leadership position. But it did not matter to his allies, who ensured he became the president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>, and that of the country <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/jacob-zuma-presidency-2009-2017-march">in 2009</a>. He was, to the alliance, an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232871908_Understanding_the_'Zuma_Tsunami'">unstoppable tsunami</a>.</p>
<p>The ANC bashed the judiciary as counter-revolutionary for unfavourable judgments against Zuma. The party claimed his prosecution was political persecution <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27756284?seq=2">at Mbeki’s behest</a>. Then ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema declared they were prepared to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/we-will-kill-for-zuma-404646">kill and die for Zuma</a>. </p>
<h2>Leading with impunity</h2>
<p>Zuma’s eventual ascendancy to the presidency of the country in 2009 was <a href="https://www.alterinter.org/?Working-class-politics-or-populism-the-meaning-of-Zuma-for-the-left-in-SA">hailed,</a> by the alliance left – Cosatu and the SACP, as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a victory against the neo-liberal orthodoxy of Mbeki.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zuma did not deliver on this expectation. Yet he continued to enjoy the support of the tripartite alliance. </p>
<p>He went on to <a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=905b9cd41887a59aJmltdHM9MTcwNTg4MTYwMCZpZ3VpZD0zMGZhN2Y5OS00MWYwLTYxYjctMjZmMS02Y2ZlNDAxMDYwYmYmaW5zaWQ9NTE5NQ&ptn=3&ver=2&hsh=3&fclid=30fa7f99-41f0-61b7-26f1-6cfe401060bf&psq=betrayal+of+the+promise+report&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9wYXJpLm9yZy56YS93cC1jb250ZW50L3VwbG9hZHMvMjAxNy8wNS9CZXRyYXlhbC1vZi10aGUtUHJvbWlzZS0yNTA1MjAxNy5wZGY&ntb=1">subvert</a> the criminal justice system to avert prosecution for his corruption charges. </p>
<p>The judiciary <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-judges-in-south-africa-under-threat-or-do-they-complain-too-much-45459">pushed back</a> but earned the wrath of the ANC and its alliance partners.</p>
<p>They always closed ranks to shield Zuma from accountability. He survived numerous motions of no confidence in parliament for, among other things, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-08-parties-to-file-motion-of-no-confidence-against-zuma/%22">“dangerously flawed judgment”</a> relating to his <a href="https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/president-zuma-appoints-new-national-director-public-prosecutions-25-nov-2009">appointment of Menzi Simelani</a> as head of the National Prosecuting Authority, despite evidence that he had lied to a presidential commission of inquiry.</p>
<p>Among the notable no-confidence votes against which the ANC-dominated parliament shielded Zuma was over his use of public money to renovate his private homestead <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2016/11.pdf">at Nkandla</a>. </p>
<p>The stage was set for Zuma to wreak havoc with impunity. The alliance left only started to move away from him when it became obvious that he had outsourced the running of the country to his friends, <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/how-gupta-brothers-from-india-landed-south-africas-ruling-party-in-its-biggest-crisis-397138">the Gupta family</a>. It was too late.</p>
<p>In 2015, he <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0UO0KO/">sacked</a> the finance minister Nhlanhla Nene, only to replace him with an obscure Gupta-sanctioned appointee, with an eye on the national treasury.</p>
<p>The market tailspinned into and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5c0da8b2-9eb5-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861">rand plummeted</a>. Yet the ANC still defended him in parliament.</p>
<p>Towards the end of 2016, the public protector released a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/state-capture-report-public-protector-14-october-2016">damning report</a> showing how the state had been captured at Zuma’s behest. Again, the ANC foiled attempts to remove him.</p>
<p>He only resigned on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066443?utm_source=Media+Review+for+February+15%2C+2018&utm_campaign=Media+Review+for+February+15%2C+2018&utm_medium=email">14 February 2018</a>. This was not so much for his misdemeanours but because he was no longer the president of the ANC.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>The ANC’s indecisiveness does it no good. Its claim that he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fuu_FEGQc0A">“walked away”</a> from the party and is therefore no longer a member is wishful thinking. He has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zuma-says-he-will-not-vote-anc-south-africas-election-2023-12-16/">made it clear</a> he will remain an ANC member.</p>
<p>The only way to terminate his membership is to expel him. This should have happened much earlier, at least before the ANC’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-marks-its-112th-year-with-an-eye-on-national-elections-but-its-record-is-patchy-and-future-uncertain-221125">112th anniversary festivities </a> earlier this month. They could have used the platform to explain the decision to cleanse the party of those who debase it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mashupye Herbert Maserumule received funding from National Research Foundation(NRF). He is affiliated with the South African Association of Public Administration and Management(SAAPAM).</span></em></p>The ANC tied itself in knots defending Zuma’s destructive bad behaviour in the past. Acting against him now would require it to own up to its sins.Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2163852024-01-24T13:28:42Z2024-01-24T13:28:42ZNigeria has a democracy deficit – corruption and a lack of welfare policies are to blame<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/democracy">Democracy</a> refers, at a minimum, to a political system that guarantees some involvement in decision-making. It gives citizens opportunities to choose and replace their leaders or representatives via free and fair elections. </p>
<p>But that’s not all. Democracy also protects citizens’ socio-economic, political and cultural rights.</p>
<p>Its success turns on its ability to bring changes to the living conditions of citizens.</p>
<p>It is a form of governance that holds this truth: that the people are what matters most.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lysias-Gilbert-2/publication/269867317_Democracy_and_Good_Governance_The_Missing_Link_in_Nigeria/links/571641a908aef165cc2b4fe9/Democracy-and-Good-Governance-The-Missing-Link-in-Nigeria.pdf">paper</a> I co-authored, we used these defining features to assess the state of democracy in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Our paper was based on observation and narratives on democracy found in literature. We concluded that very few countries in Africa met the basic conditions of a democratic state. The exceptions were Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania.</p>
<p>In the case of Nigeria, we found that what was missing in the country’s democratic efforts was good governance. Good governance is central to the performance and measurement of democracy. We looked at two measures of good governance: the welfare of citizens; and succession. On both scores we found that Nigeria fell short. Although our research was conducted in 2014, the factors we identified remain in place today. </p>
<p>We conclude that on both measures of good governance improvements could be made – firstly by strengthening the crusade against corruption, and secondly, by steps to improve the welfare of citizens.</p>
<h2>Good governance</h2>
<p>Good governance should be the goal of any government interested in improving the quality of life of its people. Professor of economics <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/609425458">Michael Obadan has argued</a> that there are five fundamental elements to good governance. We found that Nigeria was falling short on all these scores:</p>
<p><strong>Accountability of public office holders with regard to public funds</strong></p>
<p>In public service there are many accountability mechanisms, including codes of conduct, which are intended to guide decisions of public officials.</p>
<p>Sadly, the adherence to these principles often falls short of expectations, leaving room for a culture of impunity in Nigeria. A clear example shows up when the influence of a state governor permeates the state legislature, especially in the budget-making processes. This unchecked influence compromises essential public scrutiny for the welfare of citizens. Officials can then misappropriate public funds and evade justice. </p>
<p><strong>Transparency in public policy and decision making processes</strong></p>
<p>A cloud of secrecy surrounds governance in Nigeria. Details of how officials get and use funds are often withheld. The public can’t see the impact of policies formulated to improve their well-being.</p>
<p><strong>Predictability in government behaviour</strong></p>
<p>The essence of predictability in good governance is the ability to expect the policies, decisions, and activities of government. Predictability makes it possible for citizens to engage in civic life, contributing to a democratic process. </p>
<p><strong>Openness in government dealings and effective communication between government and the governed</strong> </p>
<p>There are different ways of achieving this, including official and unofficial media. It means that the public won’t misinterpret proposed government projects and goals. </p>
<p><strong>Adherence to the rule of law</strong></p>
<p>At the core of good governance lies the rule of law. It signifies that the law is supreme, applying universally without exception. This principle reinforces the idea that no individual or entity is exempt from legal obligations. It promotes fairness and a just society. </p>
<p>Addressing these basic aspects will contribute to a governance framework that truly serves the interests of the Nigerian people.</p>
<p>We found that in the case of Nigeria there were challenges to good governance in the following areas:</p>
<ul>
<li> the election process</li>
</ul>
<p>Rigging of elections, poor management of polling, a lack of independent election management institutions, a lack of neutrality of external and internal monitors, a lack of credible opposition, weak political parties – all these are problems.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>lack of effective participation of citizens in the political process</p></li>
<li><p>a culture of impunity</p></li>
<li><p>political violence leading to insecurity </p></li>
<li><p>ineffectiveness of the Nigerian police force</p></li>
<li><p>corruption and lack of accountability</p></li>
<li><p>influence of the executive over other organs of government.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>We argue that these negative outcomes are due to bad governance.</p>
<h2>The welfare of citizens</h2>
<p>When elected political leaders emerged in 1999 after 16 years of military dictatorship, many Nigerians expected an improvement in their economic and social conditions. But that has not happened.</p>
<p>Unemployment, shortage of food, lack of public safety, lack of clean water, inadequate healthcare and poor incomes remain <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237469439_Down_To_Earth_Changes_in_Attitudes_Toward_Democracy_and_Markets_in_Nigeria">prevalent</a>. </p>
<p>The performance of politicians in improving the welfare of citizens shows that Nigeria’s civil regime has achieved nothing. Programmes that would improve the lives of all Nigerians are still lacking. </p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>One of our main conclusions is that the crusade against corruption remains the basis of ensuring good governance. But this will only be effective if the anti-corruption institutions themselves are subject to democratic governance and the oversight powers of responsible civil society. </p>
<p>Political corruption violates democratic principles and procedures. It should therefore attract equal condemnation and punishment with other forms of corruption such as economic and financial crimes. Often, it is neglected because the political elite in Nigeria is guilty of this.</p>
<p>For example, the history of elections in Nigeria is filled with stories of rigging. Post election adjudication should not only be concerned with determination of who did and did not win in those elections, but should punish with imprisonment and fines in cases where it is established beyond reasonable doubt that political elite or their agents have violated electoral rules.</p>
<p>This is a non-negotiable first step to making leaders accountable to citizens. </p>
<p>Secondly, poverty and unemployment require the institutionalisation of development oriented practices. This means a political and governing culture that places a high priority on the welfare of citizens. </p>
<p>The absence of development oriented practices has been one of the major weak points in Nigeria’s democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fidelis Allen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Good governance is the missing link in Nigeria’s democratic experience since 1999.Fidelis Allen, Professor of Development Studies, University of Port Harcourt Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177312024-01-14T12:51:29Z2024-01-14T12:51:29ZUrban Kenyans mistrust police even more than rural residents do: study sets out why it matters<p>Across the African continent – from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/10/20/in-nigeria-police-brutality-on-two-years-after-endsars-protests">Nigeria</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanaians-dont-trust-the-police-a-criminologist-on-what-needs-to-be-done-about-it-216671">Ghana</a> to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-protests-police-trfn-idUSKBN23G2QQ/">South Africa</a> – widespread protests have taken place to demand police reform in the wake of police misconduct and brutality. A continent-wide survey done in 2022 shows very low trust in the police and a prevailing perception of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/AD512-PAP9-Citizens-report-widespread-predation-by-African-police-forces-Afrobarometer-dispatch-20march22.pdf#page=2">the police as the most corrupt</a> among key institutions.</p>
<p>Low public trust in police poses a serious problem for the most central state institution tasked with upholding law and order. Trust influences both <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2015.1077837?casa_token=lT9eMx7fNTYAAAAA%3AdNayrFpApabWcaVi3iJ3A2fZIMWBCkM9M1g6gSNg4shQZxGJbShjWG0N4scdiQzDz_btx94CIdGl">police effectiveness</a> and the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1098611103258959?casa_token=Tb5FMa0zv0UAAAAA:_aXSde5HYiY68ovVq8SzIPufP7zx8D-nHE4RB39LCVXF0E7mcU0OhKssPhFTXYIQ4P5rk2u8Nl5h">perception of safety</a> among the public.</p>
<p>We are scholars with a longstanding research engagement with Kenya who <a href="https://www.katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=N99-1598_1">study</a> the <a href="https://www.katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=N7-1153">role of the police</a> from the perspective of conflict research and political science. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2023.2239430">study</a>, we set out to analyse citizens’ trust in the police in Kenya. </p>
<p>We analysed data from four national surveys conducted in the country between 2011 and 2019. In each survey, respondents were asked a number of questions, including how much they trusted the police. <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/AD552-Kenyans-cite-criminal-activity-and-corruption-among-police-failings-Afrobarometer-16sept22-1.pdf#page=2">These surveys found</a> that Kenyans had limited trust in the police. </p>
<p>Trust, as we study it, is an individually held belief that a certain actor can be relied on. It is closely related to perceptions about fairness and legitimacy. We argue that individuals who have witnessed or experienced unfair treatment by the police are more likely to mistrust them. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2023.2239430">study</a> found that urban and rural residents in Kenya perceived the police differently. Those in cities and urban centres had lower trust in the police than the rural population. The findings matter because Kenya is rapidly urbanising, and the policing challenges we describe will grow with the expansion of urban centres.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">reform processes</a> intended to improve legitimacy and effectiveness of Kenyan policing will be more likely to succeed if there is adequate understanding of the contexts in which the police operate, and how environments shape citizens’ perceptions of the police.</p>
<h2>Understanding the differences in trust</h2>
<p>Over several years, we have conducted interviews with local residents, the police, experts and civil society actors in Kenya. Based on our research, we argue that three major dynamics help explain the urban-rural divide in police trust. </p>
<p>Firstly, the police face <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?hl=sv&lr=&id=HXEdAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=urban+policing+cities+challenges+&ots=g1cHUCy00Q&sig=EPfpfoaKqXJ3XYEwIyrVmY7BYAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=urban%20policing%20cities%20challenges&f=false">different security challenges</a> in urban and rural settings. Urban environments are generally more challenging than rural contexts because:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>police-citizen interactions are more frequent and visible to the public in cities</p></li>
<li><p>many different groups and interests are present in cities.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Secondly, police have been involved in <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-killings-point-to-systemic-rot-and-a-failed-justice-system-193468">extrajudicial killings</a> in urban settings. These have primarily affected poor, young men in low-income and densely populated settlements. An estimated <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2023/07/kenya_country_brief_final_en.pdf#page=4">50%</a> of Kenya’s urban population will be residing in slums, as defined by UN Habitat’s <a href="https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/06/wcr_2022.pdf#page=18">World Cities Report</a>, by 2030. It is in these types of settlements that police have become <a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">notorious</a> for arbitrary arrests and use of excessive force. </p>
<p>This behaviour has negative spillover effects on the urban population and makes citizens in urban areas more likely to form negative views of the police.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/many-kenyans-have-embraced-vigilante-cops-an-ineffective-police-force-is-to-blame-196449">Many Kenyans have embraced vigilante cops – an ineffective police force is to blame</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Third, the dynamics in rural settings are different from those in urban areas. In many rural locations, police are spread thin. They cover large jurisdictions and geographical distances, influencing whether and how citizens can be served. Although around 70% of Kenya’s population lives in rural areas, such areas are usually served by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43905012">few and often under-resourced police officers</a>. A <a href="https://icj-kenya.org/news/executive-summary-report-of-the-national-taskforce-on-police-reforms/">task force</a> reviewing ongoing police reforms recently concluded that police vehicles in rural areas don’t always have enough fuel to cover the area under jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Due to limited interactions with the police, Kenyans in rural areas are less likely to see the police as a relevant actor, for good and for bad, and are more likely to turn to other security providers. These include <a href="https://crimeresearch.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Policing-the-Periphery-Opportunities-and-Challenges-of-Kenya-Police-Reserves-.pdf#page=17">community-based militias and vigilante groups</a>.</p>
<h2>Implications for police reforms</h2>
<p>In Kenya, law enforcement remains influenced by colonial legacies and extended periods of authoritarian rule. In colonial times, the police were used to <a href="https://theconversation.com/humiliation-and-violence-in-kenyas-colonial-days-when-old-men-were-called-boy-and-africans-were-publicly-beaten-218261">repress and control Kenyans</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these legacies is necessary for democratic consolidation. </p>
<p>Kenya has initiated <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">police reform</a> with the purpose of building a more legitimate and effective police force. A major reform process began in 2009, codified into the <a href="https://www.klrc.go.ke/index.php/constitution-of-kenya/158-chapter-fourteen-national-security/part-4-the-national-police-service/412-243-establishment-of-the-national-police-service">2010 constitution</a> and new <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalPoliceService(Amendment)ActNo11of2014.pdf">police legislation in 2011</a>. These processes established national policies for community policing and an independent agency to improve civilian oversight. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gove.12672?casa_token=KDZIMZZyBYsAAAAA%3AjZS68xeaqMZ6ZfXIsb3Jr0XpmuJj4_YCLEn9t8AhJCKTatR7fEWNnK_ARbhsXP7aQQ-TuutQTj5H6h8">progress has been limited</a>. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/gove.12672">Corruption</a> within the Kenyan police remains widespread and normalised. Impunity remains high. Despite an emphasis on community policing, the establishment of such structures has been <a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/reader/68f17c94582e95f55d6faac47761d73251f89120">uneven</a>, and public awareness remains low.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-tried-to-reform-its-police-force-but-its-left-gaps-for-abuse-176044">Kenya has tried to reform its police force, but it's left gaps for abuse</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The need to improve police-community relations is underlined by frequent transgressions of human rights and police brutality, including over 100 <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2023-09-14-imlu-128-cases-of-extrajudicial-killings-recorded-in-11-months/">extrajudicial killings</a> documented in the last year.</p>
<p>Therefore, improving security provisions and reducing misconduct in informal settlements in urban areas should be a key priority. </p>
<p>Better oversight to address impunity would help address issues of trust, but the police also need sufficient resources to carry out policing tasks. Investing more in community policing structures – intended to serve as a link between communities and the police – could also help improve relationships and build trust.</p>
<p>Much of Kenya’s police reform is premised on addressing the most serious problems facing urban areas. While it’s important to address issues of insecurity here, reform processes must not lose sight of priorities in rural areas, where the majority of the population still reside.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristine Höglund receives funding from the Swedish Research Council and the Formas research council for sustainable development.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Elfversson receives funding from the Swedish Research Council and the Formas research council for sustainable development.</span></em></p>Due to limited interactions with the police, Kenyans in rural areas are less likely to see the police as relevant actors.Kristine Höglund, Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala UniversityEmma Elfversson, Associate professor, Uppsala UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205202024-01-11T13:24:37Z2024-01-11T13:24:37ZSellout! How political corruption shaped an American insult<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568059/original/file-20240105-15-op8mrg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C55%2C4034%2C2967&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Alf Bruseth, 'Politician Coin Bank' (1938).</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nga.gov/collection/art-object-page.20772.html"> Index of American Design</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you follow politics, sports, Hollywood or the arts, you’ve no doubt heard the insult “sellout” thrown around to describe someone perceived to have betrayed a core principle or shared value in their pursuit of personal gain. </p>
<p>The term has recently been hurled at a range of well-known targets: Donald Trump’s former chief of staff Mark Meadows for <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/deadline-white-house/watch/-hail-mary-attempt-fails-appeals-court-rules-mark-meadows-cannot-move-case-out-of-georgia-200487493763">cooperating with</a> a special counsel investigating election fraud in 2020; Kim Kardashian for advertising <a href="https://time.com/4314413/modern-feminism-is-selling-out/">her personal brands</a> as a form of women’s empowerment; even former NFL great Deion Sanders, for leaving Jackson State, a historically Black university, <a href="https://theconversation.com/calling-deion-sanders-a-sellout-ignores-the-growing-role-of-clout-chasing-in-college-sports-196792">to coach</a> at the University of Colorado.</p>
<p>Most people, I find, are familiar with this accusation. But few people really know the full story of “selling out” – when and where the term originated, how it spread across so many different sectors of American culture, and just why this insult hurts so much. These are the questions I set out to answer in the book I’m currently writing, tentatively titled “Sellouts! The Story of an American Insult.” </p>
<p>Through my research, I found that the idea of selling out originates with American politics — and more precisely, with the scandals of the Gilded Age.</p>
<h2>Gilded Age origins</h2>
<p>This era, which gets its name from Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner’s 1873 satirical novel “<a href="https://www.loa.org/books/178-the-gilded-age-amp-later-novels/">The Gilded Age: A Tale of To-day</a>,” spans roughly from the 1870s to the 1900s. These <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25144440">decades saw the rise</a> of industrial capitalism in the United States: people moving to cities, technologies transforming industries like the railroads, growing unrest and activism by workers, and crises erupting from an economy built around banks, stocks and corporations.</p>
<p>Until this time, the phrase “selling out” had largely <a href="https://www.oed.com/dictionary/sell_v?tab=phrasal_verbs#23525421">been used to describe</a> the sale of one’s stock or holdings – cattle, steel, grain, real estate. But <a href="https://www.oed.com/dictionary/sell_n2?tab=meaning_and_use#23522487">by the 1870s</a>, the term had quickly gained a new meaning as an insult for public figures — especially politicians — who had compromised their morals, and the needs of the community, in pursuit of illicit personal gain.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Cartoon of obese men representing various industries looming over senators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568056/original/file-20240105-19-bjst1t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘The Bosses of the Senate’ by Joseph Keppler, published in the Jan. 23, 1889, issue of Puck.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Bosses_of_the_Senate_by_Joseph_Keppler.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of course, political scandals were hardly a novelty of the 1870s. What changed in the Gilded Age, <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/20317/reviews/21375/burg-summers-gilded-age-or-hazard-new-functions">historians suggest</a>, was not the frequency or severity of unethical behavior by politicians, but rather the public’s awareness of the corruption plaguing the U.S. political system. </p>
<h2>The Tweed Ring</h2>
<p>Party politics has always involved graft: skimming off the top of budgets, directing contracts to favored firms, and securing offices for friends. But <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2023/07/02/george-santos-william-boss-tweed-tammany-hall/">William Tweed, widely known as “Boss Tweed,”</a> took this corruption to new heights.</p>
<p>In the 1860s, Tweed ran New York’s Democratic Party. His circle of influence extended to dozens of city and state offices. The Tweed Ring would provide someone with a job, and then the beneficiary would provide the ring with a kickback.</p>
<p>Whenever contracts were issued for services like carpentry, the ring inflated costs and skimmed off the extra — at first, adding a mere 10%, but later exaggerating these expenses wildly. One carpeting bill from a Tweed contractor ran to US$565,731, a cost high enough for a carpet in New York City to get “<a href="https://kennethackerman.com/books/boss-tweed/">halfway to Albany</a>.” </p>
<p>The ring would also buy up large chunks of city real estate, especially plots they knew were about to receive development projects. Estimates on the total wealth they siphoned through such graft <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Boss_Tweed/ipAxruFk54AC?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover">range from</a> $20 million to a staggering $200 million – or around $5 billion in 2024, when adjusted for inflation.</p>
<p>Tweed’s cronies also fixed elections with a boldness that’s unthinkable today; one drunken accomplice <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Tiger-Rise-Fall-Tammany-Hall/dp/020162463X">confessed he had voted</a> at least 28 times on Election Day.</p>
<p>In 1870, The New York Times began an unprecedented journalistic exposé of Tweed and his ring. Their editorials used the phrase “selling out” to capture how city and state politics were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1870/11/26/archives/the-tammany-ring-and-its-agents.html">manipulated by a corrupt few</a> who lined their pockets and kept a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1871/10/16/archives/the-democratic-circus.html">chokehold on elections</a>. </p>
<p>The Times also attacked other newspapers, like the New York World, which took large “advertising revenues” from Tweed, as evidence that these papers would “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1870/11/23/archives/the-mission-of-the-democratic-party.html">sell out to the highest bidder</a>.” In a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/American_Journalism/eatZAAAAMAAJ?hl=en">major coup</a>, the Times eventually published complete records of the city’s finances, proving the ring’s corruption and landing Tweed inside the Ludlow Street Jail. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Cartoon of men standing in a circle pointing their fingers." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568057/original/file-20240105-27-m5onvj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thomas Nast’s cartoons in Harper’s transformed the public’s perception of William ‘Boss’ Tweed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/55200970-dc40-0130-375d-58d385a7bbd0">New York Public Library Digital Collections</a></span>
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<p>The Times’ crusade against Tweed pioneered a new, activist form of journalism, while also helping establish “selling out” as a recognizable idea in American life. </p>
<p>Later journalists, known as muckrakers, would launch their own famous investigations, such as Lincoln Steffens’ writing on <a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822043023084&seq=7">political machines</a> in other U.S. cities, David Graham Philips’ coverage of the <a href="https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100646108">widespread misdeeds</a> of U.S. senators, and Ida Tarbell’s exposure of Standard Oil’s <a href="https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/004490918">illicit business practices</a>.</p>
<p>All used the newly popularized phrase “selling out” to describe the corruption of a democratic society. The “corrupt government of Illinois sold out its people to its own grafters,” <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Struggle_for_Self_government/EYYmAAAAMAAJ?hl=en">wrote Steffens</a>, whereas “the organized grafters of Missouri, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island sold, or are selling, out their States to bigger grafters outside.” </p>
<h2>A contested concept</h2>
<p>Over the next century, the idea of selling out spread from politics to numerous other corners of American culture: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/pmla/article/abs/on-the-literary-history-of-selling-out-craft-identity-and-commercial-recognition/2AA296CB7FEA8768D1F944CF88F7DBDB">Novelists chastised peers</a> who went to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01956051.1984.10661963">write for Hollywood</a> as sellouts, while <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/810368/summary">Black intellectuals</a> debated what, if anything, Black elected officials had to do to be seen as <a href="https://hls.harvard.edu/bibliography/sellout-the-politics-of-racial-betrayal/">“authentic” racial representatives</a> and not sellouts. </p>
<p>For all its many uses in American culture, however, selling out remains a contested concept. For virtually any action that some people view as a betrayal, others will see as a rational choice. </p>
<p>Consider Bob Johnson, co-founder of Black Entertainment Television, who became the first Black billionaire when <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Billion_Dollar_BET/aF_LAgAAQBAJ?hl=en">he sold the cable channel</a> to Viacom in 2001. Some applauded his historic sale, but <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2000/11/04/but-has-the-network-sold-a-bit-of-its-soul/2c7ef34b-7c04-451b-8239-74f34a2c998b/">others accused</a> Johnson of “selling out” this unique platform for Black voices. </p>
<p>Trump supporters may similarly see Meadows as a traitor — a sellout who abandoned his party’s leader to save his own skin. But Democrats may see him as a Republican who has chosen the values of the country over protecting his party’s standard-bearer. Each side follows its own logic.</p>
<p>Selling out, then, is not always a clear-cut transgression. When a group feels like one of its own has betrayed some shared values, there are often meaningful questions to be asked about what that group’s values ought to be in the first place.</p>
<p>Some critics have <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/ibram-x-kendi-hasan-minhaj-and-the-question-of-selling-out">wondered whether</a> selling out is an <a href="https://mumbrella.com.au/is-selling-out-no-longer-a-concept-for-gen-z-356761">obsolete notion</a> in <a href="https://lithiumagazine.com/2020/05/22/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-sell-out-in-2020/">an age when</a> so many people aspire to be an influencer or entrepreneur. But as long as this term gets used to scold public figures like Meadows, it means Americans still believe some form of loyalty — to a community or a shared principle — matters more than personal gain.</p>
<p>But what does it say that so many Americans share the concern that success and integrity are in conflict, as if one comes at the expense of the other? Is it an increasingly unavoidable moral contradiction in a capitalist society?</p>
<p>“Selling out” evokes a widespread fear that anyone who pursues success will corrupt both their morality and their community. Some people – say, billionaires in their private jets – can perhaps suppress this fear more easily than others. But everyone knows its name.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Afflerbach does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why do so many Americans share the concern that success and integrity are in conflict, as if one comes at the expense of the other?Ian Afflerbach, Associate Professor of American Literature, University of North GeorgiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196172023-12-26T20:29:23Z2023-12-26T20:29:23ZNZ report card 2023: near the top of the class in some areas, room for improvement elsewhere<p>End-of-year results aren’t only for school and university students. Countries, too, can be measured for their progress – or lack of it – across numerous categories and subject areas. </p>
<p>This report card provides a snapshot of how New Zealand has fared in 2023. Given the change of government, it will be a useful benchmark for future progress reports. (Somewhat appropriately, the coalition seems keen on standardised testing in education.)</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that this exercise is for fun and debate. International and domestic indices and rankings should be read with a degree of caution – measurements, metrics and numbers from 2023 tell us only so much. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it’s still possible to trace the nation’s ups and downs. As the year draws to an end, we can use these statistics and rankings to decide whether New Zealand really is the best country in the world – or whether we need to make some additional new year’s resolutions.</p>
<h2>International pass marks</h2>
<p>Overall, the country held its own internationally when it came to democratic values, freedoms and standards. But there was a little slippage.</p>
<p>Despite falling a spot, Transparency International ranked New Zealand <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022">second-equal</a> (next to Finland) for being relatively corruption-free. </p>
<p>In the Global Peace Index, New Zealand dropped two places, now <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/">fourth-best</a> for safety and security, low domestic and international conflict, and degree of militarisation.</p>
<p>The country held its ground in two categories. Freedom House underlined New Zealand’s near-perfect score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">99 out of 100</a> for political and civil liberties – but three Scandinavian countries scored a perfect 100. The <a href="https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/">Global Gender Gap Report</a> recorded New Zealand as steady, the fourth-most-gender-equal country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-winston-peters-right-to-call-state-funded-journalism-bribery-or-is-there-a-bigger-threat-to-democracy-218782">Is Winston Peters right to call state-funded journalism ‘bribery’ – or is there a bigger threat to democracy?</a>
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<p>Supplementary work by the United Nations Development Programme shows New Zealand making impressive strides in breaking down <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-06/gsni202302pdf_0.pdf">gender bias</a>.</p>
<p>The Index for Economic Freedom, which covers everything from property rights to financial freedom, again placed New Zealand <a href="https://www.heritage.org/index/">fifth</a>, but our grade average is falling. We also dropped a place in the World Justice Project’s <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/">Rule of Law Index</a> to eighth.</p>
<p>New Zealanders are about as happy as they were last year, still the tenth-most-cheery nation, according to the <a href="https://worldhappiness.report/">World Happiness Report</a>.</p>
<p>The Human Development Index did not report this year (New Zealand was 13th in 2022). But the <a href="https://www.prosperity.com/rankings">Legatum Prosperity Index</a>, another broad measure covering everything from social capital to living conditions, put New Zealand tenth overall – reflecting a slow decline from seventh in 2011.</p>
<p>The Economist’s <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-liveability-index-2023/">Global Liveability Index</a> has Auckland at equal tenth, with Wellington racing up the charts to 23rd. (Hamilton, my home, is yet to register.)</p>
<p>While New Zealand registered a gradual slide in the Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/index">Press Freedom Index</a>, at 13th position it still ranks highly by comparison with other nations.</p>
<h2>Could do better</h2>
<p>New Zealand has seen some progress around assessment of terror risk. While the national terror threat level has remained at “<a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/counter-terrorism#:%7E:text=New%2520Zealand's%2520current%2520national%2520terrorism,Zealanders%2520both%2520here%2520and%2520overseas.">low</a>”, the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">Global Terrorism Index</a> ranked the country 46th – lower than the US, UK and Russia, but higher than Australia at 69th.</p>
<p>The country’s previous drop to 31st in the <a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-ranking/">Global Competitiveness Report</a> has stabilised, staying the same in 2023. </p>
<p>On the <a href="https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/Home">Global Innovation Index</a>, we came in 27th out of 132 economies – three spots worse than last year. <a href="https://kof.ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/media/press-releases/2022/12/globalisation-index.html#:%7E:text=The%2520KOF%2520Globalisation%2520Index%2520measures,a%2520long%2520period%2520of%2520time.">The Globalisation Index</a>, which looks at economic, social and political contexts, ranks New Zealand only 42nd.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-the-climate-summits-first-health-day-points-to-what-needs-to-change-in-nz-218809">COP28: the climate summit’s first Health Day points to what needs to change in NZ</a>
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<p>But the country’s response to climate change is still considered “highly insufficient” by the <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/">Climate Action Tracker</a>, which measures progress on meeting agreed global warming targets. The <a href="https://ccpi.org/">Climate Change Performance Index</a> is a little more generous, pegging New Zealand at 34th, still down one spot on last year.</p>
<p>New Zealand’s overseas development assistance – low as a percentage of GDP compared to other <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm">OECD countries</a> – had mixed reviews. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://odi.org/en/insights/principled-aid-index-2023-in-a-weaponised-world-smart-development-power-is-not-dead/">Principled Aid Index</a> – which looks at the purposes of aid for global co-operation, public spiritedness and addressing critical development goals – ranks New Zealand a lowly 22 out of 29. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/cdi#/">Commitment to Development Index</a>, which measures aid as well as other policies (from health to trade) of 40 of the world’s most powerful countries, has New Zealand in 19th place.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nicola-willis-warns-of-fiscal-snakes-and-snails-her-first-mini-budget-will-be-a-test-of-nzs-no-surprises-finance-rules-218920">Nicola Willis warns of fiscal ‘snakes and snails’ – her first mini-budget will be a test of NZ’s no-surprises finance rules</a>
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<h2>Decent economic grades</h2>
<p>The economic numbers at home still tell a generally encouraging story:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>unemployment <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/unemployment-rate/">remains low at 3.9%</a>, still below the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/unemployment-rates-oecd-updated-november-2023.htm#:%7E:text=14%2520Nov%25202023%2520%252D%2520The%2520OECD,Figure%25202%2520and%2520Table%25201">OECD average of 4.8%.</a></p></li>
<li><p>median weekly earnings from wages and salaries <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/income-growth-for-wage-and-salary-earners-remains-strong/">continued to rise</a>, by NZ$84 (7.1%) to $1,273 in the year to June</p></li>
<li><p>inflation is rising, but the rate is slowing, <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/annual-inflation-at-5-6-percent/#:%7E:text=New%2520Zealand's%2520consumers%2520price%2520index,to%2520the%2520June%25202023%2520quarter.">falling to 5.6%</a> in the 12 months to September</p></li>
<li><p>and good or bad news according to one’s perspective, annual house price growth appears to be slowly recovering, with the <a href="https://www.qv.co.nz/price-index/">average price now $907,387</a> – still considerably down from the peak at the turn of 2022.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It’s worth noting, too, that record net migration gain is boosting economic measurements. In the year to October 2023, 245,600 people arrived, with 116,700 departing, for an <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/international-migration-october-2023/">annual net gain</a> of 128,900 people.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-hopes-private-investors-will-fund-social-services-the-evidence-isnt-so-optimistic-218512">The government hopes private investors will fund social services – the evidence isn't so optimistic</a>
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<h2>Room for social improvement</h2>
<p>In the year to June, <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2023/10/new-zealand-s-suicide-rate-increases-for-first-time-in-years.html">recorded suicides increased</a> to 565, or 10.6 people per 100,000. While an increase from 10.2 in 2022, this is still lower than the average rate over the past 14 years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/statistics/quarterly_prison_statistics/prison_stats_september_2023">Incarceration rates</a> began to rise again, climbing to 8,893 by the end of September, moving back towards the 10,000 figure from 2020.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/maori-suicide-rates-remain-too-high-involving-whanau-more-in-coronial-inquiries-should-be-a-priority-217254">Māori suicide rates remain too high – involving whānau more in coronial inquiries should be a priority</a>
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<p>Child poverty appears to be <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/child-poverty-statistics-show-no-annual-change-in-the-year-ended-june-2022/">stabilising</a>, with some reports suggesting improvements in longer-term trends. While commendable, this needs to be seen in perspective: one in ten children still live in households experiencing material hardship.</p>
<p>The stock of <a href="https://www.hud.govt.nz/stats-and-insights/the-government-housing-dashboard/public-homes/">public housing</a> continues to increase. As of October, there were 80,211 public houses, an increase of 3,940 from June 2022.</p>
<p>In short, New Zealand retains some bragging rights in important areas and is making modest progress in others, but that’s far from the whole picture. The final verdict has to be: a satisfactory to good effort, but considerable room for improvement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand was mostly stable in key international rankings and domestic socio-economic measures. But there are signs of slippage in some areas and not enough progress in others.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176142023-12-19T13:17:06Z2023-12-19T13:17:06ZGuatemala’s anti-corruption leader-to-be could be prevented from taking office, deepening migration concerns for US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/566364/original/file-20231218-17-s6fipw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C416%2C4154%2C2319&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guatemala's President-elect Bernardo Arévalo waves to supporters. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/guatemalas-president-elect-bernardo-arevalo-waves-to-news-photo/1735484556">Orlando Estrada/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Guatemala is in the <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/guatemala-prosecutors-claim-presidential-election-203740355.html">midst of a democratic crisis</a> so severe that it may prevent the new president from taking office, as planned, on Jan. 14, 2024.</p>
<p>On Dec. 8, 2023, prosecutors and the Guatemalan Congress <a href="https://twitter.com/lahoragt/status/1733196649005035932?s=20">called for the nullification</a> of the election results. A few weeks earlier, the attorney general’s office in Guatemala <a href="https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-bernardo-arevalo-f7a7537e15e7f8692de8dd62ee9b666b">tried to remove</a> President-elect Bernardo Arévalo’s immunity from prosecution. The attorney general alleged that the center-left politician, who won the election on an anti-corruption ticket, made posts on social media in 2022 that encouraged students to occupy the country’s public university. In an unprecedented attempt to prevent him from assuming power, officials accused Arévalo of complicity in the takeover of the university, illicit association and damaging the country’s cultural heritage.</p>
<p>During the presidential election in September, the Public Ministry <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/guatemalan-authorities-raid-electoral-facilities-open-boxes-of-votes">raided electoral offices</a>. These actions “appear to be designed to overturn the will of the electorate and erode the democratic process,” <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/about/speech_secretary_general.asp?sCodigo=23-0037">concluded</a> the Organization of American States, a group that represents 35 countries in the region and promotes human rights, fair elections, security and economic development. </p>
<p>These developments follow a democratic backslide in Guatemala that has been going on since 2019, when the government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46789931">expelled an anti-corruption commission</a> backed by the United Nations. </p>
<p>Ordinary Guatemalans, meanwhile, are fed up with rampant corruption and electoral interference. On Oct. 2, 2023, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-protest-bernardo-arevalo-07025036d506ec51be1d7426812be1ad">thousands of protesters</a> filled the streets of Guatemala City and blockaded more than 100 roads and highways to demand respect for the election. The demonstrators represented a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/10/1204800590/after-8-days-of-peaceful-protests-in-guatemala-demonstrations-turn-violent">broad cross-section</a> of urban and rural society, including both Maya and non-Indigenous communities.</p>
<p>As a professor of history who studies <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=y9TnHZkAAAAJ&hl=en">social movements in Latin America</a>, I see the current climate of protest as part of a long history of instability and political mobilization in Guatemala. As in the past, these anti-democratic actions will likely lead more Guatemalans to migrate to the United States.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Crowd of protesters waving Guatemala flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563472/original/file-20231204-29-fqy8k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Protesters demand the attorney general’s resignation on Oct. 9, 2023, in Guatemala City.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-demonstrate-to-demand-the-resignation-of-attorney-news-photo/1715813995">Johan Ordonez/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Civil war and kleptocracy</h2>
<p>Guatemala’s recent past is marked by violent political unrest and activism.</p>
<p>Between 1960 and 1996, the country endured a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Unfinished_Conquest/-ojiw8UP-X0C?hl=en&gbpv=1">bloody armed conflict</a> between leftist insurgents and the army. About <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Terror_in_the_Land_of_the_Holy_Spirit/BXWwm7jo-hEC?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=200,000">200,000 Guatemalans were killed</a> – most of them <a href="https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CEHreport-english.pdf">from the Indigenous Maya population</a>. </p>
<p>The armed confrontation, which was rooted in <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3decc9724.html">land conflicts</a> and opposition to the <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Battle_For_Guatemala/gwlQDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=popular+movement+in+guatemala+during+the+civil+war&printsec=frontcover">military dictatorship</a>, led to <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Guatemala_la_infinita_historia_de_las_re/I0MjEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover">mass mobilization</a> in favor of fair working conditions and democratic rule.</p>
<p>Guatemala’s democracy in the post-1996 years was marked by <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/securing-the-city">neoliberal policies</a> that favored free market economics and privatization. It also saw the rise of a cadre of careerist politicians who, in the words of the jailed journalist <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/world/americas/jose-ruben-zamora-journalist-guatemala.html">Rubén Zamora</a>, created a “<a href="https://www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/el-hombre-que-le-susurra-al-poder-y-viceversa">kleptocracy</a>.” This system hinged on corrupt <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2015/05/19/repudiating-corruption-guatemala-revolution-or-neoliberal-outrage">political dealings</a>, nurtured <a href="https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Crimen-y-Violencia-GT-ENG-8.9.pdf">criminal activity</a> and perpetuated <a href="https://apnews.com/article/0b7f28a8ab5645e58fb2d708d27e3adf">high poverty levels</a>.</p>
<p>Guatemalans have taken an active – perhaps even activist – posture toward the kleptocracy. </p>
<p>In 2015, they <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/9/3/people-power-and-the-guatemalan-spring">took to the streets en masse</a> to protest government corruption. Their mobilization bolstered the actions of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/guatemala-president-otto-perez-molina-cicig-corruption-investigation">International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala</a>, or CICIG, a U.N.-backed body tasked with investigating and prosecuting crime and strengthening Guatemala’s judicial system. </p>
<p>The commission’s probe led to the prosecution of Guatemalan officials for corruption, including former President <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-president-to-prison-otto-perez-molina-and-a-day-for-hope-in-guatemala">Otto Pérez Molina</a> and former Vice President <a href="https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/guatemala-president-implicated-in-customs-fraud-scandal/">Roxana Baldetti</a>. However, the government expelled CICIG in 2019. In response, the Guatemalan public accused political elites, high-ranking bureaucrats and business leaders of forming a “<a href="https://nomada.gt/pais/la-corrupcion-no-es-normal/el-pacto-de-corruptos-2-0-resumido-en-5-puntos/">pact of the corrupt</a>” to thwart the fight against corruption.</p>
<h2>Anti-corruption candidate’s surprising win</h2>
<p>Guatemala’s 2023 general elections were held amid this fragile political climate. </p>
<p>In the weeks leading up to election day, the constitutional court, on what <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/24/americas/guatemala-elections-president-corruption-intl-latam/index.html">critics say</a> were questionable grounds, disqualified two rising political outsiders: <a href="https://nacla.org/thelma-cabrera-we-are-fighting-plurinational-state-and-well-being-peoples">Thelma Cabrera</a>, an Indigenous leftist candidate, and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-elections-carlos-pineda-df6ee50218f10b5fc8398a7531ea2d39">Carlos Pineda</a>, a conservative businessman and populist who gained a large following on social media. </p>
<p>This judicial meddling in the electoral process, however, opened the way for another political outsider, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/primavera-democratica-conversation-president-elect-bernardo-arevalo-guatemala">Bernardo Arévalo</a> of the left-of-center <a href="https://arevalopresidente.com/">Seed Movement party</a>. An increasing number of Guatemalans, including young voters, saw Arévalo and his <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/137QmBdLM70p_5ZhTsAYffbin--URNfcZ/view">anti-corruption platform</a> as an alternative to establishment candidates such as former first lady <a href="https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-sandra-torres-74ce43addf2ec3f36f356fd034546cc0">Sandra Torres</a>, who led most polls in the weeks before the election.</p>
<p>The election results <a href="https://elfaro.net/es/202307/columnas/26958/la-primera-vuelta-en-guatemala-marco-record-en-latinoamerica">sent shock waves</a> through the political system. Arévalo received 11.8% of the general vote, second only to Torres’ 15.9%. Because no candidate received a majority, a runoff election was held on Aug. 20. Arévalo won handily with <a href="https://segundaeleccion.trep.gt/#!/tc1/ENT">58% of the vote</a> compared with Torres’ 37%. </p>
<p>Arévalo is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemalas-unlikely-presidential-victor-follows-fathers-footsteps-2023-08-21/">not a political neophyte</a>. He has served as a diplomat and currently occupies a seat in Congress. He is also the son of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/08/obituaries/juan-jose-arevalo-is-dead-at-86-guatemala-president-in-late-40-s.html">Juan José Arévalo</a>, the country’s first democratically elected president.</p>
<h2>Guatemalans take to streets</h2>
<p>After the election, political elites, including members of Torres’ National Unity of Hope party and President Alejandro Giammattei’s Vamos party, alleged – <a href="https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2023/07/10/corte-suprema-guatemala-tribunal-electoral-resultados-elecciones-presidenciales-orix/">incorrectly</a>, it turned out – that the electoral software <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-07-02/la-sala-constitucional-de-guatemala-suspende-la-oficializacion-de-los-resultados-electorales-y-ordena-depurarlos.html">had favored Arévalo’s candidacy</a>. They attempted to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/guatemala-election-court-president-35acfbf1a26f905c99f4e05b4578c288">stop the results</a> from being made official.</p>
<p>More consequently, the Public Ministry, led by Attorney General Consuelo Porras, accused Arévalo’s party of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/guatemala-attorney-general-determined-block-arevalo-office-sources-2023-10-19/">using false signatures</a> during its registration process. It contended that up to 100 out of the 25,000 signatures required for registration were falsified. On July 21, one month before the runoff election, Public Ministry officials <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/21/guatemala-police-raid-office-of-semilla-presidential-candidate">raided the Seed Movement’s headquarters</a> and asked a judge to suspend the party. </p>
<p>Despite Arévalo’s resounding victory on Aug. 20, the Public Ministry continued to try to suspend his party. On Sept. 29, it took the unprecedented action of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/guatemalan-authorities-raid-electoral-facilities-open-boxes-of-votes">raiding the offices of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal</a>, the highest electoral authority.</p>
<p>Disgusted by this interference in the electoral process and fearful over the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/13/1212635508/guatemala-president-elect-bernardo-arevalo-interview">prospect of a coup</a>, Guatemalans took to the streets. The protests that began on Oct. 2 <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/10/10/1204800590/after-8-days-of-peaceful-protests-in-guatemala-demonstrations-turn-violent">brought the country to a standstill</a> for more than 10 days and united the urban and rural population.</p>
<p>Echoing a long-standing <a href="https://www.unmpress.com/9780826348661/for-every-indio-who-falls/">history of Indigenous activism</a> in Guatemala, prominent Indigenous groups such as the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=222887414099385">Peasant Committee for Development</a> and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/guatemalas-indigenous-leaders-take-to-the-street-in-nationwide-protests">48 Cantones of Totonicapán</a> played a vital role in the protests. Indigenous people, who make up nearly half of Guatemala’s population, face <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview">high poverty rates</a>, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/our-work/health-and-nutrition">poor access to health care</a> and environmental degradation of their lands caused by <a href="https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/extractive-industries-in-guatemala-historic-maya-resistance-movements/">mining and hydroelectric projects</a>. </p>
<p>For many Indigenous voters, the election interference highlighted the relationship between government corruption and their socioeconomic inequality. The central role of Indigenous communities in the protests signaled a new grassroots movement with the potential of replicating the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X8000700212">multiracial and multiclass coalitions</a> that had emerged during the armed conflict in the 1970s.</p>
<h2>Key driver of migration</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/19/report-on-the-u-s-strategy-for-addressing-the-root-causes-of-migration-in-central-america/">U.S. officials</a> and <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/migration#:%7E:text=Corruption%3A,migrate%20among%20victims%20of%20corruption.">agencies</a> report that political corruption in Guatemala is a <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/migration#:%7E:text=Corruption%3A,migrate%20among%20victims%20of%20corruption">root cause of migration</a>. In 2023, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended more than <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11151.pdf">200,000</a> Guatemalans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.</p>
<p>Guatemalans themselves understand all too well how kleptocracy reinforces the country’s social ills. They realize that democratic backsliding not only may prevent Arévalo from assuming the presidency, but it can also rob their communities of resources needed to <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/our-work/health-and-nutrition#:%7E:text=More%20than%20six%20million%20people,basic%20health%20and%20nutrition%20services.">strengthen health care</a>, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/our-work/education">improve education</a>, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview#:%7E:text=Poverty%20is%20estimated%20at%2055.2,at%2049%20percent%20of%20GDP">create jobs</a>, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/stories/guatemala-search-cases-child-malnutrition-are-hidden-pandemic">reduce malnutrition</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/hungry-desperate-climate-change-fuels-migration-crisis-guatemala-rcna2135">fight climate change</a>. Without these improvements, many will <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/lens/central-americans-migrate-united-states.html">continue to migrate</a>, despite the many perils of doing so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bonar Hernández Sandoval does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Anti-democratic actions and government corruption are key reasons many Guatemalans migrate to the US.Bonar Hernández Sandoval, Associate Professor of History, Iowa State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179412023-11-23T15:01:09Z2023-11-23T15:01:09ZSouth Africa’s immigration proposals are based on false claims and poor logic – experts<p>The South African government recently issued a long-awaited policy statement – called a <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-aaron-motsoaledi-release-white-paper-citizenship-immigration-and-refugee">White Paper</a> – outlining proposed changes to the country’s asylum and immigration system. More than 20 years after its first post-apartheid immigration legislation <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a130-980.pdf">in 1998</a>, immigration remains a <a href="https://www.iom.int/countries/south-africa#:%7E:text=South%20Africa%20is%20the%20preferred,and%20border%20management%20processes%3B%20rising">pressing concern</a>. Getting this policy right could help with South Africa’s economic recovery, increase regional prosperity, and heighten security for citizens and migrants alike.</p>
<p>A general election is <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/voter/voter-registration-campaign">due in 2024</a> and the issue is at the heart of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-africa-faces-growing-xenophobia-problem/a-67305882">political debate</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92114-9_5">Immigrant rights advocates and anti-immigrant activists</a> will welcome the far-reaching efforts to reform frameworks that currently work for none but a few <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/33573/">rent-seeking bureaucrats</a>. Most will embrace proposed initiatives to better train officials and reduce corruption but will agree on little else.</p>
<p>Human rights advocates will decry proposals to relocate the processing of asylum applications to the border and to narrow immigrants’ channels to permanent residency and citizenship. The stated imperative to “develop a well-coordinated strategy of tracking down illegal foreigners” will raise their hackles. Anti-immigrant activists and leaders will say the proposals <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/immigration-reforms-a-bandaid-on-bullet-wound--her">do not go far enough</a>. </p>
<p>Collectively we have <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=Hw4YkqoAAAAJ&hl=en">studied</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=932HsxAAAAAJ&hl=en">immigration policy and practice</a> in South Africa and elsewhere for almost 40 years. Based on this experience, we find that the White Paper does not provide an empirical foundation for effective, developmental policy reform.</p>
<p>Instead, it offers vague proposals to address problems that are less about immigration than bureaucratic and political mismanagement. It provides a smokescreen to hide government faults. Perhaps it’s intended to distract voters in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/electoral-commission-south-africa-launches-2024-national-and-provincial-elections-24-oct">2024 elections</a> from the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview">increasing inequalities and socio-economic challenges</a> in South Africa. </p>
<h2>False claims and lapses of logic</h2>
<p>What is most unsettling about the paper is how the government invents its own social reality, and then offers vague and poorly considered proposals to solve nonexistent problems.</p>
<p>Case in point: the document states that 150,997 people in South Africa have been granted citizenship by naturalisation (presumably since the 2002 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/immigration-act">Immigration Act</a>). This number is used to justify radically narrowing pathways to citizenship. Yet, this figure represents less than 0.2% of the country’s population of <a href="https://census.statssa.gov.za/#/">62 million</a>.</p>
<p>The suggestion that citizenship is easily accessed – especially through the asylum process – is bizarre. This could only happen if asylum cases were effectively processed. <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/10/south-africa-failing-asylum-system-is-exacerbating-xenophobia/#:%7E:text=Despite%20its%20strong%20legal%20and,in%20Limbo%3A%20Rights%20of%20Asylum">They are not</a>. </p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a130-980.pdf">Refugees Act was passed in 1998</a>, only <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-53.pdf">about 300,000 people have been granted refugee status</a>. Many of these have since left South Africa or needed to reapply (so they may have been counted more than once). Of these 300,000, <a href="https://genderjustice.org.za/card/what-is-the-white-paper-on-international-migration/permanent-residency-and-citizenship/">only a small percentage</a> have become permanent residents, let alone citizens.</p>
<p>The White Paper reaches its tragi-comic apex by including a substantial list of legal cases that civil society has won against the Department of Home Affairs for <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/government/home-affairs-facing-more-than-r2bn-in-lawsuits/">not enforcing its own laws</a>. The cases are supposedly so numerous that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>there are several instances wherein the DHA has been slapped with court orders of which it has not been aware of the proceedings.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Rather than bring itself into line, the department wants the law altered to prevent these court challenges. And it argues that without legal reform, scapegoating and violence against immigrants will continue. </p>
<p>The White Paper reasons that excluding immigrants from South Africa will protect them by making Home Affairs more legally compliant, and South Africans more tolerant and welcoming.</p>
<p>The paper’s most remarkable self-delusion is in its estimates of between 5 million and 13 million immigrants. <a href="https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/spotchecks/are-there-15-million-undocumented-immigrants-living-south-africa-no-another">These estimates have been debunked</a>. The most reliable source of information on population data, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16716">Stats SA Census 2022</a>, indicates that the percentage of immigrants in the country has declined in the last decade. The numbers <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-2022-census-missed-31-of-people-big-data-could-help-in-future-215560">may not be perfect</a>, but the total number of foreign-born residents (including exiles, spouses, investors, and others) is <a href="https://census.statssa.gov.za/#/">close to 2.4 million</a> – somewhere around 4% of the total population of <a href="https://census.statssa.gov.za/#/">62 million</a>. The previous census (2010) put the figure at <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf">4.4% of a total population of 52 million</a>.</p>
<p>The White Paper suggests that strict laws are needed “to protect the rights” of South African citizens against “the harsh realities” that there are simply not enough resources for everyone. Yet the question is: what exactly do South Africans need to be protected from?</p>
<h2>Misplaced blame</h2>
<p>Immigration can be a challenge. But this does not explain why South Africans spend days without light, water, jobs, or hope of addressing <a href="https://www.eh-exhibition.uni-bayreuth.de/en/cs/South-Africa/index.html#:%7E:text=At%20the%20time%20of%20Mandela's,since%20the%20end%20of%20apartheid.">economic inequality</a>. Immigrants are not the reason why the <a href="https://theconversation.com/healthcare-in-south-africa-how-inequity-is-contributing-to-inefficiency-163753">health service is failing</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/johannesburg-fire-there-was-a-plan-to-fix-derelict-buildings-and-provide-good-accommodation-how-to-move-forward-213095">infrastracture is crumbling</a>. And immigrants are <a href="https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/sar-53.pdf">not responsible for most of the country’s crime</a>. </p>
<p>Missing too from the White Paper is a grounded discussion of how mobility and immigration schemes can meet skills gaps, promote investment, and create jobs across the region. Whether in the <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20190042">US</a> or <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/empirical-evidence-shows-migrants-in-south-africa-create-jobs">South Africa</a>, most careful research suggests immigration has positive economic effects. </p>
<p>Nowhere is there reference to the careful analysis of <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwean-migrants-south-africas-anti-immigrant-sentiments-are-hindering-policy-reform-209884">connections between immigration and development</a>, or research involving the <a href="https://www.labour.gov.za/DocumentCenter/Publications/Public%20Employment%20Services/National%20Labour%20Migration%20Policy%202021%202.pdf">Department of Labour</a>, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_635964.pdf">the International Labour Organisation</a>, <a href="https://www.solidaritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Restriction-and-Solidarity-in-New-South-Africa-migration-report.1.2014.pdf">unions</a>, and <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Hw4YkqoAAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&citation_for_view=Hw4YkqoAAAAJ:_axFR9aDTf0C">scholars</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, the White Paper offers an almost Soviet style programme where experts will designate entry requirements based on predictions of needed skills. The unpredictability of the regional economy, the high economic and human costs of state-managed labour systems, and the diplomatic benefits of a more regionally integrated labour market suggest another model is needed. </p>
<p>It is another illusion that a government that <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2022-11-02-shape-and-size-matter-our-governments-structure-not-just-its-capacity-hamstrings-development/">cannot identify and respond to citizens’ basic needs</a> – <a href="https://theconversation.com/water-cuts-in-south-africa-are-hurting-hospitals-and-clinics-theres-an-increased-risk-of-infections-199425">water</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-power-crisis-will-continue-until-2025-and-blackouts-will-take-5-years-to-phase-out-206343">electricity</a>, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/south-africa-broken-and-unequal-education-perpetuating-poverty-and-inequality/">education</a>, or <a href="https://www.hhrjournal.org/2018/11/contribution-of-the-health-ombud-to-accountability-the-life-esidimeni-tragedy-in-south-africa/">healthcare</a> – can somehow predict and carefully manage a regional migrant labour system. It is equally fantastical to think that it should.</p>
<h2>Imagined problems, impractical solutions</h2>
<p>The White Paper does not outline an approach to improve immigration policy. Its proposals are vague and the problems it seeks to solve are not about immigration. </p>
<p>This appears to be part of a trend: the poorly researched and largely unsubstantiated 2017 <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r-pr107-SXO-AdultProstitution-2017-Sum.pdf">South African Law Reform Commission’s Report on Adult Prostitution</a> similarly overlooked <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-24-sex-workers-and-moral-stigmatisation-where-criminal-law-has-no-place/">robust evidence-based research</a> in favour of “data” from religious NGOs in the US and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-05-29-analysis-what-happened-to-the-sex-work-report/">personal blogs</a>.</p>
<p>Both examples point to a government lacking capacity to empirically analyse the world and develop solutions to real problems. If not that, they suggest a government wilfully deceiving its citizenry: making immigrants the scapegoat for its own failings. Given the content of the White Paper, it is likely both.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Loren B Landau receives funding from the South African National Research Foundation. Research informing this article was also supported by the Presidency of South Africa, the South African Local Government Association, the Open Society Foundation, and the US Agency for International Development. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The White Paper’s proposals are vague and seek to solve problems that are not about immigration.Loren B Landau, Co-Director of the Wits-Oxford Mobility Governance Lab, University of the WitwatersrandRebecca Walker, Research Associate at the African Centre for Migration & Society, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138412023-11-01T20:32:36Z2023-11-01T20:32:36ZCanada needs to move beyond poorly enforced bribery laws and tackle corruption’s root causes<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/canada-needs-to-move-beyond-poorly-enforced-bribery-laws-and-tackle-corruptions-root-causes" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Canada’s enforcement of laws against foreign bribery is weak, according to <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/canada-must-boost-its-efforts-to-fight-foreign-bribery-says-the-oecd-working-group-on-bribery.htm">a recent report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</a> (OECD). </p>
<p>A working group from the OECD has found that, in the nearly 25 years since Canada passed the <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-45.2">Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act</a> and <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm">signed onto the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention</a>, only two people have been convicted of foreign bribery and four companies have been sanctioned.</p>
<p>Corruption is a serious issue and a very costly threat to Canada’s foreign trade and international reputation. Although there are no reliable statistics on the exact amounts lost to global corruption, <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13493.doc.htm">estimates range in the trillions of dollars</a>. The OECD said Canada must do more to deter foreign bribery and other corruption offences. </p>
<p>Our recent research sheds light on both Canada’s slow rate of progress in combating corruption and the OECD’s failure to get to the root causes of corruption.</p>
<h2>SNC-Lavalin controversy</h2>
<p>In the past, Canada has had difficulty passing and enforcing laws against powerful multinational corporations. Nowhere is this more clear than in the SNC-Lavalin controversy.</p>
<p>In 2018, Parliament <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-715.32.html">added remediation agreements to the Criminal Code of Canada</a> in a budget bill. These agreements offer a new way to settle criminal charges for crimes like corruption. Unlike plea bargains, they provide a means to resolve cases without convictions. This mitigates the negative effects on those not involved in crime, like employees and pensioners, while still imposing consequences.</p>
<p>Remediation agreements attracted little attention until news broke that Kathleen Roussel, the head of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/snc-lavalin-federal-court-appeal-1.5086604">refused to invite engineering and construction giant SNC-Lavalin to negotiate such an agreement</a> in 2018.</p>
<p>SNC-Lavalin had hoped to use a remediation agreement to settle criminal charges relating to a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/snc-lavalin-trading-court-libya-charges-1.5400542">multi-year scheme of foreign bribery and corruption</a> in obtaining government contracts in Libya. It made no secret of being unhappy with the decision of prosecutors, <a href="https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2019/2019fc282/2019fc282.html">which it tried unsuccessfully to challenge in court</a>.</p>
<p>A few months later, another political scandal erupted when the media reported Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his staff had <a href="https://theconversation.com/saying-no-to-power-the-resignations-of-women-cabinet-members-112693">pressured then-attorney general Jody Wilson-Raybould to overrule Roussel’s decision</a>, leading to Wilson-Raybould’s resignation. It was later determined <a href="https://ciec-ccie.parl.gc.ca/en/investigations-enquetes/Pages/TrudeauIIReport-RapportTrudeauII.aspx">the prime minister’s actions violated the Conflict of Interest Act</a>.</p>
<h2>The state of affairs</h2>
<p>In 2022, we conducted a survey asking how lawyers, consultants, government officials and academics felt about the state of anti-corruption laws in Canada. We asked their opinions on what corruption is, what acts are most serious, what countries are most corrupt and what remedies they would recommend. </p>
<p>The majority of participants accepted the standard legal definition of corruption, which involves bribery offered by a private agent to a public official.</p>
<p>While acknowledging the existence of corruption in Canada, participants believed it was most severe and widespread in non-western or developing nations, and less prevalent among fellow middle-class professionals. While toxic corporate cultures were identified as contributing to corruption, weak individuals were seen as the primary issue rather than built-in incentives to maximize profit.</p>
<p>They all criticized the federal government’s enforcement record but saw the introduction of the <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2023/03/government-of-canada-tables-new-legislation-to-create-a-beneficial-ownership-registry.html">Beneficial Ownership Registries in the 2023 budget</a> as promising if enforced. This registry requires companies to reveal the true owners behind shell companies.</p>
<p>One corruption professional said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“There is no central government agency that is responsible to co-ordinate corruption at the federal level. It is a patchwork or Swiss cheese [model] with lots of holes in it. The federal government needs…to develop a national anti-corruption policy.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another corruption professional said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Sentences are not enforced and the criminal system is not up to date to deal with long and complex corruption cases…police agencies must possess sufficient tools to battle corruption in an efficient manner.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These findings reflect what we already know. Laws that sanction the crimes of the powerful are often poorly drafted and there are insufficient resources to ensure proper enforcement. Too many are willing to break the rules because they know governments will do little about it.</p>
<h2>Neoliberalism and corruption</h2>
<p>Our findings reveal that current anti-corruption efforts and debates often mask the role globalization plays in enabling corporate misconduct. The prevailing belief is that minimal government regulation is a good thing, as exemplified by <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/laws/developing-improving-federal-regulations/modernizing-regulations/red-tape-reduction-act.html">Canada’s “one-for-one” rule</a> that dictates if a new regulation is introduced, an existing one must be removed.</p>
<p>The role globalization plays in corruption, which originally led to demands for new laws in the first place, often gets lost in endless technocratic discussions about what laws are most effective for catching corporate cheats. This includes the OECD’s convention and their evaluations of Canada’s anti-bribery efforts.<br>
In the 1980s, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-exactly-is-neoliberalism-84755">neoliberal economic doctrines</a> swept through capitalist nations worldwide. Their central message was that maximum efficiency and productivity required that corporations be freed from government interference. </p>
<p>What followed was a period of unchecked globalization and massive privatization of public sector operations. Regulations were removed, regulatory agencies were downsized and funding was cut. Tariffs and currency restrictions were jettisoned, allowing corporations to expand their operations globally. </p>
<p>The surge in globalized free trade created mammoth increases in corporate wealth, size and power, and corresponding increases in inequality within and across nations. Many transnational corporations now have <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-tech-giants-worth-compared-economies-countries">annual sales and profits greater than the GDP of nations</a>.</p>
<h2>Lasting effects of deregulation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot">impact of neoliberal policies has been profound</a>. The destruction of regulation, regulatory agencies and regulatory agents through downsizing, defunding and deregulation removed many of those responsible for passing and enforcing laws punishing corporate wrongdoing. While deregulation in the United States <a href="https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Reaganomics.html">started with the election of Ronald Reagan</a> in 1980, <a href="https://www.politico.com/sory/2017/01/trump-signs-executive-order-requiring-that-for-every-one-new-regulation-two-must-be-revoked-234365">Donald Trump carried it to an extreme</a>. </p>
<p>While successive Canadian governments have never directly copied their U.S. counterparts, we, too, have witnessed the <a href="https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/canlemj21&section=17">negative outcomes associated with globalization</a>.</p>
<p>Because multinational corporations have been allowed to grow so large and powerful, and are now so central to our economic and cultural lives, governments lack the ability to curb or punish their unlawful acts. As the SNC-Lavalin debacle illustrated, our governments frequently lack the motivation to do so as well.</p>
<p>Given all this, serious action against corruption, in Canada and abroad, must include moving beyond the narrow and reactive confines of bribery law and policy, as espoused by the OECD and woefully mishandled by the Canadian government, to confront the harms associated with globalization and bring multinational corporations under democratic control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laureen Snider receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Quaid holds research grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. She is a member of Transparency International Canada and the chair of its Legal Committee. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Frauley receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Bittle receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>If Canada wants to fix its reputation for being weak on corruption, it needs to confront the harms associated with globalization and bring multinational corporations under democratic control.Laureen Snider, Professor Emerita, Department of Sociology, Queen's University, OntarioJennifer Quaid, Associate Professor & Vice-Dean Research, Civil Law Section, Faculty of Law, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaJon Frauley, Professor of Criminology, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaSteven Bittle, Professor, Department of Criminology, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2149822023-10-25T13:29:56Z2023-10-25T13:29:56ZChristian leaders in Ghana are trying to reshape government – it may not end well<p>Ghana is constitutionally <a href="https://classic.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Ghana.pdf">a secular state</a>. This means religious liberty is guaranteed, and all citizens are free to believe and manifest any religious faith. No political parties are allowed to base their appeal on religion. </p>
<p>However, the situation is changing. Church leaders are becoming more vocal on issues of national interest in Ghana. The Church of Pentecost recently <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/thecophq_nadec23-pentecostnews-possessingthenations-activity-7090623609685073920-1xGI?trk=public_profile_like_view">proposed</a> setting up a Christian morality council to oversee private and public behaviour. Some Christian leaders are also <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/9/1202">cultivating</a> “insider” status with political elites and developing a high media profile.</p>
<p>They aim to remake Ghana according to their values and beliefs. The question is what impact that will have on democracy.</p>
<p>Many Ghanaians regard the country as a “nation of Christians”. According to the <a href="https://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/">2021 census</a>, about 71% of the population is Christian. Muslims make up 18%. Followers of indigenous or animistic religious beliefs make up 5%. Another 6% are members of other religious groups or don’t have religious beliefs.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=wyX5M8UAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of religion and politics</a>, I argue in a recent paper that <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/14/9/1202">the “Christianisation” of politics in Ghana</a> is an attempt to deal with Ghana’s serious problem of state-level corruption and to improve democracy. But I don’t believe it will have this effect. Rather, Christian nationalism seeks to push aside people who have other beliefs. That is not a basis for democracy. And trying to influence policy through religion will get in the way of fundamental institutional reforms that are necessary to make the government more accountable and its actions more transparent.</p>
<h2>Christianity and politics</h2>
<p>Influential expressions of Christianity in Ghana include the <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/The-Birth-and-Effects-of-Charismaticism-in-Ghana-I-116593">burgeoning Pentecostal or Charismatic</a> churches, which in recent years have become the <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ghana/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%202021%20government,or%20have%20no%20religious%20belief">most popular churches</a> in Ghana. Census data puts them at <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ghana/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%202021%20government,or%20have%20no%20religious%20belief">44%</a> of Christians in the country. These churches tend to have a <a href="https://thecophq.org/">conservative political orientation</a>, a strong belief in the veracity of the Bible, and a message that the nation is undergoing serious moral decay. </p>
<p>Some leading Christians would like to see Christians governing the country and all of society according to biblical law. Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams, leader of the Action Chapel, one of the most prominent charismatic churches in the country, stated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2TaTLnWg7U">interview</a> in 2019 that: Christians “should rule in corporate, politics, the marketplace, everywhere”. The implication is that Christianity should be a dominant social, political and economic expression in Ghana which would project a certain worldview which all Ghanaians, whether or not they are Christians, should adhere to. </p>
<p>The issue is what the appropriate values are to which Ghanaians should adhere. On the one hand, there is a Christian approach, as suggested by Archbishop Duncan-Williams. On the other there is what might be called a “secular” approach where values are not linked to religious belief. </p>
<p>Afrobarometer <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Summary-of-results-Ghana-Afrobarometer-R9-21oct2022-1.pdf">data</a> indicates that most Ghanaians are socially conservative, for example in relation to the rights of LGBTQI+ people. Many also despair about the country’s perceived moral decay, characterised by serious corruption, and about democratic decline. There has been extra-parliamentary, yet peaceful and pro-democracy, opposition to the government, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/20563051221147328">demanding</a> a new constitution and a more equitable political system.</p>
<h2>Democratic decline</h2>
<p>Ghana transitioned from several years of military rule to democracy in 1993. It has since conducted several free and fair elections. It has a reputation as a democracy. America’s National Intelligence Council <a href="https://irp.fas.org/nic/african_democ_2008.pdf">stated</a> in 2008 that “Ghana has emerged as one of Africa’s most liberal and vibrant democracies, reclaiming a position of political leadership on the continent.”</p>
<p>In recent years things have changed under the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party, both of which have had turns governing the country.</p>
<p>Sweden’s V-Dem (“Varieties of Democracy”) Institute <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/18/dr_2017.pdf">categorised</a> Ghana as a liberal democracy in 2003-2014 and again in 2017-2020. This description changed to “<a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/12/dr_2021.pdf">electoral democracy</a>” in 2021 and “<a href="https://www.v-dem.net/documents/19/dr_2022_ipyOpLP.pdf">autocratizer</a>” in 2022 – indicating steep democratic decline. </p>
<p>The American organisation Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/ghana/freedom-world/2023">says</a> the decline involves “discrimination against women and LGBT+ people”. It also notes “weaknesses in judicial independence and the rule of law”. It points out corruption, poor public service delivery, political violence and illegal mining. </p>
<h2>A Christian solution?</h2>
<p>There are several ways to deal with these issues. One is to amend the constitution to reform government and the state, making functionaries more accountable and policies more transparent. </p>
<p>The Church of Pentecost, Ghana’s largest church, with more than three million members, favours <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2023/07/clergy-chiefs-others-call-for-establishment-of-national-moral-and-integrity-council/">another way</a>. It suggests creating a National Morality and Integrity Council with statutory powers to oversee private and public behaviour, even at state level. </p>
<p>The church believes that to improve democracy and reduce corruption it is necessary for practising Christians to play a leading role in society – including government. According to <a href="https://thecophq.org/infest-others-with-your-purity-rev-dr-joyce-aryee-tells-christians/">Joyce Aryee</a>, a former government appointee and Christian leader, this would “infest others with their purity” and transform behaviour for the good. </p>
<p>Critics <a href="https://democracyinafrica.org/does-ghanas-democracy-lack-moral-integrity/">argue</a>, on the other hand, that bringing more Christians into positions of leadership and having a morality council to oversee society would weaken democracy. Ghana must nurture a diversity of beliefs, motivations and behaviours. It could then pursue the common good by drawing on a variety of worldviews, reasoning, values, aspirations and habits – not only those deriving from Christianity. </p>
<h2>Mutual respect</h2>
<p>Democratic development can only be realised when citizens make a moral commitment to treat each other with the same respect as they would like to receive. It is necessary to care for each other’s wellbeing as one might care for one’s own growth and happiness. </p>
<p>Ghana’s democracy will fail unless the moral agency of citizens works to moderate economic and social iniquities, by reforming democratic institutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Haynes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Christian leaders in Ghana are pushing the envelope of influence in political affairs.Jeffrey Haynes, Professor Emeritus of Politics, London Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151812023-10-08T08:12:37Z2023-10-08T08:12:37ZLiberia elections 2023: three things the next president must do<p>Liberia, Africa’s oldest republic, is <a href="https://www.ndi.org/2023-liberia-presidential-election">about to choose</a> its next president. </p>
<p>On 10 October, <a href="https://necliberia.org/ecal_info.php?&92fe2e1cedf0fff268b812622bbd952ff930c1b2=MjA3">46 political parties</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-06/liberia-s-weah-to-face-19-rivals-in-october-vote-amid-public-ire">20 presidential candidates</a> will compete for two million registered votes at 5,000 polling stations in 15 counties. </p>
<p>But whoever wins will confront a polarised Liberia. </p>
<p>Liberia is more divided than it has been since the end of its <a href="https://cja.org/where-we-work/liberia/">14-year civil war</a> in 2003. The war ended with the signing of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LR_030818_Peace%20Agreement%20btwn%20GovLiberia%2CLURD%2CMODEL%20and%20the%20Political%20Parties.pdf">peace agreement</a>, but its <a href="https://www.huckmag.com/article/photos-capturing-the-invisible-scars-of-liberias-civil-war">scars</a> are still visible across the country. </p>
<p>Frustration around the soaring cost of living, cronyism, patronage, nepotism, and the culture of impunity which triggered the war is once again tearing the country of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/liberia-population/">5.4 million</a> people apart. </p>
<p>There are also external factors that could undermine Liberia’s recent <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/09/27/liberia-economic-update-prospects-for-inclusive-and-sustainable-growth">progress</a>. For example, the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/african-cooperation/mano-river-union/">Mano River Union</a>, a sub-regional body of which Liberia is a founding member, remains volatile. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/11/uncertainty-in-guinea-after-military-coup-topples-alpha-conde">recent military coup</a> in Guinea, the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/08/10/deadly-anti-government-protests-erupt-in-sierra-leone">anti-government protest</a> in Sierra Leone and <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/several-killed-protest-violence-president-ouattara-announces-third-term-bid/">the violence</a> around <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alassane-Ouattara">Alassane Ouattara</a>’s third-term re-election “victory” in Côte d’Ivoire are signals of vulnerability within the Mano River Union.</p>
<p>The next president will have to address three priorities to restore hope and confidence in Liberia’s recovery:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>national cohesion</p></li>
<li><p>corruption</p></li>
<li><p>stronger state institutions. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>My previous <a href="http://cscubb.ro/cop/ro/misiunea-ecomog-reevaluata/">analysis</a> of Liberia revealed the country’s inability to manage its internal conflicts. It also showed how Liberia’s reliance on regional powers like the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> escalated and prolonged disputes. The next president must recognise these realities and address the three priority areas. </p>
<h2>Falling living standards</h2>
<p>There are growing concerns in Liberia that the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Weah">George Weah-led</a> administration is not doing enough to improve living standards. </p>
<p>There were high expectations of change when the president took office in 2018. Many expected him to lift them from poverty. They saw a real chance for a better future. Today, however, a good number of Liberians feel he has lost his connection with poverty and with the people who elected him into office. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/AM2020/Global_POVEQ_LBR.pdf">50%</a> of Liberians live below the poverty line. The rising cost of basic commodities prevents families from meeting their food needs. </p>
<p>Weah alone is not responsible for all of Liberia’s problems. His administration inherited irregularities that plagued previous <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/21/opinion/liberia-george-weah-inauguration.html">governments</a>. </p>
<h2>Endemic corruption</h2>
<p>Corruption shows up in many forms and at all levels in Liberia. It disrupts democratic decision-making processes, weakens public trust in government and undermines the rule of law. </p>
<p>The nation’s integrity institutions lack independence. They include the <a href="https://www.iaaca.net/node/294">Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission</a>, the <a href="https://gac.gov.lr/">General Audit Commission</a> and the <a href="https://www.leiti.org.lr/">Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</a>. </p>
<p>These agencies were created to curb corrupt practices. But they lack political independence, capacity and resources. </p>
<p>They are further weakened by a <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/316010/in-liberia-corruption-sanctions-are-not-a-deterrent-for-candidates/">culture of impunity</a>. And managerial appointments are often made on the basis of cronyism (jobs for friends and colleagues) and patronage (using state power to reward selected voters for electoral support). </p>
<p>Corruption is prevalent in the judiciary too. Judges solicit bribes in exchange for <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0921">decisions</a> that favour offenders. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-liberia-politics-idUSKBN1FB24B">President George Weah</a> and his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19876111">predecessor</a>, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, ran on the promise of fighting corruption. Both failed to live up to their commitment.</p>
<p>In 2017, after her terms as head of state, Sirleaf <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/liberia-leader-acknowledges-failure-anti-corruption-fight/3690703.html">admitted</a> that her government had not done enough to fight corruption. </p>
<p>In 2022 Weah had to suspend three of his top officials after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/8/15/us-sanctions-3-senior-liberian-government-officials">US imposed sanctions</a> on <a href="https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-senior-liberian-government-officials/">them</a> for corruption and abuse of state functions. No investigation has been launched and none has been prosecuted. </p>
<p>Weah himself has faced serious criticism for his refusal to declare his <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2023/10/03/liberias-president-weah-must-be-removed-from-power-democratically/">assets</a> upon taking office and for <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/global-witness-condemns-illegal-interference-liberian-transparency-and-anti-corruption-agency/">violating</a> Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s standard procedures. </p>
<p>The country <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/liberia/corruption-rank">ranks 142nd</a> out of 180 countries in the corruption perception index. It could slide back into chaos unless the next leader takes serious actions.</p>
<p>Like Sirleaf, Weah pledged to build an equal, fair and just Liberia. But his lack of action in the fight against corruption sends the wrong message to development partners. And it undermines voters’ confidence in the electoral system. </p>
<p>Voters’ confidence in the upcoming poll is already low. A study by the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/organisation/center-democratic-governance/">Center for Democratic Governance</a> in Liberia shows only <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/News-release-Trust-in-elections-commission-weak-as-Liberians-approach-elections-Afrobarometer-3april23.pdf">34%</a> of Liberians believe in the ability of the <a href="https://www.necliberia.org/">National Elections Commission</a> to hold a free and fair elections. </p>
<p>The lack of trust in the electoral system is reinforced by the commission’s <a href="https://www.liberianobserver.com/liberia-necs-failure-publish-final-vr-raises-concerns">failure </a> to release the final voter roll 16 days before the elections. This has cast further doubt on the commission’s credibility and neutrality. </p>
<h2>Impunity</h2>
<p>There is also anger over the government’s failure to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/05/briefing-note-call-war-crimes-court-liberia">establish tribunals</a> to try individuals accused of war crimes, as recommended by Liberia’s <a href="https://hmcwordpress.humanities.mcmaster.ca/Truthcommissions/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Liberia.TRC_.Report-FULL.pdf">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a>. </p>
<p>Victims of the war want to see warlords <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67017365">punished</a> for their crimes. But the call for justice is ignored as Weah and politician Joseph Boakai (Sirleaf’s vice-president from 2006 to 2018) forge stronger <a href="https://www.liberianobserver.com/betrayal-trust-weahs-and-boakais-pact-warlords-amidst-liberias-cry-justice">alliances</a> with perpetrators and war profiteers. </p>
<p>Weah’s 2017 election victory was largely attributed to the support he received from warlord <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-liberia-election-idUKKBN1CV2IL">Prince Johnson</a>. Weah was also supported by Jewel Howard Taylor, his vice-president and ex-wife of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/4/27/charles-taylor-trial-highlights-icc-concerns">Charles Taylor</a>, Liberia’s 22nd president, convicted for <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2013/11/crc-welcomes-charles-taylor-conviction-deterrent-use-children-armed-conflict">atrocities</a> committed in Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>Weah and Johnson have long parted ways. Johnson has given his <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/10/02/2023/liberia-election-boakai-weah">support</a> for the 2023 general elections to 78-year-old Boakai. </p>
<p>However, Weah is not isolated. He still enjoys popular support from his status as a football star, his coalition with Taylor, and his new alliance with <a href="https://frontpageafricaonline.com/politics/liberia-former-rebel-commander-roland-duo-campaigns-on-war-kills-says-he-fought-more-than-prince-johnson-so-he-deserves-a-senatorial-seat-for-nimba-county/">Roland Duo</a>, a former rebel commander who boasts of his crimes. </p>
<p>Former warlords control large voting blocs, sought after by presidential candidates. Establishing a war crime court would amount to political suicide. </p>
<p>But the new president must introduce genuine reforms and promote good governance if he is to sustain peace or govern a region filled with political backstabbing, resource competition and the struggle for new global alliances. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The next head of state must act decisively on deep-rooted and unresolved grievances. </p>
<p>He or she must address public sector corruption, grant full independence to the nation’s transparency institutions and provide adequate resources for the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission and the General Audit Commission to hold offenders accountable. </p>
<p>Liberia’s next president must ensure that the recommendations of the General Audit Commission are followed through and empower the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate and indict those suspected of bribery, embezzlement and illicit enrichment. </p>
<p>Low-level corruption should not go unpunished. That includes things like patients paying bribes for medical treatment, and teachers demanding special favours from students to pass an exam.</p>
<p>Liberians hope for a better future as 10 October approaches.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Wratto does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Liberia’s next president must restore national cohesion, tackle corruption, and strengthen state institutions.Charles Wratto, Associate Professor of Peace, Politics, and Conflict Studies, Babes Bolyai University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2146482023-09-29T15:56:49Z2023-09-29T15:56:49ZAziz Pahad: the unassuming South African diplomat who skilfully mediated crises in Africa, and beyond<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/funeral-category-2-honour-mr-aziz-pahad-29-sep-2023-0000">Aziz Goolam Pahad</a>, who has died at the age of 82, was a South African anti-apartheid activist, politician and deputy minister of foreign affairs in the post-1994 government. </p>
<p>Together with a small group of foreign policy analysts, I worked with Aziz over the span of 30 years, shaping the post-apartheid South African government’s approach to international relations and its foreign policy. We spent countless hours debating foreign affairs and the numerous crises and challenges government had to face as a relative “newcomer” in continental African and global affairs. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad#:%7E:text=Aziz%20Pahad%20was%20born%20on,University%20of%20the%20Witwatersrand%2C%20Johannesburg.">Aziz</a> was generous with giving his time to formulate positions that would allow for the unlocking of a crisis. He remained open to intellectual challenges throughout his career. He was a keen participant in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2015.1090912">academic research projects</a> dealing with <a href="https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/items/eb0f44d3-a550-4740-8db1-6463330b0f82">foreign policy</a>.</p>
<p>He made a monumental contribution to the struggle against apartheid and colonial oppression in South Africa, the continent and the Middle East. And he contributed significantly to the development and execution of a progressive African-centred foreign policy doctrine. Sadly, towards the end of his career as a diplomat he witnessed the <a href="https://www.pulp.up.ac.za/images/pulp/books/edited_collections/foreign_policy/SA%20Foreign%20Policy%20Book%20Chapter%201.pdf">slow decline</a> of South Africa’s <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedafrika/18180.pdf">stature and influence</a> in global affairs. </p>
<h2>The Mandela and Mbeki years</h2>
<p>Under presidents <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/nelson-mandela-presidency-1994-1999">Nelson Mandela</a> (1994-1999) and <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/former-president-thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> (1999-2008), South African diplomats who’d sharpened their skills during many years of exile became sought-after as facilitators and mediators. Under their guidance Africa converted the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union, and reset relations with the international community via the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. </p>
<p>South African diplomats were articulate and visible in the corridors of the United Nations and in gatherings such as the Group of 7, Group of 20 and the Non-Aligned Movement. They were able to advance Africa’s quest for peace and development. In Africa, political and security crises, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Burundi, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518768">were given attention</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-and-russia-president-cyril-ramaphosas-foreign-policy-explained-198430">South Africa and Russia: President Cyril Ramaphosa's foreign policy explained</a>
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<p>However this “golden era” of South Africa’s foreign policy, as fellow scholar Chris Landsberg calls it, was unable to withstand the corroding effects of foreign meddling in African affairs. Neither could it withstand the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">grand corruption</a> which reached its apogee in South Africa under former president <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-jacob-zuma-0">Jacob Zuma</a> (May 2009 - February 2018). </p>
<h2>Preparatory years</h2>
<p>Aziz was born <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">on 25 December 1940</a> in the former Transvaal, the current North West province in South Africa. His parents were <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">Amina and Goolam Pahad</a>, activists in the Transvaal Indian Congress, a political organisation established in the early 1900s by Mahatma Gandhi and others. The congress became involved in the broader anti-apartheid struggle in later years. His elder brother, Essop, also became an activist. Essop passed away <a href="https://theconversation.com/essop-pahad-a-diligent-communist-driven-by-an-optimistic-vision-of-a-non-racial-south-africa-210413">in July</a>.</p>
<p>In 1963, Aziz completed a degree in sociology and Afrikaans at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. As an activist, he was served with a <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/aziz-goolam-pahad">banning order</a> and arrested on several occasions. After the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/rivonia-trial-1963-1964">Rivonia Trial</a> from 1963 to 1964, in which ten leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) were tried for sabotage designed to overthrow the apartheid system of racial oppression, he and Essop left South Africa and went into exile.</p>
<p>Aziz spent some time in Angola and Zimbabwe but lived mostly in London. He completed a master’s degree in politics and international relations <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/61351">at the University of Sussex</a>. He worked full-time for the exiled ANC and supported the development of the <a href="https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/anti-apartheid-struggle-south-africa-1912-1992/">Anti-Apartheid Movement</a>.</p>
<p>Even before his return to South Africa in 1990, he contributed to the transition from apartheid to democracy, a role well described in his book <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Insurgent_Diplomat_Civil_Talks_or_Civil.html?id=mbR9BAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Insurgent Diplomat: Civil Talks or Civil War?</a>. </p>
<p>Aziz worked closely with Thabo Mbeki, at the time head of the exiled ANC’s international relations department, and a small team of academics in formulating the ANC’s position on foreign policy. The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/anc_foreign_policy_perspective_in_a_democratic_south_africa.pdf">paper</a> formed part of preparations by the ANC and its <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03161.htm">alliance partners</a>, the <a href="https://www.sacp.org.za/">South African Communist Party</a> and the <a href="http://www.cosatu.org.za/">Congress of South African Trade Unions</a>, for governing the country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-foreign-policy-new-paper-sets-the-scene-but-falls-short-on-specifics-188253">South Africa's foreign policy: new paper sets the scene, but falls short on specifics</a>
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<p>The foreign policy paper provided a broad roadmap for diplomats post-apartheid. It eventually shaped government’s more formal foreign policy of 2011, entitled Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. In the mid-1990s, Aziz was instrumental in the establishment, with support from the German government, of an ANC-aligned think-tank called the <a href="http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/">Foundation of Global Dialogue</a>, run by foreign policy expert and academic <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/garth-le-pere">Garth le Pere</a> and myself. It lives on as the <a href="https://igd.org.za/">Institute of Global Dialogue</a>, based at the University of South Africa.</p>
<h2>Role in government</h2>
<p>Following the victory of the ANC in South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, Aziz was elected to parliament. From there, he was appointed by President Mandela as deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was re-elected to parliament in 1999 and 2004, and kept his position as <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/aziz-goolam-hoosein-pahad-mr-0">deputy minister of foreign affairs </a> throughout the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. </p>
<p>Holding the post for 14 years meant that he was able to create and nurture a wide network of political, academic and diplomatic connections. This enabled him to play an unassuming but key mediating and facilitation role dealing with major crises on the continent and beyond.</p>
<p>But Aziz also showed his activist roots when he <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/war-can-be-averted-says-pahad-101327">spoke out against</a> the American-led <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War">invasion of Iraq in 2003</a> and the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/">Nato-led invasion</a> of Libya and assassination of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. He supported the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-mourns-passing-former-deputy-minister-foreign-affairs-aziz-pahad">Palestinian struggle</a> for recognition over many decades.</p>
<p>Aziz resigned from government and parliament in 2008, shortly after Mbeki was removed as president of the ANC <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2007-12-18-zuma-is-new-anc-president/">in 2007</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘diplomat-scholar’</h2>
<p>In retirement, Aziz remained active as a “diplomat-scholar”. He played a prominent role, with his brother Essop, in a small but influential think-tank, the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ConcernedAfricansForum/">Concerned Africans Forum</a>. In 2015 he headed the short-lived South African Council on International Relations.</p>
<p>The council was established by the government as a body of experts and a sounding board for senior decision-makers. However, its semi-autonomous identity brought it into conflict with the ruling party’s foreign affairs structures. Politicians allowed it to wither away. </p>
<p>In 2018 the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa asked Aziz to lead a commission of experts <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-04-17-pahad-panel-missteps-noted-but-no-overhaul-of-sa-foreign-policy-on-the-cards/">to review South Africa’s international relations</a>. In a sad repeat of the council’s demise, the commission was never given a proper hearing and its value remains untapped.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-time-south-africas-foreign-policy-was-driven-by-ideas-again-50407">Why it's time South Africa's foreign policy was driven by ideas (again)</a>
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<p>This is perhaps illustrative of the reality of policy-making in dynamic settings such as South Africa’s foreign affairs. The essence of Aziz’s contribution to a progressive African-oriented worldview was ultimately ignored by the foreign policy mandarins. </p>
<p>The country will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214648/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is affiliated with Umlambo Foundation.</span></em></p>South Africa will miss having a “diplomat-scholar” of his calibre to turn to for sage advice.Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Professor of International and Diplomacy Studies, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2142252023-09-24T18:24:50Z2023-09-24T18:24:50ZMenendez indictment looks bad, but there are defenses he can make<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549871/original/file-20230924-21-ath6uu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1985%2C1326&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and his wife, Nadine Arslanian Menendez.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/MenendezBriberyDeveloper/4219da16c3724960a83927459e24e8ef/photo?Query=Menendez&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=5321&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Susan Walsh, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Reactions came quickly to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/22/nyregion/menendez-indictment-document.html">federal indictment</a> on Sept. 22, 2023, of New Jersey’s senior U.S. senator, Democrat Bob Menendez. New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy joined other state Democrats <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/22/new-jersey-democrats-menendez-indictment-00117693">in urging Menendez to resign</a>, saying, “The alleged facts are so serious that they compromise the ability of Senator Menendez to effectively represent the people of our state.”</em></p>
<p><em>The <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-senator-robert-menendez-his-wife-and-three-new-jersey-businessmen-charged-bribery">indictment charged Menendez</a>, “his wife NADINE MENENDEZ, a/k/a ‘Nadine Arslanian,’ and three New Jersey businessmen, WAEL HANA, a/k/a ‘Will Hana,’ JOSE URIBE, and FRED DAIBES, with participating in a years-long bribery scheme … in exchange for MENENDEZ’s agreement to use his official position to protect and enrich them and to benefit the Government of Egypt.” Menendez said he believed the case would be “successfully resolved once <a href="https://rollcall.com/?p=727870">all of the facts are presented</a>,” but he stepped down temporarily as chairman of the Senate’s influential Committee on Foreign Relations.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s senior politics and democracy editor, Naomi Schalit, interviewed longtime Washington lawyer and Penn State Dickinson Law professor Stanley M. Brand, who has served <a href="https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/brand">as general counsel for the House of Representatives</a> and is a prominent white-collar defense attorney, and asked him to explain the indictment – and the outlook for Menendez both legally and politically.</em></p>
<p><strong>What did you think when you first read this indictment?</strong></p>
<p>As an old pal once told me, “even a thin pancake has two sides.”</p>
<p>Reading the criminal indictment in a case for the first time often produces a startled reaction to the government’s case. But as my over 40 years of experience <a href="https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/brand">defending public corruption cases and teaching criminal law</a> have taught me, there are usually issues presented by an indictment that can be challenged by the defense. </p>
<p>In addition, as judges routinely instruct juries in these cases, the indictment is not evidence and the jury may not rely on it to draw any conclusions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a suit pointing at a poster board with various photos on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/549872/original/file-20230924-21-2fp318.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Damian Williams, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, speaks during a news conference on Sept. 22, 2023, after announcing the Menendez indictment.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/damian-williams-u-s-attorney-for-the-southern-district-of-news-photo/1695609428?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><strong>The average reader will look at the indictment and say, “These guys are toast.” But are there ways Menendez can defend himself?</strong></p>
<p>There are a number of complex issues presented by these charges that could be argued by the defense in court. </p>
<p>First, while the indictment charges a conspiracy to commit bribery, it does not charge the substantive crime of bribery itself. This may suggest that the government lacks what it believes is direct evidence of a quid pro quo – “this for that” – between Menendez and the alleged bribers. </p>
<p>There is evidence of conversations and texts that coyly and perhaps purposely avoid explicit acknowledgment of a corrupt agreement – for instance, “On or about January 24, 2022, DAIBES’s Driver exchanged two brief calls with NADINE MENENDEZ. NADINE MENENDEZ then texted DAIBES, writing, ‘Thank you. Christmas in January.’” </p>
<p>The government will argue that this reflects acknowledgment of a connection between official action and delivery of cash to Sen. Menendez, even though it is a less-than-express statement of the connection. </p>
<p>Speaking in this kind of code may not fully absolve the defendants, but the government must prove the defendants’ intent to carry out a corrupt agreement beyond a reasonable doubt – and juries sometimes want to see more than innuendo before convicting.</p>
<p>The government has also charged <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1346">a crime called</a> “<a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45479.pdf">honest services fraud</a>” – essentially, a crime involving a public official putting their own financial interest above the public interest in their otherwise honest and faithful performance of their duties.</p>
<p>The alleged failure of Menendez to list the gifts, as required, on his Senate financial disclosure forms will be cited by prosecutors as evidence of “consciousness of guilt” – an attempt to conceal the transactions. </p>
<p>However, under <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/">a recent Supreme Court case</a> involving former <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-prosecutors-and-voters-not-the-feds-can-hold-corrupt-officials-accountable-138385">Gov. Bob McDonnell of Virginia for similar crimes</a>, the definition of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-getting-harder-to-prosecute-politicians-for-corruption-91609">official acts</a>” under the bribery statute has been narrowly defined to mean only formal decisions or proceedings. That definition does not include less-formal actions like those performed by Menendez, such as meetings with Egyptian military officials. </p>
<p>The Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of official acts that included arranging meetings with state officials and hosting events at the governor’s mansion, or promoting a private businessman’s products at such events. </p>
<p>When it comes time for the judge to instruct the jury at the end of the trial, Menendez may well be able to argue that much of what he did in fact did not constitute “official acts” and therefore are not illegal under the bribery statute. </p>
<p><strong>This case involves alleged favors done for a foreign country in exchange for money. Does that change this case from simple bribery to something more serious?</strong></p>
<p>The issue of foreign military sales to Egypt may also present a constitutional obstacle to the government. </p>
<p>The indictment specifically cites Menendez’s role as <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/22/menendez-steps-down-foreign-relations-committee-00117622">chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee</a> and actions he took in that role in releasing holds on certain military sales to Egypt and letters to his colleagues on that issue. The Constitution’s <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-6/clause-1">speech or debate clause</a> <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45043.pdf">protects members from</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/doj-drops-investigation-into-three-senators-for-insider-trading-burr-probe-continues-134875">liability or questioning</a> when undertaking actions within the “legitimate legislative sphere” – which undoubtedly includes these functions. </p>
<p>While this will not likely be a defense to all the allegations, it could require paring the allegations related to this conduct. That would whittle away at a pillar of the government’s attempt to show Menendez had committed abuse of office. </p>
<p>In fact, when the government has charged members of Congress with various forms of corruption, <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-prosecutors-and-voters-not-the-feds-can-hold-corrupt-officials-accountable-138385">courts have rejected</a> any reference to their membership on congressional committees as evidence against them. </p>
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<span class="caption">New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy, left, seen here in 2018 with Robert Menendez and fellow New Jersey Democratic Sen. Cory Booker, has called on Menendez to resign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SuperstormSandyRebuildingAid/b3ee03a1ac9644d8add820dee6f3a57d/photo?Query=Phil%20Murphy%20Robert%20Menendez&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Wayne Parry</a></span>
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<p><strong>How likely is Menendez’s ouster from the Senate?</strong></p>
<p>Generally, neither the House nor Senate <a href="https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/expulsion.htm">will move to expel</a> <a href="https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33229.html">an indicted member before conviction</a>. </p>
<p>There have been rare exceptions, such as when <a href="https://www.nydailynews.com/2001/11/20/ex-sen-harrison-williams-81/">Sen. Harrison “Pete” Williams was indicted</a> in the FBI Abscam sting operation from the late 1970s and early 1980s <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">against members of Congress</a>. Williams resigned in 1982 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/03/12/williams-facing-expulsion-resigns-from-us-senate/714785a8-a310-47cd-8584-959f4549fd2c/">shortly before an expected expulsion</a> vote. With current <a href="https://about.bgov.com/brief/balance-of-power-a-partisan-convergence-in-the-senate/">Democratic control of the Senate</a> by a margin of just one seat, Menendez’s ouster seems unlikely even though the Democratic governor of New Jersey would assuredly appoint a Democrat to fill the vacancy.</p>
<p><strong>‘In the history of the United States Congress, it is doubtful there has ever been a corruption allegation of this depth and seriousness,’ <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/23/nyregion/robert-menendez-political-future.html?searchResultPosition=1">former New Jersey Sen. Robert Torricelli said</a>. True?</strong></p>
<p>That seems hyperbolic. The Menendez case is just the latest in a long line of corruption cases involving members of Congress. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">the Abscam case</a>, seven members of the House and one Senator were all convicted in a bribery scheme. That scheme involved undercover FBI agents <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/abscam">dressed up as wealthy Arabs</a> offering cash to Congress members in return for a variety of political favors. </p>
<p>In the <a href="https://ethics.house.gov/committee-reports/korean-influence-investigation">Korean Influence Investigation in 1978</a> – when I served as House counsel – <a href="https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal78-1237310">the House</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/17/archives/investigation-into-influencebuying-by-korean-figure-comes-to-an-end.html">Department of Justice conducted an extensive investigation</a> of influence peddling by Tongsun Park, a South Korean national, in which questionnaires were sent to every member of the House relating to acceptance of gifts from Park. </p>
<p>Going all the way back to 1872, there was <a href="https://www.britannica.com/money/topic/Credit-Mobilier-Scandal">the Credit Mobilier scandal</a> that involved <a href="https://www.americanheritage.com/ultimate-congressional-scandal">prominent members of the House and Vice President Schuyler Colfax</a> in a scheme to reward these government officials with shares in the transcontinental railroad company in exchange for their support of funding for the project.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stanley M. Brand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The indictment of Sen. Bob Menendez is full of lurid details – hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash stuffed into clothes among them. Will they tank Menendez’s career?Stanley M. Brand, Distinguished Fellow in Law and Government, Dickinson Law, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123122023-09-19T14:47:49Z2023-09-19T14:47:49ZAlbania: how one of the most corrupt countries in Europe is tackling crime at the highest level<p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-Anti-Corruption-Report-A-%20Reflexive-Governance-Approach/Hoxhaj/p/book/9781032087627">Albania</a> may be struggling with high levels of corruption at all levels of society, but the country is taking a new approach to tackling this crime with the introduction of a special anti-corruption body, known as <a href="https://spak.gov.al/misioni/">Spak</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://spak.gov.al/struktura/">Spak</a> is made up of a special prosecution office, the national bureau of investigation, and special courts dealing with corruption and organised crime. Its structure was established as part of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-020-00148-w">Albania’s judicial reform</a>, and adopted by its <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/22/albanian-parliament-passes-with-unanimity-the-judicial-reform-07-22-2016/">parliament in 2016</a>, giving it constitutional powers to fight corruption and organised crime at the highest levels of government and society. </p>
<p>This reform of the <a href="https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2016)064-e">constitution</a> and tackling of corruption was a key <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/22/albanian-parliament-passes-with-unanimity-the-judicial-reform-07-22-2016/">pre-condition</a> of Albania opening accession talks with the EU. </p>
<p><a href="https://euronews.al/en/altin-dumani-is-appointed-as-the-new-head-of-spak/">Head prosecutor Altin Dumani</a> only took office in December 2022, but work had started before he arrived. Spak has already confiscated assets and cash worth more than <a href="https://sot.com.al/english/politike/dumani-zbulon-se-spak-ka-sekuestruar-mbi-100-milione-euro-pasuri-gjate--i591042">£100 million</a> in the three years to May 2023. Prior to the establishment of Spak, there were <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/influential-albanian-politician-led-organized-crime-group-in-australia-intelligence-reports-claim">few cases of corruption</a> being prosecuted, because people could avoid charges by paying a bribe. </p>
<p>Spak takes on <a href="https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/218052/1/albanias-special-courts-against-corruption-and-organised-crime.pdf">cases</a> involving corruption of values over ALL50,000 (£385) for cases involving public officials, and ALL800,000 (£6,400) for corruption related to public procurement contracts.</p>
<h2>Challenging the influential</h2>
<p>Spak is now establishing a track record in charging influential people for abusing their public office and participating in corruption. In its latest investigation which concluded in August 2023, several <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/08/17/albania-arrests-former-deputy-minister-over-dubious-surgical-equipment-concession/">ministry of health officials</a>, including the deputy minister, were charged with alleged misuse of around £100m to buy medical equipment.</p>
<p>The most high-profile cases that Spak has pursued to final conviction involve the former <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/14472-albania-jails-former-general-prosecutor-for-corruption">attorney general</a> Adriatik Llalla, who received two years in prison for <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/22/jail-sentence-for-albania-former-general-prosecutor-but-his-whereabouts-are-unknown/">hiding his wealth </a>, and former <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/15963-albania-s-ex-interior-minister-jailed-for-helping-drug-traffickers">minister of interior</a> Saimir Tahiri, who received three years and four months in prison for <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/albanias-ex-interior-minister-sentenced-to-prison-following-drugs-trial/">abuses of power</a>. A number of high-profile cases, including former <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/albania-arrests-one-former-official-releases-another-on-house-arrest/">mayors</a>, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/01/06/short-circuit-the-stunning-simplicity-of-top-level-corruption-in-albaniaa%20/">ministers</a> and a <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/07/14/albanias-parliament-greenlights-ex-deputy-pms-arrest/">deputy prime minister</a> are all currently awaiting trial. </p>
<h2>Corruption problems</h2>
<p>Albania ranks as one of the most corrupt states in Europe in the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIuvKi_oOFgQMVW5RoCR2_WweWEAAYASAAEgJc9_D_BwE">Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index</a>, and is also one of the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/albania">five worst performing states in Europe</a>, along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-Anti-Corruption-Report-A-Reflexive-Governance-Approach/Hoxhaj/p/book/9781032087627">Studies</a> conducted since the late 1990s indicate that corruption is one of the five biggest problems Albanian citizens face after unemployment, healthcare, security and education. </p>
<p>To continue to tackling this long-running issue, <a href="https://www.u4.no/publications/albanias-special-courts-against-corruption-and-organised-crime.pdf">Spak</a> will require ongoing support domestically as well as from the international community. </p>
<p>So far there have been ten joint investigations with other European countries in 2022, according to Spak’s <a href="https://spak.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/raporti-vjetor-2022_Publikuar.pdf">latest annual report</a>: six with Italy, but only one with the UK, despite the fact that Albanian-organised criminal networks have a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/kings-of-cocaine-albanian-mafia-uk-drugs-crime">strong presence in the UK drug market</a>, according to the <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/how-the-albanian-mafia-took-control-of-europes-trafficking-network/">UK National Crime Agency</a>.</p>
<h2>How much corruption is there?</h2>
<p>Citizens are frequently asked to pay a bribe when using basic public services. According to most Albanian respondents to <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Country_profile_Albania_2014.pdf">Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index</a> surveys, politics (92%), the judiciary (81%), healthcare (80%), education (70%), police (58%) and civil services (52%) are the public services respondents believed to be most susceptible to corruption.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/organized-corruption-political-financing-western-balkans/">Political corruption</a> can take many different <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">forms</a>, including illegal party financing, vote buying, political patronage, lobbying and payment of bribes for favours, such as buying a seat in parliament or becoming a mayoral candidate for a major political party.</p>
<p>After granting Albania <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/albania/#:%7E:text=Albania%20applied%20for%20EU%20membership,with%20Albania%20in%20July%202022.">candidate status in 2014</a>, the EU identified corruption as one of <a href="https://integrimi-ne-be.punetejashtme.gov.al/en/anetaresimi-ne-be/historiku/">five key areas for reform</a>. Between 2018 and 2021, a <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/netherlands-now-backs-eu-bids-of-albania-north-macedonia/">number of EU member states,</a> including France, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, vetoed opening accession talks between the EU and Albania due to the country’s inability to <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-020-00148-w">fight corruption</a> at the highest levels. </p>
<p>However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Spak’s recent record of charging a number of public officials with corruption and abuse of power, the EU officially launched membership talks with Albania in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launch-accession-talks-north-macedonia-albania/">July 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>Role of the US and UK</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-balkan-sanctions-gruevski-marovic/31797648.html">US</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/breaking-the-links-between-politics-business-and-illicit-activity-in-the-western-balkans">UK</a> have also taken measures to highlight corruption in Albania. Both countries have sanctioned and banned entry to a number of high-level public officials, including the former <a href="https://www.state.gov/public-designation-of-albanian-sali-berisha-due-to-involvement-in-significant-corruption/">prime minister and president</a>, several former <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/05/18/us-sanctioned-politicians-help-albanias-socialists-to-victory/">ministers</a>, former <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/public-designation-due-to-involvement-in-significant-corruption-of-albanian-mayor-of-durres-vangjush-dako/">mayors</a>, MPs, judges and prosecutors for allegedly engaging in corruption and undermining the rule of law and democracy in Albania – as well as a number of <a href="https://al.usembassy.gov/treasury-targets-actors-for-destabilizing-behavior-throughout-the-western-balkans/">business people</a> too.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://sot.com.al/english/politike/60-agjentet-e-bkh-pergatiten-ne-shba-nga-fbi-nga-gjurmimi-i-parave-e-pe-i534568">majority of Spak investigators</a> are trained at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The UK <a href="https://spak.gov.al/komunikate-per-shtyp-vizite-e-drejtuesit-ne-mbreterine-e-bashkuar-date-07-06-2023/">hosted the head of Spak</a> Altin Dumani in London in July 2023 to develop new partnerships with the UK Home Office and National Crime Agency. The aim is to pursue joint cases against organised crime networks and break their ties with corrupt politicians and high-level public officials.</p>
<p>Spak alone cannot fight corruption, and if Albania is serious about addressing corruption, then more public institutions, the media and citizens must make greater efforts to acknowledge the serious harm it is doing to the country’s future – including driving <a href="https://theconversation.com/albanias-brain-drain-why-so-many-young-people-are-leaving-and-how-to-get-them-to-stay-207455">young people abroad</a>.</p>
<h2>How it affects migration</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.osce.org/presence-in-albania/473430">Political parties</a>, in particular, need to play a more active role in addressing corrupt behaviour within its ranks.</p>
<p>If Albania genuinely wants to improve its <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/49.3/LEIE2022015">society and economy</a>, decrease migration, attract more foreign investment and accelerate the process of integrating into the EU, it must develop a strategy that can effectively <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/39713/chapter-abstract/350382229?redirectedFrom=fulltext">control corruption</a>. </p>
<p>There is no country in the world that has developed a strategy to completely <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/quest-for-good-governance/4FC4343AEFA5A729C0C95979AAAA8FCE">eradicate corruption</a>. However, those countries winning the battle have been able to keep it under control to the point that it does not undermine the independence and efficiency of public institutions. This must be the aim for both Albanian politicians and society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212312/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Addressing high levels of corruption is crucial if Albania wants to join the EU and improve its society and economy.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121182023-09-18T14:25:31Z2023-09-18T14:25:31ZCorruption in South Africa: would paying whistleblowers help?<p>Whistleblowing is an important tool in fighting corruption. In South Africa, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202204/state-capture-commission-report-part-iv-vol-iv.pdf">commission of inquiry into state capture</a> recommended that the government should provide financial rewards for whistleblowers who report corruption. </p>
<p>The issue was in the headlines again following the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-babita-deokaran-six-accused-plead-guilty-to-murder-of-whistleblower-20230822">sentencing of six men</a> for the 2021 murder of prominent whistleblower Babita Deokaran. </p>
<p>The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development invited public comments on a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf">discussion paper</a> on proposed reforms for whistleblower protection. It proposes that whistleblowers should be given legal assistance and that a fund be created to support those who suffer severe financial hardship for reporting corruption. This fund will be financed by a levy on all employees’ salaries, similar to the <a href="https://www.sars.gov.za/types-of-tax/unemployment-insurance-fund/#:%7E:text=How%20much%20do%20you%20need,employer">Unemployment Insurance Fund levy</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
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<p>I am a <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3317-9057">legal scholar</a> with a research interest in public sector corruption and municipal governance. I presented papers at international conferences in <a href="https://urbanlaw.wixsite.com/iculc2023/schedule-1">May</a> and <a href="http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html">June</a> 2023 on whistleblower protection and money incentives.</p>
<p>In my view, whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support – which may or may not include rewards as well. But rewarding whistleblowers has potential costs as well as benefits. It should not be seen as the silver bullet that will stop corruption. Lawmakers need to be aware of possible weaknesses of money reward systems, so they can build in safeguards when developing legislation.</p>
<h2>Rewarding whistleblowers</h2>
<p>Three ways to support whistleblowers are financial support, compensation and money rewards. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16549716.2022.2140494">Financial support</a> means covering the reasonable expenses a person incurs when reporting corruption. They can be legal expenses, or expenses for accommodation and travel to court proceedings.</p>
<p>Compensation is meant to make up for the losses they suffer from retaliatory actions such as unfair dismissals or defamation. </p>
<p>The third option is more controversial. Money rewards or incentives are payments made on top of compensation and financial support. The idea is to reward whistleblowers financially for being good citizens.</p>
<p>Globally, only <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">about 22 countries</a> use money incentives for whistleblowing. One possible reason there are so few could be a lack of clear evidence as to whether reward systems contribute much to fighting corruption.</p>
<p>Money rewards <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">are commonly</a> used:</p>
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<li><p>to “buy” useful information from the whistleblower (this is done in Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, and Pakistan)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information given leads to a successful penalty or recovery of funds (Canada, Ghana, Hungary, Republic of Korea, Montenegro, Nigeria, Slovakia, the UK and the US)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information is instrumental to institute criminal proceedings (Ghana, Slovakia and Ukraine)</p></li>
<li><p>when whistleblowers are able to recover funds through legal action on behalf of the state (the US). </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-corporate-whistleblowers-dont-get-enough-protection-what-needs-to-change-201006">South Africa's corporate whistleblowers don't get enough protection: what needs to change</a>
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<p>In South Africa, individuals can <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1977-051.pdf#page=7">institute private prosecutions</a>, but are entitled to recover only their expenses involved in the prosecution if they are successful. They don’t receive a reward.</p>
<p>The US and Ghana use more than one model. This may be to provide for some flexibility depending on the type of offence concerned, the information provided and the overall interests of justice.</p>
<p>The South African government could also offer non-monetary incentives for whistleblowers. These might include national awards such as the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-baobab-0#:%7E:text=The%20Order%20of%20the%20Baobab%20is%20awarded%20to%20South%20African,is%20awarded%20for%20exceptional%20service">Order of the Baobab</a> or the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-luthuli-0">Order of Luthuli</a> for service to democracy. </p>
<p>The City of Cape Town recently <a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/Media-and-news/Cape%20Town%20announces%20Civic%20Honours%20recipients">announced</a> that it would award the Mayor’s Medal to Athol Williams, a state capture whistleblower, for his dedication and sacrifice to South Africa. </p>
<h2>The case for financial rewards</h2>
<p>There are a number of benefits to rewards.</p>
<p>The first is that money incentives lead to an <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">increase in the number of whistleblowing reports</a>. However, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">some studies</a> emphasise that there’s no guarantee the number of successful prosecutions will increase too.</p>
<p>Secondly, whistleblower reports can save state resources which would otherwise be spent on investigations. Criminal investigations can be fast tracked if people come forward with evidence to support their allegations. </p>
<p>Thirdly, money incentives can increase public awareness of corruption and whistleblowing, if there’s media coverage. This could counteract the stigma that whistleblowers are snitches.</p>
<p>Lastly, money rewards can help disrupt the activities of organised crime networks. Governments can fuel distrust among accomplices by offering rewards to the first self-reporting offender. In South Korea, for example, money incentives were useful in <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf#page=4">weakening cartels</a> that monopolised the sugar market in the early 2000s.</p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>One danger is that money rewards could lead to an increase in unreliable reports. That would increase the workload of the government and use state resources fruitlessly. A possible counter measure could be to introduce stiff penalties for frivolous and malicious reports.</p>
<p>In some countries, such as Ghana, money rewards are only given to people who report corruption to specified government institutions. Usually, though, whistleblowers are expected to first report within their institutions. The downside is that they could wait until the corrupt activities are serious enough to warrant reporting externally. Rewards could thus undermine internal reporting channels. </p>
<p>Where people have an opportunity to get a substantial monetary reward, a “lottery mindset” might set in. People might report simply to get their hands on a reward. That could create distrust in the work environment and the functionality of the institution might suffer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/corruption-in-south-africa-whistleblower-protection-law-is-being-reformed-but-it-may-not-go-far-enough-209916">Corruption in South Africa: whistleblower protection law is being reformed - but it may not go far enough</a>
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<p>Lastly, money rewards could <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">commoditise whistleblowing</a>. People might no longer blow the whistle out of public service. This might encourage certain criminal activities such as cyber hacking and breaches of privacy to get information that could be traded for these rewards. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>First of all, South African lawmakers should review current laws. Some existing provisions could be slightly adapted to provide for rewards. For example, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-environmental-management-act">National Environmental Management Act</a> already provides for whistleblowers to receive a reward where their information is instrumental to the imposition of a fine. The police also regularly provide <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/n-west-police-offer-reward-information-police-murder">financial rewards</a> to informants.</p>
<p>Lawmakers should carefully weigh up the pros and cons of whistleblower rewards in the fight against corruption. But whistleblowers should get both support and compensation. No one should be penalised for being a good citizen. Whistleblower rewards can save state resources, but care should be taken to ensure they don’t create new opportunities for malfeasance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johandri Wright receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of the Western Cape. </span></em></p>Whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support. But that has potential costs as well as benefits.Johandri Wright, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2115372023-08-17T15:47:46Z2023-08-17T15:47:46ZGabon: how the Bongo family’s 56-year rule has hurt the country and divided the opposition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542667/original/file-20230814-15-yo99yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gabon President Ali Bongo Ondimba speaks during a trade conference in London in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chris Jackson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabonese-military-officers-announce-they-have-seized-power-2023-08-30/">military intervention</a> appears set to end the Bongo family’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years hold</a> to power in Gabon. A group of senior military officers <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/military-announce-coup-in-gabon-as-senior-officers-seize-power-after-presidential-election-12950578">announced</a> that they had seized power shortly after President Ali Bongo Ondimba was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-ali-bongo-wins-third-term-after-disputed-election-2023-08-30/">declared winner</a> of the country’s recently held presidential poll.</p>
<p>The coup leaders claimed the 26 August general election was not credible. They announced a cancellation of the election result, closure of all borders and dissolution of all state institutions including the legislative arm of government.<br>
Ali Bongo was said to have won <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/gabon-election-idAFKBN30507D">64.27%</a> of votes cast in the election that the opposition described as a sham. According to the electoral umpire, Bongo’s main challenger, Albert Ondo Ossa, came second with 30.77%.</p>
<p>Ali Bongo, (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/gabon-omar-bongo-death-reports">son of former president Omar Bongo who ruled the country from 1967 to 2009</a>) contested the election on the platform of the ruling <a href="https://pdg-gabon.org/">Parti Démocratique Gabonais</a> (PDG), founded by his father. The party has monopolised power in the oil-rich central African country for more than half a century.</p>
<p>The Bongo family has held onto power for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/gabon-president-bongo-run-re-election-august-2023-07-09/">56 years</a>. It has done so through single-party government, corruption in the mining and oil sectors, and political kinship. According to some estimates Ali Bongo personally controls <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/8-richest-dictators-history-172424055.html">US$1 billion</a> in assets, much of that secreted overseas, making him the richest man in Gabon. </p>
<p>In addition, the constitution has been <a href="https://constitutionnet.org/news/revision-gabonese-constitution-between-contestation-modernization-and-inconsistencies">changed several times</a> in the past decades to ensure the Bongos’ continued rule. </p>
<p>First, term limits were removed from the constitution in 2003, ensuring that Bongo could serve as president for life. </p>
<p>Second, traditional two-round ballots were changed into single-round ballots, also in 2003. This was to ensure that Bongo’s opponents could not rally around a single challenger in a run-off. </p>
<p>Third, instead of requiring that the winner obtain a majority, all that is needed for Bongo to be re-elected is a plurality. This means a majority could be less than 50%, as long as the winner has the most votes. Had he been required to win a majority of votes, Ali Bongo, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/31/gabon-election-results-disputed-incumbent-ali-bongo-victor-jean-ping">49.8%</a> in the 2016 election, would not be president today.</p>
<p>Fourth, in April 2023, the presidential term was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230407-gabon-reduces-presidential-term-to-five-years-before-elections">reduced</a> from seven to five years, ensuring the presidential elections would occur at the same time as legislative and local elections. </p>
<p>In the past, after presidential elections, opposition parties would organise against Bongo’s ruling party to capture seats in the legislative and local elections. The change makes it much more likely that all the institutions of government power will be taken by Bongo and his party in one single election. </p>
<p>Bongo’s party increased its seats in the national assembly, holding 63 out of 120 seats in 1990 and most recently 98 out of 143 in 2018. The ruling party has also increased its seats in the senate from 52 out of 92 in 1997, to 46 out of 67 in 2021.</p>
<p>The continuous rule by the Bongos has not been good for a country of just <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/gabon/overview">2.3 million</a> people. Gabon is a resource-rich country and was once heralded as the “<a href="https://bondsloans.com/news/gabon-a-step-in-the-right-direction">Kuwait of Africa</a>”. Because of its small population and large oil reserves, per capita income is at least <a href="https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Gabon/gdp_per_capita_ppp/#:%7E:text=GDP%20per%20capita%2C%20Purchasing%20Power%20Parity&text=The%20average%20value%20for%20Gabon,2022%20is%2013949.16%20U.S.%20dollars.">US$13,949.16</a>. In neighbouring Cameroon, per capita income is only <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/cameroon/gdp-per-capita">US$3,733</a> </p>
<p>But Gabon’s “average” is belied by a population where a third of the citizens live below the poverty line and unemployment stands at about <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?locations=GA">37%</a> among young people.</p>
<h2>Dynastic republic</h2>
<p>Gabon is not a monarchy but a “dynastic republic”.</p>
<p>In dynastic republics, presidents have concentrated power in their hands and established systems of personal rule. They transmit state power through nepotism to their family and kin. This includes sons and daughters, wives and ex-wives, brothers and sisters, half-siblings and step-siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts, nieces and nephews, in-laws, illegitimate children and so on. </p>
<p>Under this system, the classical ideal of a legal-rational state – where position and rank are distributed based on merit in the name of the rational (efficient and effective) functioning of government -– is corrupted. </p>
<p>In all dynastic republics around the world – including Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Syria, Azerbaijan, North Korea, Turkmenistan and most recently Cambodia –- an institutionalisation of traditional family power through the modern vehicle of a single ruling party has been critical.</p>
<p>In Gabon, this is the Parti Démocratique Gabonais. The party holds the presidential palace and has a majority in the national assembly (98/143 seats) and in the senate (46/67 seats). It also controls the courts, and the regional and municipal governments. </p>
<p>It is critical to understand that no man rules alone. Only with a large party apparatus can a man and his family rule a republic with millions of people.</p>
<p>But why has the rule by one man and his family been tolerated? </p>
<p>The answer is the political elite need him to keep their own positions.</p>
<p>The economist <a href="https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107671/1/81962733X.pdf">Gordon Tullock</a> hypothesised back in 1987 that dynastic succession appeals to non-familial elites who are wary of a leadership struggle. In 2007, professor of government <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231991883_THE_RESILIENCE_OF_RULING_PARTIES_Jason_Brownlee_Authoritarianism_in_an_Age_of_Democratization_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_2007_Pp_xiii_264_2399">Jason Brownlee</a> tested this theory by looking at 258 non-monarchical autocrats. He found that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>in the absence of prior experience selecting a ruler through a party, regime elites accepted filial heirs apparent when the incumbent had arisen from a party and his successor predominantly emerged from that organisation. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Political scientists <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Dictator_s_Handbook.html?id=UBY5DgAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Bruno Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith</a> argue that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>essential supporters have a much greater chance of retaining their privileged position when power passes within a family from father to son, from king to prince, than when power passes to an outsider.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Omar Bongo founded the PDG in 1967 as a de jure one-party system. After constitutional reforms in 1990, he permitted the existence of opposition parties. But because he never held free or fair elections, the democratic opposition has never managed to wrest power from either the Bongos or their ruling party.</p>
<p>In the past, elections in Gabon were followed by protests, which were followed by security force crackdowns and ultimately silence. But the 2023 election may turn out to be different as it appears to have been followed by a military coup.</p>
<p><em>This article was updated on 30 August to reflect the coup in Gabon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Yates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gabon is resource rich, but the Bongo family’s continuous rule has been bad news for the country of 2.3 million people.Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science , American Graduate School in Paris (AGS)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098412023-08-10T13:39:17Z2023-08-10T13:39:17ZZimbabwe heads to the polls amid high inflation, a slumping currency and a cost of living crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541697/original/file-20230808-17-q9ved7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inflation continues to defy Zimbabwe central bank efforts </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is facing a host of pressing challenges that voters dearly want the next president to address. Persistently high <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">inflation</a>, elevated <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-28/zimbabwe-holds-key-rate-after-currency-s-world-beating-streak">interest rates</a>, and a slumping and volatile <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-07/zimbabwe-stops-short-of-free-floating-currency-in-exchange-rate-battle">Zimbabwe dollar</a> have combined to fuel a cost of living crisis for households and battered business activity. </p>
<p>These will be among the key economic concerns weighing on Zimbabweans as they prepare to cast their votes at elections scheduled for late <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">August</a>. President Emmerson Mnangagwa is campaigning to secure a second mandate that will extend his <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">five-year term</a> in power. He will square off against <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-25/zimbabwe-leader-opens-election-bid-as-inflation-battle-continues">10 presidential candidates</a>, including the opposition’s main candidate Nelson Chamisa.</p>
<p>Inflation remains sticky and jumped <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">175.8</a>% in June from <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">86.5</a>% a month ago. Part of the recent re-acceleration in inflation was triggered by the Zimbabwe dollar’s slide, which plunged <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">85%</a> in the two months through May and pushed up import costs. Although inflation <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/">edged lower</a> in July, it still remains significantly elevated.</p>
<p>The central bank responded by hiking interest rates to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/zimbabwe-liberalizes-foreign-exchange-market-as-it-hikes-rates">150</a>% from a previously elevated level of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-06/zimbabwe-liberalizes-foreign-exchange-market-as-it-hikes-rates">140</a>%. This move intensifies the pullback on business and consumer spending caused by currency weakening. Additionally, the high pace of price growth has outpaced nominal wage growth, leaving many people struggling to afford everyday essentials. Fewer jobs add to these concerns.</p>
<p>Stubbornly high inflation and its negative impact on the value of the Zimbabwe dollar are symptoms of much deeper problems rooted in decades of fiscal and central bank governance weaknesses. That’s why inflation has defied central bank efforts to rein it in with a series of aggressive rate hikes.</p>
<p>The next president will therefore need to push for reforms in governance to tackle deep underlying problems. Otherwise the country will remain locked in a seemingly endless battle to ward off the economic crisis that is being acutely felt by voters.</p>
<h2>Governance vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Governance broadly refers to institutions used to exercise authority by the government. Long-running weaknesses in fiscal and central bank governance institutions have undermined the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound fiscal and monetary policies for many years.</p>
<p>Between 2005 and 2008 for example, the government pursued an expansionary fiscal policy. Public spending averaged <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">8%</a> of GDP. </p>
<p>However, because of weak budgetary processes, spending was less efficient especially in areas critical for supporting stronger growth such as education, health, and public infrastructure. This meant that the economy could not generate more government revenue. Average government revenue collected was only about <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">5%</a> of GDP over this period. The budget shortfalls were financed by printing money, which undermined the independence and credibility of the central bank. This impaired the central bank’s ability to fulfill its mandate, including supporting price stability.</p>
<p>The influx of printed cash in the economy fanned domestic demand but did nothing to spur the production of goods and services to meet it. Inflation spiked and drove the value of the currency lower, raising the cost of imported goods and thus amplifying inflation pressures. </p>
<p>This dynamic created a feedback loop in which rising inflation and a weakening currency reinforced each other. The result was hyperinflation. In 2008 inflation reached <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7660569.stm">231 million</a> %, prompting the government to withdraw the weakening Zimbabwe dollar from circulation the following year and to replace it with the US dollar to combat hyperinflation.</p>
<p>In the years following the switch to the US dollar, inflation receded until 2019 when the Zimbabwe dollar was re-introduced. This was done without fixing vulnerabilities in fiscal and monetary governance that had eventually led to the demise of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45523636">Zimbabwe dollar</a> in 2009. </p>
<p>Because of these vulnerabilities, inflation skyrocketed to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April">255%</a> in 2019 – a 23-fold increase from a year earlier as money supply growth quickened from <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">28% to 250%</a> amid a widening government budget deficit which topped <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2023/04/03/fiscal-monitor-april-2023">10%</a> of GDP in 2017. Since then, the central bank has not been able to get a sustained deceleration in inflation despite aggressive rate hikes. </p>
<p>And the negative feedback loop between high inflation and a collapsing local currency was on full display again following the plunge in the currency in recent months. This has made the US dollar more <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/zimbabwe-inflation-back-at-three-digits-after-currency-crashes">attractive</a>, and it is used more widely to pay for everything from food, fuel, school fees, rent and other services. In February the central bank adopted a new inflation gauge that tracks prices in both Zimbabwean and US dollars to capture this reality.</p>
<p>The US dollar is also seen as a haven which has taken on greater importance as inflation remains stubbornly high. In many ways, the return of the Zimbabwe dollar evokes bad memories of the inflation crisis of 2008 which still loom large for many people.</p>
<h2>Weaknesses in governance breed corruption</h2>
<p>Weaknesses in governance also create opportunities for higher levels of government corruption, which can lead to public spending waste, inefficiencies and lower revenue collection. All worsen budget deficits and add to monetary financing pressures on a central bank lacking independence. </p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/zwe">Transparency International</a> ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 180 countries based on perceived levels of public sector corruption, where the lower the rank the higher the perceived corruption. The evidence also showed no significant progress in tackling corruption for more than a decade. Another 2022 survey by <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/">Afrobarometer</a> revealed that a staggering 87% of Zimbabweans believe corruption has increased or stayed the same.</p>
<h2>A path forward</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy is facing a confluence of challenges: inflation that won’t go away, higher interest rates and a sliding currency. The fallout has included a cost of living crisis, slowing business activity and fewer jobs. These problems are symptoms of deeply embedded structural weaknesses in the economy.</p>
<p>The following reforms are crucial for addressing these structural weaknesses:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Fiscal governance reforms to strengthen the budgetary process. This will enhance revenue collection and increase the efficiency of government spending. These reforms should also aim to boost revenue collection by lowering pervasive informality in the economy.</p></li>
<li><p>Central bank governance reforms to promote autonomy of the bank’s operations, including monetary policy independence which is important for preserving price stability.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, good fiscal governance positively affects central bank governance by reducing the need for central bank financing, which allows a reduction in inflation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209841/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo is affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. He was appointed as an International Affairs
Fellow for Tenured International Relations Scholars for the 2023-24 academic year.</span></em></p>Without governance reforms, Zimbabwe will continue to face an economic crisis.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086322023-07-24T14:47:04Z2023-07-24T14:47:04ZWhen mafia threatens democracy: research shows ordinary people are less honest in countries hit by organised crime<p>Organised crime casts a <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf">long shadow</a>, driving violence and an illicit economy. But our <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/19485506231176615">research</a> has uncovered some more subtle dimensions to its influence, too. We’ve found that organised crime can undermine the civic honesty of ordinary, law abiding people. </p>
<p>Civic honesty means adhering to shared moral norms that characterise actions such as tax evasion, bribery or welfare fraud as unacceptable. Civic honesty is a cornerstone for a robust and thriving democracy. It creates a society where people follow rules not out of fear of reprisal but due to their moral convictions. That, in turn, lessens the need for intensive surveillance and costly punitive measures. </p>
<p>Typically, civic honesty is driven by trust in public bodies such as the government and police. This trust represents citizens’ stake in a tacit <a href="https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/2020/07/01/state-capacity-reciprocity-and-social-contract">social contract</a> according to which they perform their civic duties in exchange for the competency, fairness and reliability of their government.</p>
<p>However, the link between political trust and civic honesty varies substantially from country to country. We wanted to explore if the presence of organised crime was a factor in this variability.</p>
<h2>83 countries</h2>
<p>To test this, we used an <a href="https://ocindex.net/">index</a> of global organised cime to rate the influence of criminal groups in different countries and regions on a scale of 1 to 10. We included mafia-style groups with a clear structure and a recognisable name like the Cosa Nostra in Italy or the Yakuza in Japan, and looser criminal associations without a clear structure or name. </p>
<p>We also looked at state-embedded groups – organised criminals that operate by infiltrating the state apparatus – and foreign criminal groups operating outside their home country, such as the Italian mafia operating in the US.</p>
<p>We paired this index with survey data from more than 128,000 people in 83 countries from two <a href="https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSEVSjoint2017.jsp">large-scale research studies</a> investigating beliefs, opinions and values. From these studies, we obtained two measures of individual differences: political trust and civic honesty.</p>
<p>The political trust measure was based on how much confidence people had in key legal and political institutions – the police, civil service, government, political parties and the justice system.</p>
<p>The civic honesty index was based on how justifiable respondents thought four illegal actions were – accepting a bribe, cheating on taxes, fare dodging on public transport and benefit fraud.</p>
<p>Data for these two measures were available from eight African countries, 13 countries in the Americas, 26 Asian nations, 34 European nations and two in Oceania. </p>
<h2>Corruption undermines civic honesty</h2>
<p>We found that citizens tended to be less inclined towards civic honesty in countries where organised criminal groups were more widespread. In these places, corruption is more commonly justified. </p>
<p>We also expected that people who report higher political trust would be <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9013-6">more civically honest</a>. If you believe in the integrity and reliability of the government, the police and the courts, you are more likely to abide by the rules they impose. </p>
<p>Political trust is a reflection of the legitimacy of institutions because when people see institutions as legitimate, they are more likely to internalise the norms and values they promote as their own. </p>
<p>People tend to follow the directives of legitimate institutions out of a conviction that such directives constitute the proper, moral way to act. Therefore, how much people trust institutions should be linked to their civic honesty.</p>
<p>That was indeed the case in countries that had fewer problems with organised crime, such as Denmark, Finland and Singapore. However, the picture was quite different in countries where there was more organised crime, exposing an interesting dynamic.</p>
<p>In countries such as Italy, Mexico and Russia, the association between civic honesty and political trust was weaker or even non-existent. Knowing how much trust a person has in institutions therefore tells you little or nothing about what they think about civic honesty.</p>
<p>We interpret this as an indication that in countries more strongly influenced by organised crime, institutions lose their role as moral referents. People’s judgements about the justifiability of illegal actions are not predicted by how much they trust political and legal institutions. </p>
<p>When our understanding of the appropriateness of tax evasion becomes disconnected from our confidence in institutions, for example, it shows that our norms are out of step with those of the institution. We don’t yet know what drives people’s judgements in these situations but it is likely that the perceived <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038">probability of being caught</a> or personal values become more central.</p>
<h2>Total takeover</h2>
<p>Remarkably, however, in countries experiencing the most extreme criminal influence, the correlation between trust and honesty actually inverted. If people had a greater trust in public institutions, they were more likely to show a lower level of civic honesty. </p>
<p>In countries such as Colombia, Iraq and Venezuela, people’s trust in institutions is associated with higher justification of illegal actions like bribery and fare dodging.</p>
<p>In these countries, not only do institutions lose their role as moral referents, but people’s confidence in what presumably are corrupted institutions is linked to them finding it easier to justify illegality. </p>
<p>This seemingly paradoxical outcome could be attributed to criminal groups successfully co-opting the state, thereby subverting the nature and moral responsibilities of institutions. </p>
<p>Institutions may be perceived as being manipulated to serve illegal interests, which leads to a situation where the citizens who have confidence in corrupted institutions are also the ones with a higher tendency towards immorality and crime. </p>
<h2>Crime as a democratic issue</h2>
<p>The implications of these findings for democratic systems are profound. Organised criminal groups can play a part in altering societal norms by undermining the moral authority of public bodies. An insidious erosion of the social contract can follow, shifting norms away from the principles of civic honesty.</p>
<p>The unchecked growth of organised crime doesn’t merely lead to more illegal activities and lower public security, it threatens the very fabric of our democracies. It can lead to a broader acceptance of illegal behaviours by subtly limiting, or even sabotaging, political and legal authorities’ capacity to promote a culture of legality and cooperation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208632/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giovanni A. Travaglino receives funding from the UKRI for the "Secret Power" project (Grant No. EP/X02170X/1). The grant was awarded to him under the European Commission’s “European Research Council - STG” Scheme.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alberto Mirisola and Pascal Burgmer do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mafia groups don’t just cause harm through violence, they can erode the principles that make a democracy function.Giovanni A. Travaglino, Professor of Social Psychology and Criminology, Royal Holloway University of LondonAlberto Mirisola, Associate Professor of Social Psychology, University of Palermo Pascal Burgmer, Lecturer in Psychology, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099162023-07-20T14:19:29Z2023-07-20T14:19:29ZCorruption in South Africa: whistleblower protection law is being reformed - but it may not go far enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538260/original/file-20230719-21-nyfhcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Candlelight vigil for slain corruption fighter Babita Deokaran in Johannesburg. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Fani Mahuntsi/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is on the path to reforming its law on whistleblowing to provide improved protection for individuals who expose corruption and illegal activity.</p>
<p>The country’s Department of Justice and Constitutional Development recently published a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/invites.htm">discussion document</a> on the proposed reforms. This first step in reforming the country’s law on whistleblowers is to be welcomed.</p>
<p>Whistleblowers in South Africa have endured severe consequences. These include physical harm, intimidation, and <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/investigations/sacrificial-lamb-city-of-johannesburg-dismisses-whistleblower-who-flagged-r82bn-irregularities-20230622">loss of jobs</a> and career prospects. Some have been <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-24-whistle-blower-slain-after-dropping-her-child-at-school-siu-confirms-babita-deokaran-was-a-witness-in-the-r332m-ppe-scandal/">murdered</a>. Others have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/whistle-blower-athol-williams-health-suffers-after-exposing-pariah-bain-and-co-75ada81f-bff5-4cd9-81d7-2c43a62ddc36">fled the country</a>, fearing for their <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/saps-whistleblower-patricia-mashale-flees-sa">lives</a> or <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/467736/i-think-de-ruyter-is-at-risk-his-family-probably-too-he-needs-to-take-care">safety</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/site/information/reports">Zondo Commission</a>, which investigated state capture and corruption within government departments and state-owned entities, <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202204/state-capture-commission-report-part-iv-vol-iv.pdf">highlighted whistleblowing</a> as one of the most effective tools to combat corruption. The discussion document on reform builds on <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202210/state-capture-commission-response.pdf">President Cyril Ramaphosa’s response</a> to the commission’s findings and recommendations.</p>
<p>I am a company law professor with many years of research in corporate governance – including <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365174166_THE_ESCALATION_OF_CORPORATE_CORRUPTION_DURING_THE_COVID-19_PANDEMIC_IS_THE_ANTI-CORRUPTION_FRAMEWORK_OF_THE_COMPANIES_ACT_71_OF_2008_ADEQUATE">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/critical-analysis-of-the-corporate-whistleblowing-provisions-of-the-south-african-companies-act/B993CF1BA5F46C991A7F1C153AFD220B">whistleblowing</a> – in South Africa. My recent analysis of the current whistleblowing regulations found that they do not go far enough in protecting or encouraging corporate whistleblowers. The new discussion document has many commendable proposals, in my view. But these may not go far enough.</p>
<p>While the government proposals would expand the scope of protection under the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf">Protected Disclosures Act</a>, they do not address the challenge of whistleblowers having to navigate a complex and inconsistent web of legislation currently in place. </p>
<p>What South Africa needs is a consolidated legislative framework that governs whistleblowing in the various sectors. The requirements for protection would be the same in the different sectors. This would bring clarity and consistency across sectors. It would also make the laws easy to understand and to rely on.</p>
<h2>Financial incentives</h2>
<p>The discussion document <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf#page=44.">rejects</a> the idea of providing financial rewards to whistleblowers. It opts instead for a fund to assist those who are dismissed and who face severe financial hardship for blowing the whistle.</p>
<p>While the fund may provide some relief to unemployed whistleblowers, it does not go far enough to give whistleblowers an incentive to come forward.</p>
<p>Without adequate incentives, whistleblowers may hesitate to come forward and expose corruption. Given the alarming <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022">levels of corruption</a> in South Africa, it is imperative that whistleblowers are incentivised to step forward and that their <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-corporate-whistleblowers-dont-get-enough-protection-what-needs-to-change-201006">protection</a> is ensured.</p>
<p>It is controversial whether whistleblowers should be rewarded for their disclosures. This is because of moral and ethical concerns. Some worry about potential ulterior motives taking the place of a genuine desire to expose wrongdoing when rewards are offered. Another concern is that whistleblower awards may encourage fraudulent reporting and false allegations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
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<p>However, in a highly corrupt environment, the need to expose corruption should outweigh concerns about motives. Strict penalties could be put in place in the legislative framework to overcome concerns about fraudulent reporting and false allegations.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/critical-analysis-of-the-corporate-whistleblowing-provisions-of-the-south-african-companies-act/B993CF1BA5F46C991A7F1C153AFD220B">research</a> I found that the benefits of a whistleblower award system in South Africa outweigh the potential drawbacks. Such a system may encourage whistleblowers to disclose high-quality information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. This is crucial in a country with high levels of corruption but low rates of reported wrongdoing.</p>
<h2>Other proposals for reform</h2>
<p>The justice department suggests that whistleblowers under the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf">Protected Disclosures Act</a> should have the right to request state protection if they reasonably believe that their lives or those of their immediate family members are in danger. This <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf#page=82">proposal</a> is commendable because of the risks whistleblowers face in South Africa.</p>
<p>It also proposes that criminal offences should be imposed on certain persons or organisations that ignore whistleblowers’ disclosures, such as the <a href="https://www.pprotect.org/">Public Protector</a> and the <a href="https://www.psc.gov.za/">Public Service Commission</a>. <a href="https://legal-aid.co.za/">Legal Aid South Africa</a> should provide legal assistance to whistleblowers at the justice minister’s discretion.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-corporate-whistleblowers-dont-get-enough-protection-what-needs-to-change-201006">South Africa's corporate whistleblowers don't get enough protection: what needs to change</a>
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<p>Another <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf#page=92">proposal</a> is to allow whistleblowers who believe that detrimental action has been taken against them to file complaints with the <a href="https://www.sahrc.org.za/">Human Rights Commission</a>. The commission will have the authority to decide whether to investigate or dismiss the complaint, or refer it to a court to determine whether detrimental action was indeed taken.</p>
<p>This proposal would enhance the commission’s powers in managing whistleblower complaints. It is, however, crucial to establish effective processes and to avoid prolonged delays in addressing complaints.</p>
<h2>Consolidated legislative framework</h2>
<p>The main statutes governing whistleblowing in South Africa are the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf">Protected Disclosures Act of 2000</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/companies-act">Companies Act of 2008</a>.</p>
<p>But there are at least nine other statutes governing whistleblowing. These include: </p>
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<li><p>the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/labour-relations-act">Labour Relations Act</a> </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/prevention-and-combating-corrupt-activities-act-0">Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act</a> </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/financial-intelligence-centre-act">Financial Intelligence Centre Act</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-environmental-management-act">National Environmental Management Act</a>.</p></li>
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<p>This fragmented regulation creates a confusing web. It also results in inconsistent protection. The complexity and vagueness may also discourage people from disclosing wrongdoing.</p>
<p>The proposed reforms focus at this stage on enhancing the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-026.pdf">Protected Disclosures Act</a>, but not the other statutes related to whistleblowing. </p>
<p>The act protects whistleblowers who are employees in the public and private sectors from being subjected to occupational detriments, such as being dismissed, demoted, suspended or disciplined. The justice department proposes widening its protections to include persons who are not in an employer-employee relationship.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-and-tax-evasion-what-south-africa-needs-to-add-to-its-toolbox-178055">Whistleblowers and tax evasion: what South Africa needs to add to its toolbox</a>
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<p>Whistleblowing is neither self-serving nor socially reprehensible. It is an essential weapon in the fight against corruption. Given South Africa’s staggering and escalating corruption levels, a strong legal framework is needed which both encourages whistleblowing and effectively protects whistleblowers. </p>
<p>The reforms are still in the early stages. They require further development before being drafted into an amendment bill. The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/invites.htm">discussion document</a> is open to public comment until 15 August 2023. It remains to be seen what effect the public comments will have on the proposed reforms. </p>
<p>Hopefully, the final reforms will provide stronger encouragement and incentives for whistleblowers, considering the risks they face while bravely serving society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209916/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rehana Cassim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Given South Africa’s staggering corruption levels, a strong legal framework is needed to encourage and protect whistleblowers.Rehana Cassim, Professor in Company Law, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2091132023-07-20T08:13:51Z2023-07-20T08:13:51ZNigeria’s new police chief faces structural challenges - 5 key issues to tackle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537773/original/file-20230717-248129-zjsaf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's new police chief must continue to enforce discipline within the police. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officers-stand-as-supporters-march-to-campaign-for-news-photo/1243642462?adppopup=true">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/tinubus-ex-cso-egbetokun-appointed-acting-igp/">named</a> a new inspector general of police on 19 June 2023. He appointed the deputy inspector general, Kayode Egbetokun, to replace Usman Alkali Baba, whom former president Muhammadu Buhari had <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/453508-updated-buhari-appoints-new-acting-inspector-general-of-police.html?tztc=1">appointed</a> in April 2021. Egbetokun will serve in an acting capacity pending his confirmation by the senate in accordance with Nigeria’s constitution. In this interview with The Conversation Africa, participatory policing expert Lanre Ikuteyijo suggests an agenda for the new police chief.</em></p>
<p><strong>What are the major issues confronting the new police inspector general?</strong></p>
<p>The major issues are police accountability and transparency, professionalism within the police, inter-agency collaboration and police welfare. Further, he must review police activities leading to the 2020 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58817690">#ENDSARS protests</a> against police brutality and then follow up with the reforms promised after the protests. The Buhari government <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2021/01/01/fg-committed-to-five-endsars-demands-buhari-woos-youths-in-new-year-speech/">promised</a> mental evaluation for new police recruits, improved welfare for policemen, disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad and legislation for community policing. </p>
<p><strong>How should he tackle these issues?</strong></p>
<p>He must continue to enforce discipline in the police like his predecessor. Some erring officers were <a href="https://punchng.com/police-dismiss-18-officers-in-three-months/">reportedly dismissed</a> during the era of Baba Alkali, which gave some semblance of accountability. Police activities are supposed to be regulated through both internal and external mechanisms. The internal regulatory mechanism must be strengthened to make officers carry out their duties responsibly. Lack of discipline has been <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272121016_The_Image_of_Nigeria_Police_Lessons_from_History">identified</a> as a contributor to ineffective law enforcement.</p>
<p>He must also ensure the professionalisation of the police. At present, police services are commodified: some elites and celebrities have more police protection than some entire communities. There have been <a href="https://punchng.com/police-summon-orderly-carrying-vips-food-ex-envoy-denies/">reports</a> of some police officers performing domestic chores for elites. He must stop this by ensuring regular training of officers to improve their sense of duty and self-esteem. </p>
<p>He must also promote collaboration among the security agencies in the country. The police are the most visible among the agencies and are constitutionally responsible for the maintenance of law and order. However, the realities of contemporary security challenges, including the rise in banditry, kidnapping and cybercrime, have made it <a href="https://www.thedefencehorizon.org/post/synergy-police-army-nigeria">necessary</a> for the police to have cordial working relationships with other security agencies. There should be a seamless relationship between the police, the armed forces and other paramilitary agencies. These include <a href="https://interior.gov.ng/nigeria-security-and-civil-defense-corp/">Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps</a> and <a href="https://immigration.gov.ng/">Nigeria Immigration Service</a>. I’ve <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272121016_The_Image_of_Nigeria_Police_Lessons_from_History">highlighted</a> ways to achieve this in some of my <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272407936_Community_Partnership_in_Policing_The_Nigerian_Experience">past research</a>.</p>
<p>He must also take the welfare of the police seriously. Issues needing attention include housing, promotion, medical, children’s education, pensions and gratuities of retired police officers, as well as the care of families of officers who died in active service.</p>
<p>Some of the <a href="https://nairametrics.com/2020/10/12/breaking-endsars-president-buhari-promises-extra-judicial-killings-investigations-police-reform/">promises</a> the government made after the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58817690">#ENDSARS protests</a> are yet to be fulfilled. The new inspector general should ensure the steps taken by his predecessor are completed. The main demand was for better salaries and welfare of police officers. Another demand was to ensure justice for those maimed by some members of the defunct Special Anti-Robbery Squad, and compensation for their families. All those arrested during and after the protests but to whom no crime has been traced should be released and compensated as well.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-police-work-under-terrible-conditions-what-needs-to-be-fixed-179852">Nigeria's police work under terrible conditions: what needs to be fixed</a>
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<p><strong>The immediate past police chief faced some of these issues too. Why are they recurring?</strong> </p>
<p>Most of these problems are structural and were there even prior to the tenure of the past police chief. The solutions will therefore require deliberate actions on the part of the police management. It will take a willing police chief and a ready president to bring about the changes. </p>
<p>It’s a good start that Mobile Police Force personnel attached to ex-governors, former ministers and lawmakers have been <a href="https://punchng.com/ig-withdraws-mobile-policemen-from-ex-govs-ministers-vips/#:%7E:text=This%2C%20the%20IG%20said%2C%20was,from%20VIP%20escort%2Fguard%20duties.">withdrawn</a>. The government too must have the political will to drive police reforms.</p>
<p><strong>What agenda did the last police chief follow and how successful would you say he was?</strong></p>
<p>The last police chief came to power on the heels of protests, essentially against police brutality and for a change of guard among the service chiefs. He started by addressing some of the issues raised by the public. Some errant officers were publicly disciplined. He also tried to implement the increment in salaries of police officers as well as other conditions of service (the level of actual implementation or success is yet to be determined). He addressed other issues such as promotion and uniforms. I will say he did not succeed in bringing about reformation, but he laid a foundation on which his successor can build to ensure that Nigeria has a better and more professional police force.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-police-few-promises-of-reform-have-been-kept-a-year-after-endsars-protests-170028">Nigeria's police: few promises of reform have been kept a year after #EndSARS protests</a>
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<p><strong>What new things would you recommend for the new police chief?</strong></p>
<p>He should work towards the digitisation of the police. This of course will require training and retraining of officers to equip them with modern, smart and virtual policing skills. </p>
<p>More work should equally be done to promote a healthy police-civilian relationship. The public relations department has a lot of work to do in this regard. Innovative public engagement via social media platforms and regular town-hall meetings with stakeholders could be introduced too.</p>
<p>The reward system should also be as effective as the improvement in the discipline witnessed in the last few months. There are several dedicated, outstanding and gallant police officers across the country who are giving their best to ensure the country is safe, true to their calling. These should be rewarded to serve as both specific and general motivations.</p>
<p> </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209113/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lanre Ikuteyijo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nigeria’s new police chief needs fresh ideas to confront old challenges.Lanre Ikuteyijo, Senior lecturer, Obafemi Awolowo UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2098832023-07-18T14:32:55Z2023-07-18T14:32:55ZNelson Mandela’s legacy is taking a battering because of the dismal state of South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538003/original/file-20230718-27-ey48jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Mandela, the late first president of democratic South Africa, is credited with the relatively peaceful transition from apartheid rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Per-Anders Pettersson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The multiple concerns about the dismal state of South Africa – including a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/06/15/cf-south-africas-economy-loses-momentum-amid-record-power-cuts">stagnant and failing economy</a>, a seemingly incapable state, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-capture-report-chronicles-extent-of-corruption-in-south-africa-but-will-action-follow-174441">massive corruption</a> – have led to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">questioning</a> of the political and economic settlement made in 1994 to end apartheid. The settlement is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nelson-Mandela">strongly associated with Nelson Mandela</a>, who oversaw its progress to a successful conclusion. He subsequently underpinned it by promoting reconciliation with white people, especially Afrikaners, the former rulers.</p>
<p>The questioning of the 1994 settlement, and therefore Mandela’s legacy, has different dimensions, running through diverse narratives. One, associated with a faction of the governing African National Congress (ANC) that claims to stand for “<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ret-and-what-does-it-want-the-radical-economic-transformation-faction-in-south-africa-explained-195949">radical economic transformation</a>”, is that the settlement was a “sell-out” to “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-monopoly-capital-an-excuse-to-avoid-south-africas-real-problems-75143">white monopoly capital</a>”. Another is the inclination to lay the blame for state failure <a href="https://theconversation.com/rule-of-law-in-south-africa-protects-even-those-who-scorn-it-175533">on the constitution</a>, thereby deflecting responsibility for massive governance failures away from the ANC.</p>
<p>Yet another stems from the frustrations of recent black graduates and the mass of black unemployed for whom there are <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Media%20release%20QLFS%20Q4%202022.pdf">no jobs</a>. There are also huge numbers of people without either <a href="https://apsdpr.org/index.php/apsdpr/article/view/372/739">adequate shelter</a> or <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16235#:%7E:text=More%20than%20half%20a%20million,high%20risk%20of%20acute%20malnutrition.">enough to eat</a>. South Africans want someone to blame. While their search regularly targets a wide range of usual suspects, it also leads to a questioning of what Mandela really left behind. </p>
<p>It does not help that Mandela continues to be lionised by many, if not most, white people, who despite much grumbling about the many inconveniences of life in South Africa have largely continued to prosper.</p>
<p>This means that those of us who are social scientists and long-term observers of South Africa’s politics and history need to think carefully about how we think critically about Mandela’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Questioning Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>From a historian’s view the questioning of Mandela’s legacy is normal. Historians are always asking new questions and reassessing the past to gain new insights about the role important political leaders play.</p>
<p>This has posed particular problems for Mandela’s biographers. Biography has always had a problematic relationship with history as a discipline. This partly stems from history’s reluctance to endorse “Great Men” versions of the past. Partly from the more generic problem of assessing individuals’ role in shaping wider developments. Thus it has been with Mandela. Nonetheless, the six or seven <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Mandela+biopgraphies&rlz=1C1GCEA_enZA1007ZA1007&oq=Mandela+biopgraphies&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIJCAEQABgNGIAEMgkIAhAAGA0YgAQyCQgDEC4YDRiABDIJCAQQABgNGIAEMggIBRAAGA0YHjIICAYQABgNGB4yCAgHEAAYDRgeMggICBAAGA0YHjIKCAkQABgFGA0YHtIBCDQ5NjNqMWo3qAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">significant biographies of Mandela</a> may be said to revolve around the following arguments.</p>
<p>First, Mandela played a critical role in preventing a descent into total civil war. It was brutal enough as it was. Narratives at the time often suggested that the period 1990-94 was a “<a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2019-07-09-sas-transition-to-democracy-miracle-or-mediation">miracle</a>”, a difficult but “peaceful transition to democracy”. But this was misleading. <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02167/04lv02264/05lv02335/06lv02357/07lv02372/08lv02379.htm">Thousands died</a> in political violence during this time.</p>
<p>Mandela’s biographers argue that his initiating negotiations with the regime from jail, independently of the ANC, was crucial. Without his actions, the apartheid state would not have come to the party. This, even though by the time FW de Klerk, its last president, came to power, it was seeking a route to a settlement. </p>
<p>Second, Mandela played his cards carefully in steadily asserting his authority over the ANC. Although the ANC in exile had carefully choreographed the imprisoned Mandela as an icon around which international opposition to apartheid could be mobilised, there remained much questioning within the organisation following his release about his motivations and wisdom. Also whether he should replace the ailing <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a> as its leader. That he proceeded to convince his doubters by constantly proclaiming his loyalty to the ANC, its militant “line” and his subjection to its discipline while simultaneously edging it towards negotiations is said to have been key to his establishing his claim to leadership. This was necessary to convince his doubters within the ANC that it could not defeat the regime on the field of battle. Hence there was a need for compromise with the regime.</p>
<p>Third, Mandela is credited with successfully steering the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa">negotiations which led to South Africa’s democracy</a>. That he played a limited part in negotiating much of the nitty-gritty of the new constitution is acknowledged. Yet, this is combined with recognition of his acute judgment of when to place pressure on the regime to secure concessions and when to adopt a more conciliatory line. Generally, it is agreed that the ANC outsmarted the apartheid government during the negotiations. Praise is correctly showered on Mandela for his role in bringing both the far right, under <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02426/05lv02691.htm">Constand Viljoen</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>’s quarrelsome Inkatha Freedom Movement <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf5601/files/Policy_Note_ID137.pdf">into the 1994 election at the very last moment</a>, without which it would have lacked legitimacy.</p>
<p>Fourth, while today it is recognised that a narrative of the time – that South Africans had negotiated the finest constitution in the world – was overcooked, the negotiations resulted in the country becoming a constitutional democracy. </p>
<p>We now know, of course, that the ANC has subverted much of the intention of the constitution and undermined many of its safeguards. <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-ruling-party-has-favoured-loyalty-over-competence-now-cadre-deployment-has-come-back-to-bite-it-199208">Its cadre deployment policy</a> of appointing loyalists to key state institutions has severely diminished the independence of the state machinery. Furthermore, the ANC has merged party with state. Above all, it has severely weakened the capacity of parliament to <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-parliament-fails-to-hold-the-executive-to-account-history-shows-what-can-happen-192889">hold the president and ministers accountable</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.statecapture.org.za/">State Capture Commission</a> has laid bare the mechanics of all this in great detail. It has placed huge responsibility for this upon the ANC. Nonetheless, it is widely recognised by civil society that the constitution and the law still provide the fundamental basis for exacting political accountability. This is confirmed by the many judgments the Constitutional Court has <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-south-africas-constitutional-court-protecting-democracy-107443">rendered against the government</a>.</p>
<p>Fifth, while his critics often argue that Mandela leant over too far to appease whites, the counter-argument is that this grounded democracy. At the beginning of his <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/318431.Long_Walk_to_Freedom">autobiography</a>, Mandela presents the struggle in South Africa as a clash between Afrikaner and African nationalisms. His role during negotiations can be viewed through the prism of his conviction of the need to reconcile these, as one could not defeat the other. Without reconciliation, however imperfect, there could be no making of a new nation. After all, what was the alternative? </p>
<h2>Capturing Mandela’s legacy</h2>
<p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to. If it really does become a “<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-political-risk-profile-has-gone-up-a-few-notches-but-its-not-yet-a-failed-state-170653">failed state</a>”, as the doomsters predict, there will be much need for reexamination of whether this failure has its roots in the constitutional settlement which Mandela did so much to bring about. For the moment, however, Mandela continues to inspire South Africans who place their hopes in constitutional democracy. What other hopes do they have?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209883/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is never going to be a final assessment of Mandela’s legacy. How it is regarded will continue to change, depending on the destination South Africa travels to.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2060272023-07-17T15:06:18Z2023-07-17T15:06:18ZThey Eat Our Sweat - new book exposes daily struggles of transport workers in Lagos<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/535262/original/file-20230703-266873-aa70gw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A minibus driver and an agbero exchange blows at Ojota, Lagos. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Daniel E. Agbiboa’s book <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/they-eat-our-sweat-9780198861546?cc=us&lang=en&">They Eat Our Sweat: Transport Labor, Corruption, and Everyday Survival in Urban Nigeria</a> explores the world of drivers of minibuses (danfo) and motorcycles (okada) in Lagos, the economic capital of Nigeria. <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/people/daniel-e-agbiboa">Agbiboa</a> is assistant professor of African and African American studies at Harvard University. His research interests include the informal economy, urban change, mobility and youth politics. </p>
<p>The book describes the everyday interactions between the drivers, their conductors, union members regulating the garages through which they pass daily, and police officers. The drivers work 10 to 12 hours a day, six days a week, but go home without much revenue after paying daily “fees” or “dues” to bus owners, police officers and union members. </p>
<p>To gather materials for the book, Agbiboa worked as a conductor in a minibus for several months. He witnessed everyday forms of exploitation of these drivers by the police and touts. One driver summed it up: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I work tirelessly each day, while the ‘baboons’ (touts and police) stand in the roundabout and just chop (eat) my sweat.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Agbiboa reveals the micro dynamics of corruption and the drivers’ obligation to pay street-level bureaucrats from the National Union of Road Transport Workers and police. </p>
<p>His book is very welcome as he explores in detail the everyday survival of minibus and okada transport workers. Like many informal workers, transport operators have no fixed income, no days off and no social protection. And, as elsewhere on the continent, drivers have to speed to make ends meet. A central argument of the book is that corruption levels are high on the road.</p>
<p>My view, as a scholar of <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/histoire/en/researcher/Laurent%20Fourchard/76183.html">Nigerian history and political sociology</a>, is that the book’s solid empirical base makes it an important study of transport working conditions in the country. Agbiboa usefully questions the distinction – recently established by critical scholars – between “capitalist owners” (of minibuses) and “proletarian workers” (who have only their labour to sell) in Africa’s cities. In Lagos, he suggests, the workers have the potential to earn more money than the owners. </p>
<p>The author also places Lagos in a larger conversation about informal transport in Africa’s cities, moving beyond any exceptional character of Lagos. He rightly insists there is order beyond the apparent chaos in African cities.</p>
<p>The book also documents the efforts of some transport associations to challenge state laws which deprive workers of their revenues. In an attempt to promote Lagos as a “world class city”, the <a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/09/04/lagos-traffic-law-okada-riders-vow-resistance/">2012 Lagos State Law</a> banned motorbike riders from operating on the most important roads of the state and wealthy neighbourhoods. <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2012/12/13/okada-riders-loss-battle-against-lagos-traffic-law/">Okada attempted to resist but eventually lost</a>. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-okada-motorcycles-have-a-bad-image-but-banning-them-solves-nothing-154765">saga</a> revealed the imbalance of power and the official narrative that associated motorbike drivers with crime, danger and disorder.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-okada-motorcycles-have-a-bad-image-but-banning-them-solves-nothing-154765">Nigeria's okada motorcycles have a bad image, but banning them solves nothing</a>
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</em>
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<p>. </p>
<h2>Extortion and complicity</h2>
<p>Agbiboa suggests the daily encounters between <em>agbero</em> (the agents who collect fees from drivers for the transport union), drivers and police agents are marked by extortion and complicity. </p>
<p>The book asserts complicity between <em>agbero</em> and police agents and never between <em>agbero</em> and drivers. My own observations in several motor parks in Lagos suggest, however, that there isn’t always complicity between <em>agbero</em> and police, and that complicity between <em>agbero</em> and drivers is very common. Most <em>agbero</em> and drivers work together daily in the same garage for years, sometimes for decades. They know each other and develop various forms of sociability that could not be reduced to violent exploitation. </p>
<p>To a large extent, the book presents the drivers’ perspective, more than that of union members, whose voices are rarely heard. Most drivers are not members of the <a href="https://web.facebook.com/nurtwabuja/?_rdc=1&_rdr">National Union of Road Transport Workers</a>, but former drivers are often union members. </p>
<p>The union is powerful in regulating transport and plays a key role in electoral politics, two dimensions that remain to be explored in more detailed empirical works. </p>
<p>The book presents the union mainly as a criminal organisation. The author defends the hypothesis of a predatory union-state alliance that “eats the sweat” of drivers. This view has merit but it probably needs further explanation. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2022.2132924">My own research suggests</a> there are more ambivalent relationships between union members, state officials, police and military officers at the grassroots level. Union members are often in conflict with the police while negotiating with police officers for the release of their drivers from police stations or jails. None of them want the drivers working under their authority to be arrested, and many of them try to protect them against police extortion in order to keep business flowing.</p>
<p>Agbiboa makes a welcome distinction between <em>agbero</em> identified with a specific garage or motorpark and “area boys”, or “delinquents” associated with a particular neighbourhood. <em>Agbero</em> do not want to be associated with crime: they think of themselves as workers. Still, <em>agbero</em> are criminalised in the book. They are the easy target of public criticism. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=922&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537269/original/file-20230713-23-fn0yq9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1158&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The book.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/they-eat-our-sweat-9780198861546?cc=us&lang=en&">Oxford University Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2><em>Agbero</em> seen as outlaws</h2>
<p>Drivers insist that <em>agbero</em> are making easy money from their work but, as my <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02255189.2022.2132924">research</a> has found, <em>agbero</em> are often in the same precarious conditions as transport workers themselves. Their leaders impose on them a daily revenue target to be taken from the drivers. Many of them hardly make a living from their work. </p>
<p>In my view, the <em>agbero</em> has become the new figure of a long history of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4100568">criminalisation of poor young urban men</a>. Transport in Nigeria could be better understood if <em>agbero</em> were analysed as the least powerful members of the union working for the benefit of more powerful and better connected members of society: union bureaucrats, government officials, politicians and law enforcement agents who have a common interest in keeping this revenue system intact. </p>
<p>These remarks aside, Agbiboa’s book is the most detailed and accurate account of Nigeria’s road transport system so far.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurent Fourchard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new book focuses on the politics of road transport, the everyday corruption and the hard-living world of transport workers in Lagos, Nigeria.Laurent Fourchard, Research Fellow, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.