tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/des-van-rooyen-30835/articlesDes van Rooyen – The Conversation2017-02-21T08:40:21Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/732862017-02-21T08:40:21Z2017-02-21T08:40:21ZReplacing South Africa’s finance minister, or his deputy, would carry a heavy cost<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157660/original/image-20170221-18664-9zq029.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Finance minister Pravin Gordhan, his deputy Mcebisi Jonas, and Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many see <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2017-02-17-brian-molefe-to-be-sworn-in-as-a-member-of-parliament">the decision</a> by South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) to send the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2016-11-03-state-of-capture-report-reduces-brian-molefe-to-tears/">disgraced</a> former CEO of the power utility Eskom to parliament as the precursor to another <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/02/17/brian-molefe-becomes-an-mp-next-stop-finance-minister/">attack</a> on the National Treasury and to remove finance minister Pravin Gordhan. </p>
<p>The decision to give Brian Molefe a seat in the country’s parliament has led to widespread <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-02-20-life-of-brian-mexican-standoff-looms-for-zuma-of-guptas-new-cabinet-deployee/">speculation</a> that he is being positioned for a cabinet post – either as finance minister or as deputy finance minister. While some commentators believe that President Jacob Zuma has his sights set on appointing Molefe as finance <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/02/17/Molefe-as-MP-seen-as-a-bid-to-oust-finance-minister-Gordhan">minister</a>, others <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/02/17/whats-the-real-plan-for-brian-molefe/">argue</a> that the real target is Deputy Minister Mcebisi Jonas. The deputy minister <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/mcebisi-jonas-takes-on-ajay-gupta-over-saxonwold-meeting-20170217">blew the whistle</a> on an alleged bribery attempt by a member of the Gupta family which is at the centre of a political storm amid allegations that it has attempted to exert undo influence on Zuma.</p>
<p>Either way, there is no doubt that Molefe’s appointment to either position would cause substantial turmoil in the country’s financial system and cost South Africa billions of rand. </p>
<h2>The cost of the rand taking a knock</h2>
<p>South Africa would take a massive economic blow because its currency would depreciate dramatically. The rand <a href="http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=ZAR">fell</a> through the floor the last time Zuma made a misbegotten attempt to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zumas-actions-point-to-shambolic-management-of-south-africas-economy-52174">install</a> one of his cronies at the helm of the National Treasury in December 2015.</p>
<p>This should worry South Africans. The country’s current account <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16218.pdf">deficit</a> in the third quarter of 2016 was 4.1%. This means that the sum of imports and external debt – borrowing from abroad – is larger than the sum of its exports and lending abroad. Mineral products, machinery and chemical products alone <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/zaf/all/show/2014/">constitute</a> more than 50% of South Africa’s imports. A weaker rand would make these more expensive since the country would have to pay more rand per dollar value. This means that prices for everything from consumer products to transportation would go up. South African firms, which often depend on intermediate inputs from abroad, would face a rise in the cost for their products and an erosion of their profits. As a consequence, fewer people would invest in the country.</p>
<p>A currency depreciation would affect investors in other ways too. A weaker rand would diminish their returns and they would therefore be more likely to look for investment opportunities elsewhere. Not only will they stop investing, they would also likely unwind their existing positions. This in turn would drain liquidity from the financial system, making banks less likely to provide new loans for businesses. The knock on effect would be lower growth and higher unemployment.</p>
<p>It is difficult to put a number on the impact of a sudden depreciation of the rand. But some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations can help. South Africa spends roughly US$10 billion more on imports than it gets from exports. This corresponds roughly to R130 billion per year. If the rand weakens from 13 to 14 Rand per US$1, the country would need another R10 billion to finance its trade imbalance. </p>
<p>South Africa has watched this movie before. Between November 2015 and January 2016 when Zuma installed the backbencher Des van Rooyen as finance minister the rand weakened from R14.4 to R16.9 per US$. This R2.5 increase per US$ corresponded to additional R25 billion cost to finance our trade deficit. On top of this <a href="http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2015/12/15/cost-to-sa-of-zuma-v-rooyen-gordhan-nene-r171bn/">private investors</a> are estimated to have lost R171 billion after finance minister Nhlanhla Nene <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2015/12/09/New-finance-minister-announced">was fired in 2015</a>.</p>
<h2>Secondary effects</h2>
<p>Removing either the finance minister or his deputy would also result in rating agencies downgrading the country’s investment rating to junk status. </p>
<p>Zuma has shown in the past that he has no clue about the impact of ratings on the country’s finances. Amidst threats of downgrade late last year Zuma was <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/zuma-we-take-the-ratings-agencies-very-seriously-but-20161025">quoted</a> as saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>But although they’re important, their ratings don’t necessarily have an impact on the agreements and commissions South Africa have entered into with other countries.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This simply is not true. A downgrade affects the interest rates on every new bond issuance. Every year some of our outstanding R2,000 billion <a href="https://commodity.com/debt-clock?off">domestic</a> and R141 billion foreign denominated debt has to be <a href="http://www.resbank.co.za/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/7195/08Statistical%20tables%20%E2%80%93%20Public%20Finance.pdf">rolled over</a>. Debt services are already at roughly R150 billion per year – the second largest position in the country’s <a href="https://www.fanews.co.za/article/economy/43/budget-2016/1390/budget-2016-all-about-debt-stabilisation-and-a-social-compact/19856">budget</a>. A 5% increase in the country’s refinancing cost would already cost South Africa additional R7.5 billion every year. Money that is missing to finance social grants, healthcare, police or student bursaries.</p>
<p>The banking group Absa did some <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/145453/fears-over-south-africa-junk-status-this-is-how-it-will-affect-you/">sample calculations</a> on how a ratings downgrade would affect the average South African. It concluded that every adult person would lose roughly R2,000 because a ratings downgrade would mean that the banks themselves would face higher refinancing costs. These would be passed on to their customers. </p>
<p>These numbers mirror a World Bank <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/145453/fears-over-south-africa-junk-status-this-is-how-it-will-affect-you/">estimate</a> that a ratings downgrade in South Africa would result in a reduction of R1,000 per capita by the end of 2017.</p>
<p>The numbers paint a clear picture. Zuma’s last attack on the National Treasury cost South Africa <a href="http://www.biznews.com/undictated/2015/12/15/cost-to-sa-of-zuma-v-rooyen-gordhan-nene-r171bn/">billions</a>. Molefe’s appointment would be seen as another attack on the institution given that he was implicated by the former public protector Thuli Madonsela in her state capture <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-02-breaking-read-the-full-state-capture-report/">report</a>. The effect of his appointment would be equally costly for the country. </p>
<p>South Africans should not allow this raid on the National Treasury to happen. The last time Zuma and his allies attempted to capture a well-functioning institution for their own personal gains the private sector gave them a hiding. The good news is that it is likely that markets will show a strong reaction this time, too. The question is whether ordinary South Africans realise the threat that a captured National Treasury would pose to their wallets and stand up before it is too late.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73286/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Co-Pierre Georg is a Policy Associate at Economic Research Southern Africa. He writes in his private capacity.</span></em></p>The decision to give former Eskom CEO, Brian Molefe, a seat in the country’s parliament comes with the potential to cause great economic pain for South Africa.Co-Pierre Georg, Associate Professor, UCT School of Economics; South African Reserve Bank Research Chair in Financial Stability Studies, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680962016-11-02T16:51:40Z2016-11-02T16:51:40ZTide begins to turn against South Africa’s president and his supporters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144260/original/image-20161102-27212-1kcdzpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protestors call for the removal of South Africa President Jacob Zuma outside court in Pretoria, the capital city.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Hutchings/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are growing signs the tide has indeed begun to turn against South African President Jacob Zuma and his supporters. The politics of patronage is no longer working as it used to when Zuma’s defenders could be rewarded for their efforts with promotion, tenders, or a lucrative revolving door to corporate directorships. </p>
<p>In addition, his power base is in a state of increasing disarray. Zuma came to power on a <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-03-coalition-of-the-wounded-turn-on-zuma">campaign driven</a> by the African National Congress Youth League, Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), and the South African Communist Party. Today the youth league is a <a href="http://www.destinyconnect.com/2016/02/08/anc-youth-league-still-relevant-young-people/">shadow of its former vibrant self</a>. The trade union federation has split, with large unions such as the <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/numsa-zuma-must-resign-1678131">National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa</a> and the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/11/01/Zumas-position-now-untenable-and-he-must-resign-Nehawu">National Education, Health and Allied Workers’ Union</a> opposing him. The Communists are now strident in <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/curb-zumas-powers-20160827">condemning state capture</a>.</p>
<p>For the moment Zuma’s supporters control the ANC’s levers of power. But an unprecedented and growing army of ANC veterans, whose service to the party goes back to the 1950s, like <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ahmed-mohamed-kathy-kathrada">Ahmed Kathrada</a>, <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/andrew-mokete-mlangeni">Andrew Mlangeni</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/ben-turok">Ben Turok</a>, issue public protest upon <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/10/28/101-ANC-stalwarts-pen-open-letter-backing-Gordhan">public protest</a>. </p>
<p>Most devastating of all, the ANC’s chief whip in parliament, Jackson Mthembu – whose very job description includes caucus discipline – backs critics of the ANC’s current executive. The chief whip would certainly not have issued his statement that the party’s leadership <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/10/23/Mthembu-calls-for-entire-ANC-leadership-to-step-down">should resign</a> unless he had taken the feeling of the majority of his caucus.</p>
<p>In short, Zuma’s critics within the ANC are emboldened to make protest upon protest, with clearly growing momentum. There is a sense that the Zuma machine within the ANC has begun to grind to a halt.</p>
<h2>The unravelling</h2>
<p>Some key Zuma allies are now deeply wounded, if not rendered ineffective. Among them are his defenders in the prosecution agencies, including the <a href="https://www.npa.gov.za/">National Prosecuting Authority</a>. Its powerful deputy director of public prosecutions Nomgcobo Jiba and the Specialised Commercial Crimes head Lawrence Mrwebi have felt the heat. Instead of being rewarded for their hard work protecting Zuma, their efforts got them <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/16/NPA-places-Jiba-on-special-leave">debarred as advocates</a>. And the president was compelled to institute an inquiry into whether they are fit and proper persons to hold their current posts. </p>
<p>Next, Shaun Abrahams, the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, ignominiously had to <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/npa-drops-charges-against-gordhan-2085233">withdraw</a> his threatened prosecution of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. A barrage of critics want him declared <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-10-31-shaun-abrahams-double-trouble/#.WBngtfp97IU">unfit for office</a>.</p>
<p>Another Zuma ally, police minister Nathi Nhleko has also suffered a severe setback. His repeated attempts to dismiss Robert McBride from the Independent Police Investigative Directorate have backfired. The National Prosecuting Authority has withdrawn charges of fraud and <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-national/1332262/npa-withdraws-charges-robert-mcbride-co/">defeating the ends of justice</a> against him.</p>
<p>It appears that the <a href="http://mg.co.za/tag/gupta-family">Gupta family</a> – accused of “capturing” Zuma and some of his cabinet ministers – also seems to be hedging its bets. There are reports that it has bought a <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/the-guptas-r445m-dubai-pad-20160507">R450 million mansion</a> (US$34 million) in Dubai.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, Zuma’s legal woes never seem to cease. Yet <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/11/02/live-blog-the-release-of-the-state-capture-report-as-it-happens">another report</a> from the retired Public Protector has not been good news for Zuma and his cronies, Minerals Minister Mosebenzi Zwane and Cooperative Governance Minister Des van Rooyen. </p>
<p>Zuma’s legal team has managed to stall a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-03-07-this-way-out-holomisas-exit-strategy-for-jacob-zuma/#.WBn2u_p97IU">flurry of litigation</a> from the official opposition and tenacious NGOs throughout the five years of his first term of office which started in 2009. His second term hasn’t been easier and it will now be tougher to continue stalling.</p>
<p>If Zuma is prosecuted at some point in the future, there is now no longer any guarantee that there will be hand-picked prosecutors in place should he come to court.</p>
<p>And up to 1000 former ANC municipal councillors are now unemployed following the recent local government <a href="https://theconversation.com/major-shift-in-south-african-politics-as-the-da-breaks-out-of-its-cape-enclave-63619">elections</a>. Councillors voted out of office only get a once-off severance payment, but no pensions. That once-off payment will have run out by now. Demoralisation and despair will be eroding Zuma’s support from that constituency too. ANC national MPs and provincials MPs will be calculating how a continuing Zuma presidency might hurt their own chances in the 2019 election.</p>
<h2>On the defensive</h2>
<p>Zuma supporters in the ANC are on the defensive. They are no longer able to justify <a href="http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201408222154-0024098">Nkandlagate</a> – the scandal over the use of public money on his private homestead – or his allegedly corrupt relationship with the <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-23-zupta-contagion-hard-questions-anc-must-ask-but-cant/#.WBn5APp97IU">Guptas</a>. </p>
<p>His supporters are reduced to diversionary debating tactics and peddling in <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/27/Report-Police-investigation-opened-into-Thuli-Madonsela-spy-claims">conspiracy theories</a> and western imperialist plots for regime change. This attempt at smearing Zuma’s critics within the ANC as foreign agents is carrying less weight than ever before.</p>
<p>Meantime the official opposition, <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">the Democratic Alliance</a>, has announced it is transferring a chunk of its HQ staff to Johannesburg – with the specific mission of running a two and a half year election campaign against the ANC in the Gauteng Province. And so far, the difficult tactical alliance between the DA and Economic Freedom Fighters is holding.</p>
<p>British Prime Minister Harold Wilson famously remarked during the 1960s that a week can be a long time in politics. One ANC cabinet minister to whom I quoted that responded: “A <em>day</em> can be a long time in politics!”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68096/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC but writes this in his capacity as a political scientist. </span></em></p>For the moment President Zuma’s supporters control the governing ANC’s levers of power. But an unprecedented number of people in the ANC are turning against him. How long will the centre hold?Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/651232016-09-18T16:43:08Z2016-09-18T16:43:08ZSouth Africa’s dysfunctional cabinet is a far cry from Mandela’s era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137640/original/image-20160913-4983-33aar2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Nelson Mandela forged a powerful cabinet of national unity.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s cabinet has become dysfunctional. This highest executive body charged with managing the state’s daily affairs has 35 members. </p>
<p>The cabinet is responsible for, among other things:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… developing and implementing national policy [and] coordinating the functions of state departments and administration.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But judging from <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-patronage-and-state-capture-spell-trouble-for-south-africa-64704">recent events</a> it is failing dismally at its task. There is mounting evidence that cabinet’s co-ordination and decision-making capacity has collapsed. </p>
<p>It hasn’t always been this way. Recent history reveals just how important co-ordinated cabinet decision making can be. In 1994 President Nelson Mandela created a <a href="https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/downloads/vol3-2/Traniello.pdf">“power-sharing” cabinet</a>. It was made up of ministers from the African National Congress as well as the party’s erstwhile enemies – the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party. Mandela forged a powerful and effective decision-making body.</p>
<p>A functioning, stable cabinet is an important ingredient for building prosperity. This is particularly true in a developing democracy like South Africa. The executive cabinet is uniquely empowered to improve the quality of ordinary people’s lives.</p>
<p>A strong cabinet provides the direction and political impetus for schools to be run effectively, houses to be built and corruption to be minimised. And, as <a href="http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/kenya-powersharing-cabinet">illustrated by Kenya</a>, it can help restore order in the midst of instability.</p>
<p>But a disjointed cabinet beset by infighting, as infamously seen in countries like <a href="https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/escaping-political-deadlock-nepal-caretaker-cabinet">Nepal</a>, undermines the state’s ability to effectively implement development policies.</p>
<h2>Contradictory statements</h2>
<p>The recent <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-02-cabinet-to-seek-judicial-inquiry-into-banks-moves-against-the-guptas/#.V9aHIa2Gzvs">statement</a> by Mineral Resources Minister Mosebenzi Zwane provides the most glaring evidence of a meltdown in the executive. Zwane claimed that cabinet had resolved to establish a judicial inquiry into the country’s banking sector. </p>
<p>This came after South Africa’s four largest banks cut ties with companies linked to the controversial <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-there-needs-to-be-judicial-oversight-of-bank-account-closures-58003">Gupta family</a>. The family is at the centre of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-state-capture-is-a-regressive-step-for-any-society-56837">state capture allegations</a>. </p>
<p>Zwane was immediately contradicted by the presidency. It released a <a href="http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-09-02-presidency-statement-of-minister-of-mineral-resources-is-not-government-position/#.V9aIoK2Gzvs">statement</a> which said Zwane:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… does not speak on behalf of cabinet and the contents of his statement do not reflect the position or views of cabinet.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A defiant Zwane, who has previously been <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/guptas-have-business-link-to-mines-minister-zwane-20160219">linked</a> to the Guptas, refused to answer questions about the matter in parliament. </p>
<p>At the same sitting, his cabinet colleague and the finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, publicly distanced himself from the call for a judicial inquiry. Gordhan <a href="http://city-press.news24.com/News/gordhan-contradicts-zwane-on-call-for-banking-inquiry-20160908">asserted</a> that South Africa already had a strong financial regulatory framework in place.</p>
<p>This episode inflicted further damage on dwindling investor <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/02/SA-business-concerned-over-unstable-investor-confidence">confidence</a> in the country. </p>
<p>But the most concerning aspect of Zwane’s conduct is the fact that it was not an isolated incident.</p>
<p>Discord within cabinet was also evident in December last year when Zuma ill-fatedly replaced his finance minister, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-removal-of-south-africas-finance-minister-is-bad-news-for-the-country-52170">Nhlanhla Nene</a>, with Des van Rooyen.</p>
<p>The appointment sparked turmoil in the <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2015/12/13/Zuma-faces-uprising-over-Nene-sacking">currency markets</a> and Van Rooyen was moved to a different cabinet portfolio after <a href="http://www.fin24.com/Economy/pravin-gordhan-appointed-minister-of-finance-20151213">just four days</a>. He subsequently <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/08/30/Van-Rooyen-accuses-Gordhan-of-dragging-Hawks-investigation">launched</a> a public attack on his successor, Gordhan. </p>
<p>There are other recent examples of a lack of cohesion within cabinet. These include the <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nomvula-defies-treasury-20160910-2">revelation</a> that Water Affairs Minister Nomvula Mokonyane has defied the National Treasury by resolving to merge the country’s two most powerful water boards. </p>
<p>The scale of the infighting and conflicting messages suggest that the Zuma cabinet has undermined its ability to manage the affairs of state. It evidently lacks coherent, deliberate and evidence-based policymaking procedures. It is quite simply the most paralysed cabinet the country has had since democratisation in 1994.</p>
<p>Thanks to Mandela’s effective leadership, in addition to the tireless work of committed people like Cabinet Secretary Jakes Gerwel, a group of former adversaries were able to overcome their differences for the sake of the public interest. </p>
<p>Despite challenges, Mandela’s cabinet ultimately laid the foundation for a long-term democratic future through the adoption of the <a href="http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996">1996 Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>Out of the ashes of apartheid, Mandela’s cabinet also played a central role in:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>creating the conditions to restore fiscal stability;</p></li>
<li><p>drawing up new laws;</p></li>
<li><p>conducting South Africa’s first democratic local government elections; and</p></li>
<li><p>supporting the creation of key institutions such as the Constitutional Court and Public Protector. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>But it would appear those days are long gone. Mandela fostered an environment of goal-oriented collaboration, dialogue and compromise. And while Thabo Mbeki’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/12283440">centralisation</a> of executive power ultimately contributed to a political backlash that cost him his job, his administration was downright coherent compared to the Zuma cabinet. </p>
<p>Zuma’s lack of leadership and his relentless focus on self-enrichment has created an environment of fear, factionalism and selfishness.</p>
<p>While Mandela’s cabinet made allies out of erstwhile adversaries, Zuma’s cabinet is making enemies out of former allies.</p>
<p>A functional, collaborative and goal-oriented cabinet is vital for good governance. In recent months Zuma and many of his fellow executives have conclusively demonstrated they lack the leadership qualities needed to steer South Africa out of its economic and social crises.</p>
<p>With ever-darker storm clouds gathering on the horizon, the country’s captain is feasting below deck while his ministers fight over control of the ship’s wheel. If it is not steadied, the consequences will be disastrous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leon Schreiber does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While Nelson Mandela’s cabinet made allies out of erstwhile adversaries, Jacob Zuma’s cabinet is making enemies out of former allies.Leon Schreiber, Senior Research Specialist, Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/646432016-09-01T15:35:45Z2016-09-01T15:35:45ZComrades in arms against apartheid are now at one another’s throats<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/135954/original/image-20160830-28260-1ivszm5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Des van Rooyen, cooperative governance minister and new treasurer-general of the MK Military Veterans Association. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">eNCA.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa’s embattled finance minister Pravin Gordhan has come under attack from two colleagues in government. The public attack has <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-30-des-van-rooyen-says-gordhan-is-undermining-the-hawks-and-trying-to-garner-sympathy">made headlines</a> because all three men serve in government as members of the African National Congress (ANC). In addition, they all served in the ANC’s military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. Gordhan was, and is, very much the two men’s senior. Cooperative governance minister Des van Rooyen and military veterans’ affairs deputy minister Kebby Maphatsoe inferred at a <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2016/08/29/Gordhan-accused-of-undermining-the-Hawks-using-media-to-solicit-sympathy">media briefing</a> that Gordhan’s <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2016/08/24/hawks-accuse-pravin-gordhan-of-corruption">refusal</a> to present himself to the country’s elite police unit, the Hawks, was because he had something to hide. Politics and society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Keith Gottschalk to unpack what the incident says about tensions in the ANC.</em></p>
<p><strong>How important was MK in the liberation struggle and what significance does it have today?</strong></p>
<p>Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was the armed wing of the then underground ANC. While it could never physically block apartheid soldiers from entering any “liberated zone”, its importance was threefold.</p>
<p>First, it electrified millions of oppressed people to mobilise internally in the United Democratic Front, trade unions and a host of civil society organisations and their campaigns “to make South Africa <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41067113?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">ungovernable</a>”.</p>
<p>Second, it gave the ANC credibility internationally as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-anc-survive-the-end-of-south-africas-heroic-epoch-57256">dominant resistance movement</a> against the apartheid regime, in a way that for example, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, the Azanian People’s Organisation and the Unity Movement could never claim. </p>
<p>Third, its activities compelled the apartheid regime to extend conscription successively during the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/military-service-becomes-compulsory-white-south-african-men">Conscription</a> was instituted in 1962 in the form of nine months of service for all white males between the ages of 17 and 65. Conscripts became members of the South African Defence Force or the South African Police. They were used to enforce the government’s stance against liberation movements, anti-apartheid activists and the “communist threat”. </p>
<p>In 1972, conscription (national service) was increased from nine months to one year. After completing the year, they were called up annually for 19 days for five years as part of the Citizen Force. </p>
<p>By the middle of 1974 control of northern Namibia was handed over to the South African Defence Force from the South African Police, and in 1975 the army invaded Angola. To keep up with operational demands, Citizen Force members were then required to complete three-month tours of duty.</p>
<p>In 1977 conscription was once again increased, this time to two years plus 30 days annually for eight years. </p>
<p>The state was also forced to pour funds into the Armaments Corporation of South Africa <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/topic/armaments-corporation-south-africa-armscor">(Armscor)</a>, building <a href="http://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/">six atomic bombs</a> and a long-range missile to threaten neighbouring states that were providing rear bases to MK. All this was a crippling financial burden which contributed to bring down the apartheid state, as did the emigration of white professionals to <a href="http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AG1977/AG1977-A5-19-001-jpeg.pdf">avoid conscription</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What role did Gordhan play in MK?</strong></p>
<p>Gordhan was in the MK underground network operating in KwaZulu-Natal during the 1980s. He was joint secretary of the Regional Politico Military Committee in the greater Durban region of the then banned and underground ANC.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=823&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136262/original/image-20160901-1030-1oljgze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1035&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">South African finance minister Pravin Gordhan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gordhan was responsible for setting up a number of MK units operating in what was then southern Natal. He was closely involved in the mobilisation process and recruitment of young guerrillas in that area to undergo military training inside South Africa. This was part of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/members-anc-and-sacp-are-detained-due-operation-vula">Operation Vula</a>, one of the ANC’s major offensives towards the end of apartheid. Gordhan was <a href="http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/37a/043.html">one of nine senior</a> Operation Vula trialists charged with terrorism by the apartheid state - it was the last terrorism trial in pre-democratic South Africa. In 1991 they were indemnified by the government.</p>
<p><strong>What is the status of MK today?</strong></p>
<p>MK was disbanded in 1991. The <a href="http://mkmva.anc.org.za/show.php?id=11329">MK Military Veterans Association</a> was formed shortly afterwards. Today it is just another ANC structure like the <a href="http://www.ancyl.org.za/">Youth League</a> and the <a href="http://womensleague.anc.org.za/">Women’s League</a>.</p>
<p>MK veterans are not a political force per se. But they are mobilised by <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/fransman-claims-anc-factions-out-to-stop-him-2045705">rival factions</a> within the ANC. For example, the smear attacks by <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/09/14/kebby-admits-he-ran-away-from-mk-camp1">Maphatsoe</a> against former intelligence minister <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/kasrils-and-kebby-settle-defamation-case-2060192">Ronnie Kasrils</a> are part of his defence of President Zuma. It is unlikely that his smears represent the views of most veterans, or that he has even consulted them.</p>
<p>These <a href="http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/03/02/behind-the-sars-wars-are-intelligence-agents-with-agendas">contestations</a> will continue until Zuma’s successor has been chosen by the ANC. This should happen in 2017 when the ANC is due to hold its national conference to <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-02-mchunu-zikalala-war-foreshadows-ancs-2017-leadership-race">elect</a> a new president and national executive.</p>
<p><strong>What does the attack on Gordhan by two colleagues tell us about the ANC?</strong></p>
<p>ANC disagreements, like those of the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-01/corbyn-sows-civil-war-as-u-k-labour-lawmakers-desert-him">British Labour Party</a>, are more often in public than is the case with their rival parties. For example, it is many years since then Democratic Alliance (DA) leader Helen Zille publicly <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2012-01-24-hilarious-storm-over-das-mazibuko-mnqasela-to-plead-not-guilty">dressed down</a> a (black) DA elected representative for saying that the party’s former parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, was not black enough. </p>
<p>But when cabinet ministers and deputy ministers criticise each other in public, as both Van Rooyen and Maphatsoe have done with Gordhan, it shows that even the top leadership is seriously divided on important issues.</p>
<p><strong>What does it all mean going forward?</strong></p>
<p>What this means for the future is that divisiveness between ANC factions in national and provincial structures will continue or even deteriorate all the way in the run-up to its 2017 conference.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member. He writes this in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>MK, the army of the then banned ANC, electrified millions of oppressed people to rise against the apartheid regime. Today, its veterans are being used in factional battles within the ruling party.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.