tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/dutch-politics-26453/articlesDutch politics – The Conversation2023-11-23T17:38:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2184772023-11-23T17:38:41Z2023-11-23T17:38:41ZGeert Wilders: how election victory in the Netherlands for Party for Freedom fits into a wider picture of European radical-right populism<p>The results of the Dutch election, in which Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom emerged as victors, have sent shockwaves through the political establishment.</p>
<p>For the first time in Dutch history, a party of the extreme right is the largest in the national parliament. Wilders is an eccentric politician known for his inflammatory rhetoric. He advocates the Netherlands leaving the European Union and has called Islam a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam">“fascist” religion</a>. In a 2016 trial, he was found <a href="https://theconversation.com/guilty-verdict-but-an-excellent-day-for-dutch-far-right-leader-geert-wilders-nonetheless-70227">guilty of inciting discrimination</a> (but received no penalty for the crime).</p>
<p>While polling leading up to the election had suggested that Party for Freedom could become the largest party, it had appeared to be running practically neck and neck with the parties of the mainstream left and right. But the polls were wide of the mark and Wilders ended up taking the most seats by a comfortable margin, even if he will need to seek coalition partners to form a government. </p>
<p>Rightwing newcomers the New Social Contract also did very well. Like Party for Freedom, this party sees immigration as one of the reasons for problems such as the Netherlands’ congested public services and lack of affordable housing. However, Pieter Omtzigt, the New Social Contract’s leader (and a former member of parliament for the more centre-right Christian Democratic Party), is critical of some of Wilders’ more inflammatory rhetoric. </p>
<p>Omtzigt would nevertheless seem the most likely candidate to form a coalition with Wilders, together with the former party of the now-departed prime minister, Mark Rutte. But it will be some time before it’s clear if such a partnership is achievable. Coalition in the Netherlands is the work of months rather than weeks. </p>
<p>These talks will be all the more complex thanks to Wilders’ personal profile. He may hold the greatest number of seats, but the controversy that has surrounded him for so many years may yet rule him out of the role of prime minister, even were he to be part of a governing coalition.</p>
<p>Should a coalition be formed, questions about the Netherlands’ place in the EU will inevitably come to the fore. Wilders wants a Brexit-style referendum and, even if this doesn’t materialise, we can expect him to bring a more Eurosceptic stance to any government in which he participates.</p>
<p>This could have considerable consequences for the EU. Even when extreme-right parties in Europe differ on the question of exit, they agree on transforming the EU into a more intergovernmental body, taking power away from Brussels.</p>
<h2>An example from Italy</h2>
<p>Wilders will be conscious of how the Italian elections played out last year for Italy’s prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, with whom he shares a certain ideological affinity. Meloni’s radical-right Brothers of Italy emerged as the strongest force in the 2022 vote and formed a coalition with other parties of the right and hard right.</p>
<p>Like Wilders, Meloni was seen as a political outsider and has long put immigration at the heart of political debate. But since coming to power, her strong anti-immigration rhetoric has had to be simmered down. She was quickly confronted with calls from the business community to address Italy’s labour shortage, which meant granting permits for migrant workers. </p>
<p>In my book <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvt9k3d3">Political Entrepreneurs</a>, co-authored with Sara Hobolt from the London School of Economics, we show that governing changes political parties. It is relatively easy to gripe from the sidelines but in government, parties bear responsibility for policy. They have to make decisions, weigh up interests – and can only spend money once. Meloni, like the leaders of so many other populist parties, quickly lost her sharp edge once she became the person in charge. </p>
<p>Most notably for Wilders, the Brothers of Italy had also campaigned with a Eurosceptic tone during the election, but can now be found walking in lockstep with Brussels even on matters relating to immigration. Meloni has even <a href="https://euobserver.com/migration/157613">made a show of her closeness</a> with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.</p>
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<p>That said, the Italian experience also offers another example that Wilders may find appealing. In our research, we’ve found that parties that have become popular by opposing existing politics sometimes prefer to keep one foot in the government and one foot out. This is certainly the case for Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega party and a junior coalition partner to Meloni. </p>
<p>Salvini never misses an opportunity to boost his own profile, even if it causes <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49318000">his government difficulty</a>. Only a junior coalition partner can get away with such antics, since a prime minister faces far more pressure. Wilders may therefore find it most convenient to follow Salvini’s path rather than Meloni’s.</p>
<p>Whichever route he takes, if Wilders becomes part of a government, the results of these elections are certain to have consequences for Dutch relations with the rest of Europe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine de Vries does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The controversial Dutch politician has won the most seats in parliament, but may still find it expedient to be the junior partner in a coalition governmentCatherine de Vries, Professor of Political Science, Fellow and member of the Management Council of the Institute for European Policymaking, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572902021-06-10T14:56:29Z2021-06-10T14:56:29ZDutch elections show the promise and perils of proportional representation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405401/original/file-20210609-14971-szflz2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C3413&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People stand in line waiting to vote in the Hague in the Netherlands.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Dutch elections were <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/17/mark-rutte-s-party-wins-most-seats-in-dutch-general-election-exit-poll-suggests">held almost three months ago</a>, but it’s still unclear who will form the next government. This is normal in the Netherlands, <a href="https://www.expatica.com/nl/living/gov-law-admin/netherlands-political-system-100756/">where all governments are coalitions because no party ever wins a majority of the seats</a>. </p>
<p>After the March 2017 elections, the new government wasn’t installed until October, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-government-idUSKBN1CV15D">record-setting 225 days after the elections</a>. That government included four parties; the new government now being negotiated is likely to include five or more.</p>
<p>With the single member plurality electoral system — known as “first past the post” — Canadians are used to quick results. On the rare occasions that no single party wins a majority of seats, the parties quickly determine if they can govern as a minority with support from other parties, as the current Liberal government is doing. </p>
<p>The first-past-the-post system, however, distorts the results. <a href="https://theconversation.com/federal-election-frustrations-for-the-greens-highlight-electoral-system-flaws-again-125621">In the 2019 Canadian election</a>, Justin Trudeau’s Liberals won 46 per cent of seats with only 33 per cent of the votes while the Conservatives won 36 per cent of seats with 34 per cent of the votes. </p>
<p>Despite winning more than twice as many votes as the Bloc Québecois, with nine per cent of seats at under eight per cent of the votes, the NDP won only seven per cent of seats, the Greens won only three seats despite winning almost seven per cent of the votes, and no other party won seats. </p>
<h2>Proportional representation</h2>
<p>By contrast, elections in the Netherlands operate with pure proportional representation, with no threshold. To win one of the 150 seats in the Dutch parliament, a party needs only 1/150th of the votes — currently around 70,000. </p>
<p>Most countries using proportional representation have an electoral threshold, often five per cent, so parties winning less than that don’t win seats. Because so few votes are needed to win a seat in the Dutch parliament, <a href="https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK20210317">37 parties ran candidates and 17 parties elected representatives</a>.</p>
<p>Had Canada used the Dutch system in 2019, the Conservatives would have had a few more seats than the Liberals (who would have had far fewer seats), the Bloc would have had fewer, the NDP and Greens would have had more, and even Maxime Bernier’s People’s Party would have won a few seats. </p>
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<p>This splintered political landscape in the Netherlands is relatively new. As recently as 2012, the government could be formed with only two parties: Mark Rutte’s conservative Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie party, known as VVD (41 seats) in coalition with Labour (38 seats). In earlier years, the largest party often won 50 or more seats. </p>
<p>The fact that every vote counts means that participation in Dutch elections is high: 79 per cent voted in March, a slight dip from the 82 per cent who voted in the previous elections — but far above the <a href="https://elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=turn&document=index&lang=e">67 per cent of Canadian voters who turned out in 2019 and the 59 per cent who voted in 2008</a>.</p>
<h2>New ideas, emerging trends</h2>
<p>Proportional representation also means that new ideas and societal trends quickly enter parliament. A Green party and an anti-immigration party both won seats as early as the 1980s, and the new Dutch parliament includes <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/06/02/caged-bunnies-budgies-may-outlawed-netherlands/">representatives of an animal rights party</a>, several religious parties, a party for pensioners, a farmer’s party and <a href="https://voltnederland.org/">three members of the pan-European party Volt</a>.</p>
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<img alt="A man in a suit and tie waves" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405390/original/file-20210609-14704-16vyxfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=515&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte arrives for an EU summit in Sweden in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)</span></span>
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<p>With proportional representation combined with a divided society, one might expect chaos and instability. Yet the opposite is often true: Rutte has been in office since 2010 and is widely expected to continue as prime minister, despite <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mark-rutte-netherlands-europe-elections-338dc3293ec7bf1ac206c9f3659caea1">parliament passing a motion of censure against him</a>.</p>
<p>Because VVD won the most votes, the party won’t drop him as leader. And the other potential governing parties do not appear to have the appetite or the numbers to cobble together the complex coalition required to govern without the VVD. </p>
<p>Similarly, it took a <a href="https://time.com/6053465/israel-netanyahu-coalition/">coalition of eight parties in Israel to oust prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu</a>, who had been prime minister since 2009. It’s common to see only incremental change rather than huge swings under proportional representation systems.</p>
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<p>By contrast, in first-past-the-post systems, small changes in vote share can lead to large swings. In the 2004 federal election, for example, Stephen Harper’s Conservatives dropped from 38 per cent to 30 per cent of votes, but <a href="https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=eim/issue16&document=p9&lang=e">actually increased their seats, from 78 to 99</a>. The Liberal vote share, meantime, dipped slightly from 41 per cent to 37 per cent but they fell dramatically, from 172 to 135 seats.</p>
<h2>Low-drama elections</h2>
<p>Elections under proportional representation tend to be less dramatic because the seats accurately reflect the vote share — though in the 2017 Dutch elections, Labour suffered a historic defeat.</p>
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<span class="caption">Dutch far-right leader Geert Wilders addresses the media at the Belgian federal parliament in Brussels in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Geert Vanden Wijngaert)</span></span>
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<p>It dropped from 25 per cent of the votes (38 seats) to under six per cent (nine seats), which they repeated this year. </p>
<p>Geert Wilders dropped from 20 seats to 17 while the upstart Forum for Democracy party grew from two in the 2017 elections to eight seats with five per cent of the vote — a far cry from the results of the 2019 provincial elections, where Forum rocketed to first place with almost 15 per of the votes. </p>
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<img alt="Thierry Baudet casts a ballot." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405396/original/file-20210609-15050-3jycm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Thierry Baudet, leader of the populist party Forum for Democracy, casts his ballot in the European elections in 2019 in Amsterdam.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Peter Dejong)</span></span>
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<p>Forum leader Thierry Baudet’s <a href="https://more.bham.ac.uk/populism-in-action/2021/01/15/the-dutch-far-right-in-2021-a-view-from-the-ground/">controversial statements and conspiracy theories</a> dimmed his prospects. </p>
<p>But he won some votes by campaigning against COVID-19 lockdown measures, while also enabling a new right-wing party led by two former Forum members to win three seats.</p>
<h2>Low geographic representation</h2>
<p>Pure proportional representation does not ensure geographic representation. The Netherlands has a <a href="https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/dashboard-bevolking">population of over 17 million people</a> in an area smaller than Nova Scotia. Yet even in such a small country, there are regional differences, and the existing electoral rules do a poor job of translating those differences into seats. </p>
<p>For example, while every one of Canada’s 338 MPs represents a specific geographic constituency, the most recent Dutch elections resulted in only one representative each from two of its 11 provinces; most representatives come from the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Randstad">dominant Randstad</a>.</p>
<p>This problem inspired one of the recommendations of the <a href="https://www.staatscommissieparlementairstelsel.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/07/18/download-the-english-translation-of-the-final-report-of-the-state-commission">parliamentary commission on the state of democracy in the Netherlands</a> — introducing a personal and regional component by assigning greater weight to preference votes. Dutch voters can vote for any candidate running for any party, but candidates now need one-quarter of the general threshold (approximately 17,500 votes) to jump ahead of their colleagues on the party list and win a seat.</p>
<p>The outgoing government supports the commission’s proposal, and if the new parliament agrees, it <a href="https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/burgerforum">could be in place in time for the 2023 elections</a>. By contrast, various proposals for proportional representation in Canada have so far failed to become law, despite considerable public support and a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-electoral-reform-proportional-representation-1.5225616">promise from Trudeau that the 2015 elections would be the last held under the first-past-the-post system</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157290/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Willem Maas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The March elections in the Netherlands, and the fact that a government still hasn’t been formed, illustrate both the benefits and problems with proportional representation.Willem Maas, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor of Political Science, Socio-Legal Studies, and Public & International Affairs, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1569932021-03-19T12:37:26Z2021-03-19T12:37:26ZDutch elections: Mark Rutte wins another term but fragmented results mask continuing popularity of the far right<p>For the fourth time in a row, the liberal-conservative party VVD has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56436297">won the Dutch general elections</a>. Prime Minister Mark Rutte, one of the longest serving leaders in Europe, will hold on to that status despite a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-56393820">tumultuous year</a>. </p>
<p>The VVD’s victory was predicted but the electoral gains made by one of its coalition partners in the last government – the social liberal D66 – were more surprising. Led by Sigrid Kaag, a multilingual former diplomat and ardent supporter of the European Union, D66 has become the second largest party in the Netherlands. That could force Rutte to orientate his future policy in a more pro-European direction. </p>
<p>As Rutte ruled out any form of cooperation with the two main radical right-wing parties – <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/geert-wilders-4827">Geert Wilders’</a> Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FVD) – he will have to engage with others. And in an increasingly fragmented political landscape, the VVD has more parties to choose from than ever. The 150-seat Dutch parliament will have 17 parties after this election result. It might take a while to form the government but it will probably end up being a broad continuation of the last. That means the VVD and D66 working with the Christian Democrats (who lost a few seats). They’ll need one other party to obtain a parliamentary majority. </p>
<p>But anyone thinking these results spell the end of nationalist-populist movements in the Netherlands should look closer. The PVV lost a few seats but if you combine its vote share with those of two other more recently established radical parties – JA21 and FVD (the only party that campaigned on anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination rhetoric) – the Dutch far right has won more seats than ever before.</p>
<h2>Beware the opposition</h2>
<p>In such a fragmented political landscape, opposition is a competitive yet interesting place to be. Holding a governing coalition together is difficult at the best of times, but Rutte has to tread the line between a large number of parties. That leaves space for radical right parties to continue to build their electoral prospects while presenting themselves as outsiders. They can propose radical change and criticise the government over an array of issues – including the poor quality of welfare state services, financial aid being sent to other countries and a lack of law and order – without having to assume any responsibilities. </p>
<p>Both within the Netherlands and beyond, this diversity of issues enables the far right to thrive. That’s because their constituency, too, is highly diverse. </p>
<p>To better understand the diversity behind the radical right vote, I travelled through France and the Netherlands for several years, holding <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/roads-to-the-radical-right-9780198863632?lang=en&cc=en">in-depth interviews</a> with 125 citizens who supported Wilders and France’s Marine Le Pen. The backgrounds of the voters I spoke with differed enormously. Some were highly educated, others less so, Some were old, some were young. Some were millionaires living in penthouses and others were unemployed and in social housing. </p>
<p>Voters with different profiles turned out to hold very different motives for voting for the same party. For instance, citizens I met in socially disadvantageous positions (low levels of education and income) principally claimed that they were unfairly disadvantaged with respect to migrants and asylum seekers. They particularly spoke about social housing, health care and elderly care in this context.</p>
<p>By contrast, small business owners and employees in the private sector were less likely to believe that they received too little. Instead, they said they felt they gave too much, especially to non-native outgroups who were believed to violate their work ethic – such as “lazy Greeks”, “profiteers in Brussels”, and “fortune seekers” benefiting from their tax contributions. Other voters I spoke to from the more well-off segments of society primarily voted PVV based on ideological considerations. They were denouncing non-native outgroups (especially Muslims), who they felt lacked the willingness to assimilate into (and so threaten) the native majority culture.</p>
<p>The key to understanding Wilders’ continuing electoral appeal, and that of his political allies, lies in the particular way in which he taps into these
variegated demands. He invokes an overarching opposition between native-versus-foreign in different issue domains, including identity, European integration, Islam, security and welfare chauvinism. </p>
<p>Like other nativist leaders, he opposes a broad “us” – including, in his case, the “hardworking”, “elderly”, “Judeo-Christian” as well as “ordinary” Dutch – to a broad range of non-native outgroups (“them”), that would threaten “our” traditions, freedom, identity and prosperity. Precisely this overarching opposition allows his diverse voters to identify themselves with the same nativist agenda.</p>
<p>In other words, Wilders’ boundaries between “us” and “them” are multiple and flexible (as the PVV-leader recently illustrated, during the COVID crisis, when attacking the Dutch government’s decision to financially support Italians rather than its own population). Yet they are all based on the same nativist principle, according to which “our people” should be put first. </p>
<h2>Post-pandemic politics</h2>
<p>Rutte has held onto his popularity by presenting himself as the national crisis manager who pragmatically steered his country through the pandemic. But at some point, a debate on political accountability will unavoidably unfold, including questions on how well prepared his government was for the crisis. This blame game might negatively affect the next government, especially if the composition of the coalition is similar to the last government.</p>
<p>At some point other political issues will return to the fore and the far right will be on more comfortable political ground. When migration begins to rise again after the pandemic, for example, Wilders will be reminded of how he soared in the polls during the refugee crisis of a few years ago. Similarly, the nativist right will see an opportunity in any talk of post-pandemic financial “solidarity” between European nations.</p>
<p>Comfortably installed in the opposition benches, Dutch MPs on the radical right will be more numerous than ever. They shouldn’t be expected to fade into obscurity in the years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Koen Damhuis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There will be 17 parties in the 150-seat parliament – and the radical right holds more of them than ever.Koen Damhuis, Assistant Professor, Utrecht University School of Governance, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1288082019-12-17T13:06:11Z2019-12-17T13:06:11ZWhat would the British parliament look like under proportional representation?<p>Perhaps the only thing on which Nigel Farage agrees with the Liberal Democrats and Green Party is the need for <a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/nick-ferrari/nigel-farage-tells-nick-ferrari-plans-post-brexit/">electoral reform</a> in British politics. </p>
<p>More and more politicians in the UK are pitching for a move to proportional representation (PR), an electoral system in which the overall vote share a party wins determines the number of seats in the legislature. This includes some <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-party-proportional-representation-corbyn-leader-polls-a9249196.html">within the Labour party</a> but not leaders in the Conservative Party, which is doing very well under the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, in which MPs are elected with a majority in local constituencies. </p>
<p>But how would the UK’s December 12 election have turned out under PR? My research has shown how <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269407976_It's_Just_Nice_to_Know_There's_Someone_Close_at_Hand_Representational_Distance_and_Satisfaction_with_Democracy_in_Europe">different electoral systems</a> create distance between the policies preferred by voters and those enacted by political parties that breeds dissatisfaction with democracy. I’ve now analysed the British election result to look at how it might have turned out differently under alternative voting systems. </p>
<p>Any exercise to model an alternative election outcome comes with the major caveat that we don’t know how a different electoral system would affect voting behaviour, especially in the long term. There are also plenty of different flavours of PR. Some, such as the single transferable vote system in Ireland and in local elections in Northern Ireland and Scotland, we can’t model because they would require too much information we don’t have about the different preferences of voters. </p>
<p>I focus here on two PR systems that contain some provisions that would address concerns in the UK about voting for candidates and not just parties: the Dutch and the German electoral system. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/if-you-are-disappointed-with-the-election-result-there-are-things-you-can-do-to-help-you-move-on-128883">If you are disappointed with the election result, there are things you can do to help you move on</a>
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<h2>Dutch versus German system</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190258658-e-44">Dutch system</a> is the most proportional because all voters choose from a single national list of candidates, rather than selecting representatives for their local district. Voters pick a party and then their chosen MP from that party. This allows voters to either vote for local candidates or nationally popular figures. Any candidate that receives a certain percentage of the vote wins a seat in the parliament.</p>
<p>In contrast, the German mixed-member system <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190258658-e-37">allocates half of the seats</a> to constituency candidates under FPTP, and the other half to regional lists of candidates.</p>
<p>To model what would have happened in the UK under each of these electoral systems, let’s assume that the number of seats remains as it is at 650. In the Dutch case, this would mean that a vote share of 0.154% translates into a seat, 15.4% into 10 seats, and so on. </p>
<p>Under the German system, we would need to redraw constituency boundaries to create 325 seats that would still be allocated under FPTP, and create another 325 seats elected from regional lists. A party gets its vote share from these lists translated into seats if it receives at least 5% of the votes, or if it wins three constituencies.</p>
<p>In the real German system, citizens have two votes, one for the constituency contest and one for the list vote. Here, we have to work out the results of both contests from the one vote people cast. My calculations are based on halving the number of seats each party won to give the constituency results, and using their final vote shares to give the list results.</p>
<p>The basic translation of the election result is presented in the graph below. The Conservatives would not have won an outright majority under either PR system, although they would have won more than 300 seats under the German mixed-member system. The Liberal Democrats do better and the Scottish National Party (SNP) worse under both systems. The Brexit Party and the Greens would only benefit under the Dutch system because both fail to reach the German electoral threshold of 5%.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=305&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307411/original/file-20191217-58292-1lhnano.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">UK 2019 seat distribution, by electoral system.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinz Brandenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are some things that cannot be factored in. For example, as the Dutch system doesn’t use electoral districts, all parties are electable everywhere in the country. That means that English voters could vote for the SNP or Irish voters in Britain could vote for Irish nationalist parties. But also, Northern Irish voters could choose whether to stick with their traditional parties or instead get involved more directly in selecting the UK government by voting for one of the mainstream British parties. </p>
<h2>Searching for a stable majority</h2>
<p>The problem with such a simple comparison of seat allocations under different electoral rules is that it ignores even the most obvious flaw: under PR there are either no or very different needs for tactical voting. </p>
<p>Almost all the poll movement throughout the 2019 election campaign was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49798197">from smaller to larger parties</a>, from the Brexit Party to the Conservatives, from Liberal Democrats to Labour. This represents voters responding to a squeeze that was being applied by the electoral system.</p>
<p>Under a proportional system, there would have been no incentive for the Brexit Party to field a smaller number of candidates, or for Liberal Democrat or Green voters to contemplate lending their votes to Labour. The election result under PR may have looked much more like the polls a month before the election than like the result on December 12.</p>
<p>With this in mind, the second graph shows how the size and composition of different possible coalitions under the highly proportional Dutch system would have changed from the actual result to a more realistic vote share distribution taken from poll averages in early November. I calculated the averages from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2019/dec/11/election-opinion-polls-uk-2019-latest-poll-tracker-tories-labour">all polls published</a> between October 30 when parliament voted for an early election to November 8, a couple of days after its dissolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/307410/original/file-20191217-58302-1wfdkpi.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Possible coalitions in the UK parliament under Dutch-style PR list.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinz Brandenburg</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A Labour/LibDem/SNP/Green coalition would have been slightly weaker before tactical voting took effect – with 324 seats – than it would have been based on the final result at 330. However, such a coalition would have been very difficult to hold together because, while unified on their position on a second EU referendum, the parties would have been at odds over Scottish independence as well as social, economic and fiscal issues. The only solid majority under either scenario would therefore have been an unlikely comeback of the 2010 coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-labour-lose-in-the-north-of-england-128940">Why did Labour lose in the north of England?</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The German system would have produced similarly unstable outcomes, but there would have even been an outside chance of a majority for the two pro-Brexit parties if the Greens had come close but failed to reach a 5% electoral threshold.</p>
<p>No PR system would have been likely to produce a workable majority for any sustainable coalition, but that is a reflection of the highly fragmented multi-party political system in the UK. And with such high levels of fragmentation, some PR systems would not even robustly reflect the fact that the two pro-Brexit parties combined did not win 50% of the vote share.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128808/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heinz Brandenburg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A chorus of politicians are once again calling for electoral reform after the UK’s 2019 election.Heinz Brandenburg, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/972362018-08-15T10:23:39Z2018-08-15T10:23:39ZDutch Memorial Day: Erasing people after death<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231919/original/file-20180814-2924-12kvvci.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dutch Memorial Day commemorated in Amsterdam, May 4, 2014</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nationaal Comité 4 en 5 mei, Jasper Juinen</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the anniversary of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands approaches, a close look reveals a Dutch narrative that erases people along racial lines.</p>
<p>Indonesia <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Indonesia/The-Ethical-Policy#ref22821">declared independence from the Netherlands</a> on Aug. 17, 1945. This followed 350 years of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Indonesia/Growth-and-impact-of-the-Dutch-East-India-Company">Dutch East India Company control</a> and Dutch state rule, as well as Japanese occupation during WWII.</p>
<p>After the declaration, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Indonesian_War_of_Independence">the Netherlands waged a war</a> to re-establish colonial control over Indonesia. The war, whose dead included Indonesians killed by summary execution, cost an estimated 300,000 Indonesian lives compared with around 6,000 casualties <a href="https://www.singeluitgeverijen.nl/de-arbeiderspers/boek/koloniale-oorlogen-in-indonesie/">on the Dutch side</a>. </p>
<p>In Indonesia, national identity has been built around anti-colonial sentiment, and the history of Dutch violence is taught and discussed. There was much Indonesian attention for a court-ordered <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-16104751">Dutch apology in 2011</a> for the 1947 massacres in Rawagede and for <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2012.719362">execution pictures that surfaced in 2012</a>. Indonesian violence toward the Dutch is emphasized less, <a href="https://historibersama.com/indonesian-perspectives-anda-zara/">but not ignored</a>.</p>
<p>How does the Netherlands deal with this history? </p>
<p><a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/german/people/faculty/toebosch.html">As a social scientist</a> and director of Dutch and Flemish studies at the University of Michigan, I ask this question in my writing and teaching about issues of inclusion in the Dutch-language area. </p>
<p>The answer to that question: The Netherlands ignores the sacrifices of Indonesians. Here’s how and why.</p>
<h2>Paid independence</h2>
<p>The Indonesian War of Independence of 1945-1949 ended with the signing of an internationally mediated independence agreement requiring Indonesia to take over the Dutch East India government’s debt, effectively <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Hague-Agreement">paying the Netherlands 4.3 billion guilders</a> <a href="https://www.groene.nl/artikel/de-indonesische-injectie">for its independence</a>. Payments <a href="https://www.waterkant.net/suriname/2014/07/03/nederland-en-herstelbetalingen-column/">continued until 2002</a>.</p>
<p>A Western European nation thus rebuilt itself after World War II with <a href="https://nl.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/marshall-plan-1947-2017/">Marshall Plan loans</a> from the United States, plus a comparable amount of money from Indonesia, which was itself recovering from the war.</p>
<p>The struggle for historic justice for Indonesia continues today. One expression of that struggle unfolds on <a href="https://www.timeanddate.com/holidays/netherlands/remembrance-day">Dutch Memorial Day, May 4</a>, the day when the Netherlands remembers its dead from World War II and after. The day involves a ceremony with two minutes of national silence and the laying of wreaths by the Dutch king and queen.</p>
<p>The Indonesians who fought against the Dutch and were killed in the ‘45-'49 war are not commemorated in this ceremony, despite the Dutch officially considering them Dutch at the time. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231929/original/file-20180814-2894-1fzx474.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Relief sculpture in Indonesia depicting mass killings of Indonesians committed by the Dutch military during the Indonesian independence war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Masyudi S. Firmansyah</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>An exclusive Memorial Day</h2>
<p>Dutch Memorial Day is <a href="https://www.werkgroepherkenning.nl/maud-van-de-reijt-zestig-jaar-herrie-om-twee-minuten-stilte/">no stranger to protests against exclusion</a>, and the Indonesian victims of the war are not the only ones who have been ignored on this day.</p>
<p>It took decades, for example, for <a href="https://www.werkgroepherkenning.nl/maud-van-de-reijt-zestig-jaar-herrie-om-twee-minuten-stilte/">Dutch Holocaust victims to be remembered</a>. </p>
<p>Today a Dutch movement called “<a href="https://nltimes.nl/2018/04/25/noise-protest-planned-national-wwii-commemoration">No May 4 For Me</a>” protests the exclusion of Indonesian casualties from remembrance while their killers are remembered. Among the killers were <a href="https://www.trouw.nl/home/bernhard-wilde-nederlandse-ss-ers-in-1946-naar-indie-sturen%7Ea60cd3cf/">former Dutch Nazis, who were sent to Indonesia after World War II to fight for Holland in the War for Independence</a>. </p>
<h2>Recognizing Indonesian independence</h2>
<p>So who is, and who is not, commemorated on Dutch Memorial Day?</p>
<p>The key to the answer is this: The Netherlands <a href="https://nos.nl/video/549112-indonesie-wil-erkenning-onafhankelijkheidsdag.html">does not officially recognize Indonesia’s 1945 independence</a> – it recognizes the <a href="http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002055/1949-12-22">1949 date of the sovereignty agreement</a> instead.</p>
<p>Here’s why the Netherlands cannot recognize Indonesia’s 1945 independence: If the Netherlands recognized that date, that would mean that the country had attacked a sovereign nation after World War II with the purpose of recolonizing it. And then the massacres, euphemistically referred to in the Netherlands as the “police actions,” <a href="https://nos.nl/video/549112-indonesie-wil-erkenning-onafhankelijkheidsdag.html">would not be “police actions” but war crimes</a>, as explained in an upcoming book by Ady Setyawan and Marjolein Van Pagee. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231928/original/file-20180814-2909-fnn5y4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian independence fighters in 1945. Most are armed with bamboo spears.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8574596">Tropenmuseum/National Museum of World Cultures.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Military action</h2>
<p>According to the official Dutch story, however, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2012.719362">Indonesia was “Dutch” during the “police actions”</a>, and thus killing your own people is not a war crime but, rather, law enforcement gone wrong. </p>
<p>Except that law enforcement in the “police actions” were not police officers but soldiers serving in the <a href="https://indisch4ever.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/militaire-spectator-10-2016-limpach.pdf">Dutch army</a>.</p>
<p>The publication “<a href="https://www.4en5mei.nl/onderzoek/publicaties/de_doden_tellen">De Doden Tellen</a>” (“Counting the Dead”), issued by the government-appointed national Memorial Day committee, betrays the inconsistencies of the official story. It cites the conflict as “police actions” while simultaneously using language of military “conquest.” </p>
<p>“During the so called police actions, the Netherlands conquers areas and declares them as <a href="https://www.4en5mei.nl/nieuws/nieuwsbericht/248/herziene-editie-%27de-doden-tellen%27">Dutch territory once again</a>,” the publication says. </p>
<h2>Apartheid</h2>
<p>The Netherlands wants to count the people it has killed as its own, so as not to have committed war crimes, while at the same time not commemorating their deaths. </p>
<p>What lies beneath the surface of the exclusion is segregation on the basis of race.</p>
<p>Dutch colonialism <a href="https://joop.bnnvara.nl/opinies/algemeen-kiesrecht-werd-1919-ingevoerd">did not grant citizenship to indigenous Indonesians</a>. Now, 70 years later, colonial apartheid policies that separate, disadvantage and denigrate one race in favor of another are applied after death, on Dutch Memorial Day. On a day that commemorates civilian casualties of war, Indonesian civilian casualties are not commemorated because they had no citizenship under colonial rule. </p>
<p>The chair of the official government national Memorial Day Committee, Gerdi Verbeet, admits as much when she says that “those who had no Dutch passport <a href="https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1985563/verbeet-oproep-tot-lawaaidemo-is-respectloos">are not remembered at the moment</a>.” </p>
<p>There is further evidence of a racial exclusion policy on Dutch Memorial Day: Indonesian victims of World War II are also not commemorated. </p>
<p>Although the number is not verified, civilian casualties from World War II in Indonesia are commonly estimated at <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/japans-occupation-of-java-in-the-second-world-war-9781350022201/">4 million</a>. The <a href="https://www.4en5mei.nl/nieuws/nieuwsbericht/248/herziene-editie-%27de-doden-tellen%27">official document</a> that counts the dead to be commemorated on Dutch Memorial Day lists around 20,000, a stunning discrepancy. The way that the Dutch come up with such a wildly different number is because they exclude all indigenous people. Millions of people are thus erased on Dutch Memorial Day. </p>
<h2>Counting the dead</h2>
<p>Dutch Memorial Day is then a story about the value of human life, about who counts, who doesn’t and who gets to decide. </p>
<p>Four million brown civilian casualties of World War II don’t count; 300,000 brown victims of the “police actions” don’t count. </p>
<p>And in a sad twist in this tale, exactly one group of brown people does count: the fallen Indonesian soldiers, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Netherlands">most of them Moluccans</a>, who fought on the side of the Netherlands during the recolonization war. They are the victims-made-perpetrators by a colonial oppressor after a centuries-long history of exploitation. </p>
<p>Colonial thinking as a form of racial supremacy is never far away in the Netherlands. In Indonesia, it took the form of an assumed right to <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/title/daar-werd-wat-gruwelijks-verricht-slavernij-in-nederlands-indie/oclc/884589447">enslave people</a>, kill them and take their land for profit. Afro-Surinamese Dutch educator and writer Gloria Wekker, in her groundbreaking book “<a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/white-innocence">White Innocence</a>,” analyzes it as the racial exceptionalism that paved the way for white Dutch culture’s blindness to the many forms of racism today.</p>
<p>Dutch racism is evident in the fact that the country has the <a href="https://www.volkskrant.nl/economie/allochtoon-erg-slecht-af-op-nederlandse-arbeidsmarkt%7Ebf882e77/?akamaiType=FREE">worst employment outcomes</a> for people of color in Europe other than Sweden. In another example, the second-largest political party, the Party for Freedom, puts out <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BPCwOEDkbwg">dehumanizing campaign ads</a> in both Dutch and English that target the country’s Muslims, saying their religion equals “discrimination,” “injustice” and “honor killing,” among other attributes. A legislator warns of the <a href="https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/16/alt-right-beweging-juicht-op-het-web-hard-voor-baudet-7415174-a1550730">dangers of mixing Dutch and non-Dutch blood</a>. Just this past year, Surinamese- and Antillean-Dutch were <a href="https://caribischnetwerk.ntr.nl/2018/05/02/antillianen-en-surinamers-niet-welkom-bij-dodenherdenking/">barred from attending a May 4 memorial</a> if they spoke publicly of the history of Dutch slavery in the Dutch slave colonies of their heritage. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231983/original/file-20180814-2903-1654731.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Dutch version of Santa Claus, Sinterklaas, or St. Nicholas, and his blackface sidekicks ‘Zwarte Piet’ or ‘Black Pete.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/Peter Dejong</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most widely known <a href="https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/geen-twijfel-zwarte-piet-stamt-af-van-kindslaven-%7Ebef5d321/">throwback to colonialism and Dutch slavery</a> comes each year in the form of “Black Petes,” the caricatured black helpers of St. Nicholas on the nation’s <a href="https://www.rnw.org/archive/sinterklaas-most-important-dutch-tradition">most important tradition</a>. </p>
<h2>Shared memory</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/central-high-school-integration">Elizabeth Eckford</a>, one of the first African-American students in a desegregated school, <a href="https://www.history.com/news/the-story-behind-the-famous-little-rock-nine-scream-image">said that</a> “true reconciliation can occur only when we honestly acknowledge our painful but shared past.”</p>
<p>In the Netherlands, this message is reflected in the voices of the “No May 4 For Me” protesters, who want their dead counted but instead find a culture blind to its own guilt and unwilling to create a shared memory.</p>
<p>Building a shared memory could start today, with the Dutch recognition of Indonesian Independence Day and the commemoration of Indonesian casualties of war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97236/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annemarie Toebosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the anniversary of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands approaches, a close look reveals how Dutch policy divides people along racial lines and ignores the Indonesian dead in that war.Annemarie Toebosch, Director of Dutch and Flemish Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/927052018-03-06T10:49:34Z2018-03-06T10:49:34ZWhy the Dutch plan to scrap advisory referendums is a step back for democracy<p>Dutch voters will go to the polls on March 21 for a referendum on the <a href="http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/11/netherlands-to-hold-referendum-on-surveillance-law.php">Security Act 2017</a>, a law which grants the authorities extended surveillance rights.</p>
<p>As in many other states, such legislation has raised concern in the Netherlands that the government is snooping on emails and other personal communication. </p>
<p>Unlike most countries, however, Dutch voters can currently do something about it thanks to a 2015 law that means the government <a href="https://www.meerdemocratie.nl/dutch-consultative-referendum-law-overview">must hold an advisory referendum</a> if 300,000 voters call for one. </p>
<p>But the Dutch government now plans to overturn this right in the future. On February 22, a majority in the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch parliament, <a href="https://nltimes.nl/2018/02/23/dutch-parliament-agrees-abolish-referendum">voted to scrap the referendum law</a>. It’s unlikely that the vote will be undone by the Senate when it comes to vote on the issue.</p>
<p>The March plebiscite on surveillance powers, which is happening at the same time as local council elections, might well be the country’s last advisory referendum.</p>
<h2>Embarrassing results</h2>
<p>The Advisory Referendum Law was the brainchild of three MPs from the social liberal party, Democraten 66 (D66) – a party founded in the free-spirited and idealistic 1960s – the Socialists and the Green Party. The law was supported by these parties and rightist populist Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV). It was opposed by the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) – the party of current prime minister Mark Rutte – and the two small Christian Democrat parties, the CDA and ChristenUnie.</p>
<p>Its aim was to hold politicians to account. While the result is non-binding, it is <a href="https://www.meerdemocratie.nl/dutch-consultative-referendum-law-overview">only quorate</a> if more than 30% of voters turn out – in which case it’s difficult for Dutch politicians to ignore the result. </p>
<p>A new Dutch coalition government comprised of the VVD, CDA and ChristenUnie and the D66, took office in 2017. Rutte is a critic of referendums, and the <a href="http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/netherlands-draft-law-to-end-advisory-referendum-law/">move to abolish</a> the right to demand referendums happened at his instigation. But it’s remarkable, given the D66’s role in passing the law in the first place. </p>
<p>The reason for the turnaround is that Dutch voters have not behaved as expected. Politicians didn’t expect voters to actually challenge controversial legislation – but that’s exactly what happened, most <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-dutch-referendum-on-eu-ukraine-treaty-doesnt-signal-a-step-towards-nexit-57460">notably in a 2016 referendum</a> called to block the European Union’s Association Treaty with Ukraine.</p>
<p>As treaties with foreign countries must be unanimously approved by the EU states, the Dutch parliament could block the treaty. A concerted effort, <a href="https://nos.nl/artikel/2082091-amerikaanse-miljardair-sponsort-ja-campagne-oekraine-referendum.html">sponsored</a> by the Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, and spearheaded by Rutte, campaigned for ratification. Despite this, in April 2016, 61% of the Dutch electors voted to block the European Union’s Association Treaty with the Ukraine on a 32% turnout.</p>
<p>The outcome did not cause a revolution, nor did it fundamentally alter the relationship between the EU and the Ukraine. But it forced the Dutch government – and the EU as a whole – to find a compromise position, and to justify this to their voters.</p>
<h2>Not how to strengthen democracy</h2>
<p>“The referendum”, as Albert Dicey, a prominent legal theorist, once <a href="http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1714/0125_Bk.pdf">observed</a>, is “the people’s veto”. And in many ways, the Dutch referendum in 2016 was a clear example of this in practice.</p>
<p>But politicians do not like to be embarrassed. Now, rather than having to explain themselves to the voters, Dutch politicians want to abolish the right to demand referendums. </p>
<p>Apart from Ireland in 1928, no democratic country has taken away the right to demand referendums. Back then, the opposition party, Fianna Fail, had collected signatures to overturn the requirement that members of the Dáil swear allegiance to the British Monarch. The then Irish prime minister, William Thomas Cosgrave, responded not by holding a referendum, but by <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-24796-7_6">abolishing the provision</a> before a plebiscite could take place. </p>
<p>The Dutch government’s argument <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/06166110-1af0-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6">seems to be</a> that referendums “undermine democracy”. But this is – to use a British expression – “double Dutch”: gibberish or gobbledygook.</p>
<p>Democracies are not strengthened by doing away with referendums. If you take away responsibility from people they become irresponsible; but if you give responsibility to people they become responsible. That’s why, in 2012, voters in California <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_30,_Sales_and_Income_Tax_Increase_(2012)">voted for tax increases</a>. They were aware that the public sector required more money to deliver the level of services required in the state. </p>
<p>The referendum also provides a safety valve for letting out political steam. Those unhappy with specific policies can use the referendum to demand specific changes. In the absence of advisory referendums in the future, disgruntled Dutch voters might resort to protest voting and they could turn to protest parties to show dissatisfaction. This could strengthen Wilders’ far right PVV party. </p>
<p>Elsewhere in the world, referendums are on the increase. In some cases, the referendum has been used to resolve internal political conflicts. David Cameron’s ill-fated Brexit referendum was held to keep his party together. But in most cases, the referendums are held either because they are demanded by the people – as in Switzerland, half of the US states and Italy – or because the constitution requires that fundamental issues are supported by the mass of the electorate, which is the case in Australia, Ireland and Denmark. And in most cases, the ruling government has lost when it has tried to steamroll fundamental changes.</p>
<p>There’s no reason to change this law. Referendums – as a general rule – have <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/rise-referendums-demystifying-direct-democracy">been a people’s shield</a>, not the governors’ sword. Sadly, this shield will be taken away from the Dutch voters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matt Qvortrup has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He was a special advisor to the Constitutional Affairs and Public Administration Committee in the House of Commons on the European Union Referendum Act 2015. </span></em></p>The abolition of citizen referendums in the Netherlands will do little to remedy the distrust in the political system – and could strengthen Geert Wilders’ far-right party.Matt Qvortrup, Chair of Applied Political Science, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/746682017-03-16T02:43:32Z2017-03-16T02:43:32ZPopulist Wilders may have come up short, but Dutch intolerance is still real<p>The Dutch elections on March 15 have received a lot of attention in the international media. </p>
<p>The reason for the attention is clear: A Trump lookalike populist, Geert Wilders, was rumored to win big as part of a Western populist movement that some call the “Patriotic Spring.” </p>
<p>His rise has the liberal West confused and concerned, because if the land of gay marriage and coffee shops falls, then where is their hope for Western liberalism?</p>
<p>But, as results are coming in, two things are becoming clear: Election turnout was <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-pm-rutte-comes-first-in-election-but-loses-seats-exit-poll/">high</a> and Wilders’ support <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/dutch-pm-ruttes-vvd-emerges-top-in-first-exit-poll/a-37937959">relatively low</a>. Projections show Wilders’ party winning 19 seats compared to 31 seats for the Dutch-right liberal conservatives of Prime Minister Mark Rutte. What does all this tell us about the populist movement? Is our bedrock of tolerance safe again?</p>
<p>To understand what happened in these Dutch elections, we need to look beyond Wilders and his place in Western populism to the myth of Dutch tolerance.</p>
<p>Students in my race and ethnicity courses at the University of Michigan have been engaged in this very task as they examine current and historic diversity in the Netherlands. When they read University of Amsterdam sociologist <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780230293984">Jan Willem Duyvendak</a> or Free University of Amsterdam Holocaust historian <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hgs/article-abstract/19/3/535/645489/Return-Holocaust-Survivors-and-Dutch-Antisemitism">Dienke Hondius</a>, a more complicated picture of Dutch tolerance emerges. </p>
<p>Wilders doesn’t represent a sudden movement of the Netherlands away from tolerance. Dutch tolerance does not really exist in the way the stereotype dictates. Seventy years ago, the country saw a larger percentage of its Jewish population deported and killed than any other Western European nation. This fact does not lend itself to simple explanations but has at least in part been attributed to the lack of protection of Jews by non-Jews and to Dutch collaboration with the <a href="http://ehq.sagepub.com/content/19/3/333.citation">Nazi occupation</a>. </p>
<p>Looking at modern times, CUNY political scientist <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296822981_Assimilating_immigrants_in_Amsterdam_A_perspective_from_New_York">John Mollenkopf</a> reports poorer immigrant integration outcomes, such as employment rates and job retention, in Amsterdam than in New York City, and Duyvendak finds explanations for these outcomes in <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3362.3767">white majority-culture dominance</a>.</p>
<h2>A pretty story</h2>
<p>A few weeks after the 2016 U.S. elections, elderly Dutch statesman Jan Terlouw made <a href="http://dewerelddraaitdoor.vara.nl/media/367395">a plea to the Dutch nation</a>. Speaking as the Jimmy Carter-like voice of reason of the political establishment, he asked the nation to go back to a time where Dutch people trusted each other, a time where people could enter the homes of other Dutchmen freely and without suspicion. It was a “Make the Netherlands Great Again” message of sorts, but coming from the Dutch center-left. </p>
<p>I grew up in the Netherlands of Jan Terlouw. The country gave me an idyllic childhood, with soccer and hopscotch in the streets, but I never stepped freely into the homes of Indonesians who lived, grouped together, on the next street. My white Dutch friends still know little to nothing about the relationship between <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/white-innocence">race and our colonial history</a>, or about the people of color who came to live in the Netherlands through that history. Some Americans may be surprised to learn that the Netherlands has a more than 20 percent nonmajority ethnic Dutch population, 10 percent of which are Indonesians, Surinamese and Dutch Caribbeans from former or current colonies, as well as Turks and Moroccans who (or whose family) originally came as part of guest worker programs.</p>
<p>Terlouw’s story is a beautiful story, then, but it isn’t true, and neither is the story that the Dutch have suddenly become intolerant as part of global Western populism. In reality, the Dutch good old days were good old days because racial minorities were sidelined and did not complain, for example, about the slaves depicted on the <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/race-colonialism-and-the-netherlands-golden-coach">golden coach</a> that carries the Dutch king to the annual “Throne Address,” or the state of union.</p>
<h2>Wilders isn’t unique</h2>
<p>Now Dutch intolerance in the person of Wilders is on display around the world, and it is not limited to his party. </p>
<p>Of the 28 parties on the Dutch ballot this year, five have anti-Islam or anti-immigrant platforms, some more openly so than others. The Party for Entrepreneurs, for example, calls for a “mosque watch.” Another one of these five parties – the Forum for Democracy party, which has a restrictive immigration and EU-cautious platform – appears to have <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/dutch-pm-rutte-comes-first-in-election-but-loses-seats-exit-poll/">won two seats</a>.</p>
<p>Dutch nationalism does not just live on the right. All the big parties that are contenders to enter a coalition government after this election – from all the way left to all the way right – reference “Dutchness” in one way or another in their party platforms, as a presumed understanding of what it means to be Dutch, or in the form of shared national values and a “be like us” message to immigrants. Dutch nationalism is ubiquitous.</p>
<p>But one important aspect of today’s elections is overshadowed by the Wilders discussion. The Dutch citizens who voted Wednesday had the choice of voting for a party called “DENK,” with mixed Dutch-Turkish, or Dutch-minority, values that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/world/europe/dutch-denk-party.html">some critics</a> call the Dutch <a href="http://www.elsevier.nl/opinie/opinie/2016/04/298185-298185/">Erdogan satellite party</a>.</p>
<p>Voters could also support “Artikel 1,” a party founded by minority rights activist Sylvana Simons nine weeks ago – and just four months after the country saw its racist holiday character of Zwarte Piet (the blackfaced helper of Saint Nicholas) phased out on national television amid white nationalist screams and quieter criticisms about the end of Dutch culture and tradition. </p>
<p>Artikel 1, named for the equality clause in the Dutch constitution, has the slogan “All Different But Yet The Same” and calls for equal rights for all Dutch people, men, women, gay, straight and, importantly, black, white, native and immigrant. This election was the first time we saw minority parties such as DENK and Artikel 1 with programs advocating for education about Dutch migration history, the teaching of languages beyond the traditional European ones, a registry for racist hate crimes and a national holiday to celebrate the emancipation of Dutch slaves. Remember: The kingdom of the Netherlands is still a colonial power over the nation states of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten, and the country of the Netherlands over the three Caribbean islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba.</p>
<p>As a new Dutch government is formed in the weeks to come, we could brush the minority parties off as a reaction to Wilders’ populism and see his defeat as a return of Dutch tolerance, but we would be wiser to see these elections as the beginning of a sea change in a country that is slowly changing to meet its tolerant mythology.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74668/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Annemarie Toebosch is a member of the Dutch political party Artikel 1. </span></em></p>The famous anti-immigrant crusader fizzled at the polls, but the Netherlands still has a legacy of intolerance to turn around.Annemarie Toebosch, Director of Dutch and Flemish Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/745002017-03-14T14:43:19Z2017-03-14T14:43:19ZWill Dutch immigrant voters fight back at the ballot box?<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/europe/turkey-netherlands-ban-referendum.html">recent dispute</a> between Turkish President Recip Tayepp Erdoğan and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, concerning Rutte’s refusal to allow Turkish ministers to campaign abroad, has only made life worse for Turks in the Netherlands. </p>
<p>People from a Turkish background in the Netherlands are being forced to take a side in an unpalatable diplomatic dispute in which they have nothing to win and everything to lose. Erdoğan uses them to strengthen his position ahead of a referendum to increase his own powers, and Dutch politicians use them to show voters how tough they are on immigrants refusing to integrate. </p>
<p>The person who benefits, of course, is Geert Wilders: the most famous man in Dutch politics right now.</p>
<p>Wilders has had an enormous influence on the Dutch political debate. His harsh anti-immigrant and anti-Islam rhetoric has completely transformed the Dutch integration debate. Because of Wilders, <a href="http://econpapers.repec.org/article/blapolstu/v_3a58_3ay_3a2010_3ai_3a_3ap_3a410-426.htm">all mainstream parties</a> have shifted to the right on immigration, Islam and integration.</p>
<p>This means that Dutch voters with an immigrant background, especially Muslims, are increasingly less represented by secular progressive parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Greens, which have traditionally received the most support from immigrant voters. </p>
<h2>An open system for minority representation</h2>
<p>Almost 20% of the Dutch population is from a first-generation or second-generation immigrant background; around 12%, or two million people, have a <a href="https://ewoudbutter.wordpress.com/2016/06/16/hoeveel-allochtonen-wonen-er-in-nederland/">“non-Western” background</a>. This group is the main target of Wilders and his Freedom Party. </p>
<p>The Dutch political system of proportionality generally favours the representation of minorities in terms of gender, ethnicity and social background. Elections in the Netherlands use a party list system with pure proportionality, very low thresholds, and the ability to cast preferential votes. </p>
<p>Party lists compete in elections. The order of candidates is decided upon by each party, though voters can select a listed candidate who will independently earn a seat upon getting enough votes. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2013.773727">Parties only need about 60,000 votes</a> (in a country of almost 17 million) to win one of 150 seats in the Dutch parliament.</p>
<p>As a result of this open political system, the percentage of politicians with an immigrant background in the Dutch parliament <a href="http://sociology.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/bloemraad/Bloemraad_Schoenwaelder_WEP_Intro_2013.pdf">is among the highest in Europe</a>.</p>
<h2>The birth of DENK</h2>
<p>As mainstream parties moved further to the right in order to defend themselves against Wilders, these politicians and their constituencies have become increasingly frustrated. </p>
<p>Two politicians of Turkish descent, Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk, who have strong ties to the conservative religious part of the Turkish-Dutch community, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/world/europe/dutch-denk-party.html">left the Social Democratic Party</a> after intense internal fights about the extent to which Turkish religious organisations are an obstacle for integration and should be monitored and perhaps even forbidden. Kuzu and Öztürk started their own party, DENK, meaning “think” in Dutch and “equality” in Turkish. </p>
<p>Our research shows support for secular progressive parties among immigrant communities <a href="https://www.ois.amsterdam.nl/pdf/2014_schaduwverkiezingen.pdf">has decreased rapidly</a>, and their trust and interest in Dutch politics has further decreased, affecting participation rates significantly. </p>
<p>Studies of young people from an immigrant background illustrate that an ever-increasing proportion of this group does not identify with Dutch society or politics any more, <a href="http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2015/Werelden_van_verschil">feels frustrated and stigmatised</a> and believes that their interests are not represented by the mainstream political parties.</p>
<p>DENK is <a href="http://www.quirksmode.org/politics/polls.html">projected to win two seats</a> in parliament. Considering that the conservative Turkish-Dutch community is relatively large, well-organised and politically active, this does not seem unreasonable.</p>
<p>But whether this will signal a process of emancipation of voters with an immigrant background, and whether DENK will be able to represent their interest successfully, remains an open question. </p>
<p>Although the main message of the <a href="https://www.bewegingdenk.nl/standpunten">DENK party programme</a> is “connection”, their campaign strategy so far is to aggressively attack political rivals (especially if these rivals have an immigrant background themselves), along with the media and Wilders’s supporters. </p>
<p>In the short term, this tactic may fulfil their constituents’ need to voice anger and frustration. But in the long term it will further fuel polarisation and possibly segregation, two things that are certainly not in the interest of this group.</p>
<h2>The future of Dutch integration</h2>
<p>Voters with an immigrant background both need to believe that it still matters to fight for something and <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.12397/abstract">to receive some commitment from and connection to</a> their country of settlement, our studies illustrate.</p>
<p>Current political debates tend to focus whether immigrants are assimilating to Dutch culture. This approach portrays a connection with migrants’ origin country as a problem, leaving no room for dual identification. It will only lead to further polarisation and segregation rather than create a political discourse that allows everyone to participate.</p>
<p>Who will take the first step to build bridges between the Netherlands’ different groups and constituencies? The longer we wait, the more difficult it will get.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74500/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A recent spat between Turkey and the Netherlands reveals how Dutch-Turks are badly served by politics.Floris Vermeulen, Associate Professor, University of AmsterdamMaria Kranendonk, Phd Candidate, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744832017-03-14T07:34:37Z2017-03-14T07:34:37ZA history of Dutch populism, from the murder of Pim Fortuyn to the rise of Geert Wilders<p>The 2017 Dutch election has taken on a significance for the international media that we haven’t seen for a long time here in the Netherlands. </p>
<p>Placed in the context of other European elections in France and Germany this spring and summer, the elections in the Netherlands are now often perceived as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/europes-far-right-parties-got-a-boost-from-trump-but-will-they-govern-72319">first step in a populist revolution</a> which has been shaking up Europe and the rest of the Western world. </p>
<p>In the wake of the Brexit referendum and Trump’s unexpected victory in the United States, populism now seems destined to conquer Europe’s mainland, starting with the Netherlands. </p>
<p>But all this analysis comes as somewhat of a surprise for the Dutch. There is no reason for us to talk about a new populist revolution at all. Ever since Pim Fortuyn’s revolt in the early 2000s, we have become all too familiar with the problems and anxieties of populism. </p>
<h2>How Pim Fortuyn changed politics for good</h2>
<p>Fortuyn, an openly gay sociology professor and publicist, rocked the boat of Dutch politics significantly more than the current representative of populism, Geert Wilders, is expected to do this time around. </p>
<p>Fortuyn ran on an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1977511.stm">anti-Islam, anti-immigrant platform</a>. He claimed that Islam presented a threat to Western values of openness and liberalism, and wanted to restrict all immigration to the Netherlands.</p>
<p>He was killed on the campaign trail in May 2002 just days before the election. His assassin, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/1425944/Fortuyn-killed-to-protect-Muslims.html">Volkert van der Graaf</a>, was an animal rights activist, who said he feared the effect Fortuyn would have on minorities in the country. </p>
<p>Fortuyn’s party, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), went on to win 26 of the 150 available seats in the May 2002 elections, more than <a href="http://www.nlverkiezingen.com/TK2002.html">17% of the electoral vote</a> and enough to form a coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. But the government of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende was very short lived, mainly because of internal frictions in the LPF. </p>
<p>Fortuyn and the LPD broke open the political system with a force that still baffles Dutch political scientists and commentators. </p>
<p>At the time there was no indication that the centrist parties which had been in power for eight years, a coalition of social democrats and liberals (the Purple Coalition), were headed for a major defeat. </p>
<p>And the populist wave did not subside with the demise of the LPF – Wilders, a former conservative parliamentarian, has picked up where Fortuyn and his friends left off.</p>
<h2>21st century populism</h2>
<p>The central themes of the early 21st century right-wing populism of Fortuyn and Wilders have been fierce criticism of the political elite (usually portrayed as left-wing) combined with a steady flow of anti-Islam rhetoric and anti-EU sentiment.</p>
<p>Geert Wilders has repeatedly courted controversy, with his 2008 film Fitna, which <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/4790056/Dutch-anti-Muslim-politician-Geert-Wilders-to-screen-Fitna-film-in-Washington.html">compared Islam to Nazism</a>, and a recent trial over his call to reduce the number of Moroccans in the Netherlands, expressed during a party rally just before the 2012 election, for which he was <a href="https://theconversation.com/guilty-verdict-but-an-excellent-day-for-dutch-far-right-leader-geert-wilders-nonetheless-70227">found guilty but not punished</a>.</p>
<p>To acknowledge the fact that populism has been around in the Netherlands for quite a while already is not to underestimate its profound influence. As well as the far-right, it also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/netherlands-pm-mark-rutte-dutch-citizens-open-letter-pvv">affected some centrist parties</a>, such as the and the Christian Democrats and People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. </p>
<p>The famous Dutch tolerance and progressiveness, if ever it existed, has turned into intolerance and a prolonged and painstaking search for Dutch identity.</p>
<p>Public debate has taken a nasty turn, blaming and shaming “foreigners”, Muslims mostly, but also the elite and Europe for the problems people experience. This opened up tensions and rifts which had previously been covered by a soft blanket of “political correctness”, which used to be regarded as civilised behaviour but is now seen as treason and deceitfulness. </p>
<h2>Wilders’s first taste of power</h2>
<p>Wilders has played a role in the Dutch government before. He won 24 seats (16%) in 2010, which gave him a role as a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dutch-government-idUSTRE69D40920101014">minor partner supporting a coalition</a> between the Christian Democrats and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the first cabinet of Mark Rutte. In 2012, Wilders refused to accept major budget cuts which the cabinet had to take in order to meet EU requirements. The government <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17811509">collapsed</a>. </p>
<p>Since 2012, another Purple Coalition between the Labour Party and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy has been in power, headed again by Rutte. The current government can claim credit for financial and economic measures which <a href="http://nltimes.nl/2016/12/13/dutch-economy-recovering-pre-crisis-levels">helped the Dutch economy</a> through the recent economic crisis. </p>
<p>But both parties, especially the Labour Party, are probably going to be punished by voters for the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-king-willem-alexander-declares-the-end-of-the-welfare-state-8822421.html">austerity measures</a> they imposed on welfare and health care, as well as <a href="https://www.ipe.com/dutch-mps-reach-a-deal-to-raise-retirement-age-to-67/33013.fullarticle">raising the retirement age</a> from 65 to 67. </p>
<h2>What to expect in 2017</h2>
<p>This time around we can expect success, again, for Geert Wilders, despite the fact that his numbers in the polls have been <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-election-poll-idUSKBN1683ST">dropping slowly</a> since early January. The Dutch electoral system’s threshold of 0.7% makes it very open to new parties, so we may see a few new right-wing parties getting some seats alongside Wilders. </p>
<p>Wilders’s success however is not going to bring him into government, because none of the other centrist parties wants to collaborate with him. Another condoning role for Wilders in a right-wing coalition is highly improbable; everyone remembers the debacle of the first Rutte cabinet, when Wilders backed away from his responsibility to the government. </p>
<p>A left-wing coalition is also highly improbable, because even the most flattering polls show a collection of left-wing parties <a href="http://www.quirksmode.org/politics/polls.html">falling short of a majority</a>. </p>
<p>The Christian Democrats, recovering from the 2012 debacle, have already made it clear they will not get on board with a left-wing coalition. So, the remaining centrist parties will have to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/dutch-parliamentary-elections-everything-you-need-to-know-brexit-vote-trump-geert-wilders">build a new coalition</a> which will probably take a considerable amount of time to materialise.</p>
<h2>The new nostalgia</h2>
<p>Most scholars tend to interpret populism as a reaction to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07256868.2016.1235025">increasing inequality</a> in the Netherlands, both in terms of income and of education. However, the Netherlands is still one of the most egalitarian countries in the world, and the rift between levels of education is not a new phenomenon either. </p>
<p>The so-called “losers of globalisation” are not the only ones who vote for Wilders these days. Nor do these voters in many cases seriously believe that Wilders should rule the country. What matters is that he is tapping into the anxieties of many voters. </p>
<p>It is better to see these rifts and the turbulent public debate as the right-wing of the country calling to be heard and taken seriously. It involves people who don’t believe that things are going to get better. They long for the return to an imaginary former Dutch culture in which migrants, minorities and women don’t challenge the status quo and where the <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/02/16/wilders-prepares-law-protect-zwarte-piet-holiday-blackface">debate about blackface</a> is not, as they see it, undermining Dutch culture. </p>
<p>Nostalgia is what moves them into the belief that new <a href="http://dutchdikes.net/history/">Dutch dikes</a> are needed: to keep an ever-more-threatening outside world out of this low country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74483/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacques Paulus Koenis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dutch populism goes back much further than Trump, Brexit or even Geert Wilders.Jacques Paulus Koenis, Professor of Social Philosophy, Maastricht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/737252017-03-02T11:50:36Z2017-03-02T11:50:36ZFragmented field keeps voters guessing as Dutch election approaches<p>The parliamentary election in the Netherlands on March 15 is approaching rapidly. And with an incredibly fragmented field, it looks as though attempts to form a coalition government after the vote will prove a challenging task, to say the least.</p>
<p>Despite all the hype, it’s far from certain that the populist radical right Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders will top the polls – and even more questionable whether it will end up in government. </p>
<p>The PVV and the Liberal Party (VVD) of Prime Minister Mark Rutte have led the opinion polls for months. Behind them follow no fewer than five parties which, <a href="http://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl">according to the latest figures</a>, are predicted to win around 10% of the vote each.</p>
<p>Given the extreme proportionality of the Dutch electoral system, such a result would generate a highly fragmented parliament. If the final results resemble the opinion polls, a minimum of four parties would need to agree to cooperate to form a majority coalition. </p>
<p>In the final weeks of the campaign, the parties are focusing on socio-economic issues, including income redistribution, employment figures, healthcare contributions, and citizens’ purchasing power. But the debate certainly also touches on issues such as immigration and cultural integration – and the future of the European Union. </p>
<p>The “champion” of those issues on the culturally conservative right is Wilders’ PVV. The party continuously stresses the need to stop the “Islamisation” of the Netherlands, to preserve Dutch culture and identity, and to halt the process of European integration. The core slogan of the PVV for this campaign has a Trumpian ring to it: “The Netherlands ours again” (Nederland weer van ons).</p>
<p>Indeed, following the Brexit vote and the US presidential election, many have wondered whether Wilders will be among the next successful populist anti-establishment contenders in the Western world.</p>
<p>There is sufficient reason to assume that the PVV will remain one of the main political forces in the Netherlands. However, while the PVV has long led the opinion polls, its predicted number of seats has been sliding in recent weeks. Most voters are unimpressed by its provocative and polarising rhetoric. In December, Wilders was even <a href="https://theconversation.com/guilty-verdict-but-an-excellent-day-for-dutch-far-right-leader-geert-wilders-nonetheless-70227">found guilty</a> of insulting a group of people (Moroccans) and “inciting discrimination”.</p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/veel-kiezers-overwegen-stem-op-rutte-om-wilders-uit-torentje-te-houden%7Ea4460957/">a study has indicated</a> that a significant number of people would strategically vote for the VVD in order to prevent the PVV from topping the polls. And for the first time, all mainstream parties, and most other serious contenders, have <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/dutch-election-2017-geert-wilders-mark-rutte-coalition-deal-pvv-543284?rm=eu">ruled out cooperating with Wilders’ party</a> in government. That makes a coalition including the PVV unlikely – at least at this stage.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Wilders has undoubtedly influenced other parties’ positions and rhetoric. In an alleged attempt to woo potential PVV supporters, <a href="https://vvd.nl/nieuws/lees-hier-de-brief-van-mark/">Rutte wrote an open letter</a>, published in Dutch newspapers, lamenting the abuse of liberty by people “who came to our country precisely because of that freedom”. He urged those people to accept Dutch values (to “act normal”) or to leave the country.</p>
<p>At the same time, there has also been a surge in popularity for parties with a culturally liberal and pro-EU message. The social liberal Democrats ’66 (D66) and the greens (GroenLinks), which rely largely on the support of higher educated and more cosmopolitan voters, are riding high in the opinion polls. </p>
<h2>How to form a government</h2>
<p>The coalition formation process after the election is bound to become complicated. If the PVV is indeed excluded, forming a majority coalition may require the cooperation between most of the remaining large or medium-sized parties. These include the VVD, the Labour Party (PvdA) – currently in a governing coalition with the VVD and predicted to face a substantial loss – the Christian Democrats (CDA), D66, GroenLinks and the Socialist Party (SP).</p>
<p>This is an ideologically heterogeneous set of parties. They will find it hard to reach consensus in crucial policy areas. A minority coalition may turn out to be a more viable solution.</p>
<p>Yet many Dutch voters who float between a limited number of ideologically like-minded parties may still change their voting intention, not least to try to influence the coalition formation process. Something similar happened in the 2012 election campaign, when many voters cast a semi-strategic vote for the two main contenders at the time (VVD and PvdA) in an attempt to see either of them finish on top. This hurt the results of less traditional “challengers”.</p>
<p>It’s worth noting that Dutch voters can choose between a rich variety of (relatively) new challenger parties. Already represented in parliament are the parties 50+, representing the (economic) interests of the ageing part of the population, and the Party for the Animals (PvdD), an ecological party placing particular emphasis on animal rights. </p>
<p>DENK (Think), the party of two ex-PvdA MPs with a Turkish background, may also win a few seats on the basis of a platform defending multiculturalism and appealing to ethnic minorities. That’s partly thanks to considerable <a href="http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/-vooral-turkse-nederlanders-gaan-op-denk-stemmen%7Ea4439308/">support among the Turkish community</a>. There is also limited support for two parties on the eurosceptic and conservative right: For Netherlands (VNL) and Forum for Democracy (FvD) – the latter of which also champions direct democracy through citizens’ initiatives.</p>
<p>Clearly, Dutch voters cannot complain about a lack of choice, and the electoral system is well suited to allow for the representation of minority interests and values. However, the grand coalition that could emerge from the election may not be an outcome that pleases anyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stijn van Kessel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A large number of parties are in the running, which could make forming a coalition a complicated task.Stijn van Kessel, Lecturer in Politics, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/702272016-12-09T14:53:42Z2016-12-09T14:53:42ZGuilty verdict, but an excellent day for Dutch far-right leader Geert Wilders nonetheless<p>The populist radical right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38260377">found guilty</a> on December 9 of insulting a group of people (Moroccans) and “inciting discrimination”. Wilders, founder and leader of the Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid or PVV), has been the most prominent critic of Islam, immigration and multiculturalism in Dutch politics in the past decade. The PVV is currently the third largest party in parliament, and had previously <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/netherlands">provided</a> parliamentary support to a minority coalition between 2010 and 2012. And the party is in the lead in some <a href="http://peilingwijzer.tomlouwerse.nl">opinion polls</a> ahead of a national election in March 2017.</p>
<p>In a previous process five years ago, a Dutch court <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/23/geert-wilders-cleared-anti-islam">cleared Wilders</a> of hate charges. The politician’s claims about the violent nature of Islam, and calls for a ban on Muslim immigration and the Qur'an, were considered offensive, but still within the bounds of a legitimate political debate. </p>
<p>This time the judge ruled differently in a legal process which had been triggered by events in The Hague <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-politician-geert-wilders-leads-supporters-in-anti-moroccan-chant-9206211.html">on the evening</a> of local elections on March 19 2014. In a speech in front of supporters, Wilders asked the crowd whether they desired fewer or more Moroccans in their city and in the Netherlands, which triggered the chant: “Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!” Wilders, in turn, assured his supporters that his party would “take care of that”. </p>
<p>The incident provoked considerable public condemnation and thousands of legal complaints. It initially appeared to backfire when a number of PVV politicians distanced themselves from Wilders’s remarks or <a href="http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/03/wilders-sparks-backlash-even-among-his-own-supporters/">even left the party</a>.</p>
<p>While Wilders has been found guilty, he will not have to pay the fine of €5,000 proposed by the public prosecutor. The court also cleared the politician of the charge of “inciting hatred”. Nevertheless, the judge found that Wilders had crossed the boundaries of freedom of speech, used the word “Moroccan” to insult a specific ethnic group, and that he had contributed to the polarisation of society. </p>
<h2>Turning the verdict to his advantage</h2>
<p>Wilders and his lawyer were not present in court during the ruling, but declared <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-wilders-trial-idUSKBN13Y0OX">their intent to appeal</a> against the verdict. The PVV leader quickly reacted through Twitter – a key means of his political communication. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"807175994809401344"}"></div></p>
<p>This reaction was typical for Wilders who had previously denounced the trial as a “political process”, and refused to let it stop him from speaking the truth about what he calls the “Moroccan problem”. </p>
<p>His rhetoric perfectly fits into the PVV’s broader populist radical right appeal. The party considers mainstream politicians and other elites out of touch with ordinary people, and warns against the threats to society posed by non-native outsiders, not least Muslim immigrants. Wilders has <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/islam-now-a-monster-in-our-midst-claims-geert-wilders-mv3x2l60x">called</a> for the EU to ban Muslim immigration. </p>
<p>Wilders can use the verdict to lend credence to his claim that elitist judges defy the “will of the people”, the majority of whom – as he at least would like us to believe – support his views. Recent elections across the Western world, as well as the Brexit referendum, have shown how potent this rhetoric currently is.</p>
<p>Wilders can be pleased with the verdict. The process has already given him and his party considerable media attention in the run-up to the national election, which will now be prolonged due to Wilders’ plan to appeal. During the 2011 trial against its leader, the PVV’s popularity soared and the same effect has <a href="http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/11/geert-wilders-pvv-back-on-top-in-latest-poll-of-polls/">been seen</a> in polls during this recent process. Whether the PVV indeed comes out as the largest party after the election remains to be seen, but the process and its outcome have given Wilders an excellent opportunity to mobilise potential voters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70227/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stijn van Kessel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The leader of the Dutch Freedom Party was found guilty of insulting a group of people inciting discrimination.Stijn van Kessel, Lecturer in Politics, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649922016-09-06T13:05:48Z2016-09-06T13:05:48ZGeert Wilders: maverick who could ride anti-Islam wave to the top of Dutch politics<p>He’s been called a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/demagogues-and-cheats-un-human-rights-chief-condemns-trump-and-wilders">“demagoue” and a “cheat”</a> by the UN human rights chief and his party’s <a href="http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/08/26/pvv-hammers-de-islamization-one-page-election-campaign/">electoral platform</a>, which calls for all mosques and Islamic schools to be closed, radicalised Muslims to be arrested as a precaution and a complete stop to asylum in the Netherlands has been called a “<a href="http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/09/05/dutch-pm-rutte-calls-far-right-leader-wilders-a-societal-threat/">societal threat</a>” by the prime minister. But none of that is likely to bother Geert Wilders. </p>
<p>Despite what many would view as his extreme views on Islam and immigration, his party is riding high in the polls and looks <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/dutch-anti-islam-politician-geert-wilders-surges-polls-419080?rm=eu">set to be the largest in the Dutch parliament</a> after the next election in March 2017.</p>
<p>Wilders is one of the best-known politicians in Europe. Arguably, he is more familiar to the European public than any other living Dutch politician. How many, for example, can without going online name the current Dutch prime minister?</p>
<p>A possible competitor is the late Pim Fortuyn, who after a brief political career <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/06/3">was assassinated in 2002</a>. In many ways Wilders is a continuation of Fortuyn’s legacy. If the assassin thought his actions would put a stop to Fortuyn’s political agenda, he was badly mistaken. We will of course never know what would have happened if Fortuyn had lived, but it is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2011.616662">doubtful whether he had the strategic ability</a> to build on his initial successes. Wilders, however, has proved to be a shrewd and durable political operator.</p>
<p>Before Fortuyn the Netherlands had been a blank spot on the far-right map. The various parties that did exist, such as <a href="http://www.scotsman.com/news/obituaries/hans-janmaat-1-609495">Hans Janmaat’s Centre Democrats</a>, were very small and mostly subject to ridicule, to the extent that they got any attention at all. <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/1125205">Fortuyn changed all this</a> – and Wilders has made sure that the intervention by Fortuyn was a catalyst rather than a brief interlude.</p>
<p>Fortuyn and Wilders apparently never met in person – but they have important things in common. They share a disdain of what they see as a left-libertarian establishment in politics and the media. Above all they share a fear, verging of hatred, of Islam. Wilders started his political career in the liberal party VVD, and was first elected to parliament in 1998. Relatively soon, however, he developed into a kind of <em>enfant terrible</em> in the party. His increasingly vitriolic criticism of Islam and other disagreements with the party, for example about Turkish accession to the EU, led to growing tension and in 2004 he defected. </p>
<p>At first he was his own one-member parliamentary party, but in February 2006 he formed the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), which won nine seats in the <a href="https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-election-briefing-no-54.pdf&site=266">2010 election</a> to the 150-member Dutch second chamber. At the moment the <a href="http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/10/employers-concerned-as-anti-immigration-pvv-rises-in-the-polls/">party commands 15 seats</a>, but opinion polls suggest a <a href="http://www.ipsos-nederland.nl/ipsos-politieke-barometer/barometer-van-deze-week/">drastic increase in the 2017 general election</a>.</p>
<p>Politically, Wilders is full of contradictions. He began as a hard-hitting neo-liberal, advocating tax reductions and reduced welfare benefits, but in 2012 he withdrew his party’s support for a centre-right government because he disagreed with <a href="http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm/blog_id/41654/">proposed welfare cuts</a>. He is often referred to as a populist, but does not share the populist disrespect for the political process. He is very well versed in parliamentary procedure and has deputised with aplomb as <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15705850903553521?scroll=top&needAccess=true">parliamentary speaker</a>. In 2015 he <a href="https://euobserver.com/political/129129">joined the newly formed party group Europe of Nations and Freedom</a> in the European Parliament, led by the French Front National, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam">which he had earlier denounced</a>.</p>
<p>The constant is his anti-Islam rhetoric, although it has become increasingly drastic over the years. Even though he insists that his criticism is against Islam as an ideology rather than Muslims as people, he has made rather sweeping statements in public. </p>
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<p>He was charged with incitement of hatred and discrimination for his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/18/dutch-far-right-leader-geert-wilders-goeson-trial-for-inciting-hatred">statements about Moroccans</a> and a trial is set to begin at the <a href="http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/03/86296-2/">end of October</a>. He has previously been on trial for similar charges, but was acquitted in 2011 after a lengthy process. He has also become more open to conspiracy theories, such as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/aug/21/muslims-eurabia-europe">Eurabia</a> discourse, which among other things holds that Muslim immigration into Europe is driven by a secret agreement between the EU and a number of Arab nations.</p>
<h2>Question of racism</h2>
<p>The criticism of Islam has broadened to a more general anti-immigration position, for example by criticising the influx of workers from east European EU countries. Whether Wilders can be classified as a racist, however, is a moot point. <a href="https://www.rnw.org/archive/geert-wilders-racist-or-not">Some claim that he is</a>, but Wilders is of Indonesian descent on his mother’s side, and has spoken appreciatively of integrated immigrants from former Dutch colonies. </p>
<p>On the other hand, a long series of derogatory statements about immigrants, such as the ones for which he now faces trial, and the launch of a website where it is possible to <a href="http://www.novinite.com/articles/136623/10+Eastern+European+States+Rise+against+Wilders'+'Hit'+Xenophobic+Site">register complaints about east European EU migrants</a>, suggests that the label of xenophobia is not an exaggeration.</p>
<p>Together with his distinctive blond hair, the reason why Wilders is so well known outside his own country is that he is not afraid of controversy. If anything, he seeks it. But that is only part of the political phenomenon that he is. He may be something of a maverick, but he is also an effective communicator and a shrewd tactician. He has been able to build his PVV party into an effective and, on the whole cohesive, organisation.</p>
<p>Unless something extremely unlikely happens, PVV is set to drastically increase its bargaining power in the next election. Wilders will not hesitate to use this strengthened position to push through his anti-EU and anti-Islam agenda. It cannot even be ruled out that he will succeed Mark Rutte as prime minister – <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/geert-wilders-tells-us-hes-set-to-become-next-dutch-prime-minister-pvv-republican/">he certainly thinks so</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anders Widfeldt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest polls show Wilders’ PVV on course to be largest party in the Dutch parliament.Anders Widfeldt, Lecturer in Nordic Politics, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/574602016-04-08T13:21:20Z2016-04-08T13:21:20ZThe Dutch referendum on EU-Ukraine treaty doesn’t signal a step towards Nexit<p>The European Union’s treaty with Ukraine was rebuffed by Dutch voters on April 6 <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/dutch-voters-reject-closer-eu-links-to-ukraine-in-referendum">with over 60%</a> rejecting it in a low turnout referendum. The government must now reconsider the treaty. Initiators of the referendum hope that it will be a step towards a “Nexit” – the exit of the Netherlands from the EU. But even if more Dutch referendums are possible on EU issues, a withdrawal from Europe is rather unlikely.</p>
<p>On July 1 2015, the Advisory Referendum Act came into force in the Netherlands. If sufficient signatures are collected – 10,000 in four weeks and then 300,000 in the subsequent six weeks – a referendum can now be held on a law or treaty. If the turnout is higher than 30%, the government is formally obliged to reconsider the law or treaty. </p>
<p>The Eurosceptic foundation <a href="https://www.burgercomite-eu.nl/">Burgercomité EU</a> favours the restoration of democratic sovereignty to the Netherlands, as it considers the cession of sovereignty by parliament an “act of treason”. And it perceived the Referendum Act as an opportunity to give the Dutch people a direct voice in the EU, and a way to mobilise opposition against the Netherlands membership of the EU. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2013005">Association Treaty</a> between the Ukraine and the EU is the first piece of legislation since July 1 last year that the Burgercomité EU has targeted with the new act. Most parties in both chambers of parliament had supported the treaty in <a href="https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34116_goedkeuring">spring 2015</a>, but it’s no surprise that some voters think differently, because the EU issue has not had much influence on voters’ choice of parties in parliamentary elections.</p>
<p>The satirical blog <a href="http://geenpeil.nl">GeenStijl</a> and the <a href="http://forumvoordemocratie.nl/">Forum voor Democratie</a>, both critical of the democratic nature of the EU, joined the initiative of Burgercomité EU to use the new act to get the reconsidered. GeenStijl provided crucial mobilising power, garnering media attention and collecting signatures digitally. After sufficient signatures were obtained, an independent Referendum Committee determined the referendum question according to the format prescribed by the law. It <a href="http://www.referendum-commissie.nl/">read</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Are you for or against the law ratifying the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Referendum Committee also provided subsidies for campaigners, be they neutral, against or in favour. </p>
<h2>How the referendum unfolded</h2>
<p>The government decided to adopt a low-key campaigning strategy, aiming to keep the turnout below 30%. Enlargement is the least favoured part of European integration among Dutch voters, tying in with concerns about loss of power and identity in an ever-more expanding EU. These concerns contributed strongly to the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics">no vote</a> in the previous referendum on the European Constitution in 2005. </p>
<p>Economic pragmatism has been the <a href="http://www.boombestuurskunde.nl/bestuurskunde/catalogus/van-aanvallen-naar-verdedigen-1#">main argument</a> for supporting European integration from the very beginning among the Dutch public. But Ukraine’s small economy and widespread corruption did not help to convince voters that the Netherlands would benefit from closer ties between the EU and the Ukraine. </p>
<p>Instead, there were worries about financial support for “a second Greece”. This meant the no side had a considerable advantage. The no side, also consisting of the Socialist Party, the Animal Rights Party and the Freedom Party, <a href="https://www.sp.nl/nieuws/2015/10/sp-zegt-nee-tegen-associatieverdrag-met-oekraine">emphasised</a> that the treaty would actually destabilise Ukraine because it would provoke an even more troubled relationship with Russia. It also underlined the need to solve the EU’s own problems before becoming involved more closely with a country at war.</p>
<p>Even if a large majority in parliament supported the EU-Ukraine treaty, only the social-liberal D66 party made some serious efforts to rally support for the yes vote in the referendum, accompanied by foundations such as <a href="http://www.stemvoor.nl/">Stem voor Nederland</a>. They <a href="https://referendum.d66.nl/">emphasised</a> the potential economic benefits, the chance of improving human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Ukraine, and the possibility of enhancing stability there.</p>
<p>It also had to convince yes voters to vote, however, because some of them hoped that the turnout would remain below 30% if they would stay at home. </p>
<p>The turnout was low, not only because of strategic non-voting, but also because of opposition to the idea of a referendum. Additionally, many voters did not know what to vote: not surprising given the rather low level of information in the country about the EU in general and the Ukraine treaty in particular. </p>
<p>Eventually, more than 60% <a href="http://nos.nl/artikel/2097612-waar-werd-voor-en-waar-werd-tegen-het-verdrag-gestemd.html">rejected</a> the treaty with a 32% turnout. Yes voters were found to be among the highly educated. </p>
<h2>Rule reversal?</h2>
<p>With the 30% turnout threshold narrowly passed, the government is formally obliged to reconsider the ratification of the treaty. Parliamentary elections are looming and must be held by March 2017 at the latest, so political parties have also political reasons to take the no vote seriously. The question is how. </p>
<p>The treaty concerns both EU competences and national competences. If the no vote is considered to be a rejection of the entire treaty, it would require new negotiations between the EU, the EU member states and the Ukraine. Yet the treaty has already been ratified by all the other member states, the European Parliament and the Ukraine. </p>
<p>The parts of the treaty concerning EU competences, such as trade arrangements, have also been provisionally applied since January 2016. And the Dutch government would be even more wary of any new treaty or treaty change, because it could lead to another referendum initiative. </p>
<p>It is therefore more likely that the Dutch government might seek at EU level to state officially it is no proponent of EU enlargement with Ukraine or to be exempted from the national part of the treaty regarding political, defence and legal cooperation. It could do this through a declaration or decision by the Council of the European Union. </p>
<p>The referendum has also led to discussions about the easiness to request a plebiscite, but it will be unlikely that political parties dare to change the rules immediately after the first referendum. Meanwhile, efforts are already underway to launch another referendum initiative as soon as the EU and its member states agree on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – another sticking point. </p>
<p>A referendum on Nexit is legally impossible as there is no law or treaty expected to be adopted on Dutch withdrawal by parliament. Nexit is also unlikely, even though <a href="http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2015/Burgerperspectieven_2015_2">24% of the Dutch public</a> thinks the Netherlands would be better off outside the EU. Trust in the EU is particularly low among the less well-educated. Emotional support for the EU is also weak. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the idea that a small trading country would be worse off outside the EU is still widespread. A Nexit is therefore unlikely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57460/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hans Vollaard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Explained: the implications of a Eurosceptic victory in the Netherlands vote.Hans Vollaard, Lecturer of Dutch and European Politics, Leiden UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.