tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/ebrahim-raisi-38836/articlesEbrahim Raisi – The Conversation2022-12-16T11:57:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1960612022-12-16T11:57:23Z2022-12-16T11:57:23ZIran: dissent by public figures has amplified the protest across the country – and the world<p>Iran’s Islamic Republic continues to violently suppress ongoing pro-democracy protests, which broke out in September in response to the killing of a young woman who had been arrested for not wearing a proper head covering. According to the NGO <a href="https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5623/">Iran Human Rights</a> at least 458 protesters have been killed, including 63 children. Death sentences have been issued to at least 11 people. </p>
<p>Mohsen Shekari, a 22 year old Tehran café worker, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/08/iran-executes-man-23-mohsen-shekari-allegedly-stabbing-pro-regime-officer">was executed</a> on December 8 after being found guilty of charges of using a weapon with intent to kill and “enmity against God”. <a href="https://www.amnesty.ie/iran-execution/">Amnesty International</a> called it “a grossly unfair sham trial” with no due process. </p>
<p>Majidreza Rahnavard was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/12/scores-of-executions-feared-in-iran-as-23-year-old-hanged-in-public-execution">publicly hanged</a> on December 12. He was alleged to have killed two members of the paramilitary Basij force. Human rights advocates have resolutely condemned the execution, which took place <a href="https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5634/#:%7E:text=Iran%20Human%20Rights%20(IHRNGO)%3B,23%20days%20after%20his%20arrest">only 23 days after his arrest</a>, as being based on a forced confession. Similarly to Shekari, Rahnavard faced an unfair trial that was fast-tracked and lacked clear due process. </p>
<p>At least 18,000 people have been detained during the current protests. There are some fears of mass executions, raising the spectre of the notorious <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/prisoners/111232-irans-execution-of-protesters-is-a-repeat-of-1988-mass-killings-possible/">1988 mass executions</a> of Iranian political prisoners. The current Iranian president, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/08/irans-1988-mass-executions#five">Ebrahim Raisi</a>, was one of the judiciary officials who oversaw the 1988 executions.</p>
<p>The Islamic Republic shows no sign of relaxing its stranglehold over the country. Yet the broad-based protests have spanned various ethnic and religious communities, as well as across economic classes and geographic regions. The protesters have challenged limits on freedom of expression and civil liberties and have been strongly supported by Iran’s actors, musicians and athletes who have been among those arrested, imprisoned and tortured. This public dissent by well known public figures has had amplifying effects across Iran and internationally.</p>
<h2>Celebrity stances</h2>
<p>Rappers Toomaj Salehi and Saman Yasin <a href="https://pen.org/press-release/iran-steps-up-repression-of-rights-with-harsh-prison-sentences-for-writers-and-artists-and-reported-torture-and-abuse-in-custody/">were arrested</a> in October for online performances in support of the protesters. Toomaj Salehi articulated his criticism with the following lyrics:</p>
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<p>Someone’s crime was dancing with her hair in the wind.<br>
Someone’s crime was that he or she was brave and criticised…<br>
44 years of your government is the year of failure. </p>
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<p>Shervin Hajipour’s song <a href="https://youtu.be/z8xXiqyfBg0">Baraye (Because of…)</a> has also become part of the protest soundscape <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJb3uc1D1D8">reaching far beyond Iran</a>. Baraye has been covered by various international artists, including Coldplay in a performance with Iranian actor Golshifteh Farahani.</p>
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<p>In the world of film, Taraneh Alidoosti, award-winning Iranian actor, published a photo of herself <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63578923">without a headscarf</a>, holding a sign with the protest slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”. The photo was published on Alidoosti’s Instagram account, which has a following of eight million people. Other Iranian actors have engaged in similar acts of dissent. </p>
<p>Rakhshan Bani Etemad, the renowned Iranian director, posted a video of herself without a headscarf on social media in which she spoke out against the regime’s violence, and particularly lamented the death of nine-year-old <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/18/iran-protests-izeh-kian-pirfalak/">Kian Pirfalak</a>, who was killed when regime security forces opened fire on the car in which he was a passenger. </p>
<p>A group of prominent members of Iran’s theatre arts community also <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/202211301557">issued a statement</a> on Instagram in which they announced that they “will not participate in or watch performances where women were subjected to compulsory hijab”.</p>
<p>The Committee to Follow Up on the Situation of Arrested Artists, a nongovernmental effort dedicated to <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202212043679">tracking the arrest and detention of artists</a>, says at least 150 figures from cinema and stage “have been summoned, arrested, accused, banned from leaving the country or persecuted” since the start of the protests. </p>
<p>Sports personalities and national sports teams have also had significant public reach during the protests. Elnaz Rekabi competed in an international sport climbing competition in South Korea without wearing a headscarf. She was welcomed home by crowds at the airport in a show of support. But she was later forced to make a public statement disowning the act and explaining it as an accident. It has since been reported that she has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/21/iranian-climber-elnaz-rekabi-reportedly-under-house-arrest">placed under house arrest</a>. It was also reported that her family home <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-63847173">was demolished</a> by government officials. </p>
<p>Similarly, Iranian archer, Parmida Ghasemi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-archer-joins-athletes-support-protests-2022-11-11/">removed her headscarf</a> in Iran only to be forced to recant and apologise for the action. Fasiha Radmanesh, who won bronze at an international Muay Thai martial arts competition in Turkey, accepted her medal at the awards ceremony having written out “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom) in black ink <a href="https://twitter.com/drninaansary/status/1600189695610191872?s=20&t=d9Vr-i158vbmWfxurzKz7w">across her forehead and cheeks</a>.</p>
<p>A number of Iranian sports teams, including the men’s national beach football team, men’s national basketball team, men’s national sitting vollyball team, and men’s national water polo team, have refused to sing the national anthem as a show of solidarity with protesters.</p>
<p>The men’s national football team initially followed suit in their first match of the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In their match against England the team stood silent when the anthem was played. They had previously faced fierce criticism for meeting with Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi before departing for Qatar. </p>
<p>However, it was reported that after the game <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/11/28/football/iran-soccer-family-threats-intl-spt/index.html">they were summoned to meet</a> with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and that the families of team members were threatened with imprisonment and torture. They sang the anthem at subsequent games.</p>
<p>The head of the Political and Ideological Office of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, Ali Saeedi Shahroudi, has <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202210107952">called for</a> stricter state control over the behaviour of musicians, actors and sports stars.</p>
<p>The protests continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> </span></em></p>The protesters have been strongly supported by Iran’s actors, musicians and athletes who have been among those arrested, imprisoned and tortured.Roja Fazaeli, Associate Professor Islamic Civilisation, Near & Middle Eastern Studies, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1918092022-10-05T12:14:41Z2022-10-05T12:14:41ZIranian women burning their hijabs are striking at the Islamic Republic’s brand<p>“Women, life, liberty.” These words are ringing out on the the streets of every city in Iran, as women come out to tell the repressive enforcers of the Islamic Republic that they have had enough. </p>
<p>The death of 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, Mahsa Zhina Amini, on September 16 at the hands of the republic’s “morality police” has sparked <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-majority-of-people-reject-compulsory-hijab-and-an-islamic-regime-surveys-find-191448">huge protests</a> across the country. The regime’s brutal response has so far resulted in the <a href="https://women.ncr-iran.org/2022/10/02/400-killed-20000-arrested/">deaths of more than 400 protesters</a> and the arrest of more than 20,000.</p>
<p>Amini was murdered by the morality police for not wearing her hijab properly, according to the rigidly enforced <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/518a19404.html">Islamic Penal Code</a>. To demonstrate their fury at her death and their continuing oppression, Iranian women have been taking their headscarves off and burning them. Unable to drown the loud and determined voices of the Iranian people, the Islamic Republic has turned once again to its usual tactics: violence, internet shutdowns, mass arrests and killings. </p>
<p>Standing shoulder-to-shoulder, Iranian women chant for their freedom. These images appear unprecedented. But for anyone who has followed Iranian politics and society over the years, what we are seeing on the streets of Iran’s cities is no surprise. They are the reaction to more than four decades of brutality and violence and the climax of years and years of resistance. </p>
<p>The slogan “Women, life, liberty,” <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/arimuradd/status/1574051650695843841">adopted from Kurdish</a>, honours Amini’s heritage and connects Iranian women’s movement to one that is collective and transnational. Even schoolgirls have <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/04/iranian-schoolgirls-give-clerical-leaders-finger-join-uprising">taken part</a>. Taking off their uniforms, exposing their hair, they give the finger to the Islamic Republic. They are singing for their freedom. 20 days into the protests, we are witnessing a truly feminist revolution in the making.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1577031159233806337"}"></div></p>
<p>And yet, global feminist solidarity has <a href="https://institute.global/policy/why-west-and-its-feminists-need-support-iranian-women">traditionally been disappointing</a> when it comes to the struggle of Iranian women against this patriarchal dictatorship. For example, many female western state officials who have visited the Islamic Republic have <a href="https://nypost.com/2016/07/03/westerners-who-don-hijabs-in-iran-are-a-disgrace/">complied with its dress code for women</a>. This has the undesired effect of normalising the policing of women’s bodies. </p>
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<img alt=": Woman wearing a white headscarf sits next to a man in a suit." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488245/original/file-20221005-25-wvqfq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Christine Defraigne, president of the Belgian Senate wore a hijab to meet with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Meghdad Madadi via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
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<p>The images emerging from the streets of Iran’s cities – of loud, defiant, courageous women going face-to-face with their oppressors – don’t fit a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=A-HsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA81&lpg=PA81&dq=iran+women+in+western+media&source=bl&ots=q2nq9AhlnM&sig=ACfU3U1fU6roQPmiMST1NEITh4OUt6-XdQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj54srhgcn6AhXJQEEAHbYJDP04ChDoAXoECA4QAw#v=onepage&q=iran%20women%20in%20western%20media&f=false">common western narrative</a> of Iranian women being ultra-modest and submissive. More generally, this contrasts with common media <a href="https://www.theirisnyc.com/post/how-the-film-industry-has-failed-proper-representation-of-middle-eastern-women">and Hollywood</a> <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-real-roots-of-sexism-in-the-middle-east-its-not-islam-race-or-hate/256362/">depictions of Middle Eastern women</a> that offer racial and gender stereotypes instead of complex or diverse representation.</p>
<p>The compulsory hijab for the Islamic Republic is a symbol of subjugation over women, a tool for oppression. The inequality Iranian women experience goes beyond the way they dress. From child custody, divorce laws, to bodily autonomy, and even the right to leave the country, their <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/28/womens-rights-iran">every action is controlled</a> by a ruthless regime. </p>
<p>But it is more than just that. From the Islamic Republic’s inception in 1979, visuals have played a crucial role in cementing this regime and its propaganda. Forcing the hijab onto every single young girl and woman was a way for the Islamic Republic to carry out its ideology using women’s bodies, a way for it to create a visualisation of a supposed homogeneous Islamic state. </p>
<p>These visual signifiers are central to how the regime operates and holds onto power. More importantly, it’s the way the regime maintains its image and <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.570.3706&rep=rep1&type=pdf">brand</a>, within Iran, in the region, as well as to the outside world. </p>
<p>This means, that not only is the compulsory hijab a tool for oppression, but it is an emblem to represent the Islamic Republic. To burn it is to reject the regime in its entirety. The women of Iran are using the very symbols of the regime, to reject its legitimacy as they call for change. </p>
<h2>History of resistance</h2>
<p>Expressions of dissent and acts of disobedience have taken many forms over the 43 years of the Islamic Republic. Women have had to negotiate with the state’s red lines to challenge systems of power for years. </p>
<p>They have tried to express their agency and dissent through various acts such as wearing bright lipstick or colourful clothing, exposing hair under their compulsory hijab, or <a href="https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/iranian-youth-arrested-dancing-pharrells-happy">daring to dance</a> – all in an effort to retain some bodily autonomy. </p>
<p>But protests against the compulsory hijab have roots going back to the <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/women-protesting-hijab-1979/">beginning of the Islamic Revolution</a> in 1979. And while in recent years Iranian women have become more vocal both on social media and the streets of Iran, their <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/the-girls-of-revolution-street-waving-their-veils/">acts of resistance</a> have been met with violence and imprisonment. </p>
<p>Today, Iranian women are telling the Islamic Republic as well as the men around them and the outside world that they will no longer negotiate. “Women, life, liberty”: these are the words that fill the streets of every city across Iran. A clear, collective and loud stance against the Islamic Republic and everything it stands for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zahra Khosroshahi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The hijab, which was forced on all Iranian women after the 1979 revolution, is a tool of oppression.Zahra Khosroshahi, Lecturer in Film and Television Studies, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1874042022-07-21T15:10:09Z2022-07-21T15:10:09ZRussia and Iran’s growing friendship shows their weakness not their strength<p>Facing economic and military difficulties in his invasion of Ukraine, the Russian president Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62234183">popped up this week</a> in Iran’s capital Tehran. His plan was to show the world that, despite sanctions on Moscow and international aid for Ukraine’s resistance, he was not isolated.</p>
<p>Putin got his photo opportunity with Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who bashed the US and Nato, insisting: “If you [Russia] had not taken the initiative, the other side would have caused the war with its own initiative.” There were more pictures with the Iranian and Turkish presidents, Ebrahim Raisi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>For “anti-imperialist” — and thus pro-Kremlin — news sites such as <a href="https://thecradle.co/Article/Columns/13034">The Cradle</a>, this was proof of a new emerging bloc. The Biden administration also saw a potential axis, declaring that Iran is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/17/us/politics/drones-ukraine-russia-iran.html">preparing to</a> send hundreds of armed drones to Moscow amid Russia’s military deficiencies and losses.</p>
<p>But, beyond the pictures and posturing, the reality is more mundane. Russia’s relationship with Iran is not an alliance, but a convergence of interests at a time of crisis for each country. And the driver for this convergence is not strength but weakness: both Putin and the supreme leader are thumping their chests as a vaingloriously defiant response to international sanctions, political blowback over their ventures and the limits of their armed forces.</p>
<p>This is a pact of the isolated.</p>
<h2>The Syria catalyst</h2>
<p>Iran’s post-1979 relations with Moscow have fluctuated. Despite recognising the Islamic Republic, <a href="https://merip.org/1987/09/the-ussr-and-the-gulf-war/">the Soviets supplied Saddam Hussein</a> with weapons throughout the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The end of this conflict, soon followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought reconciliation with economic links, <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_frr01.html">arms deals</a>, and an agreement for Russia to build Iran’s first nuclear reactor at Bushehr.</p>
<p>But amid the post-9/11 Middle East and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Putin – still consolidating his own power in Russia – played a cautious hand. Russia let the US tangle itself in knots in the region, but shared US and European concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme. </p>
<p>Moscow was <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/10/getting-new-iran-deal/2-road-jcpoa-brief-history">part of the P5+1 powers</a> (Russia, US, UK, France, Germany, China) negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran. It supported UN sanctions and suspended a deal with Iran to deliver advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile systems. Iranians chided the Russians over delays in the completion of the Bushehr reactor.</p>
<p>The catalyst for a closer relationship was the Syrian uprising of March 2011. Both Russia and Iran <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">provided logistical, intelligence and propaganda support</a> for the Assad regime from the outset of its repression of mass protests. With Assad’s military at risk of dissolution, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2020/07/iran-military-agreement-syria-assad-regime/">Tehran committed itself</a> in September 2012 to establish a 50,000-strong Syrian militia, and brought in Iranian personnel fighters from Iraq, Pakistan and Lebanon.</p>
<p>Opposition factions, Kurdish groups and the Islamic State still took most of Syria. So in September 2015, Russia launched its massive military intervention with special forces, sieges and bombardment of the opposition territory. Bashar al-Assad was propped up, and Syria fractured into three parts: Turkish-backed opposition in the northwest, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, and Russian and Iranian-backed regime territory elsewhere.</p>
<p>Linked by their calculations that Assad was the flawed but preferred vehicle for their positions, Russia and Iran had established a short-term “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/4/510/5532519">tacit security arrangement</a>” – “tacit” meaning the relationship is limited, informal and based on mutual interests</p>
<p>Russia has increasingly spoken out against US sanctions on Tehran, but it is still part of the P5+1 process to bring the US back into the deal — and to ensure Iranian compliance. It has maintained a cautious approach to conflicts between the US, Iran and other parties from Iraq to Lebanon to Yemen to Israel and Palestine. Moscow may seek benefit from its relationship with Iran, but Putin is also seeking this with Iranian rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.</p>
<h2>The Ukraine catalyst</h2>
<p>On February 24 2022, Putin sent most of Russia’s armed forces into neighbouring Ukraine.</p>
<p>Iran-related complications were immediately evident. With the negotiations on a renewed Iranian nuclear deal close to completion, Russia threatened to derail them by demanding that sanctions — imposed over the invasion — be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/iran-nuclear-talks-rocked-by-russian-demand-for-sanctions-exemption">lifted on Moscow as well on Tehran</a>.</p>
<p>The Russians soon backed down amid Iranian objections. But another difficulty ensued: with Moscow failing to seize Kyiv and topple the Zelenskiy government quickly — and taking heavy losses in its operations — Russia had to <a href="https://syriadirect.org/amid-war-in-ukraine-russia-withdraws-and-iran-expands-in-syria/">draw down on its military positions</a> in Syria. That raised questions about Iran’s deployment, including whether it takes over those positions, and opened the space for Turkey’s Erdoğan to threaten renewed military operations into northern Syria.</p>
<p>Most significantly, the international response put more pressure on a Russian economy that was already struggling. Moscow has never fulfilled repeated declarations that it would provide billions of dollars in loans to help Tehran in the face of international sanctions. Now it finds itself in the same boat.</p>
<p>Salvation is unlikely to be forthcoming any time soon. China and India are happy to take advantage of heavily discounted oil from both Russia and Iran, but both are maintaining a cautious line over any bailout of Moscow with either economic or military assistance. Biden patched up the US position with Saudi Arabia and the UAE during his trip to the region, and both still treat Iran as a rival – even if the Emirates are talking of an expanded diplomatic presence in Tehran.</p>
<h2>Putin left alone</h2>
<p>The most dramatic image from Tehran was not of Putin with the supreme leader, or of him with his Turkish and Iranian counterparts. It was a minute-long video of Putin waiting alone to meet the Turkish president. In March 2020, he tried to humiliate Erdoğan by leaving him for <a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/putin-upsets-erdogan-by-making-him-wait-for-meeting-report-84002">several minutes in a hallway</a>. Now Erdoğan got payback by making the Russian wait, pacing and puffing out his cheeks as cameras rolled.</p>
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<p>It was a powerful reminder that no PR visit could substitute for the consequences of an invasion entering its sixth month. And it was a marker of where Putin finds himself that his only solace — as he looked small in a chair beside a tiny side table as the supreme leader addressed him from a distance — was the Iranian leadership finds itself just as isolated internationally.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This is not so much an alliance as a coalition of the isolated.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1628352021-06-17T19:58:19Z2021-06-17T19:58:19ZConservative hard-liner elected as Iran’s next president – what that means for the West and the nuclear deal<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407109/original/file-20210617-19-rurnrv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C4000%2C2652&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ebrahim Raisi, seen here during a 2017 rally, is expected to win Iran's presidential election.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Iran/0ac72fd2552e431d81abf5a4ff94e9df/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20raisi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=204&currentItemNo=100">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">Iran’s conservative rulers’ effort to orchestrate</a> the outcome of the June 18 presidential election triggered a voter boycott – but the result may still bode well for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/09/world/middleeast/biden-iran-nuclear.htm">ongoing negotiations over the lapsed 2015 nuclear deal</a>. </p>
<p>Iran’s Interior Ministry on June 19 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/world/middleeast/iran-election-president-raisi.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage">announced that the winner</a> is Ebrahim Raisi, chief of Iran’s judiciary and close ally of the supreme leader. He was all but assured of victory after the candidates who could have posed a serious challenge to him – including three reformists – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/world/middleeast/iran-election-khamenei-raisi.html">were disqualified</a> and prevented from participating in the election.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/council-of-despair-irans-uncompetitive-presidential-election/">unprecedented</a> disqualifications <a href="https://www.iranfocus.com/en/iran-general/47115-apathy-in-presidential-election-is-not-because-of-disqualifications-iranian-officials-say/">outraged</a> large groups of liberal and moderate voters, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-iranians-wont-vote-new-survey-reveals-massive-political-disenchantment-162374">many boycotted the election</a>. As a result, the turnout <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-iran-judiciary-4d60554fd608a5dea2c76a303ec352d8">was just 49%</a>. </p>
<p>But who is Ebrahim Raisi, and how will his presidency alter Iran’s domestic and foreign policies? As an <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ErTIYroAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">economist and close observer of Iran</a>, I believe we can start to answer these questions by exploring his past.</p>
<h2>Loyal insider</h2>
<p>Raisi is a loyal regime insider with a long career in Iran’s judicial branch, which goes back <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">more than four decades</a>.</p>
<p>He was only 19 when the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">Islamic revolution</a> deposed the shah in 1979. As a young Islamic activist, he caught the attention of several top revolutionary clerics, including Ali Khamenei, who became Iran’s <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader">supreme leader</a> a decade later. </p>
<p>Named the general-prosecutor of Kataj – a small city near Tehran – at age 20, Raisi quickly rose to more prominent positions. In 1989, when Khamenei replaced Ruhollah Khomeini as supreme leader, Raisi was promoted to chief prosecutor-general of Tehran.</p>
<p>This promotion reflected the <a href="https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ebrahim-raisi-chief-justice-of-iran">high level</a> of trust that Khamenei had in him. While serving in these positions, Raisi also attended seminary and religious studies under Khamenei and other influential religious leaders.</p>
<h2>Executing dissidents and fighting corruption</h2>
<p>During the first decade of his career, Raisi convicted a large number of dissidents and political opponents of the Islamic regime and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ali-khamenei-donald-trump-ap-top-news-elections-judiciary-ee0e777abf19424281c363ef1978ac7f">sentenced many of them to death</a>. </p>
<p>Regime critics and his political opponents <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2021/06/iran-election-dont-ignore-ebrahim-raisis-gross-rights-violations/">have condemned</a> his direct role in these executions, particularly the large number of political prisoners who were executed in 1988.</p>
<p>From 1994 to 2004, Raisi served as head of Iran’s general inspector office, which is responsible for preventing abuse of power and corruption in government institutions. It was in this position that he developed a <a href="https://www.fr24news.com/a/2021/06/iranian-ultra-conservative-raisi-favorite-in-anti-graft-polls.html">reputation as a crusader against government corruption</a>. Even as he was appointed as the first deputy chief justice in 2004 and finally promoted to chief justice in March 2019, he continued his fight <a href="https://lobelog.com/irans-goals-in-the-fight-against-economic-corruption/">against corruption</a> by prosecuting many government officials. </p>
<p>His critics have argued, however, that his fight against corruption has been highly <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/fighting-corruption-or-just-more-political-infighting-in-iran/">politicized and selective</a>. They claimed that he targeted individuals who were affiliated with his political rivals such as President Hassan Rouhani.</p>
<p>Raisi first ran for president in 2017 but <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/20/hassan-rouhani-wins-irans-presidential-election">was defeated</a> by Iran’s current President Hassan Rouhani, who after two terms is ineligible to run again.</p>
<p>In this year’s election, Raisi was the favorite candidate of the conservative right wing of the Islamic ruling elite and also enjoys the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, who has absolute power over all branches of government. Khamenei also directly appoints half of the 12-member <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/the-guardian-council">Council of Guardians</a>, which oversees all political elections and has the power to disqualify candidates without any public explanation. Khamenei <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/khamenei-defends-disqualification-key-presidential-candidates">publicly endorsed and defended the disqualifications</a>.</p>
<h2>Likely return to the nuclear deal</h2>
<p>One of the institutional weaknesses of Iran’s political system since the 1979 Islamic revolution is the potential for tension and disagreement between the elected presidents and the supreme leader.</p>
<p>That is, unlike in the U.S. system of government, the <a href="https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/02/The-Relationship-Between-the-Supreme-Leadership-and-Presidency-and-Its-Impact-on-the-Political-System-in-Iran-rasanah.pdf">Iranian president’s powers are extremely limited</a>. For example, a reformist president may want to engage more with the West or stay out of a foreign conflict, but the supreme leader could overrule or simply ignore him.</p>
<p>As a protege and close ally of the supreme leader, Raisi is expected to support Khamenei’s policies on both domestic and foreign policy – which means more coordination between the various branches of government. With the Parliament also dominated by Khamenei supporters, it also means that the conservatives will control all three branches of the government once again after eight years.</p>
<p>This harmony means Raisi will be a lot more effective as president because whatever policies he pursues will most likely be supported by the supreme leader. </p>
<p>And perhaps ironically, his victory could pave the way for a more compromising attitude on the side of Iran in the negotiations that are currently underway in Vienna for restoration of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal">2015 nuclear agreement</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">which was derailed</a> by former U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018. </p>
<p>The reason for this unconventional prediction is that both reformist and conservative factions in Iran are fully aware that a new nuclear agreement, which could end the severe economic sanctions imposed on the country, is <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/1623526450-iran-s-leading-presidential-candidate-voices-support-for-nuclear-deal">highly popular</a>. The team that signs the agreement will receive credit for ending the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/23/these-6-charts-show-how-sanctions-are-crushing-irans-economy.html">economic hardship</a> the country is currently enduring. For example, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi">inflation is over 50%</a>, exports have plunged due to the sanctions and <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/poverty-grows-iran-some-suggest-redistribution-wealth-taxation">over 60% of the population is now in poverty</a>, up from 48% just two years ago.</p>
<p>With Raisi president, the conservatives and the supreme leader have greater incentives to reach an agreement with the United States for lifting the sanctions as they can no longer blame a reformist president for the economic hardships.</p>
<p>The success of this strategy, however, is far from guaranteed.</p>
<p>First, if Khamenei, Raisi and their hard-line supporters insist on maintaining Iran’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569">confrontational foreign policy</a>, it seems unlikely to me that the economic sanctions against Iran will ease. Not all of them are tied directly to the nuclear deal, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/front-runner-iran-presidency-is-hardline-judge-sanctioned-by-us-2021-06-15/">sanctions against Raisi himself</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the growing alienation and frustration of large segments of Iran’s population – especially after reformists were banned from running for president – may still lead to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/01/latest-irans-evolving-protests">mass unrest</a> and political instability. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Iranian woman holds out her hand, which has the name 'Raisi' on it written in Persian script" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/407108/original/file-20210617-21-1k1xw81.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian woman shows her support for Raisi by writing his name, in Persian, on her hand.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIranElections/0318ab4f5253434582aed21829149655/photo?Query=iran%20AND%20president&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=12133&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Supreme Leader Raisi?</h2>
<p>Raisi’s victory may have an even more significant impact on Iran’s politics in the long run because it might pave the way for him to become Iran’s next supreme leader. </p>
<p>Ayatollah Khamenei is in his 80s, and a succession to a new supreme leader is considered probable in the next four years. According to many regime insiders, Raisi became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55257059">the most likely</a> person to replace Khamenei by winning the presidential election. </p>
<p>If Raisi eventually becomes Iran’s supreme leader, he would have far more powers to shape all types of policies. Based on his background and values, he is likely to resist political and social reforms and try to gain legitimacy for the Islamic regime by focusing on economic development in <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/irans-hard-liners-take-page-chinas-election-playbook">a similar fashion</a> to the authoritarian regimes in Asia, such as China, by focusing on economic growth while curtailing political and social freedoms. </p>
<p>Raisi – and eventually as the supreme leader – is unlikely to abandon Iran’s anti-Western foreign policy, but he has the potential to lower the tensions to a more manageable level in order to improve Iran’s economy.</p>
<p>In my view, he seems to have recognized that the continuation of current economic hardships poses the largest threat to the Islamic regime in the long run.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nader Habibi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ebrahim Raisi was declared the winner of Iran’s June 18 presidential election, which critics called rigged after his top opponents were disqualified.Nader Habibi, Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in Economics of the Middle East, Brandeis UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1623742021-06-10T12:38:05Z2021-06-10T12:38:05ZWhy Iranians won’t vote: new survey reveals massive political disenchantment<p>The Islamic Republic of Iran has never organised free and fair elections since its establishment in 1979. By definition, the combination of modern totalitarianism and Iran’s Islamic theocracy, with a supreme leader, cannot allow for more than a voting spectacle, rather than elections in the normal sense of the word.</p>
<p>Yet, a majority of Iranians have used the platform of an election to <a href="https://www.mhpbooks.com/books/the-people-reloaded/">make their presence felt</a>. They did this in 1997 with the rise of the so-called Reformists, in the disputed 2009 elections that were followed by mass protests, and in 2017 when the current president, Hassan Rouhani, was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39984066">re-elected</a> with a turnout of more than 70%. However, the population’s mode of expression has now shifted. Many Iranians say they will refuse to participate in the upcoming elections, hacking at the regime’s sole remaining pillar of legitimacy.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Listen to the authors discuss their research on The Conversation Weekly podcast.</em> </p>
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<hr>
<p>Rouhani is standing down after serving two terms and presidential elections are taking place on June 18. The frontrunner is Ebrahim Raisi, an ultra-conservative and head of the judiciary who is responsible for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/07/iran-serious-rights-violator-lead-judiciary">ordering</a> the execution of several thousands of political prisoners in 1988. Iran’s Guardian Council, a body of 12 members appointed by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and the head of the judiciary, Raisi himself, must approve the candidates. Among <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20210525-iran-bars-heavyweights-ahmadinejad-and-larijani-from-presidential-elections">those rejected</a> were former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. </p>
<p>Our research institute, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran (GAMAAN), conducted an online survey between May 27 and June 3 on the upcoming vote. The <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GAMAAN-Election-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">results</a> show that the Islamic Republic is facing its lowest turnout ever, with only 25% of respondents saying they would vote. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing who Iranian votes plan to vote for, with abstention at 7.47%." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405149/original/file-20210608-135197-1wnhu56.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nearly three quarters of Iranians surveyed said they would not vote.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GAMAAN-Election-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">GAMAAN</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Polling in authoritarian countries</h2>
<p>Our estimated turnout is lower than the official numbers published by the state-run Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), which <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran/iran-official-poll-shows-lower-turnout-after-elimination-key-candidates">predicts a turnout lower than 40%</a>. The discrepancies are likely to be caused by the differences between traditional telephone and on-site sampling on the one hand, and the less charted territories of online sampling, on the other. </p>
<p>From research in other authoritarian countries such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17457289.2016.1150284">Russia</a> and <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414015626450">China</a>, we know that respondents are much less willing to answer truthfully when they are reached using conventional, offline, survey methods. Inflated polling numbers can then be used to validate potentially fraudulent results to give autocrats an air of respectability. </p>
<p>That’s why GAMAAN conducts surveys using an anonymous digital platform, which makes people feel safe enough to share their true opinions about politically sensitive matters. </p>
<p>Iran’s internet penetration rate is comparable with Germany. According to <a href="https://www.irna.ir/news/84263095/%D8%B6%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D9%86%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DB%B9%DB%B2-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF">the most recent statistics</a>, there are 77 million mobile internet subscribers and <a href="http://ispa.ir/Default/Details/fa/2282/73.6-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C-18-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D9%86%D8%AF--%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%BE-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84">roughly 74% of Iranians</a> over 18 use at least one social media platform. So it’s possible to reach a substantial percentage of Iranians online and ask about their views.</p>
<p>We have conducted several such surveys on <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GAMAAN-Iran-Religion-Survey-2020-English.pdf">religion</a>, <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GAMAAN-Iran-Death-Penalty-Survey-2020-English.pdf">capital punishment</a>, and <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GAMAAN-Iran-Media-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">media popularity</a>, gaining insights into Iranian internet users’ behaviour that help target an appropriate range of digital channels spread across the country. </p>
<p>After cleaning the data for our most recent survey, we were left with a sample of 68,000 Iranians living in Iran. The sample was weighted and balanced to the target population of literate Iranians aged above 19, using five demographic variables, voting behaviour in the 2017 presidential elections, and new survey data on political preferences.</p>
<p>Crucial for the weighting is the participation of pro-regime respondents, whose absence would skew the results. In this survey, we attracted 9,000 respondents who voted for the conservative candidate, Raisi, in the 2017 elections. </p>
<h2>The meaning of not voting</h2>
<p>What can explain the turnout drop, from over 70% in 2017 to an expectation of less than 30% today? The vast majority of our respondents, 71%, said the main reason they were abstaining was because of “the unfree and ineffective nature of elections in the Islamic Republic.” Only 7% reported the Guardian Council’s recent “disqualification of my preferred candidate” as their reason. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing 70% of Iranians say they won't vote because of the unfree nature of the elections." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405150/original/file-20210608-28272-1lw0gzy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A lack of free and fair elections is keeping voters away from the polls.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GAMAAN-Election-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">GAMAAN</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In another survey we <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/gamaan-referendum-survey-report-english-2019.pdf">conducted in April 2019</a>, 79% of respondents said they would vote no to the Islamic Republic in a free referendum. This was before the bloody crackdowns in November that year which led to the death of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport-idUSKBN1YR0QR">an estimated 1,500</a> people, and before the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps admitted <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55488800">shooting down</a> a Ukrainian passenger airline in 2020.</p>
<p>Our latest results show that the majority’s desire to get rid of the theocratic system hasn’t changed. Around half of the population supports regime change as a precondition for meaningful change, and a quarter supports a softer transition away from the current system. Only 8% explicitly supported the Islamic Republic by identifying as Reformist, and only 13% saw themselves as Principlists, who support the Islamic Revolution and the supreme leader.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing more than half of Iranians surveyed want regime change as a precondition for change." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405153/original/file-20210608-23-1ypsz04.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A majority of Iranians think change can only come with regime change.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GAMAAN-Election-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">GAMAAN</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>We are not the only group with such findings. A <a href="https://www.farsnews.ir/news/14000312000160/%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%B1%D8%A3%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B2%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DB%B8%DB%B0-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF">recent state-run survey</a> revealed that Reformists and Principlists together have about 20% of supporters. The respectable <a href="https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp">World Values Survey</a> conducted an on-site survey in Iran in the summer of 2020 and found that the Principlists’ base was no larger than 16%. </p>
<p>Worried about the expected low turnout, the supreme leader <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210604-iran-s-khamenei-urges-people-to-vote-amid-abstention-fears">hurried to describe</a> the act of voting as a religious duty. But if Iranians’ political disenchantment has turned into <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/01/21/disenchanted-iranians-are-turning-to-other-faiths">religious disappointment</a>, with millions abandoning or changing their faith, the leader has turned the elections into a test of the nation’s religiosity. It is this entanglement of religion and politics that is at the heart of Iranians’ discontent, and which the regime’s mismanagement and <a href="https://iranintl.com/en/iran-economy/iran-near-bottom-transparency-international%E2%80%99s-2020-corruption-index">corruption</a> and the economic sanctions have only exacerbated. </p>
<p>Like other authoritarian regimes, the Islamic Republic needs a high enough turnout so that its foreign minister <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_xEHZQ6Dfg&t=2538s">can sell an image</a> of a legitimate government abroad. By boycotting what are nothing but staged elections, ordinary Iranians are refusing to participate in this political theatre. It’s time the international community recognised their will to effect a real change in Iran.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162374/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pooyan Tamimi Arab is the secretary of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Maleki is the director of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN, which received public donations to carry out this research.</span></em></p>Ahead of June 18 presidential elections, a new survey found that only around a quarter of Iranians plan to vote.Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Utrecht UniversityAmmar Maleki, Assistant Professor, Public Law and Governance, Tilburg UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624022021-06-10T11:39:22Z2021-06-10T11:39:22ZWhy so many Iranians plan not to vote this month – podcast<p>In this episode of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/the-conversation-weekly-98901">The Conversation Weekly</a>, ahead of Iran’s presidential elections later this month, we look at why so many Iranians are planning not to vote. And why light pollution is ruining the romantic mood for fireflies – and how you can help. </p>
<iframe src="https://embed.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/60c0d3c17c2da000131ee87a?cover=true" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay" width="100%" height="110"></iframe>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-561" class="tc-infographic" height="100" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/561/4fbbd099d631750693d02bac632430b71b37cd5f/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Iranians are about to get the chance to vote for a new president on June 18. Hassan Rouhani, president since 2013, is stepping down after serving two terms in office. The frontrunner to succeed him is Ebrahim Raisi, an ultra-conservative and current head of the judiciary. </p>
<p>It’s the first election since <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">a wave of protests</a> hit the country in November 2019, followed by a brutal crackdown by security services in which an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport-idUSKBN1YR0QR">estimated 1,500 people were killed.</a> </p>
<p>Getting information about how Iranians view their society and its political leaders is notoriously difficult. People can be scared to answer freely, particularly if they’re called up on the phone by a government-backed pollster. In this episode we speak to two academics in the Netherlands who take a different approach – anonymous online surveys. And they’re getting tens of thousands of people to participate. </p>
<p>Ammar Maleki, assistant professor in public law and governance at Tilburg University, and Pooyan Tamimi Arab, assistant professor of religious studies at Utrecht University carried out <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GAMAAN-Election-Survey-2021-English-Final.pdf">a new survey</a> about voting intentions in late May, via the <a href="https://gamaan.org/english/">Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran</a>, a non-profit, independent research organisation. They received responses from 68,000 Iranians living in Iran and found that only 25% plan to vote. Compared to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39984066">more than 70%</a> who voted in the last presidential elections in 2017, that’s a dramatic decrease. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-iranians-wont-vote-new-survey-reveals-massive-political-disenchantment-162374">Why Iranians won’t vote: new survey reveals massive political disenchantment</a>
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<p>They unpick why so many Iranians plan to abstain and what’s causing this massive political disenchantment. And they explain what some of their previous <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">surveys</a> reveal about a growing secular shift in Iran and whether it’s affecting people’s willingness to participate in elections. “This is the miracle of the Islamic Republic,” says Tamimi Arab, “secularisation to this extent would never have been possible under a secular regime.” </p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">Iran's secular shift: new survey reveals huge changes in religious beliefs</a>
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<p>Our second story (26m20s) provides advice on how to ensure future generations continue to enjoy one of nature’s greatest wonders: fireflies. Their glowing light comes from a biochemical reaction in their abdomen and they use it during courtship as a way to communicate. But the light shows up best in the dark – and as Avalon Owens, a PhD candidate in biology at Tufts University, tells us, its effects are dimmed by artificial light. She explains her new research into what actually happens, and how we can help to keep the fireflies blinking in their search for love. </p>
<p>And Haley Lewis, culture and society editor at The Conversation in Ottawa, gives us some recommended reading about the 215 First Nations children found in a mass unmarked grave at a former residential school in British Columbia, Canada (36m10s). </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-longer-the-disappeared-mourning-the-215-children-found-in-graves-at-kamloops-indian-residential-school-161782">No longer 'the disappeared': Mourning the 215 children found in graves at Kamloops Indian Residential School</a>
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<p>The Conversation Weekly is produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware, with sound design by Eloise Stevens and Mau Loseto. Our theme music is by Neeta Sarl. You can find us on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/TC_Audio">@TC_Audio</a>, on Instagram at <a href="https://www.instagram.com/theconversationdotcom/?hl=en">theconversationdotcom</a>. or via email on podcast@theconversation.com. You can also sign up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/newsletter?utm_campaign=PodcastTCWeekly&utm_content=newsletter&utm_source=podcast">The Conversation’s free daily email here</a>.</p>
<p>News clips in this episode are from <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7Q2bSpZTBk">France</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QSf8gDhTMNk">24</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7qTFdhbhMI">Al</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZssOvZaMnU">Jazeera</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4WZ_PloiV0">Channel 4</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12nLyhaXQH0">CBC News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KL4h4dGzqck">CNN</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPyR8wDjmZo">Democracy</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPyR8wDjmZo&t=74s">Now</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-csyrkV4oU0">AP News</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4r6jmLP3ukU">The Telegraph</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPWiEkvawz4">Salaam Times</a>. </p>
<p><em>You can listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, our <a href="https://feeds.acast.com/public/shows/60087127b9687759d637bade">RSS feed</a>, or find out how else to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-listen-to-the-conversations-podcasts-154131">listen here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Plus, why fireflies need dark nights and what you can do about it. Listen to episode 19 of The Conversation Weekly.Gemma Ware, Head of AudioDaniel Merino, Associate Breaking News Editor and Co-Host of The Conversation Weekly PodcastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/776702017-05-19T00:15:55Z2017-05-19T00:15:55ZMeet Ebrahim Raisi, the cleric who challenged incumbent Rouhani for president of Iran<p>Iranian presidential candidate <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118072271215621679">Ebrahim Raisi is an important newcomer</a> to electoral politics. </p>
<p>Last year, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed Raisi custodian of the shrine of Imam Reza and chairman of the foundation that manages its extensive complex. This is no minor post. The foundation nets the regime <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/irans-supreme-leader-key-appointment-ebrahim-raeisi-mashhad-foundation">billions of dollars</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/170014/original/file-20170518-12263-19uxkj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The shrine of Imam Ali Reza in Mashhad, Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8016164">Iahsan</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>Before this year, Raisi had never campaigned for public office or debated in the national political spotlight. His inexperience has shown. In the three live nationally televised debates, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/29/the-ayatollahs-favorite-didnt-do-so-well-fridays-iranian-presidential-debate/?utm_term=.6efd1f7589e5">lacked charisma,</a> sticking closely to his talking points.</p>
<p>While highly visible with the ability to influence public opinion and steer some aspects of national and foreign policy, the Iranian president’s power is limited. The majority of power, including that over foreign policy, national security and media, <a href="http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/supreme-leader">rests with the supreme leader</a>. </p>
<p>Given the little he has to gain from the uncertain venture, why would Raisi decide to join a crowded field to run against the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-rouhani-sees-support-slip-in-poll-1485320462">relatively popular</a> incumbent Hassan Rouhani? </p>
<h2>Why run?</h2>
<p>One answer is that with his wealth and connection to the supreme leader, Raisi thinks he has a good chance of winning. </p>
<p>The news of the exit and endorsement of his major right wing rival <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-qalibaf-20170515-story.html">Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf</a> on Sunday certainly supports this theory. For the first time since early in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s founding in 1979, the conservative side of the political spectrum has cast its lot <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/iran-ghalibaf-tehran-mayor-third-bid-president-office.html">behind a single candidate</a>. </p>
<p>Still, observers are keen to point out that history is not on Raisi’s side. Every president since the office was created has served <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/will-hassan-rouhani-be-irans-first-single-term-president">two terms</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"864853709108518913"}"></div></p>
<p>Another explanation has little to do with the presidency. There have long been whispers of illness surrounding the supreme leader, who is 77 years old. To avoid chaos and even loss of power, the regime’s ruling clerics will need to swiftly name Khamenei’s successor when he inevitably dies. Raisi is rumored to be on the short list. Hence, Raisi’s candidacy may be a tactic designed to build the confidence of key regime insiders and boost his name recognition around the country to better position him for that <a href="https://en.iramcenter.org/current-issues-en/opinion/presidential-elections-iran-stake/">coveted role</a>. </p>
<p>It is noteworthy that Raisi entered the race as an independent, despite the fact that his hard-line views neatly align with the country’s conservative Principlist Party. Running without an affiliation is a wise move for someone looking to be the next leader, as both the Constitution and political norms require the supreme leader to be above pedestrian politics and unencumbered by factional allegiance. </p>
<h2>Is Raisi a ‘historical criminal’?</h2>
<p>As a historian of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/605094">Iranian politics and media</a>, I’d contend that this election is important not just for its impact in the future of Iran, but for what it says, and does not say, about its post-revolutionary past. </p>
<p>There are a number of unanswered questions about Raisi’s past. One relates to his role on a four-man “death committee” that oversaw the execution of more than 2,000 men and women in 1988. Last summer, the estate of the late Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, one of the leaders of the Iranian revolution, <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/features/1940">released a chilling audio recording</a> of the committee’s deliberations and their response to Montazeri’s plea for leniency for the prisoners.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/12/an-opponent-of-political-violence-was-once-set-to-lead-iran-one-last-quarrel-changed-it-all/?utm_term=.f73112fcb75f">recording</a>, Montazeri can be heard condemning Raisi and the other members of the panel as “<a href="https://iranwire.com/en/features/3983">historical criminals</a>.” </p>
<p>Montezari died in December 2009. Once designated successor of the first Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini, his funeral was a major inflection point in the politics of the post revolutionary state. It inspired the <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1221/Iran-opposition-energized-by-Montazeri-funeral-in-Qom-say-eyewitnesses/(page)/2">consolidation of the Green Movement</a>, the most powerful government opposition movement to arise since the toppling of the monarchy in 1979. </p>
<p>The mass executions of 1988 were no doubt a violation of international standards of human rights. </p>
<p>If elected, might Raisi’s past come back to haunt him? Given that another member of the death committee, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-irans-stripes-havent-changed/2013/10/16/f3704948-3685-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html?utm_term=.7c384f94a60f">Mostafa Pourmohammadi</a>, is currently serving as Rouhani’s justice minister, domestic consequences are unlikely. </p>
<p>How it will play out on an international stage is less clear. One thing is sure: Raisi will play a part in the shaping of a post-Khamenei Iran.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily L. Blout does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President is not the most important leadership role in Iran. The election is not completely democratic. That said, there’s a pretty competitive contest happening.Emily L. Blout, Faculty Fellow, Internet Governance Lab, American University School of CommunicationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.