tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/economic-community-of-west-african-states-28031/articlesEconomic Community of West African States – The Conversation2022-01-31T13:47:53Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759912022-01-31T13:47:53Z2022-01-31T13:47:53ZAfter a fourth coup in West Africa, it’s time to rethink international response<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443253/original/file-20220129-27-1tm5acm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators hold a picture of Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba who led the coup against Burkina Faso president Roch Kabore.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-president-kabore-detained-military-camp-sources-tell-reuters-2022-01-24/">latest coup</a> in Burkina Faso is the fourth in Africa’s Sahel region in less than 18 months. The other three were carried out in August 2020 in Mali, in April 2021 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/24/chads-military-ruler-mahamat-deby-names-transitional-parliament">in Chad</a>, and Mali’s “<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-malis-coup-within-a-coup-161621">coup within a coup</a>” last May.</p>
<p>Yet, European and American leaders currently appear <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">more concerned</a> with the presence of Russian-linked Wagner Group mercenaries than with the region’s core political problems.</p>
<p>All of these coups illustrate the dangers of regional and international actors prioritising counter-terrorism (and competition with Russia) while ignoring other warning signs. These include flawed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burkina-election/burkina-faso-president-kabore-secures-re-election-preliminary-results-show-idUKKBN2861JZ">low-turnout elections</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-why-citizens-are-disenchanted-with-president-kabore/a-60540479">out-of-touch rulers</a>, and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-25/burkina-faso-extends-internet-shutdown-before-nov-27-protests">crackdowns on free expression</a>. </p>
<p>There’s also grinding poverty (even <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/10-Burkina-Faso-growth-without-poverty-reduction.pdf">before</a>the current crisis) and astonishing levels of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109772#:%7E:text=In%20Burkina%20Faso%20alone%2C%20the,in%20the%20last%2012%20months.">internal displacement</a>. In addition, there’s <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/11/22/burkina-faso-us-relations/">overemphasis on counterterrorism</a>.</p>
<p>The Burkina Faso coup was the subject of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">urgent regional coordination meetings</a> and an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/w-african-bloc-ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-sources-2022-01-28/">emergency virtual summit</a> of the Economic Community of West African States on January 28 which resolved to suspend Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>I have studied Islam and politics in northwest Africa for the past sixteen years, with a focus on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. My most recent book – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadists-of-north-africa-and-the-sahel/C1C391EC226A65858CCF45322879ED1B">Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups</a> – draws on case studies from Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. The study examines jihadist movements from the inside, uncovering their activities and internal struggles over the past three decades.</p>
<p>It’s my view that the latest coup presents a fork in the road for West African, French, and American policymakers. They can decide to let the coup stand and thus confirm de facto military dominance across the Sahel. Or they can draw a red line and demand that it be reversed.</p>
<h2>From revolution to failure</h2>
<p>The overthrow of Burkina Faso’s President Roch Kabore has domestic precedents as well, including a series of coups dating back to 1966. Out of the tumultuous 1980s, the ultimate victor was a military dictator named Blaise Compaore. Compaore closed the door on the revolutionary promise of his flawed but admirable predecessor, Thomas Sankara, by installing himself as de facto president for life. </p>
<p>Compaore was overthrown in a 2014 popular revolution.</p>
<p>The revolution survived its first major challenge — a 2015 coup attempt by Compaore loyalists. But it then floundered thanks to Kabore, who was elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2020. Kabore, who was close to Compaore until the early 2010s, came late to the opposition and proved a poor vehicle for the aspirations of the youth-led revolution. </p>
<p>The mainstream alternatives were little better. In both 2015 and 2020, the runners-up were politicians with ties to Compaore. These include former Finance minister Zephirin Diabre. During his first and second terms, Kabore drifted along without much of a programme.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, security collapsed across much of Burkina Faso. The easy — far too easy — explanation one sometimes hears is that Compaore had maintained an <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-jihadist-terrorism-threatens-to-destabilize-burkina-faso-and-its-neighbors/">unofficial deal with jihadists</a> in Mali and beyond. This ostensibly kept Burkina Faso free of their attacks. But once he fell, the argument goes, jihadists crowded in. </p>
<p>Another simplistic explanation is that West African jihadists, flush with cash and tactical know-how <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-africa-must-confront-its-foreign-terrorist-fighters">from abroad</a>, are strategic masterminds bulldozing their way across the region.</p>
<p>The reality is substantially more complex. Sahelian jihadists have had ups and downs. And it has taken the confluence of many factors —- beyond just Compaore’s fall or whatever strategic acumen jihadists may possess -— to make the central Sahel into one of the world’s worst conflict zones. </p>
<p>In central Mali, a renewed wave of jihadist mobilisation starting in 2015 drew on longstanding grievances connected to inequitable land access, ossified social hierarchies, and the brutal, knee-jerk reactions of the Malian security forces.</p>
<p>Across the border in northern Burkina Faso, similar developments set in by 2016. They drew on <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/254-social-roots-jihadist-violence-burkina-fasos-north">ultra-local grievances</a>, the exchange of personnel and ideas across the Mali-Burkina Faso border, and the deteriorating picture throughout the sub-region.</p>
<h2>Military corruption and coups</h2>
<p>As Mali’s crisis grew into a Sahelian crisis, the region’s militaries have been simultaneously and collectively pressed to deliver more results. In other words, more dead jihadists. From Paris, Washington, and Brussels, patronising language about <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/28/sahel-a-new-partnership-for-the-g5-the-morning-call/">“partnerships</a>” and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210603-counter-terrorism-in-the-sahel-a-training-session-with-french-special-forces">“training”</a> barely camouflages contempt. European and even American ground troops, helicopters, and drones crisscross the region, leaving Sahelian armies as supporting actors or bypassing them altogether. </p>
<p>Litanies about “good governance” decry corruption in generic terms but rarely focus on specific targets, leaving little accountability for militaries or civilians. Military corruption scandals have been routinely <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220107-niger-le-gouvernement-s-exprime-sur-l-affaire-des-d%C3%A9tournements-de-fonds-%C3%A0-la-d%C3%A9fense">swept under the rug</a>. These include the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-arms-audit/niger-lost-120-million-in-arms-deals-over-three-years-government-audit-idUSKBN233215">one</a> in Niger – now the next country where coup fears are rising.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Sahelian security forces take casualties from enemies who melt into the countryside. This leaves rank-and-file soldiers and gendarmes fearful and quick to pull the trigger against civilians, compounding insecurity.</p>
<p>All of these dynamics leave colonels -— the key movers in recent coups —- caught between ineffective presidents, complacent generals, and their own disgruntled troops. Elections bring no substantive changes, major opposition leaders offer vague alternatives, and Sahelian capitals periodically erupt into massive protests demanding an alternative to a broken status quo. </p>
<p>One can understand why the colonels react. And also why many civilians often initially support coups. But the coups make the overall situation even worse by layering new political crises over existing crises of insecurity, humanitarian emergencies, and civilian politicians’ own inability to address fundamental problems.</p>
<h2>Drawing the line in the sand</h2>
<p>The general reaction by France, the United States, and ECOWAS to the latest round of Sahelian and West African coups has been to decry them while quietly accepting them as done deals. </p>
<p>A “political reality” sets in the moment the ousted leader reluctantly agrees to resign under clear duress. This “reality” dictates that such leaders are never coming back. The “international community,” with the Economic Community of West African States as the lead negotiator, then haggles with each junta over the parameters of a transition back to civilian rule.</p>
<p>That template bogs regional diplomacy down in extended negotiations with juntas that are clearly willing to play outside the rules. Such a situation has increasingly affected Mali. </p>
<p>Paris and Washington, meanwhile, routinely appear overeager to get back to business as usual with whoever is in charge. In this case, business as usual means counter-terrorism campaigns. Such campaigns are supposedly a means of boosting political stability, but in reality they constrain effective diplomatic responses to coups, corruption, electoral irregularities, and human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Why should it be considered politically fanciful to try to reverse coups? Examples of coups being reversed are few, but that does not mean Washington shouldn’t try. At a minimum, Washington can take the lead rhetorically by not just “expressing concern” or “calling for the release” of detained, overthrown presidents, but also by demanding the reinstatement of overthrown leaders. </p>
<p>Any concerns about “losing credibility” should be tempered by the fact that Washington already appears weak and deeply hypocritical on the issue of democracy promotion and respect for human rights.</p>
<p>It is never too late to attempt consistency, including on cases now assumed to be completely settled. The Chadian junta’s rule is as unconstitutional today as it was in April 2021 when it began, for example. Beyond the rhetorical level, meanwhile, there are plenty of options for pressuring juntas through sanctions, aid suspensions, withdrawal of ambassadors, suspensions from regional and international organisations, and more.</p>
<p>ECOWAS pulled back from draconian economic sanctions in the immediate aftermath of the August 2020 coup in Mali. It has now ended up imposing them some 17 months later. This is after realising that the junta was essentially ignoring the dictates of the regional grouping all along. </p>
<p>To not use these tools when they would be most effective -— immediately following each coup —- is to become complicit in the region’s militarisation. This is true of the far-flung peripheries where jihadists gravitate, but also of other capitals across the Sahel.</p>
<p><em>This article was first published as a blog in <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/01/27/another-west-african-coup-after-burkina-faso-time-to-rethink-military-aid/">Responsible Statecraft</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander John Thurston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest coup now presents a fork in the road for West African, French, and American policymakers.Alexander John Thurston, Asst Professor, Political Science, University of Cincinnati Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1657732021-08-15T09:03:19Z2021-08-15T09:03:19ZIn search of advantages: Israel’s observer status in the African Union<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415852/original/file-20210812-24-z1fep5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rwanda's President Paul Kagame meets Israel's then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/paulkagame/35029583353">Paul Kagame/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since its establishment as a <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel#:%7E:text=On%20May%2014%2C%201948%2C%20David,nation%20on%20the%20same%20day.">state in 1948</a>, Israel has placed great importance on foreign policy. This is because it had been under a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1977-04-01/middle-east-arab-boycott-israel?amp">political and economic boycott</a> by surrounding Arab states. The boycott has been falling apart since the <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-egyptian-peace-agreement-signed">1979 peace treaty with Egypt</a>. But it is still in place with countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Libya. </p>
<p>As a result Israel pursues reliable political allies and trading partners on the periphery of the Arab world – and beyond. </p>
<p>This is true in Africa too. Israel’s strongest relations on the continent are with countries in west, central and east Africa. It now has <a href="https://jewishstudies.washington.edu/israel-hebrew/benjamin-netanyahu-resetting-israel-africa-relations/">diplomatic relations</a> with 46 of the <a href="https://au.int/">55 African Union member states</a>.</p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/23/israel-granted-observer-status-at-the-african-union">decision</a> by the African Union to grant Israel observer status has once again raised the profile of Israel’s relations with the continent. </p>
<p>For over half a decade under former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tenure, Israel lobbied hard for this outcome. </p>
<p>Netanyahu visited sub-Saharan Africa in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/africa/israel-africa-netanyahu-uganda-kenya-rwanda.html">July 2016</a>, the first Israeli head of state to visit since Levi Eshkol in 1966. In addition to encouraging further political and economic ties, his mission was to secure the support of African leaders for observer status at the African Union. </p>
<p>He carefully chose Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Ethiopia and Kenya had had close ties with Israel in the past. And they were engaged in security cooperation against the threat of Islamist terrorism and were sympathetic to Israel’s goal of achieving African Union observer status. </p>
<p>Connections with Uganda were developing, while Rwanda’s leader Paul Kagame shared an affinity with Israel given his country’s experience with genocide. </p>
<p>The following year Netanyahu visited Liberia <a href="https://www.africanews.com/amp/2017/06/04/israeli-prime-minister-woos-west-african-leaders-to-join-forces/">to address</a> the 15-member countries of the Economic Community of West African States – the first non-African head of state to do so. He made <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=sFRsPT-OTFY&autoplay=1">an appeal</a> for political support in return for economic aid and technical assistance in sectors such as agriculture, water resources, energy and health.</p>
<p>He also lobbied for African Union observer status. Israeli officials – both in public and private – continued with these efforts in the intervening years.</p>
<p>In recent years, Israel has made inroads in North Africa too. In 2019 it re-established relations with Chad, which had been broken off in 1972 because of Israel’s then-continued occupation of Egypt’s Sinai peninsula since the 1967 War. The current African Union Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, who granted Israel observer status in late July 2021, comes from Chad. Mahamat’s decision was supported by the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s president and current chairman of the African Union, Félix Tshisekedi. </p>
<p>Israel also has normalised relations with Morocco and Sudan through the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a>. These were brokered by the US and came into action initially with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signing the agreement in August 2020.</p>
<p>The reasons for wanting observer status are not hard to decipher. Firstly, Palestine <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/au-grants-palestine-observer-status/">had been granted observer status</a> in the African Union in 2013. Secondly, African countries form a large bloc at the United Nations and many vote in a similar fashion. Israeli policymakers felt that the African Union would be an easier place to lobby for their positions in the conflict with the Palestinians. Israel had had observer status in the Organisation of African Unity. But <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-19-years-after-its-ouster-african-union-reinstates-israel-as-an-observer-country-1.10020545">it was denied</a> the status when the African Union replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2002. </p>
<p>Israel hopes to get African countries to support it on issues of political interest at the United Nations, and at the very least to abstain or absent themselves. Beyond that, Israel wants to increase security cooperation and economic ties. This includes the sale of civilian as well as military items. </p>
<p>Observer status at the African Union enables Israel to have closer contacts with African policymakers and to address attendees of the organisation’s meetings. </p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>During the 1950s, as the Cold War evolved, Israel placed emphasis on ties with the US and countries in Western Europe. </p>
<p>At the same time there was a hope of developing promising relations with the independent states in Asia. The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf">Bandung Conference of 1954</a> stymied these efforts as Israel was not invited to the gathering. Many of its prominent figures would later establish the <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-aligned-movement-nam/">Non-Aligned Movement</a>, which often opposed Israel’s policies, especially towards the Palestinians.</p>
<p>One of the consequences was that when African states began achieving their independence in the 1960s, a number received a great deal of interest from Israeli policymakers. Two factors drove Israeli efforts. One was a desire to counteract diplomatic movements by Egypt. Another was an attempt to portray Israel as a model for development and as an alternative to the former imperial European states as a conveyor of technical assistance. </p>
<p>However, all African countries, except apartheid South Africa, Malawi, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Mauritius, broke off formal relations with Israel around the time of the 1973 War. This was due to the continued occupation of Arab territory <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt9309h7t3/qt9309h7t3.pdf?t=mnipnf">as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War</a>.</p>
<p>Some informal ties through embassies and business relations were maintained until many African countries began re-establishing relations with Israel at the end of the Cold War. This was also a period during which Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation began a process that resulted in normalising ties.</p>
<h2>Opposition</h2>
<p>South Africa <a href="https://m.jpost.com/israel-news/south-africa-downgrade-embassy-in-israel-to-liaison-office-585883/amp">downgraded its representation</a> in Israel in 2019 from an embassy to a liaison office over Israel’s actions in Gaza in 2018. South Africa has been at the forefront of the <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/">Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign</a> against Israel. The organisation’s raison d’etre is that isolating Israel will force it to relinquish Palestinian territory in the West Bank and end its blockade of Gaza. The movement has some appeal among left-wing individuals and groups in the west. But it is largely ignored by other African states.</p>
<p>The strong feelings of the South African government and the ruling African National Congress party are driven by two factors. The first is Israel’s military – and possibly nuclear – cooperation with the apartheid regime. The second is the affinity that many South Africans have with the Palestinian cause for self-determination. </p>
<p>South Africa was the country most strongly opposed to Mahamat’s decision. </p>
<p>However, most African countries have chosen to separate the issue of the Palestinians from economic cooperation with Israel, even though a number still vote against Israel on political issues at international forums such as the United Nations.</p>
<p>Some, like South Africa, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/shocking-south-africa-slams-israels-au-observer-status">opposed Israel’s observer status</a> on the grounds of its treatment of the Palestinians and the continued occupation of their territory. They <a href="https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/botswana-and-three-other-african-countries-oppose-israels-au-observer-status/dwep03m">included</a> Arab League members Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia as well as Namibia and Botswana.</p>
<p>Just as vocal critics – such as South Africa and Algeria – could do nothing about Morocco’s readmission to the African Union, it remains to be seen what they can do about reversing the decision on Israel. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israel has an important forum in which to lobby for its interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Bishku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most countries in Africa have chosen to separate the issue of the Palestinians from economic cooperation with Israel.Michael Bishku, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1555662021-02-18T17:20:29Z2021-02-18T17:20:29ZEbola strikes West Africa again: key questions and lessons from the past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384961/original/file-20210218-21-yx9sj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Medical staff check each others protective suits.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by SUMY SADURNI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>News of a <a href="https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/ebola-virus-disease-nzerekore-guinea-february-2021">new outbreak</a> of Ebola in Guinea is indeed distressing. The last in West Africa occurred between 2014 and 2015 and affected Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. It was the <a href="https://time.com/5939733/guinea-ebola-epidemic/">world’s deadliest</a> Ebola outbreak, which began in Guinea and in which more than 11,300 people died. Among these were <a href="https://www.isglobal.org/en/ebola">over 500</a> health workers. </p>
<p>But countries in the West African region are in a very different position seven years on.</p>
<p>Liberia and Sierra Leone <a href="https://apnews.com/article/liberia-julius-maada-bio-health-guinea-ebola-virus-ede99ac43739832a3cf56041868e1cfa">have already</a> mobilised and activated their national response and preparedness plans. A clear indication that the political will is there. </p>
<p>Countries in the region also have the experience of the past, as well as new tools to tackle Ebola. They have an experienced workforce, laboratory systems are more developed and regional organisations, such as the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/african-cooperation/mano-river-union/">Mano River Union</a> – a regional economic and security body – and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are more proactive. </p>
<p>For example, one of the outcomes of a 2018 planning meeting in Freetown, Sierre Leone, was to prepare for cross-border transmission. A whatsapp platform was developed that provided for real time tracking of outbreaks. It is now operational and is being used to transmit updates from Guinea to the surveillance and response teams from member countries. </p>
<p>However, as Pierre Formenty, the head of the World Health Organisation’s viral and haemorrhagic fever team, once pointed out to me: the worst mistake anyone can make about Ebola is to underestimate Ebola, or to think they know all about Ebola. </p>
<p>I’m an infectious disease expert and have led national response teams in previous Ebola outbreaks. A fundamental lesson I’ve learned is that the success of a control strategy is not based on the obvious information you have, but the subtle unanswered questions. I learnt this the hard way.</p>
<p>One particular incident has stayed with me. In early August, 2014, I met with Liberia’s WHO Representative who asked me how West Point was doing. West Point is Liberia’s largest slum and is located in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital. I said, with great confidence, that it was very quiet and had no ongoing Ebola transmissions. However, at that very time, there were active Ebola transmissions in the area and secret burials were happening in the early morning hours. The cases in West Point exploded.</p>
<p>It’s crucial to keep digging, and keep questioning. I’ve compiled a series of questions which are key to preparedness strategies, and which all countries in the region should address. </p>
<h2>Key questions</h2>
<p>There are some key <em>biological questions</em> that those leading surveillance and contact tracing need to answer.</p>
<p>1) The first is: <strong>how long was the first case sick before they died?</strong></p>
<p>Answering this question is crucial so that neighbouring countries
can trace possible times a sick person – or contact from the current cluster – may have come into their country. Many of the cases spread through the region in this way during the 2014 to 2015 outbreak. Many people crossed over to escape an outbreak or seek help. </p>
<p>Ebola does not kill within a day. The virus has an incubation period of between two and 21 days. People get progressively sicker as the virus multiplies in their bodies. Some studies from the previous outbreak in Guinea indicted an average of <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4434807/">eight days from the onset of symptoms to death</a>. </p>
<p>Having a timeline is crucial to understand who they might have passed the virus on to. </p>
<p>2) The second important question is: <strong>What was the source of infection? How did they get infected?</strong> </p>
<p>This helps surveillance teams identify whether the person was the index – or first case – and can identify their contacts. If this isn’t known it means the source of the infection is out there, and there could be multiple cases around. </p>
<p>Once the first case is infected, we know <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/ebola/frequently-asked-questions">it spreads</a> from human to human through direct contacts, fluids, dead bodies and contaminated materials from an infected person. </p>
<p>3) The final and most serious question is: <strong>what strain of Ebola is being dealt with?</strong></p>
<p>Vaccines are available for the <a href="https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/922973">Ebola Zaire strain</a>, but not for others. Reports I’ve received indicate that the current outbreak in Guinea is due to the Zaire strain.</p>
<p>There are also critical <em>epidemiological</em> questions that needs to be answered quickly too:</p>
<p>1) <strong>How many contacts – meaning people they came into contact with – has the first recognised case generated so far?</strong></p>
<p>It is crucial to find 100% of the contacts. Missing just one can lead to an outbreak. This will require tracking movements, interviewing families, friends and places they might have sought treatment. This is where the complex detective work of contact tracing kicks in. </p>
<p>In the case of this recent outbreak in Guinea, infected persons had attended <a href="https://time.com/5939733/guinea-ebola-epidemic/">the burial of a nurse</a>. Knowing this is vital because it allows the team to begin to map the potential spread of the disease. </p>
<p>In this case, the fact that it’s a funeral and that she was a nurse, indicates that this is a super-spreader event. </p>
<p>Funerals are often attended by relatives who might have travelled long distances to get there, and possibly even from other countries. Action can be taken on this basis – neighbouring countries are put on alert. In 2016 border checks worked. We were able to catch cases that had escaped from Guinea to seek refuge with relatives in Liberia.</p>
<p>The fact that she was a nurse points to a bigger, undetected outbreak. </p>
<p>2) <strong>What is the alert case’s demography? This includes age, ethnicity, occupation and economic activities.</strong></p>
<p>All these are pertinent in understanding who the person might have come in contact with. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2014, an infected case from Guinea, crossed over to Sierra Leone to seek care from a traditional healer among her ethnic group. This set the stage for the biggest outbreak in Sierra Leone which then spilled over into Liberia.</p>
<p>3) <strong>What were the person’s movements and how many places did the person visit when they became ill?</strong></p>
<p>This includes hospitals, clinics and traditional healers. A transmission map must be built which examines all the possible movements and transmissions. If the index case moved using public transport, vehicle logs and movements for other passengers are needed. </p>
<p>In Liberia, we worked with transport unions, visited hospitals and pored over patient records. We worked with commercial motorbike riders to piece these complex transmission maps to determine the the total number of contacts, locations and status. The reason this is critical is that in the control of Ebola it is an “all or nothing principle”. You must reach 100% contacts and follow them up and ensure that none escape or get sick and die in the community. Otherwise, there’s a new transmission chain.</p>
<p>Until each of these very complex questions are answered, neighbouring countries should operate under the assumption that cases are in their countries. There is a already an alert of a <a href="https://frontpageafricaonline.com/county-news/liberia-health-authorities-testing-suspected-ebola-case-urge-calm/">suspected case</a> in Liberia that came from Guinea. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>The governments of these countries must sustain the high levels of alertness and preparedness they have initiated. Everything must be done to ensure Ebola doesn’t enter densely populated areas. </p>
<p>Surveillance must be carried out – especially in border towns. Symptoms surveillance teams must look out for include fever, headache, joint pain and redness of eyes. Surveillance activities should also screen for ethnic groups to which sick people belong. It’s better to pick up all potential cases, rather than risk missing one. </p>
<p>There should also be visits to all hospitals and clinics in bordering towns. Patient records must be checked. </p>
<p>Any <a href="https://investor.regeneron.com/news-releases/news-release-details/regenerons-antibody-cocktail-regn-eb3-inmazebr-first-fda">medication</a> and <a href="https://www.who.int/groups/icg/ebola-virus-disease/ebola-stockpiles">vaccines</a> that can treat the disease must be on the ready to be deployed rapidly. </p>
<p>And finally, Ebola starts and ends in the community. It’s crucial to activate, educate and empower communities to say something and report something when they see something.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mosoka Fallah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries in the West Africa region are in a very different position to seven years ago. They now have the experience of the past as well as new tools to tackle Ebola.Mosoka Fallah, Part-time lecturer at the Global Health & Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of LiberiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/874702017-12-12T14:58:11Z2017-12-12T14:58:11ZWest Africa: empirehood and colonialism offer lessons in integration<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198564/original/file-20171211-15358-mcmtm8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Great Mosque of Djenné, in Mali, has a history dating back to the 13th century which can inspire regional trade in West Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dream of the founding fathers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was, among others, to foster trade and development among member states. But the integration dream will only be realised if institutional barriers to trade are addressed. These include poor protection of trade routes, weak enforcement, the fact that traders don’t know their rights and how to make complaints, and the lack of a common currency in the region. </p>
<p>The union has relied on agreements and announcements to meet its integration goals. But they aren’t enough. ECOWAS needs to operate beyond the office and paper agreements. It needs to establish physical operations at border points. </p>
<p>Leaders have lessons to learn from history – both ancient and recent. Our <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jid.3292/full">latest study</a> shows that policymakers concerned with deepening integration in <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/">ECOWAS</a> should look back in time to regional trade institutions in West Africa.</p>
<h2>How empires laid the foundation for integration</h2>
<p>Western Sudan experienced three major empires - Ghana, Mali and Songhai - from around 790 to 1650 AD. These empires covered most of present day West Africa and, to some extent, defined the precolonial history of the region. They laid the foundations for standards governing regional trade. For example, the Mali Empire – which succeeded and absorbed the Ghana Empire – adopted the import and export taxes it found. The Mali and Songhai empires - through consensus, trust and cooperation - subsumed more than 24 lesser kings under their authority. </p>
<p>The expansion of empires by absorbing other empires gradually led to common trade taxes and institutions. The <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/manden-charter-proclaimed-in-kurukan-fuga-00290">Mande charter of 1236</a> was particularly important. The charter is one of the oldest constitutions in the world although in oral form. It brought clans and small kingdoms together and codified how they were governed. It’s provisions entrenched tolerance and social peace among diverse groups through the building of trust and cooperation. Citizens of different clans and kingdoms agreed to live under one king in order to maintain peace, protect trade routes and harmonise trade rules. </p>
<p>In those ancient times, intra-West African trade was extensive with cowrie shells, gold, copper, manillas and cloth acting as common currencies and facilitating trade in the region. </p>
<p>But the last major empire in West Africa - Songhai - collapsed around 1650, creating a power vacuum that resulted in internal conflicts. This gave rise to inward looking kingdoms, and marked another turning point in the development of trade institutions in West Africa. </p>
<h2>Slave trade, colonialism and regional institutions</h2>
<p>The conventional argument is that the <a href="http://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/ism/slavery/">Atlantic slave trade (1500 and 1900)</a> and subsequent <a href="http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-colonization-of-africa.html">colonisation (1885 - late 1960s)</a> interrupted the natural development of institutions in the region. But it’s important to note that institutions such as common currencies, single administration, contract enforcement through chiefs and a common education system were put in place. These institutions continue to be important in promoting regional trade. </p>
<p>Colonialism led to a production structure that served international rather than regional trade. Europeans were interested in trade flows between Europe and West Africa, where West Africa provided the raw materials for manufactured goods. </p>
<p>Despite the potential practical benefits, enthusiasm to preserve the institutions of the colonial powers gradually waned, particularly in the British colonies. Apart from the West African Examination Council - which designed a uniform curriculum and examination materials for all the British West African colonies - other institutions in the former British colonies were abandoned after independence. Things were somewhat different in the French colonies where the single currency and some of the other institutions of colonial times were maintained. </p>
<p>During colonial times, contracts were enforced and disputes settled in ways similar to the empirehood period. Chiefs in the colonial era communicated the value of the colonial currency to the locals and taught them how to avoid exploitation. These chiefs were synonymous to the representatives in provinces during the empirehood. </p>
<p>But the protection of trade routes was more standardised and better enforced during the empirehood than it was in the colonial period. For example, during the colonial period, the influence of European traders gradually replaced that of the chiefs, and consequently led to bandits and robbers attacking trade routes.</p>
<p>Just as the royal armies patrolled trade routes and royal officials in the provinces monitored arrangements during the empirehood, ECOWAS needs to deploy personnel to patrol trade routes as well as place staff at border points to monitor how trade takes place. </p>
<h2>Deep integration</h2>
<p>The empirehood and colonial eras offer a practical case study for West Africa to have the confidence that deep integration is feasible. </p>
<p>Over the longer term, a federal style administration could be a sustainable approach to deeper integration. For example, West Africa could be clustered into zones where each zone has an elected head of state on a rotational basis. But it would require strong political will to give up national sovereignty. This can only be considered if it can be demonstrated that the benefits would be greater than under current arrangements. </p>
<p>Some progress has been made. A common external tariff for the region came into force in 2015. And more economic integration is happening with the establishment of the <a href="http://www.uemoa.int/en/presentation-uemoa">West African Economic and Monetary Union</a> and the <a href="http://www.wami-imao.org/">West African Monetary Zone</a>. </p>
<p>In the shorter term, we also suggest that regional trade institutions such as a common currency, enforcement of contracts and protection of trade routes become more standardised. In addition, ECOWAS needs to use the media to tell people about their rights. It must also be ready to punish those who harass traders, and to give incentives to its officers to reduce the motivation to take bribes.</p>
<p>These steps worked in the empirehood era. They worked in the colonial era. They will work today to foster trade among member states and integrate the West African region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>West Africa has lessons to learn from its ancient empires and colonial governments on regional trade and integration.Karen Jackson, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of WestminsterDavid Potts, Senior Lecturer (Development Economics/Project Appraisal), University of BradfordEssa Bah, Teaching Assistant in Economics, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/770242017-05-02T14:56:13Z2017-05-02T14:56:13ZWorld Economic Forum needs to move beyond spin if it’s going to help Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/167534/original/file-20170502-17275-156zf8c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa needs to improve governance, build infrastructure, and reduce trade barriers to achieve inclusive growth.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Set against the backdrop of low growth, dire unemployment figures, and a huge infrastructure deficit – the theme of this year’s African <a href="https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-on-africa-2017">World Economic Forum</a> (WEF) is “inclusive and sustainable growth”. </p>
<p>This is a familiar subject for policymakers. On both the regional and global stage it’s natural to speak in terms of market integration among groupings of nations to stimulate economic growth. Reducing bottlenecks to trade often serves as the focal point, with Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) typically the formal means of implementing these initiatives.</p>
<p>The idea behind all of this is that connected markets provide a larger base of customers into which companies can sell their products and services. And that, for their part, customers benefit from greater product diversity and value. This in turn creates a virtuous cycle in which a growing economy makes investment in the region more bankable. With greater access to funding, investment in needed capital projects can be accelerated, in turn reducing Africa’s sizeable infrastructure gap and stimulating inclusive growth.</p>
<p>Admittedly, this orthodox take on markets and growth is not firmly embraced across Africa. Rather, what remains prevalent is an emphasises on government intervention and the role of the ‘developmental state’ as seen in South Africa’s <a href="http://www.poa.gov.za/news/Documents/NPC%20National%20Development%20Plan%20Vision%202030%20-lo-res.pdf">National Development Plan </a>.</p>
<p>What’s not in dispute is the continent’s <a href="http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/Infrastructure-Africa">infrastructure gap</a>. Road and rail transport costs in Africa are estimated to be about 50% greater than comparable regions in other parts of the world. And over 600 million people across the continent lack access to electricity while even greater numbers make do with sub-standard levels of drinking water and sanitation. </p>
<p>Estimates suggest that the continent needs as much as <a href="http://ftp01.economist.com.hk/ECN_papers/Infrastructure-Africa">$1 trillion</a> in invested capital over the next ten years to close the infrastructure gap. </p>
<p>The question is whether the WEF gathering can make a dent in this problem. In reading background studies to this year’s meeting, the forum seems more attuned to the world it would like to see, rather than the one at hand. To move beyond the “spin” the forum should address impediments to inclusive growth.</p>
<h2>New solutions to old problems?</h2>
<p>The WEF is not the first to have focused on market integration as a way to promote economic growth. The African Union Summit has recently taken steps to establish a continental <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-africa-is-serious-about-a-free-trade-area-it-needs-to-act-quickly-and-differently-70234">Free-Trade Area (FTA)</a> that would include all 54 African countries. This is on top of an alphabet soup of long established sub-regional groupings such as the East African Community, West African Community, Southern African Development Community (SADC). A grouping of these three FTAs stands as a Tripartite Free Trade Area covering a combined population of almost 600 million people.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/12/14/deepening-african-integration-intra-africa-trade-for-development-and-poverty-reduction">trade between African nations</a> still represents only 12% of the continent’s total trade. This is far below levels seen in North America (40%), Asia (50%) and Western Europe (70%), and is often cited as an impediment to Africa’s economic development.</p>
<p>SADC’s recent history provides a useful perspective to the successes and failures of African FTAs. SADC was established in its modern form in 1992, having a mandate to promote integration of economic development programmes among member states. At its 2003 <a href="http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000492/P462_SADC_Communique_082003.pdf">Dar es Salaam Summit</a> it adopted an ambitious 15 year programme in which a free trade arrangement, customs union, common market and ultimately a regional monetary union were to be established. </p>
<p>While piecemeal progress has been made since then, the plan’s more ambitious aspects have been largely set aside. <a href="http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/MRI2010/MRI2010_chapter8.pdf">Post mortems</a> cite a range of protectionist measures that are defeating its objectives. These include the reluctance of member states to wind back tariffs on goods and services, provisions promoting local content, subsidised industry assistance and visa restrictions. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-inclusive-growth-and-development-report-2017">WEF</a> has replaced the language of FTA’s and customs unions with the call for “connecting markets, revitalising manufacturing, and integrating innovation”. The practical side of this focuses on industrial corridors in transport, energy markets and financial services and e-commerce.</p>
<p>Here too the SADC was ahead of the curve in terms of planning and adopting a regional infrastructure master <a href="http://www.sadc.int/files/7513/5293/3530/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Executive_Summary.pdf">plan</a> in 2012. This sector based “corridor” approach to development is meant to be rolled out across energy, transport, water and telecommunications. </p>
<p>But where the SADC has been quick to plan – it has fallen down in implementation. </p>
<h2>Old problems stand in the way of new solutions</h2>
<p>A report by the <a href="http://www.tips.org.za/files/report_on_regional_infrastructure_development_in_africa_tips_-_ellen_hagerman.pdf">Development Bank of Southern Africa </a> concludes that few measures to facilitate trade have yielded measurable results. National interests have tended to override regional objectives. Local and global protectionist trends have only made this more pervasive.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sadc.int/files/5413/5293/3528/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Energy_Sector_Plan.pdf">SADC Energy Plan</a> may become the next non-starter in infrastructure development. So far, it has identified power generation and transmission projects costing between US$ 90 billion to over US$ 200 billion. No doubt some development finance will be allocated to these projects, but the bulk of the required investment is unlikely to move beyond countless feasibility plans.</p>
<p>Obtaining the hundreds of billions needed in power markets alone will require improved standards of governance and regulation. But member states often struggle in these areas, and comprehensive reform across the region seems an unlikely outcome until these fundamental issues are addressed. </p>
<h2>Is rhetoric better than reality?</h2>
<p>It seems incongruous that the WEF talks about the region as the least competitive globally, but follows with the observation that “fortunately, there are <a href="https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-on-africa-2017">regional clusters</a> of global manufacturing excellence”. </p>
<p>This is not to discount clusters of excellence. But the WEF’s reference to an African Outer Space Programme within the context of growing a manufacturing base, and pointing to drones as a solution to the continent’s transport woes, is, at best, naive. </p>
<p>Hopefully the meeting will rise above the spin, and make a meaningful attempt at addressing the dire economic conditions affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people across Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77024/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Labson has previously received funding from the US Department of Agriculture to carry out research on international trade policy. He has received no payment or funding for writing this article.</span></em></p>The need to connect African markets to aid development will once again be discussed at the World Economic Forum. The debate needs to move beyond the usual rhetoric.Stephen Labson, Director, Trans African Energy, and Senior Research Fellow, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/603262016-06-02T15:02:35Z2016-06-02T15:02:35ZWhy East and West Africans are in favour of integration, and others aren’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124958/original/image-20160602-23261-43fq2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trucks wait at the no man's land on the Kenyan-Tanzanian border. Attitudes towards cross-border movements differ widely.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Noor Khamis</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year’s <a href="http://www.au.int/en/speeches/message-he-dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-african-union-commission-commemoration-">Africa Day message</a> from African Union Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma affirms the organisation’s commitment to political and economic integration among member states. It cites the free movement of people, goods and services as among its flagship projects for 2016.</p>
<p>But a recent analysis of <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno91_regional_integration_in_africa_en.pdf">public attitudes towards regional integration</a> suggests that “more needs to be done to convince [African citizens] of the benefits of integration”.</p>
<p>A majority (56%) of survey respondents support free movement across borders. But only a quarter (26%) say it is “very easy” or “easy” to do so in their regions. The findings are based on <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/">nationally representative surveys</a> in 36 countries conducted by Afrobarometer, a non-partisan African research network.</p>
<p>The African Development Bank <a href="http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Africa_Visa_Openness_Report_2016.pdf">report on visa openness</a> advocates free movement of labour, capital, goods and services to promote economic development. But it finds that African citizens need visas to travel to more than half (55%) of the continent’s countries.</p>
<p>Of the 20 most “visa-open” countries, 75% are in either East or West Africa. None are in Central Africa. The Seychelles leads the way, with visa-free access for all nationalities. Western Sahara is the least open, requiring all visitors from African countries to acquire a visa prior to departure.</p>
<h2>Public attitudes towards regional integration</h2>
<p>Public opinion data also show large regional differences in attitudes towards integration. Support for freedom of movement is highest among West Africans (66%) and East Africans (64%). </p>
<p>The high number of visa-on-arrival policies in East Africa account for the region’s high scores on visa openness. For West Africa, it is the free movement of persons protocol among members of the Economic Community of West African States. These regional policies may have contributed to citizens’ support for economic integration. </p>
<p>However, large disparities within both regions indicate that national policy and context continue to play an important role in shaping public preferences.</p>
<p>In East Africa, less than half (46%) of Tanzanians support free movement of labour, compared with 76% of Kenyans. This could come down to a variation in the perceived benefits of regional integration. Kenya, the region’s economic hub, has <a href="https://www.trademarkea.com/news/kenya-is-the-best-performer-in-regional-integration-in-africa/">benefited greatly</a> from intra-regional trade in the four regional economic communities it is a member of. </p>
<p>But support is lower in Nigeria (62%) and Senegal (65%), which play similar roles in Anglophone and Francophone West Africa.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=262&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124760/original/image-20160601-1425-1pvkejr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=329&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Support for free movement and perceived ease of crossing international borders, by region, for 36 countries (2014/2015).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nevertheless only minorities of citizens in West and East Africa believe it is easy to cross borders to work or trade. The gap between public support for free movement and perceptions of ease of travel is lowest in North Africa (14 percentage points). It is followed by Southern Africa (19 points).</p>
<p>The divergence between the African Development Bank’s findings on ease of travel and perception data is likely because the former focuses on accessibility in general. The Afrobarometer survey questions specify crossing borders for work or trade. </p>
<p>Low levels of support for free movement in some countries suggest that some view foreign migrants as unwelcome competitors.</p>
<p>The African Development Bank argues that integration promotes economic development. But its own study finds that eight of nine upper-middle-income countries on the continent have low levels of visa openness. Mauritius is the exception, ranking ninth on this measure. </p>
<p>Half (50%) of Mauritian citizens surveyed support the free movement of people. This is the highest level among the seven upper-middle-income countries in which Afrobarometer conducted a survey.</p>
<p>One possible explanation for this trend is the high levels of structural unemployment and income inequality in many of these countries, particularly in <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---actrav/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_230181.pdf">Southern Africa</a>. Poverty remains a major challenge for ordinary Batswana, Namibians and South Africans, despite these countries’ macroeconomic success.</p>
<p>Afrobarometer data also indicate significant challenges to political integration. A majority of citizens in all five regions support respect for national sovereignty (58%, on average). But when it comes to regional responsibility to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in other countries, support falls to 34%. Preferences vary widely by country, with support for regional responsibility highest in Burkina Faso.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=275&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124761/original/image-20160601-1964-1nd8ln3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=346&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Regional responsibility vs national sovereignty, by region, for 36 countries (2014/2015).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Few people know about the African Union</h2>
<p>The African Union and regional institutions play leading roles in promoting economic and political integration. But about three in ten Africans say they don’t know enough about the institutions to rate their helpfulness to their countries. </p>
<p>On average, six in ten citizens say the African Union (58%) or their regional communities (61%) help their country at least “a little bit”. This figure varies from an average of 70% in Central Africa to 43% in North Africa.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=199&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/124762/original/image-20160601-1959-1javzd6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Perceived helpfulness of African Union and regional organisations, by region, for 36 countries (2014/2015).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Political and economic integration are key aspirations of the African Union <a href="http://agenda2063.au.int/">Agenda 2063</a>. But public opinion data suggest that greater effort is required to promote these aims among ordinary citizens. This is particularly true of North and Central African countries.</p>
<p>Overall, national sovereignty remains important for most Africans. Resistance to free movement across borders suggests that significant numbers see foreign migrants as competition to local labour and businesses. This is true even in the continent’s most well-off countries.</p>
<p>Support for integration is highest in West and East Africa. These regions are home to countries that have made significant progress towards facilitating visa openness and free movement. These include such initiatives as regional passports.</p>
<p>This suggests that national support for cooperative and integrative agreements can affect public opinion. Still, a significant proportion of African citizens don’t know enough about the institutions promoting integration. This affects their ability to rate their helpfulness to their own countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/60326/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rorisang Lekalake does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Resistance to free movement across borders in many countries suggests that large numbers of African citizens see foreign migrants as competition to local labour and businesses.Rorisang Lekalake, Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR)/Afrobarometer Assistant Project Manager for Southern Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.