tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/equatorial-guinea-11806/articlesEquatorial Guinea – The Conversation2023-03-13T12:26:20Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2004862023-03-13T12:26:20Z2023-03-13T12:26:20ZMarburg virus outbreaks are increasing in frequency and geographic spread – three virologists explain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514041/original/file-20230307-20-6vacw1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2100%2C2190&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Marburg virus spreads through close contact with infected body fluids.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/QPbCNb">NIAID/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The World Health Organization confirmed an <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2023-DON444">outbreak of the deadly Marburg virus disease</a> in the central African country of Equatorial Guinea on Feb. 13, 2023. To date, there have been <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20230228-death-toll-in-e-guinea-marburg-outbreak-rises-to-11">11 deaths suspected to be caused by the virus</a>, with one case confirmed. Authorities are currently monitoring 48 contacts, four of whom have developed symptoms and three of whom are hospitalized as of publication. The WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are assisting Equatorial Guinea in its efforts to stop the spread of the outbreak.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Microscopy image of Marburg virus particles" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=838&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514050/original/file-20230307-16-7oenhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1053&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Marburg virus is structurally similar to the Ebola virus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/marburg-virus-is-a-hemorrhagic-fever-virus-first-described-news-photo/1035562466">Photo12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/v4101878">Marburg virus</a> and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.17573.1">closely related</a> Ebola virus belong to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmb.2019.06.029">filovirus family</a> and are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/82_2017_16">structurally</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.3201%2Feid1008.040350">similar</a>. Both viruses cause severe disease and death in people, with fatality rates ranging from 22% to 90% <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/index.html">depending on</a> <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/index.html">the outbreak</a>. Patients infected by these viruses exhibit a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.07.042">wide range of similar symptoms</a>, including fever, body aches, severe gastrointestinal symptoms like diarrhea and vomiting, lethargy and sometimes bleeding.</p>
<p>We are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rUT_g04AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">virologists</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=j9jTdBsAAAAJ">who</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=PdTPtc8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">study</a> Marburg, Ebola and related viruses. <a href="https://www.bu.edu/muhlbergerlab/">Our laboratory</a> has a long-standing interest in researching the underlying mechanisms of how these viruses cause disease in people. Learning more about how Marburg virus is transmitted from animals to humans and how it spreads between people is essential to preventing and limiting future outbreaks. </p>
<h2>Marburg virus disease</h2>
<p>Marburg virus spreads between people by close contact only after they show symptoms. It is transmitted through <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.07.042">infected body fluids</a> such as blood, and is not airborne. Contact tracing is a potent tool to combat outbreaks. The incubation time, or time between infection and the onset of symptoms, ranges from two to 21 days and typically falls between five and 10 days. This means that contacts must be observed for extended periods for potential symptoms. </p>
<p>Marburg virus <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jir299">cannot be detected before patients are symptomatic</a>. One major cause of the spread of Marbug virus disease is <a href="https://doi.org/10.3201/eid0912.030355">postmortem transmission</a> due to traditional burial procedures, where family and friends typically have direct skin-to-skin contact with people who have died from the disease.</p>
<p>There are currently no approved <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.07.042">treatments</a> or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.11.042">vaccines</a> against Marburg virus disease. The most advanced vaccine candidates in development use strategies that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ebiom.2023.104463">have been shown</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines10101582">to be effective</a> at <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/scitranslmed.abq6364">protecting against</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)02400-X">Ebola virus disease</a>. </p>
<p>Without effective treatments or vaccines, Marburg virus <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/520548">outbreak control</a> primarily relies on contact tracing, sample testing, patient contact monitoring, quarantines and attempts to limit or modify high-risk activities such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/520544">traditional funeral practices</a>.</p>
<h2>What causes Marburg virus outbreaks?</h2>
<p>Marburg virus outbreaks have an unusual history. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/520551">first recorded outbreak</a> of Marburg virus disease occurred in Europe. In 1967, laboratory workers in Marburg and Frankfurt in Germany, as well as in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia) were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1136/pgmj.49.574.542">infected with a previously unknown pathogen</a> after handling infected monkeys that had been imported from Uganda. This outbreak led to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/520551">discovery of the Marburg virus</a>.</p>
<p>Identifying the virus took only three months, which, at the time, was incredibly fast considering the available research tools. Despite receiving intensive care, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/520551">seven of the 32 patients died</a>. This case fatality rate of 22% was relatively low compared to subsequent Marburg virus outbreaks in Africa, which have had a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/outbreaks/chronology.html">cumulative case fatality rate of 86%</a>. It remains unclear if these differences in lethality are due to variability in patient care options or other factors such as distinct viral strains.</p>
<p>Subsequent Marburg virus disease outbreaks occurred in Uganda and Kenya, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola in Central Africa. In addition to the current outbreak in Equatorial Guinea, recent Marburg virus cases in the West African countries of Guinea in 2021 and Ghana in 2022 highlight that the Marburg virus is <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/outbreaks/chronology.html">not confined to Central Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Strong evidence shows that the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1000536">Egyptian fruit bat</a>, a natural animal reservoir of Marburg virus, might play an important role in spreading the virus to people. The location of all Marburg virus outbreaks coincides with the <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/29730/22043105">natural range of these bats</a>. The large area of Marburg virus outbreaks is unsurprising, given the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/v4101878">ecology of the virus</a>. However, the mechanisms of zoonotic, or animal-to-human, spread of Marburg virus still remain poorly understood.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Researchers approaching Bat Cave in Queen Elizabeth National Park" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514042/original/file-20230307-16-m3dkhs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A number of Marburg virus outbreaks are linked to human activity in caves where Egyptian fruit bats are known to roost.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/jennifer-mcquiston-jonathan-towner-and-brian-amman-approach-news-photo/1073367830">Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The origin of a number of Marburg virus disease outbreaks is closely linked to human activity in caves where Egyptian fruit bats roost. More than half of the cases in a 1998 outbreak in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo were among <a href="https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa051465">gold miners who had worked in Goroumbwa Mine</a>. Intriguingly, the end of the nearly two-year outbreak coincided with the flooding of the cave and the disappearance of the bats in the same month.</p>
<p>Similarly, in 2007, four men who <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jir312">worked in a gold and lead mine</a> in Uganda where thousands of bats were known to roost became infected with Marburg virus. In 2008, two tourists were infected with the virus after visiting <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/cdctv/diseaseandconditions/outbreaks/uganda-python-cave.html">Python Cave</a> in the Maramagambo Forest in Uganda. Both developed severe symptoms after returning to their home countries – the <a href="https://doi.org/10.3201%2Feid1508.090051">woman from the Netherlands died</a> and the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5849a2.htm">woman from the United States survived</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/29730/22043105">geographic range of Egyptian fruit bats</a> extends to large portions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Nile River Delta, as well as portions of the Middle East. There is potential for <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-spillover-bird-flu-outbreak-underscores-need-for-early-detection-to-prevent-the-next-big-pandemic-200494">zoonotic spillover events</a>, to occur in any of these regions.</p>
<h2>More frequent outbreaks</h2>
<p>Although Marburg virus disease outbreaks have historically been sporadic, their <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/outbreaks/chronology.html">frequency has been increasing</a> in recent years. </p>
<p>The increasing emergence and reemergence of zoonotic viruses, including filoviruses (such as <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/index.html">Ebola</a>, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7145a5.htm">Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/index.html">Marburg</a> viruses), coronaviruses (which cause <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html">SARS</a>, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/index.html">MERS</a> and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html">COVID-19</a>), henipaviruses (such as <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/nipah/index.html">Nipah</a> and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/hendra/index.html">Hendra</a> viruses) and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/mpox/index.html">Mpox</a> appear to be influenced by both <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-05506-2">human encroachment</a> on previously undisturbed animal habitats and alterations to wildlife habitat ranges <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04788-w">due to climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Most Marburg virus outbreaks have occurred in remote areas, which has helped to contain the spread of the disease. However, the large geographic distribution of Egyptian fruit bats that harbor the virus raises concerns that future Marburg virus disease outbreaks could happen in new locations and spread to more densely populated areas, as seen by the devastating <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/82_2017_69">Ebola virus outbreak in 2014 in West Africa</a>, where <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html">over 11,300 people died</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200486/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elke Mühlberger receives funding from NIH/NIAID, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Howard Hughes
Medical Institute (as coinvestigator on Emerging Pathogens Initiative project). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Hume and Judith Olejnik do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Marburg virus, a close cousin of Ebola, currently has no approved treatments or vaccines to protect against it.Adam Hume, Research Assistant Professor of Microbiology, Boston UniversityElke Mühlberger, Professor of Microbiology, Boston UniversityJudith Olejnik, Senior Research Scientist, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2000822023-02-17T04:00:40Z2023-02-17T04:00:40ZWhat is Marburg virus and should we be worried?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510752/original/file-20230217-28-im18ez.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3494%2C2839&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/search/marburg-virus">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An epidemic outbreak of Marburg virus in Equatorial Guinea, Central Africa, was <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/countries/equatorial-guinea/news/equatorial-guinea-confirms-first-ever-marburg-virus-disease-outbreak">confirmed this week</a>, the first time the virus has occurred there. At least 16 cases have been detected, and <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-02-15/marburg-virus-kills-nine-in-equatorial-guinea/101974932">nine deaths</a>.</p>
<p>There are no approved treatments for Marburg virus, which is closely related to Ebola virus, but <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)02400-X/fulltext#%20">vaccines are in development</a>. Following an unprecedented Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014 that caused more than <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html">28,000 cases and 11,000 deaths</a>, drugs and vaccines against Ebola were developed.</p>
<p>In fact, some of these were <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006291X20320878?via%3Dihub">repurposed for COVID-19</a> in 2020. That experience may help more rapid vaccine and drug development against Marburg virus. </p>
<h2>What is Marburg virus?</h2>
<p>Marburg is a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/virus-families/filoviridae.html">filovirus</a> like its more famous cousin, Ebola. These are part of a broader group of viruses that can cause viral haemorrhagic fever, a syndrome of fever and bleeding. </p>
<p>Filoviruses are the most lethal of all haemorrhagic fevers, compared with more common viral haemorrhagic fevers such as dengue, yellow fever and Lassa fever. The <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/index.html">first outbreaks</a> of Marburg occurred in 1967 in lab workers in Germany and Yugoslavia who were working with African green monkeys imported from Uganda. The virus was identified in a lab in Marburg, Germany. </p>
<p>Since then, outbreaks have occurred in a handful of countries in Africa, less frequently than Ebola, with the largest in Angola in 2005 (<a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">374 cases and 329 deaths</a>).</p>
<p>Marburg’s natural host is a fruit bat, but it can also infect primates, pigs and other animals. Human outbreaks start after a person has contact with an infected animal.</p>
<p>It’s spread between people mainly through direct contact, especially with bodily fluids, and it causes an illness like Ebola, with fever, headache and malaise, followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, and aches and pains. The bleeding follows about five days later, and it can be <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">fatal in up to 90% of people infected</a>.</p>
<h2>How worried should we be?</h2>
<p>Like Ebola in 2014, the fear is that Marburg could spread and become a much larger epidemic, and spread globally. Travel could see it spread to many other countries. In 2014, Ebola cases spread from Guinea to Liberia and Sierra Leone. The majority of cases occurred in these three countries, but travel-related cases occurred in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html">seven other countries</a> including the United States and the United Kingdom. </p>
<p>If Marburg case numbers increase in Equatorial Guinea or in <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/world/marburg-virus-suspected-cases-in-cameroon/3a86e700-d313-406b-8210-243d5020641e">Cameroon</a>, where it has already spread, or if it spreads to other countries, all countries should be on alert. </p>
<p>Failure to diagnose viral haemorrhagic fever in countries not familiar with it can be deadly. The diagnosis of Ebola was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/nurse-who-caught-ebola-settles-suit-against-dallas-hospital-n672081">initially missed in a traveller from West Africa</a> in Dallas, Texas at the peak of the epidemic in 2014, and a nurse became infected. In Nigeria, the same thing occurred, but resulted in an <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-20/who-declares-ebola-defeated-in-nigeria/5828414">outbreak and several deaths</a>.</p>
<p>Less is known about Marburg virus than Ebola, which was well-studied during the large 2014 epidemic. It <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.06.17.22276538v2">may be less infectious than Ebola</a>, but there are fewer epidemics to assess this. </p>
<p>However, the high fatality rate, lack of available treatments and vaccines, and lessons from Ebola in 2014 should prompt a highly precautionary approach.</p>
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<h2>How to stop its spread</h2>
<p>While researchers will <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00468-5">trial Marburg vaccines</a> currently in development against this epidemic, non-phamaceutical measures are the best hope for controlling the epidemic rapidly. That means excellent surveillance and case detection, finding and isolating sick people, tracing their contacts, and quarantine of contacts to prevent transmission. </p>
<p>The infrastructure and planning for this can be substantial, including physical sites for isolation and quarantine. During the Ebola epidemic in Nigeria, a rapid and effective response included <a href="https://www.bellanaija.com/2014/09/must-read-through-the-valley-of-the-shadow-of-death-dr-ada-igonoh-survived-ebola-this-is-her-story/">use of an abandoned building</a> to isolate and treat patients rather than risk further hospital outbreaks.</p>
<p>The importance of identifying and isolating cases was seen in West Africa in 2014, where lack of hospital beds resulted in people dying in the street and worsening spread. <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su6303a1.htm#:%7E:text=Extrapolating%20trends%20to%20January%2020,when%20corrected%20for%20underreporting)%20(Appendix**)">One study</a> found if 70% or more of infected people were isolated in a hospital bed, the epidemic could have been controlled without any drugs or vaccines. However it was very late in the epidemic when field hospitals were erected to overcome hospital bed shortages.</p>
<p>Use of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020748914003319?via%3Dihub">personal protective equipment</a> is also crucial, especially for health workers who are at <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jid/article/218/suppl_5/S679/5091974">increased risk</a> of filovirus infections. Disinfection and safe disposal of <a href="https://medicalguidelines.msf.org/en/viewport/CG/english/viral-haemorrhagic-fevers-16690024.html">biological waste</a> is also important. Funerals where washing of the body is a cultural practice can also <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4709130/">spread infection</a>.</p>
<p>Health promotion and effective, culturally appropriate communication is needed to ensure compliance with health measures. During the Ebola epidemic in 2014, a team of people trying to raise awareness about Ebola were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29256443">killed by locals</a> who were fearful of the epidemic and mistrusting of foreigners. These lessons must be heeded if the Marburg epidemic grows.</p>
<p>Both Marburg and Ebola can <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0004475">persist in the body</a> after recovery, in organs and fluids including seminal and vaginal fluid, the eye and other sites. This means <a href="https://www.ijidonline.com/article/S1201-9712(15)00292-1/fulltext">outbreaks originating from human survivors</a>, rather than from animals, are possible. </p>
<p>For low-income countries with weak surveillance systems, rapid <a href="https://www.epiwatch.org/">epidemic intelligence</a> using open-source data can help detect signals early. This is where news reports, social media and other data are used to look for patterns that could signify outbreaks of certain diseases in certain areas. We showed we could detect Ebola in the West African epidemic months earlier by <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0230322">analysing Twitter posts</a> talking about disease symptoms in the area.</p>
<p>If the current epidemic continues to spread and is poorly controlled, the World Health Organization may declare a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern”, as it did with an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-drc-ebola-outbreak-was-declared-a-global-emergency-and-why-it-matters-121991">Ebola epidemic in 2019</a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p>
<p>For now, we have knowledge and experience of a poorly controlled, catastrophic epidemic of Ebola in 2014 that can inform the response to this epidemic of Marburg virus and hopefully control it quickly.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>C Raina MacIntyre receives funding from NHMRC and MRFF and leads EPIWATCH, an AI-driven system for rapid epidemic warning signals.</span></em></p>There has been an epidemic outbreak of Marburg virus in Equatorial Guinea for the first time. Here’s what you need to know about the virus, and how it spreads.C Raina MacIntyre, Professor of Global Biosecurity, NHMRC Principal Research Fellow, Head, Biosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977012023-01-23T11:05:35Z2023-01-23T11:05:35ZKenyan prisoners on death row weren’t deterred by the threat of the death penalty: new research findings<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504876/original/file-20230117-18-n09lor.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenya last executed a prisoner in 1987 but continues to hand down the death sentence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/african-american-in-prison-royalty-free-image/88461052?phrase=prison%20black%20man&adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s <a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/kenya-part-one-a-public-ready-to-accept-abolition/">last execution</a> of a prisoner was in 1987. But the country still hosts a death row population of nearly 600. Almost all were sentenced to death for murder or robbery with violence. New sentences are handed down every year.</p>
<p>Kenya is an “abolitionist de facto” state: the death penalty is still present in law and people are sentenced to death, but they aren’t executed. Currently, 17 of the African Union’s 54 member states are abolitionist de facto – they haven’t carried out an execution of a prisoner for at least 10 years. Just 11 are fully retentionist, meaning that they sentence people to death and have carried out executions.</p>
<p>Advocates for the death penalty will often argue that it <a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/kenya-part-one-a-public-ready-to-accept-abolition/">deters potential offenders</a> from committing serious crime – even when a country has not executed anyone for years. </p>
<p>But our <a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Living-with-a-Death-Sentence-in-Kenya-Prisoners-Experiences-of-Crime-Punishment-and-Death-Row.pdf">recent research</a>, Living with a Death Sentence in Kenya: Prisoners’ Experiences of Crime, Punishment and Death Row, suggests this isn’t true. </p>
<p>We spoke to 671 inmates who had been sentenced to death in Kenya. Just over a quarter had had their sentences commuted to life. Most said they had no idea that their crimes might attract a death sentence. </p>
<p>Our findings support research done in other countries: that the threat of being sentenced to death appears to have little bearing on how people behave. They also support the argument that abolishing the death penalty wouldn’t lead to a spike in violent crime in Kenya.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-has-kenya-not-abolished-the-death-penalty-habit-and-inertia-189955">Why has Kenya not abolished the death penalty? Habit and inertia</a>
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<p><a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/deterrence-policy-position-paper/">According to deterrence theorists</a>, potential offenders will be deterred by the death penalty because they make rational choices about whether to offend. They use knowledge about the relevant laws and punishments, and then weigh up the costs and benefits of offending. They will be deterred if they think it’s likely they will be caught and convicted, and that the possible punishment outweighs the rewards.</p>
<p>Our study found that in most cases, these preconditions for being deterred from committing capital crimes were not met.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>We studied the experiences of prisoners serving death sentences in Kenya. The work was done through the Death Penalty Project, working with Oxford University’s <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/death-penalty-research-unit">Death Penalty Research Unit</a>. Our colleagues at the <a href="https://www.knchr.org/">Kenya National Commission on Human Rights</a> carried out interviews with 671 prisoners (33 were women) sentenced to death for murder (44% of the total) and robbery with violence (56%). </p>
<p>Most of the prisoners were poorly educated. Participants mainly used local languages. They might not have been able to understand information distributed in Kenya’s national languages: English and Swahili. This may explain why most didn’t know that the death penalty was the likely punishment for their offence. Our study found that just 1% of our sample said they knew the death penalty was a punishment available for their offence in law. </p>
<p>In addition, only 4% of those convicted of robbery and 8% of those convicted of murder said they had thought about the possibility of being sentenced to death. However, 48% of murderers and 69% of robbers said they had contemplated being sent to prison before committing the crime.</p>
<p>The study also challenged the claim that offenders make rational choices about whether to offend, at least in cases of homicide. For example, the most common reasons given by participants for committing murder were anger (27%), provocation (23%), self-defence (17%) and extreme emotional situations (13%). </p>
<p>Less than a third of participants said knowledge of the law and possible punishments had affected their behaviour at all. Overall, few prisoners who committed crimes that resulted in a sentence of death had, at the time of the offence, considered this potential outcome.</p>
<h2>Shifts across Africa</h2>
<p>In 2022, three sub-Saharan countries abolished the death penalty: the <a href="https://worldcoalition.org/2022/06/26/central-african-republic-abolishes-the-death-penalty/">Central African Republic</a> in June, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/19/equatorial-guinea-abolishes-death-penalty-state-television-reports">Equatorial Guinea</a> in September and <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2022/12/24/hh-announces-the-abolition-of-the-death-penalty-and-defamation-of-the-president-crime/">Zambia</a> in December. </p>
<p>In Zambia in 2016, Cornelius Mweetwa – a former lawyer and police officer who is now minister for the country’s Southern Province – <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/5137">argued that deterrence did not “work”</a>. </p>
<p>He noted three assumptions that deterrence theorists use: that people know the penalties for crimes; that they can control their actions; and that people make decisions to commit a crime based on logic not passion.</p>
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<p>However, the three assumptions usually are not true. Therefore … people still commit these crimes. </p>
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<p>Mweetwa made another argument that also came through in our research. That the harsh, socially deprived death row regime, coupled with condemned prisoners’ “<a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/node/5137">constant awareness of their impending execution</a>” meant they were being subjected to cruel and inhuman punishment as defined by the <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/catcidtp/catcidtp.html">UN Convention Against Torture</a>.</p>
<p>While there may be some differences between Zambia and Kenya, most countries in the region will have similar levels of relative deprivation, both material and educational. Therefore, the rationales applied in Zambia leading to abolition would equally apply to Kenya.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Kenya has been equivocal on its position on the death penalty. While various attempts have been made to move towards abolition, and mass commutations have taken hundreds of prisoners off death row, the country continues to sentence people to death. </p>
<p><a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/kenya-part-one-a-public-ready-to-accept-abolition/">Our report</a> reflects on the histories, decision-making and prison experiences of those subject to the death penalty in Kenya. It provides an opportunity to better understand the lives fractured by this system. </p>
<p>And our findings are clear: abolition of the death penalty in Kenya won’t lead to a rise in violent crime. The country should, therefore, take the <a href="https://deathpenaltyproject.org/knowledge/kenya-part-one-a-public-ready-to-accept-abolition/">obvious step forward</a> and abolish the death penalty in law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Hoyle receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parvais Jabbar receives funding from the European Union and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.</span></em></p>Research finds that the threat of being sentenced to death has no bearing on how people contemplate violent crime.Carolyn Hoyle, Director of the University of Oxford Death Penalty Research Unit, Centre for Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of OxfordParvais Jabbar, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Director of the Death Penalty Project, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1875422022-07-23T09:34:39Z2022-07-23T09:34:39ZThe Marburg virus: urgent need to contain this close cousin of Ebola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475615/original/file-20220722-18-62rym.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Roger Harris/Science Photo Library</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The Marburg virus is a highly infectious disease that’s in the same family as the virus that causes Ebola. The Conversation Africa’s Wale Fatade and Usifo Omozokpea asked virologist Oyewale Tomori about its origin and how people can protect themselves against the disease.</em></p>
<h2>What is the Marburg virus and where did it come from?</h2>
<p>Marburg virus causes the Marburg Virus Disease (MVD), formerly known as Marburg haemorrhagic fever. The virus, which belongs to the same family as the Ebola virus, causes severe viral haemorrhagic fever in humans with an average case fatality rate of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/index.html">around</a> 50%. It has varied <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/index.html">between</a> 24% to 88% in different outbreaks depending on virus strain and case management. </p>
<p>It was <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">first reported</a> in 1967 in a town called Marburg in Germany and in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). There were simultaneous outbreaks in both cities. It came from monkeys imported from Uganda for laboratory studies in Marburg. The laboratory staff got infected as a result of working with materials (blood, tissues and cells) of the monkeys. Of 31 cases associated with these outbreaks, seven people died.</p>
<p>After the initial outbreaks, other cases have been reported in different parts of the world. <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">Most were in Africa</a> – Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Africa, and more recently in Guinea and Ghana. Serological <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6968259/">studies</a> have also revealed evidence of past Marburg virus infection in Nigeria. </p>
<p>While the host, or reservoir, of the virus is not conclusively identified, the virus has been <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">associated with fruit bats</a>. <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">In 2008</a>, two independent cases were reported in travellers who had visited a cave inhabited by Rousettus bat colonies in Uganda.</p>
<h2>How is it spread?</h2>
<p>It is spread through contact with materials (fluids, blood, tissues and cells) of an infected host or reservoir. In the case of the monkeys from Uganda imported into Marburg, laboratory staff obviously got infected through contact with the tissues and the blood of the monkeys. </p>
<p>There can also be human-to-human transmission via <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">direct contact</a> (through broken skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, and with surfaces and materials. This includes materials like bedding, and clothing contaminated with these fluids.</p>
<p>But there’s a great deal we don’t know. For example, whether contact with bat droppings in caves can cause infections in people. </p>
<h2>What are the symptoms? And how bad can they be?</h2>
<p>After an incubation period of between 2 to 21 days, there is a sudden onset of the disease marked by fever, chills, headache, and myalgia. </p>
<p>Around the fifth day after the onset of symptoms, maculopapular rash, most prominent on the trunk (chest, back, stomach), <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/marburg/symptoms/index.html">may appear</a>. Nausea, vomiting, chest pain, a sore throat, abdominal pain, and diarrhea may appear. Symptoms become increasingly severe and can include jaundice, inflammation of the pancreas, severe weight loss, delirium, shock, liver failure, massive hemorrhaging, and multi-organ dysfunction.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">mortality is around 50%</a>, and could be as high as 88% or as low as 20%. </p>
<h2>Can it be treated?</h2>
<p>Not really, but <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/marburg-virus-disease">early supportive care</a> with rehydration, and symptomatic treatment, improves survival. </p>
<h2>What can people do to protect themselves?</h2>
<p>Avoid exposure to the virus as much as possible, and protect against discharges from infected people. </p>
<p>Also, because of the similarities in the symptoms of many hemorrhagic fever diseases, especially during the early stages, there is a need for reliable laboratory confirmation of a case of Marburg virus infection. And once that is done – as with Ebola – the person must immediately be isolated and avoid contact with other people. </p>
<h2>What should be done to ensure the virus doesn’t spread?</h2>
<p>There is no holiday from disease outbreaks. That means as a country, surveillance cannot take a break or a holiday.</p>
<p>When cases are reported, it’s time to be on the alert. Proper screening is called for. Arrivals from the affected country and other neighbouring countries must be checked at the ports of entry. </p>
<p>Studies <a href="https://www.ajtmh.org/view/journals/tpmd/38/2/article-p407.xml">done in Nigeria in the the 1980s</a> and more recently in the 1990s provide evidence of possible previous infections with Marburg virus – or a related virus – in certain Nigerian populations. This leads me to believe that the virus is probably more widespread than we think it is. We need an improvement in diagnosis which can help us do the detection as quickly, and as efficiently as possible.</p>
<p>On top of this, countries need to improve their disease surveillance and laboratory diagnosis to enhance and improve the capacity for a more definitive diagnosis of viral hemorrhagic fever infections.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187542/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oyewale Tomori does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The chances of surviving Marburg are improved if there’s early supportive care with rehydration and symptomatic treatment.Oyewale Tomori, Fellow, Nigerian Academy of ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778442022-02-24T15:12:17Z2022-02-24T15:12:17ZWomen’s Afcon 2022: Nigeria sweats as Morocco and Cote d'Ivoire usher in new era<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/448305/original/file-20220224-27-szvhxe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Francisca Ordega of Nigeria's legendary women's football team.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Omar Vega/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twelve African women’s football teams remain standing after the qualifying rounds of the 12th edition of the <a href="https://www.cafonline.com/development/women-football/photos/">2022 Women’s Africa Cup of Nations</a> (Wafcon). The final stage of this year’s tournament commences on 3 July in Morocco, with the final match scheduled for 23 July. But the story of the contest is much bigger than this year’s eventual result.</p>
<p>When women’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-football-in-nigeria-has-a-long-history-of-defiance-154573">football legends</a> Nigeria overcame Cote d'Ivoire’s challenge by just one goal to nil in the qualification round on 23 February, it showed how far the game has come in Africa and pointed to a healthy future.</p>
<p>Since the women’s African championship began in 1991, only a few countries have looked capable of challenging for the trophy. And only Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have <a href="http://www.rsssf.com/tablesa/afr-women.html">won the championship</a>. Nigeria has <a href="http://www.rsssf.com/tablesa/afr-women.html">won 11 of 13</a> finals. Only Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon and South Africa have challenged Nigeria. They have regularly reached the final stages of the competition. But teams like Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco are working hard to change that story.</p>
<p>Although Cote d'Ivoire failed to get past Nigeria, it has built a credible team to challenge the top tier of African women’s football. Morocco, too, has steadily improved in women’s football. In the inaugural CAF Women’s Champions League in 2021, the Moroccan club ASFAR <a href="https://punchng.com/caf-asfar-thrash-rivers-angels-3-0-in-group-opener/">humiliated</a> the Nigerian women’s champion team Rivers Angels FC 3-0. Two players in Cote d'Ivoire’s national team play for ASFAR in the Moroccan league.</p>
<h2>Cote d'Ivoire’s rapid rise</h2>
<p>Cote d'Ivoire has a relatively recent history of women’s football, with an official start date <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20100308003148/http:/www.fifa.com/mm/goalproject/civ_eng.pdf">recorded as 1975</a>. But its rise has been steady, through careful planning. </p>
<p>In 2011, Cote d'Ivoire was ranked way down at 136th in the world. But the hiring of <a href="https://globalsportsarchive.com/people/soccer/clementine-toure/285288/">Clémentine Touré</a> as manager in 2010 changed the team’s fortunes. Touré had represented Cote d'Ivoire as a player in the previous decade. She has subsequently become perhaps Africa’s top manager for women’s football. She was responsible for one of Equatorial Guinea’s Wafcon wins as manager in 2008. Two years later, she took Equatorial Guinea to the finals of the same competition, losing to Nigeria.</p>
<p>Her achievements with Equatorial Guinea led to Cote d'Ivoire requesting that she return home to manage her country’s women’s team. That began the meteoric rise of Cote d'Ivoire. Touré changed the team and their approach, making them more competitive and focused. Success followed. Cote d'Ivoire’s women’s team reached their first African Championship tournament in 2012. Three years later, they <a href="https://www.sportsnet.ca/soccer/fifa-womens-world-cup-ivory-coast-clementine-toure-tia-vino-ines-nrehy/">qualified for the 2015 Women’s World Cup</a>. To earn a place at the World Cup they had to overcome favourites such as Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.</p>
<p>Cote d'Ivoire, under Touré, has also encouraged women to play professionally outside the country and has recruited players born to Ivorian parents outside the country, particularly in France. Currently, the team’s players are playing professionally in Spain, France, Russia, Japan, Morocco and Equatorial Guinea.</p>
<h2>Morocco’s steady progress</h2>
<p>Morocco, the host of the upcoming Women’s Cup of Nations final round in July, has steadily become a force in African women’s football but is still considered a tier below Nigeria, Cameroon, South Africa and Ghana. </p>
<p>Recently, Morocco has built up its team, recruiting most of its players from one club – <a href="https://www.cafonline.com/caf-women-champions-league/news/asfar-the-radiant-face-of-women-s-football-in-morocco">ASFAR</a>. As many as 13 players have been invited recently from ASFAR. </p>
<p>Morocco’s current strength is marked by beating Cameroon 1-0 in the inaugural edition of the invitational <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-58549922">Aisha Buhari Cup</a> in Nigeria 1-0. The Moroccan team, managed by Reynald Pedros, don’t rely only on ASFAR but have also looked to women playing in the United States, England, Holland, Spain, Switzerland and France.</p>
<h2>Nigeria responds</h2>
<p>In spite of the rise of countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco, Nigeria is striving to maintain its supremacy. Nigeria has dominated women’s football in Africa, perhaps due to the long history of the game in the country. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09523367.2021.1993190?journalCode=fhsp20">Nigerian women were playing football as far back as 1937</a>, although serious competition at the international level did not take place until the International Federation for Football Associations introduced a <a href="https://www.fifa.com/news/remembering-the-first-womens-world-cup-final">global competition for women footballers in 1991</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/womens-football-in-nigeria-has-a-long-history-of-defiance-154573">Women's football in Nigeria has a long history of defiance</a>
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<p>As other African countries began to challenge Nigeria, the team is now seeking to draw from footballers born to Nigerian parents outside the continent. It has attracted <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/sevilla-hand-toni-payne-contract-extension-until-2021/1d758u6nr6mnb1npnoca2x4f7y">Toni Payne from Sevilla</a> in Spain, <a href="https://www.espn.com/soccer/nigeria-ngaw/story/4408279/us-born-payne-sisters-make-history-for-nigeriaset-to-face-uswnt-together">Nicole Payne</a> from the United States and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/60183943">Ashleigh Plumptre</a> from Leicester City in England. None of these players played for clubs in Nigeria. </p>
<p>In addition, the country has moved to hire foreign managers, believing that their approach will help succeed on the continent and at the global level. In 2020 the current manager <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/nigeria-name-randy-waldrum-as-super-falcons-coach/1fbs5gvdcw5to10d8te8b92lyj">Randy Waldrum</a>, from the United States, replaced Thomas Dennerby, who previously coached the Swedish women’s national team.</p>
<p>As more African women’s football teams become serious contenders and professionalise, the action at the Cup of Nations is going to grow fiercer and the gap between teams narrower. This will be good for the women’s game because it will increase investment and sponsorship in the game, grow national pride and increase the fanbase of supporters.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Twelve teams remain after the qualifying rounds of the 2022 Women’s Africa Cup of Nations - with Nigeria no longer automatic favourites as the competition diversifies.Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583292021-04-08T14:49:08Z2021-04-08T14:49:08ZStockpiling munitions carries risks. The basic steps that can stop catastrophic explosions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/393796/original/file-20210407-17-1cjvgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A lorry trailer carries the coffins of the victims of a munitions explosion in Brazzaville, the Congolese capital, in 2012. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Junior D. Kannah/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A series of massive blasts <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56311677">recently rocked</a> Equatorial Guinea’s city of Bata. The explosions, at an army barracks, killed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56337856">over 100 people</a> and destroyed military buildings as well as people’s homes around the site. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema stated that the explosions were “caused by negligence of the <a href="https://www.thejournal.ie/equatorial-guinea-military-explosion-5374845-Mar2021/">unit</a> in charge of storing explosives, dynamite and ammunition at the Nkoa Ntoma military camp”.</p>
<p>Unplanned explosions at munitions sites have occurred on all continents over the past 40 years, in both developed and developing countries. These can result in the loss of human lives and other preventable damage.</p>
<p>Explosions in and of themselves do not necessarily imply the mismanagement of stocks, as accidents can always happen, but many do result from mismanagement. </p>
<p>I work for the <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/mission.html">Small Arms Survey</a>, an organisation that provides expertise on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. This includes a <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html">global database</a> on unplanned explosions at munitions sites. It shows that the number of people who die, or are injured, in these incidents varies greatly.</p>
<p>While we should be careful about regional-level generalisations, the data suggest that Africa as a whole suffers a relatively high rate of casualties per incident. In fact, almost half of the 29,932 casualties from unplanned explosions at munitions sites recorded in our database – between 1979 and 2019 – occurred in Africa.</p>
<p>On average 170 people were wounded or killed in each incident that occurred on the continent. A dozen explosions with particularly high death tolls – <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html">such as</a> in Lagos, Nigeria, in 2002 (1,500 people) and Brazzaville, Congo, in 2012 (500 people) – account for the vast majority of the casualties. </p>
<p>The most deadly events tend to occur when munitions sites are located near populated residential areas. This in itself tells us that safety standards are not being respected or that settlements have been established informally around the depot. </p>
<p>Investigations are still needed to assess the management of the Bata site in Equatorial Guinea. However, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56337856">high reported number of casualties and available satellite imagery</a> should raise questions about the safety precautions implemented at and around the site. </p>
<p>There is no such thing as a zero risk level when stockpiling ammunition. But unplanned explosions that result in the loss of lives and resources can often be attributed to poor risk management. This should serve as a warning to other countries. </p>
<h2>Why countries stockpile</h2>
<p>As is the case for military and security forces around the world, African states acquire and stockpile weapons and ammunition for their defence and strategic needs. However, not all forces have systems in place to ensure that these stocks are well accounted for and managed through the equipment’s life cycle. </p>
<p>International guidelines for the safe storage of ammunition exist, but still need time and resources to be rolled out. In practice they are not yet systematically implemented due to a lack of political will and insufficient resources. There are also practical challenges on the ground, such as inappropriate technical expertise and infrastructure.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, few states are transparent about their stockpile levels and contents. For instance, the military data in the Small Arms Survey’s global firearms holdings <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/global-firearms-holdings.html">database</a> is largely based on estimates. Only 28 countries have released information on their military stockpiles. </p>
<p>Data on ammunition stockpiles is even scarcer and generally less detailed. This can be due to states considering the data as confidential, or to inadequate inventory management systems and record-keeping. </p>
<p>Whatever the reason, the lack of information on stockpiles – and especially surplus stockpiles (ammunition that’s labelled as unnecessary for the state) – can make it challenging for national authorities and international assistance programmes to anticipate and remedy problems.</p>
<h2>The risks of stockpiling</h2>
<p>Poorly accounted and managed ammunition stockpiles lead to safety and security risks. As time goes by, some countries procure more without disposing of old stocks, which gradually decay. Such surpluses are dangerous. Keeping unsafe ammunition increases the risks of accidental explosions and the materiel can malfunction. </p>
<p>Ammunition surpluses can also be vulnerable to diversion through theft, loss or unauthorised sale. This is because equipment that is not needed is often poorly accounted for and protected. </p>
<p>Some countries keep surpluses <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/handbooks/uems-handbook.html">with the intent to</a> sell them or because they do not wish to pay for their safe disposal. Yet the cost of destroying surplus is a small investment when compared with the much higher costs of cleaning up unplanned explosions at munitions sites. </p>
<h2>Best practices</h2>
<p>Good ammunition storage management and regulatory practices need to prioritise efficiency, safety and security from the outset. </p>
<p>National ownership and the development, adoption and implementation of regulatory frameworks and management practices are also critical for promoting accountability. This should include the establishment of dedicated national bodies that oversee and implement international best practices. They should provide competent and holistic oversight of the management of ammunition stockpiles. </p>
<p>Some countries could use local frameworks as the reference for ammunition management, others could use publicly available international best practices such as the UN SaferGuard <a href="https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/guide-lines">International Ammunition Technical Guidelines</a> and <a href="https://www.msiac.nato.int/">NATO Standards</a>. </p>
<p>Regardless of the basis for the framework, clear investment and oversight by national authorities are needed. These must ensure that stockpile management practices are adapted to the specific needs of the country, promote efficiency with respect to strategic needs and security from diversion. They should also enhance safety through the anticipation and mitigation of risks associated with unplanned explosions.</p>
<h2>Avoiding disasters</h2>
<p>Best practices recommend, among other aspects, to conduct a proper risk analysis when storing the ammunition. An important component involves measures that reduce the possibility of an explosion. These include fire safety precautions and protocols for the proper handling and surveillance (referring to the chemical stability) of the ammunition. </p>
<p>Precautionary measures also need to be taken to reduce the effects of a potential explosion. As can be observed on the satellite imagery of the Bata site, the military base was relatively isolated from civilian dwellings in 2004 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56337856">when compared</a> to today. Over time people settled in the area and the surroundings of the military base became more crowded. Proper safeguarding of the base should have prevented this development. Or the facility should’ve been moved to a better suited location. </p>
<p>By taking these important precautionary measures, countries will be taking key steps in saving lives. </p>
<p><em>Marco Baccini and Oisin Dawson, both Weapons and Ammunition Management Specialists at the Small Arms Survey, Anne-Séverine Fabre, Data Expert at the Small Arms Survey, Emilia Dungel, Communications Coordinator at the Small Arms Survey, and Florentina Pircher, intern with the Small Arms Survey contributed to the writing of this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicolas works for the Small Arms Survey, an organization that generates and provides expertise on all aspects of small arms and armed violence. It is an associated programme of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. As of 2019, the Small Arms Survey received unrestricted funding from Australia, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as project-specific support from Canada, the European Union, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, and the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, as well as service contracts from several United Nations agencies.
Nicolas also serves as member of the Research Advisory Council for the RESOLVE Network, as member of the Advisory Board for the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, and as board member for the Fondation Prix Henry Dunant.</span></em></p>Data suggests that Africa as a whole suffers a relatively high rate of casualties at munition sites where there are unplanned explosions.Nicolas Florquin, Head of Data & Analytics and Senior Researcher for the Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1444342020-08-16T09:12:39Z2020-08-16T09:12:39ZAfrica’s attempts to abandon practice of presidents for life suffer another setback<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352911/original/file-20200814-18-lai2p4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ivory Coast's President Alassane Ouattara attends a ceremony to mark the 60th anniversary of the country's independence from France on August 7. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">SIA KAMBOU/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ivorian president Alassane Ouattara (78) has finally <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/ivory-coast-president-alassane-ouattara-run-term-200807044427384.html">confirmed</a> he’ll seek a third term in office in October. Within days of this, Guinea’s ruling party <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200806-guinea-s-ruling-party-asks-alpha-cond%C3%A9-to-run-for-third-presidential-term">asked</a> President Alpha Condé (82) to seek a third term.</p>
<p>The actions signal that Africa is a long way from burying the ugly <a href="https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=assr">era of presidents for life</a>. The period, which followed immediately after independence and lasted until the end of the 1990s, had a debilitating effect on stability, democracy and <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">socio-economic development on the continent</a>.</p>
<p>In the last two decades the continent, through the African Union (AU), has developed relatively effective ways of putting a halt to unconstitutional changes of government in the form of coups d'etat. This policy effectively protects incumbent leaders. But the AU has yet to successfully tackle the problem of imperial presidencies. </p>
<p>This lack of action has triggered criticism that the organisation is a private club of incumbent leaders. </p>
<p>Africa has more than its fair share of presidents who have stayed longer than they should have. Seven of the ten longest serving presidents in the world <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-28/factbox-africas-longest-ruling-leaders">are in Africa</a>. They include Cameroon’s Paul Biya, <a href="https://www.prc.cm/en/the-president/biography">in power since 1982</a>, and
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, in power <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-01-equatorial-guineas-president-to-mark-40-years-in-power/">since 1979</a>.</p>
<p>Their regimes are <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">often characterised</a> by instability, the absence of civil and political liberties as well as extensive patrimonialism and corruption.</p>
<h2>Where term limits persist</h2>
<p>Alpha Condé came to power in 2010 from the opposition ranks, following the first competitive elections in Guinean history after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-african-union-put-stop-termism-190704090900437.html">death of Lansana Conté in 2008</a>. Conté had come to power in a coup 24 years earlier. </p>
<p>A transitional government was established <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-african-union-put-stop-termism-190704090900437.html">in 2010</a>. This was followed by the adoption of a new constitution <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf?lang=en">in 2010</a> and elections.</p>
<p>Condé had been an ardent opponent of Conté. Notably, he opposed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-african-union-put-stop-termism-190704090900437.html">2003 constitutional amendment</a> that allowed Conté to run for a third term. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/popular-protests-pose-a-conundrum-for-the-aus-opposition-to-coups-116315">Popular protests pose a conundrum for the AU's opposition to coups</a>
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<p>After coming to power in 2010, Condé quickly consolidated his power through the hegemony of his party, <a href="http://www.rpg-arc-en-ciel.org.gn/index.php/en/">Rally of the Guinean People</a>, and won a second term in 2015. In 2019, his government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-african-union-put-stop-termism-190704090900437.html">announced</a> that it would pursue the adoption of a new constitution. It deliberately aimed at bypassing a provision prohibiting amendments to the two term limit. </p>
<p>The opposition <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200806-guinea-s-ruling-party-asks-alpha-cond%C3%A9-to-run-for-third-presidential-term">criticised</a> the move as defying the spirit of the 2010 constitution against unlimited terms. Protests have been held in the capital, Conakry, and other parts of the country since October 2019. </p>
<p>They forced the postponement of the constitutional referendum, which was ultimately held on 31 March this year, and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/guinea-ruling-party-wins-constitutional-referendum/1792029">approved</a> the new constitution. The constitution retains the two-term limit, but is silent on time already served before it came into force, enabling Condé to seek two more terms. He could potentially rule until 2032. </p>
<p>Protests <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200806-guinea-s-ruling-party-asks-alpha-cond%C3%A9-to-run-for-third-presidential-term">continue</a> despite COVID-19 restrictions, and several people have been killed by security forces.</p>
<p>Elections are due to <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/guinea-sets-presidential-october-18-election-date-01597182905">be held</a> on 18 October. Condé has yet to confirm if he’ll accept his nomination for a third term. Opposition groups are yet to present their candidates. </p>
<p>Considering Condé’s stranglehold over the electoral management body, state resources, bureaucracy and security forces, and limits on opposition groups, the elections are unlikely to be free and fair, almost assuring his victory. The opposition is likely to boycott the elections, as it did the referendum and legislative elections <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/guinea-hold-contested-polls-boycotted-opposition-200224080737553.html">in March</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s working and what more needs to be done</h2>
<p>There have been some notable examples of democratic changes in leadership in Africa due to term limit legislation. Most recent examples include in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2019), Sierra Leone (2018) and Liberia (2017). In all three countries, the elections were characterised by strong competition, and won by the opposition. </p>
<p>But many other presidents have tampered with their countries’ constitutions to <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/term-limits-for-african-leaders-linked-to-stability/">extend their stay in power</a>. The list includes Togo (2002), Gabon (2003), and most recently Ivory Coast and Guinea.</p>
<p>The latest abuses should show that there’s still a way to go to stamp out this practice. A number of practical steps should be taken urgently.</p>
<p>Firstly, loopholes need to be plugged. One is to ensure that, when new constitutions are adopted, they are specific about the fact that terms already served in office still count. The Gambia’s <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2019D.pdf?lang=en">draft constitution</a> sets a model for the continent. It not only establishes two term limits, but also specifically counts terms served prior to its adoption.</p>
<p>In addition, the African Union needs to revive efforts to impose a continent-wide two term limit on presidents on the continent. A proposed provision in the draft African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which aimed to do so in 2007, was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/presidential-term-limits-and-the-african-union/1F134034E67D93524560D31A067779B7/core-reader">scrapped</a> after Uganda led opposition to its adoption. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni had already removed the two term limit from the country’s constitution <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/making-sense-ugandas-stalled-age-limit-bill">in 2005</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, an effort by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to establish a two-term limit was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">shelved</a> in 2015 due to opposition from The Gambia, then under dictator Yahya Jammeh, and Togo, whose constitutions contained no term limits.</p>
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<p>The African Union, Ecowas and other sub-regional organisations need to reignite efforts to build a specific policy of two terms. Only such a continental ban could preclude domestic legal manoeuvres and bury the ghost of life presidents. Once approved, the African Union would be able to sanction, and even expel, countries that violate the term limits.</p>
<p>The organisations would be pushing at an open door. Only five countries with presidential systems on the continent do not have term limits. They are Eritrea, Somalia, Cameroon, South Sudan and Djibouti. Most of the countries that had removed term limits have since reinstated them. Examples include Uganda, whose parliament <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/uganda-presidential-term-limits-reinstated-age-limit-lifted-7-years-mps/">reinstated presidential term limits</a> in 2017. But Museveni, who has been in power <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-museveni-has-twisted-ugandas-constitution-to-cling-to-power-118933">for 34 years</a>, can still run again. </p>
<p>Togo did so <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/togo-law-president-stand-terms-190509180859448.html">last year</a>, although the incumbent, President Faure Gnassingbe, who has been in power since 2005, is not precluded from contesting future elections. He could potentially be in power until 2030. </p>
<p>Without a concerted effort to establish a continental two-term policy, Africa may be bound to live with the spectre of presidents for life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African countries need to make a concerted effort to establish a continental two-term policy.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304802020-02-03T13:51:44Z2020-02-03T13:51:44ZGulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313087/original/file-20200131-41490-3adlyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Different reports have recently highlighted security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. One was published by the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">International Maritime Bureau</a>, another by the French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a> and another by the <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">US Maritime Administration</a>. </p>
<p>These reports come against a backdrop of pirate attacks against merchant ships in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea between Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. They have also led to attention-grabbing headlines about a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/piracy-surges-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-with-spate-of-deadly-attacks/">“piracy surge”</a> or even <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/waves-terror">“waves of terror”</a>. </p>
<p>In 2019, kidnappings of seafarers in the Gulf of Guinea reached an unprecedented number. Attacks against merchant ships were recorded off Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The area is often described as “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48581197">the world’s most dangerous seas</a>”. </p>
<p>Piracy is a significant threat for shipping companies operating in the region. Industry organisations have pointed out that urgent action is required and that seafarers should not be <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190610-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-continues-to-threaten-seafarers">“exposed to such appalling dangers”</a>.</p>
<p>The human cost is significant and hostages aren’t the only victims. Representatives from seafarers’ unions <a href="https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/latest-gulf-of-guinea-kidnapping-prompts-union-call-for-international-action-on-piracy/">have pointed out</a> that their members are at considerable risk for just doing their jobs, and even crews on ships that are merely transiting are on edge.</p>
<p>Based on a thorough analysis of attack patterns and overall maritime activities in the region, I am convinced that it will be impossible for navies and other security agencies to improve maritime security as long as root causes are not addressed. Many security incidents at sea, and notably kidnappings of seafarers, are merely an extension of land-based issues.</p>
<p>At the heart of the problem are activities by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta where kidnappings on land have long been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">security challenge</a>. Unless the massive security problems in the Delta are resolved, no significant headway will be made at sea.</p>
<h2>The numbers</h2>
<p>Beyond attention-grabbing headlines there’s no consensus on figures. Not even the reports mentioned above include the same numbers. That matters because shipping companies make commercial decisions based on official statistics, and budgets for security agencies are allocated depending on the scope and scale of the problem. </p>
<p>For example, the International Maritime Bureau reported that <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">121 seafarers</a> were taken as hostages during attacks in the Gulf of Guinea in 2019. This represented more than 90% of global kidnappings at sea recorded by the centre.</p>
<p>At the same time, the organisation only reported 64 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea last year. This was a decrease of 19% compared with 2018. </p>
<p>The US Maritime Administration highlighted a similar trend in a <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">recent advisory</a> even though the overall numbers are much higher. It reported that there were 129 attacks in 2019 after 145 attacks in 2018, representing an 11% drop. </p>
<p>The French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a>, on the other hand, reported a 20% increase in attacks against ships across the Gulf of Guinea between 2018 and 2019 (from 90 to 111 incidents).</p>
<p>Overall, numbers differ due to reporting standards and categorisations aren’t comparable. Similar events are often classified in different ways. For example, the IMB recorded four hijacked ships in 2019, the US Maritime Administration noted six, and the MICA centre classified 26 incidents as hijackings. </p>
<p>Annual statistics are further complicated by increased awareness. Incidents that would not have been reported a few years ago are now included in publicly available data, even though they may be linked to other criminal activities at sea.</p>
<p>During my <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">own research</a>, I have come across many cases where such activities were linked to incidents broadly described as “pirate attacks”, without a detailed analysis of individual circumstances.</p>
<p>Such differences <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2020/01/16/piracy-in-west-africa-annual-reports/">underline</a> that annual statistics are not necessarily a valuable tool for understanding issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, security agencies have to gain a broad understanding of all maritime security challenges. Based on such knowledge, a transparent analysis of incidents is possible, providing the necessary background for commercial decisions or law enforcement operations. </p>
<h2>Extension of a land problem</h2>
<p>Attacks at sea are generally conducted by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta. Throughout the region, there is an ample supply of foot soldiers and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/mumbai-pirates-forced-18-indian-seafarers-to-camp-near-crocodile-infested-swamp-in-nigeria/articleshow/73239638.cms">camps</a> in remote locations where hostages can be held during negotiations, the prerequisites for a lucrative business model.</p>
<p>Violent attacks <a href="https://splash247.com/abducted-jj-ugland-bulker-crew-released-by-pirates">affected various countries in 2019</a>. These are almost exclusively linked to Nigerian perpetrators.</p>
<p>Highlighting the direct link with Nigeria is important. On the one hand, neighbouring countries are unable to solve the problem unless security on land in the Niger Delta improves. On the other hand, spikes in attacks are possible at any time. For operators of merchant ships, the threat level can change within weeks, depending on factors such as weather, changes in traffic patterns or naval operations as well as the general situation on land in certain areas in the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>Furthermore, insecurity at sea is an overarching problem for regional governments. Pirate attacks may be particularly visible. But other concerns, such as <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/illegal-smuggling-for-oil-in-ghana/">fuel smuggling</a>, <a href="https://www.icsf.net/images/samudra/pdf/english/issue_77/4319_art_Sam77_e_art06.pdf">illegal fishing</a> or <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2019/08/west-africa-opioid-crisis-190827135612104.html">unregulated shipments</a> of pharmaceuticals like Tramadol, are usually more pressing for government agencies. </p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>The West and Central African region has made significant progress in fighting all types of illicit activities at sea. Various types of maritime security issues are mentioned in the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code</a> of Conduct, adopted in 2013 and aimed at improving maritime security in West and Central Africa. </p>
<p>However, human and financial resources are scarce and maritime security is generally regarded as less important than land-based security challenges which directly affect domestic populations. </p>
<p>But insecurity at sea has a significant economic impact by hurting activities related to the maritime environment. Maritime business plans therefore must include security-related expenditures for navies, coastguards and other government agencies. These are needed to maximise the potential of the maritime environment. This, in turn, would show that better maritime security has direct benefits for economic growth and development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Navies, and other security agencies, won’t be able to improve maritime security as long as root causes on land are not addressed.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1197652019-07-08T15:09:11Z2019-07-08T15:09:11ZAmid mounting abuse claims, Jammeh is unlikely to face justice soon. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282270/original/file-20190702-126376-yh8adk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Then President of The Gambia Yahya Jammeh and First Lady Zeinab arrive at the White House in Washington DC for the US Africa Leaders Summit in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Michael Reynolds</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks ago, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757981">new allegations</a> were added to a litany of human rights abuses that have been levied against the former president of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The exiled former leader, who once infamously claimed that he could cure AIDS with his own <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jun/01/survivors-yahya-jammehs-bogus-aids-cure-sue-former-gambian-leader">secret herbal mixture and spiritual healing techniques</a> has been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambia-women-accuse-ex-president-sexual-violence">accused of sexually abusing</a> at least three women at the height of his power.</p>
<p>Jammeh ruled The Gambia with a totalitarian grip for 22 years after seizing power in an army coup in 1994. After he suffered a shock defeat in the 2016 presidential election, he refused to relinquish power. It was only after regional troops <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38682184">mobilised troops</a> on The Gambian border that he fled to Equatorial Guinea. He’s still there. </p>
<p>Since then, allegations of torture, enforced disappearances, freedom of speech violations, and suspicious deaths in government custody have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/12/gambia-truth-commission-uncover-jammeh-abuses">emerged</a>. To get to the bottom of the allegations hearings are being carried out by a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a7c2ca18a02c7a46149331c/t/5a8451b4e4966bfad91329e9/1518621128178/truth%2C+reconcilation+and+reparations+commission+act%2C+2017.pdf?fbclid=IwAR34Rm3AtU6WJhL_h6nSuckVavr_8rbCMMMNRFLb0W7jG5YNNK8zMIsiuxo">Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission</a> set up by the new government. </p>
<p>Under the slogan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48525284">“never again”</a>, the Commission has the job of creating an impartial historical record of violations of human rights that took place under Jammeh’s regime. It is hoped that process achieves a number of objectives. These include promoting healing and reconciliation, addressing the impunity of previous members of government, establishing the fate of disappeared victims, allowing victims to tell their account of violations, and to grant reparations where appropriate.</p>
<p>So far, the public has heard from current and former members of armed forces over an alleged counter-coup plot against Jammeh early in his rule. The testimony of those soldiers has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">horrific</a>. But even if more victims come forward and speak out, and more human rights violations are revealed during future testimony from both victims and abusers, pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible.</p>
<p>The problem is one that those pursuing justice against former dictators and human rights abusers have encountered <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/it-finally-happened-the-long-fight-to-expel-americas-last-known-nazi">before</a>. After Jammeh lost power, he fled to Equitorial Guinea with the equivalent of more than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/27/gambias-ex-president-stole-almost-1bn-before-fleeing-country">$1 billion from public funds</a>. Equitorial Guinea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and has no obligation to return him to The Gambia to face justice. This has left Jammeh’s fate in the hands of the country’s President Teodoro Obiang, a close friend and ally. </p>
<h2>The evidence</h2>
<p>In one <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48525284">incident</a> an alleged member of the counter-coup was arrested, beaten, stripped naked, shot and stabbed with bayonets. It was then discovered that his body was too tall for the grave that had been dug, so one of the executioners chopped off his legs with an axe. </p>
<p>Three women so far have levied accusations of sexual violence against Jammeh. Two have remained anonymous while one – Fatou “Toufah” Jallow – has agreed to come forward publicly. She is expected to give testimony to the Commission later in the year. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">graphic detail</a>, Toufah explained to Human Rights Watch how she became a target of the president’s unwanted attentions when, at the age of 18, she won a state-sponsored beauty pageant. As part of her duties as a beauty queen, she was called to a meeting with Jammeh, who began to shower her with presents and money. After a sexual attack in the presidential residence, and fears for her future safety, she disguised herself in a burka and fled across the border to Senegal.</p>
<p>Two other women have also made allegations to Human Rights Watch, but they have chosen to remain anonymous. Marion Volkmann-Brandau, the researcher who exposed these allegations, believes that there were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/gambias-women-break-their-silence">many more victims</a>.</p>
<p>Toufah has said that she hopes her revelations encourage other victims to come forward and share their stories. Her plea has been echoed by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/africa/gambia-president-rape-accusation.html">Attorney General </a> who has praised her actions and asked others to speak out. </p>
<p>The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has not yet examined any allegations of sexual violence. These hearings are due to take place later in the year. </p>
<h2>Justice might be elusive</h2>
<p>Pursuing legal consequences against Jammeh is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible. One reason for this is that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not have the power to prosecute Jammeh, or any other individual for human rights abuses. Its powers are limited to recommending that the Attorney General acts on cases that can be taken before the courts. </p>
<p>Even if cases are brought, the Gambian government would have to extradite Jammeh from Equatorial Guinea to face trial. Initially, there were hopes that Obiang, who himself has been accused of numerous <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/human-rights-defenders-and-activists-in-equatorial-guinea/">human rights atrocities</a>, might feel political pressure to return Jammeh to The Gambia to face his accusers. But a recent <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-6nzNzX87E">video</a> of the two celebrating New Year together extinguished those hopes.</p>
<p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abuses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Gallop does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least in the short term, it looks unlikely that Jammeh will face either his victims or consequences for human rights abusesSophie Gallop, Lecturer, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/718422017-01-30T15:18:11Z2017-01-30T15:18:11ZCurb your enthusiasm: there are limits to the ‘Gambia-effect’ for the rest of Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/154713/original/image-20170130-7680-14cvbmi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gambia's new President Adama Barrow arriving home.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the new Gambian President <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Barrow-arrives-take-power-in-Gambia/1066-3789034-f9akifz/">Adama Barrow settles in</a>, regional organisations are being lauded for playing a key role in ensuring a democratic and peaceful transition.</p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the African Union (AU), in coalition with external actors such as the European Union (EU) have indeed been essential in making sure that his predecessor Yahya Jammeh stepped down after losing the elections. But caution is warranted in assuming this heralds regional organisations fostering a continental trend of ending dictatorships. </p>
<p>Ecowas and the AU were keen to <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201612110444.html">condemn</a> Jammeh’s refusal to relinquish power after losing the presidential elections in December 2016. They even openly threatened military action in the country to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">remove him</a>. </p>
<p>The reasons for such assertiveness, which is unusual given the many undemocratic moves in Africa, are manifold. Regional organisations on the continent are still predominantly governed by summits of heads of state. Jammeh was not able to count on key allies that would shield him from the military actions of his country’s neighbours.</p>
<p>In addition, the small and impoverished country’s <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30787:the-gambia&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255">army of less than 1 000 soldiers</a> would not have been able to resist a concerted regional intervention. Finally, regional organisations have a strong preference for stability. Governments in power are often perceived as guaranteeing such stability whereas contenders risk producing upheaval.</p>
<p>But in this particular case Jammeh was considered a source of fragility for the entire region. In other words, The Gambia provided favourable conditions for Ecowas and the AU to flex their muscles. Cautious optimism should be the order of the day before assuming this resolve will be repeated elsewhere when needed.</p>
<h2>What sets the African Union apart</h2>
<p>Unlike some other regional organisations, such as <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en">the EU</a> or <a href="http://www.complianceandrisks.com/regulations/mercosur-democratic-commitment-in-mercosur-bolivia-and-chile-ushuaia-protocol-1998-7494/">the Common Market of the Southern Cone of South America (Mercosur)</a>, democracy is not a precondition for membership in the AU. The AU’s membership comprises the whole gamut of regime types. These include democracies, absolute monarchies, authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. </p>
<p>Numerous heads of states on the continent have been in power <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/19/africa/africa-gambia-longest-serving-leaders/">for 20 or more years</a>. It’s not surprising that no country needs to fear being suspended from the continental organisation because of its domestic political system.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the AU has tried to foster democratic standards and frowns on unconstitutional changes of government. These are broadly understood as the forceful replacement of a democratically elected government. But this constellation requires free and fair elections in the first place. This fixation on constitutional change exempts countries where political power is governed by non-democratic constitutions or political practices. </p>
<p>The AU seems to be increasingly willing to interpret its mandate in broader terms when the conditions are favourable. But in many countries with massive democratic deficits the AU can be expected to continue a policy of waving through elections that are not free or fair. Governments that oppress democratic movements include the AU’s host country <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">Ethiopia</a> or Jammeh’s new home <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/equatorial-guinea">Equatorial Guinea</a>.</p>
<h2>The role of Europe</h2>
<p>The EU and its member states have also played a supportive role in increasing the pressure on Jammeh and slimming down his chances of staying in power. Whether we can see this pattern reproducing elsewhere remains questionable. This is because Europe’s current dominant interest in Africa doesn’t always favour regime change.</p>
<p>With more European governments succumbing to populist demands, cooperation with Africa is increasingly framed around <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/">reducing the number of refugees crossing the Mediterranean</a>. The Gambia is home to less than two million people. Yet, it accounts for around <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/alexandra-embiricos/back-way-to-europe-gambia-s-forgotten-refugees">5% of African refugees getting on a boat to Europe</a>. Many of these people were fleeing Jammeh’s despotic rule. The post-election turmoil further fuelled this exodus. </p>
<p>Barrow’s return and a successful transition to democracy is a favourable outcome for Europe.</p>
<p>But the situation may be different in African countries where dictators are not perceived as a reason for emigration to Europe but rather <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/eu-sudan-eritrea-migration">seem effective in oppressing the movement of people</a>. Here, the EU and its member states might be less likely to play an assertive role in supporting democratic overthrows.</p>
<h2>The main driver of political change: the people</h2>
<p>Intergovernmental organisations, be they African or external, cannot be expected to always be the saviours of democracy. The good news is that it might be enough if they play second fiddle. There has been a lot of attention on the role of Ecowas and the AU in supporting the transition in The Gambia. We easily forget who remains the main driver for political change. It’s the Gambians who overcame their fears and reclaimed their dignity by ousting a dictator. If Barrow doesn’t live up to expectations of democracy, he too is likely to face popular resistance. </p>
<p>In many other countries the established networks of patronage and the oppression of opposition voices are still firmly in place. Six years after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/02/the-guardian-view-on-the-arab-spring-it-could-happen-again">Arab Spring</a> a political coming-of-age of the sub-Saharan African youth is not yet within grasp but events such as those in The Gambia can bring the continent closer to democracy, one transition at a time. In some cases, regional organisations might be allies from the start and in other cases they will have to be won over.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Although Ecowas and the AU made sure that Yahya Jammeh stepped down after losing the elections in The Gambia, caution is warranted in assuming this heralds a trend against African dictatorships.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/373032015-02-07T09:15:38Z2015-02-07T09:15:38ZAfrica Cup of Nations needs a great Ghana vs Côte d'Ivoire final to redeem itself<p>Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire will <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31033703">meet in the final</a> of the 2015 Africa Cup of Nations on February 8, bringing to a close a tournament that has had its fair share of both beauty and bile. Chaotic scenes during the semi-final between Ghana and hosts Equatorial Guinea saw Ghanaian fans fleeing onto the side of the pitch to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31161599">escape missiles being thrown</a> from home fans, angry that their side was losing. A helicopter flew low over the pitch to disperse the crowds, and the match was only able to resume half an hour later, resulting in a 3-0 win for Ghana. </p>
<p>But in the past three weeks, Equatorial Guinea has produced some football worthy of the tournament’s growing stature. Equatorial Guinea was only chosen as host by organisers the Confederation of African Football (CAF) <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-cup-of-nations-begins-with-an-unlikely-comeback-from-equatorial-guinea-36373">as a last-minute replacement</a> for Morocco, which withdrew <a href="https://theconversation.com/morocco-lost-the-cup-of-nations-over-irrational-fears-about-ebola-34223">citing fears over the Ebola</a> outbreak. </p>
<p>Many of the matches have been very close and there have been some nail-biting games. In the first round, only one of the six games in group D produced a winner, the rest were evenly-matched 1-1 draws. This necessitated the dusting off of the rule book to decide whether Guinea or Mali moved through to the elimination stages. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/football/live/2015/jan/29/africa-cup-of-nations-2015-guinea-and-mali-draw-lots-live">After drawing lots</a>, Guinea progressed, leaving a heart-broken Mali team who exited the tournament unbeaten. </p>
<h2>Tempers flared</h2>
<p>While the games have been exciting, there were problems on the field. The tournament has been a tempestuous one, with wranglings, ugly scenes, and misbehaviour. The quarter-final game between the hosts and Tunisia ended in controversial circumstances in Bata, with a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/31/tunisia-equatorial-guinea-africa-cup-nations-match-report">late penalty</a> that forced the game into extra time. </p>
<p>At the end of the match, which resulted in a 2-1 victory for Equatorial Guinea, there were ugly scenes with Tunisian players harassing match officials. CAF took the decision to impose a US$50,000 fine on Tunisia with more to come if Tunisia <a href="http://www.cafonline.com/en-US/NewsCenter/News/NewsDetails?id=py1AtjlFPcCbq%2FnSti4BDA%3D%3D">fails to present a written apology</a> for its actions. But it was also encouraging to see CAF de-list the game’s match official from an “A” grade rating and hand him a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31125655">six-month ban</a> for the gross incompetence that preceded the shocking scenes. </p>
<p>There was similar disruption in Ghana’s game against Guinea where Guinean players took out their frustrations on match officials with wild scenes and unruly behaviour. But CAF was silent. </p>
<p>The violence that ensued in the semi-final match, which the Ghana FA <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1422490/cup-of-nations-match-turned-into-war-zone">compared to a “war zone”</a>, has cost <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31169608">Equatorial Guinea a £65,000 fine</a>. Some players from the Democratic Republic of Congo <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/31161993">expressed fears</a> for their safety ahead of the third-place play-off match in the same stadium. </p>
<h2>Unready, and unwanted protests</h2>
<p>There were also problems beyond the pitch. The opening week featured complaints about the availability of hotel rooms and running water. Three people arrested for distributing or having posters protesting about the tournament are yet to be released, <a href="http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/equatorial-guinea-african-cup-nations-peaceful-protesters-must-be-released-2015-01-29">according to Amnesty</a>. The reported imprisonment and beating of these people has not helped Equatorial Guinea dispel the loud concerns over its human rights record going into the tournament. </p>
<p>Similarly, pre-tournament concerns about the size of two stadia in Ebebiyin and Mongomo did prove to be an issue. When Equatorial Guinea reached the quarter-finals, the match against Tunisia <a href="http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/30963457">was scheduled</a> to be played in the 5,000-capacity Ebebiyin stadium. This immediately raised safety concerns as the host team attracts well over 30,000 fans to its games and it was clear that Ebebiyin was not large enough. Fortunately, the quarter final games were rescheduled to bigger stadia in Malabo and Bata. </p>
<h2>The football will win out</h2>
<p>The battle between the perennially favoured but often underachieving Ivorians, known as Les Éléphants, and the Ghanaian Black Stars, who last won the African championship in 1982 is a dream final. These are the two teams playing the best football in the tournament. </p>
<p>The Africa Cup of Nations has grown enormously since its inception in 1957, and with some of the world’s best footballers it now has a lucrative sponsorship profile. </p>
<p>There is now an expectation that each tournament will be hosted in pomp and pageantry worthy of its status. But CAF should open its doors wide for countries that have yet to host the competition. The confederation can do this by awarding joint hosting rights that help smaller countries develop sporting facilities. The Equatorial Guinea experience as joint hosts in 2012 was important in locating an emergency host in 2015. It is a lesson worth noting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire will meet in the final of the 2015 Africa Cup of Nations on February 8, bringing to a close a tournament that has had its fair share of both beauty and bile. Chaotic scenes during…Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/363732015-01-16T21:03:05Z2015-01-16T21:03:05ZAfrican Cup of Nations begins with an unlikely comeback from Equatorial Guinea<p>Even before the whistle blasts to kick off the opening match of the African Cup of Nations on January 17, this tournament is already being remembered for its comebacks. As concerns swirled over the Ebola virus, <a href="http://www.goal.com/en/news/89/africa/2014/11/11/6042531/morocco-pulls-out-of-hosting-africa-cup-of-nations">Morocco pulled out as hosts</a> in November, leaving the future of the thirtieth Afcon tournament in doubt and testing the resolve and leadership of its organisers, the Confederation of African Football (CAF). Equatorial Guinea stepped up to the spot in what many have seen as an unlikely comeback for a nation that had previously been disqualified. </p>
<p>This is the second time Equatorial Guinea has hosted the competition after it co-hosted with Gabon in 2012 and it provides the country with an unexpected opportunity to present itself to the world in a new light.</p>
<h2>Unlikely saviour</h2>
<p>With its riches in oil and gas and small population, Equatorial Guinea has Africa’s <a href="http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/statistics/">second highest GDP per capita</a> but most of its citizens live in poverty and there are frequent concerns <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/14/dispatches-soccer-smokescreen-equatorial-guinea-s-abuses">about human rights violations</a>. An opposition politician and human rights activist <a href="http://sports.yahoo.com/news/two-e-guinea-regime-foes-arrested-ahead-cup-114519425--sow.html">were arrested</a> in the lead up to the tournament after calling for it to be boycotted. </p>
<p>Hardly anyone expected Equatorial Guinea to emerge as the saviour of Africa’s premier sporting spectacle. Back in November, as 28 African nations were vying for 15 spots in the Afcon finals, the tournament became homeless. Morocco, named as host in 2011, got cold feet and sought to postpone the event citing the outbreak of Ebola in some West African nations. </p>
<p>Morocco’s decision was as surprising as it was bizarre. It was <a href="http://en.starafrica.com/football/afcon-2015-guinea-to-camp-in-morocco.html">already serving as host</a> for the home games of Guinea, a country with a major outbreak of Ebola. Guinea was the only of the three Ebola-stricken nations which had a realistic chance of reaching the finals. CAF turned down Morocco’s request for postponement and the Moroccans were forced to withdraw from hosting the event.</p>
<p>It took hours of flying from one African capital to another before the organisers found a country willing to take Morocco’s place as host. It was Equatorial Guinea – a country that had earlier <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/28160200">been disqualified</a> from the competition for fielding an ineligible player. With its poor facilities, Equatorial Guinea would never had stood a chance to earn sole hosting rights to the cup if Morocco’s intransigence had not provided the opportunity. Its team has now been reinstated, and Morocco disqualified.</p>
<h2>Rush to get ready</h2>
<p>While the opening game between the hosts and Congo will come with the usual fanfare, dignitaries, colourful spectators, Equatorial Guinea has its work cut out.</p>
<p>The country has just one stadium with capacity to host both the opening and final game – the 35,000-capacity venue in Bata. The rest of the country’s stadia are small compared to other venues used in the tournament’s history. </p>
<p>Still, Equatorial Guinea will be hard pressed to fill up all the seats. When it co-hosted the tournament in 2012, there were just 200 spectators at one of the games. Aware of the global television audience, the Equatorial Guinean president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, announced he had personally bought <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/30786453">40,000 tickets</a> to be handed out to fans.</p>
<p>Key footballing figures in Equatorial Guinea had earlier expressed concerns about Ebola arriving in the country via the tournament. In December, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/30452171">BBC published an interview</a> with a leading woman’s football from the country, Genoveva Anouma who stated: “I am afraid for everyone. They should cancel [the CAN] for the good of humanity and the good of our country. There is an 80% risk that the virus could contaminate our country but what can we do?” </p>
<p>Anouma’s fears were overstated, but it is clear her government is more concerned about image than Ebola. To its credit, Equatorial Guinea has planned ahead to <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/players-visitors-african-cup-tested-ebola-151132807.html">screen players and visitors to the country</a> for Ebola and there is due to be assistance from a <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/sport/soccer/2014/11/19/equatorial-guinea-afcon-organisers-hire-50-cuban-doctors-to-combat-ebola">team of 50 Cuban doctors</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, while a few complaints about Equatorial Guinea’s readiness have surfaced, what will matter is whether the positives will outweigh negatives by the time the final whistle blows on February 8. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/30827301">Congo Republic’s team has already complained</a> about availability of accommodation for some members of its delegation and lack of running water in its hotel.</p>
<p>There are likely to be a few similar complaints as the tournament begins. But Equatorial Guinea will bask in the opportunity handed to its tiny nation of 700,000 people to host Africa’s premier sporting event. Let the football begin. </p>
<hr>
<p>Next read: <a href="https://theconversation.com/scandal-ridden-fifa-deserves-credit-for-good-work-on-football-health-programmes-36031">Scandal-ridden FIFA deserves credit for good work on football health programmes</a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even before the whistle blasts to kick off the opening match of the African Cup of Nations on January 17, this tournament is already being remembered for its comebacks. As concerns swirled over the Ebola…Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/292892014-08-06T05:06:29Z2014-08-06T05:06:29ZUS fracking boom puts West African oil economies at risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/55795/original/bt6ktj3b-1407237978.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Is the sun setting on West African oil? A platform in Limbe, Cameroon</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/46084822@N02/4414354664/in/photolist-9LPBnH-9NAqQe-9NEwpU-9NJAiA-9NGYu8-aFz31k-9NDUEY-9NAw5D-86os6y-btvgrw-btvgp5-bBANmb-jAWpgQ-btvgr3-btvgoj-bGq6yX-btvgsj-bGq6Cn-bGvs5K-btACJ7-bGvrXZ-btACFw-btACKs-btACLQ-bGvs4F-btACHd-9NyTno-86os5L-6pmuke-9NvgtE-86os59-86os4y-9NsCbe-9NH11D-9NDgMs-hW4vet-b7Mhna-9Nv8dj-bEjcvB-ovWM5n-8f3qwx-ero6Ej-oeZPN6-89Gus2-8f3qhP-8f3qp4-8f3qre-d1aSPs-7J5HRb-72oxZw">VirginieVV</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US made a point of diversifying its sources of oil to reduce dependence on the Middle East. It was a strategic move which promised a huge boost to West African oil exporters around the Gulf of Guinea, but those same countries now face the comedown as the rise and rise of US domestic fracking whisks the opportunity away so quickly after it arrived.</p>
<p>It had all the trappings of a gold rush. Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in particular were identified as attractive sources of oil and therefore destined to become increasingly important to the post-9/11 US energy strategy. West African crude is of high quality, the region was perceived as less hostile to US interests than the Middle East, and the Atlantic Ocean waterways are a more secure shipping corridor compared to those in the Persian Gulf. </p>
<p>A 2001 <a href="http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf">National Energy Policy Report</a>, often referred to as the “Cheney Report” as it was chaired by the then US vice president, identified energy security as a top US trade and foreign policy priority. A wide range of industry experts and commentators predicted that 25% of all US oil imports would come from West Africa, thus expanding the US’ presence in the region. The <a href="http://www.africom.mil/">establishment of the United States Africa Command</a> (AFRICOM) in 2007 was considered a manifestation of the “securitisation” of Africa, relating not only to the US-led war on terror but also to the need for the US to secure energy supplies. And US oil imports from its six key suppliers in sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) increased by 40% from 2001 to 2010, whereas total US oil imports increased by only 16%.</p>
<p>In the past few years, however, we have seen a rapid increase in US shale gas and oil production, <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/fracking">a revolution in energy production</a> with major implications for the global energy trade. This has fundamentally upended widely held assumptions about both the future of US energy imports and the role of West African petro-states in supplying them. The question now is not whether the US will depend on West Africa for a quarter of its (diminishing) oil imports, but whether it will be importing West African oil at all. </p>
<p>By 2012, US oil imports from sub-Saharan Africa had declined by 59% from peaks only a few years earlier, compared to a less drastic 23% decline in overall US oil imports. Nowhere is this rapid shift felt more acutely than in Nigeria. In three years alone US crude oil imports from Nigeria have decreased by 75%, from nearly 359m barrels in 2010 to 87m in 2013. Based on the US <a href="http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_a.htm">Energy Information Agency’s figures</a> for the first quarter of 2014, US imports will drop by another 75% this year alone to about 22m barrels. Edward Morse, head of commodities research at Citigroup Global Markets, predicts that the US and Canada will completely cease importing crude oil from West Africa some time this year.</p>
<p>Nigeria is an instructive case study for thinking about how the shale revolution will impact developing states dependent on energy export revenues, in West Africa and elsewhere. There is great concern in Nigeria about the rapidly dwindling US export market, which has been by far the most important destination for Nigerian oil. Nigeria’s oil minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, identifies US shale oil as “<a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323855804578508871186460986">one of the most serious threats</a>” to Africa’s oil exporters as Nigerian oil is now being displaced by abundant and cheap US shale oil and increasing US imports from Canada. The loss of Nigeria’s most important export market is compounded by the ongoing troubles surrounding the country’s domestic production.</p>
<h2>Exploration for customers</h2>
<p>Oil theft, sabotage of infrastructure and the general corruption and social conflict that have arisen in the wake of Nigeria’s oil boom are now resulting in international oil companies pulling back from the country. <a href="http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304200804579165040226032758">Royal Dutch Shell</a>, Chevron and ConocoPhillips have begun to divest themselves from higher risk onshore and shallow water oil fields, with Nigerian and emerging market (in particular Chinese) national oil companies stepping in to fill the gaps. Nigeria and other producers in the region will reorient exports to the EU and Asia. However, these markets, too, will eventually be affected by US production. And the EU is hardly a long-term prospect for West African oil given its move towards cleaner fuels such as renewables and also lower overall energy consumption.</p>
<p>With the potential of fracking for shale gas and oil to significantly increase production in other parts of the world, such as China, Argentina, South Africa and the UK, there will likely be increasing insecurity and volatility ahead for producers of conventional oil. </p>
<p>In particular the petro-states of West Africa who are highly dependent on oil export revenues and are perhaps least equipped to deal with unpredictable revenue flows and the costs of reorienting their export markets. Oil and gas will remain crucial resources for financing development in an increasing number of African states, <a href="http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/beating-resource-curse-africa-global-effort/p28780">but as the “oil curse” has proven</a>, high risk remains ever present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/29289/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Andreasson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US made a point of diversifying its sources of oil to reduce dependence on the Middle East. It was a strategic move which promised a huge boost to West African…Stefan Andreasson, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.