tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/estonia-9520/articlesEstonia – The Conversation2024-03-29T08:48:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2268442024-03-29T08:48:08Z2024-03-29T08:48:08ZUkraine recap: Russia won’t attack Nato countries says Putin, believe it or not<p>Vladimir Putin says he has no intention of attacking any Nato members. Visiting an airbase in Torzhok, on the road between Moscow and St Petersburg, the Russian president told a group of pilots he didn’t plan to spark a war with any members of the western alliance which might bring in the US, with its massively greater defence budget. </p>
<p>“The idea that we will attack some other country – Poland, the Baltic States, and the Czechs are also being scared – is complete nonsense. It’s just drivel,” he said.</p>
<p>But he did leave himself a little wriggle room. Declaring that if Ukraine used F-16 fighter aircraft supplied by its western allies, “We will shoot them down,” – adding: “Of course, if they are used from airfields in third countries, they become legitimate targets for us, wherever they are.”</p>
<p>And, let’s not forget, he was rubbishing the idea that he intended to invade Ukraine until days before he dispatched Russia’s war machine across the border for its “special military exercise”.</p>
<p>In any case, they aren’t taking much notice of Putin’s reassurance in the Baltic states, where they have long and bitter memories of being occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 followed by more than five decades of enforced membership of the Soviet bloc. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia agreed in January to set up a common Baltic defence zone on their borders with Russia and Belarus and the three countries have each embarked on massive defence programmes, including expansion of their militaries and huge defence construction projects.</p>
<p>Natasha Lindstaedt, a specialist on authoritarianism at the University of Essex, believes the possibility that Donald Trump might return to the White House in 2025 has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-baltic-neighbours-to-create-massive-border-defences-as-trump-continues-undermining-nato-225944">focused minds in the Baltics</a>. Trump has signalled he intends to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours”, probably by cutting off US support to Ukraine (a job his proxies in the US congress are doing pretty effectively already as they drag their feet over passing Joe Biden’s aid bill).</p>
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<span class="caption">Dangerous neighbourhood: the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are beefing up their defences in case of conflict with Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/baltic-states-political-map-estonia-latvia-252343516">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>He has also been outspoken in his criticism of Nato, although he recently said he wouldn’t take the US out of the alliance, as long as its European member states pay their way. But his qualification of this support: “We have an ocean in between some problems … we have a nice big, beautiful ocean,” would have set nerves jangling. So the Baltics, which would be the Nato members most exposed to a possible Russian escalation, are making their own preparations.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-baltic-neighbours-to-create-massive-border-defences-as-trump-continues-undermining-nato-225944">Ukraine war: Russia's Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato</a>
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<p>Speaking of elections, perhaps the least surprising news of the year was that Vladimir Putin won another six year term of office (which we were able to confidently predict in the last Ukraine recap two weeks ago even as polling stations opened). Someone else with equal foresight (and a similar sense of humour) was the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, who tweeted his congratulations on the morning of the first day of voting. </p>
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<p>Putin’s victory got a mixed reaction from world leaders. China and North Korea were quick to congratulate Putin, followed by Belarus, Venezuela and Cuba. Others to hail his “victory” included India, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza. Meanwhile a roll-call of western leaders and senior diplomats declared their disgust at what Germany’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, said “was not a real election”.</p>
<p>Stephen Hall, who researches authoritarian regimes at the University of Bath, says the west should <a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putin-why-its-time-for-democracies-to-denounce-russias-leader-as-illegitimate-226158">take the advice</a> of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose leader Theodoros Rousopoulos said Putin “clearly lacks any vestige of democratic legitimacy” and urged the international community to “no longer recognise Putin’s legitimacy as president”, adding: “We call on them to cease all contact with Putin, except in the pursuit of peace and for humanitarian purposes.”</p>
<p>Hall believes that declaring Putin’s presidency as illegitimate would send a message to Russian elites “that Putin has taken Russia down a dark and dangerous path” and reassure his opponents in exile that they have friends in high places. It would also make it easier to extend western sanctions against members of Putin’s regime.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putin-why-its-time-for-democracies-to-denounce-russias-leader-as-illegitimate-226158">Vladimir Putin: why it's time for democracies to denounce Russia's leader as illegitimate</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>On the subject of sanctions, Robert Huish – an expert in international development studies at Dalhousie University in Canada – has been puzzling out how Russia managed economic growth of 3.6% in 2023 and is forecast to grow by 2.4% this year, despite being subject to more than 16,000 sanctions. <a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putins-gold-strategy-explains-why-sanctions-against-russia-have-failed-225748">The answer? Gold.</a> </p>
<p>Russia is the world’s second largest producer of gold and a lot of countries are buying gold at the moment to hedge against uncertain economic times. Huish says it is trading billions and billions of dollars worth of gold, much of it via the United Arab Emirates, which Russia is using as a cut-out to sell gold to countries such as Switzerland, which imported US$8.2 billion (£6.5 billion) in gold from the UEA, most of it Russian. </p>
<p>One solution is for other gold-producing countries to up their output to bring prices down. And a targeted sanction on UAE gold exports could also help.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/vladimir-putins-gold-strategy-explains-why-sanctions-against-russia-have-failed-225748">Vladimir Putin's gold strategy explains why sanctions against Russia have failed</a>
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<h2>Moscow massacre</h2>
<p>It should go without saying that it’s possible to decry the war in Ukraine while not wishing ill to befall individual Russians. And it’s in that spirit that we extend our sympathies to the families of the victims of the terrible massacre at Moscow’s Crocus City concert hall last week. And it was no doubt in the same spirit that the CIA sent information to Russian intelligence that an attack was imminent and would likely target a concert hall or other public performance space.</p>
<p>In the event, the warning was not heeded and more than 130 people lost their life in the attack. Robert Dover, an intelligence expert at the University of Hull, says there are a number of reasons why intelligence agencies – even those belonging to powers hostile to each other such as the US and Russia – might <a href="https://theconversation.com/moscow-attacks-why-the-kremlin-may-have-ignored-any-terrorist-warnings-from-the-cia-226549">pool their knowledge</a>: one of those over a number of years has been Islamic terrorism. Dover says cooperation on intelligence matters can also provide a back-channel through which other matters can be discussed without the usual performative diplomacy, which is very difficult given the war in Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/moscow-attacks-why-the-kremlin-may-have-ignored-any-terrorist-warnings-from-the-cia-226549">Moscow attacks: why the Kremlin may have ignored any terrorist warnings from the CIA</a>
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<p>Putin, meanwhile and somewhat predictably, has still found a way of blaming Ukraine and the west, who – say he and his senior colleagues – were behind the attack despite it being claimed by Isis-K. As you’d expect, Russian social media has been running hot as people took to sites such as Telegram to share videos and speculate as to the identity of the culprits.</p>
<p>Olga Logunova, a researcher at King’s College London’s Russia Institute, has made an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-russians-talk-about-on-social-media-vladimir-putin-dominates-while-political-friends-and-foes-trail-in-the-far-distance-225615">in-depth study of social media use</a> in Russia. She says that Putin absolutely dominates discussion on social media sites, his mentions far outpacing any other personalities, whether they are politicians or pop stars. Only Alexey Navalny got anywhere close to matching Putin’s mentions – and only then at the time of his arrest in 2021 and his subsequent death last month.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-russians-talk-about-on-social-media-vladimir-putin-dominates-while-political-friends-and-foes-trail-in-the-far-distance-225615">What do Russians talk about on social media? Vladimir Putin dominates, while political friends and foes trail in the far distance</a>
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<h2>Crimea ten years on</h2>
<p>Last week Putin celebrated ten years since Russia annexed Crimea by force. As for the people of Crimea, Shane O'Rourke, an expert in Russian history at the University of York, says their joy was <a href="https://theconversation.com/ten-years-since-its-annexation-crimea-serves-as-a-grim-warning-to-any-ukrainian-lands-that-fall-under-russian-occupation-226270">far more muted</a>. Ten years of occupation, the last two spent at war with their former compatriots, have given them little cause for celebration. </p>
<p>The peninsula’s economic mainstay, tourism, is in the doldrums, while a Russification campaign is destroying Crimea’s cultural identity and the Ukrainian and Tatar languages are being suppressed. Meanwhile residents are being forced to become Russian citizens whether they like it or not. Many do not: 50,000 people have left in the past decade.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ten-years-since-its-annexation-crimea-serves-as-a-grim-warning-to-any-ukrainian-lands-that-fall-under-russian-occupation-226270">Ten years since its annexation, Crimea serves as a grim warning to any Ukrainian lands that fall under Russian occupation</a>
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<p>Further, as Stefan Wolff – an expert in international relations at the University of Birmingham – notes here, Russia’s grip on Crimea <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-ten-years-after-putin-annexed-crimea-russias-grip-on-the-peninsula-looks-shaky-225850">looks shakier now</a> than at any time since 2014. There have been repeated attacks on the Kerch Bridge which connects Crimea to the mainland, while the peninsula is subject to regular drone attacks and the security situation has deteriorated to the extent that Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been forced to seek safer harbour on the Russian mainland. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov signalled that a major operation aimed at further loosening Russia’s grip on Crimea was imminent. Things have now reached the stage where members of the Russian parliament recently introduced a draft bill on March 11 to annul the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine by former Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev in 1954. It’s an old Soviet trick, if you don’t like history, change it.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-ten-years-after-putin-annexed-crimea-russias-grip-on-the-peninsula-looks-shaky-225850">Ukraine war: ten years after Putin annexed Crimea, Russia's grip on the peninsula looks shaky</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226844/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259442024-03-22T10:15:51Z2024-03-22T10:15:51ZUkraine war: Russia’s Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato<p>With Donald Trump leading in <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">many of the polls</a> for the upcoming US presidential election, his comments about global security and foreign policy have to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>In February, Trump flippantly remarked that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted to Nato states that failed to pay their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html#:%7E:text=As%20president%2C%20Trump%20privately%20threatened,wants%20to%20weaken%20the%20alliance">bills</a>. In a follow-up interview on GB News this week he <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">warned allies</a> “not to take advantage” of the US. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this causing more concern than for the countries in the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.</p>
<p>Not only does Trump, sometimes, say he wants to halt all US military aid to Ukraine, but Trump wants to undercut article 5 of Nato’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-trump-spending-wesley-clark-treaty-article-5-2019-12?r=US&IR=T">treaty</a> – the principle of collective defence – something that has become increasingly important in the wake of Russia’s aggression. British military <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">sources are worried that</a> Trump’s remarks will strengthen Putin’s resolve over Ukraine, and could result in him advancing on even more territory.</p>
<p>Even before Trump emerged on the US political scene, the Baltic countries have been especially concerned about Russia’s growing ambitions. They have, after all, been <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Soviet-occupation">invaded and occupied by Russia before</a>, in 1940, and then forced to become part of <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004464896/BP000015.xml">the Soviet Union</a>. There’s plenty of people who can still remember life in the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic states have been the loudest voices sounding the alarm about the existential threat posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">Russia</a>, and all three countries increased their military spending to more than 2% of their GDP, and recently agreed to raise it to <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1841298/baltics-agree-on-need-to-raise-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp">3%</a>.</p>
<h2>Building shared defences</h2>
<p>Amid growing security concerns, the defence ministers in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also agreed in January to set up a common Baltic defence zone on their borders with Russia and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/19/baltic-nations-to-build-defense-network-along-borders-with-russia-belarus-a83786">Belarus</a>. This would consist of building physical defensive structures such as bunkers.</p>
<p>Estonia will begin construction of 600 bunkers in early <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/baltic-nations-prepare-600-strong-bunker-defensive-line-with-russian-threat-in-mind/">2025</a>. The nations will also cooperate in developing missile artillery, and ensuring that their equipment, ammunition and manpower is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-lithuania-estonia-common-defense-zone-russia-border-security-concerns/">updated</a>.</p>
<p>Estonia has also doubled the size of its territorial defence force to 20,000 <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">people</a>, while Latvia reintroduced conscription in 2023 after becoming the only Baltic state to stop mandatory military service in 2006.</p>
<p>Latvia also plans to double the size of its armed forces to 61,000 by the year <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">2032</a>. Meanwhile, Lithuania has made an agreement with Germany to allow a permanent brigade of 4,800 of its troops to be combat ready on the Russian border by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-brigade-be-combat-ready-lithuania-russian-border-2027-2023-12-18/">2027</a>.</p>
<h2>Putin’s pledge to Russian speakers</h2>
<p>But given that Russia borders 14 countries, why are the Baltic states especially concerned about their security? In addition to being geographically close, a notable number of ethnic Russians live in the Baltic countries (5% in Lithuania; 25% in Estonia and 36% in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight/disquiet-in-baltics-over-sympathies-of-russian-speakers-idUSBREA2K07S20140323/">Latvia</a>. In the eastern Estonian city of Narva, 95.7% of the population are native Russian speakers and 87.7% are ethnic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/22/always-looking-shoulder-anxiety-estonia-russians-tallinn">Russians</a>. </p>
<p>This matters as Putin has argued that having substantial numbers of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia, due to the “catastrophic” dissolution of the Soviet Union, represents a “humanitarian <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329">disaster</a> of epic proportions” as it left Russians cut off from “their motherland”. Putin has vowed to actively protect all “Russians” living <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/">abroad</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, Putin has said he was concerned about how ethnic Russians are being treated in the Baltics, remarking that the deportation of ethnic Russians (most notably in Latvia where there have been recent changes to its immigration laws), poses a threat to Russian national <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1733169?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">security</a>.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has also protested the demolition of Soviet monuments in the <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/russia-protests-dismantling-of-soviet-monument.a198914/">Baltics</a>, placing Estonia’s prime minster, Kaja Kallas, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1609251885/kallas-on-russia-s-wanted-list-this-is-a-familiar-scare-tactic">on its wanted list</a> for doing so. </p>
<p>But these claims about wanting to protect Russians abroad, are really just a pretext to justify escalation with the Baltics, which will test Nato’s alliance and destabilise the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024">organisation</a>. So it’s not just important that there are ethnic Russians living there – there are strategic reasons as well that make them an easy target.</p>
<p>Even with the Baltic countries strengthening their troop numbers, Russia currently has 1.32 million active military personnel, and two million active <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296573/russia-ukraine-military-comparison/">reserve</a>. Combined this is greater that Lithuania’s entire population of 2.8 million people, and far greater than Estonia and Latvia which have populations of 1.3 million and 1.8 million people, respectively.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">The EU should stop 'westsplaining' and listen to its smaller eastern members – they saw the Ukraine war coming</a>
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<p>For Lithuania, which borders Belarus and Russian-run mini-state Kaliningrad, there are concerns that it could be taken over first by Russian forces, which would then physically isolate Lithuania from the rest of the Baltics. The Kaliningrad region has become increasingly militarised in recent years, with Iskander ballistic missiles and S-400 <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/2022-12-05-BalticRussia-FINALweb.pdf">systems</a> installed. With Trump suggesting he would weaken the US’s commitment to Nato if elected, there won’t be much of a deterrent for Putin to grab low-hanging fruit.</p>
<p>The current Nato response force consists of approximately <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-increase-high-readiness-force-300000/">40,000 troops</a>, with plans to upgrade to 300,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61954516">troops</a>. But quick-reaction units could still be too slow to protect the Baltics from Russian forces as, ironically, moving large units, vehicles and ammunition <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/is-baltic-sea-nato-lake-pub-91263">across borders is bureaucratic and takes time</a>. It would be important to have excellent intelligence and to move quickly, something that will be made more difficult with the US potentially opting out of its commitments.</p>
<p>Though Russia has plunged much of its resources into winning the Ukraine war, Putin still aims to expand Russian sovereignty across the post-Soviet states and to effectively dismantle Nato, something that Trump takes no issue with. As Russia has been ramping up its war machine, the Baltic states firmly believe that Russian aggression will not stop at Ukraine, and that they <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1717545/if-ukraine-falls-baltic-states-will-be-next-says-russia-s-former-pm#:%7E:text=In%20Kasyanov%2C%20view%2C%20the%20war,be%20next%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20said.&text=Kasyanov%2C%2064%2C%20was%20sacked%20by,People's%20Freedom%20party%2C%20or%20Parnas">could be next</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Baltic states have high numbers of Russian speakers, who Putin has vowed to ‘protect’.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2189382023-12-05T12:39:07Z2023-12-05T12:39:07ZUkraine war: Russia’s hard line at European security meeting ratchets up tensions another notch<p>After many months of <a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/exclusive-malta-under-consideration-to-become-osce-chair-in-2024/">diplomatic wrangling</a>, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was granted another lease of life at the annual ministerial council meeting last week in a <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559671">messy compromise</a> between Russia and the west. But rather than ushering in a period of renewed efforts to mend Europe’s broken security order, existing faultlines have deepened and new ones have emerged.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce">OSCE</a> traces its roots back to a period of serious attempts at detente between the US and the USSR during the 1970s. It’s now the world’s largest regional security organisation with 57 participating states encompassing three continents – North America, Europe and Asia. Yet its ability to fulfil its mandate of providing security has been severely compromised in recent years. </p>
<p>While the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the latest and most egregious violation of the OSCE’s fundamental principles, it was not the first. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the subsequent recognition of the independence of the Kremlin-supported breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August was followed, in 2014, by the annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of Donbas. </p>
<p>Russia has also deliberately undermined the OSCE’s existing missions in Ukraine. The “<a href="https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk-discontinued">Observer Mission </a>”, which was set up in July 2014 to monitor activity at key Russian-Ukrainian border checkpoints in eastern Ukraine was discontinued in September 2021. </p>
<p>Meanwhile the “<a href="https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed">Special Monitoring Mission</a>”, set up in March 2014 to observe and report in an impartial and objective manner on the security situation in Ukraine was closed in March 2022, weeks after Russia launched its all-out invasion. </p>
<p>The office of the <a href="https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine-closed">project coordinator</a> in Ukraine, which was set up at Kyiv’s request in 1999 to help it meet a range of security challenges and assist and advise on reforms, was closed in June 2022. All of these initiatives ended after Russia vetoed their continuation.</p>
<p>Yet, none of this stopped the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, from <a href="https://mid.ru/en/press_service/video/view/1918477/">declaring</a> at the latest meeting that the OSCE was becoming “an appendage of Nato and the EU” and finds itself “on the brink of the abyss”.</p>
<p>At least on this latter point, there is little disagreement. The OSCE is experiencing the <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/is-a-russian-veto-on-leadership-about-to-provoke-the-downfall-of-the-osce/">deepest crisis</a> in its history. Because of Russia’s veto, the organisation has not had an approved budget since 2021. It has only survived on the basis of “<a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/how-creative-diplomacy-has-averted-a-collapse-of-the-osce-until-now/">creative diplomacy</a>”, with individual member states finding money to fund its missions.</p>
<h2>Sense of instability</h2>
<p>The compromises <a href="https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/559671">achieved</a> at the ministerial council in Skopje last week do little to put the OSCE back onto a more sustainable footing. While <a href="https://www.shrmonitor.org/exclusive-osce-permanent-council-paves-the-way-for-malta-to-assume-the-osce-chair-in-2024/">appointing Malta</a> as chair of the organisation for 2024 averts complete dysfunctionality, the mandates of the organisation’s other top officials, including the secretary general, were extended by only nine months, rather than the customary three-year period. </p>
<p>This merely prolongs the existing agony by putting off a decision on who is to lead the organisation and its institutions. The pervasive sense of instability that now surrounds the OSCE fits neatly with the Kremlin’s narrative of the need for a fundamentally new and different European security order. </p>
<p>While Russia managed to block Estonia’s candidacy for the chair and secured a non-Nato member for the role with Malta, this is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/osce-limps-through-another-year-russia-relents-veto-2023-12-01/">hardly</a> a triumph of Russian diplomacy, given that the Kremlin had to drop its opposition to the renewal of the other leadership positions.</p>
<p>Nor is the compromise a win for the west. Crucially, the west was far from united in its approach. Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/11/28/baltic-countries-boycott-osce-meeting-over-russian-invitation">refused</a> to send their foreign ministers to the meeting in protest over Lavrov’s attendance. Their US and UK counterparts, Antony Blinken and David Cameron, attended the pre-meeting dinner but avoided any contact with Lavrov. </p>
<p>By contrast, the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, attended in person and launched a scathing condemnation of Russia and Lavrov in her <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/9/559131.pdf">statement</a>, underscoring that the Kremlin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is also a war against the OSCE. </p>
<p>Several, including non-western, delegates emphasised the importance of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all participating states. But only nine of them aligned themselves with the <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/f/559590.pdf">EU statement</a>, which called on “Russia to immediately stop its war of aggression against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw … from the entire territory of Ukraine”.</p>
<p>This does not mean that the remainder of the OSCE’s participating states support the Kremlin’s war of aggression. But it indicates the likely difficulties which Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-zelenskiys-10-point-peace-plan-2022-12-28/">peace formula</a> will face in the future. A wider pro-western line was adopted by more than 40 participating states that issued joint statements on <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/c/559713.pdf">human rights and fundamental freedoms</a> and on the <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/b/559707.pdf">90th anniversary of the Holodomor</a> genocide in Ukraine in 1932-1933.</p>
<h2>Deep divisions</h2>
<p>Yet this cannot gloss over the fundamental divide that persists in the OSCE between the collective west and Russia and its remaining allies. A <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nato-allies-joint-statement-to-the-osce-ministerial-council-2023">joint statement</a> by Nato members (and Sweden) squarely pointed the finger of blame for all that is wrong with the OSCE and European security at the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Russia and Belarus, in turn, received support from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in their <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/559662.pdf">attempt</a> to deflect that blame and portray themselves as champions of peace, security and human rights.</p>
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<p>Much was made at the ministerial council of the OSCE as an important platform for dialogue, especially in light of the many security challenges that the region faces. But, as Liechtenstein’s representative <a href="https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/1/559251.pdf">aptly put it</a>, for this to work, participating states need to recognise, and remind themselves of, the added value that the OSCE brings to each of them individually and the region as a whole. </p>
<p>There is little evidence that this message will be heard. And so the danger persists that an ongoing “dialogue of the deaf” will eventually push the OSCE into oblivion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218938/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK, a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe appears to be on its last legs.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155652023-10-12T17:09:52Z2023-10-12T17:09:52ZUkraine recap: what war in the Middle East means for Putin and Ukraine<p>For some people it was a week when they forgot that the Ukraine war was happening. </p>
<p>As news from the Middle East took up longer and longer slots on news programmes and websites, reports from Ukraine were pushed off the front pages, at least for now. </p>
<p>But as Robert Dover, professor of intelligence and national security at the University of Hull, explains, any reduction <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">in the world’s attention</a> on the Ukraine war could be an significant opportunity for President Vladimir Putin. It could easily distract the west and undermine its commitment to financial and military support for Ukraine, he argues. </p>
<p>This could open up time for Russia to regroup, slow the number of battlefield deaths and prolong the conflict. It could also divert military equipment to the Middle East. A longer war is generally seen as being in Russia’s favour as the commitment of allies is potentiallworn away by national political opposition, and worries about cost, potentially.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-gaza-conflict-an-opportunity-for-putin-while-the-world-is-distracted-215479">Israel-Gaza conflict: an opportunity for Putin while the world is distracted</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, on the Baltic coast, a gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland has been hit by an explosion, and nobody is quite sure what or who is behind it. But since both countries are Nato members, and there’s a possibility that it could be an attack by Russia, the incident is coming under intense scrutiny. </p>
<p>Supplies of gas and energy, of course, have become a hugely political issue since the beginning of the war, when European countries realised their overdependence on Russia and suddenly had to make alternative arrangements at speed or risk no heating through the winter. </p>
<p>Thomas Froehlich, a research fellow at King’s College London, who studies the geopolitics of energy, <a href="https://theconversation.com/estonia-finland-pipeline-explosion-whats-the-evidence-that-the-damage-was-deliberate-215480">talks us through</a> the importance of a thorough investigation into the damaged pipeline and why Europe needs to diversify and protect its energy sources.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/estonia-finland-pipeline-explosion-whats-the-evidence-that-the-damage-was-deliberate-215480">Estonia-Finland pipeline explosion: what's the evidence that the damage was deliberate?</a>
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>Away from the frontlines, Russians are queueing up to see the latest Hollywood blockbuster Barbie, despite the government suggesting the film does not uphold “Russian values”. No one knows exactly what punters’ motivation might be, a dash of escapism, a desire to see the latest global movie hit, or as a small act of defiance. </p>
<p>Marina Miron, a post-doctoral researcher at King’s College London, studies the power of information and how information is used during conflicts. She points out that the Kremlin likes <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-power-of-pink-how-barbies-popularity-is-pushing-back-against-kremlin-control-of-information-214673">to keep a tight grip</a> on what is said and viewed. After all, this is a country where people are not currently allowed to call the “special military operation” in Ukraine a war and journalists can face up to 15 years in prison for publishing “false” information.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-power-of-pink-how-barbies-popularity-is-pushing-back-against-kremlin-control-of-information-214673">The power of pink: how Barbie's popularity is pushing back against Kremlin control of information</a>
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<p>The overuse of the word “tragedy” is <a href="https://theconversation.com/calling-the-war-in-ukraine-a-tragedy-shelters-its-perpetrators-from-blame-and-responsibility-212080">letting Russia off the hook</a>, argues Mariana Budjeryn, a research associate, at the Harvard Kennedy School. The word “tragedy” is used far too often and it suggests that is something that is out of anyone’s control. </p>
<p>If you look at the roots of the word tragedy in its deeper original sense, it implies inadvertence and inevitability, she explains. And therefore masks the responsibility of perpetrators in causing injustices and human suffering through malicious intent and deliberate wrongdoing. </p>
<p>The word that should be used more often, she suggests, is crime. Russia is breaking international law, and therefore should be called to account, and calling what is happening in Ukraine a tragedy is not the way to do it.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/calling-the-war-in-ukraine-a-tragedy-shelters-its-perpetrators-from-blame-and-responsibility-212080">Calling the war in Ukraine a 'tragedy' shelters its perpetrators from blame and responsibility</a>
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<p>When people flee from their homelands they often cling to the few possessions they are able to take with them. There are incredibly poignant images of Ukrainian families holding on to a teddy bear or a favourite book as they jostled for spaces on trains leaving the country as war broke out. </p>
<p>But Ukrainians living away from their homes in foreign lands are choosing another way to commemorate and remember their home, by getting tattoos of Ukrainian symbols or words inscribed on their bodies. Our French edition <a href="https://theconversation.com/vivre-lukraine-en-exil-son-heritage-culturel-dans-la-peau-213587">recently published</a> an article looking at the Ukrainian diaspora in Portugal, and how tattoos are growing in popularity as a mark of resistance against Russian occupation, according to Amandine Desille, a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Lisbonne and an associate member at the University of Bordeaux.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/vivre-lukraine-en-exil-son-heritage-culturel-dans-la-peau-213587">Vivre l’Ukraine en exil, son héritage culturel dans la peau</a>
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<p>And finally for an update on how The Conversation has been covering the Israel-Gaza conflict from all its bureaux around the world, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-updates-on-the-conversations-coverage-of-the-conflict-215285">here’s a round-up</a> of coverage, compiled by global editor Stephen Khan.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-updates-on-the-conversations-coverage-of-the-conflict-215285">Israel-Hamas war: updates on The Conversation's coverage of the conflict</a>
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A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Rachael Jolley, International Affairs EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154802023-10-12T15:12:25Z2023-10-12T15:12:25ZEstonia-Finland pipeline explosion: what’s the evidence that the damage was deliberate?<p>Finland’s president, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/finnish-government-hold-news-conference-suspected-pipeline-leak-media-2023-10-10/">Sauli Niinistö, has alluded to “outside activity”</a> and said sabotage is likely to be the cause of damage to an important gas pipeline that links it to Estonia.</p>
<p>The pipeline <a href="https://gasgrid.fi/en/2023/10/08/suspicion-of-a-leak-in-the-balticconnector-gas-pipeline-between-finland-and-estonia/">suffered a leak in Finnish waters</a> on October 8, caused by an explosion, and has subsequently been shut down. A nearby telecommunications connection in <a href="https://observatorial.com/news/economy/536135/elisa-cable-damage-has-practically-no-effects-in-finland/">Estonian waters was also damaged</a>. It is so far unclear whether this was caused by the same or additional explosions.</p>
<p>Reports show that pressure dropped in the pipeline and <a href="https://www.argusmedia.com/en//news/2497905-norsar-detects-explosive-signal-near-balticconnector">seismic sensors detected at least one explosion</a>. Nato has promised to act if the pipeline has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/11/nato-vows-to-respond-if-finland-estonia-gas-pipeline-damage-is-deliberate">attacked</a>. Concerns are being raised about Russia’s possible involvement, although it is denying any role.</p>
<p>Some analysts say the cause of the damage is not clear. Finnish prime minister Petteri Orpo gave a careful statement emphasising that: <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/finland-pipeline-leak-likely-caused-by-external-activity/a-67058017">“It is too early to draw conclusions on who or what caused the damage.”</a></p>
<p>Just as with the sabotage on the <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-kremlin-russia-who-blew-up-nord-stream-2/">Nord Stream gas pipelines linking Russia to Europe in 2022</a>, the possible attack is difficult to attribute. The Kremlin has <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/nato-oil-pipeline-leak-russia-sabotage-1833802">pushed back against claims of Russian involvement</a> in Nord Stream, blaming it on other countries. </p>
<p>In any case, the Estonia-Finland pipeline is unlikely to go back online <a href="https://www.energate-messenger.de/news/237180/baltic-connector-nicht-vor-april-zurueck">until April next year</a>, according to operator Gasgrid Finland.</p>
<h2>Why is the pipeline important?</h2>
<p>The EU financed 75% of <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/news/balticconnector-gas-pipeline-and-running-1-january-2020-2020-01-08_en">the project’s total cost</a> of around €300 million (£258m). Finnish state-owned operator Gasgrid and Estonian operator Elering financed the remaining 25% of the pipeline, which has a <a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-01/pci_factsheet_balticonnector_2017_0_0.pdf">capacity of 2.6 billion cubic meters per year</a>.</p>
<p>Planning began in 2007, and the pipeline became operational in 2020. It is Finland’s only connection to the EU domestic gas market, via the <a href="https://www.ogj.com/pipelines-transportation/pipelines/article/14276216/polandlithuania-interconnector-gas-pipeline-commissioned">Gas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania (GIPL)</a> pipeline system.</p>
<p>The Estonia-Finland pipeline is capable of bi-directional flow, which means that depending on current demand and available supply, gas can be transported from Finland to Estonia or vice versa.</p>
<p>The pipeline’s closure should not affect Finnish energy supply security. Although it <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/022520-estonia-finland-gas-link-not-seen-in-reverse-mode-in-2020-official">supplies about a third of Finland’s overall gas use</a>, only 5% of Finnish energy supply stems from gas. While <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61524933">Russia stopped gas exports to Finland</a> as a reaction to the country’s Nato application in 2022, Finland can receive liquefied natural gas (LNG) via its <a href="https://gasgrid.fi/en/2023/01/16/gasgrid-finlands-lng-floating-terminal-is-now-ready-for-gas-deliveries/">floating LNG terminal in Inkoo</a>, which has a capacity exceeding Finland’s total gas demand.</p>
<p>The importance for Estonian energy supply security is more relevant, as <a href="https://www.conexus.lv/physical-flows?custom_punkti0%5B%5D=21Z0000000004952&pa_dienam=0&date_from=2022-11-01&date_to=2023-10-11&custom_submit=Generate+report">flow had been reversed in 2023 to deliver LNG</a> to Estonia at a rate of 30 GWh/day, which equals between 15 and 18% of Estonia’s daily energy consumption. However, Estonia can also rely on the Klaipėda LNG terminal in Lithuania.</p>
<h2>What are the risks involved?</h2>
<p>Given these numbers, the risk to energy supply security in Finland and Estonia is low. But the damaged pipeline might increase <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/europe-gas-prices-mostly-fall-091409202.html">gas price volatility in Europe</a>, which in turn could lead to further strengthening of right-wing populist parties who have <a href="https://cepa.org/article/polands-far-right-advances-on-anti-ukraine-sentiment/">campaigned against supporting Ukraine</a>, and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/how-viktor-orban-broke-the-eu-and-got-away-with-it-hungary-rule-of-law/">aim to weaken European institutions</a> by building concern about the increasing cost of living.</p>
<p>If evidence of sabotage can be found, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Nato’s Article 5</a> – the basis for the alliance’s collective defence mechanism – would mean an attack on any member would be considered an attack on all. Estonia has been a <a href="https://icds.ee/en/estonias-long-road-to-nato/">Nato member since 2003</a> and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm">Finland recently joined the alliance</a> in the wake of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Since the flow of the pipeline had only recently been reversed to deliver gas from Finland to Estonia, a deliberate attack on this piece of critical infrastructure – if proven – must certainly be <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/baltic-states-targets-and-levers-role-region-russian-strategy-0">interpreted as a threat to the Baltic states</a>.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done now?</h2>
<p>In a tense geopolitical environment amid <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/warstudies/assets/war-in-ukraine-one-year-on.pdf">Russia’s war against Ukraine</a>, competition between the US and China <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rethinking-us-china-competition-next-generation-perspectives/">in the Pacific</a>, and new conflict in the Middle East after <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/israel-and-palestinians-new-kind-conflict">Hamas’s attacks on Israel</a>, a thorough investigation of the incident is necessary before jumping to any conclusions.</p>
<p>Rhetorical escalation might <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg614af.9">lead to increased conflict</a>, so it’s important to note that an accident has not been fully ruled out. Estonia’s navy commander Jüri Saska said the damage appears like <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/heavy-force-damaged-baltic-sea-gas-pipeline-estonia-says-2023-10-11/">“someone tore it on the side”</a>, which could refer to a mechanical impact by a passing vessel.</p>
<p>In any case, it is important to <a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1017803">increase security around other critical infrastructure</a>. If this constitutes an act of sabotage, <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3187.html">deterrence has clearly failed</a>. A strong and coordinated effort needs to be made to substantially increase surveillance capacity for critical infrastructure – ideally on a pan-European level.</p>
<p>To minimise future disruptions to energy infrastructure, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544222010003">further diversification of the EU’s energy supply</a> would be a useful step. Expanding <a href="https://www.iea.org/news/renewable-power-s-growth-is-being-turbocharged-as-countries-seek-to-strengthen-energy-security">solar capacity for domestic use</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0960148121005942">geothermal sources for industrial applications</a> offers a route to increased supply security.</p>
<p>Even though it has not been proven that the damage to the pipeline was caused by sabotage, or indeed Russia, it is crucial for Europe to not back down on support for Ukraine, as this would be <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/09/20/how-russia-and-ukraine-interpret-and-signal-information-will-determine-the-course-of-the-war">interpreted as a sign of weakness by Moscow</a>. As the US is currently putting more efforts into <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/91790e91-3a5d-4369-a475-4a2f417f2a66">deterring Iran from intervening</a> in the newly resurfaced Middle Eastern conflict, the onus is on the EU to support Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression.</p>
<p>While it is unclear at this point what or who led to the damage of the pipeline, calm communications during the investigation must be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thomas Froehlich received funding from ESRC. He is affiliated with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). </span></em></p>Nato has promised to act if the pipeline has been attacked, but a thorough investigation is needed before jumping to any conclusions.Thomas Froehlich, Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2017512023-03-17T12:29:59Z2023-03-17T12:29:59ZEstonia’s e-governance revolution is hailed as a voting success – so why are some US states pulling in the opposite direction?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515523/original/file-20230315-20-f7nh74.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas reacts to e-vote results on March 5, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/estonian-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-reacts-after-the-news-photo/1247815927">Raigo Pajula/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Estonia, a small country in <a href="https://data.un.org/en/iso/ee.html">northern Europe</a>, reached a digital milestone when the country headed to the polls on March 5, 2023. </p>
<p>For the first time, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608904730/estonia-sets-new-e-voting-record-at-riigikogu-2023-elections">over 50% of voters cast their ballots online</a> in a national parliamentary election. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=UZaVLvIAAAAJ&hl=en">political science researcher</a> who focuses on elections, I was in Estonia to learn about the process of internet voting. In the capacity of an international election observer, I visited standard polling places and also attended the final internet vote count held in the parliament building. </p>
<p>As someone who also regularly volunteers as a poll worker in the United States, I found the contrast between Estonia’s integrated information systems and internet voting, and the patchwork system operating in the U.S., to be notable. And with several U.S. states <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161374479/electronic-registration-information-center-eric-florida-missouri-west-virginia">withdrawing from the Electronic Registration Information Center</a>, or ERIC, that contrast is growing sharper.</p>
<p>I believe Estonia offers America an important example of how information sharing can be used to enhance the integrity of elections.</p>
<h2>Estonia’s e-governance system</h2>
<p>Estonia has long been seen as a pioneer in digitizing the democratic process.</p>
<p>Internet voting, which <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101718">began in Estonia in 2005</a>, is just a small part of the e-governance ecosystem that all Estonians access regularly. Using a government-issued ID card that allows Estonians to identify themselves and securely record digital signatures, they can register a newborn baby, sign up for social benefits, access health records and conduct almost any other business they have with a government agency. This ID card is mandatory for all citizens.</p>
<p>Central to the success of Estonia’s digitization revolution is a secure data-sharing system known as the <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/interoperability-services/x-road/">X-Road</a>. </p>
<p>Government agencies collect only the personal information they require to provide their services, and if another agency has already gathered a piece of information, then it is accessible through the X-Road. In other words, each piece of personal information is collected only once and then shared securely when it is needed. A person’s home address, for example, is collected by the <a href="https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/activities/population-procedures/population-register">population register</a> and no other government entity. If it’s needed by election administrators, health care workers, a school or any other agency, those organizations request it from the population register online.</p>
<p>So, imagine that you are applying for admission to a university, which requires both your date of birth and your school grades. These are stored by two different agencies. By using your ID card, you can auto-populate <a href="https://www.sais.ee">the application</a> using data that the system instantaneously pulls in from the two agencies that store that information. </p>
<p>Because of this information sharing, election officials know who is eligible to vote and which online ballot they should receive no matter where they live in the country.</p>
<h2>A decentralized approach in U.S.</h2>
<p>For many reasons, the U.S. system of election management is very different from Estonia’s, and <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/02/17/despite-security-concerns-online-voting-advances">online voting is rare</a>. </p>
<p>Developing and maintaining an e-governance system requires technical, political and social forces to align. Because each U.S. state manages its own elections, and decisions can vary at the county level or below, it is difficult to envision a consistent technical solution. It is also more challenging to coordinate a solution across such a large country and <a href="https://verifiedvoting.org/internet-voting-faq/">safely implement secure online voting</a> given current U.S. internet voting technology.</p>
<p>Additionally, concerns about federal interference in state matters have prompted political and social pushback on <a href="https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-election-integrity-the-unnecessary-and-unconstitutional-john-r">recent election reforms</a>. Public consensus on instituting a nationally mandated electronic ID similar to the one that forms the foundation of Estonia’s internet voting appears unlikely. </p>
<p>Research shows that most <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101718">Estonians trust their e-governance systems</a>, although there are skeptics. Some critiques focus on <a href="https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/en/posts/perils-of-electronic-voting/">perceived security shortcomings</a>. </p>
<p>The internet voting process has also become politicized. In the most recent election, one political party that had discouraged its voters from using online voting – and unsurprisingly trailed its rivals in the online count – challenged the process in court. Its <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608911129/estonia-s-supreme-court-rejects-ekre-s-e-voting-election-complaint">effort to annul internet voting</a> failed. The U.S. witnessed a similar dynamic around <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/supreme-court-leaves-in-place-order-requiring-pennsylvania-to-count-absentee-ballots-after-election-day/">absentee ballots in the 2020 elections</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Long line of people standing outside waiting to vote" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/515527/original/file-20230315-28-ry6ind.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nearly all U.S. voters vote in person or by absentee or mail-in ballot.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-in-line-for-early-voting-for-the-midterm-news-photo/1439028382">Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Balancing security, efficiency and access</h2>
<p>While <a href="https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/annex/electoral-management-case-studies/the-united-states-decentralized-to-the-point-of">the United States’ decentralized approach</a> has its advantages, it also creates shortcomings in security, efficiency and access. </p>
<p>Secure elections means that only people who have the right to vote are able to cast a ballot and that they aren’t improperly influenced in the process. Efficient elections means the process is smooth — voters don’t have to wait in long lines, and their ballots are counted quickly and accurately. And access emphasizes that people who have the right to vote can register, gather the information they need in order to vote, and successfully cast their ballot. </p>
<p>Sometimes changes to voting practices that enhance one of these values – say, security – may create impediments for another – say, access. Requiring a photo ID to vote, for example, may reduce the <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Voter_impersonation">small likelihood of voter impersonation</a>, but it also risks preventing a legitimate voter who forgets to bring, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/getting-a-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec-20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html">or doesn’t have</a>, a valid photo ID from exercising their right to vote. Finding an acceptable balance among these values is a challenge for citizens and policymakers alike.</p>
<h2>Misinformation derails digital efforts</h2>
<p>Several states, including my own state of West Virginia, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161374479/electronic-registration-information-center-eric-florida-missouri-west-virginia">recently made a decision</a> that I believe undermines all three of these values by making our elections less secure, less efficient and less accessible.</p>
<p>In early March, West Virginia joined Florida, Missouri, Alabama and Louisiana in withdrawing from the <a href="https://ericstates.org">Electronic Registration Information Center</a>. ERIC is a multistate, data-sharing effort to make voter rolls more accurate and encourage eligible citizens to vote. The 28 participating states and the District of Columbia provide voter registration and driver’s license data to ERIC and receive an analysis that shows who has moved, who has died and who is eligible to vote but has not registered. </p>
<p>These reports help states clean up their voter rolls, <a href="https://www.statenews.org/government-politics/2023-03-07/larose-says-ohio-may-drop-out-of-voter-registration-program-he-praised-last-month">identify incidents of fraud</a> and <a href="https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ERIC_Bylaws.pdf">provide unregistered voters</a> with information about how to vote. </p>
<p>In other words, ERIC is designed to enhance security, efficiency and access. However, over the past year, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/08/republican-states-eric-voter-rolls-program-conspiracy">unsubstantiated claims have circulated</a> that ERIC is being used as a <a href="https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/west-virginia-resigns-from-electronic-registration-information-center/article_f68b2bc4-bc50-11ed-b356-5b309dab29c3.html">partisan tool to undermine election integrity</a>. </p>
<p>ERIC was established, however, as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18541-1_31">nonpartisan information provider with bipartisan support</a>. States that exit ERIC may be sacrificing the integrity of their election process based on <a href="https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2022/oct/17/mark-finchem/arizonas-mark-finchem-falsely-links-george-soros-t/">unfounded conspiracies</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. can learn a tremendous amount from Estonia’s e-governance revolution. Estonia faces a hostile security environment with an antagonistic Russia next door. But its integrated systems have helped balance security, efficiency and access in a wide range of government services. With the decision to withdraw from ERIC, some states are in danger of pulling the U.S. in the other direction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201751/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erik S. Herron receives funding from the US Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative. </span></em></p>Americans can look to Estonia for lessons on how online voting systems can improve election integrity.Erik S. Herron, Professor of Political Science, West Virginia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2006732023-03-03T12:31:27Z2023-03-03T12:31:27ZEstonian elections: conquered by Russia for centuries, why this Baltic country is worried about the Ukraine war<p>Russia’s war in Ukraine has quickly refocused the politics of its Baltic neighbours. Renewed threats to national security have swiftly risen to the top of each nation’s priorities. </p>
<p>In autumn 2022, Estonia like other Baltic countries, restricted travel over its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltic-states-poland-close-doors-russian-tourists-2022-09-19/">land borders from Russia</a>. Flights were already banned from Russia as part of an EU-wide decision. St Petersburg is only 229 miles away from Estonia’s capital Tallinn, and Estonians are all too aware of their recent history with Russia including being conquered by the Russian empire from 1710 and forced to become part of the Soviet Union in the 20th century. It shares memories of Russification and suppression of its language with Ukraine.</p>
<p>Occupied by the Soviet Union until 1991 and sharing a 294km border with Russia, defence and security have risen up the agenda in the Estonian media and politics in the past 12 months. But it’s not surprising with a militarised Russia on its doorstep the Ukraine war is focusing minds in the <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en">election</a> of the country’s next parliament. Estonia is providing more <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212277.htm">military aid as a share of GDP</a> than any other Nato country. Polls close on March 5 2023. National defence, crisis readiness and energy independence are all being covered in the campaigns. </p>
<p>Tensions are clear. Russia expelled <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608859871/russia-to-expel-estonian-ambassador">Estonia’s ambassador</a> Margus Laidre in January 2023 and Estonia responded by doing the same to the Russian ambassador Vladimir Lipajev. Just days before the election Estonia held a 105th anniversary parade of the Republic of Estonia in Tallinn’s Freedom Square. The highly symbolic event also featured military equipment and representation from Estonia’s Nato allies and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212277.htm">a speech</a> from Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, who evoked Estonia’s fight for freedom and the Ukrainian battle with Russia today. He said: “Your history is a strong reminder that we cannot take our freedom for granted.” </p>
<p>The first televised debate of this <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608871661/security-first-topic-of-valimisstuudio-series-of-election-debates">election</a> produced by the Estonian Public Broadcasting Service focused, not surprisingly given the international situation, on defence. </p>
<p>Estonia’s political parties seem to widely agree on security and defence <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608868757/political-parties-election-manifestos-share-similar-foreign-policy-goals">policies</a>. A cross-party consensus is committed to increasing national defence spending, with most parties pledging to bring defence spending to a minimum of 3% GDP. The radical right populist Estonian Conservative People’s party (EKRE) is, however, critical of the current government’s decision to give Ukraine weapons and ammunition, which it claimed had depleted Estonia’s defences. And <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608868616/helme-vooglaid-comments-don-t-represent-ekre-s-security-policy-positions">one prominent EKRE parliamentary candidate</a> has called for a change of policy to establish better relations with Russia.</p>
<p>There is little disagreement over Estonia’s continued Nato membership or a pledge to invest in national crisis infrastructure (such as bomb shelters and emergency sirens), issues that have not received much attention in previous election manifestos.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-is-blurring-the-lines-between-nato-and-the-eu-on-defence-policy-200849">Ukraine war is blurring the lines between Nato and the EU on defence policy</a>
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<p>Putin’s war in Ukraine and the consequent energy crisis has also highlighted the importance of energy policy, and all parties directly link the issue to national defence. While there is broad agreement across parties about the need to ensure electric energy independence by 2030, the ways in which to reach that vary by party and ideology. The liberal and centre-left parties emphasise renewable energy sources as the primary route to energy independence in their manifestos and <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608895133/politicians-discuss-energy-and-green-turn-in-latest-valimisstuudio-debate">public debates</a>, right-wing EKRE openly opposes the “<a href="https://ekre.ee/ekre_2023_aasta_riigikogu_valimiste_programm/">mad green turn</a>” and pledges to continue fossil fuels use until Estonia transitions to nuclear energy. </p>
<h2>Kallas is leading the polls</h2>
<p>Despite the widespread agreement on defence, electoral research suggests that parties can still compete on issues that they primarily agree on by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379408000255">emphasising their competence</a> and ability to manage the issue. The <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608896003/poll-reform-center-parties-see-fall-in-support">latest polls</a> suggest that current prime minister Kaja Kallas, and her Reform Party, lead this competence battle and are set to win the most votes in the election. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.err.ee/1608897113/potential-next-premier-kaja-kallas-support-unaffected-by-party-rating-drop">Kallas</a>, the first female prime minister of Estonia, enjoys a healthy lead as the most popular potential leader. She is an avid and vocal supporter of Ukraine, and <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608549766/poll-satisfaction-with-prime-minister-cabinet-up-sharply-since-january">public satisfaction</a> with Kallas and her government has increased rapidly following the start of Russia’s full-scale armed offensive in Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>Overall, her current support reflects an impressive turnaround as her <a href="https://www.err.ee/1608404057/epl-i-uuring-naitab-kallase-reitingu-langust-rekordmadalale">popularity</a> had dropped to all-time low of 16% in November 2021, when her government was perceived as indecisive in its handling of <a href="https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7387555/juhtkiri-oravate-arev-valjavaade">COVID-19 pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>Kallas is regularly seen in leading western news outlets such as the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/opinion/nato-russia-putin-estonia.html">New York Times</a>, <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-star-in-the-making-estonia-s-high-profile-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-a-9225dd5e-c02b-44f9-afb4-86d14cdabe7a">Der Spiegel</a>, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-warned-you-what-putin-was-like-now-will-you-listen-to-us-wz3lw33rc">The Times</a>. She now enjoys high approval ratings at home for her strong stance on Putin, effectively subverting common gender stereotypes of women being weak on <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12337">national defence and security issues</a>.</p>
<p>Nationalistic right-wing conservative parties including <a href="https://ekre.ee/ekre_2023_aasta_riigikogu_valimiste_programm/">EKRE</a> and <a href="https://isamaa.ee/iwp/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Isamaa-PROGRAMM-RK2023-pikk-02.pdf">Pro Patria</a> are strongly emphasising their credentials in defending the Estonian language, culture and sustainability as a nation. Notably, EKRE avoids mentioning Ukraine or Ukrainian refugees in their <a href="https://ekre.ee/ekre_2023_aasta_riigikogu_valimiste_programm/">manifesto</a>, and instead emphasises the need to stop mass migration to Estonia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Blue and yellow map of Estonia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/513370/original/file-20230303-26-8i5uls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<p><a href="https://isamaa.ee/iwp/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Isamaa-PROGRAMM-RK2023-pikk-02.pdf">Pro Patria</a> and <a href="https://ekre.ee/ekre_2023_aasta_riigikogu_valimiste_programm/">EKRE</a>, and the liberal right-wing <a href="https://reform.ee/riigikogu-valimised-2023/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Reformierakond_Kindlates-kates-Eesti_programmiraamat_DIGI.pdf">Reform party</a> also use the current security situation to highlight nationalistic credentials. These parties pledge to remove the right to vote in local elections for Russian citizens who are permanent residents in Estonia. The <a href="https://www.keskerakond.ee/files/valimisplatvorm_2023.pdf">Centre party</a>, which currently has the largest support among <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608896003/poll-reform-center-parties-see-fall-in-support">Russian-speaking voters</a>, and left-liberal <a href="https://valimised.sotsid.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/SDE-2023-programm_A4.pdf">Estonian Social Democrats</a> both pledge to respect local election voting rights for all permanent residents.</p>
<p>With a <a href="https://www.stat.ee/en/find-statistics/statistics-theme/population">23.7% ethnic Russian minority</a>, Estonia currently provides early and general education both in Estonian and Russian, in schools separated by language. The Ukraine war has brought this policy further up the agenda with most parties now pledging to create a unified school system with all or most classes taught in Estonian, with the exception of the <a href="https://www.keskerakond.ee/files/valimisplatvorm_2023.pdf">Centre party</a>.</p>
<p>The looming presence of the Russian war in Ukraine has far-reaching implications for Estonia and its neighbours. The threats created by a nearby war have further strengthened its hardline attitude towards Russia as Estonia, the other Baltic countries and Poland see (and fear) more than most what could happen next. There’s no question that this will stay at the top of the agenda for whoever takes over as prime minister.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200673/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zachary Greene receives funding from the Norface Network as part of the EU-in-Action research project and the EU Horizon 2020 OPTED project, designing infrastructure for computational text analysis in the social sciences.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maarja Lühiste does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Estonia is going to the polls but the Ukraine war casts a long shadow over its politics.Maarja Lühiste, Reader in Comparative Politics & Gender, Newcastle UniversityZachary Greene, Reader in Political Science, University of Strathclyde Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883882022-08-17T16:25:18Z2022-08-17T16:25:18ZUkraine war prompts Baltic states to remove Soviet memorials<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478061/original/file-20220808-3141-ph0zqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1599%2C998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soviet-era monument in Riga, Latvia, which was splashed with the colours of the Ukraine flag the day after Russia invaded in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/janitors/51911428821/in/album-72177720297042353/">Kārlis Dambrāns/ Flickr.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Estonia is to remove all of its Soviet-era war monuments, the latest in a line of eastern European countries to go down this path. There are <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608667843/government-office-creating-communist-monuments-register">reportedly</a> 200 to 400 Soviet-era memorials or monuments still standing across Estonia. </p>
<p>The prime minister, Kaja Kallas, said these would now be relocated “<a href="https://news.err.ee/1608675571/kallas-soviet-monuments-will-be-moved-as-soon-as-possible">as quickly as possible</a>”, adding: “It is clear that Russian aggression in Ukraine has torn open the wounds in our society that these communist monuments remind us of and therefore their removal from public space is necessary to avoid additional tensions.” </p>
<p>The move is not without its controversy. The discussed removal of a T-34 tank monument outside the city of Narva near the border with Russia has met with some opposition from the local population, 90% of whom are <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793631381/Everyday-Belonging-in-the-Post-Soviet-Borderlands-Russian-Speakers-in-Estonia-and-Kazakhstan">Russian speakers</a>. </p>
<p>But Kallas <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608675571/kallas-soviet-monuments-will-be-moved-as-soon-as-possible">stressed that</a> it is not the “right place” for commemorating the dead: “A tank is a murder weapon, it is not a memorial, and these same tanks are killing people on the streets of Ukraine right now.” </p>
<p>Over the past few years, some former Soviet bloc countries have debated the future of their Soviet-era war monuments, many of which celebrate the part played by the Red Army in the second world war and, specifically, the battle against fascism. But – beyond a few notable instances of monuments being removed from countries making the transition from communism to a liberal market economy (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/abs/persistent-legacies-of-communism-or-the-ongoing-purification-of-public-space-in-post1989-poland/FCF74311250B1A2C17BD7BFE0573519E">Poland springs to mind</a>) – not many war monuments have <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/iph-2018-0014/html?lang=en">actually been removed</a>.</p>
<p>Instead they have more often been <a href="https://www.politika.io/en/article/what-has-happened-to-soviet-war-memorials-since-198991-an-overview">neglected, defaced or otherwise altered</a>. But now the invasion of Ukraine appears to be prompting countries in eastern Europe and the Baltic states to consider getting rid of the remaining Soviet war monuments altogether.</p>
<p>In the early days and weeks of the invasion, Soviet war monuments made the news as activists and supporters of Ukraine painted some statues in the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/soviet-war-memorials-take-a-hit-across-central-and-eastern-europe/">colours of the national flag</a> as an expression of solidarity – something they <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-war-memorials-in-eastern-europe-continue-to-strain-relations-with-russia-101687">have done</a> since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Memorial with freize of soldiers, one painted yellow and blue." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia, Bulgaria, painted overnight on February 24 2014 by unknown activists in solidarity with anti-Russian protests in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the war extended into the spring and summer months, campaigns to remove the Soviet monuments <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/8/latvia-leads-charge-to-fell-soviet-memorials-in-europe">resurfaced</a> in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. All three regained their independence in 1991 and later joined Nato and the EU.</p>
<p>In June, a law on the prohibition of promoting totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and their ideologies – dubbed the “<a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1711669/new-desovietisation-law-takes-aim-at-lithuania-s-remaining-soviet-era-signs">deSovietisation” law</a> – was drafted by the Lithuanian parliament. At the same time, in neighbouring Latvia, the <a href="https://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/31206-saeima-passes-a-law-to-dismantle-sites-glorifying-the-soviet-and-nazi-regimes">parliament adopted</a> its own similar law. Now Estonia is following suit. </p>
<p>Interestingly, while the focus is on second world war Red Army monuments, there is clear impetus for a debate on the history of the Soviet control of these countries.</p>
<h2>Liberation or occupation?</h2>
<p>Despite the title of Latvia’s recent law, you’d be hard put to find any kind of monument glorifying the Nazi regime, there or anywhere else in the Baltic states. The key thing here is the equivalence drawn between the Soviet and Nazi regimes as they are remembered.</p>
<p>From the perspective of east European states, the origins of the second world war can be traced back to the secret protocols of the <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/roger-moorhouse/the-devils-alliance/9780465030750/">Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact</a> in 1939 which divided Europe into spheres of influence between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result, both are considered to bear responsibility for the war that turned much of eastern Europe into what historian Timothy Snyder has referred to as “<a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/396350/bloodlands-by-snyder-timothy/9780099551799">bloodlands</a>”.</p>
<p>In the recent discussion of the Soviet-era monuments, it is the associated interpretation of the aftermath of the second world war that is at stake. The Soviet war monuments are nothing if not ambiguous, “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01629770802461225">symbolising liberation, aggression and occupation</a>”. While these monuments refer to the liberation from the Nazi German occupations, the rescue simultaneously brought with it a long period of communist rule, accompanied by the presence of the Soviet Army across eastern Europe. </p>
<p>The removal in Prague of a <a href="https://www.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/controversies-surrounding-the-removal-of-the-marshal-konev-statue">statue of Ivan Konev</a> in 2020 is a good example of this ambiguity. Konev led the liberation of Prague from the Nazis in 1945, but also contributed to the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Tank on a plinth of stones with bouquets on the ground in front" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Angelina Ivanova/ Flickr.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New meaning</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine gave Estonia new impetus and “<a href="https://news.err.ee/1608669412/riina-solman-the-time-to-remove-symbols-of-occupation-is-now">the moral right to look at the wounds that have not yet healed</a>”, according to the minister of public administration. Soviet war monuments have become a proxy through which to seemingly achieve this task.</p>
<p>Memories of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750698018784116">Soviet occupation</a> also became a filter through which the partial occupation of Ukraine by Russian troops is understood. Soviet war monuments are now seen by many as “<a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1670910/pending-state-decision-on-cultural-heritage-lithuania-s-raseiniai-hides-soviet-monuments">glorifying Soviet imperialism</a>”, something that now extends to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. They are “<a href="https://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/31027-saeima-suspends-bilateral-agreement-between-latvia-and-russia-on-memorial-buildings-and-monuments">Soviet occupation monuments</a>” that now equally stand for what Russia is doing to its neighbouring country.</p>
<p>The linking of Soviet and Nazi regimes in the Latvia’s law is also not accidental. Rather, the removal and relocation of Soviet war monuments is framed within the Baltic and <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/culture/history/baltic-states-poland-romania-urge-eu-to-counter-russian-falsification-of-history.a466447/">more broadly east European memory</a> of the second world war and that of the 20th century. It appears to be a step towards making this position <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010614552549">secure</a> in the background of Vladimir Putin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-fixation-on-the-second-world-war-helps-explain-its-ukraine-invasion-181296">misuse of history</a> to justify the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>While public opinion in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is far from uniform, one thing seems to be clear. Against the backdrop of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the removal and relocation of these statues and monuments is not just an expression of solidarity with Ukraine. It’s a way of settling how the history of the Soviet era is to be remembered.</p>
<p>The question is whether these processes will facilitate the healing of the wounds left by the complex 20th-century history of former Soviet bloc countries. Or if they are just as likely to entrench the existing memory fault lines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dmitrijs Andrejevs was in receipt of funding from the University of Manchester (Post-Submission Career Development Award) at the time this article was written. </span></em></p>In much of eastern Europe historical memory of communist rule has been brought into sharp focus by the war in Ukraine.Dmitrijs Andrejevs, PhD candidate in Russian and East European Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1836952022-07-14T12:32:24Z2022-07-14T12:32:24ZDecrying Nazism – even when it’s not there – has been Russia’s ‘Invade country for free’ card<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473479/original/file-20220711-25-3urf1g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C15%2C3489%2C2284&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, left, with Vladimir Putin, accused the West of supporting Nazi ideas in May 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-listens-to-belarusian-news-photo/1125050408?adppopup=true">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Oleg Morozov, a member of the Russian parliament and an ally of President Vladimir Putin’s, made what sounded much like a threat in May 2022. </p>
<p>Poland should be “<a href="https://www.newsweek.com/oleg-morozov-russia-poland-denazification-comment-1706552">in first place in the queue for denazification after Ukraine</a>,” he said. </p>
<p>Just days earlier, pro-Putin Moscow city assembly member, Sergey Savostyanov, asserted that after Ukraine, Russia needs to drive alleged Nazis from power in six more countries: <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/03052022-moscow-deputy-says-besides-ukraine-russia-must-de-nazify-six-more-countries-oped/">Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova and Kazakhstan</a>.</p>
<p>Just a few months following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was made under the false pretense of denazifying the government of that country, such claims might send chills down the spines of the people in those countries as well as of many keen observers of the region. </p>
<p>It could be argued that such claims of denazification “<a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/03052022-moscow-deputy-says-besides-ukraine-russia-must-de-nazify-six-more-countries-oped/">might be dismissed as the hyperbolic expression of one individual in the overheated atmosphere of Russia today</a>,” as scholar and former diplomat Paul Goble recently described it. Yet it’s evident that for over a decade, Russia has used lies and disinformation, including many references to denazifiying Ukraine, <a href="https://theconversation.com/using-lies-and-disinformation-putin-and-his-team-have-been-building-the-case-for-a-ukraine-invasion-for-14-years-179335">to build a case specifically for the Ukraine invasion</a>.</p>
<p>And unsupported claims of denazification have been an excuse <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/09/baseless-claims-denazification-have-underscored-russian-aggression-since-world-war-ii/">for Russian international aggression since World War II</a>.</p>
<p>Putin and his allies have attempted to expand the meaning of “Nazism” to essentially render it meaningless – but still useful to them. Anyone who opposes Putin’s government can be labeled a Nazi, representing basically the worst and most horrible enemies Russia has ever faced in its history, the battle against whom cost <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/percentage-of-countries-who-died-during-wwii-2014-5">almost 1 in 6 Soviet lives</a>, civilian and military.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman stands, hand to face in the rubble of a building destroyed in Ukraine by Russian forces." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473480/original/file-20220711-23-3kbbf7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russia has claimed it’s denazifying Ukraine. Here, teacher Tetiana Novikova looks at a gymnasium building destroyed in shelling by Russian troops on July 10, 2022, in Kharkiv, northeastern Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/teacher-tetiana-novikova-looks-at-a-gymnasium-building-news-photo/1241834856?adppopup=true">Vyacheslav Madiyevskyy/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The opposition is fascist</h2>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/russian-strategic-narratives-on-r2p-in-the-near-abroad/AC7092981E5CBDF70C0AB2668E7F8808">Russian diplomatic communication</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fN3VFhcAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">I have researched</a> Russian use of language to justify its military interventions. I found that Russian diplomats inconsistently use and misuse international law expressions to justify Russian actions <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/russian-strategic-narratives-on-r2p-in-the-near-abroad/AC7092981E5CBDF70C0AB2668E7F8808">aimed at gaining either more influence or territory</a>.</p>
<p>And the label “Nazi” has been selectively used and misused to target the perceived opponents of the Putin regime, at times with some success. Indeed, on one extreme, according to Putin’s propogandists, Nazism doesn’t even have to be antisemitic. To Russian officials, anyone who expresses anti-Russian sentiment <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/putins-propagandists-explain-new-meaning-of-nazism-and-its-got-nothing-to-do-with-jews">can be denounced as a Nazi</a>. That allowed Russia to <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-antisemitism-aimed-at-ukraines-zelenskyy-is-just-the-kremlin-variant-of-a-very-old-european-virus-183592">claim that Ukraine was run by Nazis</a>, even though President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish. </p>
<p>In May 2022, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a strong ally of Putin’s, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/belarus-urges-russia-led-military-alliance-to-unite-against-west">accused the West of supporting Nazi ideas</a>. Also in May, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated that the Israeli government is supporting neo-Nazis in Ukraine. This assertion came right after Israel demanded an apology for Russian Foreign Minister <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2022/05/03/moscow-accuses-israel-of-supporting-neo-nazis-in-ukraine-after-it-seeks-apology-for-lavrovs-claim-about-hitler-being-part-jewish/?sh=57034b0e4167">Sergey Lavrov’s claim that Hitler had Jewish origins</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a green shirt looking at something on a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473483/original/file-20220711-15-ne11fe.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Russia has claimed that Ukraine is being run by Nazis, even though President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, seen here on July 8, 2022, is Jewish and lost many family members in the Holocaust.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWar/8f316a5217cc42248c7b35f58c24908c/photo?Query=(renditions.phototype:horizontal)%20AND%20zelenskyy&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=3027&currentItemNo=19">Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via AP</a></span>
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<h2>Long-running accusations</h2>
<p>Nowhere has Russia been more persistent with accusations of Nazism than in Estonia and Latvia, two countries with sizable Russian-speaking populations and membership in the European Union and NATO. </p>
<p>For decades, Russia has alleged that <a href="https://vilniusinstitute.lt/en/russias-nazism-narrative-against-lithuania-and-the-baltic-states/">fascist ideas have been circulating in these countries on a large scale and have become mainstream</a>. In 2007, Putin said that he is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/putin-accuses-europe-of-ignoring-nazism-in-the-baltics/a-2817872">dismayed by Estonia and Latvia’s alleged reverence for Nazism</a>: “The activities of the Latvian and Estonian authorities openly connive at the glorification of Nazis and their accomplices. But these facts remain unnoticed by the European Union.”</p>
<p>In 2012, Russia reacted angrily to a recent gathering of World War II veterans in Estonia and stated that it was aimed at “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/estonia-fends-off-russian-accusations-of-nazi-glorification/">glorification of former SS-men and local collaborationists</a>.”</p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.baltictimes.com/latvia_passes_law_to_make_may_9_day_of_remembrance_for_ukraine_war_victims/">Latvia designated May 9 as the Day of Remembrance</a> for those killed in Ukraine as a result of the Russian invasion. This move was sure to irk some folks in Russia, as Russia celebrates the Soviet victory over the Nazis in World War II on the very same day. Latvia was at the time also debating <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/8/latvia-leads-charge-to-fell-soviet-memorials-in-europe">the removal of monuments to Soviet-era soldiers</a>. </p>
<p>In response, Putin’s spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10703253/Kremlin-rants-against-Baltic-neo-Nazi-state-chilling-echo-Moscows-threats-Ukraine.html">the ruling regime in Latvia has long been well known for its neo-Nazi preferences</a>.”</p>
<h2>The pot calling the kettle</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, another debate rages about whether Russia under Putin itself <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-putin-and-russia-are-fascist-a-political-scientist-shows-how-they-meet-the-textbook-definition-179063">can be seen as a fascist state</a>. On one hand, Putin’s dictatorship has embraced expansionist militarism, crushed domestic opposition, promoted toxic nationalism and revived Russian patriotism by building <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-putins-russia-embraced-fascism-while-preaching-anti-fascism/">national identity around the Russian defeat of Nazi Germany</a>.</p>
<p>On the other hand, those who argue that Russia may be a repressive and aggressive dictatorship – but not a fascist state – note that fascism is a fundamentally revolutionary ideology and tends to be accompanied with mass mobilization. Meanwhile, Putin is viewed by many as a reactionary right-wing dictator who is not guided by revolutionary ideas, does not have much charisma <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-repressive-aggressive-not-fascist/31794918.html">and is governing a largely passive population</a>. His supporters will likely continue labeling perceived adversaries as Nazis. Such rhetorical groundwork could eventually lead to more wars beyond Ukraine.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juris Pupcenoks has received funding from the Latvian Ministry of Education and Science.</span></em></p>What do Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova and Kazakhstan have in common with Ukraine? Russian allegations that they are all overrun by Nazis.Juris Pupcenoks, Associate Professor of Political Science, Marist CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796182022-05-05T12:44:07Z2022-05-05T12:44:07Z‘Walking through Europe’s door, singing’ – How Eurovision helps define Europe’s boundaries (and why Ukraine will likely win)<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460412/original/file-20220428-24-ca3gcb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C71%2C2995%2C1922&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could Ukraine's entry be heading for Eurovision success?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://eurovision.tv/mediacentre/gallery/kalush-orchestra-ukraine-2022">Maxim Fesenko/eurovision.tv</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year’s <a href="https://eurovision.tv/">Eurovision Song Contest</a> – an annual celebration of pop music in which nations compete to win the votes of judges and the public – takes place on May 14 in Turin, Italy. And <a href="https://eurovisionworld.com/odds/eurovision">Ukraine is overwhelmingly the favorite</a> to win.</p>
<p>While the latest odds first and foremost reflect the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine_en">widespread sympathy throughout Europe</a> for besieged Ukraine, it certainly helps that the Ukrainian entry, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UiEGVYOruLk">Kalush Orchestra’s “Stefania</a>,” hits the right notes when it comes to Eurovision. Combining traditional folk sounds with modern hip-hop, the song is sentimental and upbeat at the same time. </p>
<p>Originally penned as an ode to the lead singer’s mother, “Stefania” has since become an anthem for the nation at war. </p>
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<p>Sung entirely in Ukrainian, it showcases historical costumes and traditional instruments in a firm stamp of Ukrainian identity, while also effectively merging a melodic chorus with the global rhythms of hip-hop. Overall, the song reflects something of Ukraine’s resilient attitude in the face of Russian aggression as well as its pro-Western cultural leanings. Indeed, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/culture/2022/04/06/ukraine-s-eurovision-entry-perform-for-young-ukrainian-refugees-in-jerusalem">one member of Kalush Orchestra declared</a>: “Our country will not only win the war, but also win the Eurovision.”</p>
<p>Russia was intent on competing this year as well. In February, however, the <a href="https://www.ebu.ch/home">European Broadcasting Union</a>, the organization behind Eurovision, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2022/feb/25/russia-banned-from-eurovision-after-invasion-of-ukraine#:%7E:text=Russia%20will%20no%20longer%20be,bring%20the%20competition%20into%20disrepute%E2%80%9">banned Russia from the competition</a>, under mounting pressure from other participating countries over the invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.routledge.com/A-Song-for-Europe-Popular-Music-and-Politics-in-the-Eurovision-Song-Contest/Tobin-Raykoff/p/book/9780754658795">long studied Eurovision</a> as <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Eurovision-Song-Contest-as-a-Cultural-Phenomenon-From-Concert-Halls/Dubin-Vuletic-Obregon/p/book/9781032037745">a cultural and political event</a>. If Ukraine does win, I believe it will continue Eurovision’s ongoing legacy of marking the boundaries of the liberal West. Despite the popular and ephemeral nature of its songs, the event has, since its inception, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Postwar-Europe-Eurovision-Song-Contest/dp/1474276261?asin=1474276261&revisionId=&format=4&depth=1">reflected the political culture and geopolitical realities of Europe</a>.</p>
<h2>They had a dream</h2>
<p>Founded in <a href="https://eurovision.tv/history/in-a-nutshell#:%7E:text=The%20history%20of%20the%20Eurovision,1956%2C%20when%20seven%20nations%20participated.">1956 by the European Broadcasting Union</a>, the Eurovision Song Contest is the longest continuously running televised international musical competition in the world, with an enormous <a href="https://www.ebu.ch/news/2021/05/183-million-viewers-welcome-back-eurovision-song-contest-as-over-half-of-young-audiences-tune-in">audience of</a> <a href="https://eurovision.tv/story/nearly-200-million-people-watch-eurovision-2015">roughly 200 million</a> people. Will Farrell’s 2020 Eurovision spoof “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt8580274/">Story of Fire Saga</a>” and a recent NBC spinoff of the actual event, the <a href="https://www.nbc.com/american-song-contest">American Song Contest</a>, hosted by Snoop Dogg and Kelly Clarkson, have piqued interest in the U.S.</p>
<iframe style="border-radius:12px" src="https://open.spotify.com/embed/playlist/2BLemiY2Mpc4DfTgFGoT7w?utm_source=generator" width="100%" height="380" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; fullscreen; picture-in-picture"></iframe>
<p>Over the years, Eurovision has expanded from a small group of six Western European nations to over 40 competitors from all over Europe, plus Israel and Australia. </p>
<p>It has grown roughly in tandem with other European and European-focused organizations, such as <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu_en">the European Union</a> and the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato">North Atlantic Treaty Organization</a>. Like those economic and strategic blocs, Eurovision expanded into the Mediterranean in the 1960s and ‘70s, and to Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Over the decades, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137367983">the contest has pushed and readjusted the boundaries of “Europe,” both geographically and ideologically</a>. </p>
<h2>Knowing me, knowing EU</h2>
<p>Eurovision’s definition of Europe’s geographical boundaries may not be intuitive for many viewers. The European Broadcasting Union follows the <a href="https://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/PlenipotentiaryConferences.aspx">1932 Madrid conference of the International Radiotelegraph Union</a>, which set the eastern and southern boundaries of the “European Region” at the 40th meridian east and the 30th parallel north, “so as to include the Western part of the U.S.S.R. and the territories bordering the Mediterranean.” </p>
<p>Israel and indeed all countries bordering on the Mediterranean are thereby eligible to participate. Adjustments were made in 2007 on those boundaries to allow the nations of the Caucasus to participate. </p>
<p>Australia’s inclusion is a different matter, going back to 2015, when the European Broadcasting Union <a href="https://eurovision.tv/story/australia-to-compete-in-the-2015-eurovision-song-contest">invited the country</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-20058-9?noAccess=true">on the basis of its unusually strong fan base</a>, to join for a celebration of the 60th anniversary of the competition. The Australians arrived with such energy and enthusiasm that they’ve stayed ever since.</p>
<p>The ever-increasing number of participating countries has expanded and stretched the understanding of which countries belong to Europe as a cultural entity. </p>
<p>More complex and nuanced is the ideological and political meaning of “Europe.” The European Broadcasting Union’s stated “<a href="https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf">core values</a>” include democracy, pluralism, diversity, inclusion and freedom of expression.</p>
<p>But those values have at times rubbed up against the political realities of countries within the geographical boundaries of Europe. </p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news-franco-s-eurovision-47020/">Spain hosted the contest in 1969</a>, Austria boycotted on account of Spanish dictator Gen. Francisco Franco’s fascist politics. Spain hosted because it had won the year before with <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYvhZOq10L8&t=2s">Massiel’s “La La La”</a>; the winning nation has usually hosted the following year’s competition since 1958. </p>
<h2>Gimme! Gimme! Gimme! a song without politics</h2>
<p>The European Broadcasting Union tries to hold to the ideal of a purely musical competition without political overtones, but some countries have tried to insert sly political critiques into their entries. </p>
<p>In 2009, Georgia attempted to protest Russia’s 2008 invasion of its country with the song “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LV1_s73fI-U">We Don’t Want to Put In</a>” – a play on the then-Russian Prime Minister’s name. But organizers <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20090310-georgia-cannot-perform-put-eurovision--0">rejected the song</a> as too obviously political. </p>
<p>On the other side of the political spectrum, the European Broadcasting Union <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2021/03/11/belarus-eurovision-entry-galasy-zmesta-face-disqualification-over-lyrics-14228006/">rejected Belarus’ 2021 entry</a>, “Ya Nauchu Tebya (I’ll Teach You)” by the band Galasy ZMesta, for its overt condemnation of that country’s pro-democracy protesters. </p>
<p>In recent years, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315097732-3/eurovision-50-post-wall-post-stonewall-robert-deam-tobin">the contest’s strong association with the LGBTQ community</a> has seen a backlash from conservative governments. Turkey’s departure from the contest in 2013 came as its interest in joining the European Union waned. While Turkey had multiple reasons for leaving, the head of Turkish Radio and Television objected specifically to the prominence of queer performers like Austria’s Conchita Wurst, who won in 2014 with “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SaolVEJEjV4">Rise like a Phoenix</a>” as a gay bearded drag queen. In 2020, Hungary also withdrew from the competition; Andras Benscik, a commentator on a pro-government television station, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hungary-eurovision-song-contest-gay-homophobia-lgbt-viktor-orban-a9221321.html">likened the contest</a> to a “homosexual flotilla.”</p>
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<h2>The winner takes it all</h2>
<p>Success in the Eurovision Song Contest has often come as countries move toward the liberal, inclusive, pluralistic, democratic ideals of Europe. Spain’s victories in the late 1960s, for example, preceded the relative loosening of societal restrictions in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain/Francos-Spain-1939-75">final years of the Franco era</a>. Turkey’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-wins-eurovision-song-contest/a-877588">victory in 2003</a> came at the height of that country’s campaign to join the European Union. </p>
<p>Most notably, the countries of Eastern Europe, which started competing in the 1990s, embraced the contest as symbol of Western freedom. After Estonia became the <a href="https://www.billboard.com/music/music-news/estonias-everybody-erupts-at-eurovision-79751/">first former Soviet Republic to win</a> in 2001, Prime Minister Mart Laar <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2050588,00.html">announced</a>, “We are no longer knocking at Europe’s door. We are walking through it singing.”</p>
<p>Ukraine fits into this pattern perfectly. Entering the competition in 2003, it won the very next year in 2004 with Ruslana’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bIDz8lIeVYA">fiery leather-clad performances of “Wild Dances</a>.” In 2005, Ukraine sent GreenJolly, which performed “Razom Nas Bahato (Together We Are Many),” a celebration of the Orange Revolution. More recently, Ukraine was victorious in 2016 with <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxS6eKEOdLQ">Jamala’s “1944</a>,” an elegiac meditation on former Russian dictator Josef Stalin’s forced removal of the Tatars from Crimea. </p>
<p>The historical reference allowed Ukraine to circumvent the European Broadcasting Union’s prohibition on politics by claiming to investigate and commemorate an event from the past, while also obviously protesting Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea. </p>
<p>Facing Russian aggression once again, it looks like Ukraine has a good chance of winning Eurovision in 2022. According to oddsmakers, as of May 13, 2022, it had a <a href="https://eurovisionworld.com/odds/eurovision">60% chance of winning</a>.</p>
<p>Assuming Ukraine does well or even wins, the Song Contest will reconfirm and reestablish the boundaries of liberal Western Europe.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Deam Tobin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politics have never been that far away from the Eurovision Song Contest. Since its inception, the annual event has reflected the political culture and geopolitical realities of Europe.Robert Deam Tobin, Henry J. Leir Chair in Language, Literature and Culture, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1641652021-07-08T14:03:57Z2021-07-08T14:03:57ZGlobal minimum corporation tax rate: why the argument that it breaches EU law will probably fail<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410347/original/file-20210708-17-toose4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It's all getting very taxing. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.alamy.com/in-this-photo-illustration-the-eu-european-union-flag-is-seen-on-a-smartphone-screen-in-front-of-apple-microsoft-google-amazon-and-facebook-logos-image432648122.html?pv=1&stamp=2&imageid=7850709D-DFC1-4237-A8C5-373D9889467D&p=473355&n=76&orientation=0&pn=1&searchtype=0&IsFromSearch=1&srch=foo%3Dbar%26st%3D0%26sortby%3D2%26qt%3Damazon%2520google%2520facebook%26qt_raw%3Damazon%2520google%2520facebook%26qn%3D%26lic%3D3%26edrf%3D0%26mr%3D0%26pr%3D0%26aoa%3D1%26creative%3D%26videos%3D%26nu%3D%26ccc%3D%26bespoke%3D%26apalib%3D%26ag%3D0%26hc%3D0%26et%3D0x000000000000000000000%26vp%3D0%26loc%3D0%26ot%3D0%26imgt%3D0%26dtfr%3D%26dtto%3D%26size%3D0xFF%26blackwhite%3D%26cutout%3D%26archive%3D1%26name%3D%26groupid%3D%26pseudoid%3D1267149%26userid%3D%26id%3D%26a%3D%26xstx%3D0%26cbstore%3D1%26resultview%3DsortbyPopular%26lightbox%3D%26gname%3D%26gtype%3D%26apalic%3D%26tbar%3D1%26pc%3D%26simid%3D%26cap%3D1%26customgeoip%3DGB%26vd%3D0%26cid%3D%26pe%3D%26so%3D%26lb%3D%26pl%3D0%26plno%3D%26fi%3D0%26langcode%3Den%26upl%3D0%26cufr%3D%26cuto%3D%26howler%3D%26cvrem%3D0%26cvtype%3D0%26cvloc%3D0%26cl%3D0%26upfr%3D%26upto%3D%26primcat%3D%26seccat%3D%26cvcategory%3D*%26restriction%3D%26random%3D%26ispremium%3D1%26flip%3D0%26contributorqt%3D%26plgalleryno%3D%26plpublic%3D0%26viewaspublic%3D0%26isplcurate%3D0%26imageurl%3D%26saveQry%3D%26editorial%3D%26t%3D0%26filters%3D0">SOPA Images/Alamy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/130-countries-and-jurisdictions-join-bold-new-framework-for-international-tax-reform.htm">The commitment</a> by 130 countries to introduce a 15% minimum corporation tax has stirred up objections from some countries that could make it more difficult to implement. Notably Estonia and Hungary contend that the agreement, brokered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), contravenes EU law, potentially causing a problem for the 23 member states which are parties to the agreement. </p>
<p>Estonia and Hungary have two of the most generous corporation tax regimes in the EU. <a href="https://taxsummaries.pwc.com/hungary/corporate/taxes-on-corporate-income#:%7E:text=The%20tax%20rate%20is%209,in%20domestic%20real%20estate%2C%20and">Hungary offers</a> a headline corporation tax rate of 9%, <a href="https://www.offshore-protection.com/estonia-offshore">while Estonia’s</a> is 20% but drops to zero for certain kinds of companies. Of the other EU nations that compete aggressively on corporation tax, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/85d4a591-5c7f-45b3-815d-972e728e0d3c">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jun/03/cyprus-block-eu-adoption-joe-biden-minimum-corporate-tax-multinationals#:%7E:text=Cyprus%20and%20Ireland%20have%20the,as%20one%20of%20national%20sovereignty.">Cyprus</a> have also stayed out of the OECD agreement, though the <a href="https://nomoretax.eu/netherlands-tax-haven/">Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100115/why-luxembourg-considered-tax-haven.asp">Luxembourg</a> have both signed up. </p>
<p>So what is Estonia and Hungary’s legal basis for claiming that the plans violate EU law, and are they likely to be right?</p>
<h2>How multinationals avoid tax</h2>
<p>At present, the 130 countries have agreed to a statement of intent, with an implementation plan to be finalised by October and to come into force in 2023. It follows <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-tax-deal-if-you-think-multinationals-will-be-forced-to-pay-more-you-dont-understand-tax-avoidance-162294">a similar commitment</a> made by the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/farming/international-cooperation/international-organisations/g7_en">G7 nations</a> at the UK summit a few weeks earlier, and aims to prevent multinational companies from avoiding paying taxes. The <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/">OECD estimates</a> that this costs countries between US$100 billion (£73 billion) and US$240 billion a year. </p>
<p>This is possible because each country decides on its own tax regime, which it can use to try and attract multinationals to set up a base with them for tax purposes. This competition, which is of course not confined to the EU, has been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56500673">characterised by</a> US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen as resulting in a “race to the bottom”. </p>
<p>Multinationals are known for setting up subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions and filtering international earnings through them even though they do little business in the jurisdiction in question. The US tech giants, for example, have become <a href="https://fairtaxmark.net/tax-gap-of-silicon-six-over-100-billion-so-far-this-decade/">particularly well known</a> for such schemes, not least in relation to earnings from digital services and intellectual property royalties. </p>
<p>The OECD agreement rests on two pillars. Pillar one enables a fairer allocation of profits by multinationals by requiring that more of their activities are taxed where profits are earned – regardless of whether they have a physical presence there. Pillar two sets the minimum corporation tax level of 15%, and this is what is causing the controversy. </p>
<h2>The Cadbury Schweppes case</h2>
<p>The argument from Estonia and Hungary appears to rest on the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62004CJ0196">2006 case</a> of Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue. Cadbury Schweppes, a confectionery and soft drinks company, was headquartered in the UK but had operated a group structure with subsidiaries established in Ireland for tax reasons. While UK corporation taxes are generally not charged on the profits of a foreign subsidiary, this case concerned UK rules that provided an exception.</p>
<p>The Cadbury lawyers argued, among other things, that the UK legislation was a restriction on the EU <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/40/freedom-of-establishment-and-freedom-to-provide-services#:%7E:text=The%20right%20of%20establishment%20includes,State%20concerned%20regarding%20establishment%20for">freedom of establishment</a>, which enables companies and individuals to set up undertakings anywhere in the bloc. The European Court of Justice accepted this argument, holding that it was incompatible with European Commission law for a member state to tax a resident company on profits made by a subsidiary in another member state, to prevent that subsidiary from taking advantage of more generous tax rates.</p>
<p>Estonia’s deputy secretary general for tax affairs, Helen Papahill, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e51c4a7b-a64d-40e5-b45c-e53ebdf284fe">is reported</a> to have said that this case “shows quite clearly that these kinds of rules should not exist” in the EU. The argument appears to be that the OECD agreement would entail countries where large companies are based imposing the minimum tax rate on subsidiaries incorporated in other member states with lower tax rates. Put simply, you can’t tax a company’s subsidiary that is based in another country.</p>
<p>However, the judges in the Cadbury Schweppes case only considered the impact of one member state’s tax laws on profits earned by a subsidiary in another member state, and it should not be taken as establishing a broader principle that the EU’s freedom of establishment laws prevent international tax rules from being agreed. </p>
<p>It is likely that the OECD agreement would be regarded as a justified limitation on freedom of establishment, potentially on the grounds that it creates a common solution to the problem that multinationals are not currently paying fair rates of tax. Arguably it would not even hinder a company’s freedom of establishment if every state followed the same minimum tax rate, particularly when smaller countries potentially have other advantages that could attract multinationals to incorporate in them, such as skilled workforces. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, this legal question is not the only obstacle to the OECD agreement being implemented. <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/decision-making-eu-tax-policy_en">As a tax measure,</a>, it is likely that it will need unanimous approval among EU member states – besides Hungary and Estonia. It is also still unclear whether <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/french-minister-appeals-to-ireland-to-reconsider-corporate-tax-rate-1.4612326">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jun/03/cyprus-block-eu-adoption-joe-biden-minimum-corporate-tax-multinationals">Cyprus</a> will sign up. </p>
<p>The agreement may also face a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/950db44b-a4ab-426b-b5c8-99fb383cdca2">tough time</a> gaining approval from the US legislature, without which it would be greatly weakened. <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-europe-fit-for-the-digital-age/file-digital-levy">Tensions between</a> the US and EU over European proposals to introduce an extra tax on digital companies are not helping. For all these reasons, the plan to tighten up corporation tax worldwide could still be facing a bumpy future in the months to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Parry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Estonia and Hungary are arguing that EU member states cannot legally implement the OECD agreement on corporation tax.Rebecca Parry, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Centre for Business and Insolvency Law, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1454852020-10-07T14:39:42Z2020-10-07T14:39:42ZEstonia is a ‘digital republic’ – what that means and why it may be everyone’s future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/361852/original/file-20201006-16-1vohkiv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5357%2C3413&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/online-international-business-concept-computer-key-1735316405">Basakk/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>People around the globe have been watching the build up to the US election with disbelief. Particularly confusing to many is the furore over postal ballots, which the US president, Donald Trump is insisting will lead to large-scale voter fraud – despite a complete <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-53353404">lack of evidence</a> to back this. And yet this issue has become a central feature of the debate. </p>
<p>Citizens of Estonia, a small nation in Baltic region, will perhaps be particularly perplexed: since 2005, Estonians have been able vote online, from anywhere in the world. Estonians log on with their digital ID card and <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/i-voting/">vote as many times</a> as they want during the pre-voting period, with each vote cancelling the last. This unique technological solution has safeguarded Estonian voters against fraud, use of force and other manipulations of remote voting that many American voters are apprehensive about in the 2020 US election.</p>
<p>Voting online is just the start. Estonia offers the most comprehensive governmental online services in the world. In the US, it takes an average taxpayer with no business income <a href="https://taxfoundation.org/best-part-estonian-tax-code-not-5-minute-tax-filing/">eight hours</a> to file a tax return. In Estonia, it takes just five minutes. In the UK, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/18/nhs-records-system-10bn">billions of pounds</a> have been spent on IT, yet the NHS <a href="https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/interoperability-also-posing-big-challenges-uk">still struggles</a> to make patient data accessible across different health boards. In Estonia, despite having multiple private health service providers, doctors can collate and visualise patient records whenever and wherever necessary, with consent from patients – <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/estonia-coronavirus">a real boon</a> in the country’s fight against coronavirus.</p>
<p>Branding itself the first “digital republic” in the world, Estonia has digitised 99% of its public services. And, in an era when trust in public services are <a href="https://www.edelman.com/research/2017-edelman-trust-barometer">declining</a> across the globe, Estonia persistently achieves one of the highest ratings of <a href="https://www.baltictimes.com/estonians__trust_in_parliament__government_much_higher_than_eu_average/">trust in government</a> in the EU. The Estonian government claims that this digitisation of public services saves more than 1,400 years of working time and 2% of its GDP <a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/legal/tech/assets/estonia-the-digital-republic-secured-by-blockchain.pdf">annually</a>.</p>
<h2>The tiger leap</h2>
<p>The foundation of this digital republic dates back to 1997, a time when only <a href="https://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm">1.7%</a> of world population had internet access, a start-up called Google had just registered its domain name and British prime minister John Major was celebrating the launch of 10 Downing Street’s official website. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the government of the newly formed state of Estonia envisaged the creation of a digital society, where all citizens would be technologically literate and governance would be paperless, decentralised, transparent, efficient and equitable. The young post-Soviet government decided to ditch all communist-era legacy technologies and inefficient public service structure. </p>
<p>In a radical move, the government – which had an average age of 35 – also decided not to embrace western technologies. Neighbouring Finland offered an analogue telephone exchange as a gift and the Estonian government declined, envisaging communicating over the internet rather than analogue telephone. </p>
<p>The government of Estonia launched a project called <em>Tiigrihüpe</em> (Tiger Leap) in 1997, investing heavily in development and the expansion of internet networks and computer literacy. Within a year of its inception almost all (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/15/estonia-ussr-shadow-internet-titan">97%</a>) of Estonian schools had internet access and by 2000, Estonia was the first country to pass <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/united-nations-declares-internet-access-a-basic-human-right/239911/">legislation</a> declaring access to the internet a basic human right. Free wi-fi hotspots started being built in 2001, and now cover almost all populated areas of the country.</p>
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</figure>
<p>The government also understood that, in order to create a knowledge based society, information needs to be shared efficiently while maintaining privacy. This was a radical understanding, even in the context of today, when for most countries, data sharing among different organisations’ databases is still limited. It is predicted that by 2022, <a href="https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/consulting/cyber-security/data-privacy/dark-data-discovery-and-its-importance-in-data-protection.pdf">93%</a> of the world’s total data collected or stored will be such “dark” or siloed data. </p>
<p>Two decades ago, in 2001, Estonia created an anti-silo data management system called <a href="https://x-road.global/xroad-history">X-Road</a> through which public and private organisations can share data securely while maintaining data privacy through cryptography. Initially developed by Estonia, the project is now a <a href="https://x-road.global/xroad-history">joint collaboration</a> between Estonia and Finland.</p>
<p>A large number of Estonian government and financial institutions using X-Road came under cyber-attack from Russian IP addresses in <a href="https://e-estonia.com/estonia-to-open-the-worlds-first-data-embassy-in-luxembourg/">2007</a>. This attack made clear how vulnerable centralised data management systems are, and so Estonia required a distributed technology that is resistant to cyber-attack. Addressing this need, in 2012 Estonia became the first country to use <a href="https://e-estonia.com/solutions/security-and-safety/ksi-blockchain/">blockchain technology</a> for governance.</p>
<h2>Blockchain governance</h2>
<p>Distributed ledger technology, commonly known as blockchain, is the underpinning technology of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. The technology has moved on significantly since its inception in 2009 and is now used for a variety of applications, from supply chains to fighting <a href="https://www.provenance.org/news/movement/traceability-versus-transparency-whats-the-difference-and-which-one-should-my-brand-be-focused-on">injustice</a>.</p>
<p>Blockchain is an open-source distributed ledger or database system in which an updated copy of the records is available to all stakeholders at all times. Due to this distributed nature, it is almost impossible for a single person or company to hack everybody’s ledger, ensuring security against cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Deploying blockchain technology not only ensures protection against any future attacks, but also poses many other benefits to Estonians. For example, in most countries citizens have to fill in many different forms with the same personal information (name, address) when they need to access public services from different government agencies. In Estonia, citizens only need to input their personal information once: the blockchain system enables the relevant data to be immediately accessible to the required department.</p>
<p>This might scare people worried about data privacy. But citizens, not the government, own their personal data in Estonia. Citizens have a digital ID card and approve which part of their information can be reused by which public service. Estonians know that even government officials can’t access their personal data beyond what is approved by them for the required public service. Any unauthorised attempt to access personal data will be identified as invalid: indeed, it is a criminal offence in Estonia for officials to gain unauthorised access to personal data. This transfer of ownership and control of personal data to individuals is facilitated by blockchain technology.</p>
<p>This should be an inspiration for the rest of the world. It is true that most countries do not have similar circumstances to post-Soviet Estonia when the Tiger Leap was introduced. But the same futuristic mindset is required to address the challenge of declining trust.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Minor amendments were made to this article on October 12 to make some of the context behind X-Road clearer.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Estonia has digitised 99% of its public services.Imtiaz Khan, Reader (Associate Professor) in Data Science, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityAli Shahaab, PhD Candidate, Distributed Ledgers / Blockchain Technology, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1284552019-12-08T18:53:26Z2019-12-08T18:53:26ZEstonia didn’t deliver its PISA results on the cheap, and neither will Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305726/original/file-20191207-90603-11udt52.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Estonia spends less per student than Australia, but its average wages are lower too.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/rsIJf4Y3IpM">Ruslan Valeev/Unsplash</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Education news in Australia last week was dominated by Australia’s worst ever showing in the OECD’s PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) tests. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/aussie-students-are-a-year-behind-students-10-years-ago-in-science-maths-and-reading-127013">mathematical literacy of our students has fallen</a> to the OECD average. It’s not good enough for a rich country like Australia.</p>
<p>Improving outcomes will need good policy, steady support for schools, and consistent hard work. </p>
<p>Economically illiterate arguments from our leaders don’t help. When the PISA results came out, federal education minister <a href="https://ministers.education.gov.au/tehan/focus-basics-lift-student-performance">Dan Tehan said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our government is providing record funding of $310.3 billion to schools. Money is not the issue because Estonia was the top-performing country in reading and science and they spend half as much money per student as Australia.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Estonia spends virtually the same per student as Australia, once wage differences are taken into account.</p>
<h2>It’s not ‘half as much money per student’</h2>
<p>Estonia’s performance in PISA 2018 was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/education-50590581">impressive</a>. Although they weren’t “the top performing country”, they were one of them and did significantly better than Australia. But what about their funding?</p>
<p>According to the OECD’s <a href="https://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance/">Education at a Glance 2019</a> report, Estonia spends the equivalent of US$6,900 per student per year for both primary and secondary students, while Australia spends US$10,000 per primary student and US$11,650 per secondary student.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305590/original/file-20191206-90609-15v758l.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Estonia’s spend per student is around 60 to 70% that of Australia’s.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>Leaving aside the fact 60-70% is quite a long way from half, the real problem with Tehan’s claim is that wages are very different in the two countries.</p>
<p>The starting wage for a secondary school teacher in Estonia, for instance, is <a href="https://data.oecd.org/teachers/teachers-salaries.htm">US$22,200</a>. In Australia, it’s exactly double that. Here’s why that matters.</p>
<h2>Wages are higher in richer countries</h2>
<p>Generally speaking, high wages reflect high labour productivity. But workers in rich countries still <a href="https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/helland-tabarrok_why-are-the-prices-so-damn-high_v1.pdf">tend to be paid more</a> even if they are no more productive than those in poorer countries. </p>
<p>Cost comparisons must adjust for differences in wages. And teacher wages are much higher in Australia than Estonia, because <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=AV_AN_WAGE">all wages are higher</a>.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305570/original/file-20191206-183404-3bdyhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">As average wages in a country rise, so do teachers’ wages.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>Like other service professions, labour productivity in teaching probably doesn’t rise much over time. The number of students a teacher can teach in an hour, with a given quality of instruction, is pretty stable. </p>
<p>Yet as wages in other sectors rise, reflecting productivity growth, teacher wages must also rise to stop teachers from chasing bigger bucks elsewhere. </p>
<p>Put bluntly, teachers get paid more in Australia than Estonia because Australian teachers have better-paid alternatives.</p>
<p>And it’s not just teachers who get paid much less in Estonia. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PRVT.PP?end=2018&locations=AU-EE&start=2014">Converted into US dollars</a> (and adjusted for costs), <a href="https://news.err.ee/935193/officials-salaries-grow-by-10-7-percent-top-3-earners-make-more-than-pm">their prime minister</a> gets paid around one-third what <a href="https://maps.finance.gov.au/guidance/remuneration/salary">our prime minister</a> does.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305591/original/file-20191206-90592-1lcx2tm.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australia’s wages are higher than those in Estonia.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<h2>Estonia spends the same as Australia on schools</h2>
<p>Australia spends <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/888933978949">3.9% of its GDP</a> on school education, compared to Estonia’s 2.9%. But this statistic only tells part of the story, because <a href="https://www.populationpyramid.net/australia/2019/">one in six Australians are school-aged</a> but only <a href="https://www.populationpyramid.net/estonia/2019/">one in seven Estonians</a> are.</p>
<p>The OECD does publish one metric that effectively takes account of both wages and demographics: the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/888933981058">spend per student as a percentage of GDP per capita</a>.</p>
<p>On this basis, Estonia spends the same on school education as Australia – 22% of GDP per capita for each student. Looking just at public spending, Australian governments spend 15% <em>less</em> than the Estonian government, and about 16% less than the average of <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Metrics-table-options.pdf">other comparable OECD country governments</a>. </p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305592/original/file-20191206-90588-1t6ezwq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australian governments spend less than the Estonian government on schools.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<p>Private funding of school education is higher in Australia than Estonia, but much of this goes to sports ovals and arts centres, not teaching. </p>
<h2>But didn’t Australia massively increase school funding?</h2>
<p>No. The nominal dollars spent each year on schools went up by <a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/report-on-government-services/2019/child-care-education-and-training/school-education/rogs-2019-partb-chapter4-attachment.xlsx">A$21 billion</a> in the decade to 2017, but mainly because wages and student numbers grew. </p>
<p>To see how much extra money schools actually received to teach their students, <a href="https://blog.grattan.edu.au/2019/05/school-funding-where-money-went/">it’s necessary to adjust for wages and students</a>. Having done this, the effective increase was closer to A$2 billion. And <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/education/lopsided-funding-gives-more-to-private-schools-that-need-it-least-20190514-p51ndt.html">80% of that money went to non-government schools</a>.</p>
<p>Over the decade to 2017, government schools got just 1% more money for teaching students – a miserly A$15.50 per student per year. Think sandwich and milkshake, not specialist teachers or more support for students with disability.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305593/original/file-20191206-90557-qli640.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Government schools got just 1% more money for teaching students in ten years.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<hr>
<h2>Where to from here?</h2>
<p>A big problem with how Australia funds our schools is that our best teachers are <a href="https://theconversation.com/three-charts-on-teachers-pay-in-australia-it-starts-out-ok-but-goes-downhill-pretty-quickly-122782">poorly paid</a> compared to their peers in other careers. This pushes <a href="https://theconversation.com/better-pay-and-more-challenge-heres-how-to-get-our-top-students-to-become-teachers-122271">high achieving young people away from teaching</a>. </p>
<p>Yet attracting talented young people into teaching and setting them up for success in the classroom is <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/news/getting-the-best-people-in-front-of-the-classroom/">the best way to boost student results in the long run</a>. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-top-ranking-education-systems-in-the-world-arent-there-by-accident-heres-how-australia-can-climb-up-128225">top-ranking education systems</a> invest relentlessly in their teachers, and so should we. </p>
<p>Our recent report, <a href="https://grattan.edu.au/report/attracting-high-achievers-to-teaching/">“Attracting High Achievers into Teaching”</a>
showed Australia could transform its teaching workforce for just A$620 per student per year. This is one-third of the increase government schools would receive if they got their full “Gonski” allocation. </p>
<p>Most of the extra money would be used to create a <a href="https://docs.education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/662684_tgta_accessible_final_0.pdf">structured career pathway</a> to give expert teachers more time to support their peers. This proposal – which builds on recommendation 16 in <a href="https://docs.education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/662684_tgta_accessible_final_0.pdf">David Gonski’s 2018 report</a> on how to achieve excellence in Australia’s schools – is what education ministers should be discussing when they <a href="http://www.educationcouncil.edu.au/Council/EC-Meetings.aspx">meet this week</a> in Alice Springs.</p>
<p>Of course money is never the only answer. But investing in great teachers would pay for itself many times over, because a better-educated population would mean a more productive and prosperous Australia. And it might just be the key to reversing Australia’s PISA woes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Grattan Institute began with contributions to its endowment of $15 million from each of the Federal and Victorian Governments. In order to safeguard its independence, Grattan Institute’s board controls this endowment. The funds are invested and Grattan uses the income to pursue its activities.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Cowgill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia spends virtually the same on schools as the Estonian government, once wage differences are taken into account.Peter Goss, School Education Program Director, Grattan InstituteMatthew Cowgill, Senior Associate, Grattan InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131742019-04-01T20:43:18Z2019-04-01T20:43:18ZRemembering minorities amid eastern Europe’s nation-state centenary celebrations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266923/original/file-20190401-177163-1sbgb56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather in the streets in Vilnius, Lithuania to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the country's statehood.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Facebook)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past year, states across central and eastern Europe have been celebrating the 100th anniversary of the creation or re-creation of their countries. </p>
<p>Some will continue to do so through 2019 and 2020 as they mark 100 years since maps were redrawn and nation-state status was granted to groups that were formerly part of vast, diverse empires. </p>
<p>Amid the festivities and fanfare, let’s not forget to include minority views and voices in the dialogue. A centenary is an important moment for these states, no doubt. It is also important for citizens — including minority citizens, many of whom remember the events of 1918 to 1920 from a different perspective. What they tend to remember of those years are grievances, losses of status, forced migration and <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/hungary-96-years-after-the-treaty-of-trianon/">changed homelands.</a> </p>
<h2>Different memories</h2>
<p>During my field work in the region, speaking with minority and majority groups, I learned that minority members tend have different interpretations and contrasting memories of the events of 1918-20, many of them painful. So they were not likely to participate in the centenary celebrations. More often, they were celebrating occasions of national and cultural significance to their particular group.</p>
<p>There are about 400 minority communities in Europe today, comprising more than <a href="https://www.fuen.org/european-minorities/general/">100 million people</a>. “Minority” refers to groups that are distinct in ethnicity, culture and language from the group that is numerically dominant in the state. They are also in a politically non-dominant position <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268417231_Ethnic_Minorities_in_Europe_The_Basic_Facts">within the state</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these groups became minorities through displacement and forced migration amid the upheaval of war. Some became minorities through the arbitrary redrawing of lines on maps, meaning they suddenly found themselves living in another country as <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/32402/">“accidental diasporas”</a>. In other words, minorities can arise when people move across borders, or when borders are redrawn around people.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PkpMEkC1WcI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Border changes: How Europe went from empires to nation-states after the First World War by Business Insider.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The First World War brought about the collapse of large multi-ethnic empires and the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/how-wwi-changed-the-map-of-europe/1970075.html">formation of several nation-states in their wake</a>. </p>
<p>Recognition of these new states was based upon the famous, or perhaps infamous, idea of self-determination, promoted at the Paris Peace Conference and in post-war treaties. Recognition was also based on the principle of nationality, which advocated and justified the notion of states created <em>of</em> and <em>for</em> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationalism-reframed/85DFC802FE96095F938638873DA92F3D#fndtn-information">particular nations</a>. The logic was: one ethno-cultural group per country, one nation per state. In reality, none of these states was entirely homogenous.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Europe, post WWI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The European Institute, copyright 2009</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stately celebrations</h2>
<p>For <a href="https://www.ev100.ee/en/main-events">Estonia</a>, <a href="https://lv100.lv/en/news/the-100th-anniversary-of-the-proclamation-of-the-republic-of-latvia/">Latvia,</a> <a href="http://www.lietuva.lt/100/en/lithuania-celebrates-100">Lithuania</a>, Poland and <a href="https://www.uncover-romania.com/romania-100/">Romania</a>, the events of 1918-20 signify the recognition of statehood. The years 2018-2020, therefore, mark the centenary of this stately occasion. The governments of these countries have put a lot of time and resources into the celebrations. </p>
<p>There are <a href="http://www.vilnius-tourism.lt/en/nemokamose-ekskursijose-idomiausios-valstybes-atkurimo-istorijos/">countless special events</a> <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/11/18/latvia-at-100-baltic-country-smitten-as-it-toasts-independence-anniversary">and programming</a> such as “100 Years” walking tours, speeches, concerts, flag and firework displays, museum exhibitions, patriotic parades, youth marches, military tributes and bonfires. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man clings to a tree trying to get a glimpse of the military parade in Bucharest, Romania, in December 2018 as thousands turned out to celebrate 100 years since Romania became a modern-day state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The national colours of each state are visible in public squares and streets, <a href="https://www.romania-insider.com/historical-buildings-romania-lit-up">and at night</a> they light up <a href="https://polska.pl/politics/home/historic-sites-lit-mark-100-years-polands-independence/">historic buildings and landmarks</a>. National anthems are played, and national poetry and literature recited, as each nation-statehood is observed. </p>
<p>The Pope visited the three Baltic states in September 2018 in a gesture seen to <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/pope-franciss-apostolic-visit-baltic-states/">acknowledge their struggle for independence</a>. There have even been <a href="https://society4romanianstudies.org/2018-conference/">Twitter hashtags</a>, 100 Year playlists <a href="https://open.spotify.com/user/dp5de9axh6bs7kjpvhv4hm2ps/playlist/1DW2TXzPlKItt0pgJLeoSy">on Spotify</a> and restaurants serving centennial meal specials. It’s the spectacle of a national holiday but amped up several times. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In a creative display outside a school in Vilnius, several countries express their congratulations and greetings to Lithuania on its 100th anniversary of statehood. Atkurtai Lietuvai means Restored Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What about the minorities?</h2>
<p>The fanfare is exciting for the dominant groups in these states. But what about the groups that are not dominant — the minorities? Where do they fit in all of this? Are they celebrating?</p>
<p>In Romania, members of the Hungarian minority view the 100th anniversary of Romania’s “Great Unification” <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/100-year-anniversary-the-loss-of-transylvania/">as more of a division</a> – as a <a href="https://rmx.news/hungary/100-years-romania-hungarian-perspective">historical tragedy rather than triumph</a>. The 1.2 million Hungarians in Romania today are there mainly because lines on the map were redrawn. </p>
<p>In 1920, Hungary was carved up by the Treaty of Trianon, and some Hungarians suddenly found themselves living in the new state of Romania. The Hungarian minority now constitutes 6.5 per cent of the population of Romania, concentrated in the northwest in the region of Transylvania. </p>
<p>This community tends to celebrate Hungary’s annual <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/15/hungary-marks-national-day-in-neighboring-communities-03-15-2018/">National Day over Romanian national days</a>, and to partake in <a href="https://magyarnapok.ro/2018/en/about-the-event/">Hungarian Cultural Days</a>. </p>
<p>An anniversary that may resonate for Romania’s Hungarians in 2020 is the proposed and very political <a href="https://hungarytoday.hu/jobbik-moves-to-declare-2020-trianon-memorial-year/">Trianon Memorial Year</a>. Trianon resulted in Hungary losing two-thirds of its territory and population. Today, many Hungarians still view the Trianon “dismemberment” as a violation of Hungary’s sovereignty and national integrity. </p>
<p>It remains one of the most traumatic events in Hungary’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/envispacplac.8.2.0069?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">collective memories</a>, and a recurring issue in Hungary’s domestic politics and <a href="https://kafkadesk.org/2018/12/05/hungary-why-is-the-trianon-treaty-so-controversial/">regional relations.</a> </p>
<p>In Lithuania, members of the Polish minority associate the years 1918-20 more with the re-emergence of the Polish state than the restoration of the Lithuanian state. Poland experienced three territorial partitions, in 1772, 1793 and 1795, and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Partitions-of-Poland">effectively disappeared from the map until 1918</a>.</p>
<p>Similar to Hungarians and Romanians, Poles and Lithuanians have had a long and contested relationship over borders, history and identity. The Polish minority constitutes 6.6 per cent of the population in Lithuania, concentrated in the southeast in the Vilnius region. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fireworks light the sky during celebrations for the 101st anniversary of the restoration of the state of Lithuania in Vilnius in February 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This community strongly celebrates the annual <a href="http://www.polnisches-institut.at/4,4,1148,de,Polish_Diaspora_and_Poles_Abroad_Day?m=">Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad Day</a> with a ceremonial march through the <a href="http://media.efhr.eu/2016/04/30/polish-diaspora-poles-abroad-day-polish-march-vilnius/">streets of Vilnius </a>. Though the parade is a sea of red-and-white Polish flags, the red, yellow and green of the Lithuanian flag can be seen as well. There are celebrations <a href="https://visegradpost.com/en/2018/05/03/may-3-a-national-holiday-in-poland/">on May 3</a>, the day when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proclaimed a Constitution in 1791, and also <a href="http://media.efhr.eu/2012/11/19/impressive-polish-culture-days-vilnius/">Polish Culture Days in Vilnius</a>.</p>
<p>The Russian-speaking minorities in <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ethnic-russians-baltics">the Baltic states</a> haven’t had much of a presence at the centenary celebrations. These groups have different memories of the years following the First World War. Russia withdrew from the war in 1917 and then <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/eastern_front_01.shtml">civil war broke out between the Bolsheviks and the White Guard</a>.</p>
<p>Amid these grand celebrations in places like Bucharest, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius and Warsaw, let’s look for whether and how minorities are celebrating. Their voices and perspectives are an important part of the story. Just as the armistice is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/06/europeans-war-1918-armistice-empires">commemorated differently in western Europe and eastern Europe,</a> the years 1918-1920 mean different things to different national groups across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra Liebich receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p>While many countries across Eastern Europe celebrate 100 years since they were born or restored as nation-states after the First World War, not everyone in these states are celebrating.Alexandra Liebich, PhD Candidate & Teaching Fellow, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1092222019-03-28T10:39:46Z2019-03-28T10:39:46ZAttacks against elections are inevitable – Estonia shows what can be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262480/original/file-20190306-100784-kt0a86.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=395%2C38%2C3928%2C2871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The March 3, 2019, elections in Estonia were well-defended against anti-democracy influences.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Estonia-Election/f4fdedf50d734c688b0702fbaaad65e9/11/0">AP Photo/Raul Mee</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kremlin-backed attackers are <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-warning-russian-hacking-groups-step-up-attacks-ahead-of-european-elections/">working to influence the upcoming</a> <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/elections">European Parliament elections</a>, according to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/21/russian-hackers-target-european-governments-ahead-of-election-fireeye.html">cybersecurity firm FireEye</a>. A hacking campaign has <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-warning-russian-hacking-groups-step-up-attacks-ahead-of-european-elections/">targeted governments and political organizations</a> as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-cyber-europe/microsoft-says-discovers-hacking-targeting-democratic-institutions-in-europe-idUSKCN1Q90GF">think tanks and nonprofits</a>, including prominent ones such as the <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2019/02/20/accountguard-expands-to-europe">German Council on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Institute and the German Marshall Fund</a>, as Microsoft has reported.</p>
<p>These new reports highlight <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/eu-prepares-for-major-international-cyber-attacks-ahead-of-elections-11669438">rising fears</a> of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html">digital attacks on democracy</a> around the world, including on the U.S. presidential elections in 2020.</p>
<p>Potential targets include election technology such as voter lists, computers that tally the votes and websites that report results to the public. But the threats go farther, to cyber campaigns against institutions supporting democratic processes like political parties, think tanks and the media, as well as information warfare targeting <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">public opinion</a>.</p>
<h2>Old problem of election interference</h2>
<p>Russian interference in the West is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-long-history-of-russian-disinformation-targeting-the-u-s">not new</a>. The experiences of Estonia – the <a href="https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/component/content/article?id=67:cyber-war-i-estonia-attacked-from-russia">first country ever victim</a> to a clearly coordinated and politically motivated cyber operation – can inform American and European defenses to these complex threats.</p>
<p>Together with its neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has won international recognition for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">effectiveness of its defenses</a> against politically motivated hacking and disinformation, which combine government, industry and public efforts. In the parliamentary elections of March 3, 2019, Estonians showcased the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/opinion/what-estonias-record-number-of-i-voters-teaches-us-about-election-trust">confidence they have in their country’s digital security</a>. </p>
<p>Three days before Election Day, close to 40 percent of those eligible had already cast their vote. <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en/news/393-voted-during-advance-poll-ended-today">Most of those early voters</a> did so online, and <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/et/valimiste-arhiiv/elektroonilise-h%C3%A4%C3%A4letamise-statistika">44 percent of the total votes</a> were cast over the internet.</p>
<p><iframe id="8AVRn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8AVRn/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Preparing to defend</h2>
<p>This recent Estonian election was largely unaffected by cyberattacks or coordinated information operations. Some of the reason is likely because the country and its people have improved their understanding of the problems, and their defenses against it, over the past couple of decades. </p>
<p>Back in 2007, the relocation of a Soviet-era memorial in the Estonian capital Tallinn resulted in public protests and <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/legalconsiderations_0.pdf">several waves of coordinated distributed denial of service</a> attacks. These did not steal citizens’ data, but they did <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">shut down many digital services</a> for a number of hours on each of several days. This highlighted both the public’s increasing reliance on digital technology and the weaknesses of online systems.</p>
<p>The digital systems that Estonian governments and businesses have developed in the years since 2007 are strong, secure and trusted by users – who welcome further digitization of their lives because it is convenient and safe. Electronic banking systems, <a href="https://www.haigekassa.ee/en/people/digital-prescription/faq-digital-prescription">digital medication prescriptions</a>, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/technology/estonia-ditches-paper-model-e-governance-services-infographic.html">e-schools</a> and thousands of other online services rely heavily on <a href="https://www.id.ee/?lang=en&id=">government-backed secure digital identity</a>, a <a href="https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/population-register">digital population registry</a> and a <a href="https://www.ria.ee/en/state-information-system/x-tee.html">robust data exchange layer</a> between databases and services.</p>
<p>These systems also facilitate the digital elements of <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en">elections</a>, <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia">including internet voting</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election security experts from around the world examine, in public, the computer used to tally the online votes from Estonia’s parliamentary elections in March 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Peinar/Estonia State Electoral Office</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Comprehensive cyber defenses</h2>
<p>A key lesson from Estonia is that with so many different threats, no single defense can protect every part of a democratic system and society. Rather, defenders must evaluate what attackers are likely to be after – and what’s at stake.</p>
<p>In 2017, two Estonian government agencies, the State Electoral Office and the Information System Authority – where one of us, Liisa Past, was chief research officer for cybersecurity – joined forces to comprehensively analyze the threats and risks to local elections. In addition to the technical risks, like failures in connections or flaws in software, the team paid close attention to issues in management as well as the <a href="https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about">possibilities for information warfare</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 64-page document assessed many of the online risks to Estonia’s cybersecurity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/ria-csa-2018.pdf">Estonia Information System Authority</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Estonian government engaged in similar analyses in the lead-up to the 2019 elections. In addition, the agencies took a lesson <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-hacking-attack-what-we-know-and-dont-know.html">from the French</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html">U.S. experience in 2016</a> and taught political parties and individual candidates how to protect themselves and their information online.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/cyber_security_of_election_technology.pdf">governments across the European Union are sharing their best ideas</a> about designing trustworthy election systems. Logging and monitoring network access, for example, can help computer administrators quickly detect and respond to unauthorized activity.</p>
<h2>Understanding the double threat of information operations</h2>
<p>Estonia’s lessons may be useful elsewhere. In the past five years, Russian attacks have targeted both election-specific systems, like the Ukrainian <a href="https://phys.org/news/2014-10-hackers-ukraine-election-website.html">national election commission website</a> in 2014, and the <a href="https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Strategic-Analysis-2018-8-Past.pdf">larger public discussion</a> around the election and current political issues. </p>
<p>Online efforts seeking to <a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">manipulate people’s views</a> in the run-up to the 2016 <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/10/17/russian-iranian-twitter-trolls-sent-10-million-tweets-fake-news/">Brexit vote</a>, as well as during presidential campaigns in the U.S. and <a href="https://firstmonday.org/article/view/8005/6516">France</a>, are quite similar to Cold War tactics known as “<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cold-war-2-0-russian-information-warfare/">information operations</a>.” </p>
<p>The practitioners use 21st-century tools like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html">social media</a> and <a href="https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-twitter-trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list">automation</a> to plant false stories and <a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/08/24/russian-trolls-bots-spread-vaccine-misinformation/">exploit social divisions</a>. They don’t necessarily seek to break through network firewalls or compromise any secure government systems, but rather appear to unwitting online audiences as <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-twitter-bots-help-fuel-political-feuds/">authentic fellow contributors</a> in a free, open debate. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sotrender.com/blog/2018/10/quick-guide-identifying-bots-and-trolls/">Bots’ characteristic behaviors</a> can give them away. Yet there are <a href="https://qz.com/1422395/how-many-of-donald-trumps-twitter-followers-are-fake/">so many of them</a> that they can crowd out human voices and undermine the democratic principle of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/23/social-media-existential-threat-idea-democracy">real participation by actual people</a>. </p>
<h2>Defense in depth</h2>
<p>Elections’ legitimacy depends on more than just technical security. They must also be seen to be free of external influence. Governments should take comprehensive views of their security, and threats to it – accounting for elements as diverse as cyber defenses of essential systems and the effects of information warfare on voters. </p>
<p>It’s a worldwide problem, with Russia exerting influence not just in the U.S. and Estonia but <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167">also Egypt</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-australia-can-help-the-us-make-democracy-harder-to-hack-102954">China attacking Australia</a>’s political system. </p>
<p>The response, therefore, has to include <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-online-disinformation-european-approach">open, healthy public debate and media literacy</a> as well as preventing, detecting and mitigating the effects of cyberattacks on the <a href="https://www.ria.ee/public/Cyber_security_of_Election_Technology.pdf">confidentiality, availability and integrity</a> at the very core of democratic systems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liisa Past worked as a Chief Research Officer of the Estonian Information System Authority and in this capacity focused on cybersecurity of election technology, including being in charge of comprehensive risk assessment for the 2017 local elections and spearheading the effort behind EU Compendium On Cyber Security of Election Technology, She continues to work with the Estonian National Elections Office and the European Commission. In 2018/19 she is a Next Generation Leader at the McCain Institute at Arizona State University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Brown does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An Estonian cybersecurity leader explains how her country defends itself, its society and its elections from Russian interference.Liisa Past, Next Generation Leader, McCain Institute for International Leadership, Arizona State UniversityKeith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093662019-01-09T11:47:02Z2019-01-09T11:47:02ZCountering Russian disinformation the Baltic nations’ way<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252878/original/file-20190108-32133-m3cw4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=636%2C404%2C3660%2C3473&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Look out for Russian influence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/russia-russian-tv-media-press-channel-760486486">M-SUR/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the new Congress begins, it will soon discuss the <a href="https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/ira-political-polarization/">comprehensive reports</a> to the U.S. Senate on the <a href="https://www.newknowledge.com/disinforeport">disinformation campaign</a> of half-truths, outright fabrications and misleading posts made by agents of the Russian government on social media in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election.</p>
<p>After years of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/opinion/cyber-war-russia-china.html">anemic responses to Russian influence efforts</a>, official U.S. government policy now includes taking action to combat disinformation campaigns sponsored by Russia or other countries. In May 2018, the <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry">Senate Intelligence Committee endorsed</a> the concept of treating attacks on the nation’s election infrastructure as hostile acts to which the U.S. “will respond accordingly.” In June, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html">Pentagon unleashed U.S. Cyber Command</a> to respond to cyberattacks more aggressively, and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf">National Cyber Strategy</a> published in September 2018 clarified that “all instruments of national power are available to prevent, respond to, and deter malicious cyber activity against the United States.”</p>
<p>There are already indications that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html">Cyber Command conducted operations</a> against Russian disinformation on social media, including warning specific Russians not to interfere with the 2018 elections. However, low-level cyberwarfare is not necessarily the best way. European countries, especially the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have confronted Russian disinformation campaigns for decades. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/03/10/592566026/baltic-countries-on-countering-russian-disinformation">Their experience</a> may offer useful lessons as the U.S. joins the battle.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Baltic Sea region of northern Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in light green in the center, west of Russia in blue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea.png">Stefan Ertmann/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Baltic experience</h2>
<p>Beginning in 1940 and continuing until they declared independence in the early 1990s, the Baltic countries were subjected to systematic <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">Russian gaslighting</a> designed to make people doubt their national history, culture and economic development. </p>
<p>The Soviets rewrote history books to falsely emphasize Russian protection of the Baltic people from invading hordes in the Middle Ages, and to convey the impression that the cultural evolution of the three countries was enabled by their allegiance and close ties to Russia. Even their <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">national anthems were rewritten</a> to pay homage to Soviet influence.</p>
<p>Soviet leaders devalued Baltic currencies and manipulated economic data to <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">falsely suggest that Soviet occupation</a> was boosting the Baltic economies. Further, Soviet authorities settled ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries, and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ideology-and-policy-the-political-uses-of-doctrine-in-the-soviet-union/oclc/16951330">made Russian the primary language</a> used in schools. </p>
<p>Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic countries, the Russian Federation has continued to deliver disinformation to the region, making extensive use of <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/virtual-russian-world-baltics">Russian-language social media</a>. Some themes characterize the Baltic people as ungrateful for Soviet investment and aid after World War II. Another common message <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">criticizes Baltic historians</a> for “falsification of history” when really they are describing the real nature of the Soviet occupation.</p>
<h2>A massive Russian attack</h2>
<p>After independence, and as the internet grew, Estonia led the way in <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2013/07/30/how-did-estonia-become-a-leader-in-technology">applying technology to accelerate economic development</a>. The country created systems for a wide range of government and commercial services, including voting, banking and filing tax returns electronically. Today, Estonia’s innovative <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/07/06/estonia-is-trying-to-convert-the-eu-to-its-digital-creed">e-residency system</a> is being adopted in many other countries.</p>
<p>These advances made the Baltics a prime target for cyberattacks. In the spring of 2007, the Russians struck. When Estonia <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/deadly-riots-in-tallinn-soviet-memorial-causes-rift-between-estonia-and-russia-a-479809.html">moved a monument memorializing Soviet soldiers</a> from downtown Tallinn, the country’s capital, to a military cemetery a couple of miles away, it provoked the ire of ethnic Russians living in Estonia as well as the Russian government. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn sparked a Russian cyberattack on Estonia in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/99437479@N00/680737463">Keith Ruffles/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For three weeks, Estonian government, financial and media computer systems were <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">bombarded with enormous amounts of internet traffic</a> in a “distributed denial of service” attack. In these situations, an attacker sends overwhelming amounts of data to the targeted internet servers, clogging them up with traffic and either slowing them down or knocking them offline entirely. Despite concerns about the first “cyber war,” however, these attacks resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/book/hacked-world-order">little damage</a>. Although Estonia was cut off from the global internet temporarily, the country’s economy suffered no lasting harm.</p>
<p>These attacks could have severely damaged the country’s financial system or power grid. But <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CDU_Analysis.pdf">Estonia was prepared</a>. The country’s history with Russian disinformation had led Estonia to expect Russian attacks on computer and information systems. In anticipation, the government spearheaded partnerships with banks, internet service providers and other organizations to coordinate responses to cyberattacks. In 2006, Estonia was one of the first countries to create a <a href="https://www.ria.ee/en/cyber-security/cert-ee.html">Computer Emergency Response Team</a> to manage security incidents. </p>
<h2>The Baltic response</h2>
<p>After the 2007 attack, the Baltic countries <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/estonias-approach-cyber-defense-feasible-united-states/">upped their game even more</a>. For example, Estonia created the Cyber Defense League, an army of volunteer specialists in information technology. These <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CDU_Analysis.pdf">experts focus on</a> sharing threat information, preparing society for responding to cyber incidents and participating in international cyber defense activities. </p>
<p>Internationally, Estonia gained approval in 2008 to establish NATO’s <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/history.html">Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence</a> in Tallinn. Its comprehensive research into global cyber activities helps identify best practices in cyber defense and training for NATO members. </p>
<p>In 2014, Riga, the capital of neighboring Latvia, became home to another NATO organization combating Russian influence, the <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/">Strategic Communications Center of Excellence</a>. It publishes reports on Russian disinformation activities, such as the May 2018 study of the “<a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/virtual-russian-world-baltics">Virtual Russian World in the Baltics</a>.” That report analyzes Russian social media activities targeting Baltic nations with a “toxic mix of disinformation and propaganda.” It also provides insight into identifying and detecting Russian disinformation campaigns.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/baltics-battle-russia-in-online-disinformation-war/a-40828834">Baltic elves</a>” – volunteers who monitor the internet for Russian disinformation – became active in 2015 after the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/poroshenko-calls-maidan-a-victorious-battle-in-war-for-independence/a-18271774">Maidan Square events</a> in the Ukraine. And the Baltic nations have <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/fighting-disinformation-baltic-states/">fined or suspended media channels</a> that display bias. </p>
<p>The Baltic countries also rely on a European Union agency formed in 2015 <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en">to combat Russian disinformation campaigns</a> directed against the EU. The agency identifies disinformation efforts and publicizes accurate information that the Russians are seeking to undermine. A new effort will <a href="https://www.baltictimes.com/estonia_welcomes_eu_action_plan_for_tackling_disinformation/">issue rapid alerts to the public</a> when potential disinformation is directed against the 2019 European Parliament elections.</p>
<h2>Will the ‘Baltic model’ work in the US?</h2>
<p>Because of their political acknowledgment of threats and actions taken by their governments to fight disinformation, a 2018 study rated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the three European Union members <a href="https://www.europeanvalues.net/vyzkum/prague-manual/">best at responding to Russian disinformation</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/xSIkkza9TVI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A look inside Russia’s propaganda machine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some former U.S. officials have suggested <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/four-steps-to-fight-foreign-interference-in-us-elections/2018/02/14/fb99b7a0-11c1-11e8-8ea1-c1d91fcec3fe_story.html">adopting similar practices</a>, including publicizing disinformation efforts and evidence tying them to Russia. The <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry">Senate Intelligence Committee</a> has called for that too, as has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-kremlins-trojan-horses-3-0">the Atlantic Council, an independent think tank</a> that focuses on international affairs.</p>
<p>The U.S. could also mobilize volunteers to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/estonias-approach-cyber-defense-feasible-united-states/">boost citizens’ and businesses’ cyberdefenses</a> and teach people to identify and combat disinformation.</p>
<p>Disinformation is a <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/russian-propaganda-disinformation-and-estonias-experience/">key part of Russia’s overall effort</a> to undermine Western governments. As a result, the battle is ever-changing, with Russians constantly trying new angles of attack and target countries like the Baltic nations identifying and thwarting those efforts. The most effective responses will involve coordination between <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/government-responses-malicious-use-social-media">governments</a>, <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/industry-responses-malicious-use-social-media">commercial technology companies</a> and the <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/role-communicators-countering-malicious-use-social-media">news industry and social media platforms</a> to identify and address disinformation. </p>
<p>A similar approach may work in the U.S., though it would require far more collaboration than has existed so far. But backed by the new government motivation to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf">strike back when provoked</a>, the methods used in the Baltic states and across Europe could provide a powerful new <a href="https://theconversation.com/cybersecuritys-next-phase-cyber-deterrence-67090">deterrent against Russian influence</a> in the West.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terry Thompson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European countries, especially the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have confronted Russian disinformation campaigns for decades. The US can learn from their experience.Terry Thompson, Adjunct Instructor in Cybersecurity, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1026252018-09-10T22:48:45Z2018-09-10T22:48:45ZCanada left behind as ride-hailing services go global<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235498/original/file-20180909-90556-18sizam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ride-hailing services have gone global, and even women in Saudi Arabia -- only recently given the right to drive -- are getting in on the action. In this June 2018 photo, a female driver for Careem, a regional ride-hailing Uber competitor, is seen behind the wheel.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like it or not, ride-hailing has become an <a href="http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2018/how-partnerships-can-help-cities-cope-with-technological-disruption/">established, regulated and accepted form of transportation in most of Canada’s largest cities</a>. </p>
<p>Canadian cities aren’t unique in this regard. Ride-hailing is now a mobility option in 89 countries, serving more than 2,600 cities around the world. </p>
<p>By adopting a global outlook, Canada can better understand, manage and benefit from the integration of ride-hailing as a component of urban mobility.</p>
<h2>Global scale</h2>
<p>In Toronto and in many North American cities, ride-hailing was initially seen as a disruption to the taxi industry, a heavily licensed and regulated municipal sector. But ride-hailing is maturing, and firms continue to innovate and expand through a variety of modifications to ride-hailing services such as <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/04/03/lyft-launches-carpooling-service.html">pooling</a> and <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/why-lyft-is-trying-to-become-the-next-subscription-business/">subscriptions</a>. </p>
<p>Ride-hailing companies are also investing in other mobility services including <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/09/didi-declares-war-on-chinas-bike-sharing-startups/">bikes</a> and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/09/uber-and-lyft-are-racing-to-own-every-mode-of-transportation.html">scooters</a>. And they’re leveraging their network of drivers to provide other logistics services like <a href="https://www.recode.net/2018/4/18/17242262/uber-eats-grubhub-food-delivery-startup">food delivery</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, ride-hailing firms abide by place and city-specific regulations and policies while simultaneously catering their services to appeal to local markets and cultural practices. In Canada, the United States, the U.K. and Singapore, ride-hailing means travelling by car. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235499/original/file-20180909-90571-1clmezs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ride-hailing services around the globe even include tuk-tuks in India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>However, in places like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/08/technology/southeast-asia-ride-hailing.html">Indonesia, Vietnam</a> and <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/30/uber-and-taxify-are-going-head-to-head-to-digitize-africas-two-wheeled-taxis/">Uganda</a>, hailing a ride can mean riding on the back of a motorcycle. Jakarta is a city of more than 10 million people known for crushing congestion and a dearth of reliable public transit. The arrival of ride-hailing firms has been credited for offering a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/motorbike-delivery-and-ride-sharing-app-go-jek-boosts-jakartas-traffic-clogged-economy.html">workaround to congestion</a>.</p>
<p>This is because ride-hailing is bringing products and services directly to customers. In India, passengers can even hail a <a href="https://www.techinasia.com/ola-auto-free-wifi">tuk-tuk</a>.</p>
<h2>The unicorns of ride-hailing</h2>
<p>As ride-hailing becomes an increasingly accepted mode of transportation with relatively low barriers to entry and expansion, ride-hailing firms have gone global. </p>
<p>Uber, with operations in 66 countries, exemplifies the global reach of ride-hailing. But Uber is hardly alone. </p>
<p>There are now 12 ride-hailing firms that have reached what’s known as “<a href="https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies">unicorn</a>” status. This means that they are startup firms with a market valuation of $1 billion or more. These ride-hailing unicorns are Uber, Didi-Chuxing, Lyft, Grab, Ola, Go-Jek, Yandex, Cabify, Gett, Careem, 99 and Taxify. </p>
<p>Their headquarter locations range from San Francisco to Sao Paulo, Dubai to Beijing, exemplifying the global reach of ride-hailing. They are also the recipients of significant venture capital investments. Based on an <a href="https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/07/the-rise-of-urban-tech/564653/">examination of venture capital investment in urban tech</a>, ride-hailing and mobility service firms attracted more than 60 per cent — or greater than $40 billion —of all urban tech investments between 2016 and 2018. </p>
<p>These firms also lead as innovators by building new mobility services. Others combine products and services in new ways, taking advantage of technology, algorithms, networks and concentrations of people. </p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, credit card adoption rates are <a href="https://www.techinasia.com/indonesias-long-road-to-cashless-payments-pt1">below seven per cent, and most people don’t have bank accounts</a>. Therefore, local startup Go-Jek is not just a ride-hailing company, but also a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/business/article/2116287/how-indonesian-unicorn-go-jek-went-20-bikes-us25-billion-and-e">financial services firm</a> offering a cashless payment system woven into its app. </p>
<p>In Singapore, <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/grab-and-nus-launch-first-of-its-kind-ai-lab">local ride-hailing unicorn Grab invested $6 million in an artificial intelligence centre and partnership with the National University of Singapore</a>. The centre will focus on using data collected by Grab to address mobility challenges faced across Southeast Asia.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-grab-and-gojek-drivers-in-indonesia-build-a-solid-union-95032">Can Grab and Gojek drivers in Indonesia build a solid union?</a>
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<p>And in India, Ola has partnered with government agencies, civic organizations and private sector firms on social entrepreneurship initiatives that <a href="https://www.medianama.com/2016/10/223-ola-training-center">train drivers</a>, <a href="https://yourstory.com/2015/05/ola-women-driver-entrepreneurs/">promote female entrepreneurship</a> and <a href="http://nrinews24x7.com/ola-join-hands-maharashtra-natural-gas-limited-mngl-promote-clean-fuel-pune/">emphasize sustainability</a> through fuel choices.</p>
<h2>Tiny Estonia has a ride-hailing unicorn</h2>
<p>There are no ride-hailing unicorns headquartered in Canada. While Canada may represent a relatively small market in global terms, the most recent entrant to the ride-hailing unicorns club is <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/uber-rival-taxify-gets-unicorn-status-with-investment-led-by-daimler.html">Taxify</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235501/original/file-20180909-18990-1d9t28u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A Taxify ride-hailing car is seen in downtown Tallinn, Estonia in July 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>Taxify is headquartered in Tallinn, Estonia, a former country of the Soviet Union with a population of just 1.3 million. Tallinn is a city that was pretty much on nobody’s map of global cities. The city, and Taxify, are emblematic of a new global economic geography of innovative firms and cities. Taxify currently operates in 28 countries, including Australia, Nigeria and Canada.</p>
<p>The rapid globalization of local ground transportation services was unexpected. But thanks to what’s known as the “platform economy,” many local services have been reconfigured into global ones with consequences for markets, firms and places. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://issues.org/32-3/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy/">platform economy</a> is comprised of big data, algorithms and cloud computing. These come together to create new digital infrastructure on which entire new markets and ecosystems operate. </p>
<p>This digital infrastructure has created new value for its owners and is an essential part of a reconfigured globalization. The global economy is being reorganized so that the owners and operators of these platforms are also the owners of the data and power. This power may be even more formidable than that held by the factory-owners of the early Industrial Revolution.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/235511/original/file-20180909-90565-1g8goce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Grab rider and driver are seen in Jakarta, Indonesia in December 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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<p>Ground transportation has until recently been a local concern and deeply rooted in place. For instance, public transit agencies like the Toronto Transit Commission or Vancouver’s TransLink are operated locally or regionally. Taxi brokerages also tend to operate locally.</p>
<p>Ride-hailing, however, is part of the platform economy infrastructure. This unique form of digitization allowed firms to expand rapidly to multiple markets, multiple languages and multiple sets of regulations and guidelines. </p>
<p>Ride-hailing depends on mobilizing local citizens to contribute, but it’s also profoundly global, with powerful consequences for the platform owners and those cities that house them.</p>
<h2>The challenge for Canada</h2>
<p>Canada is facing challenges because it’s simply become a consumer of platform ride-hailing products. We do not house any of the ride-hailing headquarters. We are not developing our own stand-alone mobility solutions for the world stage. </p>
<p>As multinational ride-hailing platforms firms take the lead on ground transportation services in Canadian cities, they also gain exclusive access to a treasure chest of data on people and places. </p>
<p>Our future economy depends on our public agencies having the knowledge and power to make informed policy choices around mobility investments. As our largest cities struggle with congestion, it’s now more important than ever to step up and invest in our urban mobility futures. </p>
<p>The sort of economy and society we create in this transition to digital platforms will be determined by the social, political and business choices we make. Canada needs to lead, not follow, in the global race for better mobility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102625/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research was conducted as part of the Creating Digital Opportunity (CDO) research project with financial support provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>Canada is simply a consumer of ride-hailing services, and has not established any of its own Ubers or Lyfts, even as tiny countries like Estonia get in on the game. That needs to change.Shauna Brail, Associate Professor of Urban Studies, University of TorontoBetsy Donald, Professor, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/998292018-07-18T18:46:38Z2018-07-18T18:46:38ZThe US is a whole lot richer because of trade with Europe, regardless of whether EU is friend or ‘foe’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228250/original/file-20180718-142428-1tmzpx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Trump and Merkel: Friends, foes or frenemies?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Trump-NATO-Summit/cef1edd9372b4fa695463faf2e375518/2/0">AP Photo/Pablo Martinez Monsivais</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump recently questioned the value of the long-standing United States-Europe alliance. When asked to identify his “biggest foe globally,” <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-cbs-news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-helsinki-jeff-glor/">he declared</a>: “I think the European Union is a foe, what they do to us in trade.”</p>
<p>This view is consistent with his recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-us-tariffs-will-affect-different-parts-of-the-eu-97651">turn against trade</a> with Europe but ignores the immense benefits that Americans have reaped due to the strong economic and military alliance between the U.S. and Europe – benefits that include nothing less than unprecedented <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20798962.pdf">peace</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/rules-based-trade-made-the-world-rich-trumps-policies-may-make-it-poorer-97896">prosperity</a>. </p>
<p>As such, Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/trade-wars-50746">trade war</a> with Europe and his hostility toward broader Western alliances such as NATO portend a future of diminished standards of living – as a direct result of less trade – and greater global conflict – <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=L53fR-TusZAC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&ots=Ey5rtq9LrE&sig=MKMMiEv_We3mXsRTdx-045JA_0A#v=onepage&q&f=false">indirectly due to</a> reduced economic integration. In the words of columnist Robert Kagan, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/everything-will-not-be-okay/2018/07/12/c5900550-85e9-11e8-9e80-403a221946a7_story.html">things</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/trump-nato-european-union-history.html">will</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/07/16/putin-trump/">not be ok</a>.” </p>
<p>Some of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=fMoODlwAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">my research</a> focuses on the impact of increased international trade on U.S. standards of living, which <a href="http://gregcwright.weebly.com/uploads/8/2/7/5/8275912/rising-tide-weai.pdf">I show</a> are causally linked during the late 20th century. Most of the trade in this period occurred among rich nations and was dominated by the U.S.-Europe relationship. </p>
<p>By calling Europe a “foe,” Trump makes clear that he simply doesn’t understand why rich countries trade with one another, which, to be fair, is something that also puzzled economists for many years. </p>
<h2>Why rich countries trade</h2>
<p>Though in some ways it seems obvious why the U.S. and Europe trade with one another – some might enjoy Parmigiana from Italy, while others prefer Wisconsin cheddar – economists initially <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2009/12/basics.htm">had trouble</a> explaining exactly why there was so much trade among rich countries. Surely, they thought, the U.S. can produce good quality cheese at a cost that is similar to producers in Italy, and vice versa, so why would we need to go abroad to satisfy our palettes? </p>
<p>In 1979, economist Paul Krugman provided a clear answer that would eventually <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2008/press.html">win him</a> the Nobel Prize in economics. The first part of his answer was simple but important and boils down to the fact that consumers benefit from having a wide range of product varieties available to them, even if they are only small variations on the same item. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union">in 2016</a> the top U.S. exports to the EU were aircraft (US$38.5 billion), machinery ($29.4 billion) and pharmaceutical products ($26.4 billion). The top imports from the EU seem almost identical: machinery ($64.9 billion), pharmaceutical products ($55.2 billion) and vehicles ($54.6 billion). Although the product categories clearly overlap, there are important differences in the types of pharmaceuticals and machinery that are sold in each market. Consumers benefit from having all these options available to them. </p>
<p>The second part of Krugman’s answer was that, by producing for both markets, companies in Europe and the U.S. could reap greater economies of scale in production and lower their prices as a result. This has been found to indeed <a href="https://www.colorado.edu/Economics/courses/boileau/4309/Paper%203.pdf">be what happens</a> when countries trade. And more <a href="http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Papers/Feenstra_Weinstein_jpe.pdf">recent research</a> has shown that increased foreign competition can also lower domestic prices. </p>
<p>These benefits have been quantified. For instance, the gains to the U.S. from new foreign product varieties and lower prices over the period 1992 to 2005 were equal to <a href="http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/Papers/Feenstra_Weinstein_jpe.pdf">about one percent of U.S. GDP</a> – or about $100 billion. </p>
<p>In short, Krugman’s answer emphasized the extent to which international trade between equals increases the overall size of the economic pie. And no pie has ever grown larger than the combined economies of the U.S. and Europe, which now <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/">constitute</a> half of global GDP.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228276/original/file-20180718-142426-1jshe9l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pfizer Inc. is headquartered in New York. Both the U.S. and the EU import and export pharmaceuticals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/On-the-Money-Cheaper-Viagra/a7eb4d8ad5b14563b3705646a0ca8107/4/0">AP Photo/Richard Drew</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Largest trading partner</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0003.html">European Union</a> is the largest U.S. trading partner in terms of its total bilateral trade and has been for the past several decades.</p>
<p>Overall, the U.S. <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union">imported $592 billion</a> in goods and services from the EU in 2016 and exported $501 billion, which represents about 19 percent of total U.S. trade and also represents about 19 percent of American GDP. </p>
<p><iframe id="t6bEs" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/t6bEs/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>A key feature of this trade is that <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/">almost a third of it</a> happens within individual companies. In other words, it reflects multinational companies shipping products to themselves in order to serve their local market, or as inputs into local production. This type of trade is critical as it serves as the backbone of a <a href="http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/4262/EU-US_trade_and_investment_talks:_Why_they_matter.html">vast network</a> of business investments on both sides of the Atlantic, <a href="https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2017/12-December/1217-activities-of-us-multinational-enterprises.pdf">supporting</a> hundreds of thousands of jobs. </p>
<p>It is also a network that propels the global economy: the EU or U.S. serves as the primary trading partner for nearly every country on Earth.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228254/original/file-20180718-142414-1muxzy3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ship to shore crane prepares to load a shipping container onto a container ship in Savannah, Ga.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-China-Tariffs/453b3c52caa348cab5bb628a37a19d3e/9/0">AP Photo/Stephen B. Morton</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shipping and new institutions</h2>
<p>The U.S.-Europe trade relationship also laid the groundwork for the modern system of international trade via two distinct innovations: new shipping technologies and new global institutions.</p>
<p>On the technological front, the <a href="http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/history-of-containerization">introduction of the standard shipping container</a> in the 1960s set off the so-called second wave of globalization. This under-appreciated technology was conceived by the U.S Army during the 1950s and was perfected over Atlantic shipping routes. In short, by simply standardizing the size and shape of shipping containers, and building port infrastructure and ships to move them, <a href="http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk/14568/1/JIE%20accepted%20manuscript%20online%20version%20%281%29.pdf">massive economies of scale</a> in shipping were realized. As a result, today container ships the size of small cities are routed via sophisticated logistics to huge deepwater ports around the world. </p>
<p>These routes eventually made it profitable for other countries to invest in the large-scale port infrastructure that could handle modern container ships. This laid the groundwork for the eventual growth of massive container terminals throughout Asia, which now <a href="https://maritimeintelligence.informa.com/content/top-100-success">serve as the hubs</a> of the modern global supply chain. </p>
<p>At the same time that these new technologies were reducing the physical costs of doing business around the world, the U.S. and Europe were also creating <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/anthologies/2011-12-14/archives-international-institutions">institutions</a> to define new international rules for trade and finance. Perhaps the most important one was the post-war General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which eventually became the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-wto-99274">World Trade Organization</a>, creating the first rules-based multilateral trade regime. A large body of research shows that these agreements have <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/7362891.pdf">increased trade</a> and, more importantly, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/joes.12087">raised incomes</a> around the world.</p>
<p>Overall, these advancements contributed to the <a href="http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ass/article/viewFile/36581/20566">subsequent enrichment</a> of hundreds of millions of workers in Asia, Latin America and Africa by helping to integrate them into the global economy.</p>
<p>And when the world gets richer, the U.S. also benefits for many of the same reasons noted above: demand for U.S. products increases as incomes rise around the world, as does the variety of products the U.S. can import, and the prices of these goods typically fall. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/228252/original/file-20180718-142423-1tf5lke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A cartoon Trump blimp flies as a protesters speak out against Trump’s visit to London.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Britain-Trump-Visit/66460331f9b84b1c8e573d985f6c9dbd/18/0">AP Photo/Matt Dunham</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Taking the long view</h2>
<p>But it appears that President Trump sees the U.S. on the losing end of a failed relationship. </p>
<p>It is unsurprising that tensions with Europe have come to the forefront over perceived imbalances in trade, particularly for a president who is not afraid <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-go-it-alone-approach-to-china-trade-ignores-wtos-better-way-to-win-93918">to take long-time allies to task</a>. </p>
<p>This is because U.S. trade policy <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/normalizing-trade-relations-with-china-was-a-mistake/562403">has arguably been overly optimistic</a> in recent years, particularly with respect to China, whose accession to the WTO proved to be much more disruptive to labor markets around the world than was predicted. Previous U.S. administrations preferred patience over confrontation, leading to a perhaps inevitable backlash that has spilled into other relationships, such as the one with Europe. </p>
<p>However, the U.S. relationship with Europe is clearly different, primarily because it is longstanding and has been largely one of equals. But also because their shared values mean that there are many non-economic issues — such as the spread of liberal democracy and the promotion of human rights — that get advanced by the close economic ties. </p>
<p>It’s important to not underestimate what is at stake if the U.S.-Europe alliance is allowed to falter. Americans are likely in the midst of the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/we-enjoy-the-most-peaceful-period-on-earth-ever_us_57ab4b34e4b08c46f0e47130">most peaceful era</a> in world history, and global economic integration, led from the beginning by the U.S. and Europe, <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/globalisation-promotes-peace">has been</a> a key contributing factor. Global extreme poverty is also <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty">at its lowest point</a> ever, again in large part due to globalization. </p>
<p>These are the byproducts and legacies of seven decades of expanding international trade and should not be taken for granted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Wright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The president, who called the European Union a ‘foe’ following a series of meetings in Europe, may not realize just how much Americans have gained from their relationship with Europe.Greg Wright, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, MercedLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/971292018-05-30T13:27:09Z2018-05-30T13:27:09ZFree public transport doesn’t add up – unless you get rid of the drivers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220977/original/file-20180530-120514-tovdb5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C208%2C1949%2C1324&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fras/226581663/sizes/l">FraserEliot/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The idea of free public transport has clear appeal. Cities in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-paris-transportation/paris-mulls-free-public-transport-to-reduce-pollution-idUSKBN1GW1KU">France</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/german-cities-to-trial-free-public-transport-to-cut-pollution">Germany</a> are already considering such proposals, to reduce traffic and air pollution. And in the UK, Labour party leader Jeremy Corbyn declared that he would introduce <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43726983">free bus travel for under-25s</a>, to complement the passes already available to senior citizens. </p>
<p>But the evidence suggests that offering free public transport causes headaches for local authorities – and may not be an effective way of getting commuters to stop driving cars. Tallinn, capital of Estonia, introduced free public transport for residents in 2013. But <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11116-016-9695-5">a 2014 survey showed</a> that most of the people who switched to public transport had previously walked or cycled, rather than driven. A <a href="http://urmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/URMI-2017-FARE-FREE-PUBLIC-TRANSPORT-IN-TALLINN.pdf">further survey in 2017</a> showed that patronage had increased by only 20% over four years. </p>
<p>In the April 2018 edition of German trade publication Stadtverkehr, Naumann claims that the only cost effective way to get car drivers to switch to public transport is to couple reasonably priced transit with severe traffic restraints. For example, in the English city of Sheffield, attractive bus fares and timetables used to keep cars out of the city centre. From the 1970s, <a href="http://www.grahamstevenson.me.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=773:british-bus-deregulation">until the service was deregulated</a> in 1986, there was simply no need for residents to drive into Sheffield. </p>
<h2>Finding the funds</h2>
<p>The biggest drawback to free public transport schemes is the lack of funds from fares to cover maintenance and upgrades. In Tallinn, for example, the city’s inadequate tram system will eventually require capital for a complete renewal – or face closure. Hasselt, a Belgian town with a population of 70,000, offered free bus travel for 16 years until 2013, but <a href="http://www.eltis.org/discover/news/hasselt-cancels-free-public-transport-after-16-years-belgium-0">eventually scrapped it</a> when costs became unsustainable. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220980/original/file-20180530-120514-hh5sf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Waiting for a bus in Hasselt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hasselt-belgium-people-wait-transport-statue-1075200038?src=pY0AyAgar7xnLt3l2TSzKQ-1-0">Marat Yakhin/Shutterstock.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Paris, meanwhile, has already banned the most polluting vehicles and offered free public transport for a few days each year when pollution has reached dangerous levels due to atmospheric conditions. But according to Haydock, writing in the June 2018 edition of Today’s Railways EU, traffic is rarely reduced more than 10% on these days, and the long term shift to other forms of transport is minimal.</p>
<p>In the UK, free bus travel for senior citizens <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brutal-spending-cuts-rural-bus-services-have-reached-the-end-of-the-line-63432">has hastened the demise</a> of many rural and intercity services. Many local authorities have diverted support away from rural, evening and weekend services, to the concessionary fares budget. During <a href="http://www.foscl.org.uk/sites/foscl.org.uk/files/FoSCL%20Mag%20Feb%202017.pdf">interviews with BBC Radio 4</a>, younger people – who rely on buses to get to work or go out on the evenings and weekends – complained that services had been axed to offer senior citizens free travel during daytime on weekdays. </p>
<p>But irrespective of your age, health or prosperity, there is no point in having a free bus pass if there are no buses to use it on. As bus services are further deregulated in the UK, there will continue to be pointless oversupply on some corridors, while other areas struggle to see more than a few buses per week – if any at all.</p>
<h2>Driverless minibuses</h2>
<p>The development of <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2017/12/6/16733944/moia-vw-minivan-shuttle-ridesharing-autonomous">autonomous electric minibuses</a> could be a game changer, especially if a manufacturer is prepared to lease them on favourable terms. Local authorities could pilot a scheme whereby the bus is “hailed” by smart phone 15 to 30 minutes before departure. Indeed, tests for autonomous on-demand services are already <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2017/11/7/16615290/waymo-self-driving-safety-driver-chandler-autonomous">underway in cities across the US</a>, <a href="https://www.smmt.co.uk/2017/11/autonomous-buses-debut-cambridge/">UK</a> and <a href="https://www.thelocal.fr/20160902/france-to-roll-out-world-first-driverless-buses">Europe</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/220988/original/file-20180530-120518-9hv1cp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An autonomous minibus, on trial in Toulouse.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/toulouse-france-march-13-2018-driverless-1050255878?src=mQoTnBAxxivxEoTJR4SABw-1-4">Irina Capel/Shutterstock.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once the expensive and restrictive labour element is removed from the operating costs, there is no reason why such services could not be offered free of charge to all users. In the urban core – within a 10km radius of a city centre – these services could run 24/7. Further afield, in the suburbs, a daily service from 6am until midnight would probably be sufficient to compete with the private car. </p>
<p>Autonomous minibuses could automatically connect with city buses and trains, which would continue to be staffed and paid for by fares. The minibuses would provide a “last mile” service, taking people within easy walking distance of their destination. In urban areas, all residential and business premises would be within 200m of a minibus stop, extending to 500m in suburban areas and 1km in rural areas. </p>
<p>At off peak times, the minibuses could replace some conventional bus services to avoid the inefficiencies created when a 70 passenger bus is used to transport only ten people on an evening or Sunday service.</p>
<p>To prevent abuse of the minibuses, passengers would scan their phones on boarding to confirm the booking. If they didn’t, a penalty could be collected automatically from their phone. CCTV could identify any disruptive passengers and refuse further bookings. Meanwhile, taxis would continue to prosper from those people willing to pay for a personal door-to-door service.</p>
<p>Public transit systems, as we know them today, would struggle to deliver a sustainable free service. But there’s a real possibility that the autonomous vehicles of tomorrow could do just that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97129/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Disney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It might not be effective now, but the development of self-driving vehicles could be a game changer for public transport services.John Disney, Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/813892017-07-28T02:18:56Z2017-07-28T02:18:56ZEveryone falls for fake emails: lessons from cybersecurity summer school<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179292/original/file-20170722-28501-1ej5jac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students infiltrate a host computer under the watchful eye of a mentor during a capture the flag exercise. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Matthews</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What do nuclear submarines, top secret military bases and private businesses have in common? </p>
<p>They are all vulnerable to a simple slice of cheddar. </p>
<p>This was the clear result of a “pen testing” exercise, otherwise known as penetration testing, at the <a href="http://www.studyitin.ee/c3s2017">annual Cyber Security Summer School</a> in Tallinn, Estonia in July.</p>
<p>I attended, along with a contingent from Australia, to present research at the third annual <a href="http://cybercentre.cs.ttu.ee/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/crw2017_final.pdf">Interdisciplinary Cyber Research workshop</a>. We also got the chance to visit companies such as <a href="https://www.skype.com/en/about/">Skype</a> and <a href="https://markets.funderbeam.com">Funderbeam</a>, as well as the <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/">NATO Collaborative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence</a>.</p>
<p>The theme of this year’s school was social engineering – the art of manipulating people to divulge critical information online without realising it. We focused on why social engineering works, how to prevent such attacks and how to gather digital evidence after an incident.</p>
<p>The highlight of our visit was participation in a live fire capture the flag (CTF) cyber range exercise, where teams carried out social engineering attacks to pen test a real company.</p>
<h2>Pen testing and real world phishing</h2>
<p>Pen testing is an authorised simulated attack on the security of a physical or digital system. It aims to find vulnerabilities that criminals may exploit.</p>
<p>Such testing ranges from the digital, where the goal is accessing files and private data, to the physical, where researchers actually attempt to enter buildings or spaces within a company.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179562/original/file-20170725-11177-1u91hac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">University of Adelaide students attended a private tour of the Tallinn Skype office for a presentation on cyber security.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Matthews</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the summer school, we heard from professional hackers and pen testers from around the world. Stories were told about how physical entry to secure areas can be obtained using nothing more than a piece of cheese shaped like an ID card and confidence. </p>
<p>We then put these lessons to practical use through several flags - goals that teams needed to achieve. Our challenge was to assess a contracted company to see how susceptible it was to social engineering attacks.</p>
<p>Physical testing was specifically off limits during our exercises. Ethical boundaries were also set with the company to ensure we were acting as cyber security specialists and not criminals. </p>
<h2>OSINT: Open Source Intelligence</h2>
<p>The first flag was to research the company. </p>
<p>Rather than researching as you would for a job interview, we went looking for potential vulnerabilities within publicly available information. This is known as open source intelligence (OSINT). Such as:</p>
<ul>
<li>who are the board of directors? </li>
<li>who are their assistants? </li>
<li>what events are happening at the company? </li>
<li>are they likely to be on holiday at the moment? </li>
<li>what employee contact information can we collect? </li>
</ul>
<p>We were able to answer all of these questions with extraordinary clarity. Our team even found direct phone numbers and ways into the company from events reported in the media.</p>
<h2>The phishing email</h2>
<p>This information was then used to create two phishing emails directed at targets identified from our OSINT investigations. Phishing is when malicious online communications are used to obtain personal information.</p>
<p>The object of this flag was to get a link within our emails clicked on. For legal and ethical reasons, the content and appearance of the email can’t be disclosed.</p>
<p>Just like customers click on <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-not-to-agree-to-clean-public-toilets-when-you-accept-any-online-terms-and-conditions-81169">terms and conditions without reading</a>, we exploited the fact that our targets would click on a link of interest without checking where the link was pointing. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=279&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179456/original/file-20170724-10327-7xrbfv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=351&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Initial infection of a system can be obtained by a simple email containing a link.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Freddy Dezeure/C3S</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In a real phishing attack, once you click on the link, your computer system is compromised. In our case, we sent our targets to benign sites of our making. </p>
<p>The majority of teams at the summer school achieved a successful phishing email attack. Some even managed to get their email forwarded throughout the company.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179455/original/file-20170724-21564-gikurs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">When employees forward emails within a company the trust factor of the email increases and the links contained within that email are more likely to be clicked.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Freddy Dezeure/C3S</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our results reinforce the findings of researchers about people’s inability to distinguish a compromised email from a trustworthy one. One study of 117 people found that around <a href="https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01463838/document">42% of emails were incorrectly classified</a> as either real or fake by the receiver.</p>
<h2>Phishing in the future</h2>
<p>Phishing is likely to get only <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09819.pdf">more sophisticated</a>.</p>
<p>With an increasing number of internet-connected devices lacking basic security standards, researchers suggest that phishing attackers will seek out methods of hijacking these devices. But how will companies respond?</p>
<p>Based on my experience in Tallinn, we will see companies become more transparent in how they deal with cyber attacks. After a massive <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">cyber attack in 2007</a>, for example, the Estonian government reacted in the right way. </p>
<p>Rather than providing spin to the public and covering up the government services slowly going offline, they admitted outright they were under attack from an unknown foreign agent.</p>
<p>Likewise, businesses will need to admit when they are under attack. This is the only way to reestablish trust between themselves and their customers, and to prevent the further spread of a phishing attack.</p>
<p>Until then, can I interest you in <a href="http://www.drmatthews.science/index.php/youve-been-pwn3d/">free anti-phishing software?</a></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81389/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Matthews is an elected member of Council at The University of Adelaide. He was one of several students who benefited from funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to attend the Sumer School. He is a member of the South Australian branch of the Labor Party and a Graduate Member of the Institute of Engineers Australia.</span></em></p>Cyber Security Summer School is a chance for researchers to test their skills during live penetration testing.Richard Matthews, PhD Candidate, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757732017-04-26T20:13:51Z2017-04-26T20:13:51ZCyber attacks ten years on: from disruption to disinformation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165503/original/image-20170417-32689-1c98k0s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The solider of Tallinin, a bronze statue that triggered the first recognised cyber attack. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/65817306@N00/486689679/in/photolist-5iP5Zr-8rPtBA-4xb1j4-4TUoCZ-4TUouK-JDiyB-4TYBEQ-4TUofi-JDiyH-K1pTn-JDiyv-JDiyK">65817306@N00/flickr </a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Today is the tenth anniversary of the world’s first major coordinated “<a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">cyber attack</a>” on a nation’s internet infrastructure. This little-known event set the scene for the onrush of cyber espionage, fake news and information wars we know today.</p>
<p>In 2007, operators took advantage of political unrest to unleash a series of cyber measures on Estonia, as a possible form of retribution for symbolically rejecting a Soviet version of history. It was a new, coordinated approach that had never been seen before. </p>
<p>Today, shaping contemporary views of historical events is a relatively common focus of coordinated digital activity, such as <a href="http://theconversation.com/why-china-will-be-watching-how-we-commemorate-anzac-day-75856">China’s use of social media</a> to create war commemoration and <em>Russia Today</em>’s <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/1917LIVE">live-tweeting the Russian Revolution</a> as its centenary approaches.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"852833575359594496"}"></div></p>
<p>In 2017 and into the future, it will be essential to combine insights from the humanities, particularly from history, with analysis from information operations experts in order to maintain cyber security.</p>
<h2>Estonia ground to a halt</h2>
<p>A dispute over a past war triggered what might be called the first major “<a href="https://apnews.com/2c25d7da76f4409bae7daf063c071420/What-makes-a-cyberattack?-Experts-lobby-to-restrict-the-term">cyber attack</a>”.</p>
<p>On April 27, 2007 the Government of Estonia moved the “Soldier of Tallinn” – a bronze statue that commemorated the Soviet Army of World War II – from the centre of the city to a military cemetery on Tallinn’s outskirts. The action followed an extensive debate over the interpretation of Estonia’s past. A “history war” concerning the role of the Soviet Union in Estonia during and after World War II had split Estonian society.</p>
<p>Several days of violent confrontation followed the statue’s removal. The Russian-speaking population rioted. The protests led to 1,300 arrests, 100 injuries and one death. The disturbance became known as “Bronze Night”.</p>
<p>A more serious disruption followed, and the weapons were not Molotov cocktails, but thousands of computers. For almost three weeks, a series of massive cyber operations targeted Estonia. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/oGZkCdpPLBE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In 2007, Estonia was the victim of an unprecedented attack on its IT networks.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The disruption – which peaked on May 9 when Moscow celebrates Victory Day – brought down banks, the media, police, government networks and emergency services. Bots, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and spam were marshalled with a sophistication not seen before. Their combined effects brought one of the most digital-reliant societies in the world <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">to a grinding halt</a>.</p>
<h2>The Tallinn Manual</h2>
<p>In the aftermath, NATO responded by developing the <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/">NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence</a> in Estonia. A major contribution of the centre was the publication of the Tallinn Manual in 2013 – a comprehensive study of how international law applied to cyber conflict. The initial manual focused on disabling, state-based attacks that amount to acts of war.</p>
<p><a href="https://ccdcoe.org/research.html">Tallinn 2.0</a> was released in February 2017. In the <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/au/academic/subjects/law/humanitarian-law/tallinn-manual-20-international-law-applicable-cyber-operations-2nd-edition?format=PB">foreword</a>, Estonian politician Toomas Hendrik Ives argues:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In retrospect, these were fairly mild and simple DDoS attacks, far less damaging than what has followed. Yet it was the first time one could apply the Clausewitzean dictum: War is the continuation of policy by other means.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The focus of the new manual reveals just how much the world of cyber operations has changed in the ten years since Bronze Night. It heralds a concerning future where all aspects of society, not just military and governmental infrastructure, are subject to active cyber operations.</p>
<p>Now the scope for digital incursions by one nation on another is much wider, and more widespread. Everything from the personal data of citizens held in government servers to digitised cultural heritage collections have become issues of concern to international cyber law experts.</p>
<h2>A decade of cyber operations</h2>
<p>In the ten years since 2007 we have lived in an era where persistent cyber operations are coincident with international armed combat. The conflict between Georgia (2008) and Russia, and ongoing conflict in the Ukraine (since 2014) are consistent with this.</p>
<p>These operations have extended beyond conventional conflict zones via <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/pawn-storm-power-social-engineering/?linkId=36875070">intrusion</a> of civic and governmental structures.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/10/apt28-a-window-into-russias-cyber-espionage-operations.html">claims</a> of nation-state actors <a href="https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/does-a-bear-leak-in-the-woods/">active measures</a> and DDoS incidents (similar to those that may have disabled last year’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/did-the-census-really-suffer-a-denial-of-service-attack-63755">Australian census</a>) on <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/10/apt28-a-window-into-russias-cyber-espionage-operations.html">Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan</a> in 2009. </p>
<p>German investigators found a penetration of the <a href="https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-on-the-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/">Bundestag</a> in May 2015.</p>
<p>The Dutch found penetration in <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-targets-mh17-investigation-team/">government computers</a> relating to MH17 reports.</p>
<p>Now, famously, we know there were <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-russian-intelligence-activities">infiltrations</a> between 2015-16 into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html">US Democratic party computers</a>. Revealed in the last few days, researchers have identified phishing domains targeting <a href="http://blog.trendmicro.com/pawn-storm-power-social-engineering/?linkId=36875070">French political campaigns</a>.</p>
<p>There are even <a href="https://www.acsc.gov.au/publications/ACSC_Threat_Report_2016.pdf">concerns</a> that, as <a href="https://research.unsw.edu.au/people/professor-greg-austin">Professor Greg Austin</a> has explained, cyber espionage might be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-russian-hacking-pose-a-threat-to-australian-democracy-71405">threat to Australian democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Recently, the digital forensics of a computer hacked in 1998 as part of an operation tagged <a href="https://securelist.com/files/2017/04/Penquins_Moonlit_Maze_PDF_eng.pdf">Moonlight Maze</a> revealed that it is possible that the same code and <a href="http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/threat-actor">threat actor</a> have been involved in operations since at least that time. Perhaps a 20-year continuous cyber espionage campaign has been active.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/rid.aspx">Thomas Rid</a>, Professor in Security Studies at King’s College London, recently <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-trid-033017.pdf">addressed</a> the US Select Committee on Intelligence regarding Russian active measures and influence campaigns. He expressed his opinion that understanding cyber operations in the 21st century is impossible without first understanding intelligence operations in the 20th century. Rid <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/04/russian-hackers-used-backdoor-two-decades/">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is a field that’s not understanding its own history. It goes without saying that if you want to understand the present or the future, you have to understand the past.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Targeting information and opinion</h2>
<p>Understanding the history of cyber operations will be critical for developing strategies to combat them. But narrowly applying models from military history and tactics will offer only specific gains in an emerging ecosystem of “<a href="https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-for-cyber-security/sites/accs/files/uploads/DISCUSSION%20PAPER%20AUSTRALIA%20REARMED.pdf">information age strategies</a>”.</p>
<p>The international response to the “attack” on Estonia was to replicate war models of defence and offence. But analysis of the last ten years shows that is not the only way in which cyber conflict has evolved. Even the popular term <a href="https://www.acsc.gov.au/publications/ACSC_Threat_Report_2016.pdf">“cyber attack”</a> is now discouraged for incidents smaller than Estonia, as risks on the cyber security spectrum have become more complex and more precisely defined.</p>
<p>Since Estonia 2007, internet-based incursions and interference have escalated massively, but their targets have become more diffuse. Direct attacks on a nation’s defence forces, while more threatening, may in the future be less common than those that target information and opinion. </p>
<p>At the time, the attack on national infrastructure in Estonia seemed key, but looking back it was merely <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-trid-033017.pdf">driving a wedge</a> into an existing polarisation in society, which seems to be a pivotal tactic.</p>
<p>Nations like Australia are more vulnerable than ever to cyber threats, but their public focus is becoming more distributed, and their goal will be to change attitudes, opinions and beliefs.</p>
<p>A decade ago in Estonia, a cyber war erupted from a history war. The connection between <a href="http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:44110/bin5e1185fd-daf1-4f54-a89b-79512f11a218?view=true">commemoration and information war</a> is stronger than ever, and if nations wish to defend themselves, they will need to understand culture as much as coding.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Sear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A decade after the first coordinated cyber attack, the players might be the same, but cyber operations have changed dramatically.Tom Sear, PhD Candidate, Australian Centre for Australian Centre for Cyber Security, Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744462017-04-04T05:30:53Z2017-04-04T05:30:53ZWelcome to E-Estonia, the tiny nation that’s leading Europe in digital innovation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163709/original/image-20170403-21966-ai7ls5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Estonia is all about digital governance. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/crankyuser/24119151/in/photolist-Q6CoT-Q6BHc-LbaUf-Q6CJ2-Q67e9-Q67mb-Q6BXv-Q67zN-Q67iQ-Q6D5X-Q6Bqn-Q67Cu-Q67tf-38BMr-Q6BsP-Q67Yj-Q68Lm-Q6CFc-Q6C3X-Q6BJP-Q66DS-Q67xh-Q67EC-24vdL9-Q67ZL-Q6CCr-oY8TUP-kz1J1-Q6CQM-Q68bQ-Q6Bw2-Q67K1-Q685S-c6g1Fy-Q66JE-Q6Bca-Q66Ub-Q66Fm-Q6Cfz-Q6BiD-6EJsY7-ABcMes-agrVMW-9jEqP-AyjQLi-Q68uY-Q6CTD-Q6BEM-Q6BxP-Q66LY">Brian Yeung</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Big Brother does “<a href="http://www.economist.com/node/8765972">just want to help</a>” – in Estonia, at least. In this small nation of 1.3 million people, citizens have overcome fears of an Orwellian dystopia with ubiquitous surveillance to become a highly digital society. </p>
<p>The government took nearly all its services online in 2003 with the <a href="https://e-estonia.com/the-story/how-we-got-there/">e-Estonia State Portal</a>. The country’s innovative digital governance was not the result of a carefully crafted master plan, it was a pragmatic and cost-efficient response to budget limitations. </p>
<p>It helped that citizens trusted their politicians after Estonia regained independence in 1991. And, in turn, politicians trusted the country’s engineers, who had no commitment to legacy hardware or software systems, to build something new. </p>
<p>This proved to be a winning formula that can now benefit all the European countries.</p>
<h2>The once-only principle</h2>
<p>With its digital governance, Estonia introduced the “once-only” principle, mandating that <a href="https://euobserver.com/economic/127800">the state is not allowed to ask citizens for the same information twice</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, if you give your address or a family member’s name to the census bureau, the health insurance provider will not later ask you for it again. No department of any government agency can make citizens repeat information already stored in their database or that of some other agency. </p>
<p>Tech-savvy former prime minister and current Vice President of the European Commission Andrus Ansip <a href="https://euobserver.com/economic/127800">oversaw the transformation</a>. </p>
<p>The once-only principle has been such a big success that, based on Estonia’s common-sense innovation, the EU enacted <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/eu-wide-digital-once-only-principle-citizens-and-businesses-policy-options-and-their-impacts">a digital Once Only Principle and Initiative</a> early this year. <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=5155">It ensures that</a> “citizens and businesses supply certain standard information only once, because public administration offices take action to internally share this data, so that no additional burden falls on citizens and businesses.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163712/original/image-20170403-21960-qjrl2q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Estonia, citizens and businesses supply certain standard information only once through a digital portal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=42528421">Priit Koppel</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Asking for information only once is an efficient strategy to follow, and several countries have started to implement this principle (including <a href="https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/node/158757">Poland</a> and <a href="https://www.scoop4c.eu/news/austrian-federal-government-commits-implementing-once-only-principle-new-e-government-plan">Austria</a>). </p>
<p>But this by itself does not address the fact that merely asking for information can still be a bother to citizens and business. The once-only principle does not guarantee that the collected data was necessary to request, nor that it will be used to its full potential. </p>
<h2>‘Twice-mandatory’ principle</h2>
<p>Governments should always be brainstorming, asking themselves, for example, if one government agency needs this information, who else might benefit from it? And beyond need, what insights could we glean from this data?</p>
<p>Financier Vernon Hill <a href="http://thefinanser.com/2011/04/vernon-hill-on-metro-bank.html/">introduced an interesting “One to Say YES, Two to Say NO” rule</a> when founding Metro Bank UK: “It takes only one person to make a yes decision, but it requires two people to say no. If you’re going to turn away business, you need a second check for that.”</p>
<p>Imagine how simple and powerful a policy it would be if governments learnt this lesson. What if every bit of information collected from citizens or businesses had to be used for two purposes (at least!) or by two agencies in order to merit requesting it? </p>
<p>The Estonian Tax and Customs Board is, perhaps unexpectedly given the reputation of tax offices, an example of the potential for such a paradigm shift. In 2014, it launched <a href="http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/paper_47.pdf">a new strategy</a> to address tax fraud, requiring every business transaction of over €1,000 to be declared monthly by the entities involved.</p>
<p>To minimise the administrative burden of this, the government introduced an application-programming interface that allows information to be automatically exchanged between the company’s accounting software and the state’s tax system. </p>
<p>Though there was some negative push back in the media at the beginning by companies and former president <a href="https://twitter.com/ilvestoomas">Toomas Hendrik Ilves</a> even vetoed the initial version of the act, the system was a spectacular success. Estonia surpassed its original estimate of €30 million in reduced tax fraud by more than twice. </p>
<p>Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Romania, Hungary and several others have taken a similar path for controlling and detecting tax fraud. But analysing this data beyond fraud is where the real potential is hidden. </p>
<h2>Analytics and predictive models</h2>
<p>Big data, analytics and predictive models will play the main role in the next wave of e-government innovation. For example, if single-transaction information puzzle pieces are put together to form a map of the broader national business context, it might be possible to understand the kind of complex interdependencies between companies visualised below.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=277&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162874/original/image-20170328-21264-3435rz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Example of complex network of business transaction data, collected by Estonian Tax Office from 2014.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But this also raises an interesting question: could a national government use this same digital tracking system to glean insights about the economy’s health and general economic trends? </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ehJkysi4BDA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Visualization of interdependencies between sectors in Estonia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Estonian Tax and Customs Board seems to be moving in this direction. Its 2020 Strategic Plan (<a href="http://www.kadrina.ee/atp/public/Maksu-_ja_tolliameti_strateegia_presentatsioon.pdf">in Estonian here</a>) demonstrates a shift in mindset, from tasking itself solely with controlling and punishing people to envisioning giving advice to taxpayers. </p>
<p>Might tax offices be transformed into management consultancy-type agencies that advise companies on how to capture growth in related sectors, mitigate risk from peers’ bankruptcies or improve profits – all based on analysis of the vast amount of data it has collected? </p>
<p>Currently, dozens of people collect, analyse and clean such data about the business sector, but it’s possible this job could be done automatically using tax data. In this scenario, taxes could be considered a service fee paid in exchange for valuable business insights. </p>
<p>The key problem with Estonia’s great idea is privacy. It’s easy to imagine that giving industry-specific advice (or advice spanning several industries) based on business-transaction data might break the trust of the companies being monitored. </p>
<p>Indeed, one of the core founding principles of <a href="http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm">OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy</a> is that data should only be used for the purpose stated and not for any other reasons. So-called “purpose limitation” has since made its way into most modern data protection acts, including to <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm">EU data protection rules</a>. </p>
<p>But as the “ask information only once, but use at least twice” idea demonstrates, data not only can and should be used for more than its original purpose, it should never be processed solely for a single aim. Some legal experts <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf">agree</a>, stipulating that “within carefully balanced limits” data may be used for purposes beyond its original intent.</p>
<p>An innovative, visionary tax office that serves, rather than controls, society’s business sector is a big ask. But if any country can do it, e-Estonia can.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74446/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Innar Liiv does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Big data, analytics and predictive models will play the main role in the the next wave of e-government innovation.Innar Liiv, Associate Professor of Data Science, Tallinn University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/657772016-09-30T01:18:12Z2016-09-30T01:18:12ZPutin’s cyber play: What are all these Russian hackers up to?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139665/original/image-20160928-27051-wqkfbl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russia is pressing its national interests online.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-460465558/stock-photo-russian-hacking-usa-concept-of-hacking-into-the-computer.html">Flags and keyboard via shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia has been implicated in many breaches of U.S. networks in recent months, most notably the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/07/heres-know-russia-dnc-hack/">Democratic National Committee</a> and the <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/dccc-cyber-attack-russia/493634/">Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee</a> hacks, whose data were subsequently dumped to the whistleblowing site <a href="https://wikileaks.org/">WikiLeaks</a>. On Sept. 28, FBI Director <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/28/politics/fbi-james-comey-election-cyberattacks/">James Comey told a congressional hearing</a> that Russian hackers have been testing cyberdefenses of voter registration databases in more than a dozen states.</p>
<p>Last year, hackers working on behalf of the Russian government stole sensitive information <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/politics/irs-cyber-breach-russia/">from the IRS</a>, the <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2015/08/06/russia-hacks-pentagon-computers-nbc-citing-sources.html">Pentagon</a>, the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/politics/state-department-hack-worst-ever/">State Department</a> and the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/us/russian-hackers-read-obamas-unclassified-emails-officials-say.html?_r=0">White House</a>.</p>
<p>Hacking groups using names like <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/0615/Meet-Fancy-Bear-and-Cozy-Bear-Russian-groups-blamed-for-DNC-hack">Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear</a>, and pseudonymous individuals like <a href="https://guccifer2.wordpress.com/">Guccifer 2.0</a>, are not just targeting the U.S., but are also going after any entity that obstructs the interests of Russia’s government.</p>
<p>These hackers are tied to, for example, the recent breach of the World Anti-Doping Agency, making public the <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-rio-summer-olympics/russian-hackers-post-medical-files-biles-serena-williams-n647571">health records of many Olympians</a>. That attack was an apparent response to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/russia-doping-scandal">doping scandal</a> that saw many Russian athletes banned from Olympic competition in Rio de Janeiro – possibly to suggest that it wasn’t just Russians who broke the rules. (They have also <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-rio-summer-olympics/russian-doping-whistleblowers-fear-their-lives-after-cyber-attack-n638746">hacked the email accounts</a> of the <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/stepanov-russian-sports-doping-hacking-1.3719792">whistleblowers who revealed Russia’s violations</a>.)</p>
<p>What is Russia trying to do with its hacking efforts? Who are the people doing this? How do we know they’re working for Russia, and how closely tied are they to the government? As scholars of Russian cyber-conflict and information warfare, we have learned that this is just Russia’s most recent digital effort to benefit its national interests.</p>
<h2>Taking on Hillary Clinton</h2>
<p>One clear goal for the Russian hackers involved in these recent attacks is to make the presidential campaign harder for Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton and easier for her Republican opponent, Donald Trump. The hack of emails belonging to <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/colin-powell-calls-trump-national-disgrace-hacked-emails-n648011">former Secretary of State Colin Powell</a> was an obvious effort to deepen the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/27/us/politics/what-we-know-about-hillary-clintons-private-email-server.html">private email saga</a> that has damaged Clinton’s campaign.</p>
<p>Given the DNC and DCCC hacks, it seems that Russian hackers are targeting only Clinton and the Democrats. There is evidence that the <a href="http://www.redstate.com/absentee/2016/09/14/breaking-rnc-confirms-email-server-hacked/">Republican National Committee was hacked as well</a>, but no documents obtained have yet been made public. Furthermore, the U.S. affiliates of Russian state-owned media outlets such as <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/">RT</a> (formerly Russia Today) and <a href="https://sputniknews.com/us/">Sputnik</a> daily report negative stories about Clinton and upbeat stories about Trump. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=862&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139667/original/image-20160928-27047-1m3tgz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1083&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AVladimir_Putin_-_2006.jpg">Russian Presidential Press and Information Office</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are very good reasons Russian President Vladimir Putin would favor Trump. Trump’s views on <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/nato-trump-russia/493001/">NATO’s relevance</a>, <a href="http://observer.com/2016/08/the-desire-to-please-dictators-why-trumps-crimea-gaffe-matters/">Russia’s annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/world/europe/ukraine-trump-crimea-politics.html">Ukraine conflict more generally</a> are music to Putin’s ears. By contrast, a Clinton presidency would see a <a href="http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/clinton-expresses-strong-support-for-nato-and-europe">stronger and expanded NATO</a>, <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/where-do-clinton-and-trump-stand-russia-487777">increased pressure on Russia</a> over the Ukraine dispute, and even a push to <a href="http://news.antiwar.com/2016/07/29/clinton-to-reset-syria-war-focus-on-ousting-assad/">oust Russian allies</a> from powerful positions in the Middle East.</p>
<p>It’s impossible to be certain, but a personal conflict may be in play, too: Putin is a <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective_Giles_02.pdf">patient and calculated seeker of revenge</a>. In Russia’s 2011-2012 legislative and presidential elections, Putin’s <a href="http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_today.php">United Russia Party won big</a>, and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russians-voting--and-watching/2012/03/04/gIQA3j6CqR_story.html">Putin was again elected president</a> by large margins. Some election watchdogs cried foul, alleging stuffed ballots and overcounts for the United Russia candidates. Then Secretary of State Clinton <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russia-elections-clinton/">demanded further investigations</a>, which lent support to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16042797">anti-Putin demonstrations</a> across Russia.</p>
<h2>Understanding Russian information warfare</h2>
<p>Russia has a long history of using information as a political and military tool. Domestically, the practice of doctoring and censoring information dates back to the <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/4925.html">beginnings of the commercial newspaper industry</a> during the late years of imperial Russia. It continued, in an ever more sophisticated form, <a href="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2280.pdf">throughout the Soviet era</a>. </p>
<p>Using information as a support for domestic political systems led to its use as a lever in foreign affairs and a weapon in military conflict. That did not disappear with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Rather, <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf">decades-old methods have been used in new ways</a>.</p>
<p>Some Russian cyberattacks made headlines for backfiring. The <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">large-scale DDoS attack on Estonia</a> in 2007, a response to the <a href="http://archive.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/04/28/violence_continues_over_estonias_removal_of_soviet_war_statue/">relocation of a Soviet war memorial</a>, failed. In fact, it pushed Estonia to <a href="http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/01/heres-what-us-could-learn-estonia-about-cybersecurity/103959/">build some of the world’s strongest cyberdefenses</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/139668/original/image-20160928-27014-dmetwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian troops in South Ossetia in 2008.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASouth_Ossetia_war_58_army.jpg">Yana Amelina</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A year later, Russia brought information warfare to its <a href="http://www.zdnet.com/article/coordinated-russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack-in-progress/">conflict with Georgia</a>. Targeting Georgian communications, both online and <a href="http://aidworkerdaily.com/2008/08/11/it-still-very-difficult-to-get-a-call-anywhere-around-the-country-right-now-npr/">physically</a>, its efforts were not only aimed at providing an advantage for troops on the ground. They also had the goal of preventing the spread of objections to Russia’s forcible annexation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Word got out anyway.</p>
<p>Similar efforts have been under way in Russia since the beginnings of the <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CyberWarinPerspective_Jaitner_10.pdf">Ukraine crisis</a>. Sometimes they have been <a href="http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin's%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf">unimaginative and unsuccessful</a>; other efforts have been <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2015/proceedings/03_jaitner_mattsson.pdf">more effective</a>. </p>
<p>For example, many people still question the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880">“Western” version</a> of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35706048">Malaysia Airlines 17 plane crash</a>, which pins the blame on Russia or the Kremlin-backed separatists in Ukraine. This skepticism is an effect of Russian propaganda. While the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/27/europe/mh17-report-russia-radar/">Russian versions</a> have failed to convince most people, they still have spread doubts about who actually shot down the airliner in 2014.</p>
<h2>Taking on the West</h2>
<p>Russia conducts both overt and covert information operations in Europe and the U.S. The overt methods include using state-owned Russian media outlets <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/10/kremlins-sputnik-newswire-is-the-buzzfeed-of-propaganda/">to inject pro-Russian narratives into the political discourse</a>. Less visible efforts include having individuals and groups spread Russia’s messages, a phenomenon that has become known as a “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/world/europe/russia-finland-nato-trolls.html">troll army</a>.” Also, well-placed <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-wages-hybrid-war-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html">individuals and interest groups spread Russian narratives</a> in support of their own causes, with some even <a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/news/marine-le-pens-party-asks-russia-for-27-million-loan-51896">being paid for their support</a>.</p>
<p>As with the Malaysia Airlines 17 narrative, <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/it-not-easy-counter-putins-barrage-lies-333506?rm=eu">credibility is not always Russia’s main goal</a>. Rather, it’s just trying to spread distrust of official viewpoints, particularly those coming from the EU or NATO. With any Western fringe group Russia can attract, it is attempting to stall Western decisions, sow discontent and distrust, and draw apart societies and partnerships.</p>
<p>We are now seeing this tactic making inroads in the American political discourse. For example, the <a href="http://www.thewrap.com/dnc-wikileaks-shocking-revelations-bernie-sanders-arina-grande-wasserman-schultz-democrat/">DNC emails released by WikiLeaks</a> showed party leaders’ prejudices against insurgent candidate Bernie Sanders, and their efforts to divert DNC funds to help Clinton win the nomination. </p>
<p>Although the revelations don’t disclose anything illegal, the popular narrative from many U.S. media outlets was that the DNC <a href="http://yournewswire.com/wikileaks-dnc-committed-election-fraud-against-bernie-sanders/">unduly influenced</a> the outcome of the primary. That divided the Democratic Party, potentially giving Trump an advantage. </p>
<p>Similarly, recent <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/guccifer-2-0-releases-documents-dccc-hack-n629631">DCCC voting list releases</a> shouldn’t have any direct effect on the electoral outcomes in November, but spread doubt about the legitimacy of the election. There’s also no way to say whether it worked – if Trump ends up winning, it’ll be impossible to say any of these leaks was the cause.</p>
<h2>Ties to the Russian government</h2>
<p>There are some advantages to taking on adversaries in cyberspace, rather than the physical world. It is less costly in terms of risk and escalation: Conventional espionage would require physical infiltrations and, if caught, could spark an escalating crisis between Russia and the U.S. Cyberspace is also relatively ungoverned by <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=RydACgAAQBAJ&pg=PA111&lpg=PA111&dq=cyber+and+weak+international+law&source=bl&ots=t6CKxCGmdL&sig=YpeeI6PVMA8VlRbmbMqD2_h6pbw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi0ptHojqbPAhXF5YMKHcvYCvAQ6AEIMjAD#v=onepage&q=cyber%20and%20weak%20international%20law&f=false">international law</a> and a much easier place to achieve <a href="https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/state-proxies-and-plausible-deniability-challenging-conventional-wisdom-644.html">plausible deniability</a>.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/29/cozy-bear-fancy-bear-russia-hack-dnc">evidence to the contrary</a>, the Russian government has denied any involvement or collusion with Cozy Bear, Fancy Bear, Guccifer 2.0, the <a href="https://labsblog.f-secure.com/2015/09/17/the-dukes-7-years-of-russian-cyber-espionage/">Dukes</a> and <a href="https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf">Quedagh</a>. Usually malicious nonstate group cyberattackers are motivated by money – but these groups and individuals seem to be focused on stealing information that could be used geopolitically against Russia’s adversaries. That suggests a direct connection to the Russian government.</p>
<p>Key to stopping these incursions will be improving American <a href="http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-importance-of-cyber-hygiene-in-cyberspace/">cyber-hygiene</a> practices, building more resilient networks throughout the public and private sectors and promoting international cyber-norms. Therefore, perhaps contrary to the <a href="http://drryanmaness.wixsite.com/irprof">sophisticated cyberattacks</a> it has launched in the past, the U.S. must cooperate with international efforts to improve global cybersecurity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Margarita Levin Jaitner receives funding from Swedish Defence University. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan C. Maness does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The FBI is warning of Russian cyberattackers probing American election systems. Information warfare scholars discuss Russia’s digital efforts to benefit its national interests.Ryan C. Maness, Visiting Fellow in Political Science, Northeastern UniversityMargarita Levin Jaitner, Researcher of Information Operations, Russia Project, Military Studies, Swedish Defence UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/635442016-08-05T10:01:08Z2016-08-05T10:01:08ZIf two countries waged cyber war on each another, here’s what to expect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133136/original/image-20160804-513-1eqkv50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-124191613/stock-photo-hacker-attack-background.html?src=BSvU_gtuq7pgomeZg_fxDw-1-19">lolloj</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine you woke up to discover a massive cyber attack on your country. All government data has been destroyed, taking out healthcare records, birth certificates, social care records and so much more. The transport system isn’t working, traffic lights are blank, immigration is in chaos and all tax records have disappeared. The internet has been reduced to an error message and daily life as you know it has halted. </p>
<p>This might sound fanciful but don’t be so sure. When countries declare war on one another in future, this sort of disaster might be the opportunity the enemy is looking for. The internet has brought us many great things but it has made us more vulnerable. Protecting against such futuristic violence is one of the key challenges of the 21st century. </p>
<p>Strategists know that the most fragile part of internet infrastructure is the energy supply. The starting point in serious cyber warfare may well be to trip the power stations which power the data centres involved with the core routing elements of the network. </p>
<p>Back-up generators and uninterruptible power supplies might offer protection, but they don’t always work and can potentially be hacked. In any case, backup power is usually designed to shut off after a few hours. That is enough time to correct a normal fault, but cyber attacks might require backup for days or even weeks. </p>
<p>William Cohen, the former US secretary of defence, <a href="http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/William-Cohen-defense-chief-terrorist-attack-power-grid/2015/06/29/id/652742/">recently predicted</a> such a major outage would cause large-scale economic damage and civil unrest throughout a country. In a war situation, this could be enough to bring about defeat. Janet Napolitano, a former secretary at the US Department of Homeland Security, <a href="http://www.offthegridnews.com/grid-threats/napolitano-warns-downed-power-grid-is-inevitable-due-to-cyber-attack/">believes</a> the American system is not well enough protected to avoid this. </p>
<h2>Denial of service</h2>
<p>An attack on the national grid could involve what is called a <a href="http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DDoS_attack.html">distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack</a>. These use multiple computers to flood a system with information from many sources at the same time. This could make it easier for hackers to neutralise the backup power and tripping the system. </p>
<p>DDoS attacks are also a major threat in their own right. They could overload the main network gateways of a country and cause major outages. Such attacks are commonplace against the private sector, particularly finance companies. Akamai Technologies, which controls 30% of internet traffic, <a href="https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/about/news/press/2016-press/akamai-releases-first-quarter-2016-state-of-the-internet-security-report.jsp">recently said</a> these are the most worrying kind of attack and becoming ever more sophisticated. </p>
<p>Akamai recently monitored a sustained attack against a media outlet of 363 gigabits per second (Gbps) – a scale which few companies, let alone a nation, could cope with for long. Networks specialist Verisign <a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_GB/forms/reportcyberthreatstrends.xhtml">reports</a> a shocking 111% increase in DDoS attacks per year, almost half of them over 10 Gbps in scale – much more powerful than previously. The <a href="https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/about/news/press/2016-press/akamai-releases-first-quarter-2016-state-of-the-internet-security-report.jsp">top sources</a> are Vietnam, Brazil and Colombia.</p>
<p><strong>Number of attacks</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133098/original/image-20160804-496-1r4cwza.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Verisign</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Scale of attacks</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=177&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133100/original/image-20160804-505-1p0xdpd.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=223&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Verisign</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most DDoS attacks swamp an internal network with traffic <a href="http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/35571/how-does-a-reflection-attack-work">via the</a> DNS and NTP servers that provide most core services within the network. Without DNS the internet wouldn’t work, but it is weak from a security point of view. Specialists have been trying to come up with a solution, but building security into these servers to recognise DDoS attacks appears to mean re-engineering the entire internet. </p>
<h2>How to react</h2>
<p>If a country’s grid were taken down by an attack for any length of time, the ensuing chaos would potentially be enough to win a war outright. If instead its online infrastructure were substantially compromised by a DDoS attack, the response would probably go like this:</p>
<p><strong>Phase one: Takeover of network</strong>: the country’s security operations centre would need to take control of internet traffic to stop its citizens from crashing the internal infrastructure. We <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/turkey-shows-hint-what-would-happen-cyber-warfare-william-buchanan?articleId=8214254822041100839">possibly saw this</a> in the failed Turkish coup a few weeks ago, where YouTube and social media went completely offline inside the country. </p>
<p><strong>Phase two: Analysis of attack</strong>: security analysts would be trying to figure out how to cope with the attack without affecting the internal operation of the network. </p>
<p><strong>Phase three: Observation and large-scale control</strong>: the authorities would be faced with countless alerts about system crashes and problems. The challenge would be to ensure only key alerts reached the analysts trying to overcome the problems before the infrastructure collapsed. A key focus would be ensuring military, transport, energy, health and law enforcement systems were given the highest priority, along with financial systems. </p>
<p><strong>Phase four: Observation and fine control</strong>: by this stage there would be some stability and the attention could turn to lesser but important alerts regarding things like financial and commercial interests.</p>
<p><strong>Phase five: Coping and restoring</strong>: this would be about restoring normality and trying to recover damaged systems. The challenge would be to reach this phase as quickly as possible with the least sustained damage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=356&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/133139/original/image-20160804-513-143grda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mission: recovery.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-354538334/stock-photo-specialists-with-network-cable-macro-photo.html?src=oBinwJXlUrmMHubLWEQt7w-1-34">kirill_makarov</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>State of play</h2>
<p>If even the security-heavy US is concerned about its grid, the same is likely to be true of most countries. I suspect many countries are not well drilled to cope with sustained DDoS, especially given the fundamental weaknesses in DNS servers. Small countries are particularly at risk because they often depend on infrastructure that reaches a central point in a larger country nearby. </p>
<p>The UK, it should be said, is probably better placed than some countries to survive cyber warfare. It enjoys an independent grid and GCHQ and the National Crime Agency have helped to encourage some of the best private sector security operations centres in the world. Many countries could probably learn a great deal from it. Estonia, whose infrastructure was disabled for several days in 2007 <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-attack/">following</a> a cyber attack, is now <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/be26fbd2-5005-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a">looking at</a> moving copies of government data to the UK for protection. </p>
<p>Given the current level of international tension and the potential damage from a major cyber attack, this is an area that all countries need to take very seriously. Better to do it now rather than waiting until one country pays the price. For better and worse, the world has never been so connected.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63544/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Buchanan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How the internet has made us terrifyingly vulnerable.Bill Buchanan, Head, The Cyber Academy, Edinburgh Napier UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/500142015-11-08T19:21:45Z2015-11-08T19:21:45ZIt’s time for an eAustralia Card<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101016/original/image-20151106-16273-58zecd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A digitally integrated identity card with comprehensive security could simplify many transactions with government and business.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australian e-government is a long way behind many other developed nations. Our national leadership has utterly failed to comprehend why e-government should have been a national priority decades ago, and continues to offer little in the way of policy direction.</p>
<p>Hence, our current solutions are a bizarre mish-mash of inconsistent approaches, making it confusing and frustrating for Australians. Every mis-step sets back public trust in online government services. Usability, reliability and security are the keys.</p>
<p>The Australian Tax Office (<a href="https://www.ato.gov.au/">ATO</a>), for example, provides online data entry, but inadequate explanatory guidance. Searching the ATO website is risky because it also contains obsolete material from previous years. </p>
<p>The ATO communicates by print-formatted electronic documents to a separate MyGov email inbox, making reference to non-existent additional information, yet two-way communication is not possible through this service.</p>
<p>If the <a href="https://www.dto.gov.au">Digital Transformation Office</a> is appropriately funded, empowered and motivated, then a top-down review of government services may be able to address the usability and reliability issues over time. Of much greater concern and urgency is the challenge of digital identity. </p>
<h2>Who are you?</h2>
<p>The Australian <a href="https://mygov.gov.au">MyGov</a> identity system was developed by the Department of Human Services (<a href="http://www.humanservices.gov.au/">DHS</a>) for the online delivery of Centrelink and Medicare transactions in particular. </p>
<p>According to the Department’s <a href="http://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/about-us/">own website</a>, it has no role in the development of government-wide online services. So it is perplexing that the ATO has adopted an identity solution from a non-specialist department, developed to address a particular application and its own list of security concerns.</p>
<p>Whether those particular security concerns are relevant to the ATO is not clear. It’s also not clear whether a top-down threat assessment was ever conducted for either the DHS or the ATO.</p>
<p>The security threat is not just that government agencies want to protect their own systems, it is also that the users of these services need to be able to trust that their private information is accurate, correctable, auditable and secure. </p>
<p>The key issue is establishing that the digital identity of an account truly belongs to the physical person. Unfortunately, personal health records, social security payments and tax details provide a strong incentive for identity theft, and MyGov’s identity verification process is weak.</p>
<p>So how else could you establish that you really are who you say you are?</p>
<h2>The UK and New Zealand</h2>
<p>The UK government rightly puts identity front and centre in the mission of the <a href="https://gds.blog.gov.uk/category/id-assurance/">Government Digital Service</a>. And the UK government has been at pains to <a href="https://gds.blog.gov.uk/2014/01/23/what-is-identity-assurance/">consult and to explain publicly</a> how the digital identity system will work.</p>
<p>In the UK model, identity is established by one of a small number of private service providers, using multiple identification sources. In most cases, this can be done entirely online. The UK government also believes that the private sector is the most efficient way to develop evolving solutions to minimise the risk of emerging identity fraud attacks.</p>
<p>There is a further requirement that identity verification for a particular government service is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/06/govuk-quietly-disrupts-the-problem-of-online-identity-login">proportionate</a> to the service. Passports need biometric verification, but other services have less stringent requirements.</p>
<p>We have similar familiar in-person processes in the form of a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_point_check">100 point check</a> for financial service providers such as banks, and multiple identity documents for passports.</p>
<p>New Zealand has followed the UK model with <a href="https://www.realme.govt.nz">RealMe</a>. However, the service is provided by the <a href="http://www.dia.govt.nz/">Department of Internal Affairs</a> in collaboration with the New Zealand Post Office rather than private providers. Once identity has been established, details can be shared with service providers.</p>
<p>Of particular interest in New Zealand is that RealMe is sufficient to open a bank account and apply for a passport entirely online.</p>
<h2>The Estonian approach</h2>
<p>The mature and battle-hardened <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-australia-can-learn-about-e-government-from-estonia-35091">Estonian e-government</a> approach includes digital signatures, electronic prescriptions, online voting, and opening and operating both bank accounts and online businesses. Estonia has also extended its digital services to so-called e-Residents. </p>
<p>Estonia’s identity solution requires a smart identity card to be issued in person, which is when they collect biometric information, including a photograph and fingerprints. A smartphone application also provides identity validation for lower risk services.</p>
<p>The underlying system architecture provides a very robust and secure platform for both government and private sector services, even enabling users to verify who has been accessing their private information, and why.</p>
<p>The Estonian approach works in no small part because of <a href="http://www.themandarin.com.au/31637-australia-false-understanding-privacy-says-estonia-cio/?pgnc=1">strong and effective leadership in the 1990s</a>, which brought with it public support. Whether or not Estonians like their current government, there is an inherent sense of trust in the security of government services.</p>
<h2>What is happening in Australia?</h2>
<p>If you search hard enough in the Digital Transformation Office website, you’ll eventually find a glib reference to <a href="https://www.dto.gov.au/budget/trusted-digital-identity-framework">digital identity</a>. Just <a href="https://www.dto.gov.au/budget">A$254 million</a> has been budgeted over four years to begin the transformation of Australia’s Commonwealth services to online delivery. That’s less than half the cost of the <a href="http://indaily.com.au/news/2014/05/07/oval-costs-wrap-610m/">Adelaide Oval redevelopment</a>, but with enormous and quantifiable long term benefits to Australia’s economy and society.</p>
<p>In 1985 the Hawke Labor government proposed a national identity card, the <a href="http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/cabinet/by-year/1984-85/australia-card.aspx">Australia Card</a>, which was subsequently abandoned in 1987. Politics got in the way of our nation’s leaders to grapple with real policy substance, to Australia’s detriment. </p>
<p>Robust policy debate still might not have delivered the Australia Card, but whatever solution emerged might have set up Australia to be a world leader in the delivery of modern government services.</p>
<p>Policy needs to be driven by open public discussion and consultation. The UK and New Zealand models are compatible with Australian expectations, although the Estonian smart-card based solution is far more robust and versatile.</p>
<p>We have two clear choices: an eAustralia Card would offer flexibity, security and convenience, not to mention eliminating a half-dozen cards from a typical wallet; or we can continue to fail to innovate, swallow our pride and follow New Zealand’s lead.</p>
<p>In the absence of well-considered policy driving e-government services, Australians will continue to have no good reason to trust our government to keep our private information secure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sorell holds an Estonian "e-Resident" Digital ID Card and has a research relationship with the Tallinn University of Technology.</span></em></p>It’s time to bring our digital identity up to date with other developed nations. That might even mean a unified digital identity card with top notch security and privacy protections.Matthew Sorell, Senior Lecturer, School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.