tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/eu-citizens-in-uk-55809/articlesEU citizens in UK – The Conversation2021-06-30T16:01:47Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1636732021-06-30T16:01:47Z2021-06-30T16:01:47ZSettled status deadline: what’s next for EU citizens in the UK?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409116/original/file-20210630-27-t9hp78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C81%2C4868%2C3172&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/uk-biometrical-residence-permit-cards-brp-1532038592">Ascannio/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Today, June 30, is the deadline to apply for EU Settled Status. All EU, EEA and Swiss citizens living in the UK (before December 31 2020), as well as their non-EU family members, needed to submit an application to the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) before the deadline to secure their continued rights to live and work in the UK.</p>
<p>In many respects, the scheme has been incredibly successful, with more than <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/eu-settlement-scheme-statistics">5.6 million applications</a> as of the end of May – at least <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/eu-settlement-scheme-the-5-million/">1 million more than expected</a>. But no scheme has ever reached a 100% application rate, and the UK does not know how many people need to apply. Therefore, claims of success must be tempered with the reality of an unknowable number of people for whom the scheme has not worked -– only in the coming months and years will this number become apparent.</p>
<p>EU, EEA and Swiss nationals, and their family members, now fall into one of five categories. Here’s what it means for each of them. </p>
<h2>1. Those with settled status</h2>
<p>Settled status will have been awarded to people who applied in time, showing more than five years of residency in the UK. To date, 52% of applicants to the scheme have received settled status. This status is the equivalent to indefinite leave to remain (ILR) and this group keeps most of the rights they had under EU free movement. So they will face no restrictions in access to, for example, welfare benefits, housing and healthcare. </p>
<p>However, this group will now need to prove their rights in the UK, particularly when applying for jobs or seeking housing. Since settled status is recorded digitally, its holders can “view and share” their status and generate a digital shareable code to prove their immigration status to any relevant third parties, such as employers and landlords. They will lose their settled status if they are absent from the UK for more than five years.</p>
<h2>2. Those with pre-settled status</h2>
<p>Those who have applied and been awarded EU pre-settled status have shown less than five years’ residency in the UK. This is the equivalent of limited leave to remain (LLR) and this group keep some of the same rights they had under EU free movement, such as the right to work. </p>
<p>One significant difference for this group, compared with those with settled status, is around additional tests to access welfare benefits. This is subject to <a href="https://www.eurightshub.york.ac.uk/blog/1jspkx6yi70lnnyckej80741peipe7">ongoing litigation</a>. Pre-settled status holders will also need to “prove” their rights and can generate a shareable code to give evidence of their status to employers and landlords. </p>
<p>UK law requires this group to make another application to the scheme to move from pre-settled to settled status once they have been in the UK for five years. So far, 43% of applicants to the scheme have received this status, meaning that eventually, over 2 million people will need to reapply to the scheme to secure settled status in the UK.</p>
<h2>3. Pending applications (pre-deadline)</h2>
<p>The next group are those who have submitted applications to the scheme “in time”, but have not yet received a decision. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/may/10/eu-citizens-applying-for-settled-status-face-legal-limbo-due-to-backlog">backlog</a> is at least 400,000 people, probably more, given the pre-deadline surge of 10,000-12,000 applications a day. Recent reports show that <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/children-babies-eu-settlement-scheme-home-office-b1864161.html">26% of this backlog</a> are applications for children – despite children representing only <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/eu-settlement-scheme-statistics">15% of the total applications to date</a>. Once an application is made, the person receives a certificate of application, which immigration minister <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jun/23/eu-citizens-in-uk-face-28-day-notice-if-they-miss-settled-status-deadline">Kevin Foster has confirmed</a> can be used as evidence of continued rights pending a decision.</p>
<h2>4. Late applications: reasonable grounds</h2>
<p>It was always known that there would need to be a mechanism for late applicants for those with “reasonable grounds”. In April of this year, the Home Office <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/988540/main-euss-guidance-v12.0-gov-uk.pdf">updated caseworker guidance</a> on what would constitute <a href="https://www.freemovement.org.uk/eu-settlement-scheme-late-applications-euss/">“reasonable grounds”</a> for a late application to the scheme. A non-exhaustive list includes examples such as applicants under 18, adults with care or support needs, or those suffering from a serious illness. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="An advertisement at a bus stop urging EU citizens living in the UK to apply for the settlement scheme." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409117/original/file-20210630-17-1hpxy8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">EU citizens in the UK have been encouraged to apply for the EU Settlement Scheme before the June 30 deadline.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/27-2019-billboard-hm-government-street-1359850634">Brookgardener/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government indicated it would be lenient in the short term, but less so as time passes. The government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jun/23/eu-citizens-in-uk-face-28-day-notice-if-they-miss-settled-status-deadline">also said</a> that those who come into contact with “immigration enforcement” (such as via immigration checks on employers) who have not submitted an application will be issued with a 28-day notice of their need to make an application. </p>
<p>What remains unclear is what happens if someone does not submit an application within the 28-day period. This will, potentially confusingly, create a situation where some late applicants will receive a 28-day notice period to apply, and others will not, but will still be late applicants in need of “reasonable grounds” to justify their tardiness.</p>
<h2>5. Non-applicants: newly undocumented</h2>
<p>This is the least protected group – those who will become undocumented starting July 1. At least, until they are able to start the application process and move into the previous group as a late applicant to the scheme. In the interim, they have <a href="https://www.the3million.org.uk/rights-table">lost their residency rights</a> in the UK and may well come face to face with the reality of the UK’s <a href="https://www.jcwi.org.uk/the-hostile-environment-explained">“hostile environment”</a> (now renamed “<a href="https://theconversation.com/compliant-environment-turning-ordinary-people-into-border-guards-should-concern-everyone-in-the-uk-107066">compliant environment</a>”) towards undocumented migrants. This could include immigration enforcement action, such as deportation. </p>
<p>This is the group on which the government has no data. Even an estimated 1% of eligible people not applying to the scheme could put this group into the tens of thousands from July 1. Sustained work will be needed to identify and support this group to submit late applications in line with the “reasonable grounds” threshold, potentially for many months and even years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163673/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Barnard receives funding from the ESRC's UK in a Changing Europe programme. . </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Costello receives funding from the ESRC through the UK in a Changing Europe Programme.
Fiona Costello also works for charity, GYROS/ CPP Project, in Norfolk. </span></em></p>As we pass a key deadline, what will happen to the millions of EU citizens living in the UK?Catherine Barnard, Professor of EU law and employment law, University of CambridgeFiona Costello, Research associate, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1177062019-05-23T15:45:21Z2019-05-23T15:45:21ZEuropean elections – government was warned voters could be turned away at polling stations<p>As polling got underway in the European elections in the UK, stories began to emerge about EU nationals being turned away from polling stations because they were not properly registered. As the day went on, more and more claims were being made. #DeniedMyVote began trending, with well over 20,000 tweets being sent out by lunchtime.</p>
<p>But their troubles could have been predicted. The UK’s system of electoral administration has been creaking for some time. The government has long known about a range of issues that need improvement.</p>
<p>These European elections were particularly important to EU citizens in the UK, because the franchise for the 2016 Brexit referendum had excluded them from voting on something that clearly had a major impact upon them. Many saw this as their first real opportunity to express their views on Brexit at the polls. </p>
<p>The problem with EU citizens in the UK arose because they were required to submit an additional form along with their electoral registration form before they could be fully registered. This additional form certified that they would only vote once – in the UK rather than the country where they hold citizenship.</p>
<p>Amid fears that this additional requirement would disenfranchise EU citizens, campaign groups for EU citizens, such as <a href="https://www.the3million.org.uk/let-us-vote-campaign">The 3 Million</a>, had complained that this requirement was not well publicised. They made considerable efforts to communicate this more widely. They made representations to the Electoral Commission and to local authorities. Questions were also asked in <a href="https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2019-05-09.252485.h&s=european+elections+citizens#g252485.r0">parliament</a> around this issue to attempt to get government to resolve it, to little effect.</p>
<p>There were also reports of British citizens registered as overseas voters having similar problems. Some said they <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48351281">had not received their postal votes</a> in time to return them. The legal timetables for sending out such ballots were inevitably tight. And, when coupled with the vagaries of domestic and international postal systems, it was almost inevitable that some ballot papers would arrive too late.</p>
<h2>Why did this happen?</h2>
<p>Lots of voters inevitably feel disenfranchised. Many are calling it a scandal. In reality, issues of this sort had been brewing for a long time, and had largely been ignored by government. My <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/identifying-the-determinants-of-electoral-integrity-and-administration-in-advanced-democracies-the-case-of-britain/4B51C001A3133DD2E7C81DF9DAE4E914">own research</a> into election administration sheds some light into how such difficulties arose.</p>
<p>Election administrators are the unsung heroes of the electoral process. Most of the people who work in polling stations and at counts are volunteers, employed only for the duration of the election itself. They are not experts. Professional election services and registration teams are very small – with as few as three people working on them in some local authorities. The speed and uncertainty of events in recent years has put them under immense pressure. The Association of Electoral Administrators has been very publicly offering members support to help them cope in the run-up to these European elections.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1129424543217528832"}"></div></p>
<p>Electoral administration has been underfunded in the UK for some time. Austerity has taken its toll on budgets. And, in 2014, individual voter registration was introduced. This was intended to tidy up the register and ensure accuracy but, instead, many people have fallen off registers. People have no easy way of checking whether they are registered, which not only means that some people are no longer on the register but also has the perverse affect of driving people who are already registered to try to register again every time a vote comes up. Such duplicate registrations inevitably increase the workload of small electoral registration teams. </p>
<p>Spending on election administration is vital <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512118824787">if elections are to run smoothly</a>. In <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">research</a> done for the Electoral Commission on the 2016 EU Referendum, we found 43% of our respondents saying that they had <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">insufficient funds to maintain their register</a>. The short notice with which the European elections were called has inevitably driven up costs for both registration and administration.</p>
<p>Research I have carried out into polling station workers (with Toby James from the University of East Anglia) has shown that the most regular problem faced in polling stations is not electoral fraud – as is often claimed – but people being <a href="https://theconversation.com/voter-id-our-first-results-suggest-local-election-pilot-was-unnecessary-and-ineffective-100859">turned away because they are not on the register</a> for whatever reason. The Electoral Commission has started collecting data on this and is asking election observers for more feedback to help understand the issue.</p>
<p>Nor are problems with overseas voting a new problem. We identified this as something to be addressed in research we did for the <a href="https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/214991/A-Clark-and-T-S-James,-Electoral-Administration-at-the-EU-Referendum-September-2016.pdf">Electoral Commission</a> on the 2016 EU Referendum.</p>
<h2>Wrong priorities</h2>
<p>The government is thinking about asking voters to show ID at polling stations, after running pilots in local elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/13/second-voter-id-trial-sees-800-people-unable-to-vote-in-local-elections">2018 and 2019</a> – a move that many fear will lead to people being disenfranchised. There are may be problems in electoral administration in the UK, but impersonation fraud is not one of them.</p>
<p>Electoral Commission data show that, while there were 266 allegations of electoral fraud in the 2018 local elections, there had been only one conviction and two cautions – and none for impersonating another voter. That’s from an eligible electorate of around 21.5 million voters.</p>
<p>These European elections are a stark reminder that more pressing problems are at hand.</p>
<p>Responsibility for running elections in the UK is confused. The Electoral Commission has no powers of direction over local returning officers or registration, except in specific circumstances around running referendums. It can advise, but not direct. Meanwhile, returning officers run the elections in their locality, with support from their local authorities, but are not responsible for the national picture.</p>
<p>The Cabinet Office has a role in delivering electoral administration, but this has not been an obvious priority given other competing demands. Uncertainty around Brexit and the short notice for of these European elections will surely have played a part in voters being turned away on polling day.</p>
<p>The UK’s electoral administration is clearly creaking at the seams. Administrators achieve a lot, under very difficult circumstances. But there is only so much they can do. #DeniedMyVote should not have happened. It did so as much by government omission as anything more sinister. But the government has been warned about this problem – again and again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117706/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alistair Clark has I the past received research funding from the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust for research into polling station workers, and from the Electoral Commission for research and evaluation into electoral administration in the 2016 EU Referendum (both with Toby S. James). </span></em></p>Chronic underfunding has made elections difficult to run in the UK. Yet the government continues to obsess over voter ID.Alistair Clark, Senior Lecturer in Politics, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142222019-03-28T11:33:24Z2019-03-28T11:33:24ZBrexit: what a delay means for EU citizens and the settled status scheme<p>Amid the ongoing Brexit stalemate, the Home Office is pushing ahead with its plan for EU citizens living in the UK to register for a new “settled status”. It has launched a new nationwide <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-launches-nationwide-campaign-for-eu-settlement-scheme">marketing campaign</a> to encourage them to apply for the EU Settlement Scheme before its full roll-out on March 30. </p>
<p>All this is happening despite uncertainty over what the date of Brexit will actually be. At a crunch EU summit in Brussels on March 21, the EU agreed to grant the UK <a href="https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7960#fullreport">two possible extensions</a> of varying length to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M050">article 50</a> negotiating period which governs the Brexit process.</p>
<p>If MPs in Westminster don’t approve the Brexit withdrawal agreement by March 29, then the Brexit date will be extended until April 12. If they do approve it, the extension will be until May 22. Yet the option to revoke the article 50 notification period – or cancel Brexit – and the option for a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/21/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-the-european-council-meeting-art-50/">long extension</a> remain possible, should the UK decide to hold European Parliament elections.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-deadline-extended-why-brussels-chose-these-dates-and-what-happens-now-114050">Brexit deadline extended: why Brussels chose these dates and what happens now</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There are estimated to be over 3m EU citizens living in the UK and around 1.3m British citizens living in <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.asp">other EU countries</a>. So what do the extended dates mean for citizens unsure of their status once the UK leaves the EU? </p>
<p>After Brexit, the rights of EU citizens in the UK will be protected either under <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/notes/division/2/index.htm">national law</a> or by the existing international treaties the UK has signed, such as the <a href="https://rightsinfo.org/the-rights-in-the-european-convention/">European Convention of Human Rights</a>. The rights of UK nationals elsewhere in the EU will fall back on the protections provided by each country and EU legislation on the rights of third country nationals, such as the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0109">long term residents directive</a>. This setup is likely to remain in place until the UK and the EU agree a future international treaty upon which their relationship will be based – when the second stage of Brexit is complete. </p>
<h2>EU citizens in the UK</h2>
<p>The rights currently guaranteed to mobile EU citizens and their families by EU law are wide ranging and often strongly depend on whether they are economically active. These <a href="https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/2939190">include</a> the right to work, study and to undertake self-employment activity. They also include the rights to pensions and healthcare, and the possibility to draw on <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-and-benefits-why-leaving-the-eu-wont-solve-britains-migration-issues-60916">social welfare benefits</a>. </p>
<p>If the current withdrawal agreement is not approved by MPs, then EU law will cease to apply in the UK on April 12 if it leaves the bloc without a deal. So, it’s likely that most of these rights will depend on whether a person has the right to live legally in the UK. As of today, much uncertainty remains regarding the precise details of some rights, for example EU citizens’ access to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eea-nationals-in-the-uk-access-to-social-housing-and-homelessness-assistance-in-a-no-deal-scenario">social housing and homelessness assistance</a> or <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-citizens-in-the-uk-benefits-and-pensions-in-a-no-deal-scenario">benefits and pensions</a>.</p>
<p>The government’s principle mechanism for determining the right of residence for non-Irish EU citizens after Brexit is the settled status scheme, which will be launched on March 30. It doesn’t cover Irish nationals, who will be protected in the same way as the UK nationals. </p>
<p>According to the scheme’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families">official guidance</a>, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal, EU citizens will have until December 31, 2020 to register. If MPs do agree the Brexit deal, the timeframe for registration would be longer: June 30, 2021. Those who don’t apply by these deadlines may <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/deportations-removals-and-voluntary-departures-from-the-uk/">risk deportation</a> from the UK. This means that despite the uncertainty over when Brexit will actually happen, EU citizens are still encouraged to apply for settled status. They can seek <a href="http://www.eurights.uk/">free advice on how to do this</a>. </p>
<p>In a no-deal scenario, EU citizens in the UK will find it <a href="https://adminlawblog.org/2019/01/11/joe-tomlinson-and-byron-karmeba-no-deal-no-appeal-a-case-for-amending-the-uks-immigration-and-social-security-co-ordination-eu-withdrawal-bill/">more difficult</a> to challenge administrative immigration decisions in relation to settled status applications, especially given the UK’s extremely <a href="https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/simplifying-the-immigration-rules/">complex</a> current immigration rules. This is because the <a href="https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/immigrationandsocialsecuritycoordinationeuwithdrawal.html">Immigration and Social Security Coordination Bill</a>, currently going through parliament, doesn’t provide for a right to appeal to a tribunal in such circumstances. </p>
<p>In contrast, if a deal is agreed, the right to appeal decision is provided for in the withdrawal agreement, ensuring access to justice and better protection for some of the <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Report-Unsettled_Status_3.pdf">most vulnerable EU citizens at risk</a>. These include – among others – children, carers, women, people who believe they are ineligible, or who will struggle to submit an application due to language, age, disability or digital literacy.</p>
<h2>British citizens in the EU</h2>
<p>Despite calls from citizens, the EU has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47408789">refused</a> to act separately to safeguard the rights of EU citizens in a no-deal scenario. As with the UK, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/residence-rights-uk-nationals-eu-member-states_en">many EU countries</a> will require UK nationals to complete temporary registration with the authorities, in order for their residence to be legally recognised. </p>
<p>The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office published <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/overseas-living-in-guides">guidance</a> for UK nationals living in the EU which explains what residence rules will apply in each member state, and the Department for Work and Pensions has drafted special guidance on <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-nationals-in-the-eu-benefits-and-pensions-in-a-no-deal-scenario">benefits and pensions</a>. The European Commission also recently published <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/factsheets-and-questions-and-answers_en">several factsheets</a> to help EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU plan their life in the case of no deal. </p>
<p>Despite this, there are many EU rights that are awarded to anyone living in an EU member state, regardless of their citizenship. These include consumer protection, workers’ rights or environmental protection, which award common guarantees that will <a href="https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/questioning-eu-citizenship-9781509914654/">continue to be</a> applied to UK nationals living in the EU after Brexit. </p>
<p>For many, the uncertainty regarding their rights will remain. Once Brexit takes place, the next step will be to <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-options-for-uk-trade-after-brexit-62363">negotiate the future relationship between the UK and the EU</a>, which may create a different legal landscape for cross-border rights. But all this will depend on the international treaty negotiated in the second stage of the Brexit process.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Egle Dagilyte has previously consulted the European Commission, The3Million and British in Europe. She is currently carrying out research on the Migrant Workers’ Mapping Project, funded by the Rosmini Centre Wisbech. Her work will contribute to the wider multi-agency two-year project led by the Fenland District Council (sponsored by the Controlling Migration Fund) that aims to understand migration in Fenland better, in preparation for post-Brexit challenges.</span></em></p>What rights and legal protections will EU citizens in the UK and Britons in the EU have when they become ‘third country nationals’ after Brexit?Egle Dagilyte, Senior Lecturer in Law, Anglia Ruskin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1090942018-12-19T19:06:29Z2018-12-19T19:06:29ZUK’s new post-Brexit immigration plan is surreal and cynical<p>The publication of the British government’s <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766465/The-UKs-future-skills-based-immigration-system-print-ready.pdf">white paper</a> for a post-Brexit immigration system is long overdue. But coming so late in the day, with such uncertainty continuing about what Brexit will look like, much of what’s being proposed feels quite surreal.</p>
<p>The UK’s immigration system is currently a malfunctioning mess. It’s overly complicated, opaque and weighed down with political and social expectations that cannot be met. It’s been <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/82/82.pdf">consistently castigated</a> by senior legal figures for being so labyrinthine that even immigration lawyers have difficulty navigating it. It’s expensive, intrusive, and places unreasonable burdens on citizens, including landlords, health service workers and lecturers, to act as if they were <a href="https://theconversation.com/compliant-environment-turning-ordinary-people-into-border-guards-should-concern-everyone-in-the-uk-107066">employed as border guards</a>. The current system can also end up <a href="http://www.irr.org.uk/news/the-windrush-scandal-exposes-the-dangers-of-scaremongering-about-illegal-immigrants/">unfairly discriminating</a> by ethnicity. </p>
<p>Many of these shortcomings are acknowledged in the Home Office’s white paper, and the potential clarity the eventual publication of this document brings to the debate on the UK’s future immigration policy is welcome. </p>
<p>In the immediate aftermath of the white paper’s publication, much was made of the absence of a numerical target <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-immigration-javid/uks-post-brexit-immigration-system-will-not-include-net-migration-target-idUSKBN1OI0OI">for net migration</a>. But this is a red herring. The target has been politically dead in the water since before the 2016 referendum. </p>
<h2>Devil in the detail</h2>
<p>There are other, rather more fundamental changes in the government’s new plans for both migrants and employers. The resident labour market test will be scrapped, meaning employers can recruit directly from outside the UK without having to advertise in the UK first. Migrants on “skilled-employment” visas will also be able to stay for five years, and bring dependants with them. A system of new temporary visas will be created that are not tied to a single employer, enabling migrants to move between employers in precarious and flexible sectors of the labour market. At the same time, these temporary migrants will be prevented from renewing their status or continuing their employment even if they and their employers would prefer it. </p>
<p>What happens to these proposals as they are consulted on, translated into legislation, and then into guidance and Home Office practices will be key. </p>
<p>In UK immigration policy, the devil is always in the detail. Restrictions often become clear in the non-legislative detail of immigration paperwork and key questions must await those technical documents. How high will the health service fee be for migrants on temporary visas? What will the level of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/uk-visa-sponsorship-employers/immigration-skills-charge">“skills charge</a>” be to employers? What checks on prospective qualifications of employees will employers have to make in order to employ someone on a skilled visa?</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the policy outlined in the new white paper has three striking characteristics that shed light on its overall weaknesses. It is in turns, rather surreal, cynical and in places, potentially quite sinister.</p>
<h2>Problems with an earnings threshold</h2>
<p>There is much weight given within the white paper to the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/718237/EU_Settlement_Scheme_SOI_June_2018.pdf">settlement scheme</a> for EU citizens currently living in the UK that will be in place until the end of the Brexit “implementation period” in December 2020. Yet without parliament’s approval of the Brexit withdrawal agreement, which includes a reciprocal arrangement with the EU on the rights of citizens, the political basis for that scheme is void. That means the proposals in the white paper might be dead by March if there is a no-deal Brexit – at least as far as EU citizens are concerned.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-draft-withdrawal-agreement-experts-react-107027">Brexit draft withdrawal agreement – experts react</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Much is made in the white paper of the “skills” basis for the new immigration system. Yet the skilled employment route has two problems. First, it’s likely such a route will be tied to an earnings threshold. The government will consult on a proposal, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-advisory-committee-mac-report-eea-migration">made by the independent Migration Advisory Committee</a> (MAC) in September, to set that threshold at £30,000 a year, just above median earnings. This is politically contentious as there are many skilled workers who earn well below this. Second, it treats “skilled employment” as if this is an objectively measurable attribute – it isn’t. </p>
<p>The policy proposals are also pretty cynical. The MAC report found <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-eu-migration-has-done-for-the-uk-103461">little evidence</a> of large effects of migration on employment and wages. Yet it explicitly made reference to such pressures when it proposed keeping the £30,000 per year earnings threshold for skilled employment, arguing that such a high level might encourage employers to pay their skilled workers – librarians, care workers, physiotherapists, teachers – more. For the same reason, it opposed lowering the income threshold for public sector workers, on the grounds that upward pressure on their wages would be a good thing. </p>
<p>Yet, under current public expenditure levels, skilled public sector workers will not have wage increases to match these requirements. In the face of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/02/cbi-warns-low-skill-visa-cap-carolyn-fairbairn">employer complaints</a>, the government has explicitly invited employers to discuss the rate at which the threshold will be set in a year-long consultation. It’s likely the threshold will go down, directly undermining the MAC’s rationale for having it at all, and continuing to endorse the UK’s low-wage economy. Meanwhile, the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/genderpaygapintheuk/2018">gender pay gap</a>, and the differential treatment of skills in typically male and female employment, means that women migrants are less likely to meet whichever threshold is set. </p>
<h2>Selecting ‘immigrants’</h2>
<p>One of the rather understated, but politically telling, elements of the Home Office’s plans is that they permit two possible divergences from the new employment visa regimes they are proposing. First, new trade agreements after Brexit may open new routes for migrants from preferred countries and the UK will <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-special-migration-rules-in-free-trade-deals-work-103709">trade access to its labour market</a> for those willing to do a deal. Yet it’s unclear how this constitutes “taking back control”, being open, or having a skills-led immigration policy.</p>
<p>The second, is that immigration policy may diverge in future if more immigration routes are closed on the basis of “risk”. “Low-risk nationalities” and “low-risk countries” will have access to the UK. Migrants – however skilled – that do not conform to this “risk” assessment are always vulnerable to exclusion. “Risks” can be defined in many ways and give governments wide powers to select which countries the skilled migrants may come from. And the government is specifically proposing to automate such assessments. This opens the possibility for a return to the outright discriminatory and racist immigration policy of the past. </p>
<p>Overall, the timing of the white paper’s publication is surreal, it presents proposals that rather cynically reproduce existing inequalities in the UK’s precarious labour market and its casts a rather sinister light on how the government thinks about selecting “immigrants” after Brexit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Carmel received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and European Union for a research project, TRANSWEL, completed in July 2018.</span></em></p>The British government’s immigration plans may be long-awaited, but they have not come at a good time.Emma Carmel, Senior Lecturer, Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1065492018-11-08T10:05:36Z2018-11-08T10:05:36ZEU citizens in the UK and a no-deal Brexit – what remains unclear<p>The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union has been a difficult process to navigate from the start. With time running out to secure a Brexit deal, the British immigration minister, Caroline Nokes, caused confusion in early November, when she appeared not to know the UK government’s plans for EU citizens in the event of a no-deal Brexit. </p>
<p>Nokes was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-46034742/yvette-cooper-is-confused-by-caroline-nokes-position-on-eu-migrants-after-brexit?intlink_from_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.co.uk%2Fnews%2Ftopics%2Fcp841kx3edyt%2Fcaroline-nokes&link_location=live-reporting-map">asked by</a> Yvette Cooper, chair of the home affairs select committee, how employers were to distinguish between EU citizens who had just arrived, and EU citizens who had been in the UK for years in the event of a no-deal. Nokes replied that there was an expectation on employers to carry out <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46035919">right-to-work checks rigorously</a>. Yet, this would allow employers to determine who was an EU citizen, and also therefore discriminate against them more easily. </p>
<p>Nokes’s answer directly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-immigration-no-deal-rights-eu-citizens-employers-home-office-caroline-nokes-a8611966.html">contradicted statements</a> issued by the Home Office to EU citizens’ rights campaign groups, which guaranteed that such checks would not be necessary. The confusion caused <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/01/home-office-caroline-nokes-eu-checks-immigration-brexit-employers-right-to-work">panic among EU citizens living in the UK</a>. </p>
<p>Sajid Javid, the home secretary, had to quickly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-46070709">issue a statement reassuring EU citizens</a> that what Nokes said was, in fact, wrong. Instead, there would be a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/nov/01/home-office-caroline-nokes-eu-checks-immigration-brexit-employers-right-to-work">“transition period”</a> before the right-to-work checks were required. Yet it’s not clear whether this is the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43456502">same transition period</a>, due to end in December 2020, that the EU and UK set out as part of the Brexit negotiations.</p>
<p>So what do we really know about what a no-deal Brexit would mean for EU citizens?</p>
<h2>Hinged on the withdrawal agreement</h2>
<p>In March 2018, the EU and UK jointly published a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691366/20180319_DRAFT_WITHDRAWAL_AGREEMENT.pdf">draft withdrawal agreement</a>. The section on citizens’ rights, which was entirely agreed by both sides, suggested that a number of residency rights for EU citizens and their families, whether EU citizens or not, would be protected and continue <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32004L0038">in the same way</a> as they currently exist under EU law. This reciprocally covers EU citizens living in the UK and British citizens in the EU.</p>
<p>However, a <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf">joint report on the progress of negotiations</a> published in December 2017 had included a key caveat: “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. This means that if no deal is reached between the EU and UK, the draft withdrawal agreement would not apply and anything previously agreed in it would not be binding.</p>
<p>In this case, both EU citizens in the UK and British citizens in the EU would be left in a precarious position. In fact, <a href="http://www.senat.fr/leg/pjl18-009.html">a draft law</a> currently going through the French parliament would potentially allow visas to be imposed on British citizens visiting France if the UK exits without a deal. </p>
<h2>Settled status</h2>
<p>In July 2018, the Home Office published its <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/718237/EU_Settlement_Scheme_SOI_June_2018.pdf">guidance on a new EU citizen settlement scheme</a>, which all EU citizens in the UK will need to apply for to secure their right to stay in the UK after Brexit. It was advertised as a straightforward online process with <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44553225">three “simple” steps</a> that applicants must satisfy in order to qualify. </p>
<p>In September 2018, the pilot scheme was rolled out and an <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752872/181031_PB1_Report_Final.pdf">initial report on the first stage</a> of testing declared it a success. However, this was contradicted by the fact that the Home Office itself admitted that the app created to manage the settlement applications <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/04/24/app-eu-citizens-get-uk-residency-brexit-wont-work-apple-phones/">will not work on Apple phones</a>. </p>
<p>The system doesn’t rely on there being a deal reached, so it is possible that in the event of a no-deal, the UK government may still decide to continue with it. Still, there are outstanding issues <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-citizens-what-settled-status-after-brexit-really-means-a-legal-expert-explains-97810">with the EU settlement scheme</a>, separate from those posed by a no-deal scenario, and some have expressed concern that it <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-citizens-at-risk-of-failing-to-secure-settled-status-after-brexit-94947">will be difficult</a> for vulnerable EU citizens to apply. </p>
<p>In September, the Prime Minister Theresa May <a href="https://rightsinfo.org/no-deal-rights/">guaranteed</a> that the rights of EU citizens in the UK will be protected in the event of a no-deal scenario. </p>
<p>But will the EU settlement scheme be abandoned in such a scenario? If so, then those who are not able to claim permanent residency by living in the UK for five years consecutively before March 29 2019 could potentially find themselves at risk of deportation. This raises a whole host of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2958113">human rights issues</a>, mostly related to interferences to private and family life.</p>
<h2>Ending free movement</h2>
<p>The biggest remaining question is when exactly free movement of EU citizens to the UK will end if no specific Brexit deal is reached. Under the terms of the transition period agreed with the EU, it would end after December 2020, meaning any EU citizen arriving to live in the UK until then would be guaranteed the right to stay. But when asked in parliament on November 5 what would happen in the event of a no-deal the government was <a href="https://goo.gl/UtbCcQ">unable to answer</a> whether free movement would immediately cease on March 30 2019.</p>
<p>Though this important question has been asked many times since <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/31/eu-prepares-for-a-no-deal-brexit-amid-lack-of-progress-on-talks">no-deal became more likely</a>, the closer March 29 2019 draws, the more urgently an answer is needed. </p>
<p>Deal or no-deal, the UK government needs to clarify its position on EU citizens’ rights after Brexit as mistakes like those made by Nokes do nothing to reassure those affected, who need to make decisions about their futures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106549/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrienne Yong has consulted for The3Million campaign group. She receives funding from the City Pump Priming Scheme for a project entitled 'The Brexit effect on the private and family lives of EU citizens in the UK'.</span></em></p>There is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding EU citizens’ rights in the event of a no-deal Brexit.Adrienne Yong, Lecturer at The City Law School, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1025212018-09-04T11:28:05Z2018-09-04T11:28:05ZIt’s too early to talk of a ‘Brexodus’ – doing so ignores how many EU migrants have made Britain their home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234771/original/file-20180904-45143-6p8q3g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Big decisions. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/380564566?src=YpOVNK8acEEjjYz425DuHw-1-2&size=medium_jpg">Shutterstock.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the deadline for a final Brexit deal approaches, close attention is being paid to statistics on the number of EU citizens living in Britain. In late August, after the Office for National Statistics published its latest <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreportprovisionallongterminternationalmigrationltimestimates">long-term international migration estimates</a>, news <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/23/net-migration-from-eu-to-uk-at-lowest-level-since-december-2012?CMP=share_btn_link">reports</a> continued to talk of a “Brexodus” – the exodus of EU citizens from the UK ahead of Brexit. But such commentary, which is mirrored in <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexodus-of-eu-citizens-from-the-uk-is-picking-up-speed-92089">academic debate</a>, is overblown and it’s symptomatic of the assumptions made about how mobile the EU migrants who’ve made their homes in Britain actually are.</p>
<p>Brexit has provoked high levels of uncertainty about the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/conditioning-familylife-at-the-intersection-of-migration-and-welfare-the-implications-for-brexit-families/C0CF897BC9AB22FE6A7D115322B71B47#fndtn-information">future rights of EU citizens and their families</a>. While the draft <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/status-of-eu-nationals-in-the-uk-what-you-need-to-know#history">Withdrawal Agreement</a> between the UK and the European Commission may have allayed some of those fears, the first batch of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/how-to-prepare-if-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-with-no-deal">government’s “no-deal Brexit” papers</a> was silent on whether this agreement, and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families">Settlement Scheme</a> that implements it, would still stand in the event of no deal. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-citizens-what-settled-status-after-brexit-really-means-a-legal-expert-explains-97810">EU citizens: what settled status after Brexit really means – a legal expert explains</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Meanwhile, a recent inquiry <a href="https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/understanding-the-difference-the-initial-police-response-to-hate-crime.pdf">predicted</a> that reported hate crimes against migrants, which <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652136/hate-crime-1617-hosb1717.pdf">increased</a> at the time of the referendum, could spike again around the point of the UK’s exit from the EU in March 2019.</p>
<p>The narrative of “Brexodus”, however, is far from accurate in capturing how EU citizen migrants are responding to this situation. As the latest estimates indicate, EU net migration – the number of people leaving subtracted from the number arriving – has fallen. At 87,000 it is now at its lowest level since 2012, and far below its peak of 189,000 in the year ending June 2016. But, the decline in the number of EU citizens arriving in the UK accounts for more of the fall in net migration than does a rise in the number leaving. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234643/original/file-20180903-41726-1har8ba.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">UK net migration by citizenship from year ending June 2008 to year ending March 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2018#migration-patterns-for-eu-and-non-eu-citizens">Long-Term International Migration, Office for National Statistics</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The number of EU citizens leaving the UK in the year ending March 2018 was 138,000. According to the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreportprovisionallongterminternationalmigrationltimestimates">ONS</a> this number has: “Remained stable following a previous increase between the years ending September 2015 and September 2017.” So, we are not seeing a pattern of departures implied by the narrative of “Brexodus”. </p>
<p><iframe id="PwiMW" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PwiMW/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Outflows are also very different depending on which countries EU citizens come from. Between the year ending March 2017 and that ending March 2018, there was a 21% increase in the number of departures among EU15 nationals – referring to the <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6805">15 member states</a> of the EU until enlargement in 2004 – and a 19% increase in the number of departures of EU2 nationals, from Romania and Bulgaria. However, the increase in the number of departures of citizens from EU8 countries – those countries including Poland and Hungary which joined in 2004 – was significantly lower, at 4%. </p>
<p>EU citizen migrants are also <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-june-2018-data-tables">applying for UK citizenship</a> in increasing numbers: with over 11,000 applications in each of the first two quarters of 2018. This is the highest on record and around 2,000 more than in the respective periods in 2017.</p>
<p><iframe id="SPkUl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/SPkUl/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The “Brexodus” narrative doesn’t capture these nuances and complexity because it is based on an inaccurate construction of migration under EU freedom of movement as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24371603?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“super mobile”</a>. The assumption is that when circumstances change, people move on. The same assumption informs the UK government’s construction of EU migrants – as with migrants in general – as mobile and disposable, and the “Brexodus” narrative simply reinforces this.</p>
<h2>Left to feel like ‘a floating log’</h2>
<p>Our research is indicating, however, that there is a dissonance between migrants’ experiences and the assumptions being built into migration policy. EU migrants in the UK are rarely continually mobile, and despite the unsettling force Brexit presents to their personal and family biographies, <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/22/eu-citizens-in-the-uk-after-the-shock-comes-the-strategy-to-secure-status/">moving on is not necessarily an option</a>. </p>
<p>Brexit is clearly a potentially destabilising force in the lives of the 3m or so EU citizens resident in the UK. This was clear from a public <a href="https://discoversociety.org/2017/12/15/not-one-of-you-any-longer-eu-nationals-brexit-uncertainty-and-mistrust/">Q&A event</a> attended by 70 people in Sheffield on Brexit and the rights of EU nationals, which we helped organise in November 2017. Of those attending, 37 people from 14 different countries contributed written responses to the question: “What is your main concern for EU nationals in the UK after Brexit?”</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-eus-rules-on-free-movement-allow-all-its-citizens-to-do-62186">What the EU's rules on free movement allow all its citizens to do</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One participant from Germany wrote: “Moving back to one’s home country is by no means straightforward due to housing issues, finding qualified work, getting into health insurance, transfer savings without double taxation.” While another participant, also from Germany wrote: “The UK makes me feel like a visitor but I have been here so long that the country of my origin is strange to me.”</p>
<p>For many, the Brexit process has provoked a deep sense of insecurity. As one person wrote: “It feels like being a floating log in the middle of the ocean.”</p>
<p>A more sophisticated way to understand how Brexit is influencing the decision-making of EU citizen migrants is needed than simply labelling it a “Brexodus”. Such an approach needs to acknowledge that decisions are shaped by inter-connected economic, political and personal considerations. Family relationships and <a href="https://theconversation.com/polish-grandparents-face-uncertain-family-future-after-brexit-80993">responsibilities</a> across the life course also influence migration or settling strategies. So it’s key that analysis of migration trends in the months and years to come go beyond the numbers to examine the multilayered processes and considerations likely to inform migrants’ decisions to move or stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Majella Kilkey receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, the European Commission and the Noble Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Ryan receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>What migration figures really tell us about the movement of people.Majella Kilkey, Reader in Social Policy, University of SheffieldLouise Ryan, Professor of Sociology, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/989292018-06-27T09:40:17Z2018-06-27T09:40:17ZHow Brexit is making young Eastern Europeans in the UK fear for their future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224907/original/file-20180626-112607-1kf52rj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>It is hard for me to identify as both British and Romanian because people make me feel as if you can’t be both – as if being foreign is a permanent thing and can’t be changed no matter how long you’ve spent in a country or what you consider to be “home”. I consider the UK to be my home. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Like Romanian teenager Ioana, whose words above articulate her painful reality, 15-year-old Alicja moved to Britain from Bulgaria when she was a young child. On the night of the EU referendum, her family gathered around the TV to watch the result. Her mother said she saw it coming; having listened to comments at work about Eastern Europeans taking local jobs in their small fishing town, she realised that anti-immigration feelings were running deep. For Alicja, who had grown up in Scotland, “Brexit had me in tears – it has changed everything”.</p>
<p>In the months since, her family’s economic security and plans to stay in the UK are up in the air. They don’t have the money to apply for citizenship (currently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fees-for-citizenship-applications">£1,330 per person</a>) and they don’t even know if they would qualify, with Alicja’s mother in part-time work. But what is clear is the impact that Brexit has had on young people’s sense of belonging in Britain.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/v07ESsbymYw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>No future?</h2>
<p>Young Europeans living in the UK have been considerably affected by the decision to leave the European Union, underscored by the rise in applications for British citizenship from EU citizens and the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/migrationsincethebrexitvotewhatschangedinsixcharts/2017-11-30">recorded increase</a> in migration of EU citizens from the UK since the referendum.</p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.migrantyouth.org/">research project</a> is the largest study of Eastern European young people aged 12 to 18 living in the UK, since the EU referendum. Like Alicja, the majority of the survey participants said they felt “uncertain” (56%), and “worried” (54%), while just over a quarter (27%) said they were “scared” about their future.</p>
<p>Although most had lived in the UK for more than five years, only 8% had British or dual nationality. While the UK government has promised to make applications for <a href="http://theconversation.com/eu-citizens-what-settled-status-after-brexit-really-means-a-legal-expert-explains-97810">settled status</a> straightforward for EU nationals, there is evidence that many groups – including children in vulnerable families, children in care or those with parents in insecure work, are at risk of becoming undocumented. Young people in our study had an acute sense of insecurity about their future. As Polish-born Renata, 15, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I will need to get citizenship in the UK to stay. I’m still not sure what my parents will do, we definitely can’t afford for all of us to get citizenship, so they might have to move back, while I’ll need to live by myself here.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Like the children of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/windrush-generation-the-history-of-unbelonging-95021">Windrush generation</a>, young Eastern Europeans arrived in the UK mainly because of their parents’ desire for a more secure future. But for many, growing up in “austerity Britain” has meant an increasing sense of feeling unwelcome, given the growing hostile attitude to immigration.</p>
<h2>Prejudice and pride</h2>
<p>Such an environment affects the everyday lives of young Eastern Europeans living in the UK and does not help integration. More than three quarters (77%) of our participants said they have experienced racism and xenophobia, and for one in five, these experiences happened “often” in school. A third also thought that their neighbours had some level of prejudice against Eastern Europeans, which made some feel unsafe and worried they might be attacked. Many said they adopted “blending in” tactics, like not speaking their own language in public or putting on a local accent.</p>
<p>So how do you develop a sense of belonging in a place where you generally feel unwanted? And what effect does it have on your sense of identity, especially in these formative years? </p>
<p>As many had strong links to Europe through birthplace and regular visits, it is unsurprising that 92% said they felt European. They had a strong sense of connection and belonging to Europe, with many saying that a European identity would always be part of who they were and how they saw their place in the world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/224911/original/file-20180626-112601-lbkcp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some Eastern European youngsters living in the UK say they feel less welcome since Brexit</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-united-kingdom-june-23-2017-667302487">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Anchoring themselves in a European identity seemed to offer security during insecure times in Britain. However, the majority (83%) felt they belonged in the UK, and this feeling became stronger the longer young people had lived here. Less than half (41%) said they felt British. Navigating these identities – in addition to other dimensions such as gender, class and religion – is clearly a complex and emotionally charged process for many. As Polish-born Emilia, 16, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I may live in the UK, but I’ve been brought up in a Polish house. There’s still a part of me that doesn’t feel fully connected. I also feel like a fake Pole – like I’m not really part of that culture either. I’m stuck in the middle, just doing my best to fit in with whoever will let me.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Three quarters said they are likely to stay, many with plans to continue their education, volunteering or work, while others consider leaving and planning a future elsewhere. Many of them are clear there is no “going back” to the country of their birth, but rather envisage their future elsewhere. Latvia-born Michael, 18, said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I feel very connected to Europe and European culture. There has been some concern whether I want to stay here due to the political changes. I might move to the EU after finishing university, despite the fact that I enjoy living in this country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many EU-born young people who arrived in Britain when their parents migrated are clearly emotionally bruised by the UK’s decision to leave the EU, which for many was like “a kick in the teeth”. Educated in Britain, they are now at the point of making decisions about their own futures – but here or elsewhere? For most, Britain is their home, with connections to family, friends, places and memories.</p>
<p>Migrating elsewhere will not be easy and while some will stay, others are increasingly looking beyond Britain for their future. For employers, educators and policy makers, one of the key questions now is what this country needs to do to encourage young Europeans to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98929/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniela Sime receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naomi Tyrrell receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>Most feel they belong, but the Leave decision has left them anxious and insecure.Daniela Sime, Reader in Education and Social Justice, University of Strathclyde Naomi Tyrrell, Senior Research Fellow School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of PlymouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.