tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/france-elections-29505/articlesFrance elections – The Conversation2022-06-20T13:27:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1854132022-06-20T13:27:37Z2022-06-20T13:27:37ZParliamentary elections shock France’s political order to its core<p>The campaign for the second round of France’s legislative elections pitted two antagonistic forces against each other, Emmanuel Macron’s presidential coalition and the left-wing group, the New Popular Ecological and Social Union (NUPES).</p>
<p>But the results also clearly confirmed the weight of a third, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). The far-right party now boasts of a parliamentary group for the first time since 1986, with 89 out of 577 elected deputies. The hopes of Macron’s bloc to secure an absolute majority of seats as in 2017 are now all but buried. Those of a classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">cohabitation</a>, too.</p>
<p>The uncertainty that hung over the campaign of the two rounds is unheard of since the 1997 parliamentary elections, which followed the dissolution decided by then-president Jacques Chirac (in office from 1995 to 2007). What was until now an “unthinkable” relative majority for Macron’s coalition will drive new alliance strategies – particularly between the presidential bloc and Les Républicains (LR) (64 seats), the right-wing party of former presidents Jacques Chirac (1995-2007) and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012). Therein lies a risk of paralysis.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, two political forces dominated the public debate. Macron’s party, La République en Marche (now called “Renaissance”) had joined forces with François Bayrou’s MoDem and Edouard Philippe’s Horizons, to form Ensemble! (Together). The left-leaning NUPES was led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise, which hammered together a coalition with France’s Socialist, Communist, and environmental parties after Mélenchon’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-president-emmanuel-macron-wins-re-election-a-victory-with-deep-challenges-181843">strong finish in the presidential election</a>.</p>
<p>While Macron’s coalition won the largest bloc of seats in the new national assembly, 245, it was 100 fewer than the total won in 2017, and Macron fell 34 seats short of the 289 required to have an absolute majority. NUPES picked up the second-largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly, 131, and showed that it was a political force to be reckoned with, but failed to reach the symbolic bar of 150 seats.</p>
<p>On the right end of the political spectrum, the LR party, had been nearly inaudible throughout the campaign, managed to hold on to 64 seats thanks to the anchorage of its local representatives. With the RN holding 89 seats, the new National Assembly is made up of four unequal blocs, the first of which is the presidential coalition which holds only a relative majority.</p>
<h2>A history of compromise</h2>
<p>While unexpected, such results are not without precedent: born in 1958, the country’s Fifth Republic has already seen a relative majority, in 1988. President François Mitterrand (1981-1995) was re-elected in 1986 and had to govern with a National Assembly dominated by the two right-wing parties, the RPR and UDF. After two years of cohabitation, Mitterrand chose to dissolve the National Assembly and hold fresh parliamentary elections. “It is not good for a party to govern alone” he said during the 1988 campaign, during his annual ascent of the <a href="https://www.burgundy-tourism.com/discover-burgundy/holiday-in-the-great-outdoors/unmissable-natural-sites/the-rock-of-solutre-explore-this-remarkable-place/">Solutré rock</a>, north of Lyon, during the Pentecost weekend.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/469767/original/file-20220620-20-vj1vpj.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=532&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">François Mitterrand climbs Solutré Rock on 18 May 1986 alongside with Roland Dumas, mayor Dordogne, and Jack Lang, mayor of Blois.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Feferberg/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mitterrand campaigned to “open up” to the centre – a movement he intended his new prime minister, Michel Rocard, to embody – and hoped that the gamble would reward him with a clear majority. He did not wish to return to the union of the left between Socialist and Communist parties, which constituted the basis of the government led by Pierre Mauroy between 1981 and 1984, nor to rely on a majority based on the Socialist Party alone, like in 1984-1986.</p>
<h2>The challenge of governing</h2>
<p>The governments led by Michel Rocard (1988-1991), Edith Cresson (1991-1992) and Pierre Beregovoy (1992-1993) had to build majorities to pass each piece of legislation, sometimes with the Communists, sometimes with the centrists and non-affiliated members. Macron’s coalition could also break deadlocks by resorting to Article 49-3 of the French Constitution, which allows the government to pass legislation without a parliamentary vote. Doing so is not without risk, as right- and left-wing oppositions can join up and call for a no-confidence vote.</p>
<p>Successive Mitterrand governments used the article 39 times. In five years, only the 1989 budget was adopted without it. On two occasions, no-confidence votes almost brought down the government. In 1990, Michel Rocard was five votes short of being overthrown when he used Article 49-3 to pass a bill raising taxes to finance social security. In 1992, Pierre Bérégovoy’s government faced a no-confidence vote when it sought to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).</p>
<p>Despite the challenges, governing with a relative majority is therefore possible, and the first 1988 legislature is an example of this. It was marked by a certain ministerial stability and the implementation of important reforms, including the <em>revenu minimum d’insertion</em> (a cash benefit for low-income residents with children) and taxes to fund national health insurance. And all this despite a turbulent international context, with the collapse of the communist bloc, signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the first Gulf War.</p>
<h2>A necessary culture of compromise</h2>
<p>This historical precedent helps shed light on the present political situation. Like Mitterrand, Macron can hardly hope for the support of one of the opposition groups to form a stable majority. The left-wing coalition, NUPES, has emerged strengthened from an election in which their voters supported a collective front and strong opposition to Macron. RN deputies also stand at loggerheads with the executive, which since 2017 has designated the far-right group as its main opponent and an existential threat to France.</p>
<p>As for the LR parliamentarians, while some may be tempted, like the centrists of 1988, to form alliances with the government on ideological grounds, this would nevertheless be with the view of forming an anti-Macron front on the right.</p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/politique/legislatives-la-majorite-relative-redonne-la-main-au-parlement-20220617_SP4U2GKSXRHZFAJNSKUAZHELN4/?redirected=1">Christian Delporte</a> points out, Macron hardly embodies the “culture of compromise” that the situation calls for. And he does not enjoy the same legislative arsenal as his predecessors.</p>
<p>Indeed, since the <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/19494-le-recours-larticle-493-de-la-constitution">2008 constitutional reform</a>, the 49-3 article has been considerably weakened. While its principle remains, its use is limited to one bill during a parliamentary session, with the exception of legislation relating to the budget or health care. Prior to this, the government could resort to it as often as it wanted and on any bill.</p>
<h2>An increasingly fragile democratic system</h2>
<p>Macron is facing a more delicate situation than François Mitterrand. He has to grapple with a radicalised opposition, both on the left (with the NUPES) and on the right (with the RN), who have no interest in helping him implement his political agenda. Above all, his majority is much more precarious than that of his distant predecessor. The three-way split of French politics, which we had first seen in the first round of the 2022 presidential elections, is such that deputies might have well been elected under a proportional representation system.</p>
<p>Moreover, the coherence of the presidential majority is more fragile than that of the Socialist Party (PS) in the late 1980s. The presidential party does not have the same territorial anchorage as the PS of 30 years ago, be it in terms of activists, executives or local elected officials. And it has to rely on allies – Edouard Philippe (Horizons) and François Bayrou (MoDem) who guard their autonomy and influence more closely than did the allies Mitterrand was able to count on.</p>
<p>This relative majority comes at a moment when France’s democratic system is far less robust than it was 40 years ago. The legitimacy of elected representatives and institutions is weakened by the rise of abstention (30% in the 1988 legislative elections vs. 52% in those of 2022), with a genuine distrust among a growing part of the population. The rise of the far right (14.5% in the 1988 presidential elections, more than 30% if we add up the voters of Le Pen and Eric Zemmour in 2022) is also one of the symptoms of the rise of populism.</p>
<p>The successive collapse of the parties that structured French political life in the second half of the 20th century (Gaullist, Socialist and Communist) has created a fragmented and shifting political landscape that brings back memories of the unstable <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110810104932582">Fourth Republic</a>, which saw 24 governments during its existence between 1946 and 1958.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was translated from the original French by Natalie Sauer and Leighton Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185413/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The results of the second round resulted in a historic record of seats for the RN and an even greater polarisation of political life within the National Assembly itself.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818432022-04-24T21:21:18Z2022-04-24T21:21:18ZFrench president Emmanuel Macron wins re-election: a victory with deep challenges<p>Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/24/macron-wins-french-presidential-election_5981506_5.html">decisive victory</a> over Marine Le Pen in the second round of France’s presidential election on 24 April 2022 is no surprise. For more than a year, opinion polls had been predicting it. As early as April 2021, the leading polling institutes (Elabe, Harris interactive, Ifop, Ipsos) estimated the final score of the outgoing president in a range of 54 to 57% of the vote. And when it came down to the final night, Macron made it through all the campaign’s twists and came out unscathed, with 58.8% of the vote.</p>
<p>The success continues the theme of the first round, when Macron finished 4.5 points and 1.6 million votes ahead of Le Pen, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon just barely being eliminated for the second round – he won nearly <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/11/french-presidential-election-the-winners-and-the-losers-of-the-first-round_5980244_5.html">22% of the vote</a>, just a single percentage point behind the far-right candidate.</p>
<p>With the first round behind him, Macron knew that he could count on the support of a larger number of candidates (Valerie Pécresse, Les Républicains; Yannick Jadot, Europe Ecologie–Les Verts; Fabien Roussel, Parti Communiste; and Anne Hidalgo, Parti Socialiste) than Le Pen, who was endorsed only by the two other far-right candidates (Eric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan). </p>
<p>While Mélenchon did not call for his supporters to cast votes for Macron, he proclaimed that <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20220410-pr%C3%A9sidentielle-jean-luc-m%C3%A9lenchon-appelle-%C3%A0-ne-pas-donner-une-seule-voix-%C3%A0-marine-le-pen">“not a single vote”</a> should go to Marine Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Re-election without shared power</h2>
<p>Emmanuel Macron thus escapes the curse of the <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-billet-politique/emmanuel-macron-face-a-la-malediction-du-sortant">“punishment vote”</a> against the incumbent president that led to the defeats of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 and Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, and also contributed to François Hollande’s decision not to stand for re-election in 2017. Macron also becomes the first president of France’s Fifth Republic to be reelected without having to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitation">share power</a>. François Mitterrand went into the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44484352">1988 elections</a> with the centre-right Jacques Chirac as prime minister. The situation was reversed from <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843396">1997 to 2002</a>, after then-president Chirac made the error of calling elections early and ended up with Lionel Jospin of the Parti Socialiste as his prime minister.</p>
<p>Macron’s win appears to vindicate his 2017 strategy in which he cast himself as the “progressive” champion of pro-European liberals of the right and the left against the “nationalist populists” gathered around Marine Le Pen. In the past five years, Macron’s words and actions have sought to consolidate the bipolarisation that had ensured his success in the second round of the 2017 presidential election and appeared to be the key to a second term.</p>
<h2>An imperfect strategy</h2>
<p>The strategy worked, but only imperfectly. Indeed, the French political landscape is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">structured around three poles</a> rather than two. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s score was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/les-resultats-du-premier-tour-une-stabilite-apparente-une-reconfiguration-profonde-181046">first round’s biggest surprise</a>, as was his capacity to bring together left-wing voters hostile to Macron’s liberalism. This was most overlooked by Macron himself, who concentrated on capturing the electorate of the traditional right. </p>
<p>During the two-week period between the two rounds, the question of what left-wing voters would – or wouldn’t – do was crucial, with the two finalists both seeking to attract those who voted for Mélenchon. Marine Le Pen pushed her <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">“social-populist strategy”</a> while seeking to minimise her party’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/marine-le-pen-the-rassemblement-national-and-russia-history-of-a-strategic-alliance-181649">deep ties to Russia</a>. Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, declared that he would <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2022/04/17/macron-unveils-plan-to-address-climate-change-ahead-of-french-election_5980777_5.html">make the environment the top priority</a> of his goverment. Neither succeeded in fully convincing voters nor did the balance of power really shift.</p>
<p>The results of the second round seem to indicate that left-wing voters did not behave in a mechanical and uniform way. A significant proportion opted for Marine Le Pen, particularly in rural areas and in the <a href="https://la1ere.francetvinfo.fr/guadeloupe/marine-le-pen-plebiscitee-par-les-guadeloupeens-les-saint-martinois-et-les-saint-barths-1276256.html">overseas departments and territories</a>. In the latter, she attracted many who had voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round: she obtained almost 70% of the vote in Guadeloupe, where he had won 56% of the vote a fortnight earlier. Still, a slightly larger fraction voted for Emmanuel Macron, especially in the big cities where Mélenchon’s supporters have a sociological profile fairly close to that of the incumbent president. </p>
<h2>Refusing to choose</h2>
<p>Even more numerous are those who refused to choose. More than 12% of voters cast a blank or invalid ballot, compared to 2.2% for the first round. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-cause-cachee-de-la-montee-de-labstention-180152">abstention rate</a> was also significantly higher than that of the first round of 2022 (28% versus 26.3%), and was also higher than that of 2017’s second round (25.4%). </p>
<p>The electorate’s three-way split does not sit well with the two-round majority vote. In 1969, the low proportion of votes cast in relation to the number of registered voters (63%) was already proof of this. 2022 serves as an even bolder example, with turnout sinking below 60% – a record for a French presidential election. Emmanuel Macron is therefore both one of the “best elected” presidents of the Fifth Republic (behind Jacques Chirac in 2002 and himself in 2017) if we compare his score to the votes cast, and “worst elected” if we look at the percentage of registered voters (barely 35%, against 38% for Georges Pompidou in 1969 and 43.5% for himself in 2017).</p>
<p>The scattering of left-wing, and to a lesser extent, of traditional right-wing votes, has caused Macron to fall back by more than 8 points and nearly 4 million voters compared to the second round of 2017. This drop is unprecedented in the history of presidential elections: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in 1981, and Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012, had respectively lost 3 and 5 points compared to the previous election.</p>
<h2>A crumbling “Republican front”</h2>
<p>This has less to do with a punishment vote than the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2021/06/25/de-la-sfio-aux-regionales-de-2021-la-lente-erosion-du-front-republicain-dans-le-monde_6085704_4500055.html">erosion</a> of the “Republican front” – or the French political tradition consisting in setting aside political differences to prevent the far right’s rise to power. It had a huge impact in 2002, was less effective in 2017 and only worked partially in 2022. Hence although Le Pen has lost again, voting for a far right candidate is no longer seen as unacceptable in France.</p>
<p>The victory of Emmanuel Macron, while anticipated, should not mask the election’s two main lessons. First, the far right obtained a level never before reached in France, thanks to its ability to bring together a heterogeneous, predominantly working-class electorate. Second, the country’s political landscape, now structured around three poles, is out of step with a voting system adapted to two dominant parties. These two issues make the outcome of France’s upcoming legislative elections, which take place in June, all the more uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181843/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>Emmanuel Macron’s success validates a strategy aimed at making him appear as the champion of the “progressives”, but it has only partially worked.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1811802022-04-12T18:27:04Z2022-04-12T18:27:04ZFrench elections: a divided country faces an uncertain second round<p>The first round of the French election took place on April 10, and predictably it did nothing to resurrect old-school parliamentarism, five years after <a href="https://theconversation.com/disruption-ou-irruption-la-republique-dans-limpasse-presidentielle-174980">Emmanuel Macron</a> first burst into the country’s fragile party system.</p>
<p>On the contrary. Far from stabilising the political order born in 2017, it unveils an <a href="https://theconversation.com/first-round-of-the-french-election-apparent-stability-yet-a-profound-reconfiguration-181084">eerie landscape</a> from which the old governing parties seem to be excluded, on the right as well as on the left. Five years ago, with candidate Benoît Hamon at 6.36%, it was the Socialist Party (PS) that was on its way out; now it is the turn of conservative Les Républicains (LR), torn between Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), tallying less than 5% of the vote. Meanwhile, the PS was overtaken by rural centrist Jean Lassalle (Résistons) and communist Fabien Roussel (Parti Communiste Francais, PCF), marking the lowest score in its history at less than 2%.</p>
<p>This is a terrible descent into hell in a two-tier society where political parties that are still the masters of the game at the local level are paradoxically ditched at the national scale.</p>
<h2>Deadly triangulation</h2>
<p>In France there has been a longstanding discussion over adjusting the balance of power and creating the conditions for full democratic representation. However, this would have required reforming the country’s political institutions, and successive governments, left and right, have failed to do so. As a result, the merciless, guillotine-like mechanics of the presidential election have been at work, amid an atmosphere where anger and fear compete with resignation.</p>
<p>Uncertain voters, who have alternatively cast their ballot in the name of strategy, values, or protest, have hammered the last nails in the coffin of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-gauche-et-la-droite-font-elles-encore-sens-en-france-178181">distinction between the political left and right</a>. Now, voters hover around three poles:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>far right, with 32.29% of the vote and which has gained 1.6 million votes compared to 2017.</p></li>
<li><p>radical left, described by Mélenchon as “union populaire” (popular unity), with 22% of the vote.</p></li>
<li><p>centre right, as embodied by the current president, who received 27.84% of the vote.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Candidates outside these poles are left isolated: Roussel, Jadot, Pécresse, and Hidalgo total just 13.45% (4,727,073 votes). Caught between the far right and Macron, LR comes out particularly damaged by such dynamics. Valérie Pécresse received just 1,679,470 votes – 5,533,525 fewer than those cast for <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">François Fillon</a> five years earlier.</p>
<p>Ecologists and the socialists are also reeling from the momentum that has benefited Mélenchon – who cast himself as the only progressive candidate capable of facing off against Macron and Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Spectacular defeats</h2>
<p>In the face of this great political shake-up, some defeats are more noticeable than others: of the twelve candidates, only three received more than 20% of the vote, while nine are below the 10% and eight below the 5% mark – and almost 15 points separate the fourth from the third candidate.</p>
<p>It is particularly strange to observe how at odds this new political field is with <a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/linvite-des-matins-dete/entre-decompositions-et-recompositions-ou-va-la-vie-politique-francaise">local power dynamics</a>. The <a href="https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__presidentielle-2017/(path)/presidentielle-2017/FE.html">2017 presidential election</a>, when the four candidates fought an exceptionally tight race, now seems like another world: at the time, Macron scored 24.01%; Le Pen, 21.30%; LR’s François Fillon, 20.01%; and Mélenchon, 19.58%.</p>
<p>Mélenchon can boast of a higher score than the polls suggested, although probably less important than he had hoped for: at 21.95%, he has progressed by 655,000 votes compared to 2017 (+5.97%). The fact that many ecologists and socialists rallied around him was not enough to compensate for the presence of his former communist ally, Roussell, who this time went it alone. Mélenchon fell short by just 421,000 votes in his bid to overtake Le Pen.</p>
<p>Macron, on the other hand, managed to come out ahead of his main rival by almost four points. With 27.84% of the vote, he improves his 2017 score by more than 1,130,000 votes (+13%). As for Le Pen, her 23.15% shows she has been successful in her appeal to the French to vote strategically for her, thereby overcoming the initial obstacle represented by Zemmour’s candidacy. Compared with the last election, she gains more than 450,000 votes (+5.96%).</p>
<h2>Vote transfers</h2>
<p>The road to the second round is riddled with uncertainties and pitfalls, and the game that will be played is doubly complex. Aside from the question of who will get the keys to the Elysée Palace, there is also the issue of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/sociologie-des-institutions-politiques--9782707158611-page-87.html">capacity of the country’s institutions</a> to meet the expectations of a deeply divided country.</p>
<p>The first round’s results leave us with the illusion the second might yield a clearer outcome. Instead, its three-way crystallisation could curb what constitutes one of the two key dynamics of the second round: <a href="https://www.cairn.info/comment-les-electeurs-font-ils-leur-choix--9782724611076-page-381.htm">vote transfers</a>.</p>
<p>Le Pen seems to have the least to worry about on that front: The far-right vote is homogeneous and the two other candidates in her camp, Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout la France, DLF), have called on their supporters to vote for her. In addition, the far-right leanings of the second most popular candidate of the LR’s primaries, Éric Ciotti, make it likely she will reap a share of the votes collected by Pécresse.</p>
<p>Le Pen could end up benefiting from some of Mélenchon’s “everything but Macron” votes. This is despite the fact the leftwing candidate urged his supporters several times on Sunday evening not to “give a single vote” to the far right, while failing to explicitly back Macron.</p>
<h2>A difficult campaign for Macron</h2>
<p>Faced with two blocs united by their common hostility to him, Macron does not have the same potential resources. It is true that Anne Hidalgo, Valérie Pécresse, Yannick Jadot and Fabien Roussel have firmly and clearly called to vote for him. But their potential electorate remains weak. Macron will have to fight hard to attract Mélenchon’s voters and make an LREM ballot politically less toxic to progressives. Other cards left to play include boosting participation levels among those who shunned the first round. Turnout in the latter was lacklustre: only two points more than in 2002 and four less than in 2017.</p>
<p>This brings us to the second dimension of the election: French institutions’ democratic efficiency. French people suffer from a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique.html">dearth of confidence in their elected representatives</a>. These past years have gone to show that elections – however brilliant they may be – are not enough on their own to guarantee consent to politics. It will be necessary to invent a mode of government for the country to exit the dead-end into which the presidential illusion has parked it over the decades.</p>
<p>Rather than presidential smoke and mirrors, the future would look very different if France benefited from a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2021/02/24/quel-serait-le-visage-de-l-assemblee-nationale-avec-la-proportionnelle-integrale-ou-partielle_6071093_4355770.html">proportional representation system</a> that allowed for pluralism and diversity of opinions. If our institutions worked in a way that was more respectful of the balance of power. To make do without this reform in the past five years has been a serious mistake. We must now foot the bill.</p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron seems to have understood this, as he declared on the evening of the first round:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I am ready to invent something new to bring together [the country’s] various convictions and sensibilities.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Not having the means to act immediately, Macron must now work to convince voters of how he intends to proceed to help France escape from the vertical and concentrated practice of power up to now.</p>
<p>In light of the results of the first round, the exercise promises to be perilous. One of the French Revolution’s leading figures, Georges Danton, once said that it takes enthusiasm to found a republic. It’s also required to preserve one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claude Patriat ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The first round of the French presidential elections leaves the country’s party system in tatters and voters divided along three poles. What will happen in the second round is now anyone’s guess.Claude Patriat, Professeur émérite de Science politique Université de Bourgogne, Université de Bourgogne – UBFCLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1810842022-04-11T11:56:36Z2022-04-11T11:56:36ZFirst round of the French election: apparent stability, yet a profound reconfiguration<p>With the majority of the ballots counted on Monday morning, the <a href="https://www.resultats-elections.interieur.gouv.fr/presidentielle-2022/FE.html">official results</a> of the first round of the French presidential election appear to confirm the power dynamics at work from the previous election. </p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM) and Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, RN) have made it into the second round – in the same order as five years ago, making it the second time the duel will take place. The last and only time this happened in France was when Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (RPR) twice faced off against François Mitterrand (Socialist Party), first in 1974, when the <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/histoire/archives/2017/05/02/26010-20170502ARTFIG00146-10-mai-1974-le-debat-televise-giscard-mitterrand-point-d-orgue-de-l-entre-deux-tours.php">right-wing candidate won</a> and then again in 1981, when the <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/invites-du-point/michele-cotta/giscard-mitterrand-1981-un-duel-historique-06-12-2020-2404386_1595.php">socialist candidate triumphed</a>.</p>
<p>Such stability is largely linked to the main candidates’ clout. Already in the game five years ago, Macron and Le Pen have been able to retain a loyal electoral base. Over the past weeks new voters have rallied around them, prioritising a so-called strategic vote (“vote utile”) over partisan considerations. </p>
<h2>Strategic voting</h2>
<p>Compared to 2017, Macron is up by <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-retrouvez-tous-les-resultats-du-scrutin-commune-par-commune-4104853">nearly 4%</a>. The rise is all the more notable given the incumbent president has abandoned the middle-ground stance between right and left that had ensured his initial success and adopted an agenda that clearly places him <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/editos-analyses/emmanuel-macron-balise-au-centre-droit-1362478">on the centre-right</a> of the political spectrum. </p>
<p>The move alienated a fraction of his voters from the left, but attracted a larger part of the voters from the centre and the right – a testament of which is the <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/les-resultats-de-valerie-pecresse-sont-les-pires-a-la-presidentielle-pour-la-droite_fr_624ebd8ce4b007d3845fbea5">very low score</a> (4,7%) of Valérie Pécresse, candidate of Les Républicains (LR).</p>
<p>Le Pen has <a href="https://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/presidentielle-avec-pres-de-24-des-voix-marine-le-pen-obtient-un-score-historique-pour-son-parti-4104873">risen nearly as much</a>, with a score never before achieved by the Front National (FN) and then RN within the context of a presidential election. She too benefited from calls to vote strategically and was thus able to largely outperform Éric Zemmour (Reconquête), the former <em>Figaro</em> journalist and far-right candidate. Having initially undermined her leadership, in the end Zemmour helped complete Le Pen’s decade-long effort to “normalise” her candidacy. By claiming the niche of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/dou-vient-lobsession-identitaire-de-la-politique-francaise-175540">identity-based right</a>, Zemmour enabled Le Pen to stress the bread-and-butter issues that appealed to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-fallout-from-ukraine-war-could-give-le-pens-social-populist-strategy-an-edge-179863">working classes</a>. </p>
<p>On the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (LFI) obtained his best score in his third presidential election, also benefiting from the in extremis support of an electorate of the moderate left concerned above all to avoid a second round opposing Emmanuel Macron to Marine Le Pen. Mélenchon came within less than 1.5 points of Le Pen’s score, yet wasn’t able to stop her and make it to the second round himself. </p>
<h2>A French political field split into three</h2>
<p>The momentum of the strategic vote, which picked up barely a month before the first round, appears to confirm the restructuring of the French political field around three major poles dating back to the 2017 election.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A liberal, centrist and European pole attracting, at every national election, a little more than a quarter of the voters but which, thanks to the mechanics of the majority vote, manages to dominate political life until now. </p></li>
<li><p>A populist and identity-based pole, today dominated by Le Pen and represented by two candidates whose cumulative score (over 30%) constitutes an all-time record for the extreme right and populist identity in a national election in France: it is therefore this pole that has recorded the strongest surge over the last five years.</p></li>
<li><p>A radical left-wing pole, dominated by the La France Insoumise. If we include the results of the communist and Trotskyist candidates, this totals just under 25% of the vote. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Such a three-way split results in the marginalisation of the two political parties that have structured French political life since the 1970s, the centre-right Les Republicains (formerly the UMP) and the centre-left Socialist Party.</p>
<h2>The decline of the traditional parties: an air of déjà vu</h2>
<p>With less than 2% of the vote, the Socialist Party sees a decline that could merely be circumstantial. Such a turn of events is not without reminding of the fate of the Radical Party at the beginning of the Fifth Republic: having dominated the left at the time, the party had fallen victim to the bipolarisation of the political landscape set in motion by President Charles de Gaulle and had survived only thanks to a large network of elected representatives, mainly present (like that of the Socialist Party today) in the southwest of France.</p>
<p>The decline of the traditional right is another significant fact of this election, with LR candidate Valérie Pécresse gaining just a quarter of the score achieved by her party five years earlier. The result appears as yet another blow to Les Républicains (LR), who recorded their <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2019/05/26/elections-europeennes-2019-les-republicains-placent-la-droite-a-son-plus-bas-niveau_5467643_4355770.html">lowest vote share</a> in the 2019 European elections at 8.4%, in contrast to 20.1% in 2014. It also goes to show the narrowness of the political space now occupied by this party, wedged between Macron’s centre-right and Marine Le Pen’s populist far right.</p>
<h2>Important developments since 2017</h2>
<p>It’s important to not interpret the results of this first round as a repeat of the 2017 election. The apparent stability of the balance of power masks important changes. The political landscape continues to shift rightward. Testament to this is the emergence of Éric Zemmour’s identity-based platform and Emmanuel Macron’s renewed political offer. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon made gains, they were not enough to compensate for the Socialist Party’s precipitous decline.</p>
<p>Populism also continues to grow. In five years and under the effect of a certain number of social movements (the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/yellow-vest-protests-65314">Yellow Jackets</a> in particular), its rhetoric has become more radical. More than ever, the split between the people and the elite shows itself at the ballot box. This populist rise weakens Emmanuel Macron, whose position is less favourable than it may appear at first glance.</p>
<p>The incumbent president obtains scores comparable to some of his predecessors who were not re-elected for a second term: Giscard d'Estaing in 1981 (28% of the vote), Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012 (27% of the vote). Moreover, he cannot capitalise on the desire for change that largely explained his victory five years ago. The campaign between the two rounds will thus bring into play two antagonistic projects, two visions of society, but also a tension between the “dégagisme” (i.e., a political ideology based on the French verb <em>dégager</em>, “to oust”, calling for the rejection of the established political class) hostile to the outgoing president, and calls by most first round candidates for a collective front against the extreme right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mathias Bernard is president of the University of Clermont-Auvergne.</span></em></p>The dynamics of the “strategic vote” in France have amplified the restructuring of the political field around three major poles: centrist, identitarian and far left.Mathias Bernard, Historien, Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1808192022-04-08T16:12:28Z2022-04-08T16:12:28ZBehind French election tweets, the far right is hidden in plain sight<p>During the 2017 French presidential election, Emmanuel Macron was the darling of digital democracy. With his calls for a “startup nation,” the future head of state placed technology at the centre not only of his programme but also of his <a href="https://frenchcrossroads.substack.com/p/startup-president-part-3?s=r">campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The now-president’s digital performance in the run-up to this year’s election has been much less clear-cut. It’s left-wing Jean-Luc Mélenchon who’s been trying to push the technological envelope, going so far as to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/06/jean-luc-melenchon-hologram-french-election">appear in the form of a hologram</a>, while Macron concentrated on shifting his programme to the right. And while he still leads in the polls, his <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/">margin is slipping</a>. Indeed, five years after Macron took office, far-right candidates have been more effective than Macron at exploiting the Internet and social networks.</p>
<p>In the newly published book <a href="https://www.epflpress.org/produit/1047/9782889154548/l-illusion-de-la-democratie-numerique"><em>L’illusion de la démocratie numérique. Internet est-il de droite?</em></a> (EPFL Press), I argue that conservatives dominate online. While the Internet may have been a key part of left-leaning movements, such as the Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street, the right dominates the online world thanks to factors such as its popular bases, hierarchical organisations, capital, as well as social inequality. The French presidential elections are a case in point.</p>
<h2>The French Internet: a political genealogy</h2>
<p>But before we turn to the current elections, it is worth revisiting French politics’ digital history. France is no newcomer to digital politics, with the egalitarian use of the 1980s pre-web French <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/thank-minitel-for-the-french-election/">Minitel computers for political information</a> paving the way to current global networks. Imagining the early web as a bastion of left-leaning French politics led by Macron is overly simplistic, though, as the National Front was the first political party in France to have a web presence, as well as an army of trolls working behind the scenes.</p>
<p>But it would be a mistake to view Le Pen’s support as artificial or top-down. She has been the sleeper in this current election, pulling ahead in the polls. While digital media eyes were on Zemmour, Le Pen boasts a strong base of support throughout the country, both online and offline. From Facebook groups, Twitter, down to WhatsApp channels, she dominates her rival. Despite extensive coverage in international media outlets, the former <em>Figaro</em> columnist has fewer than 400,000 Twitter followers, versus 2.7 million in the case of Le Pen.</p>
<h2>Zemmour and Le Pen</h2>
<p>Both have launched their campaigns amid a rightward turn of French politics, as voters increasingly resent the gap between their purchasing power and that of previous generations. While Zemmour and Le Pen have both clearly capitalised on such sentiments, scapegoating immigrants subtly or explicitly, there are differences between them.</p>
<p>Throughout his campaign, Zemmour has deployed an openly Islamophobic rhetoric that closely mirrored that of a <a href="http://hatemeter.eu/">research project tracking online anti-Muslim hatred</a> between 2018 and 2020. Zemmour’s movement, Reconquête (“Reconquer”) echoes the theme of a supposed “invasion” by immigrants that marked the 2016 US presidential campaign. Like former US president Donald Trump, Zemmour asserts the need to make France “great again”.</p>
<p>Le Pen also privileges imagery celebrating “traditional France”, including its agricultural heritage. Unlike Zemmour, she has confined most of her speeches to bread-and-butter issues, directly appealing to much of the working-class and rural <em>gilets jaunes</em> base. The movement started out in 2018 as a fuel-tax occupations in mostly small towns stopping traffic and morphed into a series of mostly urban marches. Once focused on cost-of-living issues, the protesters’ demands became diverse and sometimes contradictory ideologically, and the movement lost steam in late 2019 when the pandemic hit.</p>
<h2>Popular bases</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/456985/original/file-20220407-21-mlmngx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=672&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In advance of the French election, Eric Zemmour has been sinking in the polls relative to Marine Le Pen, and so has sought to dismiss them.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Zemmour/Twitter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Too many people on the left present right-wing leaders as puppet masters and downplay the role of organised people on the ground. The fantasy is that by somehow getting rid of these leading online influencers, whether Zemmour or Le Pen, or even Putin or Trump, that the right-wing digital base will disappear.</p>
<p>The reality is in fact the opposite. These leaders built their movements on existing networks and groups. These include everything from the far-right component of the <em>gilets jaunes</em> to Civitas, Action Française, and even elements of the Catholic Church. Institutions like these are more likely to have a solid network of political supporters that are in constant communication, as well as have dedicated armies of volunteers to post and promote online content relevant to its members.</p>
<p>This finding of the role of organisations, and especially what I found in the United States in how hierarchical organisations dominated online as opposed to the myth of horizontal digital activism. Simply put, conservative groups are more likely to be hierarchical, as compared to many of those on the left, and this enables more online engagement.</p>
<h2>A media ecosystem benefiting the far right</h2>
<p>But it is not just individual groups peppered throughout France, or any other country, that enable conservative digital activism. Key to the circulation of social media information is how these groups work in sync with an ecosystem of other like-minded organisations. As in the United States, conservative media outlets are growing in France: the far-right media empire of <a href="https://www.vivendi.com/en/biography/vincent-bollore/">Vincent Bolloré</a> includes CNews, which propelled Zemmour into the nightly TV spotlight, while the media conglomerate of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200122-bernard-arnault-france-s-wolf-in-cashmere-billionaire">Bernard Arnault</a> pushes free-market ideas. And the content they produce and personalities they promote feed directly into conservative social-media feeds, despite – and because of – conservative claims that the media censors them.</p>
<p>By contrast, the left in France is fragmented and does not work as effectively as the far right does with all types of media outlets. This has a direct relationship with what works – and doesn’t – in terms of virality on social media. Conservative conceptions of <em>freedom</em> play better on platforms that favour simplistic, short, and provocative posts, whether it is “freedom” from immigrant “invasions” or from “mask mandates.” The left focuses more on principles such as <em>fairness</em>, and the messages are inherently more nuanced and dispersed. Whether it is the environment, gender rights, anti-racism, or LGBTQ+ issues, the broad coalition of ideas can lead to fuzzy messaging. So in today’s digital era, the left has a bigger hill to climb, and France is no exception.</p>
<p>So this is how ideology, even in its own right, fuels the digital activism gap I found in my research in why conservatives dominate online.</p>
<h2>Inequality</h2>
<p>Now for the last factor that we also see in France: inequality. The Internet was supposed to be a place where everyone can come together on the same playing field, but this is not the case. But how does this map onto the French working-class increasingly voting for Le Pen?</p>
<p>As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Not included in polls of Le Pen’s working-class base are the members of the working-class who do not vote or those who are not citizens and thus can’t vote. As it is defined in surveys, the working class in France also does not include other low-wage workers or those unable to work. The digital divide in access and skills, for example, is still strong in France, especially in rural areas. The cliche of far-right supporters is that they are duped, uninformed, and uneducated, but in my research and with Zemmour’s base, it’s key to see the dominance of middle to upper-class “well-educated” voters that he has captured.</p>
<h2>The right’s big money</h2>
<p>Questions have also swirled around who may be financing Zemmour’s glitzy campaign of slick posters, synced social media, and well-orchestrated rallies. Certainly, conservatives are more likely to have these resources, both individually and organisationally. And this kind of big money is key to digital <em>production</em> of online content, but it does not automatically result in digital <em>participation</em>. It takes people on the ground who believe and support these far-right philosophies to keep the social media content flowing. It is not just individual supporters. Political organisations, whether parties or civil society groups, that have a lot of resources can harness the power of platform algorithms by paying staff (or trolls) to engage online or can afford the high-tech software and other gadgets to sustain digital participation.</p>
<p>The result, then, of differences in institutions, ideologies, and inequalities offline is a dominance of the far right online. The bottom line is that offline power results in online power, and with conservatives having and gaining power, it is an uphill battle for those on the left.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the AXA Research Fund has been supporting nearly 650 projects around the world conducted by researchers from 55 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the <a href="https://www.axa-research.org">Axa Research Fund</a> or follow on Twitter <a href="https://twitter.com/axaresearchfund?lang=fr">@AXAResearchFund</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180819/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jen Schradie ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>While many progressive movements have organised online, conservatives dominate because of better organisation, capital, and social inequality. France’s presidential elections are a case in point.Jen Schradie, Digital Sociologist, Sciences Po Paris, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1798632022-03-28T18:27:50Z2022-03-28T18:27:50ZEconomic fallout from Ukraine war could give Le Pen’s social-populist strategy an edge<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454187/original/file-20220324-17-33awhp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The RN candidate has spent the past years attempting to present herself as a champion for living standards.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">VALENTINE CHAPUIS / AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the economic impact of the war in Ukraine looms over French voters, Marine Le Pen’s social-populist appeal may give her a boost in the battle over second place that is taking place to the right of France’s presidential politics, despite her prominently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">pro-Russian stance</a> prior to the invasion.</p>
<h2>Economic concerns take over the presidential agenda</h2>
<p>The economic consequences of the war in Ukraine are already being felt in France. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-07/france-s-le-maire-says-power-price-surge-is-absolute-emergency">surge in energy prices</a> is adding to the inflation that has accompanied the post-Covid‑19 recovery of France’s economy. Price shocks are expected to have a significant impact on both households and companies.</p>
<p>Economic fears are clearly one of the dominant themes of the campaign. According to CEVIPOF-Science Po Paris’ latest presidential <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/EnEF%202022%20vague%208%20-%2021-24%20mars%202022%20(1).pdf">election survey</a>, 58% of those polled stated that prices and purchasing power will bear an important influence on their vote in April, up by 6% since early March.</p>
<p>While the war in Ukraine is of great concern in France, fears are falling somewhat. A third (34%) of respondents say they’re “very worried” about the war: it was 43% early March. The war is also becoming less salient politically: only 23% of our respondents say it will matter to their vote, down by 10% from two weeks earlier.</p>
<p>The focus now is on the economic consequences of the Ukraine crisis, with 43% of respondents claiming they are “very worried”. Fears of a wider conflict or a nuclear strike by Russia are, on the other hand, shrinking at 33% and 28%, down by 6% and 7% respectively since early March (see Figure 1).</p>
<h2>Figure 1. Changing concerns about the war in Ukraine</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454660/original/file-20220328-25-14c17a4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Percentage of those polled who say they are ‘very worried’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Election Panel, IPSOS–CEVIPOF–_Le Monde_, Wave 8, 20-24 March 2022</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The outcome of the presidential race in April will hinge a good deal on the candidates’ response to bread-and-butter issues in the electorate.</p>
<p>Anticipating a “long crisis”, Jean Castex’s government has signalled the importance of supporting the French economy by drawing up an <a href="https://www.gouvernement.fr/actualite/presentation-du-plan-de-resilience-economique-et-sociale">emergency “resilience plan”</a>. The <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/economie-social/guerre-en-ukraine-ce-qu-il-faut-retenir-du-plan-de-resilience-presente-par-jean-castex-1647425415">26-billion-euros-strong plan</a> is intended to help companies and households cope with rising energy costs.</p>
<p>The plan is intended to help keep Macron’s re-election bid on track just three weeks ahead of the first-round vote. Memories of 2018’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/shockwaves-from-french-yellow-vest-protests-felt-across-europe-108578">“yellow jackets” movement</a> are still vivid, and they have prompted the government to respond quickly to signs of popular discontent.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=352&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454182/original/file-20220324-13-3n95az.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Like elsewhere in Europe, fuel prices have soared in France following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thomas Coex/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Diverging economic strategies</h2>
<p>Macron still dominates the polls – at 28% in our latest study – but economic concerns have become key to the battle over second place.</p>
<p>To the left of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon from La France Insoumise (FI) is consolidating his lead in a crowded field, currently polling at 14% in our survey. His agenda of social justice and economic redistribution is popular among voters who see the <em>Insoumis</em> as a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/02/18/presidentielle-2022-jean-luc-melenchon-se-reve-en-candidat-du-vote-utile-a-gauche_6114176_6059010.html"><em>vote utile</em></a> (tactical vote) for the left to make it to the second round. Mélenchon has moved ahead despite his pro-Russian stance prior to the invasion and subsequent attempts to <a href="https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/guerre-en-ukraine-zemmour-melenchon-le-pen-le-changement-de-pied-des-candidats-pro-russes-24-02-2022-SAPOHM4F6BDYBI3Q5ZLOFJ6LJ4.php">recalibrate earlier comments</a>.</p>
<p>Sinking in the polls after creating an early buzz among potential voters, Éric Zemmour has continued to push his overriding theme of immigration. On March 22, he stated that if elected, he would create a government ministry of <a href="https://www.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle-2022/20220322.OBS56037/ministere-de-la-remigration-de-zemmour-un-message-vers-l-extreme-droite-la-plus-radicale.html">“reimmigration”</a> with the goal of forcing 1 million French residents to leave the country.</p>
<p>Le Pen has also run into trouble with her longstanding pro-Russian positions and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/french-far-right-leader-marine-le-pen-forced-to-defend-putin-links">support for Vladimir Putin</a>, although these seem to have only marginally hurt her standing among potential voters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454179/original/file-20220324-22-1dyc4ha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Despite once boasting of her links with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen is surviving the war in Ukraine politically.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Klimentyev/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A potentially more important consideration relates to the candidates’ economic stances. We see diverging economic strategies to the right of French politics, which may produce different opportunities in the first round.</p>
<p>When it comes to the government’s coffers, Zemmour and Valérie Pécresse of Les Republicains (LR) are pushing a right-wing agenda of tax cuts and welfare retrenchment, including unpopular pension reform. Amid turbulent economic times, such conservatism appears increasingly at odds with popular demand for more protection and state intervention, most evidently among working-class and lower-middle-class voters.</p>
<p>Le Pen has chosen a different economic path, emphasising social issues, healthcare, public services and redistribution.</p>
<p>Even prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Rassemblement National (RN) candidate had promised a positive “shock” to purchasing power, pledging that she would “protect the people” and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEVj9za0298">“give the French their money back”</a>. Alongside traditional immigration and security themes – far less present than with Zemmour, however – Le Pen’s presidential platform offers a significant Keynesian package of lower VAT, higher wages, tax exemptions and free transport for young workers, while advocating the revaluation of pensions.</p>
<h2>Le Pen’s social-populist credentials</h2>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/NoteBaroV13_GI_socialpopulisme_mars2022_V4.pdf">statistical analysis of Le Pen’s presidential manifesto</a>, left-leaning policies make up no less than two-thirds (66%) of her economic platform: this is the highest percentage since the party’s electoral breakthrough in the mid-1980s (see Figure 2).</p>
<p>In contrast, the RN has moved further away from the hallmarks of conservative economics such as welfare retrenchment, small government and free market reforms. Such policies make up only 21% of the 2022 manifesto compared with 35% five years ago. It was nearly 80% under Jean-Marie Le Pen back in the mid-1980s.</p>
<h2>Figure 2. Clusters of FN/RN economic policies since 1986</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/454245/original/file-20220324-17-qiw34p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This figure shows the orientation of the FN/RN’s economic policies since 1986. The data consist of 500 economic policy pledges across FN/RN electoral platforms between 1986 and 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author’s own analysis and calculations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In line with the RN’s <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01889832/">traditional nationalist and populist agenda</a> of opposing the so-called “globalist” elite to the “people”, Le Pen’s increasingly social tone bears all of the trappings of <a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01385779/document"><em>social populism</em></a> – a political approach drawing from both left-leaning egalitarian and nationalist economic traditions.</p>
<p>This shift is <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/fp.2015.17">nothing new to RN politics</a>, however. Le Pen has worked to establish a reputation as the candidate of the <em>pouvoir d’achat</em> (purchasing power) for more than a decade, immediately after she took over her father’s party and veered to the economic left. In the wake of the 2008 financial and 2011 Eurozone debt crises, the FN had taken up a “Keynesian” program of state regulation, government spending, and public services expansion, emphasising income redistribution and purchasing power. In 2012, 59% of the FN’s economic proposals were already leaning toward the economic left.</p>
<h2>Le Pen’s successful gamble?</h2>
<p>Since 2017, Le Pen has worked to cultivate her social-populist image, joining ranks with the left and trade unions against Macron on several occasions. In late 2019, she <a href="https://www.europe1.fr/politique/marine-le-pen-tout-est-a-jeter-dans-la-reforme-des-retraites-3937513">opposed the government’s pension reform</a>. In March 2021, she denounced cuts to the unemployment insurance scheme as <a href="https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel/status/1445398684288655365">“shameful, economically stupid, humanly unworthy and deeply unfair”</a>.</p>
<p>As the latest <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/EnEF%202022%20vague%208%20-%2021-24%20mars%202022%20(1).pdf">CEVIPOF National Election survey</a> suggests, the RN candidate is currently polling at 17.5% (up by 3% since early March) compared to 11.5% and 10% for Zemmour and Pécresse, respectively.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/26/en-meeting-dans-le-bordelais-marine-le-pen-s-attaque-au-bilan-de-macron_6119256_6059010.html">campaign meeting</a>, Le Pen reiterated her populist vision, contrasting the “little” people to the “big” interests. “Between Emmanuel Macron and us,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cad2sY77tz8">Le Pen said</a>, “it is a choice between the power of money for the few and more purchasing power for all”.</p>
<p>Le Pen’s social-populist agenda clearly resonates with a slice of the French electorate, particularly working-class and less-educated voters. Rising fuel prices tied to Russia’s invasion have been easily incorporated in Le Pen’s social-populist rhetoric, with the RN leader pledging that she would lower petrol taxes and compensate by <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/marine-le-pen-veut-taxer-les-petroliers-20220310">taxing major oil companies</a>. More recently she said that she would enact a <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2022/article/2022/03/24/marine-le-pen-presente-un-budget-bancal-de-son-projet-pour-la-presidentielle_6118918_6059010.html">zero-VAT policy</a> on a selection of 100 essential products to reduce prices for low-income households.</p>
<p>The CEVIPOF survey shows that war-driven economic concerns are highest among Marine Le Pen’s electoral support: 53% say they are “very worried” about the economy, as opposed to 43% in the general electorate. 69% of Le Pen’s voters say that concerns about purchasing power will define their first-round vote, as opposed to 56% and 47% among those who say they would vote for Valérie Pécresse and Éric Zemmour.</p>
<p>By pushing a social-populist agenda long before the war and increasing her rhetoric after the invasion, Le Pen is gambling that growing socio-economic concerns among the country’s electorate could help give her an edge among voters. So far, polls appear to be proving her right.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilles Ivaldi has received funding from the French National Agency for Research (ANR)</span></em></p>Under fire for her past Russian links, Marine Le Pen may still be within reach of the second round of the French presidential elections thanks to her left-leaning economic agenda.Gilles Ivaldi, Chercheur en science politique, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1791202022-03-14T18:59:02Z2022-03-14T18:59:02ZWar anxiety makes French voters rally round Macron. For how long?<p>As they watch the war in Ukraine escalate, French voters are rallying around President Emmanuel Macron. This rally effect is fuelled by deep anxiety about the war, and it may eventually give Macron a decisive boost in the April presidential election.</p>
<p>Since John Mueller’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/presidential-popularity-from-truman-to-johnson1/FBA184821B05C29F50256634B50440A8">seminal work</a> in the 1970s, the “rally round the flag” phenomenon has been an important fixture of political science. At the core of it lies the idea that major international crises increase national cohesion among both elites and voters. This generally translates into increased support for the incumbent.</p>
<p>In the context of this year’s presidential election in France, an important aspect of the rally effect, I argue, is voter anxiety about the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>The results of the latest wave of the <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/resultats-et-decryptage-par-vague.html">National Election Panel</a> conducted by Sciences Po Paris’s Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF) among a large national sample on March 2-3 suggest that such anxiety is a significant driver of the recent surge in support for Macron.</p>
<h2>Under shock, voters turn to Macron</h2>
<p>According to this survey, the war in Ukraine has become a salient political issue for 50% of the French. For another third, the war will be important to their vote in April, up to 55% among Macron’s voters. Amid fears of nuclear terror, an overwhelming majority (90%) say they are very or somewhat worried about the war and its consequences.</p>
<p>As would be expected, since the outbreak of the war, we have seen cross-partisan support for the president <a href="https://www.franceinter.fr/politique/pas-encore-candidat-emmanuel-macron-engrange-des-ralliements-a-gauche-et-a-droite">from left to right</a> of the political spectrum. It is no surprise that Macron waited until the last minute to officially <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/europe/macron-presidency-campaign-france-ukraine.html">declare himself candidate</a>. The president has been showcasing his diplomatic skills, hoping to get momentum from <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-emmanuel-macron-mise-a-fond-sur-la-carte-europeenne-1380164">taking over the reins of the EU</a>. Pictures of European leaders gathering around Macron for <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220310-macron-hosts-eu-leaders-for-ukraine-crisis-talks-at-versailles">Ukraine war talks in Versailles</a> on March 10 will certainly help him continue building his profile as key player in the ongoing crisis.</p>
<p>Dissonant voices have been few. Even radical right challengers like Marine Le Pen and Éric Zemmour have had to back the president, while taking the hit for their <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/marine-le-pen-et-eric-zemmour-totalement-decredibilises-des-lors-qu-ils-ont-fait-allegeance-a-vladimir-poutine-dit-valerie-pecresse_4991586.html">pro-Putin positions</a> and, in Le Pen’s case, for her past <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39478066">financial connections</a> with Russia.</p>
<p>More to the centre of French politics, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate, is still struggling to make herself heard in the campaign following a disastrous meeting in Paris last month. More importantly, the candidate for the LR party has yet failed to find her political space between Macron and the far right.</p>
<h2>A substantial spike in approval ratings for Macron</h2>
<p>As our poll suggests, none of the challengers seem to be convincing voters that they could do a better job as future commander in chief. For about 60% of the French, things would even go worse if one of the radical candidates won the election.</p>
<p>Despite domestic socio-economic grievances and frustrations over <a href="http://www.odoxa.fr/sondage/le-pouvoir-dachat-enjeu-central-de-la-presidentielle-2022/">rising living costs</a>, the French are rallying around their country’s leader. Polls show a substantial spike in approval ratings for Macron since the beginning of the Ukraine war: the president is up five points in the March ELABE-<em>Les Echos</em> <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/elections/sondages/sondage-exclusif-la-cote-de-confiance-de-macron-fait-un-bond-avec-la-crise-en-ukraine-1390422">Barometer</a>.</p>
<p>Such increase in popularity is met with a surge in voter support. According to our survey, Macron has increased his lead in the first round by four points, from 26% just before the war up to 30% on March 2-3. In the run-off, he is set to win by a very large margin against any of his potential contenders.</p>
<p>The panel design of our survey allows to look at individual-level change behind net shift in the overall voting intention balance in the first round. As our data in the graph below show, voters are turning to Macron from all across the board: of all “new” voters who have rallied around the president in the last week, about a third (30%) come from one of the far right candidates, a fifth (20%) from the right, a quarter (25%) from the left while another 25% previously said they would abstain or cast a blank vote.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1. Where do Macron’s new voters in March come from?</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451618/original/file-20220311-20-imev.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">National Election Panel (ENEF) conducted by Sciences Po Paris’s Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF), waves 6 (24-27 February) and 6bis (2-3 March 2022).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Voter anxiety drives electoral shifts</h2>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/resultats-et-decryptage-par-vague.html">our data</a> suggest that war anxiety may be a significant driver of such individual shifts. We find significant differences with regards to voter concern and perception of the consequences of the conflict.</p>
<p>Those who have left other candidates to rally around Macron since the beginning of the Russian invasion show a much higher level of anxiety. Among those who shifted to Macron, 55% said they are very worried about the war, compared with only 39% among voters who remained loyal to other candidates during the first week of the Russian invasion.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 2. War anxiety among loyalists and new Macron voters</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451619/original/file-20220311-13-hjpqzt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">National Election Panel (ENEF) conducted by Sciences Po Paris’s Centre for Political Research (CEVIPOF), waves 6 (24-27 February) and 6bis (2-3 March 2022).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Voter fears primarily concern a broader conflict in Europe, much less economic consequences. Among voters who have turned to Macron in just the past few days, 52% say they are very worried about the impacts of the crisis on France’s economy, as opposed to 43% among those who have stayed with other candidates. There is a larger gap when voters contemplate a possible wider conflict, with a 19 point difference between the two groups (56/37).</p>
<h2>Will the rally effect last long enough for Macron to win in April?</h2>
<p>History has <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3096071">taught us</a> that rally effects generally tend to be ephemeral and that they do not always allow incumbents to divert public attention from domestic difficulties. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-682X.1994.tb00386.x">Yellow ribbons</a> do not necessarily improve the incumbent’s long-term political standing, so we should expect changing political, economic and international circumstances to weigh on the course of the campaign.</p>
<p>Domestic issues have already made their comeback in the campaign. In his first public meeting after his official announcement, Macron put France’s pension reform back in the spotlight. His controversial plan goes even further than the <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20210713-macron-to-revive-controversial-pension-overhaul-once-covid-is-under-control">original reform</a> that was put on hold by the pandemic, and which had given rise to large social and political protests. Macron’s more ambitious plan to move the retirement age from 62 to 65 years has been met with strong criticism by his rivals, giving them a first chance to divert attention from the war.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, this could win him even more support from the conservative right at a time when Pécresse’s support is taking a plunge in <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/resultats-et-decryptage-par-vague.html">our survey</a>, down one point at 11.5% since last week – now in fifth position – and no less than four points since early February.</p>
<p>Given the proximity of the election, however, there is only a short window of opportunity for all his challengers to sing along to their favourite “anti-Macron” tune. French presidential elections are notoriously unpredictable, but Emmanuel Macron seems nevertheless on a clear path to winning re-election in April.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179120/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilles Ivaldi has received funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) in France. </span></em></p>The “rally round the flag” phenomenon has been an important fixture of political science. Will voter anxiety over war in Ukraine give president candidate Macron a definitive boost?Gilles Ivaldi, Chercheur en science politique, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1635452021-06-29T08:52:59Z2021-06-29T08:52:59ZThe undisputed winner of the French regional elections: abstention<p>France has gone to the polls in the last elections before the presidential vote in 2022, and the resounding winner was “none of the above”. The vast majority of French people <a href="https://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/regionales/regionales-et-departementales-2021-vers-unnouveau-record-d-abstention-au-second-tour-20210627">did not vote</a> in the regional and departmental elections, which took place over two weeks – 67% of eligible voters stayed home in the first round and 66% abstained in the second.</p>
<p>Turnout was dampened by the Covid effect, which weighed heavily on proceedings – as was also the case in local elections in 2020. This combined with a continuing trend toward abstention in almost all recent French elections, and a poll whose stakes were not apparent to the French people – all the less so because no one was able to point them out.</p>
<p>With so few people turning up to vote, France is at risk of becoming <a href="http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Folio/Folio-actuel/La-democratie-de-l-abstention">“a democracy of abstention”</a>, as described by political scientists Céline Braconnier and Jean-Yves Dormagen.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Lire cet article en français:</strong> <a href="https://theconversation.com/la-democratie-de-labstention-ou-les-defis-demmanuel-macron-163478">“La démocratie de l’abstention” ou les défis d’Emmanuel Macron</a></p>
<hr>
<p>And while the explanations for this trend are multiple and cannot be reduced solely to the responsibility of politicians, it nevertheless shows that the French public’s relationship with politics it deeply damaged and highlights the huge democratic fractures within the country.</p>
<p>It also indicates that Macron has failed to deliver on one of the most essential pillars of his original political project: to fix the broken relationship between the French and their politicians and to restore confidence in political action.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart showing abstention rates in French regional elections, 2004-2021" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=295&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/408834/original/file-20210629-22-1cassm1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation France</span></span>
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<h2>A cycle of endless crisis</h2>
<p>France has been in a cycle of endless crisis since 2018, when the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-frances-gilets-jaunes-protesters-are-so-angry-108100"><em>gilets jaunes</em></a>, or yellow vests, first burst onto the political scene. Since then, there has been a significant gap between the presidential narrative of a France that is moving forward, and the political and social reality of a country that doubts, worries and flares up at regular intervals.</p>
<p>As the recent results from our <a href="https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/fr/content/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique.html">Barometer of Political Confidence</a> have shown, the Covid crisis has not erased the French democratic crisis. In February, my colleagues Luc Rouban, Gilles Ivaldi and I <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/02/22/le-fosse-du-deficit-democratique-francais-n-a-pas-ete-comble-depuis-l-election-d-emmanuel-macron_6070766_823448.html">concluded</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If public institutions have shown their resilience in the face of the crisis, the world of politics and everything that it embodies continue to be perceived negatively. The French democratic deficit has not been closed since the election of Emmanuel Macron, even if some points are improving.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a conclusion we share with Macron himself. Speaking at the beginning of the gilets jaunes crisis, he <a href="https://www.lci.fr/politique/video-je-n-ai-pas-reussi-a-reconcilier-le-peuple-francais-avec-ses-dirigeants-le-mea-culpa-de-macron-sur-tf1-2104545.html">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is impatience, there is anger. I share this anger, because there is one thing I have not managed to do. I have not managed to reconcile the French people with their leaders.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A blow to Macronism</h2>
<p>So at the end of these regional and departmental elections, the last time the French people will go to the polls before the end of his mandate, what room for manoeuvre does Macron have to stem this crisis of political confidence?</p>
<p>First of all, it’s important to note that the popularity of the current head of state is today much higher than that of his predecessors. Most opinion polls place Macron’s popularity between 40 and 50%, which has been increasing for several weeks, driven by the improvement of the health situation and the gradual reopening of the country after many long months of lockdown.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Tableau-de-bord-des-personnalites-Juin-2021.pdf">recent survey</a>, 50% of respondents had a good or excellent opinion of both Macron and his prime minister, Jean Castex, with the pair coming 5th and 6th in a list of preferred French political figures (Marine Le Pen came in 28th place).</p>
<p>Despite this, it’s clear that the results of the regional elections have exposed weaknesses of Macronism as a political project. Going into the 2022 presidential elections, Macron no longer has a winning political machine in the form of his political-movement-turned-party, La République En Marche, or LREM.</p>
<p>While the party swept the legislative elections of 2017, which swiftly followed Macron’s presidential victory, it performed less well in the European elections of May 2019, faltered in the local elections of spring 2020 and has now resoundingly failed in the regional polls.</p>
<p>A number of Macron’s ministers, including the secretary of state for pensions, Laurent Pietraszewski, and justice minister, Eric Dupond-Moretti, ran in the regional elections and failed to make a mark, with the exception of hardline right-wing interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, who <a href="https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/politique/elections-departementales-gerald-darmanin-en-position-de-force-a-tourcoing-1624353469">handily won in Tourcoing</a>, a northern city of which he was previously mayor.</p>
<p>A second weakness is that Macronism does not seem to have succeeded in imprinting an easily identifiable ideology or political doctrine on public opinion. Macronism, in public opinion, is Emmanuel Macron. In a <a href="https://tnova.fr/rapports/la-republique-en-marche-anatomie-d-un-mouvement">2018 survey</a> of LREM members, my colleagues and I identified a strong sense that this was a “personal party” – apart from Europe and education, our survey showed that the great cause of LREM was Macron himself.</p>
<p>These two weaknesses of Macronism explain a third one, which came to light during these most recent elections: Macron and his party lack natural allies. If the 2017 presidential campaign could only be based on the spectacular emergence of the “young Macron”, the 2022 campaign must explain to us with which majority and with which electoral coalition the mature Macron will govern.</p>
<p>There is no easy answer to this. Three potential right-wing presidential candidates – Xavier Bertrand, Valerie Pécresse and Laurent Wauquiez – had perfectly successful regional election campaigns without the need for an agreement with the party of Macron.</p>
<h2>Three questions before 2022</h2>
<p>As he looks to the 2022 election, Marcon will need to answer three important questions.</p>
<p>First, the question of his presidential style and his leadership: after a mandate marked by major social, democratic and health crises, who is Emmanuel Macron today? What has he really learned from these repeated crises?</p>
<p>Second, why does Macron need a second mandate? The deceptively simple answer (to prolong the reforms he has already put in place) cannot be sufficient, as the country has experienced so many upheavals since 2017 and the economic horizon is unclear.</p>
<p>And finally, a second term, but with whom? An alliance with the right-wing Les Républicains? A new Macronist movement to replace LREM?</p>
<p>He may not have all the answers now, but it’s doubtful the French president will be able to qualify for the second round of voting in 2022 if he does not respond to each of these questions eventually.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163545/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bruno Cautrès ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Sky-high abstention rates reveal the weakness of Emmanuel Macron’s political project.Bruno Cautrès, Chercheur en sciences politiques, Sciences Po Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/793652017-06-13T16:17:33Z2017-06-13T16:17:33ZAs France’s electoral marathon nears its denouement there could still be surprises<p>When Emmanuel Macron launched his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/16/emmanuel-macron-outsider-bid-french-presidential-race-election">outsider campaign for France’s presidency</a> in November 2016, most observers thought he had little chance of winning – he was “too young” and had support from neither of the major parties. Then he squeaked out a win in the first round and went on to crush the extreme right-winger Marine Le Pen <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-crushes-le-pen-66-34-in-french-presidential-runoff-76941">nearly two-to-one</a> in the May 7 finale. </p>
<p>Now the candidates put forward by Macron and his party, La République en Marche (LREM) have dominated the first round of the legislative elections, with potential wins in more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/president-macron-marches-to-parliamentary-majority-in-france-79245">400 seats out of a total of 577</a>. </p>
<p>The legislative elections have served to amplify the restructuring that was already taking place during the presidential elections. This featured a collapse of the Socialist Party, a weakening of Les Républicains (LR), and a significant drop for both Le Pen’s Front National (FN) and the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (France Unbowed). </p>
<h2>A record abstention</h2>
<p>The overall abstention rate in the first round of the legislatives on June 11 was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/french-parliamentary-elections-emmanuel-macron-low-turnout">51.3%</a>, a jump of 8.5 points over 2012’s 42.8% – the previous record low. The abstention rate has steadily risen since the 2002 reform that moved the legislative elections to <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidentielle-pourquoi-les-tirs-au-but-devraient-etre-tires-avant-la-prolongation-76299">immediately after the presidential election</a>. The feeling for many voters seems to be that the president should be able to move forward with his proposals – tacit approval without an explicit vote.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/sondage_ipsos_sopra_steria_11_juin_20h_comprendre_le_vote_des_francais.pdf">According to an Ipsos poll</a> on the eve of the first round, 24% of respondees agreed with Macron and wanted him to have a majority in the assembly; another 28%, while they didn’t agree with the new president, also felt that it was preferable for him to have a majority.</p>
<p>This in part explains the high abstention rate in the legislative elections – one that was <a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/decrypter-societe/2017-06-11-1er-tour-legislatives-2017-sociologie-electorats-et-profil-abstentionnistes">most pronounced</a> among far-right and far-left voters. Of those who voted for the FN in the first round of the presidential election, 57% skipped the legislative elections. On the far left, 52% of Mélenchon’s supporters stayed home. The abstention rates were lower for the centre-left and centre-right: 43% of those who had backed Benoît Hamon, the Socialist Party’s candidate, and 38% of supporters of François Fillon, candidate for Les Républicains, stayed home. By comparison, the abstention rate for Macron supporters was only 37%.</p>
<p>Polls also show continuing disapproval of the political class. The emergence of new political forces – mainly LREM and France Insoumise – have not been enough to convince disappointed citizens to come back to the voting booth. The sociological characteristics of non-voters <a href="http://www.ouest-france.fr/elections/legislatives/legislatives-les-raisons-d-une-abstention-record-5055547">remain the same</a>: 64% of the 18-to-34-year-olds didn’t vote, compared to 35% of those over 60-years-old. Working-class voters remained on the sidelines, with 66% not participating, and abstention rates were high for low-income and less-educated residents as well.</p>
<h2>The president’s side, on the rise</h2>
<p>Candidates aligned with Macron received 32.3% of the votes cast (28.2% for LREM and 4.1% for François Bayrou’s centrist MoDem party), a jump of 8.3 points over the first round of the presidential election. While many LREM candidates are new to politics, the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/12/le-premier-tour-des-legislatives-en-cartes-les-partis-qui-gagnent-les-partis-qui-perdent_5142951_4355770.html">district-level results have been excellent</a>. Not only did Macron’s backers remain mobilised at a higher rate, they picked up 21% of those who had voted for Fillon, 17% of Hamon’s supporters, and 14% of Mélenchon’s. Macron won many more voters than he lost.</p>
<p>Macron’s strategic choices since his election have paid off. He appointed a prime minister from the political right, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/emmanuel-macron-names-edouard-philippe-as-french-prime-minister">Edouard Philippe</a> and ministers on the left and right according to their “Macron-compatible” profile. He has already begun announcing his first reforms, and been a confident presence on the international scene. According to the Ipsos poll, <a href="http://www.ipsos.fr/sites/default/files/doc_associe/sondage_ipsos_sopra_steria_11_juin_20h_comprendre_le_vote_des_francais.pdf">58% of those surveyed</a> said they were satisfied with Macron’s first actions in office, no small accomplishment.</p>
<h2>Tradition in meltdown</h2>
<p>Things are less rosy for two traditional parties, the centre-left Socialists and centre-right Les Républicains. In the 2012 legislative elections, the Socialists and their allies won 34.4% of the votes – in 2017 they collected only 9.5%. Victims in the first round of the legislative elections included Hamon and Jean‑Christophe Cambadélis, the head of the party itself, both of whom lost seats they had long held. The poor showing is a verdict on François Hollande’s presidency as well as the result of internal divisions between the party’s left wing and centrist right wing.</p>
<p>By comparison, Les Républicains held on better. They and other centre-right parties won 21.6% of the vote, versus 32% in 2012. This is barely better than Fillon’s 20% score in the first round of presidential election. Their high abstention rate in the legislative election is explained by the party’s divisions – between those favouring a hard-right ideological line and a more moderate approach, as well as the split between those who urged “constructive” support of Macron versus those who wanted to be a part of the opposition.</p>
<h2>The decline of the FN and France Insoumise</h2>
<p>While Le Pen obtained 21.3% in the first round of the presidential election, support for the FN’s legislative candidates dropped from 13.6% in 2012 to 13.2% in 2017. This calls into question the party’s longstanding efforts to remake itself and leave behind its sulphurous past. Following the double loss, internal divisions have risen again as well as questions on the party’s platform. In particular, its positions against the euro and the EU probably led many FN supporters to abstain.</p>
<p>Mélenchon won 19.6% of the votes in the first presidential round, but has been on the decline since. The party’s candidates got only 11% of the vote in the legislative elections, which can be explained by its strategy of isolation and rejection of an alliance with the once-powerful Communist Party. Overall, however, compared to the 2012 legislative election, the far-left is on the rise and hopes to dominate the moderate left in the coming years.</p>
<h2>Two possible scenarios</h2>
<p>At the end of this first legislative round, France faces a new political landscape. Instead of four almost equal political forces with between <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest">24% and 20% of the vote</a>, France now has a single dominant force in the centre, a weakened family on the right, an extreme right that’s stumbling, and a deeply divided left. And half of potential voters are still sitting on the sidelines, seeing how the political situation evolves.</p>
<p>Two scenarios can be anticipated for June 18 – when the second and final round of the legislative elections take place. Because the winner of each constituency will be the candidate with the majority of votes, it’s likely to confirm the results of the first round and give a large majority to Macron. But one can also imagine a decrease in the momentum for the president, with opposition parties gaining more seats than anticipated.</p>
<p>And there could still be some surprises at the end of a very long series of elections that have completely transformed the French political landscape.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Leighton Walter Kille.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Many French voters seems willing to give the new president and his party, La République en Marche, a broad mandate, even if they didn’t initially support him.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/777742017-06-07T01:32:58Z2017-06-07T01:32:58ZFour reasons why the French parliamentary elections matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/172573/original/file-20170606-3662-1fsm5sp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Electoral posters of a candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, in Marseille, France.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Claude Paris</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The 2017 French presidential election saw <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-beats-le-pen-but-can-he-lead-france-76640">the victory of newcomer Emmanuel Macron</a>. But the French aren’t done voting. Elections for the lower house of French Parliament, the National Assembly, will take place on June 11 and 18. </p>
<p>Here are four reasons you should be keeping an eye on these elections.</p>
<h2>No majority, no agenda</h2>
<p>First, it can make or break Macron’s agenda of reforming the labor market and bringing back growth to a <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/19/news/economy/france-election-economy/index.html">morose French economy</a>. The <a href="http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constitution_anglais.pdf">French Constitution</a> grants extensive powers to the president. These include, for instance, the authority to dissolve the Parliament and nominate the prime minister (the head of the government), as well as broad control of defense and foreign policy.</p>
<p>But, the president must have the support of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macron-faces-a-really-big-problem-if-he-becomes-french-president-73886">majority in Parliament to govern</a>, pass laws and implement his campaign agenda. Macron would still be able to shape French foreign policy, even without a majority in the Parliament, but he would have limited say over domestic policy. </p>
<h2>Unpredictable election</h2>
<p>Second, this parliamentary election is unpredictable because of the French voting system.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/does-french-political-system-work-main-parties/">parliamentary election</a> includes essentially 577 mini-contests – one for each district that represents an area of France – which take place over two rounds. A candidate can win outright in the first round if he or she receives more than 50 percent of the votes. If no one reaches that threshold, then there is a runoff in the second round with anyone whose score from the first round equaled at least 12.5 percent of registered voters.</p>
<p>Such an electoral system encourages <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-factbox-idUSKBN1881F3">preelection agreements between compatible parties</a>, as well as deals between the two rounds. Thus, an eligible candidate might choose not to contest the second round to ensure the victory of an ally, or to block a rival. </p>
<p>Although the alliance supporting Macron has a very good shot at achieving a majority in Parliament, one cannot rule out two other outcomes that would be <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/the-french-election-that-really-matters-president-parliament-2017-le-pen-macron-fillon-hamon/">unfavorable to the new president</a>. Another party or coalition could win a majority in the Parliament, which would be a major blow to Macron’s domestic agenda. Or, there could be a fragmented outcome, with no party or coalition able to achieve a majority.</p>
<h2>Shifting political landscape</h2>
<p>Third, regardless of the results, the election will signal a significant rearranging of the French political landscape and pose a challenge for major parties. </p>
<p>If Macron’s movement gains a majority, it will be a stunning development considering it came into existence only in April 2016. The two parties that have dominated French politics since 1958, the left-wing Parti Socialiste and the right-wing Les Républicains, are in disarray. </p>
<p>Les Républicains are divided and facing pressure from Macron, who poached several of their <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/4-takeaways-on-emmanuel-macrons-first-cabinet/">leading figures for his Cabinet</a>, including Prime Minister Edouard Philippe and Minister of the Economy Bruno Le Maire.</p>
<p>The Parti Socialiste, following the catastrophic showing of its candidate Benoit Hamon in the presidential elections (6.36 percent of the first round votes), is reeling and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39900003">facing possible extinction</a>.</p>
<h2>Renewing the political class</h2>
<p>Fourth, the election will bring in a needed influx of new faces to the French political class. Until this election, it was extremely common for French politicians to combine local and national offices, such as being both a local mayor and a member of the national Parliament. <a href="http://en.rfi.fr/france/20170331-end-dual-mandate-french-parliamentary-officials">But this practice is now forbidden by a 2014 law</a>, which gave three years for politicians to choose between a local and a national office.</p>
<p>Since that <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170522-france-high-stakes-legislative-elections-primer-macron-lower-house">practice was widespread</a>, it has led many to choose their local office over their seat in Parliament. Already 206 incumbents (or 36 percent of the total number of members of Parliament) have chosen not to run again in the election. </p>
<p>Macron’s movement has certainly <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170511-france-macron-parliament-candidates-en-marche-celebrities">tried to capitalize on this turnover trend</a> when <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-france-parliament-20170511-story.html">choosing its candidates</a>. More than half of the candidates come from civil society and have never run for office, half of the candidates are women and only 5 percent are incumbent members of the Parliament.</p>
<p>Macron’s party may or may not gain a majority in the parliamentary election. And that majority may or may not be sufficient to enact much-needed reforms in France. But there is no doubt that the French political landscape will be dramatically different in the next five years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Emmanuel Macron may have won the presidential election, but his agenda could fail if his party doesn’t get a majority in Parliament.Garret Martin, Professorial Lecturer, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/767662017-05-04T11:15:15Z2017-05-04T11:15:15ZEmmanuel Macron takes step closer to French presidency with strong performance in fiery debate<p>Emmanuel Macron was a virtually unknown figure in French politics before 2012. Now, as leader of the new political movement En Marche! he finds himself in the position of being the defender of French liberal democratic values in the second round of the French presidential elections against the far-right Marine le Pen. </p>
<p>Many doubted that he would hold his own during the televised debate between the two candidates on May 3, the only one before the second and final round of voting on May 7. But Macron delivered a masterclass performance in public speaking. </p>
<p>A relative newcomer to politics, Macron has espoused policies that are too left-wing for many voters on the right, and too right-wing for many voters on the left. Yet during the debate, he proved he could deliver a clear and coherent message. He also proved that Le Pen’s programme could not stand the light of scrutiny.</p>
<h2>Timing, tone, and attitude</h2>
<p>Macron’s approach during the debate was pitch perfect. With both candidates given the same amount of talking time, Macron’s mastery of his own time was remarkable. He took control of the debate at the beginning, taking more time than Le Pen to deliver a message that both played on national pride, but also accused her of telling lies and spreading nonsense. After letting his opponent talk more in the middle of the debate, Macron finished strong, unmasking Le Pen’s contempt for the French justice system, while urging the French to be optimistic about the future. </p>
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<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcr/article-abstract/21/1/205/1853761/Message-Order-Effects-in-Persuasion-An-Attitude">Research</a> has shown that people remember and are persuaded more by information they receive either at the beginning of a message, or at the end, rather than in the middle. At the beginning and at the end of the debate, Macron was at his strongest. </p>
<p>The debate was full of accusations and insults on both sides, making it uncomfortable to watch. It is well known that <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=g4CSBQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=mutz+incivility&ots=oeGsaXktS-&sig=gDZlhD0X_6CJmZGwFnHYknXGYuA#v=onepage&q=mutz%20incivility&f=false">people do not like</a> incivility in debates. But here Macron was again a step ahead of his opponent. While he accused her of telling lies and not having her facts right, his accusations were for the most part specific, relating to what she had done, or had proposed to do or had said. When justified, people are <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00494.x/full">more willing</a> to accept incivility in debate. </p>
<p>On the other hand, he also debunked her accusations, for example when she accused him of being in charge of the takeover of a mobile phone company at a point when he did not hold elected office. At the end of the debate, she was reduced to simply shouting out the names of politicians who had endorsed Macron while he was espousing his vision for the future of France. </p>
<p>His nonverbal demeanour was also striking. Looking straight into the camera or straight into his opponent’s eyes, sitting slightly leant backward, shoulders straight, speaking with a clear, strong and calm voice, he exuded confidence. Opposite him, Le Pen often crossed her arms, leant forward, and lost eye contact. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/candidate-confidence-and-electoral-appeal-an-experimental-study-of-the-effect-of-nonverbal-confidence-on-voter-evaluations/ADE9ABD349F24E692440AD2F9DAA4CBC">Research</a> has shown that displaying nonverbal confidence is very important for voters’ impressions of a candidate’s leadership and winning potential. </p>
<h2>Catching up to do</h2>
<p>Since taking over the reins of the Front National from her father in 2011, Marine Le Pen has strived to convince the public that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-bid-to-detoxify-the-far-right-marine-le-pen-wants-to-appeal-to-french-jews-73993">party has changed</a>, that it is no longer a party catering to a niche electorate of the extreme right, but can be a party in government. Numerous <a href="http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/marine-le-pen-prise-aux-mots-cecile-alduy/9782021172102">analyses</a> of her discourse throughout the year have shown this not to be the case, and that the changes <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41253-016-0012-7">are simply image based</a>. </p>
<p>During the debate, the lack of viability of FN policies, such as on removing France from the euro, and Le Pen’s inability to show command of state and economic affairs, such as when she was surprised to learn that many medical drugs are produced outside of France, was obvious. She painted the FN’s familiar apocalyptic picture of France, full of despair and bleakness, mentioning key phrases such as “national interest” multiple times, but offered nothing else new. </p>
<p>Macron, on the other hand, clearly expressed his desire to change the way things are done in France, and to do so with a pragmatic approach that takes advantage of the current strengths of France, her people and her place in Europe and the world. On every topic raised during the debate, he presented a clear plan of action. He talked about small and very small businesses, about the problem of youth radicalisation, about schools, about fiscal policy, and about people with disabilities.</p>
<p>While both candidates’ performances may not change how people vote (Macron still has a <a href="https://ig.ft.com/sites/france-election/polls/">20 percentage point lead</a> in the polls), it may have changed why people vote. No longer to stop Le Pen, but for Macron as a candidate and for his programme.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Delia Dumitrescu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron went head-to-head in the final debate before the second round of voting on May 7.Delia Dumitrescu, Lecturer in Media and Cultural Politics, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/771142017-05-04T09:24:57Z2017-05-04T09:24:57ZThe French election shows the democratic limits of the country’s presidential system<p>After the final debate between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, the race for the French presidency is nearing its end point on May 7. But the presidential election has demonstrated once again that France’s electoral system is less about democracy, and more about restraining it. </p>
<p>The late stages of the first round campaign were incredibly open and led to <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/04/jean-luc-melenchon-france-insoumise-elections-socialist-party-fn-le-pen/">real debates</a> between different visions for the future of France. This seemed to enthuse French voters. While polls suggested that abstention <a href="http://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/presidentielle-l-abstention-premier-parti-de-france-18-04-2017-6862803.php">could reach a record 30%</a>, the turnout in the first round of voting on April 23 was in fact close to 78%, similar to the 2012 election. </p>
<p>The results in the first round also pointed to sharp ideological divisions in France, with four candidates finishing with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest">more or less 20% of the vote</a>. From the radical left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon to the hard right conservative François Fillon, from centrist newcomer Emmanuel Macron to far right Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>France seemed at a turning point, with the two mainstream parties who have governed the country for most of the Fifth Republic – Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste – suffering terrible blows. Yet the system is such that only the two candidates with the most votes in the first round are allowed to battle it out in the second. This has meant that the voice of 60% of the voters who did not vote for either Macron or Le Pen in the first round (plus that of the 20% of the population who abstained) is no longer democratically relevant. This voice must either be voided in abstention or blank ballots, or now transferred to the least worst candidate in the second round. </p>
<p>After the first round, Macron and Le Pen represented <a href="http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Election-presidentielle-2017/Election-presidentielle-2017-resultats-globaux-du-premier-tour">only 34% of registered voters overall</a> and 45% of the vote. This is even more striking as <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/elections-presidentielle-legislatives-2017/2017/04/25/la-france-de-macron-un-vote-par-defaut_1565365">41% of Macron’s electorate</a> appears to have voted tactically in the first round.</p>
<h2>More oxygen for Le Pen</h2>
<p>Through this archaic system, Le Pen, who was within a million votes of Fillon and Mélenchon, has been given the opportunity to legitimise her ideas further and is likely to set a new record in terms of votes for her far-right Front National (FN) party. Between the two rounds, Le Pen has been given ample opportunity to push her agenda, and spread false news <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/04/26/europe-macron-emploi-la-trumpisation-de-marine-le-pen-sur-tf1_5117479_4355770.html">in a manner similar to Donald Trump in the US</a>. As Macron seems unable to counter Le Pen’s demagoguery, he may help to further legitimise some of her politics by joining a race to the bottom, on anti-terrorism legislation in particular.</p>
<p>This is despite the fact that it would take a political earthquake for Le Pen to win. In 2007 and 2012, Le Pen would have needed more than 18m votes to win the election – her current record is 7.7m in the first round of the 2017 election. While her supporters tend to be loyal, her vote base tends to be more restricted, and most polls suggest that French voters still see the party as <a href="http://www.ouest-france.fr/politique/front-national-un-danger-pour-la-democratie-selon-58-des-francais-4840879">a threat to democracy</a>. </p>
<p>Considering that the two mainstream parties, Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2017/04/failed-french-presidential-candidates-who-refuse-endorse-emmanuel-macron">have called</a> on their supporters to vote for Macron, and that Mélenchon’s supporters <a href="https://www.fiducial.fr/fr/Actualites-FIDUCIAL/Rolling-2017-Ifop-Fiducial-l-election-presidentielle-en-temps-reel-n-66">seem more likely</a> either to abstain or turn to Macron, Le Pen faces almost certain defeat in the second round.</p>
<p>However, Macron’s lacklustre campaign for the second round thus far and <a href="http://www.francetvinfo.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron/un-geste-envers-les-insoumis-la-reponse-d-emmanuel-macron_2170964.html">his refusal to offer the left-wing electorate some concessions</a> could allow Le Pen a very strong showing. Rather than the presidency, Le Pen’s aim is most likely to reach 35% or more of the vote in the second round, benefiting from massive abstention rates rather than her own strong gains between the two rounds. Should she achieve such a result, she would be in a very strong position to plan for the 2022 election, to continue to normalise her ideas and position herself as the main opposition in France.</p>
<p>In the mid-term, the alliance of all other candidates behind Macron in a Republican Front is bound to reinforce Le Pen’s idea that she is the only one fighting against a deeply distrusted establishment. In this context, it is understandable that Mélenchon <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-04-28/melenchon-attacks-macron-as-le-pen-scraps-to-win-his-supporters">was not keen</a> to lend support to Macron, but it is perhaps not acceptable when considering the threat. The situation is a real catch-22 for the left.</p>
<h2>Where next for democracy?</h2>
<p>In this context, it is urgent to acknowledge the anti-democratic nature of the French presidential elections. The campaign debates and the space given to alternative voices before the first round revived the interest of the French people. Debates and disagreements shifted the focus away from the toxic nationalism promoted by the FN, which had been lazily borrowed by mainstream politicians and opportunistically hyped by much of the media. The return of class politics in the second debate was particularly welcome, and certainly played a part in the late <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">surge</a> of Mélenchon ahead of the first round of voting.</p>
<p>Throughout the campaign, polls suggested that <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2017/04/12/le-fn-premier-parti-des-jeunes-qui-votent_5109981_823448.html">young people</a> and the working class would turn en masse to the FN as it would be the sole alternative to the status quo. However, a single month of debate dedicated to different ideas turned the tide, and Mélenchon attracted the <a href="http://mashable.france24.com/monde/20170424-vote-jeunes-jean-luc-melenchon-marine-le-pen">most young voters</a>, and around 30% of the <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/elections-presidentielle-legislatives-2017/2017/04/19/entre-le-pen-et-melenchon-le-vote-des-ouvriers-balance_1563884">working-class vote</a>. Considering that Le Pen has benefited from disproportionate media coverage since 2012, and Macron for a year, one can only wonder where the debate would be if all ideas were equally discussed in day-to-day politics.</p>
<p>Yet the presidential system is only one element taking us away from democratic decision-making. Were our democratic demands serious, we would not restrict them to voting for less and less representative politicians every few years. We would instead bring politics back to our day-to-day interactions. For example, we could demand that a <a href="http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/tranches-de-campagne/20120418.OBS6504/jacques-ranciere-l-election-ce-n-est-pas-la-democratie.html">degree of chance</a> and the drawing of lots is added to our decision-making system, meaning that anyone and everyone can be selected to take office at any time. We could also bring democracy back to where we spend much of our lives and energy: our workplaces and our economy.</p>
<p>This would demand effort and courage, but this is what democratic politics is and must be about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/77114/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurelien Mondon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>France seems more divided than ever going into the run-off vote between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen on May 7.Aurelien Mondon, Senior lecturer in French and Comparative Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765292017-04-27T09:46:58Z2017-04-27T09:46:58ZFrance’s major parties want to block Marine Le Pen – but don’t expect a repeat of 2002<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166850/original/file-20170426-2834-1eby0mq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/blandinelc/7421299474/in/photolist-ciN6Md-ac9D9Y-ciN6DY-ciN8Cw-8oRwDY-fyDveJ-EXw5v-4mdd8V-6fNMyT-39Kbj6-ciMn6Y-79WJQX-8dEp72-8CPvPw-58J9hV-7a1mnf-ciN6wC-6LQePr-73b5YD-fBJs18-ciMZmQ-6He2iF-fuwSMb-droD2K-4H21A-9G8A1Y-81Q4oM-bAQJGE-fy8Ycn-rc8Vke-aPsbvF-dUMiaB-JzVfT-ac96kT-JjzBcL-aE7ptC-qgAFi-paKVNx-4mdcXK-aE7pZd-cY2M67-7P6fUB-D8bZZ5-RB6QvQ-RbNmCG-9n6ztu-aCDtCe-QwEsMF-9n6x4w-9n6ChU">Blandine Le Cain/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s down to two. In the second round of the French presidential elections on May 7, the far-right Marine Le Pen faces a run-off with the centrist independent Emmanuel Macron. Many comparisons have been made to 2002, when Marine’s father Jean-Marie Le Pen <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/thefarright.france">made it</a> through to the second round against Jacques Chirac. But the social and political context in 2017 is very different to 2002. </p>
<p>Although Macron is the favourite to win the presidency by a long <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39641442">margin</a>, with around 60% of the vote to Le Pen’s 40%, and both candidates of the centre-left and centre-right have called on their voters to back him, the “Republican front” against Marine Le Pen is likely to be thinner on the ground than many predict.</p>
<p>In 2002, Le Pen’s presence in the second round was widely viewed as a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/22/thefarright.france">shock</a>, an unexpected breakthrough at a time when the French model of integration and assimilation seemed to be working, heralding a rainbow nation.</p>
<p>The victory of the French football team in the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/27402053">1998 World Cup</a> final, held on French soil, led politicians and intellectuals from across the political spectrum to embrace the “black, blanc, beur” (black, white and mixed-race) heritage of the French team. Hot on the heels of the release of Matthieu Kassovitz’s <a href="http://www.empireonline.com/movies/la-haine/review/">La Haine</a> in 1995, a film which decried the lack of social opportunities for immigrants in France, the victory seemed to herald a new, multicultural and welcoming image of France. </p>
<p>Le Pen’s second place in 2002 brought that crashing down, revealing that the reality in France was more nuanced and not everyone hailed the prominent role of second- and third-generation immigrants in French sport and culture.</p>
<p>Leading the national mood, the left-wing daily newspaper Libération, a distinct and vociferous critic of Le Pen and the Front National (FN) since the party’s inception in 1972, filled the front page with the historic one-word headline “Non”. In 2017, instead of attacking the Le Pens the day after the first round, the paper chose to celebrate Macron’s narrow first round victory.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"856596226774622208"}"></div></p>
<p>Back in 2002, in between the two rounds of voting, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1954553.stm">mass demonstrations</a> took place on May 1. This is a date historically claimed by both left and right in France as simultaneously both labour day (la fête du travail) and, since the Vichy regime rebranded the festival, as a celebration of Joan of Arc. Around two million people demonstrated against Le Pen in May 2002, leading to a resounding victory for Chirac in the second round of the election, with 82.2% of the vote.</p>
<p>Yes, Chirac – the incumbent – <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/1127414">won</a> convincingly, and yes Le Pen was blocked by the mainstream parties joining forces to galvanise their supporters. But in spite of the mobilisation of a “Republican front” to ensure the election of Chirac, Le Pen in fact increased his share of the vote in the second round, when he gained 720,319 additional votes. These may have come more or less entirely from the camp of fellow extremist and former top lieutenant at the FN, Bruno Mégret, who gained just over 600,000 votes in the first round. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it’s likely Marine Le Pen will also receive a boost from her target voters who chose centre-right and extreme-left candidates in the first round.</p>
<h2>Different contexts</h2>
<p>May 1, 2017 is due to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/events/1344452545633540/">bring protest</a> rallies against Le Pen and the FN, though they are likely to be smaller than those in 2002. Le Pen’s second place is simply not a shock. Success for the FN in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/06/front-national-wins-opening-round-in-frances-regional-elections">2015 regional elections</a> had been a foretaste of the 2017 presidential campaign. </p>
<p>The French election debate was not purely one dominated by issues of immigration, integration and secularism, as it was in 2002. Instead, following five years of unpopular Socialist government under François Hollande, everyday concerns over the economy, working conditions and France’s membership of the European Union are also part of the picture. Since the January 2015 attacks on the offices of <a href="https://theconversation.com/charlie-hebdo-attackers-killed-now-france-seeks-answers-36084">Charlie Hebdo</a>, and the attacks in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994">Paris</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36801671">Nice</a> which followed, terrorism has become a central concern. Le Pen has thrived on the insecurities that have stemmed from these attacks.</p>
<p>A vote for Marine Le Pen is not purely a vote against immigration, as it was for her father in 2002, but may also be a vote directed against the Eurozone, against globalisation or in favour of better working conditions for the French people. Her long-term plan to detoxify the party image reached its apogee in her <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-leader-steps-down-candidate-for-all-french-people-election-party-a7701031.html">temporary withdrawal</a> from her role as head of the party in order to appear exclusively as a presidential candidate. </p>
<p>Not only is her presence in the second round simply not a shock, but unlike her father, Marine Le Pen is seeking to appear as an independent candidate, free from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-bid-to-detoxify-the-far-right-marine-le-pen-wants-to-appeal-to-french-jews-73993">toxic history</a> of the FN. As 2017 is such a different social context to 2002, Le Pen’s political nous means it would be foolish for Macron to be complacent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76529/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lees does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When Jean-Marie Le Pen made it to the second round in 2002, France was in a very different mood.David Lees, Teaching Fellow in French Studies, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/758952017-04-24T10:47:11Z2017-04-24T10:47:11ZFrexit: how a Le Pen victory could unleash a tsunami of economic volatility<p>With Marine Le Pen through to the second round of the French presidential elections, the prospect of Frexit, which is at the centre of her economic policies, is beginning to spook financial markets. While the possibility of Le Pen winning in the second round remains remote, two weeks can be a long time in politics.</p>
<p>When it comes to the implications of a French exit from the European Union, commentators have <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/22/france-exiting-the-euro-would-be-the-largest-default-in-history-with-serious-contagion-effects.html">so far focused</a> on the €1.7 trillion of French public debt issued under French law – which can be re-denominated into francs, if France leaves the eurozone. According to the rating agencies, this would constitute the largest ever sovereign default. </p>
<p>By comparison, <a href="http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5343&context=faculty_scholarship">Greece’s sovereign debt restructuring</a>, which affected €200 billion of debt held by the private sector in 2011-12, appears miniscule. While the timing of a French default remains uncertain, French sovereign bondholders are likely to flee <em>en masse</em> the moment they realise their baseline scenarios – which do not account for a Frexit – are wrong. </p>
<p>Although a sovereign default of such magnitude could unleash a tsunami of volatility in international financial markets, that is only the tip of the iceberg. The roll-out of a new currency across the economy would create new and unprecedented solvency and liquidity risks, which could cause financial turmoil, if not chaos, early on in the life of the new government. </p>
<p>Frexit would certainly have implications for the debt issued by French banks and corporations, irrespective of whether it has been issued under French law or otherwise. In the case where the debt has been issued under French law, its redenomination in French francs would be automatic. Again, international investors would be likely to flee early on, attempting to cut their losses short. This would cause abrupt drops in French bond prices and collateral values. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166466/original/file-20170424-12468-abax4b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Returning to the franc would have huge ramifications.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>French banks and corporations are likely to lose the ability to continue borrowing on international markets, and would have difficulties refinancing existing debt. They would therefore face a liquidity squeeze, which could lead to a wave of corporate insolvencies, contraction of the real economy and rising unemployment.</p>
<p>In the case of debt issued under other countries’ law, the ability of the issuer to honour liabilities in euros or other currencies would no doubt come under question. The solvency of the issuer is clearly dependent on their ability to survive in the new environment. Plus, the issuer’s ability to make payments in foreign currency depends on their ability to circumvent capital controls, which are likely to be introduced soon after if this new government takes office.</p>
<h2>Risk of a bank run</h2>
<p>Whether they are part of the economic programme of a Le Pen government or not, capital controls are almost a certainty. They would be needed to protect the rest of the euro area from the risk of massive losses that Frexit may entail. This is because French bank liabilities – including bank deposits – would, at some point, be redenominated in the new currency. </p>
<p>Although the French government may think that it can take its time to introduce the new currency, French depositors are unlikely to wait. As the experience of <a href="https://theconversation.com/euro-nightmare-unfolds-queues-at-banks-in-greece-as-capital-controls-follow-ecb-funding-cap-43984">Greece</a> and <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/dp/specialPapers/PDF/SP245.pdf">Cyprus</a> showed, fear of euro exit causes mass withdrawals from the banks as people turn their deposits into cash or other safe havens. And the precedent of measures to limit withdrawals in both Cyprus and Greece, means that French depositors are likely to be even less patient. </p>
<p>A massive bank run is, therefore, on the cards should Le Pen come to power. In Greece, <a href="http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/deposits.aspx">bank deposits</a> declined from nearly €300 billion at the start of the crisis in 2010 to nearly half that amount by mid-2015. To survive these outflows, the Greek banking system became chronically dependent on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by the European Central Bank (ECB), which peaked at <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-04/emergency-liquidity-assistance-for-greek-banks-an-explainer">around €124 billion in 2012</a>.</p>
<p>Given that <a href="http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=1000003346">deposits in French banks exceed €4.1 trillion</a>, a similar occurrence in France could mean that French banks might need over €2 trillion of central bank liquidity. But because of their new level of risk, French banks may be frozen out of the ECB’s standard monetary policy operations. They may, therefore, need to resort to the French central bank for ELA. National central banks in the euro system, however, rely on the ECB to obtain the necessary funds for ELA. So although the national central bank that provides the ELA is the one that bears the risk of such lending, any residual risk is borne by the ECB and other euro area central banks. </p>
<h2>Unchartered territory</h2>
<p>Under normal circumstances, the collateral pledged by commercial banks is sufficient to protect a national central bank (and ultimately the rest of the euro system) from ELA losses. But, in the event of a country declaring that it wishes to exit the euro, the national central bank’s position vis-à-vis the ECB and the rest of the euro system becomes dubious. </p>
<p>In the case of Cyprus and Greece, the ECB continued to supply the necessary funds to their respective central banks – because there was a political commitment to remain in the euro. If it came to Le Pen forming a government in France, the ECB would find itself in unchartered territory. The residual risk of any ELA operations borne by the ECB and the rest of the euro system would rise to unprecedented levels. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=797&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166465/original/file-20170424-27254-14uqmlx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1001&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">France’s central bank is linked to the ECB.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>If the French government is prepared to default on its international obligations, would France’s central bank be allowed to honour its obligations to the ECB? After all, Le Pen <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-06/le-pen-s-plan-to-break-up-the-euro-and-make-france-great-again">pledged to take away its independence</a> so that it could print money to finance government deficits (a cardinal sin for euro area member states, as the EU Treaty <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1001/mofi/html/index.en.html">prohibits</a> monetary financing). Would the ECB wait until that actually happens before it acts to contain its risks from Frexit? </p>
<p>The ECB would likely consider it irresponsible to supply any liquidity to French banks, in the event that its government is intent on leaving the euro. For that reason alone, France is more than likely to be forced to introduce draconian – and highly disruptive – capital controls, including limits on cash withdrawals from bank accounts, soon after its elections. These could then remain in place for many years to come, while the country is shunned by international financial markets. </p>
<p>French voters would be wrong to think that Brexit, and the relative calm that the UK has experienced since its Brexit vote, is a relevant precedent. In all likelihood, a Frexit would need to be fast forwarded to prevent complete economic paralysis. Even if the new government manages to swiftly introduce its new currency, the French economy would inevitably enter a high inflation environment with disruptive capital controls and a rapidly depreciating currency. This does not even take into account the real costs that increased protectionism, also pledged by Le Pen, would entail. </p>
<p>All this may sound alarmist, but to someone who has experienced the chaos created by coming close to a euro exit in March 2013 Cyprus, it is just common sense. The biggest question mark in my mind this time is what could happen to the rest of Europe when a country that has always been an important part of its core leaves. It is a frightening prospect. Europe, after all, was first and foremost a project for peace, than one of economic and monetary integration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Panicos O Demetriades does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The prospect of a Marine Le Pen victory has financial markets spooked. For good reason.Panicos O Demetriades, Professor of Financial Economics, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763852017-04-24T09:59:56Z2017-04-24T09:59:56ZWhat happened to the French Socialist Party?<p>The 2017 French presidential election was destined to go down to the wire and it didn’t disappoint. The traditional political landscape has been shot <a href="https://theconversation.com/macron-and-le-pen-to-face-off-for-french-presidency-but-she-wont-be-pleased-with-first-round-result-76565">through by the victory</a> of two outsiders, Marine Le Pen, the candidate of the far-right Front National, and Emmanuel Macron, the new kid on the block. </p>
<p>Under the ashes lie the two mainstream parties, the two pillars of French politics. The Republican right and its candidate François Fillon, marred by <a href="https://theconversation.com/francois-fillon-scandal-is-the-once-favourite-presidential-candidate-toast-72430">scandals</a>, only missed the second spot by a whisker but you need to go all the way down to 6% to find Benoît Hamon, the candidate for Parti Socialiste (PS), the French Socialist Party. He came in fifth position, with a thoroughly humiliating result.</p>
<p>The PS is a giant of modern French politics. It is the party of the former president François Mitterrand, whose 14 years in the Élysée Palace, between 1981 and 1995, shaped much of contemporary France. It is the party of the other François, Hollande, who entered the Elysée in 2012. And it is the party of other leading and legendary figures of the French left from Jean Jaurès to Léon Blum, and many others. </p>
<p>But the party which won the presidency in 1981, in 1988, and again in 2012, has been reduced to less than 10% of the vote in 2017. </p>
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<p>Since 1969, the PS has always been either the ruling party or the largest opposition party. In 1969, its predecessor, the SFIO, reached a nadir and obtained just 5% of the vote. The party rebranded and was rebooted by Mitterrand, who took over in 1971, with a programme much more to the left. </p>
<p>It hasn’t been plain sailing all the way, with the highs of winning elections followed by troughs. The worst was in 1993 when the party collapsed and only obtained 57 MPs out of 577. More recently in 2002 its candidate failed to reach the second round of the presidential election, leaving the Front National’s Jean-Marie Le Pen to face Jacques Chirac. But even then, its candidate, Lionel Jospin, finished in third place in the first round, with 16% of the vote, ten points higher than Hamon. </p>
<p>The PS is renowned for its infighting and party factionalism. It has experienced nasty episodes of civil war, most notably at a 1991 Rennes party conference and a near break-up during the 2005 referendum on the EU constitution, which saw it split in the middle. </p>
<h2>Enter Hamon</h2>
<p>More recently, its “rebel” MPs, including Hamon have opposed Hollande’s “pro-business” policies, which they perceived as a betrayal of the promise he made in 2012 to fight the power of global finance. No one really expected any Socialist candidate to win this election. Hollande’s popularity rating <a href="http://www.tns-sofres.com/dataviz?type=1&code_nom=hollande">reached</a> an all-time low for any president in November 2016 of 11% and has recovered little since. The party has lost ground in all local, regional and European elections since 2012, including a bloodbath in the 2014 municipal elections. </p>
<p>Part of Hamon’s predicament stems from the way <a href="https://theconversation.com/benoit-hamon-wins-french-socialist-nomination-as-party-sees-a-reassuring-bump-in-the-polls-72139">he was chosen</a> as the party’s candidate. Hollande was expected to stand for a second term and the other candidates were ready to fight the primary on an anti-Hollande platform. When, faced with dire polls, Hollande threw in the towel, Manuel Valls, the former prime minister, stepped in. The battle pitted two visions of the party, the more moderate and reformist one around Valls, and that of the rebels, represented by Hamon. </p>
<p>Hamon won on a programme designed to get the party squarely back to the left, away from the pro-business reforms carried out by Hollande. He might have won the socialist primary handsomely (with 58.7% of the vote) but it was not long before he was caught in a pincer movement. </p>
<p>On his right, his victory left a boulevard for the centrist Macron, who was able to appeal to the moderate electorate of the PS. And with more and more socialist politicians, opposed to Hamon’s vision, announcing their support for Macron, including Valls, Hamon lost the full support of a strong and organised party. </p>
<p>On his left, Hamon was overtaken by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>. He had a much more radical programme, and was not tainted by having ruled the country for five years with limited economic and social results to show for it. Hamon may have left the government in 2014 but his party remains inextricably linked to Hollande’s presidency. With Macron a new face in politics, Mélenchon a much better orator, and Hamon slow to launch his campaign and appearing shy in the two televised debates, the socialists’ voice quickly became inaudible.</p>
<h2>What next for the left?</h2>
<p>Now the results are in, the whole of the French left is likely to undergo a radical transformation, with a social-democratic and reformist pole around Macron and a radical left around Mélenchon. This will leave the PS in a very tight corner. With the French media now openly wondering whether the party itself can survive, the 2017 presidential election is likely to be a watershed moment for one of the oldest parties in France. All bets are off as to whether it will reinvent itself once again or suffer a slow and inglorious agony.</p>
<p>The parliamentary elections due in June could provide one possible road to redemption. After all, the PS has always been very resilient after a presidential defeat. Even after its shock rout in 2002, it succeeded in being the second largest party in the National Assembly, with <a href="http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2113_02.htm">just under 140 seats</a>. This time, however, is likely to prove very different, with two major obstacles in its fight for survival. </p>
<p>Macron might well act as a magnet, with socialist candidates, aware of the toxic brand of their party, tempted to jump ship and seek endorsement from his movement En Marche! The socialists are also faced with the stark erosion of their support at a local level. The number of regions under their control declined from nearly all of them in 2010 to just five in 2015, and the party lost control of more than 140 large towns between 2008 and 2014. </p>
<p>Humiliated, unloved and threatened to be plundered by Macron’s movement, the French socialists stand shivering at a crossroad.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ariane Bogain is affiliated with the trade union UCU. </span></em></p>With just 6% of the vote, the French socialist party of outgoing president François Hollande came a distant fifth in the French election.Ariane Bogain, Senior Lecturer in French and Politics, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/764842017-04-24T01:49:29Z2017-04-24T01:49:29ZSurprise! Round one of the French presidential election went pretty much as expected<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166394/original/file-20170424-12650-vznsc9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">First-round winners: Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP/Christophe Ena (Macron)/Michel Spingler (Le Pen)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The votes <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/french-citizens-vote-in-an-uncertain-race-that-could-determine-europes-future/2017/04/23/fd3759ce-1fa4-11e7-bb59-a74ccaf1d02f_story.html?utm_term=.407d34b7041f">are mostly counted</a> in the first round of the French presidential election. </p>
<p>Marine Le Pen of the French far right National Front has received 21.5 percent of the vote. Emmanuel Macron, an independent candidate running on the slogan of En Marche! – which translates roughly to “Let’s March” – is slightly ahead with 23.9 percent.</p>
<p>Both candidates will proceed to the runoff round on May 7. </p>
<p>The winner of that round will be the next president of France. </p>
<p>There are many unusual features of this first-round vote, but let’s start with the fact that the French polls accurately predicted the outcome. </p>
<h2>Pollsters get a win</h2>
<p>Marine Le Pen had been on track to make the second round since the European parliamentary elections of 2014, when her party came in first ahead of more established parties. From the time that she took over the National Front from her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in 2011, she aimed to make it a party of governance and not simply provocation. The terrorist <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/opinions/berezin-paris-attack-europe-politics/index.html">attacks of the last few years</a> in France that elicited an increased collective anxiety around immigrants <a href="http://isa-global-dialogue.net/extremist-politics-before-and-after-charlie-hebdo/">contributed to her momentum</a>. </p>
<p>However, French and international media, spooked by <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-exits-the-eu-how-brexit-will-hit-america-61412">Brexit</a> and the election of Donald Trump, contributed to a narrative that polls were unreliable and the outcome was up for grabs. For a few short weeks after the April 4 presidential debate that featured all 11 candidates, far left candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon seemed to have a chance to make it through to the second round. But in the end, even though <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-french-election-is-way-too-close-to-call/?ex_cid=story-twitte">FiveThirtyEight</a> labeled the French election a “mess,” the French more or less voted as the polls said they would. The only real surprise was that the Socialist Party candidate Benoît Hamon dropped to 6 percent in the first round.</p>
<p>Just because the results were not surprising does not mean that the first round was insignificant. On the contrary, it signals major ruptures in French and European politics – just not the ones that occupied print and social media. </p>
<h2>Socialists and Republicans big losers</h2>
<p>First, the election signaled the end of the political competitiveness of institutionalized French politics. The National Front has been around since 1972, but with the exception of 2002 and 2012, the party has remained at the margins of electoral politics. This is the first time in recent French electoral history that neither of the established political parties – Socialists or the Republicans– made it into the second round. </p>
<p>This wasn’t completely out of the blue, however. The last presidential election was a harbinger of the party dissolution observed today. In the 2012 election, the two extremes, again Le Pen and Melenchon, attracted more total votes than either Socialist Francois Hollande or Republican Nicholas Sarkozy. </p>
<h2>Globalism and nationalism</h2>
<p>Second, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0151">the tension between globalism</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=V_rXEE11k2gC&dq=Berezin&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwif3uiL7rvTAhWn5YMKHeyzC3Q4ChDoAQg9MAU">nationalism</a> that the European Union embodies and that has been percolating at least since 2000 in France and beyond is finally out in the open. Intellectuals and politicians have done their best to ignore it for the last few years, until 2009, when the sovereign debt crisis and the Greek austerity regime <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=VoSlMd6wrlkC&lpg=PT5&dq=austerity%20Mabel%20Berezin&pg=PT303#v=onepage&q=austerity%20Mabel%20Berezin&f=false">exploded on the scene</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/emmanuel-macron-33770">Macron is</a> the quintessential cosmopolitan globalist. He studied at the prestigious École Nationale d'Administration, the equivalent of going to an Ivy League school, has worked as an investment banker for Rothschild, been finance minister in Hollande’s government, is a committed European – and, unusually for a French politician, speaks fluent English. He is the candidate that the rest of Europe wants and is supported by the educated mobile young who pursue opportunities in a global arena. If MSNBC could vote, he would be their candidate. Politico has already reported that <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/euro-jumps-as-emmanuel-macron-leads-france-vote-count/">the Euro “jumped”</a> when Macron’s candidacy became a certainty. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/marine-le-pen-2938">Marine Le Pen</a>, on the other hand, is a committed nationalist. She wants to tighten borders against terrorists and illegal immigrants, is fervently anti-EU and preaches a form of “economic protectionism.” She wants to hold a referendum on exit from the Eurozone a la Brexit. Her slogan is “In the Name of the People” and she promises to “Put France in Order.” An attack on “savage globalization” is a major campaign theme. She is the candidate of the rust belts of France as well as the rural areas. </p>
<p>Unlike Macron, who was relatively unknown and not experienced in government, she has served in the European Parliament. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/marine-le-pen-after-brexit-the-peoples-spring-is-inevitable.html?_r=0">She has written op-eds</a> that appeared in The New York Times. In 2015, Time magazine named her among its <a href="http://time.com/3823288/marine-le-pen-2015-time-100/">100 most influential persons</a>. In a twist of irony, the magazine also picked her co-national, the best-selling left economist <a href="http://time.com/collection-post/3823302/thomas-piketty-2015-time-100/?iid=sr-link1">Thomas Piketty</a>. </p>
<p>Comparisons to Trump make good press but are in many ways off the mark. Le Pen has a law degree, speaks coherently and has well-thought-out programs, whether one agrees with them or not. She also explicitly believes in working with Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>If Marine Le Pen were elected president of France, the European Union as well as NATO would be seriously weakened. Global stock markets would likely plummet, at least for a bit. </p>
<p>But, I’d contend that Marine Le Pen is not going to win – at least not in 2017. The National Front has the significant negative baggage of xenophobia and anti-Semitism attached to it, thanks to her father. Normalizing the party will take more than a few years. Every second-round electoral poll had her losing to any possible first-round candidate. Macron and Le Pen will take the global versus nationalist conflict into the public sphere. </p>
<p>Social inequality is the big question facing all European politicians. Macron, if elected, will need to find ways to provide opportunities not only for the educated but also for those youth who truly are left behind by globalization and see no future. These are the groups that French geographer Christophe Guilluy identifies as the lost popular classes of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=yPxzBAAAQBAJ&dq=guilluy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjUqLSL4LvTAhXK2SYKHV8VCDAQ6AEIJTAA">La France Périphérique</a> </p>
<p>Both Macron and Le Pen, the outsider candidates, are charismatic figures with prodigious amounts of political talent. The next two weeks are going to be fascinating political theater that will lay bare the major social, economic and cultural fissures in France and Europe. </p>
<p>Even if Le Pen loses, she is not leaving the French political scene anytime soon. Populism in France and in Europe will be with us well into the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mabel Berezin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Marine Le Pen of the far right National Front and independent Emmanuel Macron advance to the runoff on May 7.Mabel Berezin, Professor of Sociology, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765662017-04-24T00:15:20Z2017-04-24T00:15:20ZThe fate of Europe will depend on the winner of the French presidential election<p>The results of one of the most divisive and unpredictable presidential contests in recent French history, which saw early frontrunner, the conservative François Fillon, laid low <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/europe/france-francois-fillon-charged.html">by a corruption scandal</a> and judicial investigation; a late surge by Jean-Luc Mélenchon <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/jean-luc-melenchon-france-presidential-election.html">the far-left firebrand</a> who wants to take France out of the European Union and NATO; and the Socialist Party candidate Benoît Hamon come in a distant fifth place, are now in. </p>
<p>Centrist Emmanuel Macron and far-right Marine Le Pen will face off on May 7 in the second round of voting to determine who will be the next French president.</p>
<p>This is the first time since the Fifth Republic was established in 1958 that the top two from the first voting round do not belong to one of France’s two mainstream parties. Le Pen leads <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-frances-far-right-national-front-rises-memory-of-its-past-fades/2017/01/26/dfeb0d42-e1ac-11e6-a419-eefe8eff0835_story.html?utm_term=.90513066c94d">the far-right National Front</a>, which has historically been on the fringe of French electoral politics, while Macron is running as an independent.</p>
<h2>Two different visions for Europe</h2>
<p>The outcome of the run-off could have historic and far-reaching implications for France, Europe, and the EU. </p>
<p>A Le Pen victory would mark the first time <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/opinion/sunday/france-in-the-end-of-days.html">the extreme right</a> has held power in France since the 1940s. </p>
<p>Macron, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/17/emmanuel-macron-the-french-outsider-president">who quickly advanced through</a> the Socialist Party hierarchy before leaving it to start his own political movement last year, has never held elective office.</p>
<p>The candidates offer two totally different visions for France’s future and its relationship to Europe. <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/21/politics/europe-far-right-conference/">Le Pen has called the EU</a> a “chimera” and a “anti-democratic oligarchy” and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-lepen-referendum-idUSKCN1190HW">has promised</a> a referendum on France’s EU membership within six months of taking office. </p>
<p>After last year’s Brexit vote, a Le Pen victory would signal that European voters are rebelling against the EU in a historic way.</p>
<p>Macron, on the other hand, embraces European integration and wants to deepen France’s partnership <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-france-macron-analysis-idUSKBN16M2LQ">with Germany</a> to lead Europe. His victory could lead to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/09/emmanuel-macron-france-reform-eu-britain">a rejuvenation of the EU</a> at a time when the bloc faces a period of unprecedented and historic crises.</p>
<p>Beyond Europe, a Le Pen victory could threaten the post-second world war transatlantic alliance. Le Pen is a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/world/europe/marine-le-pen-trump-populism-france-election.html">fierce critic of NATO and the US role in Europe</a>. She would likely seek to align France more closely with Russia, precisely at a time <a href="https://theconversation.com/twin-crises-in-syria-and-ukraine-prove-the-west-cannot-restrain-russia-65811">when relations between Moscow and the West</a> have deteriorated to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. </p>
<p>She has called the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014 “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-front-national-russian-kremlin-putin-invasion-annexation-crimea-ukraine-2014-a7566196.html">completely stupid</a>,” and has suggested that she might recognise Russia’s seizure of the peninsula.</p>
<p>The most immediate impact of a Le Pen victory would likely be felt in the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-would-a-le-pen-victory-in-france-mean-for-markets-1492858801">financial markets</a>. Stock markets around the world would react strongly. </p>
<p>Anticipating a possible French exit from the Eurozone, investors would sell off the country’s debt. Fears of capital controls and devaluation could lead to bank runs in France. </p>
<p>Markets could even start to anticipate the collapse of the entire Eurozone, leading to serious economic, social, and even political disruption and destabilisation.</p>
<h2>A Le Pen victory is still possible</h2>
<p>Current polls show Macron easily beating Le Pen in the second round of voting.</p>
<p>While <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/france-s-presidential-election">many experts</a> continue to dismiss the possibility of a Le Pen victory in next month’s runoff, few would go so far as to say that it is completely unimaginable.</p>
<p>The central question is whether a “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/23/world/the-french-surprise-the-shock-french-political-leaders-rally-around-chirac.html">Republican front</a>” will emerge to block Le Pen, as happened in 2002 when her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, faced Jacques Chirac in the second round of presidential voting. </p>
<p>Left-leaning voters helped deliver a decisive victory for Chirac.</p>
<p>But if first-round supporters of François Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, socialist Benoît Hamon, or the lesser candidates do not come out for Macron – many of them see him as just a continuation of the dreadful Hollande government – Le Pen could have a chance. Her supporters tend to be <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/world/europe/france-election-voters.html">more motivated and more likely to come out in strong numbers to vote</a>.</p>
<p>A Le Pen victory would thus be a tragedy for those who believe in the idea and reality of a united Europe. Its economic and political integration was a French initiative, spearheaded after the second world war by <a href="http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2014/monnets-brandy-and-europes-fate.html">visionary French statesmen</a>, such as Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet.</p>
<p>Three generations of French and other European leaders devoted their careers to building a united and peaceful Europe. And until recently, most French leaders saw their country’s future as inextricably tied to the EU.</p>
<h2>Ambivalence toward European integration</h2>
<p>But when given an opportunity to express their voice, French voters have been ambivalent towards greater European integration. In a 2005 referendum, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/30/world/europe/french-voters-soundly-reject-european-union-constitution.html">55%</a> of them said no to the adoption of a so-called EU constitution. </p>
<p>In 1992, French voters approved the Maastricht Treaty, which transferred more powers to EU institutions in Brussels, by the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/21/world/turmoil-in-europe-french-approve-unity-treaty-but-slim-margin-leaves-doubts.html?pagewanted=all">narrowest of margins</a>, 51% for and 49% against.</p>
<p>And today, after some 20 years of economic stagnation, France has <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677987-france-has-less-and-less-influence-eu-and-fears-use-what-it-still-has-dispensable">less influence</a> in the EU than it has had in decades. </p>
<p>The EU has always been led by <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21577100-european-union-fretting-over-widening-gulf-between-two-partners-have-always">a Franco-German tandem</a>, but the power balance today has shifted decisively toward Berlin. On issues ranging from Greek bailouts, the refugee crisis, or containing Russian aggression, Germany increasingly calls the shots. </p>
<p>Still, the majority of French voters want to remain in the Eurozone and the EU. According to a recent <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/10/three-quarters-french-against-return-franc-blow-marine-le-pen/">poll</a>, 72% want to keep the euro. </p>
<p>And while a Pew Research Center <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/pm_2016-06-07_brexit-01/">poll</a> last year found that 60% of French respondents hold an unfavourable view of the EU, more French citizens want <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-who-will-be-next-to-leave-the-eu">to stay in the EU</a> than to leave it.</p>
<p>Next month’s run-off then is a critical juncture for the future of France and the EU. Facing the effects of an unprecedented migration crisis, the rise of right-wing populism, Brexit negotiations, and nearly a decade of economic austerity, the EU is already embattled. </p>
<p>A Le Pen victory could signal the end of the project. The stakes could scarcely be higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Maher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Le Pen and Macron offer two totally different visions for France’s future and its relationship to Europe.Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765652017-04-23T21:30:58Z2017-04-23T21:30:58ZMacron and Le Pen to face off for French presidency – but she won’t be pleased with first round result<p>In the end, the polls were right. Emmanuel Macron will go into the second round of the French presidential election against Marine Le Pen. For a while it seemed as though a dead heat were on the cards but, in the end, Macron <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39686993">took first place</a>, with nearly 24%, ahead of Le Pen at just under 22%.</p>
<p>Republican candidate François Fillon and far-left contender <a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-jean-luc-melenchon-the-far-left-candidate-shaking-up-the-french-election-76384">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a> followed close behind, with Socialist Benoît Hamon trailing badly. </p>
<p>Despite coming second, for Le Pen and her supporters, the score is a disappointment. For so long, she was touted for first place and predicted a score as high as 27%. Even on the eve of the vote, some pundits were predicting the possibility of a score of 30%. Her score is well behind the 28% the Front National scored in the regional elections in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/dec/13/french-regional-elections-2015-live">December 2015</a>. Above all, it reflects Le Pen’s failure to make the key aspects of her programme count in the campaign. She was strangely muted in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-pen-fails-to-land-her-punches-in-first-tv-debate-of-french-presidential-campaign-74950">TV debates</a> and now it shows.</p>
<p>The disappointment was clear on Le Pen’s face when she made her first TV appearance at a little after 9pm on the night of the vote. At her campaign HQ, by 10pm they’d turned off the TV screens and half her supporters had gone home while others were enjoying the disco.</p>
<p>All the polls that have run a Le Pen/Macron scenario for the second round have suggested a 60/40 split in favour of Macron. Le Pen will hope for better, of course, but while she has to believe she can win on May 7, it’s a very long shot. </p>
<p>The final result will have an impact on Le Pen and the future direction of the Front National. She is not in danger of being replaced if she loses; there is no alternative leader for the time being. But the strategy and the programme, largely devised by her acolyte Florian Philippot, will be put under the spotlight. </p>
<p>Her voters are loyal, and Le Pen will hope to secure a proportion of Fillon’s voters as well as those Mélenchon followers who cannot countenance supporting Macron. But with so many other candidates urging their followers to now back Macron, she has a lot of ground to cover in a very short space of time. </p>
<h2>Fillon gracious in defeat</h2>
<p>Despite Mélenchon’s late rally, it seems that Fillon is the third man in this race. At 8.45pm, he appeared at his campaign headquarters to deliver a remarkably dignified speech in which he accepted his defeat and called, without hesitation, for his supporters to vote for Macron in the second round.</p>
<p>Not all of them will. Le Pen will hope that the right wing Catholic vote will swing to her rather than Macron, for example. Nevertheless, with Fillon’s defeat, most of the Republican heavyweights came out in favour of Macron. It may even be that, in due course, once the allegations against him are out of the way and show him to be innocent, Fillon might even foresee a situation where he and other figures from the right might have a role to play between now and 2022.</p>
<p>While Fillon demonstrated both restraint and dignity, throughout the evening Mélenchon and his camp showed the opposite. They refused to accept the projections based on exit polls, even as they appeared to confirm the gap between Macron and Le Pen, and again Fillon and Mélenchon. This is the downside of Mélenchonite. After the fever reaches its high point, it inevitably leads to disappointment, not to say depression. In 2012, having thought he might come third, Mélenchon slipped to fourth, and by a distance. In the last fortnight of this campaign, Mélenchon and his supporters convinced themselves that they would be in the second round. Fly high, fall far.</p>
<p>But Mélenchon succeeded in one of his missions: to reduce Socialist candidate Benoît Hamon to fifth place and a crushing 6.5%. Hamon was out of the blocks first, by 8.15pm, to call for his supporters to vote Macron. By nine, his HQ was empty, with only a handful of journalists hanging around.</p>
<p>Now, with the second round approaching on May 7, Le Pen will be hoping that Macron blunders. But until this point, he has avoided the obstacles thrown across his path, while Le Pen has failed to make her key points count. Perhaps, just perhaps, now that Fillon and Mélenchon are out of the way, Le Pen will find a second wind, and more easily be able to define her programme. She may take back the initiative that has eluded her so far in this campaign. To win she would have to win over a huge slice of the electorate that so far continues to regard a Le Pen presidency as an anathema.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After a historic battle, we now know that one of two people will be the next president of France.Paul Smith, Associate Professor in French and Francophone Studies, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765322017-04-21T16:04:13Z2017-04-21T16:04:13ZQ&A: What role has the fight against terror played in the French election?<p><em>As the 11 candidates vying for the French presidency were making their last televised bids to the electorate on the evening of April 20, news broke that a policeman <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39662315">had been killed</a> in an attack on the Champs-Élysées in Paris. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility, though this has not yet been confirmed, and an investigation was launched by French anti-terror police. Leading right-wing candidates <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-election-fillon-shooting-idUKKBN17M2RY">François Fillon</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/21/counryside-marine-le-pen-forgotten-france-presidential-election-2017">Marine Le Pen</a> cancelled their last public campaign rallies ahead of the first round of voting on April 23.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Eglantine Staunton, research fellow at the University of Leeds, to explain the role terrorism has played in the election campaign.</em> </p>
<p><strong>Has the fight against terrorism played a big part in the campaign?</strong></p>
<p>The fight against terrorism – and security issues more generally – has been one of the most debated issues of the presidential campaign (along with economic measures). It is a real concern for the French population as France has recently had to face several terrorist attacks and threats on its soil. The presidential campaign has not put these concerns to ease, with the <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/18/35003-20170418ARTFIG00300-securite-une-campagne-sous-tres-haute-tension.php">Le Figaro</a> newspaper arguing that there have never been so many terrorist threats during a presidential campaign. On April 18, two men were arrested in Marseille for planning a “<a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2017/04/18/arrestation-de-deux-hommes-soupconnes-de-preparer-des-attentats-avant-les-elections_5113042_1653578.html">violent and imminent attack</a>”, which was suspected of targeting some of the leading presidential candidates.</p>
<p>Beyond the concerns of the French population, journalists have also played a role by focusing on the fight against terrorism. This issue sells papers because it leads to heated debates between the candidates. </p>
<p><strong>How important is terrorism to French voters as they consider who to vote for?</strong> </p>
<p>In light of the importance of the fight against terrorism for the French population, this issue will likely play a central role in people’s decision, especially in light of recent events since so many voters remain undecided. A <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/presidentielle-les-electeurs-plus-indecis-que-jamais_1881116.html">poll published on April 16</a> reported that with a week to go, less than 50% of the population intending to vote in the first round of the election knew who they would vote for. </p>
<p>Even though it is hard to predict how much of an impact the attack on the Champs-Élysées may have on the vote, it is likely to benefit Le Pen and her Front National in the short run. By proposing the expulsion of foreigners who are suspected of having ties with terrorists, and the departure of France from the Schengen free movement zone, she appears to many as the candidate who has the strongest programme against terrorism. Le Pen has <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/19/35003-20170419ARTFIG00155-avec-moi-il-n-y-aurait-pas-eu-d-attentat-marine-le-pen-persiste.php?pagination=30">also claimed</a> that if she were president, there would not have been terrorist attacks. The morning after the Champs-Élysées attack, she called for <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-shooting-le-pen-idUKKBN17N0UQ?il=0il=0">French borders to be reinstated</a>. </p>
<p>Fillon <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/19/35003-20170419ARTFIG00335-fillon-sur-la-lutte-contre-l-islamisme-comme-sur-tout-le-reste-macron-est-flou.php?redirect_premium">warned</a> right-wing voters who are concerned by security matters that voting for Le Pen, rather than for him, would actually benefit Macron in the long run and increase the centrist candidate’s chance of making it to the second round on May 7. </p>
<p><strong>How have the left-wing and centrist candidates proposed that they will tackle the terrorism threat?</strong></p>
<p>As expected, proposals to fight terrorism and increase security have been extensively developed by right and extreme-right candidates Fillon and Le Pen. However, considering how important these issues are for the French population, this is no longer an issue left to the right wing.</p>
<p>In terms of what can be done internationally, the centrist Emmanuel Macron <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/06/35003-20170406ARTFIG00132-comment-les-pretendants-a-l-elysee-comptent-ils-gerer-le-dossier-syrien.php">has suggested</a> that he would be willing to cooperate – at least temporarily – with leaders like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad since IS constitutes a common enemy and his priority is to eradicate terrorism. </p>
<p>From a domestic point of view, Macron’s positions are not as clear. In particular, he seems undecided about whether terrorists holding a double nationality should be stripped of their French one and this has led candidates like Fillon <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/04/19/35003-20170419ARTFIG00335-fillon-sur-la-lutte-contre-l-islamisme-comme-sur-tout-le-reste-macron-est-flou.php?redirect_premium">to criticise him</a> for not having clear objectives. Even though Macron has promoted a reinforcement of FRONTEX (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), his pro-Europe – and pro-Schengen – position has not helped reassure the voters who believe the lack of French frontiers is to blame for the attacks. </p>
<p>The far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s position has created even more controversy among voters who are concerned with terrorism. By promoting the end of the state of emergency and arguing that stripping terrorists of the French nationality was “<a href="http://melenchon.fr/2016/01/21/contributions-contre-la-decheance-de-nationalite/">shameful</a>”, he has been the object of fierce criticism and his position is deemed to be particularly weak when it comes to fighting terrorism. </p>
<p><strong>What are the main ways French anti-terrorism policy has changed since the 2012 election? How has this – and the ongoing state of emergency – influenced the campaign?</strong></p>
<p>In addition to several counter-terrorism laws which have been passed by the French parliament since 2012, key anti-terror measures have also been put in place. These include the state of emergency, a <a href="http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/">“stop jihadism” website</a>, training for judicial services to identify those who might be under the influence of terrorist networks, reinforced security controls such as a <em>plan vigipirate</em> (similar to the UK threat level) and increased recruitment to the secret services, police and army. </p>
<p>Some of these measures have generated heated debates during the campaign. The maintenance of the state of emergency is one of them. Fillon wants to reinforce it, while Mélenchon wants to put an end to it.</p>
<p>But the issue that has been at the centre of many of the debates on terrorism remains the proposal to strip terrorists who hold more than one nationality of their French one. Even though the proposal was originally put forward by the existing government before <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/francois-hollande-drops-plan-to-revoke-citizenship-of-dual-national-terrorists">eventually being put</a> to rest by outgoing president, François Hollande, in light of the controversy it created, it has remained at the centre of the 2017 presidential campaign.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76532/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Eglantine Staunton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The killing of a policeman in a terror attack has heightened tensions as France chooses its next president.Dr Eglantine Staunton, Research fellow, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762962017-04-21T06:45:54Z2017-04-21T06:45:54ZWhy the French election is a pivotal test for Europe<p>French voters go to the polls on April 23 for the first round of what has been the most unorthodox, unpredictable and potentially momentous presidential contest in recent French history. </p>
<p>For the first time in 60 years, <a href="https://ig.ft.com/sites/france-election/polls/">polls</a> suggest that the two candidates who garner the most votes in the first round will likely not belong to either of France’s main parties. </p>
<p>Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front, is all but certain to advance to the May 7 runoff. There she is likely to face the independent Emmanuel Macron, a 39-year-old former investment banker and one-time economic adviser to President François Hollande. </p>
<p>A Le Pen victory could lead to France’s withdrawal from the Eurozone and even from the European Union, a once unthinkable prospect that would have repercussions far beyond the continent.</p>
<p>In a crowded field of 11 contenders, which <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38220690">includes</a> a car factory mechanic, a Trotskyite high school economics teacher and a long-term activist who wants to colonise Mars, four candidates have a realistic shot at making it to the second round. </p>
<p>In addition to Le Pen and Macron, they include former prime minister François Fillon, who is under judicial investigation for misuse of public funds, and far-left firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon.</p>
<p>Le Pen and and Fillon <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39662315?ocid=global_bbccom_email_20042017_top+news+stories">ended their campaigns early</a> after a gunman shot dead a police officer and wounded two others on the Champs-Élysées on the evening of April 20. The gunman was shot dead by police while attempting to flee. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/paris-champs-elysees-shooting.html?emc=edit_mbe_20170421&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=64524812&te=1">Islamic State has claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, and <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/paris-attack-could-help-marine-le-pen.html">Le Pen’s chances might get a boost</a> from the incident because she has taken a hard line against Muslim immigration and has vowed to make the fight against Islamic terrorism an “absolute priority”. </p>
<h2>Top two contenders</h2>
<p>The National Front has been around for 45 years, but it has never been in a better position to capture the French presidency; it is no longer a fringe party. </p>
<p>For the past year, Le Pen has been at or near the top of the polls. The question has never been whether she would make it to the second round runoff but who she would face there.</p>
<p>Le Pen has vowed to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/europe/french-election-marine-le-pen-national-front.html">drastically</a>” reduce immigration into France, combat the “Islamification” of society and renegotiate the terms of France’s EU membership. </p>
<p>Saying that she wants France to be <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/french-election-vote-existential-threat-eu-brussels-worried-marine-le-pen/">a “true country” and not “a mere region of the European Union”</a>, Le Pen proposes to exit the Eurozone and reintroduce the franc, leave the EU’s Schengen border-free area and hold a national referendum within six months of taking office over leaving the EU.</p>
<p>Emmanuel Macron, who has never held elected office, is neck-and-neck with Le Pen in the latest polls. A graduate of the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the traditional training ground for France’s business and government elite, he launched his <em>En Marche!</em> (Onward!) movement just over a year ago. </p>
<p>Only 36 when Hollande appointed him to run the ministry of economy in 2014, he is one of the youngest people to ever hold a cabinet position in France.</p>
<p>Macron <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/business/international/emmanuel-macron-of-france-is-the-face-of-the-new-socialism.html">presents himself</a> as a reformist, pro-Europe, pro-business technocrat. He wants to preserve many elements of France’s social model while enhancing the country’s global competitiveness. </p>
<p>He is a strong defender of European integration, and has said that he wants to forge a new Franco-German partnership to lead Europe. He praised German chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2015 decision to welcome more than a million migrants and refugees into Germany, saying it saved Europe’s “<a href="http://www.dw.com/en/french-presidential-candidate-macron-praises-merkels-refugee-policy/a-36971293">collective dignity</a>”.</p>
<p>Still, many voters remain sceptical of Macron, pointing to his youth, inexperience and undistinguished record in government.</p>
<h2>Corruption and disarray</h2>
<p>Just a few months ago, François Fillon was widely considered to be a shoo-in for the Elysée Palace. A socially conservative free-market defender, he <a href="http://www.wsj.com/video/in-surprise-win-fillon-defeats-sarkozy-in-french-primary/43B5EB84-C0FF-418C-B0A1-94ABD75377F6.html">defeated</a> former president Nicolas Sarkozy (his one-time boss) and former prime minister Alain Juppé to win the nomination of the centre-right Republicans last November.</p>
<p>Accused of giving his wife and two children generous salaries for fictitious jobs as parliamentary aides, Fillon was last month <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/world/europe/france-francois-fillon-charged.html">charged</a> with several counts of embezzlement. His support has steadily declined since the story broke in January 2017, and it now appears unlikely that he will advance to the second round of voting.</p>
<p>France’s traditional left is also in disarray. Hollande, its first Socialist president since François Mitterrand’s tenure ended in 1995, is <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-hollande-poll-idUKBRE99R0TY20131028">the most unpopular president</a> in modern French history. With an approval rating that at one point sunk to 4%, Hollande is now the first sitting president in the history of the Fifth Republic not to run for reelection.</p>
<p>Instead, the Socialist Party nominated Benoît Hamon, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/world/europe/benoit-hamon-french-socialists-presidential-primary.html">beat out</a> former prime minister Manuel Valls. Hamon’s campaign, which promises <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38723219">a universal basic income</a>, has failed to gain traction; he is currently polling in fifth place.</p>
<p>Unexpectedly, though, the radical leftist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, backed by the Communist Party, has made a late surge. He is now running neck-and-neck with Fillon in the number three spot, behind Le Pen and Macron. </p>
<p>Mélenchon, who has called for a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/jean-luc-melenchon-france-presidential-election.html">citizen revolution</a>”, opposes the EU and NATO, wants a 90% maximum income tax rate and to lower France’s official working week from 35 hours to 32.</p>
<h2>Detrimental to Europe</h2>
<p>Most current polls concur that Le Pen and Macron will advance to the second round runoff next month, with Macron ultimately <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/r-new-poll-shows-centrist-macron-beating-le-pen-to-win-french-election-2017-3">beating</a> Le Pen by a 20-point margin.</p>
<p>While a Le Pen victory remains unlikely, it is not implausible. Much will depend on voter turnout; a low showing is expected to help Le Pen. Her supporters tend to be more motivated to cast their ballots than those of other candidates.</p>
<p>Current <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/french-people-not-voting-2017-3">forecasts</a> suggest that turnout may be as low as 65% in the first round. That would be the lowest in recent history (the previous <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/21/france.election/?related">low </a> was 72% in 2002). </p>
<p>If, in the second round, Fillon’s, Hamon’s and Mélenchon’s supporters opted to stay home rather than vote for Macron, Le Pen could eke out a narrow victory.</p>
<p>Europe has had a number of important elections and referenda over the past year, but none with the gravity and significance of France’s presidential election. </p>
<p>The EU will survive Brexit: the UK entered the European Economic Community, the EU’s precursor, late and was always lukewarm on the enterprise. But it would not survive a French exit. And a Le Pen victory next month may lead to the unraveling of both the idea — and the reality — of a united Europe.</p>
<p>There’s folly in mistaking the improbable for the impossible, as Brexit and Donald Trump proved in 2016. “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/opinion/france-braces-for-the-now-possible-impossible.html">What seemed impossible</a>.” as Le Pen herself said the morning after Trump’s presidential triumph, “is now possible.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76296/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Maher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Europe has had a number of important elections over the past year, but for the EU none is as significant – or as potentially grave – as France’s upcoming presidential election.Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760372017-04-20T06:32:13Z2017-04-20T06:32:13ZThe Kremlin has its watchful eyes set on the French elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165361/original/image-20170414-25865-1d5l1pv.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin, here with French President Francois Hollande, has big plans for Europe.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17593/photos/14713">Kremlin Press Office</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Ukrainian crisis, from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/-sp-ukraine-maidan-protest-kiev">Maidan protests</a> and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/22/annexing-crimea-putin-make-russia-great-again">annexation of Crimea</a> to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38837730">the violent conflict in Donbass</a>, has led to an unprecedented deterioration of relations <a href="https://theconversation.com/twin-crises-in-syria-and-ukraine-prove-the-west-cannot-restrain-russia-65811">between Russia and the West</a>. As early as 2014, the West imposed <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-are-taking-russia-back-to-the-worst-days-of-the-ussr-32104">diplomatic and economic sanctions</a> on Russia.</p>
<p>The logic behind these actions was straightforward and clear. Initially, the sanctions <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26672800">targeted</a> higher Russians officials, freezing their assets and restricting their entry to Europe and the United States. Later, they were followed by <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/ssi_list.aspx">“sectoral” sanctions</a> that aimed to restrict Russian companies’ access to western technologies and investment.</p>
<p>The sanctions were meant to undermine Vladimir Putin’s legitimacy among the Russian elite and the general population, and have contributed to the economic crisis in the country.</p>
<p>The West thought that a “<a href="https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/obama-says-western-sanctions-have-left-russias-economy-in-tatters-43069">tattered economy</a>” in Russia would force Putin to step back from his foreign policy strategies because of domestic discontent. It was naïve enough to expect the Kremlin to do nothing but sit and wait.</p>
<h2>Russia’s counter-strategy in France</h2>
<p>For the last few months, Moscow’s counter strategy has included building political alliances with “pro-Russian” political forces in the West as well as pro-Russian candidates running for top political position in countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Serbia.</p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/us/politics/russian-hack-report.html">unequivocal support</a> for Donald Trump in the recent US presidential campaign was the first try.</p>
<p>Although I do not believe Russia directly intervened in the US presidential election campaign or that <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/12/politics/russian-hack-donald-trump-2016-election/">Russian hackers</a> played a decisive role in it, I must admit that Moscow has never so directly interfered in a Western election before.</p>
<p>In the French presidential campaign, which officially started on April 10, the Kremlin has obviously decided to support <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/opinion/can-the-kremlin-influence-the-french-election.html">the candidates from both the right and far-right</a> – François Fillon and Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>Both candidates have showed <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/02/french-polling-watchdog-issues-warning-russian-news-report-claims/">positive attitudes</a> towards Putin and, most importantly, they <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-21/vladimir-putin-is-winning-the-french-election">advocate</a> ending French support for sanctions against Russia.</p>
<p>François Fillon, for example, has garnered Moscow’s sympathy by repeatedly claiming that sanctions on Russia <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-fillon-europe-idUSKBN1571BL">have no effect</a> and by pushing the idea of officially recognising Russian jurisdiction over Crimea.</p>
<p>But Marine Le Pen – with her image of being a “Frexit” advocate and her commitment to anti-Americanism and populism – seems to be Putin’s best friend in Old Europe.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/24/vladimir-putin-hosts-marine-le-pen-in-moscow">Her recent visit to Moscow</a>, a meeting with Vladimir Putin and her talk in the State Duma are clear signals that she remains the Kremlin’s favourite.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165360/original/image-20170414-25865-1sg5nd6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Marine Le Pen visits the Museums of the Moscow Kremlin on March 17 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54102/photos">Kremlin Press Office</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And even if, until now, there is no clear evidence of Russian hacking in the French election process, Russian involvement is well documented.</p>
<p>For Marine Le Pen, it includes <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/17/world/europe/french-election-russia.html">media promotion</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/21/marine-le-pens-russian-links-us-scrutiny/">financial support</a>, as well as informal contacts with top Russian officials and businessmen.</p>
<h2>French turbulence</h2>
<p>What the Kremlin could not have foreseen is the turbulence that has caused in the French election campaign. In particular, as François Fillon became engulfed in a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fillon-corruption-scandal_us_58c83a00e4b015d064bfa9eb">corruption scandal</a>, his chance of getting to the second round diminished significantly.</p>
<p>According to polls, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37221220">Emmanuel Macron</a>, the former economy minister who runs on a centrist platform and would be a less helpful candidate for Moscow, could win in the second round against Marine Le Pen.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has clearly taken that into account. Last week, the French polling watchdog warned of news reports coming from Russia with the aim of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/02/french-polling-watchdog-issues-warning-russian-news-report-claims/">trying to re-boost Fillon’s campaign</a>.</p>
<p>As for left-wing candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, he seems to be a surprise for the Kremlin. Although he made a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/18/jean-luc-melenchon-germany-putin-french-presidential-race">few pro-Russia statements</a>, including criticising the new Ukrainian government and stating that he would support <a href="http://inosmi.ru/politic/20161205/238336583.html">leaving the European Union and NATO</a> if elected, Mélenchon’s political and ideological platform has nothing in common with Putin’s regime.</p>
<p>Emancipation, anti-capitalism and the expansion of the social welfare state absolutely contradict the Russian oligarchs’ wild capitalism, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-dismissessweeping-corruption-allegations-against-medvedev/2017/03/05/dac18d32-01af-11e7-a391-651727e77fc0_story.html?utm_term=.083a21a1ce45">corruption</a> and hypocrisy that are key features of Putin’s Russia today.</p>
<h2>Remove sanctions, destroy European unity</h2>
<p>No doubt, the key goal of any Russian interventionist strategy is to reduce the burden of sanctions. In the long run, the Kremlin also aims to undermine European unity and thus be able to work with a divided Europe.</p>
<p>It’s worth noting that all this is not just the whim of an autocratic leader. The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that further EU enlargement to the East is unacceptable for Moscow and that the Kremlin would be ready to deter this perceived offence by all possible means.</p>
<p>For public opinion in Russia, the shift of previously pro-Russian – or at least neutral – regimes toward the West, together with the NATO’s “open door policy” is seen as a threat to national security.</p>
<p>Without resistance to EU and NATO expansion, many people in Russia believe that the country’s western border would be surrounded by hostile regimes repeatedly demanding deployment of NATO forces.</p>
<p>The Kremlin’s strategy might become successful due to the fact that many people in the EU – and we are not talking about the elites – are, in fact, opposed to the Union’s enlargement, as was shown when Dutch voters rejected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/dutch-voters-reject-closer-eu-links-to-ukraine-in-referendum">a referendum on closer EU links to Ukraine</a> in 2016.</p>
<p>And politicians representing such EU-skeptic groups surfing on the current nationalist wave are potential partners for the Kremlin.</p>
<h2>Populism in France would be a win for Russia</h2>
<p>The French election can be explored through another perspective as well.</p>
<p>One can argue that any further victory of right-wing populists in Europe will contribute to the legitimisation of the Russian political regime.</p>
<p>Putin’s agenda for his third presidency was built on so-called “<a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/enotes/russieneivisions/conservatism-russia-political-tool-or-historical-choice">conservative shift</a>”, with an emphasis on “traditional values”, increasing the role of religion and the Russian Orthodox Church, and establishing the lower classes as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481">the social base</a> of the regime.</p>
<p>The latter is likely to align Russia ideologically with Brexit supporters, European nationalist parties and probably the French right populist electorate as well. Thus, Russian leaders repeatedly stress political parallels with the West.</p>
<p>In the long run, that would be the way to create a Moscow-based conservative “<a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2015/03/24/europe-s-far-right-flocks-to-russia">internationalism</a>”, with the possibility of seeing Vladimir Putin as a symbol of resistance against America if his country’s current relations with the US <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-russia-want-from-donald-trump-76276">deteriorates</a> even further.</p>
<p>But wild accusations that Putin could steal the French presidential election are baseless. Any claims that the Kremlin – or any other foreign power – can have a significant impact on the will of French voters are certainly an exaggeration.</p>
<p>To quote <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/putin-says-u-s-isn-t-banana-republic-should-get-over-itself">Vladimir Putin himself</a> regarding the US presidential campaign: “Is America some kind of banana republic? America is a great power.”</p>
<p>The same comment applies to France. But, depending on who is elected, the next French president could have a very different attitude toward Moscow. And even if Marine Le Pen loses the upcoming election – as she most probably will – her supporters will not disappear overnight.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has no power either to extend or reduce the right-wing electorate in Europe. But the Russian leadership is already engaged in long-term cooperation with politicians who represent this sector of the population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrey Shcherbak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Kremlin wants to build strong alliances with “pro-Russian” forces in the West. In France’s upcoming election, Putin is placing his bets on two right-wing candidates for president.Andrey Shcherbak, Senior Research Fellow, Russian National Research University The Higher School of Economics Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/753722017-04-19T01:11:10Z2017-04-19T01:11:10ZWhy the French presidential candidates are arguing about their colonial history<p>When the French presidential elections begin on April 23, the world will be watching closely. </p>
<p>Polls are tightening up, but Marine Le Pen, of the far-right National Front (FN) Party, seems likely to get through to the second, runoff ballot on May 10. Will the xenophobic populism that brought Brexit to the U.K. and Donald Trump to the White House claim the Elysée Palace, too?</p>
<p>Le Pen’s expected advance has been one of the few constants in a campaign marked by surprising, dispiriting twists. To a historian of French colonialism like me, one of the most revealing is the renewed debate over the memory and teaching of the colonial past. The candidates’ positions on this issue can be seen as a revealing barometer of French attitudes toward immigration, race and multiculturalism today. </p>
<h2>Sixty million subjects</h2>
<p>At its height in the 1930s, the French empire encompassed some 60 million colonial subjects, from <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Greater_France.html?id=UFD_d-d7FhgC">the Caribbean to Southeast Asia</a>. But after decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the French relegated imperial racism, slavery and colonialism to the “<a href="http://www.beacon.org/Silencing-the-Past-P329.aspx">historical back burner</a>.” The eruption of the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/les-guerres-de-memoires--9782707154637.htm">history wars</a> finally broke this public silence in the mid-1990s. </p>
<p>There were two main triggers for the decade-long fight about how to remember France’s colonial history. </p>
<p>The first was the 150th anniversary of the French abolition of colonial slavery in 1998. Angered by the self-congratulatory celebration of French abolitionists, black and Afro-Caribbean activists demanded greater attention to <a href="http://www.temple.edu/tempress/titles/2424_reg.html">enslaved Africans’ suffering</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165662/original/image-20170418-32723-dyb9k5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Christiane Taubira.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christiane_Taubira#/media/File:Christiane_Taubira_par_Claude_Truong-Ngoc_juin_2013.jpg">Wikicommons/Claude Truong Ngoc</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Their efforts culminated in a 2001 law sponsored by Guyanese deputy Christiane Taubira. The “<a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005630984&dateTexte=vig">Taubira Law</a>” “recognizes the slave trade and slavery as crimes against humanity.” </p>
<p>The second came in 2000, with revelations about the French army’s systematic use of torture during the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). Memoirs published by an Algerian nationalist and a French military officer and studies by <a href="http://www.editionsladecouverte.fr/catalogue/index-Une__dr__le_de_justice-9782707142580.html">two young French historians</a> <a href="http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Folio/Folio-histoire/La-torture-et-l-armee-pendant-la-guerre-d-Algerie">unleashed harsh condemnation</a> of abuses committed in Algeria, <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100455090">the jewel of the French empire</a>.</p>
<h2>A notorious law</h2>
<p>The supposed injustice of such criticisms of French empire is <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/004724419802810906?journalCode=jesa">a favored theme</a> of the National Front and its founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen’s father and a veteran of the Algerian War. Nostalgia for the colonies jibes neatly with the FN’s nationalistic, anti-immigrant, Islamophobic ideology. Strategically, “positive” accounts of the colonial past appeal to former settlers from French North Africa, known as <a href="http://www.cairn.info/revue-pole-sud-2006-1-page-75.html">pieds-noirs</a>, and to nationalist defenders of the French military. </p>
<p>This made colonial revisionism tempting to mainstream conservatives, too, as FN began to gain electoral ground beginning in the mid-1980s. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s shocking advance to the second round of the 2002 presidential elections spurred new conservative efforts to win back FN voters, especially <a href="http:/www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9780719087233/">the pieds-noirs</a>. </p>
<p>Prime among them was the infamous <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000444898&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id">law of Feb. 23, 2005</a>, whose Article 4 specified that French school programs should “recognize the positive role of the French presence overseas, especially in North Africa.”</p>
<p>Historians responded with loud, public <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/15/highereducation.artsandhumanities">outrage</a>. They objected to the imposition of an “official history,” the sidelining of slavery, racism and colonial violence, and the apparent endorsement of <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/03/24/colonisation-non-a-l-enseignement-d-une-histoire-officielle_630960_3224.html">nationalist ethnocentrism</a>. The ensuing outcry convinced President Jacques Chirac to <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=137787">repeal the offending Article 4</a> a year later.</p>
<p>But since then, rising protests against inequality from immigrant and minority groups and growing fears of Islamist terrorism have fueled the revival of colonial revisionism on the French Right. </p>
<h2>History and political positioning</h2>
<p>Among the current presidential candidates, not only the current FN leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter Marine, but also the (now scandal-ridden) conservative candidate François Fillon have publicly endorsed revisionist colonial histories. </p>
<p>Marine Le Pen has long favored <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2013/02/26/marine-le-pen-contre-enseignement-seconde-guerre-mondiale-colonisation_n_2766337.html">“rebalancing”</a> secondary school curricula. She objects to what she calls the “masochism” of critical histories and calls for counting empire as one of the “glorious elements” of the French past. Students should be taught colonization’s “positive aspects” alongside its negatives.</p>
<p>Fillon, for his part, carries on the conservative attempt to peel off FN support by co-opting its rosy view of colonialism. In <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/pour-francois-fillon-la-colonisation-visait-a-partager-sa-culture_1825773.html">a speech</a> last August, he denounced school programs that teach students “to be ashamed” of their country’s treatment of colonized peoples. Instead, textbooks and lesson plans should be revised to give a more favorable image of colonization as a “sharing of culture.”</p>
<p>“France is not blameworthy for wanting to share its culture with the peoples of Africa, Asia and North America,” Fillon <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/pour-francois-fillon-la-colonisation-visait-a-partager-sa-culture_1825773.html">declared</a>, nor should it be held particularly responsible for the evils of slavery. </p>
<p>Also excised from Marine Le Pen’s “most positive, most flattering” version of national history is French collaboration with the Nazis during World War II. Too painful and “complex” for children, such events should be revisited only in high school, “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2013/02/26/marine-le-pen-contre-enseignement-seconde-guerre-mondiale-colonisation_n_2766337.html">if it’s necessary</a>.”</p>
<p>Fillon agrees that primary school is no place for difficult, uncomplimentary historical topics. “Calling our history into question: this is a shameful teaching!” he protested in <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/pour-francois-fillon-la-colonisation-visait-a-partager-sa-culture_1825773.html">his August 2016 speech</a>. Like Le Pen, Fillon sees a glorious national “narrative” (récit) as essential to national unity. Teachers should focus on figures, sites and events whose meaning lies “in the progressive construction of France’s singular civilization.”</p>
<p>This view of history education has been a staple of French nationalism since the Third Republic made primary public schooling <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=3200">free and compulsory in the 1880s</a>. In the 19th century, lessons about the development of French civilization aimed to cultivate patriotism and civic virtue among future (male) voters and soldiers. Today, Le Pen and Fillon both seek to revive this colonial-era tradition and, by extension, the hierarchies of race and civilization that defined it.</p>
<p>Only one candidate has openly challenged this new revisionism: the current favorite to face Le Pen in the second round, centrist former Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron. Macron made waves in February by telling an Algerian television station that French colonization in North Africa was a <a href="http://www.liberation.fr/elections-presidentielle-legislatives-2017/2017/02/15/en-algerie-emmanuel-macron-qualifie-la-colonisation-francaise-de-crime-contre-l-humanite_1548723">“crime against humanity.”</a> </p>
<p>“Colonization is part of French history,” he said. “It is a true barbarity and a part of that past we must confront head-on, while also apologizing to the women and men against whom we committed these acts.” He went on to specifically denounce any effort to glorify colonization, as Article 4 had tried to do in 2005.</p>
<p>These are forceful words that might have signaled a shift in official discourse on colonial history, had the speaker been willing to stand by them. </p>
<p>He wasn’t. </p>
<p>When the Right and pied-noir groups accused him of indulging in unpatriotic, leftist “repentance,” Macron folded. Only four days later, he apologized not to the victims of colonization but to <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/article/2017/02/18/nouvelle-manifestation-de-pieds-noirs-devant-le-meeting-de-macron-a-toulon_5081891_4854003.html">the pieds-noirs</a>. </p>
<p>Equally damning, Macron’s Algiers statement was a flagrant about-face from an interview he did last November with the French magazine <a href="http://www.jeuneafrique.com/376888/societe/france-emmanuel-macron/">Le Point</a>. Then, he had earned condemnations from the left for <a href="https://twitter.com/LarrereMathilde/status/801425252173672449">saying</a> that “the reality of colonization” included “elements of civilization and elements of barbarity.”</p>
<p>Macron’s shifting position on French colonization is clearly opportunistic, making it hard to tell what he really thinks about it. But perhaps what matters most is that he saw taking a position on the colonial past as a political opportunity in the first place. In the current election, as in the history wars of 20 years ago, colonial history has once again become political.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75372/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nothing to disclose.
</span></em></p>Should French children be taught about the ‘positive aspects’ of colonialism? What the presidential candidates say.Jennifer Sessions, Associate Professor of History, University of IowaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/760582017-04-18T06:08:46Z2017-04-18T06:08:46ZIs there such a thing as a ‘Muslim vote’ in France?<p>On April 8, the well-known French television show <em>Salut les terriens</em> <a href="http://www.ozap.com/actu/tensions-entre-sonia-mabrouk-et-marwan-muhammad-dans-salut-les-terriens/523759">turned sour</a> when guests discussed the very sensitive topic of the so-called “French Muslim vote”. </p>
<p>One panelist, journalist Sonia Mabrouk, argued that Muslims in France are constantly used by opportunists, from politicians to intellectuals, as a constituency to serve their own purposes.</p>
<p>The incident recalled the final televised debate of France’s 2012 presidential election, when then-candidate François Hollande sparred with incumbent President Nicolas Sarkozy over the “Muslim vote”.</p>
<p>Hollande was in favour of extending the right to vote in local elections to non-EU citizens living in France, while Sarkozy <a href="http://world.time.com/2011/11/28/should-foreign-residents-be-allowed-to-vote-in-france-sarkozy-flip-flops/">argued against it</a>. The president claimed that such a move would lead to “identity-based voting practices” and “divisive sectarian demands”.</p>
<p>Women, it’s worth remembering, were once suspected of <a href="http://ljpol.com/why-is-womens-suffrage-in-france-only-70-years-old/">voting with their sex</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Fhv1VVCRrJY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">France’s 2012 presidential debate emphasised the issue of the so-called ‘Muslim vote’</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the French go to the polls on April 23 and May 7 to elect their new president, the question reemerges: is it reasonable to assume that Muslims’ voting behaviour is based on their religion and on the Quran? </p>
<h2>The impact of religion on votes</h2>
<p>Some 93% of French Muslims cast their ballots for François Hollande in the second round of the 2012 presidential election, according to a poll by <a href="http://opinionlab.opinion-way.com/dokumenty/Sondage_jour_de_vote_T2_SOCIOLOGIE_DU_VOTE_2_1.pdf">OpinionWay</a>. That’s 41% above than the national average, since Hollande was ultimately elected with 52% of votes.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.ifop.fr/media/pressdocument/482-1-document_file.pdf">Several attempts</a> have been made to explain why <a href="http://www.cevipof.com/fichier/p_publication/436/publication_pdf_cahierducevipof34.pdf">French Muslims voted almost unanimously for the left</a>.</p>
<p>In their 2012 book <a href="http://www.pressesdesciencespo.fr/fr/livre/?GCOI=27246100034710&fa=author&person_id=250"><em>Français comme les autres?</em></a> (As French as everyone else?), political scientists Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj concluded that the impact of religion on the voting practices of believers should not be overestimated. </p>
<p>Catholics in France and in the United States, for example, vote in ways diametrically opposed to each other. In France, people who identify as Catholic <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170410-france-catholic-vote-presidential-race-conservatives-fillon-le-pen-libourne">are today markedly in favour</a> of the conservative <em>Républicains</em>, particularly since the <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20121105-french-catholic-church-weighs-against-gay-marriage-law-family-adoption">legalisation of same-sex marriage</a> in 2013. </p>
<p>In the US, on the other hand, <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis">they tend to vote for the Democrats</a>, a more socially progressive party. </p>
<p>How can this difference be explained? According to Brouard and Tiberj, Catholics in the US vote Democratic for precisely the same reasons that Muslims in France went for Hollande’s Socialist Party: they cast their ballots for candidates who support minority rights.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/164713/original/image-20170410-31911-13bw6v9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=613&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">OpinionWay’s 2012 poll showed that many people who identified as Muslim voted for François Hollande.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">F.Khemilat</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both groups are often found among racial and religious minorities – American citizens of Latin American origin and people of Maghrebian or African background in France – who have faced economic and social marginalisation in their respective countries. </p>
<p>In France, on the other hand, Catholicism is the main religious faith. Hence the difference in voting orientations (though <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2017/01/12/une-enquete-inedite-dresse-le-portrait-des-catholiques-de-france-loin-des-cliches_5061270_1653130.html">a bastion of left-wing Catholic voters</a> has also historically existed in France). </p>
<p>In other words, religion is not the be-all, end-all of a believer’s political choices.</p>
<h2>Identifying as Muslims</h2>
<p>Though the impact of faith must be taken with a grain of salt, it is not entirely irrelevant in the context of elections. <a href="http://afsr.hypotheses.org/">Qualitative research I conducted in 2012 and 2013</a> found that the vote of French Muslim citizens I interviewed was indeed influenced by their religious identity. </p>
<p>Being a Muslim did not predetermine their answer to the question, <em>Who should I vote for?</em> But it did lead people to ask, <em>Who shouldn’t I vote for?</em> The impact was negative, helping them eliminate candidates deemed Islamophobic, rather than positive ([I] choose a candidate who defends my values, including religious values). </p>
<p>French Muslims took into account laws banning the headscarf or <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/24118241"><em>niqab</em></a>, a veil that covers the face, as well as public comments against Islam, for instance, when weighing different candidates and their platforms. Candidates’ positions on foreign policy were also considered, with military interventions in Muslim-majority countries particularly frowned upon. </p>
<p>This is similar to how French citizens who identify as <a href="http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfsp_0035-2950_1983_num_33_6_394100">Jewish tend to be especially sensitive to antisemitism</a> and to the position of candidates regarding Israel.</p>
<p>According to my study, being a Muslim can have three different effects on a person’s vote: it can consolidate a choice previously made, based on factors unrelated to religion; it can help select among a few candidates on the basis of the Islamophobia criterion; and when a candidate’s attitude towards Muslims is negatively perceived, it can destabilise and change a person’s political orientation.</p>
<p>Take, for example, Youssouf, a self-made man who in 2007 voted for Nicolas Sarkozy, the Republican party candidate. But in 2012, after what he called “the unashamed Islamophobic discourses and public policies targeting Islam made by him and his governement”, Youssouf decided to vote for the left-wing François Hollande. Even though Youssouf didn’t at all like Hollande’s stance on economic and social issues. </p>
<p>Because of their lower socioeconomic status and <a href="http://www.cevipof.com/fichier/p_publication/436/publication_pdf_cahierducevipof34.pdf">the marginalisation they face</a>, many French Muslims, especially those living in France’s <em>banlieues</em> (suburbs), might simply choose <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20170306-socialist-stronghold-paris-suburb-turns-away-left">not to vote</a>. </p>
<p>Some of them <a href="http://www.saphirnews.com/Ces-musulmans-qui-usent-de-la-religion-pour-de-legitimer-le-vote_a18625.html">justify their abstention</a> with religious explanations, claiming that “voting is not halal”, since France is not a Muslim country.</p>
<h2>Calls for abstention in 2017</h2>
<p>Generally, this position is only held by a minority of highly orthodox Tabligh or Salafist Muslims. But today, several public Muslim intellectuals, including leaders who are not necessarily from those sects are calling for an “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL2jO7-zqKU">active abstention</a>” by Muslims of the 2017 presidential election. The intent is to escape the constant trap of voting for the “lesser of two evils”. </p>
<p>Nizarr Bourchada, leader of the <em>Français et Musulmans</em> (French and Muslim) party, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ccifofficiel/videos/1699162723432574/">advocates a similar approach</a>. His is one of the first French political parties to claim a strong attachment to both Islamic and French Republican values.</p>
<p>This echoes French author Michel Houellebecq’s prescient 2015 novel <em>Soumission</em> (Submission). Set in 2022, the book imagines the rise to power in France of a Muslim political party that imposes polygamy and prohibits women from wearing clothes that make them “desirable”. </p>
<p>Within a few weeks of publication, <em>Soumission</em> had become a <a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/livres/2015/02/11/03005-20150211ARTFIG00053-houellebecq-superstar-des-ventes-en-europe.php">bestseller in France, Italy and Germany</a>. It bolsters the idea that a collective vote of French Muslims, or at least their federation into a political party, would be a threat for French society.</p>
<p>The reality is quite different. But whatever the outcome of this election season, it seems that the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/missionrep/videos/1736516329973298/">fantasy of a “Muslim vote”</a> will continue to haunt Europe’s imagination for years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fatima Khemilat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A candidate’s perceived Islamophobia may influence a French Muslim’s vote, but the impact of religious faith on political choice should not be overstated.Fatima Khemilat, PhD Student, Sciences Po AixLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/762262017-04-17T06:31:00Z2017-04-17T06:31:00ZThe evolution of France’s left and right politics, from the 1789 French Revolution to this year's election<p>France is heading to the polls on April 23 for the first round of its presidential election. This election holds particular <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2017/04/french-politics-election-democracy/">importance for the European nation</a>, which finds itself at a crossroads, with its whole political system in question. </p>
<p>From abroad, the situation seems <a href="http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/03/24/french_elections_the_elusive_debate_112266.html">puzzling</a> to many commentators. According to the newspaper China Daily, for instance, the election is particularly “<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2017-02/18/content_28250685.htm">messy</a>” (because it’s confusing). </p>
<p>While five candidates <a href="http://time.com/4666894/france-election-candidates-president/">appear to have emerged</a> as favourites from the 11 who qualified to stand for election, their platforms, the values they promote and their political affiliations (except for a few) are not very obvious. </p>
<p>Indeed, France is witnessing a “<a href="https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-journal-des-idees/la-fin-du-clivage-droite-gauche">political blur</a>”, in which the clash between left- and right-wing ideologies seems long gone. Just ahead of the first round of the polls, <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/05/anne-muxel-l-electeur-apprend-a-gerer-l-incertitude-de-son-vote_5106193_3232.html?xtmc=anne_muxel&xtcr=1">42% of French people have declared</a> that they still haven’t made up their minds. </p>
<p>The second round of voting will take place on May 7.</p>
<h2>Labels that date to the King</h2>
<p>Left and right are old labels, <a href="http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/election-101-how-did-the-political-labels-left-wing-and-right-wing-originate">dating back to the French Revolution</a>. In 1789, the National Constitutive Assembly met to decide whether, under France’s new political regime, the king should have veto power. If so, it queried, should this right should be absolute or simply suspensive, for a period of time.</p>
<p>When voting, supporters of the absolute veto sat on the president’s right, the noble side. <a href="http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c2a6.htm">According to Christian tradition</a>, it is an honour to be seated at the right side of God, or to the right <a href="http://ask.metafilter.com/60767/Sit-down-and-shut-up">of the head of the family</a> at dinner. Those who wanted a highly restricted veto were seated on the left. </p>
<p>Thus, the layout of the room took on political significance: to the right, supporters of a monarchy that sought to preserve many of the king’s powers; to the left, those who wished to reduce them.</p>
<p>In the 19th century, this vocabulary was increasingly used to describe the political leanings of members of the French parliament. </p>
<p>The great advantage of these labels is their simplicity: they reduce complex political ideas to a simple dichotomy. It also makes it easy for people to identify the “right” side, to which they belong, and the “wrong” side, <a href="http://junior.senat.fr/les-dossiers/droite-et-gauche-histoire-dun-clivage-politique.html">which they condemn</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165277/original/image-20170413-25898-15eve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The French parliament in 1877.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/63/Le_Lib%C3%A9rateur_du_Territoire-_Jules-Ars%C3%A8ne_Garnier.jpg/1024px-Le_Lib%C3%A9rateur_du_Territoire-_Jules-Ars%C3%A8ne_Garnier.jpg?uselang=fr">Jules-Arsène Garnier/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From the 19th century onward, sub-categories quickly developed, aimed at placing every politician on a kind of spectrum from left to right. In this way, political parties can be said to be more or less left wing, or more or less right wing, in relation to one another. </p>
<p>Soon, people were talking about “right-wing coalitions”, “left-wing blocks”, “centre-right”, “centre-left”, “far-right” and “far-left”, and the like.</p>
<h2>‘The clash of two Frances’</h2>
<p>At the beginning of the 19th century, the left-right divide essentially distinguished supporters of an absolute monarchy from those of a constitutional monarchy. </p>
<p>It would later set monarchists against republicans, then conservative republicans against the modernists who implemented the <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-d-histoire-moderne-et-contemporaine-2009-5-page-40.htm">major social reforms of the Third Republic</a> that included the freedom of the press, freedom of association, the right to belong to a trade-union and divorce, among other things. </p>
<p>At the turn of the 20th century, the left-right debate essentially covered the divide between the defenders of Catholicism and advocates for the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2141325">separation of church and state</a>. This shift, which took place in 1905, would often <a href="https://assr.revues.org/1115">be referred to</a> as “the clash of two Frances” – Catholic and anticlerical. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=661&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165278/original/image-20170413-25898-jakrtd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Caricature from a satirical paper, ‘Le Rire’, in May 1905, illustrating the separation of church and state in France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Le_Rire_-_S%C3%A9paration_de_l%27Eglise_et_de_l%27Etat.jpg">Charles Léandre-Bibliothèque nationale de France/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From the 1930s onward, the economic divide came to the fore, with the left advocating for socialism and the right calling for economic liberalisation.</p>
<p>By the 1970s, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualit-paris-may-1968-784703.html">the liberalisation of social mores</a> had become a key issue, with continuing debates on abortion, divorce, homosexuality, marriage equality and euthanasia. The same is true of immigration and openness to the world, which stood in opposition to cultural, social and economical protectionism.</p>
<h2>Parties with many faces</h2>
<p>In France, the divide grew in several political realms. In his famous work, <a href="http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/1574.html">The Right Wing in France</a>, political historian René Rémond defined three separate right-wing currents: the legitimist and counter-revolutionary right, the liberal right, and the Bonapartist right, <a href="http://www.persee.fr/doc/ahrf_0003-4436_2006_num_343_1_2881_t1_0241_0000_2">authoritarian and conservative</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165214/original/image-20170413-25901-i3ngr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former president Nicolas Sarkozy was the face of the 21st-century Republican right.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Flickr_-_europeanpeoplesparty_-_EPP_Summit_October_2010_%28105%29.jpg">Parti populaire européen/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Whether or not these divisions still exist today is open to debate. What is certain is that there is still a significant difference between the conservative, more authoritarian right that favours an economy in which the state plays a regulatory and protective role, and the liberal right that favours deregulation, less restrictive labour laws and more entrepreneurship. </p>
<p>Today’s French Republican party represents the latter position well, from former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin to former president Nicolas Sarkozy. </p>
<p>The Bonapartist right – often identified to Gaullism after the former French president Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969) – can now be partially <a href="http://www.la-croix.com/Archives/2012-11-30/La-droite-hier-et-aujourd-hui.-L-analyse-de-Rene-Remond-relativise-aujourd-hui-la-coupure-droite-gauche.-Jerome-Grondeux-historien-_NP_-2012-11-30-882553">identified</a> with Marine Le Pen’s National Front, which prizes a strong leader, order and patriotism. </p>
<p>In truth, for each overarching area of political debate, there are at least two right wings and two left wings. Concerning family values and gay marriage, for instance, a minority on the right are open to increased tolerance, while a minority on the left are rather reluctant.</p>
<p>The same can be said of immigration. Not everyone on the right is convinced by restrictive immigration policies, while open immigration policies are far from universally approved of on the left.</p>
<h2>Don’t forget the centre</h2>
<p>Centrist positions are often difficult to pin down. Those who self-identify as centrists sometimes occupy the middle ground on certain main political issues but stand to the left on one issue and to the right on another. </p>
<p>Early 20th century radicals, often characterised as defenders of secularism and basic freedoms, were also economically liberal, and generally considered as having “<a href="http://www.larousse.fr/archives/grande-encyclopedie/page/2584">their heart on the left but their wallet on the right</a>”. Centrists from the Christian Democratic tradition, who favoured social protections, dialogue between workers and management, and oppose unchecked economic liberalism, were also conservative on family issues. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165320/original/image-20170413-25859-grvpz6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Young women dressed as Marianne, the French revolutionary symbol of freedom, demonstrating against same-sex marriage in Paris on January 13 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Manif_pour_tous_Paris_2013-01-13_n44.jpg">Marie-Lan Nguyen / Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While it is possible to identify broad schools of thought that can be classified as right, left or centre over the long term, policies vary greatly over time. We cannot ascribe unchanging, universal content to these categories.</p>
<p>These days, we cannot even say that the right is for the status quo or that the left wants change, as has sometimes been <a href="http://www.rfs-revue.com/spip.php%3Farticle1267&lang=en.html">claimed</a>. When it comes to the welfare state, people on the right clamour for reform, whereas those on the left want to defend social protections. </p>
<p>Still, in each era, centre, left and right have served as signposts, allowing us to classify political parties, politicians and the ideas they promote.</p>
<h2>The 2017 presidential election deepens the divide</h2>
<p>In the right- and left-wing “primaries” that took place a few weeks ago, French parties selected candidates who clearly illustrated their ideological differences. </p>
<p>But this process also revealed more left- or right-leaning positions within each camp, as demonstrated by the second-round primary between <a href="https://theconversation.com/alain-juppe-victime-de-la-peur-du-chirac-bis-69181">François Fillon and Alain Juppé</a>, on the right, and, on the left, between <a href="http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/elections/en-direct-hamon-valls-le-debat-du-second-tour-de-la-primaire-a-gauche_1872753.html">Benoît Hamon and Manuel Valls</a>. </p>
<p>It’s likely that the majority of those who watched the first televised debate on March 20, prior to the first round of voting, would have similarly placed candidates on the spectrum of left to right. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38875197">Jean-Luc Mélenchon</a>, the candidate for “<em>La France insoumise</em>” (the rebellious France), embodies a type of social protest. He refuses any alliance with the current left-wing government and takes more radical stands on institutions, Europe and economics than the Social Democrat <a href="http://gauravdhakar.com/top-stories/benoit-hamon-to-be-socialist-candidate-in-french-election-bbc-news/">Benoît Hamon</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/165315/original/image-20170413-10077-1e55yk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Jean-Luc Mélenchon, France’s current ‘protest’ candidate, represents several ‘radical left-wing’ groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Melenchon,_6%C3%A8me_R%C3%A9publique_-_MG_6549.jpg">Pierre Sélim/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Emmanuel Macron, the former economy minister responsible for a large share of President François Hollande’s economic policy, is running on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macron-plus-proche-de-juppe-que-de-hollande-dans-les-urnes-virtuelles-60402">centrist platform</a>. A strong proponent of liberal economic policies, he also supports a certain social safety net and the integration of immigrants while opposing discrimination against minorities. He is trying to attract moderates from the left and the right.</p>
<p>In other words, Macron seeks to build an electorate comprised of Socialists who find Benoît Hamon too lefty and of Republicans or centrists who find François Fillon too far to the right. That marks a clear difference between this mainstream right and the populist, protectionist, anti-European extreme right represented by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401">Marine Le Pen’s</a> National Front.</p>
<h2>Not all the same</h2>
<p>So why is the belief that there is no real difference between left and right so commonly held? </p>
<p>This view can be traced back to opinion surveys from the 1980s. A growing number of people now claim that the concepts of left and right have lost all meaning. Yet these same people, in the same surveys, happily self-identify on a continuum of left to right and define their political identity in these dichotomous terms. </p>
<p>They also <a href="http://www.pressesdesciencespo.fr/fr/livre/?GCOI=27246100672860">respond differently to a variety of political issues</a>, as compared to their self-established position on that scale. </p>
<p>This apparent paradox can be explained. Many people who personally feel more left wing or right wing according to their convictions also believe that governments tend to implement similar policies when in power. They therefore expect clear political platforms that can be summarised as left wing or right wing but are ultimately disappointed by the outcomes.</p>
<p>As a result, candidates make promises to attract votes without taking into account how difficult they may be to implement. But selling right- or left-wing ideas during an election campaign also serves to make people dream – capturing hearts and minds at the expense of considering the realities that elected governments must face.</p>
<p><em>Translated from the French by Alice Heathwood for <a href="http://www.fastforword.fr/en/">Fast for Word</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76226/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Bréchon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As France heads to the polls ton April 23, citizens seem more confused than ever about just what is “left” and what is “right”.Pierre Bréchon, Professeur émérite de science politique, Sciences Po Grenoble, Auteurs historiques The Conversation FranceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/761412017-04-14T00:49:58Z2017-04-14T00:49:58ZSix questions about the French elections<p><em>Editor’s note: As France goes to the polls to elect a new president, observers are wondering if the vote will follow a populist trend that led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/britain-exits-the-eu-how-brexit-will-hit-america-61412">Brexit</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-things-that-explain-donald-trumps-stunning-presidential-election-victory-66891">the election of Donald Trump</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Here are a few important things to know about the upcoming vote, as explained by Joshua Cole, an American scholar of <a href="http://books.wwnorton.com/books/webad.aspx?id=17165">European history</a>.</em></p>
<h2>1. How does the French presidential electoral process work?</h2>
<p>Prospective candidates must gather 500 signatures of support from French elected officials and have their candidacy approved by the Constitutional Court. A presidential term is five years, and all citizens 18 years and older can vote. This year the first round of voting is on April 23. If no candidate gets more than 50 percent, there will be a second-round runoff between the top two candidates on May 7.</p>
<h2>2. Is president an important job in France?</h2>
<p>The prime minister is the head of the French government, but the president outranks the prime minister and has important powers in national defense and foreign relations. </p>
<p>The president also chooses the prime minister from the majority party in parliament. Occasionally, the president is forced to choose a prime minister from a different party than his or her own. This is called “cohabitation.” This year, the legislative elections will be in two rounds on June 11 and 18.</p>
<h2>3. Who are the most popular candidates for president?</h2>
<p>Eleven <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38220690">candidates</a> are running, with five seen as the main contenders. Two candidates are leading the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-french-election/">polls:</a> Marine Le Pen of the extreme right-wing National Front and Emmanuel Macron, a centrist and former economics minister, who is not associated with a traditional party. </p>
<p>Surprisingly, the candidates from the <a href="http://about-france.com/political-parties.htm">parties</a> who have dominated presidential politics for almost 40 years – the Republicans and the Socialists – are seen as unlikely to make the second round. Republican François Fillon has been hobbled by <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/europe/francois-fillon-investigation/">scandal.</a> Socialist Bénoit Hamon has found little traction among voters tired of the current socialist president, François Hollande. </p>
<p>A candidate from the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has seen his <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21720667-worst-case-scenario-run-between-marine-le-pen-and-communist-backed-firebrand-frances">chances</a> of making the second round improve in recent days.</p>
<h2>4. France has been under a nationwide state of emergency since November of 2015. Is security a big issue?</h2>
<p>Multiple terrorist attacks in 2015-2016 have made security more important than ever. <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008">Article 16 of the French Constitution</a> gives the president the power to declare a state of emergency and then exercise executive and legislative powers simultaneously, ruling directly by decree. Given the likelihood of more terrorist attacks, this possibility has received a great deal of attention of late. A group of lawyers and jurists recently published a <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/04/11/la-constitution-donne-trop-de-pouvoir-au-president-pour-le-confier-au-fn_5109367_3232.html?xtmc=article_16&xtcr=5">letter</a> arguing that the Constitution gives too much power to the presidency and that electing Le Pen was a danger to French democracy.</p>
<h2>5. During the 2012 election, some said then-President Nicolas Sarkozy was afraid to visit immigrant neighborhoods. How are these so-called “banlieues” playing into the election this time?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france">banlieues</a> are zones of economic and cultural exclusion, where problems of chronic unemployment are concentrated. Not all French Muslims (about 8 percent of the <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/">population</a>) live in the banlieues, but some banlieues have large Muslim populations. Le Pen’s campaign painted the banlieues as zones of failed assimilation and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/world/europe/marine-le-pens-anti-islam-message-gains-influence-in-france.html?_r=0">danger</a> to France, blaming the residents for their own isolation.</p>
<h2>6. What are the chances Le Pen will win?</h2>
<p>Le Pen is popular among many <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/01/522177444/frances-national-front-party-draws-young-voters-to-the-far-right">young people</a>, who seem not to be bothered by the National Front’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401">long association</a> with racism and anti-Semitism. She is also supported by those who are opposed to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-france-first-policies">European integration</a>. Most <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/french-presidential-election-marine-le-pen-lose-emmanuel-macron-win-poll-voters-certain-choice-a7665706.html">polls</a> say a second-round runoff between Le Pen and Macron is likely, and that Macron will win this match-up. With more than a third of the <a href="https://qz.com/950677/france-presidential-election-2017-the-voter-apathy-that-helped-donald-trump-win-could-help-elect-frances-marine-le-pen/">electorate</a> saying they’re undecided on whom to vote for in the second round, the result may end up being much closer than predicted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76141/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Cole has previously received funding from the Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Bourse Chateaubriand (France), the Centre National des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires (France), the Social Science Research Council, and the Council for European Studies. He has also received research support from the University of Georgia and the University of Michigan (including from the Frankel Institute for Advanced Judaic Studies, the Institute for the Humanities, and the Eisenberg Institute for Historical Studies).</span></em></p>Get up to speed before the first round of voting on April 23.Joshua Cole, Professor of History, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.