tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/giorgia-meloni-126962/articlesGiorgia Meloni – The Conversation2024-03-07T15:00:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226652024-03-07T15:00:05Z2024-03-07T15:00:05ZFemicide in Italy: A modern phenomenon deeply rooted in country’s cultural past<p>“Femicide is not a crime of passion, it is a crime of power,” wrote Elena Cecchettin <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/25/anger-across-italy-as-killing-of-student-highlights-countrys-femicide-rate">after her sister</a> was killed in November 2023.</p>
<p>Italian student Giulia Cecchettin, 22, was killed allegedly by her controlling ex-boyfriend, Filippo Turetta, a fellow student at a university in Padua. Not being able to handle the breakup, Turetta <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67530529">lured Giulia into one last shopping trip together</a> before killing her, prosecutors claim. Her body, <a href="https://www.ilmessaggero.it/en/life_behind_bars_filippo_turetta_s_new_routine-7910899.html">with more than 20 stab wounds</a>, was found at the bottom of a ditch. Turetta fled to Germany, was caught <a href="https://www.ilmessaggero.it/en/life_behind_bars_filippo_turetta_s_new_routine-7910899.html">and is now behind bars awaiting trial in Italy</a>, according to the latest reports from Italy. </p>
<p>Cecchettin’s case has grabbed headlines in Italy <a href="https://nypost.com/2024/01/06/opinion/stop-ignoring-violence-against-women-in-italy/">and worldwide</a>. But it is not unique. Femicide – <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/femicide#:%7E:text=%2F%CB%88fem%C9%AAsa%C9%AAd%2F-,%2F%CB%88fem%C9%AAsa%C9%AAd%2F,girl%20because%20she%20is%20female">the act of killing women on account of their gender</a> – is worryingly common in Italy. At least <a href="https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2023/12/11/109-women-murdered-in-italy-so-far-in-2023-study_b1b82904-4d40-47e6-8758-ed3450567548.html#:%7E:text=As%20of%20December%203%2C%20109,criminal%20police%20presented%20on%20Monday">109 women were killed in Italy in 2023</a>; more than half were murdered by a partner or an ex-partner.</p>
<p>International <a href="https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/cp_data_news/in-italy-femicides-are-not-decreasing-like-homicides/">comparisons on femicide rates can be difficult</a>, but those who do track such numbers suggest that Italy’s femicide problem has been persistent. So much so that cultural organization <a href="https://inarea.com/en/case-study/treccani/">the Institute of the Italian Encyclopedia Treccani</a> chose “femicide” as <a href="https://www.unionesarda.it/en/the-word-of-the-year-for-2023-treccani-chooses-quot-femicidequot-ozm95r5j">2023’s word of the year</a>.</p>
<p>In an attempt to address the high rates of femicide, on Dec. 12, 2023, a new law went into effect in Italy titled <a href="https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-12-27/italy-new-law-to-combat-violence-against-women-and-domestic-violence-enters-into-effect">Provisions for Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence</a>. Although the law strengthens protection for women by broadening the definition of unlawful conduct related to domestic violence and by increasing penalties for offenders, the legislation has its limits.</p>
<p>One of the ministers who proposed that law, Eugenia Maria Roccella, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/22/world/europe/italy-giulia-cecchettin-violence-against-women.html">emphasized how laws had failed to protect Giulia Cecchettin</a>, or “any other women who did not suspect the violence brooding in the heart of the man who claimed to love them.” </p>
<p>Indeed, Elena Cecchettin pointed at a cultural factor in the killing of her sister and other women in Italy: a patriarchal society in which male violence and control has long been accepted. “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67514334">Monsters are healthy sons of the patriarchy and rape culture</a>,” she said.</p>
<h2>The Roman rule</h2>
<p>Femicide is a cultural phenomenon with deep roots that go back millennia.</p>
<p>Many premodern societies were patriarchal and violent, but Italy is in many ways unique. The legacies of the Roman Empire, Italian Fascism and Roman Catholicism still loom large. Each, I would argue, has contributed to a modern Italy in which male violence has been normalized. </p>
<p>The history of Rome is <a href="https://www.thefrenchhistorypodcast.com/metoo-and-roman-rape-culture-with-darah-vann-orr/">inseparable from misogyny and rape</a>; it is present in the city-state’s origin story. When Romulus found his newly born city bereft of women, he trapped unmarried girls and women from the neighboring Sabine tribe and kept them as Roman concubines. By the time the Sabines sought revenge, many of the tribe’s daughters and sisters were either carrying or had given birth to Romans. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sabine">The women</a>, so the story goes, ran onto the battlefield as live shields to <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/359809">secure peace between their fathers and Roman captors</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A painting depicts women being abducted by Romen men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580308/original/file-20240306-18-2g9zim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pietro da Cortona’s painting ‘Rape of the Sabine Women.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Cortona_Rape_of_the_Sabine_Women_01.jpg">Wikmedia Commons</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Roman women were treated as second-class citizens. During <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Colosseum">gladiator fights</a>, women were allowed to <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/please-find-your-seats-evidence-seating-plan-discovered-colosseum-180954023/">sit only in the worst seats</a>, next to the slaves. Women’s disobedience resulted in severe physical punishment, with instances of Roman women being <a href="https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/shaps-research/2022/06/01/domestic-violence-and-the-law-in-ancient-rome/">kicked to death, drowned and thrown from windows</a>. </p>
<p>Higher social status did not protect women. Emperor <a href="https://blogs.unimelb.edu.au/shaps-research/2022/06/01/domestic-violence-and-the-law-in-ancient-rome/">Nero’s first wife and his mother were murdered on his orders</a>; Nero’s second wife was kicked to death while pregnant. Even <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Vestal-Virgins">Vestal Virgins</a>, holy Roman priestesses, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Vestal-Virgins">were buried alive</a> if they violated their vow of chastity or let the eternal flame die. </p>
<p>While prostitutes and actresses <a href="https://www.focus.it/cultura/curiosita/che-cose-la-suburra">were traded</a>, <a href="https://www.focus.it/cultura/storia/diritto-di-bacio-antica-roma">raped and killed</a>, noble women were subject to “<a href="https://historicaleve.com/right-to-kiss-in-ancient-rome/">the right to kiss</a>.” Through that law, male relatives were allowed to “test” women to make sure they had not drunk wine. Violating that “right to kiss” and the no-alcohol policy <a href="https://www.focus.it/cultura/storia/diritto-di-bacio-antica-roma">was punishable by death</a>.</p>
<p>Misogyny was so endemic that Roman law <a href="https://theconversation.com/ancient-rome-didnt-have-specific-domestic-violence-legislation-but-the-laws-they-had-give-us-a-window-into-a-world-of-abuse-179460">focused on preserving a woman’s chastity</a> rather than on punishing the perpetrator in the case of rape. Roman centurion <a href="https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/libertatis-virginia-killed-by-her-father-to-protect-her-from-appius-claudius-221779">Lucius Verginius killed his daughter</a> to protect her chastity from an abuser, Appius Claudius. </p>
<p>This misogynist culture has been celebrated through art, education and cinematography. For example, works by Giambolognia, Rubens, Poussin and Picasso all depict the rape of Sabines, with pieces <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/359809">on display in New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art</a> and in <a href="https://www.theflorentine.net/2022/06/14/new-summer-opening-hours-at-the-accademia-gallery/">Florence’s Accademia Gallery</a>. </p>
<p>Roman patriarchal legacy is prevalent in pop culture, too. From “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043949/">Quo Vadis</a>” to “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0052618/">Ben-Hur</a>” and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0172495/">Gladiator</a>,” movies have glorified a violent time in which strong men were venerated. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, many contemporary men are – as it has been recently claimed – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/15/style/roman-empire-men-tiktok-instagram.html">obsessed with the Roman Empire</a>. </p>
<p>So too are cultural industries. Cinecittà film studios’ gladiator series “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2023/jul/14/hollywood-on-the-tiber-cinecitta-stars-return-to-rome-studios-heston-fellini">Those About to Die</a>” has become <a href="https://variety.com/2023/film/global/roland-emmerich-those-about-to-die-prime-video-1235684470/">an international hit</a>.</p>
<p>For a certain type of modern man, Rome represents an escape from <a href="https://www.genderspecialist.com/blog/whymenareobsessedwithrome">egalitarian norms</a>, allowing them to reclaim a perceived loss of male power. </p>
<h2>The Fascist touch</h2>
<p>Italian society also continues to be influenced by fascism, an ideology <a href="https://phillipian.net/2023/12/15/hypermasculinity-and-the-rise-of-fascism/">steeped in male violence</a>.</p>
<p>Fascism, introduced to Italy by Benito Mussolini in the 1930s, held <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1394751">procreation as the main woman’s duty</a>. Women were defined in terms of their full subordination to men and in regards to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/026569149302300103">their role in the family and in motherhood</a>. </p>
<p>Nearly 100 years later, the legacy of fascism is alive in Italy. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni praised Mussolini in her youth, and her own right-wing political party, Fratelli d’Italia, is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-the-political-provocateur-set-to-become-italys-first-far-right-leader-since-mussolini-190116">descendant of the Italian Social Movement party</a> that was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-mussolini-denies-rehabbing-fascism-after-army-calendar-outcry/">founded by former fascists</a>. </p>
<p>And as a new TV show about Mussolini’s rise, “<a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2023/12/21/in-rome-cinecitta-studios-embraces-new-golden-age_6365899_117.html">M: Son of the Century</a>,” shows, the fascist leader remains in the national consciousness. So too does the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/04/what-do-incels-fascists-and-terrorists-have-in-common-violent-misogyny">toxic “masculinism</a>” that became associated with fascism, finding a new audience among incels as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/08912432221128545">rationale to legitimize anti-woman violence</a>. </p>
<h2>The Catholic grip</h2>
<p>Catholicism has also, I believe, helped <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=71987">normalize patriarchy and misogyny</a> in Italy. </p>
<p>Catholicism is at the core of the so-called “<a href="https://www.modernintimacy.com/the-psychology-of-the-madonna-whore-complex/">Madonna-whore complex</a>,” in which women are seen as being either chaste and virtuous or promiscuous and immoral. Theorists have long explored how that dichotomy is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/aps.1831">steeped in misogyny</a>. Stereotypes based on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2013.832088">that dichotomy</a> have been used to justify perpetrators’ violence against women.</p>
<p>Take the example of Roman baroque painter Artemisia Gentileschi, who <a href="https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/exhibitions/past/artemisia/artemisias-rape-trial">was raped by her painter-mentor</a>, Agostino Tassi, in 1611 at the age of 17. She gave testimony in court, was physically tortured during the trial and treated as a promiscuous seductress. </p>
<p>Tassi was protected by the pope and set free; Gentileschi, despite being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/oct/05/artemisia-gentileshi-painter-beyond-caravaggio">a brilliant artist</a>, was shamed and erased from public memory for centuries.</p>
<p>The influence of Catholicism has also contributed to customs and a legal system that can make women more vulnerable. Italy’s abortion laws allow Catholic doctors to “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8106580/#:%7E:text=Data%20from%20the%20Italian%20Ministry,increased%20over%20the%20last%20decade.">conscientiously object</a>” to performing a termination, forcing women seeking the procedure to <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/09/23/the-difficulties-of-getting-an-abortion-in-italy">travel across the country or abroad</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Catholic <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/opinion/grace-margins/church-must-face-its-own-role-violence-against-women">doctrine on contraception and abortion</a> has forced women – even those made pregnant through rape or facing high-risk pregnancies – to give birth.</p>
<p>Research also suggests the Catholic Church’s teachings on divorce may <a href="https://doi.org//10.4236/psych.2016.713155">cut off a route of escape</a> for women trapped in violent relationships. </p>
<h2>The deadly passion</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, Italy’s patriarchal traditions have bled into law and society in other ways.</p>
<p>The mandating of extreme leniency to those implicated in <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-giulia-cecchettin-confronts-its-toxic-culture-of-violence-against-women/">the killing of “spouses, daughters and sisters caught in illicit sex</a>” was written into the country’s penal code until 1981. And even today, public figures refer to “<a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-giulia-cecchettin-confronts-its-toxic-culture-of-violence-against-women/">crimes of passion</a>” and “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-italy-has-changed-its-view-on-murdering-women/2016/11/02/8f22d42a-930b-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html">honor killings</a>” in reference to the killing of women involved in “illicit” sexual relations. </p>
<p>Femicides do not occur in a vacuum; they are the outcome of a society that legitimizes violence against women. And while I believe changes to the law to better protect Italy’s women are welcome, looking at the country’s culture – both past and present – may also be a necessary step. Until then, Italy’s daughters will not be safe, or fully free.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of recent high-profile murders has put focus on the role of patriarchy and misogyny in persistent rates of anti-woman violence in Italy.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2213552024-01-18T16:49:32Z2024-01-18T16:49:32ZThe maths of rightwing populism: easy answers + confidence = reassuring certainty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570085/original/file-20240118-17-no0zv8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=149%2C77%2C3426%2C1820&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock/Pictrider</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Rightwing populists appear to be enjoying a <a href="https://theconversation.com/iowa-was-different-this-time-even-if-the-outcome-was-as-predicted-221094">surge</a> across the <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-poised-to-score-big-at-next-european-elections-214702">western world</a>. For those who don’t support these parties, their appeal can be baffling and unsettling. They appear to play on people’s fears and offer somewhat trivial answers to difficult issues.</p>
<p>But the mathematics of human inference and cognition can help us understand what makes this a winning formula.</p>
<p>Because politics largely boils down to communication, the mathematics of communication theory can help us understand why voters are drawn to parties that use simple, loud messaging in their campaigning – as well as how they get away with using highly questionable messaging. Traditionally, this is the theory that enables us to listen to radio broadcasts and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Claude-Shannon#ref666143">make telephone calls</a>. But American mathematician <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norbert_Wiener">Norbert Wiener</a> went so far as to <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/153954.The_Human_Use_of_Human_Beings">argue</a> that social phenomena can only be understood via the theory of communication.</p>
<p>Wiener tried to explain different aspects of society by evoking a concept in science known as the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/second-law-of-thermodynamics">second law of thermodynamics</a>. In essence, this law says that over time, order will turn into disorder, or, in the present context, reliable information will be overwhelmed by confusion, uncertainties and noise. In mathematics, the degree of disorder is often measured by a quantity called <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/entropy-physics">entropy</a>, so the second law can be rephrased by saying that over time, and on average, entropy will increase.</p>
<p>One of Wiener’s arguments is that as technologies for communication advance, people will circulate more and more inessential “noisy” information (think Twitter, Instagram and so on), which will overshadow facts and important ideas. This is becoming more pronounced with AI-generated disinformation. </p>
<p>The effect of the second law is significant in predicting the future form of society over a period of decades. But <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-43403-4">another aspect</a> of communication theory also comes into play in the more immediate term.</p>
<p>When we analyse information about a topic of interest, we will reach a conclusion that leaves us, on average, with the smallest uncertainty about that topic. In other words, our thought process attempts to minimise entropy. This means, for instance, when two people with opposing views on a topic are presented with an article on that subject, they will often take away different interpretations of the same article, with each confirming the validity of their own initial view. The reason is simple: interpreting the article as questioning one’s opinion will inevitably raise uncertainty.</p>
<p>In psychology, this effect is known as <a href="https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/confirmation-bias">confirmation bias</a>. It is often interpreted as an irrational or illogical trait of our behaviour, but we now understand the science behind it by borrowing concepts from communication theory. I call this a “<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.797904/full">tenacious Bayesian</a>” behaviour because it follows from the <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bayes-theorem/">Bayes theorem</a> of probability theory, which tells us how we should update our perspectives of the world as we digest noisy or uncertain information.</p>
<p>A corollary of this is that if someone has a strong belief in one scenario which happens to represent a false reality, then even if factual information is in circulation, it will take a long time for that person to change their belief. This is because a conversion from one certainty to another typically (but not always) requires a path that traverses uncertainties we instinctively try to avoid.</p>
<h2>Polarised society</h2>
<p>When the tenacious Bayesian effect is combined with Wiener’s second law, we can understand how society becomes polarised. The second law says there will be a lot of diverging information and noise around us, creating confusion and uncertainty. We are drawn to information that offers greater certainty, even if it is flawed. </p>
<p>For a binary issue, the greatest uncertainty happens when the two alternatives seem equally likely – and are therefore difficult to choose between. But for an individual person who believes in one of the two alternatives, the path of least uncertainty is to hold steady on that belief. So in a world in which any information can easily be disseminated far and wide but in which people are also immovable, society can easily be polarised.</p>
<h2>Where are the leftwing populists?</h2>
<p>If a society is maximally polarised, then we should find populists surging on both the left and right of the political spectrum. And yet that is not the case at the moment. The right is more dominant. The reason for this is, in part, that the left is not well-positioned to offer certainty. Why? Historically, socialism has rarely been implemented in running a country – not even the Soviet Union or China managed to implement it. </p>
<p>At least for now, the left (or centrists, for that matter) also seem a lot more cautious about knowingly offering unrealistic answers to complex problems. In contrast, the right offers (often false) certainty with confidence. It is not difficult to see that in a noisy environment, the loudest are heard the most. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-have-authoritarianism-and-libertarianism-merged-a-political-psychologist-on-the-vulnerability-of-the-modern-self-218949">Why have authoritarianism and libertarianism merged? A political psychologist on 'the vulnerability of the modern self'</a>
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<p>Today’s politics plays out against a backdrop of uncertainties that include wars in Ukraine and Gaza with little prospect of exit strategies in sight; the continued cost of living crisis; energy, food and water insecurity; migration; and so on. Above all, the impact of the climate crisis.</p>
<p>The answer to this uncertainty, according to rightwing populists, is to blame everything on outsiders. Remove migrants and all problems will be solved – and all uncertainties eradicated. True or false, the message is simple and clear. </p>
<p>In conveying this message, it is important to instil in the public an exaggerated fear of the impact of migration, so their message will give people a false sense of certainty. What if there are no outsiders? Then create one. Use the culture war to label the “experts” (judges, scholars, etc.) as the enemy of the people.</p>
<p>For populists to thrive, society needs to be divided so that people can feel certain about where they belong – and so that those on the opposing side of the argument can be ignored. </p>
<p>The problem, of course, is that there are rarely simple solutions to complex issues. Indeed, a political party campaigning for a tough migration policy but weak climate measures is arguably enabling mass migration on a scale unseen in modern history, because climate change will make <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/">many parts of the world uninhabitable</a>.</p>
<p>Wiener was already arguing in 1950 that we will pay the price for our actions at a time when it is most inconvenient to do so. Whatever needs to be done to solve complex societal issues, those who wish to implement what they believe are the right measures need to be aware that they have to win an election to do that – and that voters respond to simple and positive messages that will reduce the uncertainties hanging over their thoughts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorje C Brody receives funding from the UK Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EP/X019926/1).</span></em></p>In an uncertain world our natural instinct is to seek out answers that reassure, even when they don’t make sense.Dorje C. Brody, Professor of Mathematics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2181482023-11-21T16:54:45Z2023-11-21T16:54:45ZItaly’s far-right claim The Lord of the Rings – but they’ve misread Tolkien’s message<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560365/original/file-20231120-27-v478qj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=125%2C116%2C5865%2C3871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Region of Mordor on the map of Middle-earth.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/region-mordor-on-map-middleearth-2307612455">Erman Gunes/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italian prime minister <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Giorgia-Meloni">Giorgia Meloni</a> and I have precious little in common. But one important thing we share is The Lord of the Rings. Both she and I regard the J.R.R. Tolkien trilogy as a personal “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/16/tolkiens-biggest-fan-italys-giorgia-meloni-opens-new-exhibit/">sacred text</a>” which has profoundly shaped our values and our political commitments. </p>
<p>Speaking as a queer, leftist theologian, however, the tricky thing about sacred texts is this: when you come to them searching for echoes of your own beliefs, with a little digging <a href="https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/43275654/a-new-teaching-with-authority-pacific-school-of-religion">you can usually find something</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that the leader of a far-right political party and I can both come to The Lord of the Rings and find sustenance for our imaginations suggests one of two things. Either Middle-earth is wide and wild enough to admit multiple interpretations, or one of us is reading it wrong.</p>
<p>Conservative Tolkien scholars have frequently claimed the latter. As Joseph Pearce writes in his foreword to Bradley Birzer’s book <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/J_R_R_Tolkien_s_Sanctifying_Myth.html?id=TyKDAwAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y">Tolkien’s Sanctifying Myth</a> (2003), it is “not merely erroneous but patently perverse to see Tolkien’s epic as anything other than a specifically Christian myth”. </p>
<p>J.R.R. Tolkien was a devout Roman Catholic. In <a href="https://bibliothecaveneficae.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/the_letters_of_j.rrtolkien.pdf">a 1954 letter</a> to the Jesuit Robert Murray, he described his trilogy as a “fundamentally religious and Catholic work”.</p>
<p>Tolkien was a particular kind of Catholic. Pre-<a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Vatican-Council">Vatican II era</a> (the most recent council of the Catholic Church) and English, he shared his tradition’s deep suspicion of modernity. </p>
<p>Middle-earth, with its ranked orders of elves and angels, and distinctions between High and Low Men, was influenced by the medieval Catholic notion of the <a href="http://dimitrafimi.com/2018/12/02/revisiting-race-in-tolkiens-legendarium-constructing-cultures-and-ideologies-in-an-imaginary-world/">Great Chain of Being</a> in which God ordains natural hierarchy in the cosmos. </p>
<p>It’s because of this that some of today’s far-right claim Tolkien as one of their own, arguing that his work underwrites values such as reactionary nationalism, rigid gender roles and the use of state violence to enforce cultural homogeneity.</p>
<h2>Interpreting The Lord of the Rings</h2>
<p>In his book <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-reactionary-mind-9780190692001">The Reactionary Mind</a> (2011), political theorist <a href="https://twitter.com/CoreyRobin?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Corey Robin</a> argues that conservatism is, at its root, the defence of hierarchy. It would therefore be intellectually dishonest to deny that The Lord of the Rings could have certain right-wing interpretations. </p>
<p>If you are a neofascist, for example, looking to justify xenophobia and racism, you can latch onto Tolkien’s troubling tendency to cast nonwhite characters in the role of evil. If you are a reactionary Catholic who longs for a <a href="https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2020/11/christian-humanism-j-r-r-tolkien-bradley-birzer.html">restoration of the Holy Roman Empire</a>, you can read Aragorn’s return and coronation as justification for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/theocracy">theocracy</a>. These things are an inescapable part of the text.</p>
<p>However, if you wish to produce such a reading of The Lord of the Rings, you will have to ignore a lot of other things about the text too.</p>
<p>The fact, for instance, that the <a href="https://lotr.fandom.com/wiki/War_of_the_Ring">War of the Ring</a> requires cooperation between diverse peoples, from diverse backgrounds, with diverse goals, in order to confront a common threat.</p>
<p>Or the fact that <a href="https://tolkiengateway.net/wiki/Sauron">Sauron</a> and <a href="https://lotr.fandom.com/wiki/Saruman">Saruman</a> seek to impose their will through forced industrialisation, brutal oppression of subject populations and naked violence on a mass scale – all favourite weapons of the far right. (The <a href="https://lotr.fandom.com/wiki/Ents">Ents</a> even rise up against their mechanising oppressors and drown their factories).</p>
<p>Then there’s the fact that the plot hinges around the <a href="https://lotr.fandom.com/wiki/One_Ring">One Ring</a>, an object with the power to dominate which corrupts all who seek to wield it and which must be destroyed – not deployed – in order to overcome the forces of evil once and for all.</p>
<p>And the fact that the salvation of the world is brought about not by force of arms, but by the dogged persistence and fierce love of the small and powerless, by pity for the pitiless and mercy upon the merciless. These are, to my mind, far more “fundamentally religious and Catholic” ideas than racialised hierarchy is.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="J. R. R. Tolkien" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/560368/original/file-20231120-15-dwico7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">J. R. R. Tolkien in the 1920s on leaving Leeds University.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._R._R._Tolkien#/media/File:J._R._R._Tolkien,_ca._1925.jpg">Bodleian Library</a></span>
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<p>In a <a href="https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol42/iss1/3/">recent paper, I argued</a> that The Lord of the Rings is too open to interpretation – and too enchanting – to collapse into a single authoritative meaning. </p>
<p>In his foreword to the second edition of The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien defends “the freedom of the reader” against reductive readings. He was far more concerned that readers take his novel on its own terms as a work of art, rather than arrive at some objectively “correct” interpretation. There is, quite simply, no one “right” way to read Tolkien – but, in my opinion, there are wrong ones.</p>
<p>There are readings that ignore what’s in the text, twisting it to suit the reader’s own religious, cultural and political purposes. Far-right readings of The Lord of the Rings do not come from nowhere. But they are far from the only solution to the riddle of Middle-earth’s enduring power. Tolkien was savvy enough to realise that his imaginative reconstruction of a mythic past was fiction. Reactionary ideologues lack any such self awareness. </p>
<p>Far-right readings of The Lord of the Rings are therefore wrong in the sense that they are technically bad interpretations. More importantly to my mind, however, they are ethically wrong. There is nothing in Middle-earth – not even its most troubling elements – which requires readers to take it as an argument for far-right nationalism. That interpretation is a choice – and it must be resisted. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Emanuel receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).</span></em></p>Tolkien was far more concerned that we take his novel on its own terms as a work of art than that we arrive at some correct interpretation.Tom Emanuel, PhD Candidate, English literature, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164942023-11-20T17:32:12Z2023-11-20T17:32:12ZNostalgia in politics: pan-European study sheds light on how (and why) parties appeal to the past in their election campaigns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/556651/original/file-20231030-29-e0kxju.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=71%2C71%2C3336%2C2118&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unsplash/Jon Tyson</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Have you ever felt nostalgic when thinking about the past? Then you are not alone. According to <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/eupinions_Nostalgia.pdf">survey research</a>, around two-thirds of the European public feel nostalgic.</p>
<p>Nostalgia is defined as a predominantly positive emotion associated with recalling memories of important events, usually experienced with people who are close to us. And these feelings may not be limited to personal experiences: in politics, nostalgia may refer to a longing for a more prosperous past or lost cultural traditions.</p>
<p>Take the Italian far-right party, Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), which currently leads the country’s coalition government. The party’s 2022 <a href="https://www.businesspost.ie/analysis-opinion/aidan-regan-meloni-capitalises-on-cultural-nostalgia-in-a-bid-to-make-italy-great-again/">manifesto</a> contained numerous nostalgic references. </p>
<p>One standout claim was that the “natural resources and artistic heritage of the nation are an inheritance to be guarded and enhanced”. Another was that “the elderly represent our history: a heritage of experiences, skills, talents that have helped to the birth and growth of our nation”. </p>
<p>Such statements draw upon a shared pride in the nation’s past to knit together a compelling narrative.</p>
<p>Increasingly, there is evidence that nostalgic feelings can affect our political views. Recent studies on the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12593">Netherlands</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000666">Turkey</a> support these findings. </p>
<p>Nostalgic citizens are less satisfied with the government and more likely to vote for radical right parties. In a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123423000571">new publication</a>, we examined the extent to which political parties capitalise on nostalgic rhetoric in their campaigns by analysing <a href="https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/L198GI">1,650 election manifestos</a> published by parties across 24 European democracies between 1946 and 2018. </p>
<p>Election manifestos, by definition, mostly contain promises for the future. They are a list of pledges a party promises to implement should it be part of a future government. But we also discovered that on average, about 10% of a party manifesto is dedicated to <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/715165">discussing the past</a>.</p>
<h2>Central and Eastern Europe: nostalgia reigns</h2>
<p>We found that parties in central and eastern Europe and southern Europe are more nostalgic than those in northern and western Europe. The average manifesto in central and eastern Europe included 44 nostalgic sentences per 1,000 sentences, while in western and northern Europe, the average manifesto contains fewer than half that.</p>
<p>It’s also notable that many of the most nostalgic parties across the continent are classified as nationalist by researchers at the <a href="https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/">Manifesto Project</a>. Examples of highly nostalgic nationalist parties include All for Latvia, the Estonian People’s Union, Golden Dawn in Greece, Sweden Democrats and the French National Rally (formerly the National Front). </p>
<p>That said, although nationalists are most prone to nostalgia, nostalgic rhetoric is evident across the political spectrum and was found in eight out of ten manifestos in some form or another. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/contested-memory-in-giorgia-melonis-italy-how-her-far-right-party-is-waging-a-subtle-campaign-to-commemorate-fascist-figures-211465">Contested memory in Giorgia Meloni's Italy: how her far-right party is waging a subtle campaign to commemorate fascist figures</a>
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<p>It also appears to be cultural conservatism rather than economic conservatism that makes a party more likely to use nostalgia. Nostalgic rhetoric addresses cultural issues much more frequently than economic topics. </p>
<p>This is revealing about nostalgia as a device. Parties seem to strategically employ nostalgic references and choose to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/715165">focus on either the past, present or future</a> when talking about a given topic depending on the wider political context. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231197456">Other research</a> shows that parties tend to frame education, economic and environmental policy with a future-related focus, while security, immigration and defence policy are more often referred to with an emphasis on the past.</p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>There is nothing inherently wrong with nostalgia, but the use of nostalgia in political campaigning is, by definition, strategic. And its prevalence in the documents we examined suggests parties clearly see it as a useful tool.</p>
<p>But a focus on the past should not replace a critical evaluation of a party’s plans for the future. A nostalgic sentiment, such as “our historic market towns, cathedral cities, and unspoiled countryside are the envy of the world”, is not an electoral pledge. </p>
<p>Its use could therefore be seen as a device to obfuscate when a party lacks concrete solutions or proposals for the future of the nation they seek to govern. Given our propensity towards nostalgia, it could also be used as a narrative device that might provide cover for parties seeking to introduce potentially controversial policies. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000121">Research</a> on policies such as gun control, immigration and social justice show voters can be swayed in directions they might not normally take if they are presented with nostalgic messaging at the same time. </p>
<p>If socially conservative parties have identified it as a powerful rhetorical device, perhaps socially progressive parties could find a way to use it for more positive reasons as well. Since a significant portion of society has nostalgic feelings, such messages are unlikely to disappear from political discourse anytime soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Müller receives funding from the Science Foundation Ireland and the Swiss National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research has been funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/1-390838866.</span></em></p>Nationalist parties are the most likely to be found dreaming of a glorious past in their campaign literature, especially in central and eastern Europe.Stefan Müller, Assistant Professor and Ad Astra Fellow, School of Politics and International Relations, University College DublinSven-Oliver Proksch, Professor of Political Science and Chair for European and Multilevel Politics, Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, University of CologneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2161972023-10-24T09:41:38Z2023-10-24T09:41:38ZGiorgia Meloni: how the realities of office trumped the Italian prime minister’s radicalism<p>A year ago many pundits feared that Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s government would turn out to be a radical one. This was not just because of her party’s roots in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/10/22/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-new-prime-minister-intl-cmd/index.html">extreme right</a> but also because she came to office promising big change.</p>
<p>A year in, Meloni has certainly not refrained from igniting culture wars. The bitter row over <a href="https://theconversation.com/lgbtq-parents-are-being-removed-from-their-childrens-birth-certificates-in-italy-heres-whats-behind-this-disturbing-trend-208241">adoption rights for same-sex couples</a> is a case in point. However, in other respects this government’s term has so far been much less eventful than expected. The need to project a certain image to international partners and the lack of fiscal wriggle room at home have seen her attempt to move away from her image as an extreme right-winger.</p>
<p>As far as foreign affairs and security matters are concerned, Meloni’s government has been treading the same path as its predecessor – the administration led by Mario Draghi. Meloni has stuck to a firmly pro-US and pro-Nato line, whether concerning <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-ready-risk-unpopularity-over-support-ukraine-2023-03-21/">Ukraine</a> or the conflict between <a href="https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-telephone-conversation-prime-minister-state-israel/23829">Israel and Hamas</a>.</p>
<p>Sooner or later (and generally sooner), every post-war Italian government has reached the same conclusion that the country’s interests are best served by keeping close to the US and Nato, as well as remaining <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/draghi-says-italy-must-remain-heart-eu-international-alliances-2022-08-24/">“at the heart of Europe”</a>. In this sense, Meloni’s executive is no exception.</p>
<p>Meloni has worked to reassure her American allies of her credentials as a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/27/joint-statement-from-president-biden-and-prime-minister-meloni/">“moderate”</a>. And, closer to home, she has cultivated a friendly relationship with Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EU Commission. It’s a position that makes good financial sense since Italy is the recipient of the largest share of the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu_en#:%7E:text=NextGenerationEU%20is%20the%20EU's%20%E2%82%AC,digital%20and%20more%20resilient%20future.">NextGenerationEU</a>.</p>
<p>Politically, Meloni also needs to keep the commission onside if there is ever to be any hope that the EU will take on a greater role in managing migration and asylum-seeking at its southern border. In other words, Italy simply cannot afford a conflictual relationship with EU institutions right now, and Meloni understands this.</p>
<p>And then there are the international financial markets. Being seen as an irresponsible and extremist leader carries with it real risks for the prime minister of a country that relies heavily on foreign investors to help service an overall debt burden of over 140% of GDP. Memories of a previous right-wing government losing its parliamentary majority in 2011 due to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/08/world/europe/italy-economy/index.html">considerable financial turmoil</a> are still fresh in Italy. Meloni’s first experience of an executive role (as youth minister) was as a member of that government – which was led by one Silvio Berlusconi – so she is not likely to have forgotten either.</p>
<h2>On a collision course?</h2>
<p>However, Meloni’s apparent prudence and restraint are at odds with the promises she made to voters ahead of her election, potentially putting her on a collision course with her own supporter base. </p>
<p>She had pledged, for example, to set up a “naval blockade” to repel the boats carrying would-be migrants and asylum seekers who <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/23/europe/meloni-italy-migrants-politics-intl/index.html">travel to Italy from northern Africa</a>. This was replaced with a deal committing the EU to effectively paying Tunisia to tighten its border to prevent departures in the first place. Now even this deal is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/tunisia-hands-back-60-m-eu-funding-migration-deal">no longer on the cards</a>. Meanwhile, Meloni’s Ministry of the Interior reports that the number of arrivals by sea has almost doubled since 2022, <a href="https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/dati-e-statistiche/sbarchi-e-accoglienza-dei-migranti-tutti-i-dati">and almost tripled since 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Nor do things look any easier for Meloni on the economic front. Many of her voters were led to believe that her government was going to reverse a reform of the pension system implemented in 2011, and that they would be able to retire earlier. But Giancarlo Giorgetti, the finance minister, now says there will be no comprehensive reform of the pension system <a href="https://www.fiscoetasse.com/approfondimenti/14178-riforma-pensioni-2024-giorgetti-frena.html">after all</a>. On the contrary, he has warned that with overall expenditure on pensions predicted to rise by almost 8% in 2023, strict control of public spending has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/imperative-italy-control-public-spending-economy-minister-says-2023-10-10/">become essential</a> instead.</p>
<p>Populist radical-right parties are increasingly parties of government across Europe. However, they are subject to the same external constraints as any other administration. In Italy’s case, the country’s government needs to show fiscal restraint in order to keep the financial markets happy, and it knows that a good relationship with the EU Commission is essential to its success.</p>
<p>However, given the extent and speed at which the promises made during the 2022 electoral campaign are now being shelved, Meloni’s government risks giving right-wing voters the impression of being all talk and no action. This poses a conundrum for Meloni. Given the levels of electoral volatility in Italy, the last thing she can afford to do is take her recently acquired supporters for granted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from The British Academy, Leverhulme Trust, Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).</span></em></p>Even the most firebrand politicians find they need allies when they reach office, and Meloni’s predicaments make that even more true.Daniele Albertazzi, Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2147022023-10-04T17:06:30Z2023-10-04T17:06:30ZFar-right poised to score big at next European elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551289/original/file-20230929-17-y6jzfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C47%2C3982%2C2616&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Far-right are fast taking root in France, Italy, Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Spain and Finland.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/rome-italy-october-23-2022-giorgia-2228022383">Alessia Pierdomenico/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A little over a year since leader of <a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-melonis-win-in-italy-proves-even-a-seemingly-successful-government-can-fall-victim-to-populism-191278">Fratelli d'Italia Georgia Meloni rose to power in Italy</a>, the latest data spells out a clear message: she is not the only ultraright politician surfing on voters’ anxieties. In fact, we may be entering a <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/09/14/a-fresh-wave-of-hard-right-populism-is-stalking-europe?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIr679_tfXgQMVhejVCh1hOAI0EAAYASAAEgLeIfD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds">new cycle of far-right extremism across the continent</a>, with heavy stakes for the next European elections in June 2024.</p>
<h2>A far right moment</h2>
<p>Recent results are eloquent. Last year, in France, Marine Le Pen won an all-time record-high 41.5% of the vote in the second round of the presidential election. In Hungary, <a href="https://theconversation.com/viktor-orban-hungarys-controversial-authoritarian-prime-minister-secures-yet-another-term-in-national-election-180466">Fidesz </a> took 54% of the vote in the parliamentary elections, landing Viktor Orbán a fourth consecutive term. In <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-government-far-right-alliance-ulf-kristersson-euroskeptic-migration-climate-eu/">Sweden</a>, Jimmie Åkesson’s anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats came second with 20.5% of the vote, emerging as new allies for Kristersson’s Moderates.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in Europe, far-right parties are setting roots in countries like <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/portugals-third-political-force-among-prominent-hate-organisations/?_ga=2.135169649.1768408080.1696262250-1974928266.1696262249">Portugal</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/21/how-spains-conservatives-joined-forces-with-far-right-vox">Spain</a> and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/06/16/finland-to-get-right-wing-government-with-far-right_6032446_4.html">Finland</a>, winning substantial support and entering government at local or national level.</p>
<p>They currently top the polls in <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/08/polls-suggest-austrias-populist-freedom-party-is-on-course-to-lead-the-country">Austria</a> and <a href="https://www.belganewsagency.eu/elections-2024-the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-belgium">Belgium</a>. </p>
<p>In Eastern and central Europe, the far right is on the rise in Estonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Notwithstanding <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/01/polands-opposition-supporters-mass-in-warsaw-two-weeks-before-election">opposition parties’ historical, one-million-strong demonstration in Warsaw</a>, the radicalized conservatives of the PiS are still on track to win the next legislative elections in Poland, with 38% of voting intentions, flanked by the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/hanging-in-the-balance-how-the-polish-far-right-could-swing-the-next-election/">Confederation</a>, a heterogeneous extremist group which could win up to 11% of the vote. In Slovakia, the ultra-nationalists of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovaks-choose-between-pro-russian-ex-pm-fico-pro-western-liberals-2023-09-29/">Slovak National Party</a> (SNS) have entered the country’s national council, and they may form a coalition with Robert Fico’s populist and pro-Russian SMER party.</p>
<h2>Multiple layers of resentment</h2>
<p>Instead of weakening the far right, the war in Ukraine has created new political opportunities for these parties. Their nationalist and anti-establishment rhetoric resonates with growing political discontent among citizens, along with popular demand for authoritative and strong leadership.</p>
<p>According to the region, ultraright politicians have taken a variety of stances toward Russia. Parties such as Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Chega in Portugal, and the Dutch PVV have shifted their positions on Putin’s regime, rapidly condemning Russia’s invasion.</p>
<p>Nowadays the far right is riding the economic anxieties of working and middle-class voters affected the most by the economic fallout of the war. Many of these parties, like the French RN, the Italian Lega, the Flemish Vlaams Belang, Chega in Portugal and the Czech SPD, have criticized the <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/ecps-report-the-impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-on-right-wing-populism-in-europe/">sanctions</a> imposed on Russia as primarily hurting their country’s ‘people’, while calling for more social protection and welfare.</p>
<p>Of course, the post-Covid-19 pandemic period is particularly ripe for populist gains: many of these parties, such as Austria’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/austria-schallenberg-far-right-anti-vaxxers/">FPÖ</a>, the Polish Confederation, and the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/12/germany-vaccines-soviets-afd/">AfD</a> in Germany, fiercely opposed health measures, and have been silently <a href="https://revistaidees.cat/en/losers-in-the-crisis-europes-radical-right-wing-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/">capitalizing on public discontent</a> during the health crisis.</p>
<p>Finally, the surge in support for the far right bears witness to the persistence of cultural and identity-based concerns related to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/27/world/europe/germany-immigration-control.html">immigration</a>, Islam and multiculturalism. Such issues continue to deeply divide European electorates, as illustrated by current immigration debates in France, Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. Meanwhile, the Italian island of <a href="https://worldcrunch.com/migrant-lives-1/lampedusa-far-right-meloni-le-pen">Lampedusa</a> is once again making the headlines, fuelling fears of new waves of immigration.</p>
<p>The European elections of June 2024 are likely to see the far right entrench itself more deeply into the political landscape. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/">National voting intention polls suggest</a> that far right parties could clinch up to 180 seats in the European Parliament, compared with just about 130 in the current legislature (see Table).</p>
<h2>Voting intentions and seat projections for far-right parties in Europe</h2>
<p>The Fratelli d'Italia, RN in France, Germany’s AfD and Spain’s Vox should emerge as the big winners, with 27, 25, 18 and 9 seats, respectively. Marine Le Pen has already begun a diplomatic blitz to rally her <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/le-pen-praises-salvinis-previous-anti-migration-efforts-tackling-meloni/">European far-right allies</a>, and recently launched an offensive against Giorgia Meloni, her main rival for far-right leadership in Europe.</p>
<p>Two former heavyweights, Poland’s PiS and Matteo Salvini’s Lega in Italy, are on the other hand likely to suffer losses in the June 2024 ballot, with an anticipated 22 (-5) and 7 (-18) seats, respectively. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán is set to secure about his 2019 level of support, but is still isolated within the European far right.</p>
<p>Finally, new far-right parties are set to enter the European Parliament: the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), Chega in Portugal, the Slovak National Party, the Danish Democrats, possibly also Éric Zemmour’s <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2023/09/07/marion-marechal-to-lead-eric-zemmour-s-party-in-european-elections_6127815_5.html">Reconquête</a> in France.</p>
<h2>Cutting cordon sanitaires</h2>
<p>While essentially reflecting national political dynamics, the current wave of the far right reveals similar trends across Europe, most evidently the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/far-right-on-the-march-europe-growing-taste-for-control-and-order">mainstreaming of such parties</a>.</p>
<p>In many countries, far-right parties have achieved a strategic equilibrium between government <a href="https://esprit.presse.fr/article/gilles-ivaldi/l-extreme-droite-au-centre-44261">credibility and radical politics</a>. They have toned down their extremism to broaden their electoral appeal and rise to power, most notably by softening their Euroscepticism and by distancing themselves from <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-giorgia-meloni-relationship-russia-italy-not-friends/">Putin’s </a> Russia. Meanwhile, these parties have maintained their <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-materiaux-pour-l-histoire-de-notre-temps-2021-1-page-16.htm">typical nationalist and authoritarian ideology, combined with anti-establishment populism</a>, which allows them to continue to thrive on voter resentment and anger.</p>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/europe-conservative-wave/">a move toward the centre ground of European politics</a> has facilitated political cooperation with parties of the mainstream right in countries like Italy, Finland, Sweden, and Spain. Soon Austria may be added to the list, and possibly Belgium where the growing popularity of the Vlaams Belang is putting the country’s <em>cordon sanitaire</em> under greater strain. Even the German CDU seems now inclined to venture down the dangerous path of forming <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-09-22/success-of-far-right-afd-party-reveals-cracks-in-germanys-democratic-firewall.html">local alliances with the AfD.</a>.</p>
<p>Far-right ideas are infusing the mainstream right as illustrated by the radicalization of parties such as the ÖVP in Austria, the VVD in the Netherlands, and what is left of the Republicans (LR) in France after their 2022 presidential debacle. Such contagion has been most visible in the co-optation of far right’s restrictive immigration policies in those countries.</p>
<p>This complex interplay of forces is key to understanding upcoming reconfigurations at the European level.</p>
<h2>How European parliamentary blocs could evolve</h2>
<p>The current layout of far-right European parliamentary groups shows a persistent divide between the more “mainstream” Atlanticist parties affiliated with Giorgia Meloni, the Spanish Vox, and Polish PiS within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), on the one hand, and the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, on the other hand. Since its formation in 2019, the ID group has become the main hub for previously pro-Russian far-right and extremist parties around Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, the Austrian FPÖ, and the AfD. Other far right, pro-Russian parties such as Orban’s Fidesz remain with the Non-Inscrits (unaffiliated).</p>
<p>Bolstered by her success in Italy, Giorgia Meloni is seeking a rapprochement with the European People’s Party (EPP), which would pull the ECR toward the centre of European politics. Parties like Vox, the Finns, the Latvian National Alliance, and the Romanian AUR are expected to join, which would bring the ECR group to about 80 seats. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/melonis-balancing-act/">Meloni’s strategic downplay</a> of European and immigration issues certainly opens the door to a broader alliance of the European right. This, however, remains conditional to EPP demands. The chair of the European parliamentary group, Manfred Weber, has clearly indicated that future EPP allies should respect the rule of law and unequivocally support Ukraine, <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/06/26/polish-government-condemns-german-epp-leaders-call-to-replace-ruling-party-in-poland/">singling out the Polish PiS</a> for its illiberal drift. Additionally, the internal dynamics of the EPP, particularly current disagreements between the CDU (Germany’s Christian Democratic Union) and the CSU (Christian Social Union in Bavaria), may change the course of the group’s trajectory in the next months.</p>
<p>Further to the right, Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini will need to rely on their traditional allies in Austria and Belgium, while seeking new partners in Slovakia and Portugal, even perhaps initiating talks with Viktor Orbán. The current configuration and reputation of the ID makes it difficult for Le Pen in particular to distance herself from far-right extremism, which will be essential to her bid to win the next French presidency. Among other challenges, the ID will confront accommodating extremist parties, including a now more powerful yet politically cumbersome AfD that has become nothing less but a <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/dangerous-liaisons-the-true-proximity-of-germany-s-afd-to-neo-nazis-a-e69c51d3-4b3c-49d2-8d54-d7b0a19c3f9a">refuge for neo-Nazis</a> in Germany.</p>
<p>While many things may change before June 2024, as illustrated by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/24/world/europe/spain-election-vox-party.html">Vox’s setback in the last Spanish elections,</a> the current tide of the far right possibly indicates a shift of Europe’s political centre of gravity. Despite their ‘normalization’, far-right parties remain the primary source of opposition to the foundational values and principles of the European Union, most evidently within the ID group which is likely to continue with its project of a ‘Europe of free and independent nations’.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214702/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>More than a spectre, the latest data shows the far-right is a reality set to bear heavily onto the June 2024 European elections.Gilles Ivaldi, Chercheur en science politique, Sciences Po Andreu Torner, Doctorant en Relations Internationales, Universitat Ramon LlullLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2114652023-08-14T15:40:07Z2023-08-14T15:40:07ZContested memory in Giorgia Meloni’s Italy: how her far-right party is waging a subtle campaign to commemorate fascist figures<p>Since coming to power, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni and her party Brothers of Italy have repeatedly raised the question of who and what is remembered in Italy. They have paid particular attention to how the experience of Italian fascism is told.</p>
<p>Writing on the front page of newspaper <a href="https://www.governo.it/it/node/22468">Corriere della Sera,</a> Meloni questioned the way the nation marks April 25 – the day Italy remembers its liberation from Nazi-fascism and honours the victory of the Italian resistance. She implied that those with rightwing political views are effectively locked out of the commemoration. She suggested that “the category of fascism” is used as a “weapon of mass exclusion” so that certain groups or people are not included on the “list” of those allowed to celebrate the anniversary. </p>
<p>The implication was that people associated with fascism should also be recognised for their contribution to the democratic republic. Referring to the Italian Social Movement, founded in 1946 by people who wanted to revive fascism and fight communism, Meloni wrote: “those who were excluded from the constitutional process for obvious historical reasons undertook to lead millions of Italians into the new parliamentary republic, shaping the democratic right wing”. Several Brothers of Italy leaders cut their teeth in the party’s youth group, including Meloni.</p>
<p>Meloni’s letter, published on a day intended to mark freedom from fascism, was remarkable for its failure to mention “antifascism” once.</p>
<p>Since its foundation a decade ago, Brothers of Italy has made the memory of the Italian far right and commemoration of its victims a priority. The party advocates for a broad national memory culture that even honours former fascists, dissolving the fascist-antifascist binary upon which the democratic republic was built. </p>
<p>It is behind <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20160523/jewish-community-angered-by-rome-mayor-hopefuls-vow-to-name-road-after-fascist">longstanding calls</a> to dedicate a road in Italy’s capital to Giorgio Almirante, founder and leader of the Italian Social Movement. Almirante was a minister in the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-23893-4_8">Italian Social Republic</a> – the second incarnation of the fascist state between 1943 and 1945 – and an editor of <a href="https://museoebraico.roma.it/en/rivista-la-difesa-della-razza/">The Defence of the Race</a> magazine, which promoted biological racism. </p>
<p>Most recently, Brothers of Italy co-founder Ignazio La Russa, <a href="http://ttps//www.liberoquotidiano.it/video/liberotv/35369883/terraverso-ignazio-la-russa-immigrazione-arma-puntata-contro-italia.html.">president of the Italian Senate, asserted</a> that the partisans involved in the 1944 Via Rasella attack – an attack by the Italian resistance in Nazi-occupied Rome – had killed a “semi-retired band” of musicians. The real victims were Nazis. Casting partisans as villains, these historical inaccuracies poke at the moral foundations of the antifascist republic, distorting and confusing the past.</p>
<h2>The original contested memory</h2>
<p>Fascists recognised the significance of gaining control of commemoration as early as 1924. This is when Benito Mussolini introduced a series of restrictions designed to banish the memory of antifascist victims. His move came in response to antifascists leaving red carnations in memory of socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti at the site in Rome where he was kidnapped in 1924. Matteotti was a staunch and vocal opponent of Mussolini and was murdered by Mussolini’s henchmen. His body was found on August 16 1924 just outside the city. </p>
<p>In the six weeks between his disappearance and the recovery of his body, tributes were laid, removed and replaced at the kidnap site, creating a grassroots site of memory. A cross was drawn on an embankment wall and red wreaths and carnations laid – material symbols of an emerging antifascist memory culture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A black and white photo of a man bending down to take a close look at a huge pile of flowers placed in memorial." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542590/original/file-20230814-27-7vutg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=559&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A makeshift memorial emerges at the site of Matteotti’s kidnap.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Giacomo_Matteotti#/media/File:1924_13_giugno_-_Roma,_lungotevere_Arnaldo_da_Brescia_-_on._Bruno_Buozzi_reca_l'omaggio_della_CGdL_a_Giacomo_Matteotti.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Mussolini responded with a ban on flowers, commemorative ribbons and gatherings within ten metres of the site. He even tried to force Matteotti’s family to adopt a new name. In January 1925, he accepted “political, moral and historical responsibility” for Matteotti’s murder in a <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/benito-mussolini-declares-himself-dictator-of-italy">pivotal speech</a>. He then introduced a series of laws that banned opposition parties, curtailed press freedoms, introduced a secret police force and made the head of government accountable only to the King. It was the cementing of a dictatorship.</p>
<p>Mussolini’s ban pushed memory into private space in Italy. But commemoration of Matteotti abroad was public, persistent and popular. It occurred as far away as Australia, the United States and Venezuela and closer to home in Paris, London and Vienna.</p>
<p>Monuments to Matteotti went up as far away as Buenos Aires, where a statue of him is dedicated to all workers and emigrants. His name was visible in urban space: the social housing complex in Vienna named <a href="https://www.pinterest.com/pin/matteotti-hof-vienna--345651340122558362/">Matteotti Hof still stands today</a>, and there are several streets named after him in France. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An illustration of Mussolini and other fascists murdering people with bodies floating through a river of blood." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=462&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/542375/original/file-20230811-35944-ygvzgi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=581&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Swiss anarchist publication illustrated the violence of the fascist regime after Matteotti’s murder.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Giacomo_Matteotti#/media/File:Guerre_et_Fascisme_%E2%80%93_Rome_1924.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>When Mussolini resigned in July 1943, Matteotti’s name returned to Italian public space. As Allied forces and Italian partisans fought to free the country from fascism city by city, streets dedicated to fascist heroes were renamed. Matteotti’s name became more visible – a marker of the progress of Italy’s liberation. Today, more than 3,200 sites bear Matteotti’s name in Italy.</p>
<p>Far from being the decision of a few gatekeepers, this overwriting of fascist heroes was official policy in the new, democratic republic. With Brothers of Italy in power, the names of far-right figures could return to public space. Earlier this year, the centre-right city council in Grosseto laid out its plans for a new district of the city. Its main road – National Pacification Street – will fork with a road dedicated to Enrico Berlinguer on the left, honouring the longstanding leader of the Italian Communist Party, and another honouring Giorgio Almirante on the right. </p>
<p>There is more at stake than just political wins. This is a dangerous attempt to undermine the values on which the republic was founded by reframing the way Italy remembers its past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211465/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amy King does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brothers of Italy want streets named after fascist figures and the far-right’s ‘contribution’ to democracy recognised on national days of memory.Amy King, Lecturer in Modern European History, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082412023-06-28T14:57:12Z2023-06-28T14:57:12ZLGBTQ+ parents are being removed from their children’s birth certificates in Italy – here’s what’s behind this disturbing trend<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534033/original/file-20230626-15-gxzlyi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C7%2C2485%2C1654&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstration in Piazza Della Scala, in Milan (Italy) for the rights of children of same-sex parent couples.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/es/image-photo/milano-lombardy-italy-march-18-2023-2276836109">Shutterstock/Federico Fermeglia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A public prosecutor in the Italian city of Padova is attempting to <a href="https://espresso.repubblica.it/politica/2023/06/20/news/famiglie_arcobaleno_guerra_diritti-405159363/">challenge</a> the legitimacy of 33 birth certificates of children born to same-sex couples <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/06/20/padova-impugnati-atti-nascita-coppie-omogenitoriali/">via insemination</a> by a donor. The prosecutor, Valeria Sanzani, also seeks to remove the names of the mothers considered “non-genetic” from the birth certificates.</p>
<p>This motion is one of the broadest within more widespread, though still patchwork, efforts in Italy that have emerged in the past six months to annul the birth certificates of children conceived through the use of reproductive technologies abroad, particularly in cases concerning “rainbow families” – families with same-sex parents. </p>
<p>This includes another <a href="https://milano.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/23_giugno_23/tribunale-di-milano-trascrizioni-padri-mamme-f9b18bcb-c9a4-4679-8617-e93bd8983xlk.shtml">case</a> in Milan, in which the birth certificate of a child born abroad via surrogacy to two men was annulled. </p>
<p>Such action should be seen in light of the Meloni government’s policy aims, which are being interpreted and enacted in a way that particularly targets rainbow families. </p>
<h2>Going back a few months</h2>
<p>In January, Meloni’s Minister of the Interior issued a <a href="https://associazionelucacoscioni.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/circ-dait-003-servdemo-19-01-2023.pdf">circular</a> ordering all Italian Mayors to stop automatically registering the births of children born or conceived abroad via assisted reproductive technologies. </p>
<p>The circular cited a case from Italy’s Court of Cassation, which ruled on December 30 2022, that the birth certificate of a child of a gay couple who used a surrogate abroad to conceive should not be automatically recognised and transcribed in Italy.</p>
<p>Although the court case and circular related to surrogacy, a practice which is illegal in Italy for both heterosexual and same-sex couples as well as single people, in its interpretation and enactment by Prefectures and Municipalities, it has specifically targeted rainbow families, including those who don’t use surrogacy.</p>
<p>In April, the Milan prefecture <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/30/905x2560/1680186579-prefetto-milano.jpg?x57999&x82864&x82864">extended the logic</a> of the circular to same-sex couples who conceived abroad via insemination by a donor. This cited Italian law, which states that insemination by a donor is only legal for heterosexual couples, and specifically argued that birth certificates of children born to same-sex parents should be targeted. </p>
<p>At the time, the Mayor of Milan agreed that he would not automatically transcribe birth certificates moving forward, but <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/04/12/famiglie-omogenitoriali-annullamento-tribunale/">declined</a> to retroactively revise the ones he had already signed. Also in April, the birth certificate of one child born to two mothers was annulled in the city of Bergamo. </p>
<p>The events in Padova are noteworthy as they suggest a growing, and worrisome trend. The prosecutor has challenged the legitimacy of many more birth certificates, and going as far back as 2017 (the year after civil unions for same-sex couples were legalised in Italy). </p>
<p>Such a move would have consequences for both children and parents. The children, some as old as six, would have their names and parental status <a href="https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/701563/la-procura-di-padova-dice-stop-ai-figli-con-due-mamme-intervista-a-nicola-fratoianni">forcibly changed</a> by an act of the state. The non-genetic parent would <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/06/19/news/coppie_gay_due_mamme_padova_atti_di_nascita_cancellazione-405074842/">lose parental rights</a>. They wouldn’t be able to pick up their children from school, take them to the doctor or leave the country without an official note from the legally-recognised parent.</p>
<p>Within Italy, motions like the ones enacted in Padova, Milan, and Bergamo are being seen as acts that <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/06/19/news/coppie_gay_due_mamme_padova_atti_di_nascita_cancellazione-405074842/">punish</a> LGBTQ+ individuals and their children. </p>
<p>In an <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/editoriali/lettere-e-idee/2023/06/17/news/gestazione_per_altri-12862736/">opinion piece</a> for La Stampa, lawyer Filomena Gallo writes, “Children will be estranged (<em>allontanati</em>) from their legitimate families just to satisfy the ideological whims of the proponents (of these efforts).”</p>
<h2>Moves from the Meloni government</h2>
<p>While campaigning, Meloni made clear the stance that her government could be expected to have regarding LGBTQ+ rights. In a 2022 rally in Spain, Meloni <a href="https://video.corriere.it/politica/meloni-andalusia-sostenere-vox-palco-arringa-folla-spagnolo/8ce5509e-eb15-11ec-b89b-6b199698064a">exclaimed</a>: “Yes to the natural family! No to the LGBT lobby!”</p>
<p>The January circular marked the beginnings of the Meloni government’s actions to make good on such positions. Currently, her party, the Brothers of Italy, is pursuing legislation that could result in an almost total ban on state recognition of rainbow families. These actions focus on surrogacy – making surrogacy abroad illegal, which would affect heterosexual couples and singles as well. However, the behaviour of public officials, together with the rights of same-sex couples under current Italian law, mean that the consequences for LGBTQ+ individuals hoping to start families would be drastic. </p>
<p>While a total ban on surrogacy would affect heterosexual couples seeking to conceive as well, these couples have a right to adopt or to use artificial insemination through a donor that same-sex couples do not have in Italy. </p>
<h2>Problems with citizenship</h2>
<p>A serious concern is the impact that such policies could have on the citizenship status of the concerned children. Should Sanzari’s challenge be successful in court, the question will become: what to make of the children whose Italian citizenship derives from the non-genetic/gestational parent? </p>
<p>Though same-sex unions have been <a href="https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/05/21/16G00082/sg">legal</a> through civil partnership since 2016, these unions don’t provide the same rights as official marriage in Italy, notably the right to adopt as a couple. In current cases, adoption rights for the non-genetic parent are not guaranteed, only result from a long and arduous process, and are only considered when circumstances have been deemed exceptional.</p>
<p>As such, for bi-national, same-sex couples in Italy, recognised partnership in Italy does not necessarily mean that their children will have Italian citizenship. With the removal of non-genetic same-sex partners on birth certificates, there is a potential loss of citizenship for the children. Some are already into their primary school education and have not necessarily known any other country as home.</p>
<h2>‘Protecting the children’</h2>
<p>In mobilizing public sentiment against LGBTQ+ people, opponents often invoke the need to protect “the child”. From <a href="https://www.dragstoryhour.org/">drag queen story hour</a> to gay marriage, many elements of LGBTQ+ inclusion have been framed as a threat to children. </p>
<p>Meloni’s government ran on a platform of protecting the family, attempting to connect conservative policies on LGBTQ+ inclusion and migration through the frame of defending a homeland and family. One of her campaign slogans was “God, homeland, family.” An unfortunate irony, then, that this policy is proving so destructive to families.</p>
<p>With these moves, the Meloni government further establishes itself as a new force for anti-LGBTQ+ politics in Europe, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/lgbt-rights-eastern-europe-backsliding/31622890.html">alongside the governments of Poland and Hungary</a>. </p>
<p>The Hungarian government has passed a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/15/lgbt-rights-under-renewed-pressure-hungary">series of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation</a> over the past few years, banning LGBTQ+ content in schools as well as in books and television programmes geared toward young people, ending gender recognition by the state and embedding a ban on gay marriage and adoption in the constitution. </p>
<p>Poland has also recently passed a <a href="https://www.thepinknews.com/2022/02/10/poland-lgbt-propaganda-bill-andrzej-duda/">ban</a> on LGBTQ+ content in schools and denied <a href="https://www.ilga-europe.org/news/rainbow-families-have-the-right-to-move-and-reside-freely-eu-court-reiterates/">recognition</a> to rainbow families. Since 2020, the government has supported local initiatives to establish <a href="https://gcn.ie/eu-legal-case-poland-anti-lgbtq-zones/">“LGBT-free zones”</a> in municipalities throughout the country. </p>
<p>Concerned by this alliance, the European parliament passed an <a href="https://www.unionesarda.it/en/world/lgbt-the-european-parliament-condemns-italy-with-poland-and-hungary-quot-too-much-anti-rights-rhetoricquot-qnai6hcq?amp=1">amendment</a>, strongly condemning “the spread of anti-rights, anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric by some influential political leaders and governments in the EU, as in the case of Hungary, Poland and Italy.”</p>
<p>If successful in Italy, then it is possible that we could see these efforts adopted elsewhere in Europe. As we’ve seen, anti-rights legislation is proliferating in certain parts of Europe. Should other governments follow in the footsteps of what they perceive as a successful effort in Italy, then even more children in Europe will be at risk of denaturalisation just for having same-sex parents.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.</span></em></p>The Prosecutor’s Office of Padova (Italy) has asked a local court to remove any same-sex non-biological parent on birth certificates, denying same-sex families the right to State recognition.Samuel Ritholtz, Max Weber Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University InstituteMargaret Neil, PhD candidate in International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2057612023-05-17T23:07:34Z2023-05-17T23:07:34ZIn Meloni’s Italy, young Black men are particularly at risk of ending up on the street<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526920/original/file-20230517-9960-anjh1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C11%2C3816%2C2752&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Groups of refugees from war-torn regions gather in Milan's Central Station. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/image-photo/milan-italy-november-10th-2016-groups-514008019">Alexandre Rotenberg/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italy is in the grip of a housing crisis, and has been for years. It’s not as if the problem had gone unnoticed. There has been no shortage of articles in the <a href="https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/05/04/news/ilaria_lamera_tenda_politecnico_protesta_caro_affitti_milano-398739819/">national</a> – or even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/12/italy-students-protest-over-cost-housing-high-rents">international</a> – media over students’ struggle to access affordable accommodation. Over the past days, they have taken to pitching tents outside university buildings, as part of a growing protest movement against high rents. Begun by Ilaria Lamera, an engineering student at Milan Polytechnic who found it impossible to find a room under 600 euros, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/12/italy-students-protest-over-cost-housing-high-rents">the demonstration has since spread to Milan, Rome, Florence, Bologna, Padua and Cagliari</a>.</p>
<p>In Bologna, where I am writing from, rising student numbers and Airbnb rentals have snatched away the prospect of a home for many. But young adults are also grappling with another, less publicised issue: that of the ongoing racism toward those construed as “foreign” or “other”. The phrase “no foreigners” is a common refrain when looking for rental accommodation in Bologna. This racial discrimination is normalised by estate agents. It is <a href="http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9218/">presented as if it were a form of “eligibility” criteria for landlords</a>, like a requirement for an employment contract and references. As if it were totally normal and acceptable for landlords not to want to rent to “foreigners”, by which they mean those who are racialised, and not me, as a white British woman – also a “foreigner”. Sometimes, this is made even clearer. For example, when a housing volunteer at a <a href="https://www.centroastalli.it/rete-territoriale/centro-astalli-bologna/">local charity assisting migrants</a> arrived at a flat viewing together with a young Black African man, they were told by an estate agent: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Madam! You should have told me you were asking on behalf of an African! We don’t rent to Blacks here.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Launched in 2022 and funded by the <a href="https://www.leverhulme.ac.uk/">Leverhulme Trust</a>, my current research at the University of Bologna examines the longer-term fate of young men from West Africa who arrived in Italy as children seeking asylum, and hence are bureaucratically labelled as “unaccompanied minors”. While much ink has been spilled over the experiences of unaccompanied minors as <em>children</em>, less is known about what happens after they turn 18. Yet, it is at this moment that the rights they are accorded as children, including accommodation, may be lost. In my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1440783321993918">latest paper</a>, drawing on my PhD research undertaken between 2017-2018, I analyse what happens after they become adults and must leave the reception centre that hosted them as children in a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/anti.12873">socio-political landscape that is increasingly anti-migrant</a>.</p>
<p>This is based on ethnographic participant/observation in a reception centre for unaccompanied minors in Bologna while working as a volunteer keyworker for eight months between May 2017 and December 2018. In-depth and repeat interviews were conducted with 12 young African young men (six Gambians, four Nigerians, a Ghanaian and a Somalian), aged between 16 and 21. My current research involves a return to my fieldwork site after four years and involves interviews with five of the young men (two Nigerians and three Gambians) to assess their longer-term outcomes as adults.</p>
<h2>On the record</h2>
<p>The local council has launched the <a href="http://www.comune.bologna.it/centrozonarelli/spad-sportello-antidiscriminazioni/">SPAD Anti-discrimination Help Centre</a> to deal with racial discrimination, but this is in its infancy and under-reporting remains an issue. The first <a href="https://www.comune.bologna.it/notizie/giornata-mondiale-contro-discriminazioni-razziali-2023">SPAD report</a> documents reports of discrimination, and housing is found to be the second most prevalent area in which discrimination occurs. The young men in my study present a weary resignation to the continuing racism they face in the housing sector (and elsewhere).</p>
<p>Innocent*, who is now 22 and arrived in Italy as a twelve year old from Nigeria tells me he has been looking for a place to rent for months. Frequently, he is told by estate agents things such as “the owner is elderly, they don’t want any foreigners”, or “They are afraid because you are Black”.</p>
<p>Innocent goes on to tell me he is regularly stopped for no reason by the police around the station when getting the train to work. They ask him for his residence permit. I ask him how this makes him feel:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Really upset, also because of the housing situation. Us Blacks, we’re nothing here.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Edrisa, a young Gambian who is now 22 came to Italy when he was sixteen, reflects on the difficulties of finding a place to live once outside the reception system. Playing on the Italian name for a residence permit (<em>permesso di soggiorno</em>, meaning a permit to stay), he tells me that many migrants, including him, have “a permit to stay but no place to stay, it doesn’t make sense. It is not right”. This seemingly <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2023/02/18/senzatetto-lavoratori-bologna/">contradictory situation</a>, of migrants who are employed, paying taxes, and have the legal right to stay, but cannot find a house, is widespread.</p>
<p>Edrisa explains that despite having regular work on construction sites, as a qualified builder, he was homeless for nearly four months, crashing with friends, sometimes even sleeping in his work van.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It is really difficult for a foreigner to find a house here, actually, not all foreigners but if you are Black… Italians don’t want to rent to Black migrants. It is so difficult.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For Edrisa this is due to a combination of the housing crisis and the racism he faces as a young Black man in Italy. He maintains racism is due to the stereotyping of Africans as backwards and threat, compounded by the constant negative imagery of Black and Brown bodies arriving via sea. The <a href="https://series.francoangeli.it/index.php/oa/catalog/book/791">public discourse</a> on immigration in Italy is characterized by the stigmatization of racialised migrants who are framed as inferior and threat.</p>
<h2>Beyond landlords, racism has long tainted Italy</h2>
<p>Clearly, however, it is not feasible to suggest that racism merely pertains to landlords <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1354066119858388">as an individual mentality or exception from the norm</a>. Rather, we must dig deeper into the ongoing colonial legacies of racism that become visible in the act of renting. As the anthropologist Bruno Riccio observed over ten years ago, “culturalist” readings of difference have led to <a href="https://www.editions-ulb.be/en/book/?GCOI=74530100426670#h2tabtableContents">residential segregation and discrimination in the Italian housing market</a>. This “rental racism” builds upon the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-51391-7_3">“fertile soil”</a> of racism rooted in Italian colonialism and fascism and is then embedded within a historically rooted racial landscape. Rent should be understood not solely as an economic transaction, but a <a href="https://radicalhousingjournal.org/2019/editorial/">social relation embedded in emplaced social, cultural, political and material conditions</a>. </p>
<p>This is starkly evident in the recent declaration by Italy’s Agriculture and Food Sovereignty Minister Francesco Lollobrigida that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65324319">Italy’s low birth rate meant Italians are facing “ethnic replacement”</a>. Italy’s Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, also a member of the far-right Brothers of Italy political party, has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65324319">made similar remarks in the past</a>. According to the OHCHR’s (2019) <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IT/ItalyMissionReport.pdf">“Report of mission to Italy on racial discrimination”</a>, the worst years for racially motivated attacks were 2009 and 2018; both periods in which the public discourse was particularly anti-migrant. During the far-right Lega’s election campaign in 2017-18, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/28/italys-intelligence-agency-warns-of-rise-in-racist-attacks">racially motivated attacks in Italy tripled</a>. The leader of the Lega, Matteo Salvini, is now a Minister in the coalition government.</p>
<p>The coalition government recently introduced a new immigration law, the Cutro Decree (decreto Cutro), named after the Calabrian town close to where <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/09/protests-as-meloni-cabinet-meets-near-scene-of-deadly-shipwreck-cutro-italy">at least 72 people died in a shipwreck in February this year</a>. The new law is controversial and has received widespread criticism from <a href="https://ecre.org/mediterranean-controversial-cutro-decree-approved-by-parliament-as-italy-sees-continued-increase-of-arrivals-death-toll-of-2023-breaks-1000-as-ngo-struggle-to-save-lives-under-dramatic/">human-rights organisations, concerned about the increased precarity and irregularity that would be created</a>. </p>
<p>Naming a law which brings in increasingly restrictive immigration practices after a shipwreck that some <a href="https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2023/02/27">rights organisations</a> argue resulted from the very same government’s harsher laws, together with wider EU policies, is deeply problematic. While the law does not directly affect the young men in my study, its effects are pervasive and increase the ongoing hostility toward racialised migrants, just like <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/ill-wind-weathering-impact-far-right-government-italy/">previous immigration legislation brought in under a far right party</a>. The divide between “us”
(white Italians) and “them” (racialised migrants) keeps on widening.</p>
<p>In Bologna, like other gentrifying global cities in the Global North, the mobility of elites stand in stark contrast to those who are racialised, unable to access the city, which increasingly risks <a href="https://www.scielo.br/j/ts/a/wv4Pj5n9HJqNv7J7R3RpyWP/">becoming a spectacle of elite privilege and tourist consumption</a>. The local council recently launched a <a href="https://www.comune.bologna.it/notizie/giornata-mondiale-contro-discriminazioni-razziali-2023">“local action plan for an anti-racist and intercultural city”</a>, and has made attempts to regulate Airbnb; <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13683500.2018.1504899">recognised as a challenging</a> feat. However, for Bologna to become a city in which more than the porticoes are ‘open’ to young racialised migrants, what is really needed is a deeper conversation on racism in Italy, particularly as manifested at the political level.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>All names are pseudonyms.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Walker ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>As student protests against high rents unfurl across Italy, one academic points out one of the groups most likely to end up on the streets under a far-right government: young black men.Sarah Walker, Visiting postdoctoral researcher and adjunct professor, Università di BolognaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010522023-03-07T18:03:33Z2023-03-07T18:03:33ZWith the two top jobs in politics now held by women, Italy just became a real-time case study in female leadership<p>Italy elected its first female prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, leader of the far-right Fratelli d’Italia party, in October last year. Now, the leftwing opposition Democratic party has elected its own female leader for the first time, too, in the form of Elly Schlein.</p>
<p>As a result, a country which is highly conservative in terms of gender equality, now has two women party leaders – one leading the government and the other leading the main opposition party. The glass ceiling has been broken: women have reached the top positions in politics.</p>
<p>Women have long been under-represented in Italian politics. According to the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2022/">World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index 2022</a>, Italy ranks 40th out of 146 countries for gender equality in politics. Only around 31% of current parliamentarians are women – which is in fact a decrease in gender balance for the first time in 20 years. </p>
<p>Women represent only 22% of regional councillors and 15% of municipal mayors. Meanwhile on the wider labour market, female participation barely reaches 50% – one of the lowest levels in Europe.</p>
<p>All this makes the rise of both these women surprising. It sends a positive message to future generations of women. They can plainly see that reaching the highest level is feasible across the entire political spectrum.</p>
<h2>Far right and far left</h2>
<p>Meloni and Schlein sit at the extreme opposite ends of that spectrum, one on the far right and the other the far left. Neither tends to compromise and both dabble in populism.</p>
<p>They take very different positions in their politics and have different approaches to leadership. Meloni says she wants to be referred to by the male <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/12/02/giorgia-meloni-il-presidente-of-the-council-of-ministers_6006350_4.html">“Il Presidente”</a> rather than “La Presidente”, effectively opting out of celebrating the fact that a woman has reached the premiership for the first time. </p>
<p>“La Presidente” would be the technically correct (and more progressive) term to use in her case, yet she prefers to distance herself from any feminist interpretations.</p>
<p>Schlein is also controversial but on the opposite extreme. She expresses radical intersectional feminist views and is bisexual with a female partner. She not only speaks about these identities but led her leadership campaigning by talking about them, famously stating at a rally:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am a woman, I love another woman and I am not a mother, but I am no less a woman for this. We are not living wombs, but people with their rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In terms of their social and economic views, Schlein and Meloni have nothing in common. Schlein prioritises minorities and civil rights. She is in favour of the “citizen’s income”, which provides the poorest with a form of guaranteed income. And she is against the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/italy-economy-reform-idUSL5N11A2IE20150904">jobs act</a>, a labour market reform law introduced by Matteo Renzi’s former centre-left government which makes it easier to fire workers.</p>
<p>Meloni, meanwhile, promotes nationalism and takes conservative positions on family. She governs in alliance with Lega Nord, which is well known for its opposition to the LGBTQI+ community.</p>
<p>The two women are also examples of how times change. Gone are the days when rich people leaned right politically and the poor voted left. The far-right Meloni grew up in a working-class neighborhood of Rome while the far-left Schlein comes from the rich region of Canton Ticino, the Italian speaking part of Switzerland.</p>
<h2>A radical experiment</h2>
<p>Decades of studies have shown that female politicians are on average <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/gender-equality-and-public-policy/gender-equality-and-public-policy/714D4A441FF39B8CD6C97F0EE816ED82">different</a> from their male counterparts. Women tend to care more about women’s issues and support policy agendas which are more inclusive. They are less corrupt and less confrontational.</p>
<p>Although we lack conclusive evidence on how having women in leadership affects public spending (because many other variables are at play), there is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268020300446">abundant evidence</a> on the different style of leadership men and women bring to the table, including communication style and electoral strategy.</p>
<p>The current Italian scenario will provide new evidence that will enrich our knowledge of women in politics. Meloni and Schlein have such polar opposite views that the chances of them uniting around any shared “women’s issues” is effectively nil. </p>
<p>At the same time, people in Italy no longer need to choose between having a leader who shares their politics and having a woman leader because all sides are being catered for in an unprecedented way. Meloni leads a coalition of the right and Schlein, while far left herself, is the head of a centre-left party. </p>
<p>Women leaders often talk of needing to adapt to fit into a world dominated by men so it will be fascinating to see what happens in Italy once that particular pressure is removed.</p>
<p>Identity politics has suddenly become multidimensional and intersectional. We are about to see how gender interacts with the many other dimensions of these politicians (their sexual orientation, social background and religion). Radical and divisive political views should be expected on both sides – but the results are harder to predict.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the AXA Research Fund has supported nearly 700 projects around the world conducted by researchers in 38 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the AXA Research Fund or follow on Twitter @AXAResearchFund.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201052/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paola Profeta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Giorgia Meloni famously became the first woman prime minister last year. Now she has a female opponent as leader of the Democratic party.Paola Profeta, Dean for Diversity Inclusion and Sustainability, Professor of Public Economics, Director of Axa Research Lab on Gender Equality, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976092023-02-17T13:48:33Z2023-02-17T13:48:33ZUkraine war has exposed the folly – and unintended consequences – of ‘armed missionaries’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510387/original/file-20230215-24-vsyky3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=21%2C514%2C7284%2C4578&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Putin's decision to go to war has seen great geopolitical ripples.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-attends-a-wreath-laying-news-photo/1246743353?phrase=putin&adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The evening before Russia invaded Ukraine, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-putin-wont-invade-ukraine/">it seemed</a> to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2021/12/06/quick-take-why-putin-wont-invade-ukraine/?sh=5f6437812927">many observers</a> – <a href="https://theconversation.com/invading-ukraine-may-never-have-been-putins-aim-the-threat-alone-could-advance-russias-goals-177178">me included</a> – nearly unimaginable that Putin would carry through with weeks of a threatened military attack. As I wrote at the time, Putin <a href="https://theconversation.com/invading-ukraine-may-never-have-been-putins-aim-the-threat-alone-could-advance-russias-goals-177178">is not as erratic or rash</a> as he is sometimes painted.</p>
<p>I had failed to take into account that Putin is, in the words <a href="http://blog.catherinedelors.com/no-one-likes-armed-missionaries-or-what-the-french-revolution-could-teach-us">of French statesman and revolutionary</a> Maximilien Robespierre, an “armed missionary.” Writing in 1792, <a href="http://blog.catherinedelors.com/no-one-likes-armed-missionaries-or-what-the-french-revolution-could-teach-us/">Robespierre explained</a>, “The most extravagant idea that can take root in the head of a politician is to believe that it is enough for one people to invade a foreign people to make it adopt its laws and constitution. No one likes armed missionaries; and the first advice given by nature and prudence is to repel them as enemies.”</p>
<p>Those words seem fitting as Vladimir Putin’s disastrous war in Ukraine drags on. </p>
<p>Putin’s decision marked the beginning of a year of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63580372">massive destruction and death</a> in Ukraine and of extraordinary costs – both <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/12/24/the-cost-of-war-russias-economy-faces-a-decade-of-regress-a79783">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-war-death-toll-soldiers-1763829">in lives lost</a> – for Russia.</p>
<p>It was also a colossal blunder on Putin’s part: It has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/31/1145981036/war-against-ukraine-has-left-russia-isolated-and-struggling-with-more-tumult-ahe">weakened Russia significantly</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/23/nato-unity-ukraine-tanks-lloyd-austin/">solidified the NATO powers</a> around the leadership of the United States and created a more unified, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/fashion-beauty/article/3184593/ukraine-everything-so-patriotic-now-even-fashion-military">nationally conscious Ukraine</a> than had existed before the war.</p>
<h2>Imperial overreach</h2>
<p>As a fading power, Putin’s Russia has refused to accept its own limitations, both economically and militarily. In invading its smaller neighbor, Russia made a bid to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04401006">upset the international system</a> <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-united-states-moscow-5cc322a7ef3b0407c529ebf8bb1fbfd2">headed by the United States</a>. It also sought to establish its own hegemony over Ukraine, and by implication, over much of the former Soviet Union.</p>
<p>But Russia’s failure to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-believes-russia-planning-decapitate-ukraines-government-2022-02-24/">decapitate” the Ukrainian government</a>, which in turn inspired heroic resistance by Ukrainians, proved a disastrous example of what might be called “<a href="https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch/">imperial overreach</a>” – when a state tries to expand or control other states beyond its own capacity to do so.</p>
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<img alt="A tank in a field lightly covered with snow." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/509863/original/file-20230213-14-6tfthr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">One of many destroyed and abandoned Russian tanks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/destroyed-tank-is-seen-after-snowfall-amid-the-ongoing-news-photo/1247081730?phrase=russian%20tank%20&adppopup=true">Wolfgang Schwan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>It has produced a weakened Russia – an isolated pariah state perceived as a threat to democracies and the rules-based liberal international security system.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Putin’s diatribes against the West have evolved from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-putin/putin-criticizes-nato-expansion-as-alliance-holds-london-summit-idUSKBN1Y71K5">complaints about the expansion of NATO</a> to attacking the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-06/putin-aims-to-triumph-in-battle-for-cultural-supremacy?sref=am1wYMj6&leadSource=uverify%20wall">permissive culture of the West</a>.</p>
<p>Putin deploys rhetoric about dangerously subversive liberal, democratic values and practices – echoing right-wing politicians like <a href="https://theconversation.com/viktor-orbans-use-and-misuse-of-religion-serves-as-a-warning-to-western-democracies-146277">Hungary’s Victor Orbán</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-the-political-provocateur-set-to-become-italys-first-far-right-leader-since-mussolini-190116">Giorgia Meloni</a>, the far-right Italian leader. It appears that a new “International” – just as ominous to the liberal West as the Communist International was – is being formed of illiberal and authoritarian states, with Russia a key member. </p>
<p>This view of the Ukrainian war as a cultural struggle plays in the Russian media as an emotional rallying cry to mobilize the basest fears of Putin’s people.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-unanswered-propaganda-led-to-the-war-in-ukraine-180202">Propaganda disguised as news</a>, social media posts and the screeds of government officials are being deployed to shape ordinary Russians’ perceptions of the war.</p>
<h2>Toward a multipolar world?</h2>
<p>The consequences of Putin’s miscalculation are not limited to the war itself, or to Europe. Rather, they have had reverberations far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine and the homes of Russians whose sons have been slaughtered or <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-men-leave-country-fearing-call-to-fight-in-ukraine">fled abroad</a>.</p>
<p>Putin’s imperial aggression against Ukraine – implausibly proclaimed to be a defense of a united Russia and of Ukrainian peoples against Nazi usurpers – has a long genealogy. </p>
<p>Ever since his famous speech at the <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/copy/24034">Munich Security Forum in 2007</a>, Russia’s president has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-united-states-moscow-5cc322a7ef3b0407c529ebf8bb1fbfd2">railed against the “unipolar</a>” military and economic dominance of the United States. What he wants is “multipolarity” – that is, the ability of other great powers to hold sway over their neighborhoods. </p>
<p>In such a multipolar world, Ukraine and Georgia would never join NATO and much of the former Soviet Union would fall under the umbrella of Russia. China would have paramount influence in East Asia, likewise India in South Asia. And perhaps this is Iran’s ambition in much of the Middle East. </p>
<p>To countries hostile to the United States – and even to some friendly states – this multipolar rearrangement of the international order has considerable appeal. </p>
<p>Yes, the war in Ukraine has solidified the Western alliance around its idea of the rules-based international order that has been in place since 1945. But it has also <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-ukraine-war-deepens-great-power-divisions-a-revitalized-non-aligned-movement-could-emerge-181136">awakened the aspirations of “the Global South</a>” – those countries in neither NATO nor the former Soviet bloc, largely in the Southern Hemisphere.</p>
<p>Countries from Latin America and Africa to Pacific Island nations have urged a greater dispersion and sharing of international clout. The two most populous countries in the world, India and China, <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-g7-is-one-part-of-indias-pursuit-of-a-multipolar-world/">have expressed their support</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183p561">for a new multipolar international order</a> and have not been openly critical of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.</p>
<h2>Redefining regional, global power struggles</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine has also had ripple effects on other global tensions.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/yearender-eye-storm-taiwan-centre-sino-us-tensions-2022-12-06/">Taiwan as a potential flashpoint</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/26/asia/north-korea-missile-testing-year-end-intl-hnk/index.html">saber-rattling by North Korea</a>, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines are gravitating toward closer military cooperation with the United States in East Asia. China and North Korea are moving in the opposite direction, closer to Russia. </p>
<p>The Ukraine war is also <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/09/14/1122895383/how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-is-reshaping-the-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict">reshaping the long-festering conflict</a> between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both states desire sovereign power over the disputed region of mountainous Karabakh. But with Russia bogged down militarily and economically, Putin has been disinclined to aid Armenia, its one loyal ally in the South Caucasus. This is despite the fact that Azerbaijan has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/access-asia/20220913-deadly-clashes-erupt-along-azerbaijan-armenia-border">repeatedly violated the borders</a> of its neighbor. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan, by contrast, has been increasingly aided by its regional allies Israel – spurred by a shared hostility to Iran – and Turkey. Both have supplied Azerbaijan with advanced weaponry, giving the country an upper hand in the conflict.</p>
<p>The Ukraine conflict also has an effect on the great global power struggle to come: China and U.S. With EU states and regional rivals to China forging closer ties with Washington, Beijing may eye a growing threat – or even an opportunity to exert its influence more aggressively as regional power dynamics evolve.</p>
<p>American policymakers in both the Trump and Biden administrations have warned that the rise of China, economically and militarily, is a serious threat to the continued position of the U.S. as the strongest, richest state on the globe. To its competitors on the global stage, the U.S. also looks like an armed missionary. </p>
<p>The uncertainty of the Ukraine war, and the still uncertain ways in which it is reshaping geopolitics, will do little to dislodge those fears. Rather, it may encourage international relations scholars, such as <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/destined-war-can-america-and-china-escape-thucydidess-trap">Harvard professor Graham Allison</a>, who believe in the “Thucydides’ Trap.” Based on the ancient Greek historian’s explanation for the origins of the Peloponnesian War, the theory has it that when an emerging power threatens to displace a regional or global hegemon, war is inevitable.</p>
<p>As someone trained to look to the past to understand the present and possible futures, I believe that nothing in history is inevitable; human beings always have choices. This was true for Putin on the eve of the Feb. 24, 2022, invasion, and it is true for policymakers around the world today.</p>
<p>But the decision to invade Ukraine underscores a clear danger: When statesmen perceive the world as a Darwinian zero-sum game of winners and losers, a clash between the West and the rest, or as an ideological conflict between autocracies and democracies, they can create the conditions – through provocation, threat or even invasion – that lead to wars with unintended consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A year into the war in Ukraine, a historian reflects on how it has affected the geopolitical environment.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1979402023-01-17T18:34:04Z2023-01-17T18:34:04ZMatteo Messina Denaro: arrest of mafia boss after 30 years on the run is the end of an era – but not the end of the Cosa Nostra<p>Matteo Messina Denaro, one of the leaders of the Sicilian mafia, the Cosa Nostra, has finally been detained after 30 years on the run. His arrest came as around 100 police officers surrounded the private Maddalena clinic in Palermo where they had discovered he was receiving treatment. </p>
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<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Rumours had been rife for weeks that Denaro was ill and having chemotherapy – but it came as a surprise to the public that Italy’s most wanted man was having treatment in a Palermo clinic alongside ordinary citizens. He was in the queue for tests when a police officer approached him to ask him who he was. An associate standing with him made a run for it but he came forward and simply answered “I am Matteo Messina Denaro”. </p>
<p>Investigators <a href="https://www.unionesarda.it/en/italy/matteo-messina-denaro-the-press-conference-of-the-carabinieri-n3gg04a6">explained at their press conference</a> that it was his need for healthcare that finally enabled them to identify him and move in. </p>
<p>Denaro’s arrest on January 16 came exactly 30 years and one day after the arrest of his mentor, the boss, Toto “the Beast” Riina. It seems significant that after three decades on the run, this was the date the state finally managed to catch up with him. It may indicate that the internal dynamics of Cosa Nostra are changing and that someone had decided to give him up because he was no longer considered “useful”.</p>
<p>Denaro is the last boss who knows all the secrets surrounding Cosa Nostra’s terrorist attacks on the state of the early 1990s. Were he to talk, he could provide essential pieces to the post-war Mafia puzzle. This is very unlikely, however, so anyone hoping for closure or the truth may well be disappointed.</p>
<p>His arrest is also a worrying reminder for authorities about the current state of play. His is the last known face of Cosa Nostra’s leadership. Investigators know less about what current leaders look like and will now be fighting with one hand tied behind their back as they look for other mafia suspects.</p>
<h2>A bridge between the old and new school</h2>
<p>Denaro was the last of the old generation mafia bosses. He represents the final link between the <a href="https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/155016">belligerent and overt Cosa Nostra</a> of the early 1990s and the silent, business-like mafia of the 21st century. He was born into a mafia family and was known for his violence but he also moved in the “right” circles for progressing his career. </p>
<p>He is the last mafia boss who associated with the Corleone generation, a group of mafiosi (led by Riina and Bernardo Provenzano) that essentially conducted out-and-out war on the Italian state in the early 1990s. The conflict caused numerous violent deaths such as of judges <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004281943/B9789004281943-s044.xml">Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino</a> and of Giuseppe Di Matteo, the 12-year-old <a href="https://allthatsinteresting.com/giuseppe-di-matteo">son of a turncoat</a>, who was kidnapped, strangled and dissolved in acid to force his father to backtrack on his collaboration with the state. </p>
<p>Considered to be less conservative than traditional and older leaders, Denaro was flashier and more modern. He was able to direct the Cosa Nostra from 2007 until his arrest by infiltrating the legitimate economy through front companies. While Riina adopted a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-mobster-salvatore-riina-helped-motivate-a-fightback-against-the-mafia-87876">terrorist strategy towards the state</a>, Denaro’s mafia brand encapsulates the 21st century: it is based on a mixture of violence, illegal activities, social solidarity (providing jobs and justice to local communities), silence and anonymity. Solid business and political contacts are also crucial, especially the capacity to reinvest “dirty money” into the legitimate economy. </p>
<p>In recent years, it has even been suggested that Denaro was investing in innovative and forward-looking businesses (such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/4/3/italy-seizes-mafia-tied-clean-energy-assets">wind and solar energy companies</a>). All this is abetted by a <a href="https://researchportal.bath.ac.uk/en/publications/facilitating-the-italian-mafia-the-grey-zone-of-complicity-and-co-2">large network of enablers and facilitators</a> who have protected Denaro for the past 30 years. These are often likely to be people with no criminal record of their own, so are less traceable by the authorities. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/married-to-the-mob-what-the-lives-of-two-camorra-women-tell-us-about-how-to-challenge-the-power-of-the-mafia-193924">Married to the mob: what the lives of two Camorra women tell us about how to challenge the power of the mafia</a>
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<p>The existence of such trusted support networks within Denaro’s mafia is a crucial issue for the authorities. It shows still the existence of a layer of <em>omertà</em> – silence – that protected him. This arrest is a clear victory for the Italian state, but it must be asked why it took so long to find Denaro in Sicily. His protective circle has evidently been hard to break down. </p>
<p>The police have slowly been able to remove these layers of accomplices which made him vulnerable – but it has taken time. The Italian police has come to rely on both traditional monitoring and more modern digital and telephone intercepts when investigating mafia networks. These eventually proved successful.</p>
<h2>The end of Cosa Nostra – or a new era?</h2>
<p>Denaro’s arrest could well produce a power vacuum that throws the Cosa Nostra into crisis – but this is not the end of the mafia. The fall of Denaro might even create an opportunity for it to mutate once again, change and adapt to new business opportunities, like a snake changes its skin. I believe that this arrest marks a change of the guard for the leadership of Cosa Nostra. It may be that Denaro was no longer relevant or needed. Maybe, he had even outlived his usefulness. A new generation will already be in place managing Cosa Nostra.</p>
<p>Many people may now declare Cosa Nostra dead. Clearly, it is not as healthy as Italy’s other main organised crime gangs – the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13532944.2011.554805?tab=permissions&scroll=top">Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/mafia-in-naples-is-still-going-strong-and-we-must-not-forget-how-it-affects-everyday-life-in-the-city-120177">Neapolitan Camorra</a>, both of which are thriving – but it is far from a lost cause. Even after Denaro’s downfall, the Cosa Nostra continues to function, permeating the Italian economy and the economies of plenty of other European nations. Therefore, the Italian state and European countries must relentlessly continue their fight against mafias and organised crime groups and never let their guard down.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197940/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Felia Allum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The mafia boss is the last known face of the Cosa Nostra crime syndicate. But his capture represents the end of an era, not the end of the mafia in Sicily.Felia Allum, Professor of comparative organised crime and corruption., University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1928332022-11-02T16:33:55Z2022-11-02T16:33:55ZWhy the ideology of the ‘New Right’ is so dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492547/original/file-20221031-16-h5sd8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8640%2C5755&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Giorgia Meloni gestures during the handover ceremony with outgoing Prime Minister Mario Draghi at Chigi Palace in Rome in October 2022. Meloni, whose political party with neo-fascist roots secured the most votes in Italy's national election in September, took office as the country's first far-right leader since the end of the Second World War. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-the-ideology-of-the--new-right--is-so-dangerous" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The populist radical right has been on the rise for some time, with candidates and parties on the far-right fringe of the political spectrum reaching new heights across the world. </p>
<p>The electoral successes of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/how-did-donald-trump-win-analysis">Donald Trump</a> in the United States, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/24/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-presidential-election-say-projected-results">Marine Le Pen</a> in France, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/24/angela-merkel-fourth-term-far-right-afd-third-german-election">Alternative for Germany</a> and, most recently, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/21/giorgia-meloni-tells-italian-president-she-is-ready-to-become-pm-berlusconi-salvini">Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy</a> has put the spotlight on an ideological shift: the so-called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2021.1979139">New Right</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
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<p>It’s a loose network of radical right-wing activists who organize themselves in regional initiatives such as the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276421999446">Alt-Right </a> in the U.S., the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/as-macron-does-quiet-deals-with-le-pen-the-far-right-has-france-in-its-grip">Nouvelle Droite</a> in France, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2019.1700661">Neue Rechte</a> in Germany and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/feb/22/casapound-italy-mussolini-fascism-mainstream">CasaPound</a> in Italy. </p>
<p>This broad movement is aiming for an ideological renewal of right-wing politics by focusing on cultural identity and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220600769331">politics of belonging</a>. Such an approach is called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/096394800113349">“metapolitical”</a> since it first attempts to shape how we think about and experience our daily world, playing a long game to change the political structures of our societies. </p>
<h2>Identity politics</h2>
<p>The focus on <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/STEFST-11">identity politics</a> has led to a very <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/01/the-ruthlessly-effective-rebranding-of-europes-new-far-right">successful rebranding</a> of far-right extremism. Proponents of the New Right are less committed than their predecessors to discussing natural superiority, and try to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3817/0393099099">avoid the overt racism</a> of traditional neo-Nazi groups, giving their political views a broader appeal. </p>
<p>They instead push the line that <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/white-supremacy-returned-mainstream-politics/">white people are oppressed in contemporary western societies</a>. They present themselves as “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/13/us/patriot-front-beliefs-history-explainer/index.html">patriotic activists</a>” who are simply concerned with responding to “uncontrolled immigration,” “anti-white discrimination” and the “loss of traditions.”</p>
<p>One of their main enemies <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/globalization">is globalization</a>, against which they insist on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2011.635688">“right to difference”</a> (including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2021.1920722">Alain de Benoist</a>, one of the founders of France’s New Right movement) for each culture. </p>
<p>They reject the melding of cultures since they believe that cultures are rooted in clearly demarcated and internally uniform social groups. This stems from their key contention that humanity consists of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310306084">plurality of distinct “ethnocultures.”</a></p>
<p>Ethnocultures are organic communities to which their members belong by birth. The family is frequently presented as the biological source of ethnocultural communities. </p>
<p>The members of a community also ostensibly share a way of life. Their communal life is characterized by specific cultural practices and moral values. A person’s individual identity is thus shaped by the ethnocultural community they belong to, according to these New Right proponents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A vandalized campaign poster shows a candidate with a Hitler moustache." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492549/original/file-20221031-14-2z90cg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A vandalized election campaign poster for the far-right Alternative for Germany party showing the party’s top candidate, Oliver Kirchner, with an Adolf Hitler moustache is seen in Magdeburg, Germany, in June 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Markus Schreiber)</span></span>
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<h2>Passing on traditions</h2>
<p>These proponents often invoke mythical beginnings or supposedly glorious chapters of a community’s past, and emphasize the necessity of historical continuity for its survival.</p>
<p>Cultural traditions therefore must be passed on from generation to generation without significant changes. Fulfilling this task is the common destiny of the members of an ethnocultural community. </p>
<p>New Right advocates focused on identity politics believe that ethnocultures are in competition with each other and their encounters lead to clashes that threaten the collective identity of a community — a ready-made justification for violent conflicts, <a href="https://www.thepostil.com/the-return-of-the-iron-curtain/">including war</a>. The results of these struggles show the supposed inequality of the different cultures. </p>
<p>Their concept of culture readily explains why the New Right is obsessed with migration and regard it as a major threat to their political vision. Consequently, they propagate conspiracy theories, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/08/a-deadly-ideology-how-the-great-replacement-theory-went-mainstream">“great replacement” theory</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-nationalism-is-a-political-ideology-that-mainstreams-racist-conspiracy-theories-184375">White nationalism is a political ideology that mainstreams racist conspiracy theories</a>
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<p>In this pernicious view, migration is depicted as a plot organized by liberal global elites to replace the native people of western countries with foreigners. The often proclaimed “right to difference” therefore only applies to the relationships between groups. Individual members of a certain group have to conform to its overall character. </p>
<p>This segregationist agenda not only has harmful consequences for migrants, but also for those who are seen as members of an ethnoculture. Treating cultures as uniform can mask important differences between sub-groups within a culture, especially the diverging interests of the group’s elite and its non-elite members. </p>
<p>We saw this exploited in the rhetoric that British people should “<a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/perspective/eu-ref-haughton.aspx">take back control</a>” of the United Kingdom through voting for Brexit. This idea was questionable for a number of reasons, especially the false implication that all members of the group “the British” would be more powerful following Brexit.</p>
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<img alt="Three people hold pro-Brexit signs, two in Santa hats. One side reads Make Britain Great Again." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492550/original/file-20221031-26-63vj3n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pro-Brexit demonstrators hold banners outside Parliament in London in December 2019. (</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth)</span></span>
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<h2>Dangerous</h2>
<p>The ideology of the New Right is politically dangerous. It also depicts an <a href="http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/34221">inaccurate picture</a> of how cultural life works. </p>
<p>Cultures neither have clear boundaries nor are they uniform and consistent over time. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397118816939">They are flexible and dynamic</a>, in constant interaction with each other.</p>
<p>These intercultural encounters can be opportunities to grow and to increase both self-understanding and an understanding of others. Think about the many formative influences that other cultures have had on Europe, including on Christianity (which comes from the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-christianity-spread-around-world-animated-map-2015-7">Middle East</a>) and the numerical system (which <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hindu-Arabic-numerals">comes from India</a>). </p>
<p>We should embrace the diversity of our cultural lives, and reject the New Right’s attempts to further divide us. <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9237638/brazil-election-results-bolsonar-lula/">While recent election results in Brazil</a>, and <a href="https://newsinteractives.cbc.ca/elections/us/2020/results/">in the U.S.</a> two years ago, may be hopeful signs, this is a broader fight about how we interpret the world. </p>
<p>It requires more than election victories to push back against the dangerous ethnocultural framing of social conflicts that’s often embraced by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/02/the-new-austrian-government-will-brand-itself-as-moderate-but-dont-believe-it">mainstream politicians</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, we need convincing counter-narratives that explain the causes of the economic crises we are facing and promote solidarity as a solution to the staggering social inequality that undermines all societies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johannes Steizinger received funding from the European Research Council (Project: The Emergence of Relativism, Grant No: 339382) to conduct his research on far-right ideologies. </span></em></p>The so-called New Right is aiming for an ideological renewal of right-wing politics by focusing on cultural identity and the politics of belonging. Here’s why that’s so ominous.Johannes Steizinger, Associate Professor of Philosophy, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1917192022-10-27T15:14:30Z2022-10-27T15:14:30ZWhat is the difference between a populist and a dictator? The ancient Greeks have answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489615/original/file-20221013-9673-ammf7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A statue of Plato.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Panasevich/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Giorgia Meloni is Italy’s new <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/25/giorgia-meloni-sets-out-vision-for-italy-in-maiden-speech-as-pm">prime minister</a>. Her party, Fratelli d’Italia, received 26% of the vote and, as part of a far-right <a href="https://www.termometropolitico.it/1176989_tutti-i-partiti-centrodestra.html">coalition</a>, now controls a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2022/sep/25/italian-election-2022-live-official-results">majority</a> in both chambers of the legislature.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/wahlen-in-italien--ist-giorgia-meloni-die-gefaehrlichste-frau-europas--32742572.html">Stern</a> magazine, Meloni is the “most dangerous woman in Europe”. One <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/sep/24/giorgia-meloni-is-a-danger-to-italy-and-the-rest-of-europe-far-right">concern</a> is that her party are a “neo-fascist” organisation and so pose a danger to democracy in Europe. </p>
<p>Her victory poses an old question: how can we tell the difference between a democratic populist and an aspiring tyrant? </p>
<p>Twentieth-century experience suggests that highly ideological and totalitarian parties, such as Mussolini’s Fascists, represent the greatest threat to democracy. But <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/policy-and-engagement/documents/authoritarian-regimes-provocation-paper-v5-002.pdf">we can better identify</a> threats to democracy in the modern world using a wider range of historical examples. The 21st-century “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674660069">despots</a>” and “<a href="https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/august-september-2022/confusing-populism-with-tyranny/">strongmen</a>” resemble an older model of authoritarian rule: the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/03/23/the-rise-of-personalist-rule/">personalist dictator</a> or tyrant, in which power is vested more in an individual than a party or ideological group.</p>
<p>The first people to examine the puzzle of how to recognise a future dictator, and the first theorists of tyranny, were <a href="https://academic.oup.com/liverpool-scholarship-online/book/43261?login=false">the ancient Greeks</a>. Classical theorists, including Plato and Aristotle, identified two truths that have since been neglected by the western world.</p>
<p>First, tyranny is primarily <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/agpt/38/2/article-p208_3.xml">defined</a> not by ideology or behaviour but by the distribution of power within a state. Constitutions in the ancient world were categorised by who was sovereign (thus democracy is a state where the people, <em>demos</em>, have power, <em>kratos</em>). In a tyranny, one individual and his closest supporters have a monopoly of power and wealth. To identify a tyranny, the key question is not whether a politician is a demagogue but whether the state’s structures allow him or (much less frequently) her to consolidate power.</p>
<p>The second basic principle is that power corrupts and the distribution of power determines behaviour. If so, the tyrant – who possesses excessive power – will in time be corrupted morally. This observation is <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Hdt.+3.80&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0126">recorded</a> first by the Greek historian Herodotus (around 430BC). Herodotus claimed that certain Persian nobles debated what constitution they should adopt (in around 522BC). One of those nobles, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otanes">Otanes</a>, observed that the absence of effective legal checks led even good people to yield to the temptation of abusing power over time.</p>
<h2>Separation of powers</h2>
<p>Modern data goes some way towards confirming these observations. Authoritarian regimes tend to be associated with higher levels of corruption and worse governance than functioning democracies. At the most extreme end, “personalist” dictatorships (of which Vladimir Putin’s Russia is a current egregious example) are characterised by erratic decision-making, high levels of <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/706049?casa_token=ohirMfOf4cEAAAAA%3A1pn_g7qdZk5to4lydwTk72m-zdwpGieZhZrSUugavVSns36zjfTETc2rYujC1lKBI25gb9iakns">repression</a> internally and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/strongmen-and-straw-men-authoritarian-regimes-and-the-initiation-of-international-conflict/4352949B5F1550DD67076468BFB1BB8F">belligerence</a> externally.</p>
<p>The key is to examine the separation (or concentration) of power in particular countries. The overall health of democratic institutions, with or without nationalist politics, determines whether states are susceptible to democratic decay. An important factor (as demonstrated by data on <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm">regime transitions</a>) is how long these institutions last. Established democracies are far less likely to move towards authoritarianism than democracies in which constitutions are new or routinely altered.</p>
<p>Aspiring tyrants do not generally remove institutions: they prevent them from functioning properly. <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2896">Populists</a> mistrust institutions, dictators use them. In the ancient world a tyrant such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pisistratus">Pisistratus of Athens</a> (ruled around 546-526BC) did not need to abolish the existing laws. One <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0046%3Achapter%3D16">anecdote</a> tells how Pisistratus attended a trial for murder as a defendant. The prosecutor, however, did not. He was intimidated into dropping the case. Tyrants can act this way, because they control who holds state offices. They also often possess a personal militia or means of coercion. One of Pisistratus’ first moves was to persuade the Athenians to grant him a bodyguard. Tyranny is thus a state where the law does not rule, but the tyrant rules by means of law.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-a-laureate-a-classicist-explains-the-words-roots-in-ancient-greek-victors-winning-crowns-of-laurel-leaves-191407">What's a laureate? A classicist explains the word's roots in Ancient Greek victors winning crowns of laurel leaves</a>
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<p>Modern analysts tend to focus less on the distribution of power and more on leaders’ ideologies, public pronouncements and leadership styles. In Meloni’s case, any resemblance to 1930s fascism in Italy sparks alarm. Many point to the origins of Meloni’s party in the <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/italy-election-meloni-far-right/">neo-fascist</a> Movimento Sociale Italiano. </p>
<p>Aspiring and established dictators come from all ideological backgrounds. Nationalist politics do not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. While xenophobia is often a tool of dictators, Fratelli d’Italia’s <a href="https://www.fratelli-italia.it/about-us/">promotion</a> of national sovereignty is also mainstream conservatism.</p>
<p>Victor Orban’s Hungary is an example of where a right-wing party (Fidesz) has not only won elections but has been able to <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary">concentrate power</a> to a worrying degree. The government has increasing (though not universal) control over the media, there are widespread allegations of corruption. Judicial independence is now questionable and unlawful surveillance has been reported.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/italys-election-is-a-case-study-in-a-new-phase-for-the-radical-right-92198">Italy's election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right</a>
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<p>Criticism of Orban has focused on ideological elements of his programme, such as traditional Christian views on sexuality. This has helped Fidesz to rally support from the right. The EU, through its attempts at aggressive economic coercion, has also turned Orban into something of a <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1405479/Eu-news-viktor-orban-fidesz-epp-Matteo-salvini-afd-germany-weber">martyr</a> for those concerned by European federalism. For opponents of the European project, Orban and Putin are fighting a common enemy.</p>
<p>Based on these definitions, Meloni is not a dictator, and neither is Orban, although the second is edging closer as he seeks to control the major institutions of power.</p>
<h2>How to respond to populism</h2>
<p>Overreaction to nationalist populism in democracies can backfire. Orban has won four elections in 12 years. Meloni’s triumph shows that the politics of Europe remain unstable. A more conciliatory approach is needed to diffuse the toxic belief, held by many on the right, that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/nov/26/democracy-rigged-trump-biden">system is rigged</a> against them. </p>
<p>It was possible to predict Putin’s monopolisation of power would lead to increasingly aggressive behaviour. Aristotle <a href="http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book=5:section=1313b&highlight=war">noted</a> that “the tyrant is a stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people constantly in need of a leader”. </p>
<p>Policymakers and the media need to distinguish between movements or individuals that legitimately challenge the political status quo in a democracy and those that are a genuine threat to democracy itself. </p>
<p>Democracy, demagogues and tyrants are all words used by the Greeks. Demagogues, or populists, are an inherent feature of democracy where all have equal rights. For <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520251687/whats-wrong-with-democracy">many theorists</a>, from Aristotle to the US Founding Fathers, this is a key weakness of democracy. But if western societies are to remain democracies, it is also an unavoidable part of politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191719/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edmund Stewart receives funding from UKRI Policy Fund. </span></em></p>The first people who studied tyranny were the ancient Greeks, an expert says.Edmund Stewart, Assistant Professor in Ancient Greek History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/921982022-10-13T07:02:46Z2022-10-13T07:02:46ZItaly’s election is a case study in a new phase for the radical right<p>Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the populist radical right party Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), may have emerged as the victor in Italy’s recent elections, but she did so at the head of a delicately balanced coalition of parties – one that included Matteo Salvini, the man once spoken of in the same terms as Meloni herself.</p>
<p>Before Brothers of Italy’s meteoric rise, it was Salvini who was seen as the populist right-wing threat in Italy. Now he finds himself playing second fiddle to Meloni.</p>
<p>Salvini’s League (Lega) teamed up with Brothers of Italy in a pre-election alliance that came with the promise of being part of a government led by the radical right. But the deal came at a cost. The relationship between the two allies has evolved into a zero-sum game, with Brothers of Italy taking electoral support from the League.</p>
<p>Brothers of Italy won 26% of the national vote in the September election — a share that dwarfs the results of its two coalition partners combined. Salvini’s League took 8.8% and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (the third partner in the alliance) took 8.1%.</p>
<p>This was a stunning reversal of fortunes given that in the previous election in 2018, Brothers of Italy won just 4.4% of the vote. That year the League took 17.4% and Forza Italia 14%.</p>
<h2>Decimated in the north</h2>
<p>A pressing concern for Salvini is the extent to which Brothers of Italy has eaten into the League’s historical strongholds in the north of Italy. The League was once called the Northern League, precisely because it sought to represent these areas specifically. It was established in 1991 by uniting several regional parties and movements and for most of its history its key goal was regional autonomy for the north of Italy. It is only in the past ten years that the party has tried to expand into the south. Along with this expansion came a pivot towards nationalist campaign tactics and more radical anti-immigration rhetoric.</p>
<p>Despite this history as a northern party, Brothers of Italy has overtaken the League in the whole of the north – and by a large margin.</p>
<p><strong>Election results in the Northern regions</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table showing Brothers of Italy outperformed the League across the northern regions of Italy" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=208&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/488962/original/file-20221010-18-xxvhd0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=261&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Reversal of fortunes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2022/09/26/risultati-camera-lanalisi-dettagliata-di-liste-e-coalizioni-per-regioni-e-zone-geopolitiche/">Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Lombardy, support for the League dropped by 15 percentage points between the 2018 and 2022 elections. In Veneto, it fell by 18.3 percentage points. </p>
<p>For voters, the two parties are now virtually indistinguishable in terms of ideology and policy, which has made it easier for the former to cannibalise the other. The League – and Salvini – are confronting an existential threat.</p>
<p><strong>Percentage-point losses and gains between the 2018 and 2022 elections</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing how votes have passed from the League to Brothers of Italy." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489331/original/file-20221012-12-inln4t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The migration of right-wing votes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2022/09/26/risultati-camera-lanalisi-dettagliata-di-liste-e-coalizioni-per-regioni-e-zone-geopolitiche/">Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>We can’t all be outsiders</h2>
<p>There is an important lesson here for populist radical-right parties more generally. By dropping regionalism and trying to “go national” Salvini has implicitly invited the (large) constituency of right-wing voters who embrace radical ideas about migration and law and order to choose between his party and Meloni’s on the basis of credibility, since there is no longer anything to distinguish them in terms of ideology. In this comparison, the League is on the back foot, having taken part in multiple governments in recent years and, at many points, compromising with other parties. Brothers of Italy can therefore assume the role of disruptive outsider and appeal to voters who are discontent with the status quo. </p>
<p>Apparently recognising Salvini’s weakness in this respect, Brothers of Italy’s election campaign framed Meloni as the only untested alternative on offer – the only candidate of the right untainted by compromise with the left.</p>
<p>Their wrangling is a case study in a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/varieties-of-populist-parties-and-party-systems-in-europe-from-stateoftheart-to-the-application-of-a-novel-classification-scheme-to-66-parties-in-33-countries/7CB95AE2CA7274D5F4716EC11708ACD8">new phase for Europe’s radical right</a>. These parties are largely thought of as the “challengers” to the traditional mainstream but their electoral successes have pushed them into government. Now, they compete not just against the traditional establishment but also among themselves for the control of the executive.</p>
<p>This is the first time that a western European country is likely to be run by a populist radical-right party that also needs to share government with another populist radical-right competitor. Given that multiple similar parties operate elsewhere, too, similar scenarios potentially lie ahead in countries such as Denmark, France and the Netherlands.</p>
<p>Tensions of this kind create a very interesting dynamic for government. Meloni needs Salvini as a junior partner in her coalition but it is inevitable that the arrangement will be beset by infighting. Indeed, Salvini’s political future practically depends on his ability to make it so. It is logical to expect that Salvini will try to fight back against Meloni’s new dominance by keeping <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380500310600">one foot in and one foot out</a> of government. He will seek to hold positions of power but will agitate from within. We might expect him, for example, to loudly criticise the government for not cutting taxes sufficiently (a key theme for League voters), being too worried about the country’s deficit, or too subservient to the “diktats” of the European Commission.</p>
<p>We might even expect him to fight future campaigns on the idea that he was unwilling to compromise in this government. It’s a new iteration of a familiar problem – what happens to parties that wish to be seen as outsiders once they are included in coalition governments? Only this time, all the outsiders are on the inside.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92198/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniele Albertazzi has received funding from AHRC, British Academy, ESRC and the Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mattia Zulianello has received funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>For the first time, two populist radical-right partners are teaming up to form a government. So who is the outsider now?Daniele Albertazzi, Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe, University of SurreyMattia Zulianello, Assistant Professor in Political Science, University of TriesteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1876622022-09-28T20:45:27Z2022-09-28T20:45:27ZWill baby drop boxes from the Italian Renaissance become more common after Meloni win?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486622/original/file-20220926-21-psj4vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=154%2C7%2C4675%2C3134&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Although pregnancy was celebrated in Renaissance paintings, like the 'Primavera' by Botticelli, the reality was quite different. Will Giorgia Meloni's far-right government reverse abortion rights in Italy?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Uffizi Gallery</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Italy, abortion has been legal since 1978. But now that Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-its-first-far-right-leader-since-wwii-mean-for-italy-190655">has won the national election</a> and the far-right form a majority in both the Italian Parliament and Senate, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/world/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-women.html">access to abortion in Italy could face new restrictions</a>.</p>
<p>Anti-abortion supporters like Movimento per la Vita <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-abortion-access-erodes-riding-united-states-wave/">have been buoyed</a> by Meloni’s recent win as well as this summer’s United States Supreme Court ruling on Roe v. Wade. </p>
<p>As an art historian, my work has always seemed safely detached from today’s reality. However, after these recent political shifts, it seems historical artifacts and practices are now painfully relevant.</p>
<h2>Revival from ages past</h2>
<p>In Piazza di San Remigio, a few streets away from the Arno river in Florence, Italy, there’s a rectangular, box-like contraption encased in the wall about the same size as a bank machine. It sits opposite the façade of the church that gives the piazza its name. Drawings of sweetly swaddled babies are visible inside the box behind its glass pane. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477926/original/file-20220805-7920-nph7d7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A culla per la vita (baby box) in Piazza di San Remigio, Florence, Italy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarah Wilkins</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The contraption is a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/28/world/europe/28rome.html"><em>culla per la vita</em></a> or “cradle for life” where <a href="http://www.culleperlavita.it/dove_sono.php">desperate mothers can deposit unwanted infants</a> while retaining anonymity. Pressing a button opens the glass panel and the newborn can be placed inside the ventilated space on a receiving cloth. The partition closes automatically after ten seconds and cannot be reopened. </p>
<p>A sensor immediately notifies monitoring personnel and medical services who come to retrieve the infant.</p>
<p>This <em>culla per la vita</em> was installed in 2006 by the Florentine chapter of Movimento per la Vita, which aims to make abortions illegal in Italy. It is one of a growing national network of deposit points.</p>
<p>In the United States, there are over 100 baby boxes and, as in Italy, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/us/roe-safe-haven-laws-newborns.html?searchResultPosition=1">most are tied to anti-abortion, safe-haven movements</a>.</p>
<h2>No reproductive rights during the Renaissance</h2>
<p>The mechanized “baby box” or “baby hatch” is a revival of centuries-old cultural practices — first recorded as early as the 12th century and which particularly flourished during the Italian Renaissance. </p>
<p>In 15th and 16th-century Italy women had no reproductive rights. Without access to advanced medical care, women used all kinds of methods to end unwanted pregnancies, such as <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/abortion-remedies-medieval-catholic-nun/">time-honoured herbal abortifacients</a>, acidic substances, the insertion of foreign objects and folkloric practices.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether the pregnancy was wanted or not, the risk of death during childbirth was inescapable across all social classes. Although historical maternal mortality rates are hard to calculate, one estimate, using Florentine <em>Libri dei morti</em> (Books of the Dead), <a href="https://hdl-handle-net.ocadu.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb01278.0001.001">concludes that at least one out of five women of childbearing age died due to neonatal complications and trauma</a>. </p>
<p>It was not unheard of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004375871_012">for women to write wills while pregnant</a>, especially when carrying their first child. The risk of complications was amplified by the pubescent age of many Renaissance brides. </p>
<h2>The ‘Primavera’ by Botticelli</h2>
<p>In Florence today, visitors flock to the city’s historic Uffizi galleries to experience the beauty of Botticelli’s <em>Primavera</em> and other Renaissance artworks. But whether viewers of the painting realize it or not, <em>Primavera</em> draws attention to stark inequalities for women. </p>
<p>The painting, some argue, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1358279">commemorates a marriage</a>, possibly that between Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de’ Medici and Semiramide Appiani in 1482. At the far right of the panel, the god Zephyr pursues the terrified nymph Chloris. Raped by Zephyr, Chloris transforms into the goddess Flora, who holds a cluster of blossoms at her abdomen, emphasizing her fertility, and to the eyes of a new bride, foreshadowing her expected pregnancies.</p>
<p>While new mothers of the elite were served sweetmeats and delicacies and given lavishly painted <em>deschi di parto</em> (birth trays) to celebrate the delivery of a child, most Italian women of the time experienced harrowing deprivation.</p>
<h2>An early baby box</h2>
<p>In 1419, Florence’s Silk Guild commissioned Filippo Brunelleschi to design the famed Ospedale degli Innocenti, which opened in 1445.</p>
<p>The building’s <em>loggia</em>, or portico, features semicircular arches made of soft grey <em>pietra serena</em>, ornamented with glazed terracotta roundels of swaddled infants by Andrea della Robbia inserted in 1487.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three arches, above the columns are terracotta figures of infants surrounded by a circular blue background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/481337/original/file-20220826-1650-5xi5b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A few of the terracotta roundels in the portico of Brunelleschi’s Hospital of Innocents in Florence, Italy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unwanted newborns were initially left in the loggia in the <em>pila</em> — an elevated basin or pillar — followed by the <em>finestra ferrata</em>, a small gated window, with dimensions that restricted the age of those accepted. Later, infants entered via <em>la ruota degli esposti</em> (“wheel of the exposed” or “foundling wheel”) — the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Visual-Cultures-of-Foundling-Care-in-Renaissance-Italy/Presciutti/p/book/9781138316171">preferred method</a> of surrender by the 16th century. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-a-newborn-was-found-in-a-recycling-bin-a-safe-haven-baby-hatch-may-save-lives-132851">After a newborn was found in a recycling bin, a safe haven baby hatch may save lives</a>
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<p>This cylindrical wooden device allowed the baby to be placed in an opening, rotated inwardly, and received inside. Infants often arrived wrapped with small talismans or a scrap with a scrawled name. Half a ribbon, a broken <a href="https://www.visitflorence.com/florence-museums/innocenti-museum.html">charm</a>, pendant, or coin, these marks of recognition were left with the child hoping for future reconciliation. The mother or relative kept the other half as proof of the long-lost familial relationship.</p>
<h2>Catholic doctrine barred burials</h2>
<p>Infant deaths were not just an earthly tragedy. Catholic doctrine forbade the baptism of deceased infants. Unbaptized infants who died quickly after birth, were officially <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11120678">barred from burial</a> in consecrated cemeteries and family chapels or tombs.</p>
<p>Midwives plunged unresponsive newborns into water or doused them with liquid in a desperate test for life. If revived, religious authorities <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/146960531770434">allowed emergency baptisms by midwives or laypeople</a>.</p>
<p>Thousands of unwanted infants nevertheless survived their births. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the compassionate retrieval of abandoned infants may be a well-intentioned outcome to a highly complicated dilemma. However, we cannot forget the systemic torment of the mother by a world that does not provide adequate healthcare.</p>
<h2>Will abortion rights change under Meloni?</h2>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A woman in a white suit waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=242%2C206%2C5748%2C4041&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486618/original/file-20220926-16-wvyhhq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fratelli d'Italia (‘Brothers of Italy’) leader Giorgia Meloni in Rome on Sept. 25.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Gregorio Borgia)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the legality of abortion many Italian women struggle to obtain one. Almost 70 per cent of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/europe/on-paper-italy-allows-abortions-but-few-doctors-will-perform-them.html">gynecologists</a> — 83 per cent in Italy’s southern regions — <a href="https://www.ilpost.it/2021/03/29/aborto-obiezione-coscienza-italia/">are conscientious objectors</a>.</p>
<p>Giorgia Meloni has said that abolishing Italy’s abortion law is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/22/abortion-rights-at-risk-in-region-led-by-party-of-italys-possible-next-pm">not on her agenda</a> but her party has been <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/09/15/news/meloni_aborto_legge_194_reazioni-365762519/?fbclid=IwAR2u8B44TEt_2ZMyTr2kG80B4f9SmaAr0NLsc57DQ_BPYuQmNIrUE2e4QKE">accused of impeding abortion access in some regions</a>.
For example, Marche’s regional council opposes abortions using pill RU 486 in clinics outside hospitals in contrast to Ministry of Health guidelines. </p>
<p>Meloni has said she wants women <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/09/15/news/meloni_aborto_legge_194_reazioni-365762519/?fbclid=IwAR2u8B44TEt_2ZMyTr2kG80B4f9SmaAr0NLsc57DQ_BPYuQmNIrUE2e4QKE">“to have the right to make a different choice” other than abortion</a>. The precise meaning of this statement is yet to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heather Coffey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The baby drop box is a revival of centuries-old cultural practices from the Italian Renaissance when reproductive rights were zero.Heather Coffey, Assistant Professor of Art History, OCAD UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1912782022-09-27T08:51:42Z2022-09-27T08:51:42ZGiorgia Meloni’s win in Italy proves even a seemingly successful government can fall victim to populism<p>In a historic win, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy took 26% of the national vote in Italy’s latest election – the first time a far-right party will take the lead in government since the second world war. Meloni will become prime minister at the head of a coalition – although the make up of that government is yet to be decided.</p>
<p>While this outcome was expected, it is still astonishing. In the 2018 elections, Meloni’s party took a mere 4.3% of the vote. But her fortunes rapidly changed. By February 2021, when former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi was forming a national unity government, 16.5% of the voting public was already saying they intended to vote for Brothers of Italy – the only major political party not supporting Draghi. Although respected internationally, Draghi’s government was perceived by many Italians as being the ultimate expression of the power held by the world’s financial elites. Meloni voiced this populist concern on many occasions, and her strategy has paid off. </p>
<p>When the Draghi government <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">fell apart</a> in July 2022, after barely a year and half in office, Brothers of Italy had reached 25% while the League was down from 25% to 12.4%. </p>
<p>By staying outside of the coalition, Meloni gave herself the opportunity to freely criticise the government and present her party as the only true opposition. More than a nostalgic vote for a distant fascist past, the Italian electorate’s support for Meloni reflects a discontent with the current economic and social situation. </p>
<p>Distance from the Draghi government also paid off for the <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/08/26/understanding-the-populism-of-the-five-star-movement-and-its-continuity-with-the-past/">Five Star Movement</a>. The populist party currently led by Giuseppe Conte was floundering on 10% in July 2022 (having polled as high as 33% in 2018) but has rebuilt to somewhere more like 15%. During the electoral campaign, the Five Star Movement revived some popular policy measures, such as a guaranteed “citizen’s income”, which Draghi had criticised. They made a particularly strong showing in the south, thanks to policies of this kind.</p>
<p>Parties that explicitly or implicitly (in the League’s case) opposed the Draghi government together took more than 50% of the vote while parties running on the “Draghi agenda” (Azione) or pledging their support to the Draghi government (the Democratic Party and More Europe) reached less than 30%. </p>
<p>The revolt against Draghi’s government is all the more interesting since he was not pushing for austerity measures but rather drafting reforms and investment measures financed by the EU. The populist narrative of protecting the ordinary people from the financial elite still proved a successful tactic.</p>
<h2>What a Meloni government will look like</h2>
<p>Meloni is Italy’s first female prime minister. With the exception of Scandinavia, most other female prime ministers in Europe have also come from right-wing parties. This is somewhat ironic, given how it is often parties of the left who pride themselves on advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment. Ironically, the Brothers of Italy’s victory led to the replacement of a 75-year-old man belonging the establishment (Draghi) with a 45-year-old woman (Meloni). </p>
<p>Nevertheless, forming a government will not be easy for Meloni. While the electoral results established her as the clear head of the coalition, a lack of expertise and experience will make populating ministerial posts a challenge. The highest level expert advisers in Italy are more commonly associated with moderate political parties, so finding people will be less easy for an insurgent party like Brothers of Italy. Who to put in charge of foreign affairs and economics are particularly pressing questions. Former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi has already offered his support. </p>
<p>Meloni will have a chance to take a hardline approach on domestic policy and will certainly endeavour to be tougher on migration and on social rights, as her electorate appears to be demanding. But she will struggle to do much by way of radical economic change. The Draghi government already drafted a detailed plan of reforms and investments that will have to be carried out in order to secure EU financing. Although the Brothers of Italy is a statist, corporatist and nationalist party which tends to mistrust globalisation, Meloni can’t afford to put too much distance between herself and the European Union. </p>
<p>She may follow the style of many Italian politicians before her by double dealing. There’s an old saying that Italian politicians hold two press conferences in Brussels: one on the top floor for business and EU partners, and another in the basement, for the public who blames Brussels for any reform measure.</p>
<p>And given the complex international landscape, Meloni will find foreign policy just as difficult to manage. </p>
<p>On campaign posters, Meloni asked Italians “<em>Pronti?</em>” (ready?) – the same question Draghi posed to members of the Italian parliament about his reform plans before it all fell apart. While her election has been received as a radical shift, the new prime minister would be wise to not overestimate how ready people are for change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191278/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vincenzo Galasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy’s next prime minister promises a lot on the campaign trail but the reality of government will prove a shock.Vincenzo Galasso, Professor of Economics, Bocconi UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1906552022-09-26T06:04:27Z2022-09-26T06:04:27ZWhat will its first far-right leader since WWII mean for Italy?<p>“Una vittoria storica” – a historic victory. That’s how the website of one of Italy’s major newspapers, the <a href="https://www.corriere.it/">Corriere della Sera</a>, reacted to the <a href="https://www.ansa.it/english/news/2022/09/25/-centre-right-ahead-in-opinio-rai-exit-poll-with-41-45-_75e4546a-fce5-4bc3-8863-8999d2974a3a.html">exit polls</a> released after voting closed in Italy’s general election on Sunday night.</p>
<p>With a predicted vote share of between 40-45%, the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni looks on course to secure at least 230 of the 400 seats in the Lower House, giving it a clear majority.</p>
<p>Meloni’s party, Brothers of Italy, was the big winner on the right, with various agencies estimating it at around 25% of the vote. This was more than the combined total of her two main allies, as Matteo Salvini’s League was tipped to receive approximately 8-9%, with former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia just below that.</p>
<p>In just four years, Brothers of Italy has gone from minor to major player on the right. In 2018, they took 4.4% compared to the League’s 17.4% and Forza Italia’s 14%. And, if we look further back, Italy’s right-wing coalition has moved from having been dominated for over 20 years by a centre-right populist party (Forza Italia), to being dominated now by a far-right populist one (Brothers of Italy).</p>
<p>Brothers of Italy’s victory represents several firsts. Italy will have its first woman prime minister. And both Italy and Western Europe will have their first far-right majority government since the fall of Mussolini and the end of the Second World War.</p>
<h2>Who is Giorgia Meloni?</h2>
<p>Meloni’s trajectory owes much to that history. Beginning as an activist of the post-fascist Italian Social Movement in the Roman working-class district of Garbatella in the early 1990s, Meloni rose to prominence in a political milieu that didn’t deny its heritage.</p>
<p>She stated in an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuoXr-zjqas&ab_channel=INAPolitique">interview</a> with French TV in 1996 that Mussolini was a “good politician” and “all that he did, he did for Italy”.</p>
<p>While Meloni <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=da4OO5mLZv0&ab_channel=GuardianNews">now says</a> Italy has consigned fascism to history, vestiges of her party’s political roots remain. For example, the <a href="https://citynews-romatoday.stgy.ovh/%7Emedia/original-hi/67277628313202/fdisim-2.jpg">flame</a> in the party’s symbol is taken from the post-fascist Italian Social Movement, and there have been recent instances of its politicians and supporters <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2021/12/31/napoli-dirigenti-e-militanti-di-fratelli-ditalia-in-posa-mentre-fanno-il-saluto-romano/6442006/">performing fascist salutes</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-and-the-return-of-fascism-how-italy-got-here-190866">Giorgia Meloni and the return of fascism: how Italy got here</a>
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<p>Meloni and her party’s success can be traced back to Berlusconi’s entry into politics in 1994. His centre-right Forza Italia movement legitimised two smaller radical right parties (the northern regionalist League and the National Alliance) by bringing them into a coalition that easily won that year’s general election.</p>
<p>The coalition that will soon take power almost 30 years later contains the same three ingredients, but their internal balances have now drastically changed.</p>
<p>While some commentators focus on the continuity the new government will represent, there’s a historic change here. The pendulum on the right has shifted from Berlusconi’s centre-right populist governments with a far-right edge in the 1990s and 2000s, to Meloni’s far-right populist government with a centre-right edge in 2022.</p>
<h2>What do these results mean for Italian politics?</h2>
<p>Within the overall success of the right, there are winners and losers. Meloni is obviously the former, and Salvini is the latter.</p>
<p>Salvini is the politician who, having revitalised his party between 2013 and 2019, has now overseen a huge fall in its support from <a href="https://twitter.com/duncanmcdonnell/status/1574170616084643840/photo/1">over 35%</a> in the polls in July 2019 to under 10% today. Only the lack of an obvious successor may save Salvini from losing his party’s leadership.</p>
<p>For the main party on the Left, the Democratic Party, it’s yet another bad day. Having dropped to under 20% in the 2018 general election, they look unlikely to do much better than that this time. Their failure to find a campaign narrative beyond “stop the far right” and to create a broader coalition underlined the strategic ineptitude that has long undermined the Italian left.</p>
<p>Another “first” of this election is the turnout, which has <a href="https://thewest.com.au/politics/low-turnout-as-italy-elects-new-parliament-c-8354488">slipped below two-thirds</a> for the first time in Italian post-war history, declining from 73% in 2018 to 64% in 2022. This speaks to the image of a country in which large swathes of the population, especially in the South, are disillusioned with decades of politicians who have promised the earth and delivered little.</p>
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<p>In economic and foreign policy terms, Italy may not change much in the short-term. Meloni will be keen to show Italian and international elites that she’s a responsible leader. Powerful domestic interest groups, such as the employers’ federation “Confindustria”, must be kept onside. As must the European Union which supports Italy through its post-COVID recovery plan.</p>
<p>But much could change for the far-right’s “enemies of the people”: ethnic, religious and sexual minorities; immigrants; and those judges, intellectuals, and journalists who dare to criticise the new regime.</p>
<p>Things will also change for those far-right Italians who, as Meloni <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/politica/2022/09/21/video/meloni_e_lambiguita_della_frase_ricorrente_ai_suoi_comizi_sogno_una_nazione_in_cui_nessuno_debba_abbassare_la_testa_per_c-9091284/">recently put it</a>, have had to “keep their head down for so many years and not say what they believed”. So, while the Brothers of Italy’s conservation of the post-fascist flame may be more smoke than fire for some groups, for others it will be incendiary.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/giorgia-meloni-the-political-provocateur-set-to-become-italys-first-far-right-leader-since-mussolini-190116">Giorgia Meloni – the political provocateur set to become Italy's first far-right leader since Mussolini</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duncan McDonnell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofia Ammassari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Italy will have its first woman prime minister. And both Italy and Western Europe will have their first far-right majority government since the fall of Mussolini and the end of the Second World War.Sofia Ammassari, PhD researcher, Griffith UniversityDuncan McDonnell, Professor of Politics, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1908662022-09-23T09:03:29Z2022-09-23T09:03:29ZGiorgia Meloni and the return of fascism: how Italy got here<p>The rise of far-right politician Giorgia Meloni has left many outside Italy asking how her brand of what many argue is fascism can achieve such prominence in a country that has experienced life under the dictatorship of Benito Mussolini. The answer can be traced back to a recent normalisation of reactionary politics.</p>
<p>In truth, the existence of a far-right government in Italy is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/29/world/after-50-years-fascists-return-to-italian-government.html">not entirely without precedent</a> in the post-war era. Between 1994 and 2011 a speciously <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/riding-the-populist-wave/italy-the-mainstream-right-and-its-allies-19942018/444EB29D3CBA1E12FCCCC820DD60500C">labelled “centre-right” alliance</a> – consisting of Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), various iterations of a small Christian democratic or centrist wing, Umberto Bossi’s Northern League (LN) and Gianfranco Fini’s National Alliance (AN) – governed Italy four times. The National Alliance was the predecessor party to <a href="https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2022/the-italian-right-ahead-of-the-2022-general-electi.html">Meloni’s Brother’s of Italy</a></p>
<p>Berlusconi takes a revisionist view of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21222341">Mussolini’s role in Italian history</a>. He believed him to be one of Italy’s “greatest statesmen” and an essentially <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-berlusconi-gaffes-idUKTRE7AB0Z720111112">“benign dictator”</a> who had “done good things for Italy”. This provided a counter-narrative that contradicted the reality of the Italian republic’s anti-fascist foundations. That, in turn, was exploited by the far right.</p>
<p>The Northern League first emerged as a series of parties seeking greater autonomy for Italy’s prosperous northern regions. And the National Alliance was the latest iteration of a neo-fascist tradition which has roots in the Italian Social Movement (MSI) established by veterans of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic in 1946.</p>
<p>Both parties helped bring far-right and reactionary policies <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203875742/re-inventing-italian-right-stefano-fella-carlo-ruzza">into the mainstream</a> as coalition partners in Berlusconi-led administrations.</p>
<p>The balance of power in this alliance shifted decisively between 2013 and 2017 when Matteo Salvini took the reins of the Northern League. He gradually abandoned regionalism for nationalism and appealed to the far and extreme right, adopting the slogan <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180124/italians-first-far-right-northern-league-matteo-salvini-donald-trump-2018-election/">“Italians First”</a>, which was previously used by the neo-fascist party <a href="https://www.affaritaliani.it/politica/lega-diventera-prima-gli-italiani-ma-uno-slogan-registrato-da-casapound-557908.html">Casa Pound</a>. The (now renamed) League partnered with the Five Star Movement to govern as what was euphemistically termed a “populist” coalition between 2018 and 2019. </p>
<h2>Extreme views packaged as ‘common sense’</h2>
<p>This was a period which saw, among other reactionary policies, a <a href="https://ecre.org/salvini-decree-approved-by-italian-senate-amid-citizens-protests-and-institutional-criticism/">“security decree” </a> which tightened immigration regulations, limited the right to asylum and made the expulsion of migrants and revocation of citizenship easier. The decree was ultimately overturned in 2020 but by that time it had already served as a symbolic victory for Salvini.</p>
<p>Back in 2017, Salvini promised Italian voters a <a href="https://www.facebook.com/salviniofficial/photos/a.278194028154/10155320986293155/?type=3">“common sense revolution”</a> – a trope which soon became central to his party’s political messaging. The idea was to bring far-right ideology into the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2021.1949829">mainstream</a> by portraying extreme, racist policies as “normal” ideas based on views shared by “ordinary Italians”. </p>
<p>Like many populist far-right politicians, he thrived on the idea that he was saying out loud what “everyone was really thinking”. Salvini claimed to be putting <a href="https://twitter.com/LegaSalvini/status/1439952256418394113">“Italians first”</a> – although he really meant white, Catholic, straight Italians from “traditional” (read mother and father) families. He also promoted closing borders and <a href="https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1280554027646935041">clearing migrant camps</a>.</p>
<p>Salvini’s common sense image, while deeply flawed, initially proved a successful electoral tactic. But by 2019 he started to lose control of the narrative, largely thanks to a series of miscalculations. </p>
<p>The first of these was his ill-fated decision to pull the plug on the government he had formed in coalition with the Five Star Movement in 2018. Fuelled by hubris induced by strong polling figures and in the hope of triggering elections, Salvini withdrew support for the government. But his gamble did not pay off. He instead consigned his party to the opposition benches.</p>
<h2>Meloni profits from Salvini’s tactics</h2>
<p>Salvini’s losses have been Meloni’s gains and the balance of power on Italy’s political right has once again shifted away from the League. With Salvini spending the past two years lending his parliamentary support to the government, Meloni has been able to position herself as having been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220914-we-ve-tried-them-all-except-meloni-far-right-leader-tipped-to-become-italy-s-first-female-pm">“alone in opposition”</a> – and therefore as being more in touch with “real Italians”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, she has capitalised on his success at bringing far-right and reactionary ideas further into the mainstream.</p>
<p>A key element of Salvini’s “common sense” strategy was downplaying the threat of fascism and arguing that calling for law and order or stronger borders is <a href="https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/964598412288065536">not fascistic</a>. This has created the perfect conditions for neo-fascists to thrive. </p>
<p>Meloni has been free to claim that her party has shaken off its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">fascist past</a> even as she espouses obviously hardline views. What might be termed a <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-and-%E2%80%98post-fascism%E2%80%99-political-logic">post-fascist strategy</a> is unfolding. </p>
<p>Meloni can gaslight the public by making fascist assertions while claiming fascism no longer exists. Importantly, those who warn that fascism is making a comeback are derided as irrational.</p>
<p>This is all exemplified in the dog whistle references to Mussolini that have characterised the 2022 election campaign. Both the League and Brothers of Italy have deployed campaign slogans <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-fYJOoqyMf0">first used</a> in the <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-and-%E2%80%98post-fascism%E2%80%99-political-logic#:%7E:text=Mussolini%E2%80%99%2C%20while%2C%20Meloni%E2%80%99s-,%E2%80%98ready%20for%20victory%E2%80%99,-also%20harks%20back">fascist era</a>. The latter has even kept the <a href="https://culturico.com/2021/11/12/post-fascism-in-italy-so-why-this-flame-mrs-giorgia-meloni/">tricolour flame logo</a> used by its predecessors, the neo-fascist MSI.</p>
<p>Meloni <a href="https://www.facebook.com/giorgiameloni.paginaufficiale/posts/no-al-matrimonio-tra-persone-dello-stesso-sesso-sarebbe-una-spesa-enorme-per-lo-/10153287497622645/">opposes same-sex marriage</a>, wants to put significant curbs on <a href="https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/1568874880468140032">access to abortion</a> to address the “emergency” of Italy’s <a href="https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/italia/779530/meloni-denatalita-e-vera-emergenza.html">declining birth rate</a> and has made explicit references to Europe’s supposed “Judeo-Christian” roots. The latter is a common Islamophobic trope that has long formed a key part of European far-right ideology. </p>
<p>Her racism is also evident in a depiction of immigration as an invasion – via calls for a naval blockade and portrayal of “undocumented migration” as a UN plot. This plays willingly on racist <a href="https://www.resetdoc.org/story/the-poisonous-roots-of-the-great-replacement-theory/">“great replacement”</a> narratives.</p>
<p>Meloni’s success may shock, but it should not surprise. She is a canny social media operator and expert strategist but her path has been cleared by many figures that came before her. Salvini now follows her lead but his work to shift the <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/04/what-overton-window-politics">Overton window</a> of what is mainstream in politics has made her the politician she is today. That was a process that took years and unfolded in front of our very eyes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>George Newth works for University of Bath</span></em></p>The return of fascist discourse has been several decades in the making and owes a lot to Matteo Salvini.George Newth, Lecturer in Italian Politics, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1908572022-09-20T12:42:23Z2022-09-20T12:42:23ZItaly election: why Giorgia Meloni’s far-right Brothers of Italy party is almost guaranteed to win<p>When Italy last held an election in 2018, the Fratelli d’Italia – Brothers of Italy – were minnows, taking a mere 4.4% of the vote. Now, ahead of the 2022 vote on September 25, opinion polls suggest the far-right group is on course for a historic victory that would make them the largest party in Italy. </p>
<p>If this comes to pass, the Brothers of Italy would enter government at the head of a three-party coalition (already agreed with Matteo Salvini’s the League and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia). Party leader Giorgia Meloni would be prime minister. </p>
<p>This is significant because Brothers of Italy’s historic lineage traces back to the neo-fascists of the post-war period. Indeed, its very symbol (a tricoloured flame) is the same as that of its predecessor, the National Alliance, and of its predecessor, the Italian Social Movement – which was founded by veterans of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chart showing how the Brothers of Italy have massively increased their support in recent years." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485087/original/file-20220916-14-xnmf00.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rise of the Brothers of Italy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.istitutopiepoli.it/">Istituto Piepoli</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The result of this election is already considered a foregone conclusion. That is not just because the margin of difference in polling is so great, but also because the parties of the centre and left have failed to construct a pre-electoral coalition.</p>
<p>In Italy, this is a form of political suicide. The <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/italys-odd-turn-to-the-right/">electoral system</a> – part majoritarian and part proportional – favours those parties which make pre-electoral pacts and form large coalitions. Yet, the Democrats rejected a pact with the Five Star Movement because of its role in bringing down the government of <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">Mario Draghi</a>. </p>
<p>The centrist <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/italys-renzi-creates-third-pole-with-centrist-ally-ahead-of-elections/2659198">“third pole”</a> created by two smaller parties then rejected the Democrats because they were flirting with the Green Left. This fragmentation means not just that the right-wing coalition is unsurpassable but that it could, with over 40% of the vote, secure more than two-thirds of the seats in the Italian parliament.</p>
<h2>Alarm bells ringing</h2>
<p>A majority of that size would enable the government to amend the constitution and introduce a directly elected presidency – an idea on which all three parties in the coalition seem to agree. When a politician of the far right like Meloni speaks of replacing parliamentary democracy with a “democracy of the people”, it sends a shiver down the spines of many Italians. </p>
<p>Fears of a return to the fascism of the past may nevertheless be overstated. A detailed look at any policy area (European integration, migration, the energy crisis, Ukraine) reveals significant differences between the three parties of the right. It is not at all clear that they are capable of producing coherent government, let alone see through on a radical constitutional overhaul.</p>
<p>The positions adopted by the Brothers of Italy also often seem incompatible, if not contradictory with each other. This is because Meloni is speaking to two audiences. One needs reassuring that she will not be too extreme if elected. The other comprises party members, militants and sympathisers who need to hear about ideologically motivated changes to come, and who are more interested in the tone and big picture than the details.</p>
<h2>Europe and Russia</h2>
<p>Meloni’s position on Europe is another cause for concern. Although she declares herself to be committed to the EU, she also wants to review various financial arrangements with the bloc. And the other parties in her coalition are well known for their eurosceptism. Their programme (“For Italy”) says it wants <a href="https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-italian-elections-and-the-threat-to-european-integration/">a more political and less bureaucratic EU</a>, and there is concern as to what this might mean.</p>
<p>A Meloni-led government also brings potential ramifications for the sanctions on Russia and the arming of Ukraine. Both Europe and Moscow are wondering if the election outcome might see a change in the Italian government’s position that undermines Europe’s united front. For all Meloni’s apparent commitment to the European position, <a href="https://www.politicanews.it/quotidiani/la-repubblica-la-destra-si-divide-su-putin-84142">Salvini</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-accept-vladimir-putin-demands-italy-silvio-berlusconi-tells-europe-1708918">Berlusconi</a> are sceptics, if not outright opponents. </p>
<p>The American National Security Council recently <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/09/15/news/soldi_russia_italia_documento_usa-365703569/?ref=RHTP-BH-I365694626-P1-S1-T1">revealed</a> evidence that Russia secretly channels funds to a large network of (as yet unnamed) parties (including Italian ones), in order to disrupt democratic processes and garner support for Moscow. This has fuelled suspicions that the parties of the right may all be involved.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Italy finds itself in a significantly deteriorating economic scenario and is especially exposed to the Russian gas crisis. The IMF has estimated that an embargo on Russian gas would see an <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2022/07/19/how-a-russian-natural-gas-cutoff-could-weigh-on-europes-economies/">economic contraction in Italy</a> of over 5% – higher than all other EU nations but Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia. </p>
<p>The country will also be affected by the European Central Bank’s decision to scale back its stimulus programme by raising interest rates and stopping the purchase of national bonds. Small wonder that investors have been selling off Italian bonds and hedge fund investors have been betting <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5cef309f-9daf-4337-bdc6-f6b2ef8ffe02">against them on a mammoth scale</a>. The markets, in short, are worried, although they are, as it were, building in expectations of a right-wing victory, which may therefore offset a dramatic post-election fall.</p>
<h2>Deja vu?</h2>
<p>It should be noted that Italy has been in a similar political position before. There were widespread fears ahead of the 2018 general election about what would happen if the populists came to power – and, sure enough, they did. The Five Star Movement, with an extraordinary 32.7% of the vote, formed a government with Salvini’s League. Yet, the government proved to be hopelessly divided (some would say incompetent) and collapsed a year later. On today’s opinion polling evidence, Five Star is now a relatively minor political force.</p>
<p>True, what makes 2022 different is that this will be the first time the heirs of neo-fascism have come to power. But it should not be forgotten that Italy’s political system is difficult to monopolise, and even more difficult to reform. In short, the jury on the threat represented by Meloni is still out.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin J Bull does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the opposition all but giving up, a party with origins in post-war fascism is poised to form a government.Martin J Bull, Professor of Politics, University of SalfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1901162022-09-19T12:22:07Z2022-09-19T12:22:07ZGiorgia Meloni – the political provocateur set to become Italy’s first far-right leader since Mussolini<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485171/original/file-20220918-49267-igrjib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C18%2C4144%2C2318&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A 'V' for victory for Giorgia Meloni?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/giorgia-meloni-leader-of-italian-far-right-party-fratelli-news-photo/1243215867?adppopup=true">Nicolò Campo/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the autumn of 1922, Benito Mussolini, the ambitious and charismatic founder of the Fascist Party, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/video/213452/Top-questions-and-answers-for-Benito-Mussolini#:%7E:text=In%201922%20Mussolini%20led%20a,(%22The%20Leader%22).">became Italy’s youngest prime minister</a> – seizing power in <a href="https://historyonthisday.com/events/italy/mussolini-march-on-rome/">a march on Rome</a> that ushered in a dark period of totalitarian rule.</p>
<p>A century on, Italy looks set to get its first far-right leader since Mussolini’s body was strung up for all to see at the end of World War II. On Sept. 25, 2022, voters are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">widely expected to elect</a> as prime minister Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy – a party whose lineage traces back to the rump of <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220906/political-cheat-sheet-understanding-the-brothers-of-italy/">Mussolini’s fascists</a>. </p>
<p>Many <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/15/world/europe/giorgia-meloni-italy-right.html">Italians and Europeans are understandably worried</a>. Her likely ascent comes at a time of national fragility for Italy, which is wracked by <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-07-15/it-s-summer-so-italy-is-in-crisis">economic woes</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-approve-new-package-against-inflation-next-week-minister-says-2022-09-01/">spiraling inflation</a> and an <a href="https://www.rescue.org/country/italy">immigration crisis</a>. It also poses uncomfortable questions over the idea of European identity and unity. Moreover, it is a symptom of the political malaise in Italy and of the winds that have seen <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyd-populism-commentary/commentary-why-populists-are-becoming-more-popular-idUSKCN1GL2FC">populist right-wing leaders gain support</a> around the world.</p>
<h2>Who is Giorgia Meloni?</h2>
<p>Meloni has been accused of being a political provocateur. A proud nationalist, her policy stances stress <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220810-woman-mother-christian-guides-italian-far-right-to-brink-of-power">anti-immigration positions and the protection of Italy from “Islamization</a>.” In contrast, she presents herself as the defender of traditional family values, politicizing Christianity and motherhood as the cornerstones of the authentic Italian national identity. In a 2019 speech, she explained: “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220810-woman-mother-christian-guides-italian-far-right-to-brink-of-power">I am Giorgia. I am a woman, I am a mother, I am Italian, I am a Christian”</a> – a rhetorical flourish that went viral, even being <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhwUMDX4K8o">turned into a disco remix</a>.</p>
<p>But Meloni is also a political chameleon. She changes strategy when it is politically advantageous to do so. In her youth, she openly <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/inspired-by-mussolini-giorgia-meloni-makes-her-move-on-rome-41925810.html">admired Mussolini</a> and considered him a good politician. But asked in the run-up to the election if she agreed that the fascist leader was bad for Italy, <a href="https://9breakingnews.com/giorgia-meloni-may-lead-italy-and-europe-is-worried/">she said “yes</a>.”</p>
<p>Over the years, she has courted leaders deemed by many to be ultra nationalist, such as <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20180319/italian-rightwing-politicians-matteo-salvini-giorgia-meloni-putin-russian-election/">Vladimir Putin of Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/italys-meloni-backs-orban-says-hungary-is-democratic/">Viktor Orbán of Hungary</a> and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2019-06-03/ty-article-opinion/.premium/meet-italys-le-pen-the-defender-of-christian-identity-who-could-become-premier/0000017f-dbb3-d856-a37f-fff334e90000">Marine Le Pen of France</a>. Yet she has also tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-promises-defy-chinese-russian-expansionist-ambitions-2022-08-25/">position herself as aligned with the conservatism</a> of the British Conservative Party and the Republican Party in the U.S.</p>
<p>She has of late tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-promises-defy-chinese-russian-expansionist-ambitions-2022-08-25/">distance herself from prior support</a> for the strongmen of Russia and China and to reemphasize her willingness to patriotically serve her country.</p>
<h2>Fratelli d’Italia’s rise to power</h2>
<p>The ploy has seemingly worked. </p>
<p>The far-right alliance of Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and like-minded parties Lega and Forza Italia are on course to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">win an absolute majority in the Parliament</a>. But it is Meloni’s party that has stood out, with polls showing it is set to win around <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/polls-predict-easy-victory-for-italys-far-right-under-firebrand-giorgia-meloni/">a quarter of all votes</a>.</p>
<p>It marks a remarkable rise to power for Fratelli d'Italia. In the course of the past four years, the party’s polling numbers <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/italy/">have been steadily growing</a> from a little over 4% in 2018 to over 25% in 2022. The trajectory suggests that the party has either shrugged off its <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-fascist-giorgia-meloni-mario-draghi-silvio-berlusconi-matteo-salvini-racist-mussolini-election/">historical links to fascism</a> or that many Italians simply don’t care.</p>
<p>Fratelli d’Italia is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">descendant of the Italian Social Movement party</a>, formed by Mussolini supporters after World War II. Meloni has tried to put distance between the lineage, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">declaring that</a> the Italian right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/scepticism-over-giorgia-melonis-claims-fascism-is-history-in-italian-far-right">considers fascism</a> to be confined to Italy’s history.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men stand around a flag with 'Fratelli d'Italia' on it and a flame symbol below." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/485184/original/file-20220918-60235-g64i76.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Brothers of Italy’s emblem contains the flame symbol of the neofascist Italian Social Movement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-with-a-brothers-of-italy-flag-during-the-news-photo/1243340253?adppopup=true">Marco Cantile/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meloni has also exploited national <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/publication/documents/2021-05/Flair-Italy-2021-10-points_0.pdf">sentiments of insecurity and anxiety</a>, caused by the multiple crises the country has faced in the last couple of years. These include <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/b76a212b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/b76a212b-en">the COVID-19 pandemic that hit Italy particularly hard</a> and the <a href="https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/02/28/behind-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-the-mediterranean-five-years-after-lampedusa-political-incoherence-and-dysfunction-continues-to-kill/">still-unresolved major humanitarian crises</a> caused by mass migration across the Mediterranean, with Italy being the main receiving country of migrants heading to Europe. Italy is also facing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-approve-new-package-against-inflation-next-week-minister-says-2022-09-01/">rising inflation</a> and an <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220901/energy-crisis-italy-to-urge-residents-to-turn-down-heating-this-winter/">ongoing energy crisis</a>, driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine and Putin’s strategy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-weaponization-of-natural-gas-could-backfire-by-destroying-demand-for-it-182102">weaponizing Russia’s gas supply to the European Union</a>.</p>
<p>Faced with these crises, Meloni has positioned herself as the person to “rescue” Italy. History has proved that in times of precarity, charismatic <a href="https://phys.org/news/2022-03-people-rethink-nationalist-beliefs-uncertain.html">ultra nationalists leaders tend to do well</a>.</p>
<p>With a familiar formula of putting Italy “first,” <a href="https://euobserver.com/eu-political/149336">Meloni’s euroskepticism</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/in-italy-beating-the-right-means-thinking-beyond-the-ballot-box/">xenophobia</a> and <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2161376">Islamophobia</a> – repackaged as patriotism – has gained popularity among Italians.</p>
<h2>Out of the chaos of coalition collapse</h2>
<p>But the success of Fratelli d’Italia is not all about Meloni. The flip side of her success is the failure of other parties and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/20/world/europe/draghi-italy-prime-minister.html">chaos of a government collapse</a> that affected many of the parties running against her.</p>
<p>The snap election in Italy followed the resignation of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/business/mario-draghi-ecb-euro.html">Prime Minister Mario Draghi</a>, an internationally admired economist <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-super-mario-draghi-undone-by-political-infighting-2022-07-21/">nicknamed “Super Mario</a>” for his impressive handling of the eurozone crisis as the head of the European Central Bank. </p>
<p>Draghi presided over a wide coalition but was forced to resign in July 2022, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliecoleman/2022/07/14/italian-prime-minister-mario-draghi-moves-to-resign-leaving-government-in-turmoil/?sh=27da8d234d00">amid a worsening economic and political crisis</a> that saw some coalition partners turn against the prime minister.</p>
<p>Italy has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/boris-johnson-covid-health-italy-western-europe-2f8c454104ae3544fb04e958f8105749">often struggled with its political leadership</a>. The country’s political system all but <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-heading-to-snap-election-as-unity-coalition-crumbles-explaining-the-nations-fragmented-party-system-187213">ensures government by coalition</a>. But that often means rule by a group of parties, whose agendas and visions may be drastically different – sometimes almost mutually exclusive. And the collapse of Draghi’s wide coalition has tainted many parties across the political spectrum, including the once-popular 5-Star Movement.</p>
<p>On top of this, there has been the individual failures of the parties challenging Meloni in the election. This has included <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/its-been-25-years-since-anyone-in-italy-trusted-the-government/">cases of corruption</a>, with the former leader of the Democratic Party – and later the centrist Italia Viva – Matteo Renzi being <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italys-matteo-renzi-charged-with-illegal-party-financing/">charged with illegal party financing</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, attempts to forge a successful center-left coalition to challenge the right-wing bloc have failed, with an alliance <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-07/italy-s-center-left-coalition-collapses-days-after-agreement?sref=Hjm5biAW">falling apart just days after being formed</a>. </p>
<h2>Ready to govern?</h2>
<p>The political parties gaining from this political mess have largely been on the right. In alliance with Meloni’s Fratelli d'Italia are the euroskeptic, anti-immigrant Lega and Forza Italia – the party of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/i-chased-ageing-playboy-silvio-berlusconi-says-expremier-s-young-fiancee-as-he-attempts-to-rebuild-reputation-8839537.html">85-year-old former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi</a>. </p>
<p>But while Forza Italia and Lega had been part of Draghi’s coalition, Meloni has been able to run on a campaign that is unblemished by association to that failed government.</p>
<p>Meloni is also symptomatic of an emerging European political climate that has seen growth in support for hard-right politicians such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-le-pen-now-second-most-liked-french-politician-poll-shows-2022-03-31/">Marine Le Pen</a> in France and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungary-election-triumph-for-viktor-orban-is-a-warning-to-progressive-parties-seeking-a-marriage-of-convenience-with-the-far-right-180196">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán</a>. </p>
<p>Meloni has <a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">run under a campaign slogan of</a> “<a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">Pronta a governare</a>” or “<a href="https://torino.corriere.it/politica/22_settembre_13/giorgia-meloni-riempie-piazza-carlo-alberto-pronta-governare-ma-non-parla-torino-1ae1152c-339b-11ed-80fb-2302675b77bf.shtml">Ready to govern!</a>”</p>
<p>The big question now is whether Italy is ready for Meloni as prime minister.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The far-right leader of the Brothers of Italy has tried to distance the party from its fascist lineage, but many are still worried about the direction she will take the country.Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager, Associate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State UniversityEvgeniya Pyatovskaya, Ph.D. Candidate in Communication, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1884922022-09-18T12:49:45Z2022-09-18T12:49:45ZAs a divided Italy heads to the polls, a sharp right turn is likely<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484350/original/file-20220913-4673-x6jhb6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4141%2C2758&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">From left, Silvio Berlusconi, Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini address a rally in Rome in 2019. Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy) party, with neo-fascist roots, has been rising rapidly in popularity ahead of Italy's Sept. 25 parliamentary elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Italians will soon vote in national elections and the country will have <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2021/01/31/why-does-italy-go-through-so-many-governments">its 70th government since the founding</a> of the republic in 1946. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://politpro.eu/en/italy">polling on voting intentions</a> point to a significant victory for the right-wing coalition with Giorgia Meloni’s party, Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy), at the helm. These results could usher in the country’s first female prime minister, but questions remain about how far right she will govern, how long support will last and how she’ll respond to European and international pressures.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with grey-ish hair and wearing a suit smiles and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484354/original/file-20220913-3930-sof8u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Italian Premier Mario Draghi waves to lawmakers at the end of his address to parliament in Rome in July 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andrew Medichini, File)</span></span>
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<p>Italy is notorious for its political fragmentation and governmental instability, often struggling to reach a full year with the same cabinet in power. </p>
<p>Shrewd political manoeuvring has led to the rise and fall of many coalitions and technocratic governments over the past few decades, including the recent national unity government of Mario Draghi, the former head of the European Central Bank, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/italian-government-collapse-the-political-chess-moves-behind-mario-draghis-resignation-187648">collapsed in July 2022</a>.</p>
<h2>Hung parliament</h2>
<p>This election is significant because it’s the first held since 2018, when the anti-establishment Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star movement) and Lega (the League) won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-berlusconi">most seats in a hung parliament</a> and found a governing compromise with non-politically aligned leader Giuseppe Conte, who served until January 2021. </p>
<p>Draghi was then appointed prime minister by President Sergio Mattarella, with support of all major parties — except the Brothers of Italy — to stabilize the government during recovery efforts from the COVID-19 pandemic, including overseeing critical <a href="https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/draghis-plan-to-cut-italian-red-tape-clears-hurdle-for-eu-aid">European Union financial support to Italy</a>.</p>
<p>This campaign also appears to be Meloni’s to lose, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-right-heads-clear-election-victory-final-polls-indicate-2022-09-09/">as her support has grown from four per cent in 2018 to 25 per cent today</a>. Along with her right-wing coalition partners Matteo Salvini (the League) and Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia), they are approaching 50 per cent and are forecast to win potentially large majorities in both Italy’s Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. </p>
<p>The centre-left coalition made up of the Democratic Party and other small parties, with less than 30 per cent support, have opted not to partner with the Five-star movement and risk being banished to opposition benches for years.</p>
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<img alt="A blonde woman speaks into a microphone and points upwards. A sign that says Meloni is seen behind her." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484358/original/file-20220913-4044-xlylo8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Giorgia Meloni addresses a campaign rally in Ancona, Italy, in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Domenico Stinellis)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Towards a right-wing victory?</h2>
<p>Meloni has been in politics for a while, joining the post-Mussolini era neo-fascist party, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), as a youth. </p>
<p>By 2008 at age 31, she became <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62659183">Italy’s youngest ever minister</a>, managing the Youth and Sport portfolio in Berlusconi’s government. In 2012, she founded <a href="https://www.thelocal.it/20220906/political-cheat-sheet-understanding-the-brothers-of-italy/">Fratelli d'Italia</a>, and since then has grown the party by conjuring up the former rhetoric and populist policy positions of both the MSI and Berlusconi’s former right-wing partner, the National Alliance.</p>
<p>Brimming with confidence from recent polling results, Meloni is projecting a “ready to govern” attitude in the final stretch of the campaign. </p>
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<p>Her party has surpassed the traditional right parties of Forza Italia and even the League. </p>
<p>The largest vote winner in the coalition generally becomes prime minister in Italy, and Meloni knows this. She has tried to assuage concerns about some of her radical proposals and anti-European Union rhetoric by claiming she’ll govern for all Italians <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/69f8e007-bb07-4342-8dd0-b7e99a6582af">in support of the EU and NATO</a> alliances, but with a much different tone than previous governments.</p>
<h2>Meloni’s Italian-style populism</h2>
<p>Like her populist predecessors across Europe, Meloni has honed in on soaring cost of living, demographic crises, pandemic fatigue, migration and economic malaise with typical promises about returning power to the people from the elites, securing the border and reviving the economy by lowering taxes and regulations. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62726468">Promises include</a> renegotiating Italy’s massive EU COVID-19 recovery plan, changing the constitution to elect the Italian president by popular vote, erecting a naval blockade of migrants from Libya and integrating fewer Muslims. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-once-overwhelmed-by-covid-19-turns-to-a-health-pass-and-stricter-measures-to-contain-virus-165457">Italy – once overwhelmed by COVID-19 – turns to a health pass and stricter measures to contain virus</a>
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<p>All of this is premised on returning the cultural values of the “traditional” Italian family, which means rolling back the clock on LGBTQ+ rights and even a pledge to ban <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brothers-of-italy-calls-open-season-on-peppa-pigfdi-lgbt/"><em>Peppa Pig</em> episodes</a> over the use of same-sex couples in the animated kids show.</p>
<p>As she pursues these policies and cozies up to allies like France’s Marie Le Pen and Hungary’s Viktor Orban, observers are worried about Italy’s rightward drift.</p>
<p>Yet whether her main coalition partners, Salvini and Berlusconi — two powerful men with their own large followings — will support Meloni as prime minister for many years is in question. While the parties share some libertarian economic views and traditional cultural outlooks, their differences are significant. </p>
<p>The League under Salvini has worked for years <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13597566.2018.1512977">to broaden its appeal</a> to the rest of Italy and <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2018/10/how-italy-s-separatist-northern-league-went-national">shed its northern, separatist moniker</a> (it was formerly called Lega Nord) by focusing on migrants and the EU as scapegoats for Italy’s woes.</p>
<p>But it appears Meloni poached a good number of right-wing and disenchanted voters who temporarily sided with the Five-star and the League in 2018 with her similar but more forceful <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/aug/14/georgia-meloni-no-fascist-evokes-grim-memories-italys-past">populist promises.</a></p>
<h2>Berlusconi as king-maker</h2>
<p>Enter Berlusconi. He was pushed <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/berlusconi-poised-to-step-down/2011/11/12/gIQAMJuZFN_story.html">to resign in 2011</a> during the sovereign debt crisis in favour of technocrat Mario Monti and <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/06/24/195185941/silvio-berlusconi-found-guilty-in-sex-for-hire-case">was convicted</a> on a number of charges related to prostitution and tax fraud. </p>
<p>He completed community service and was banned from Parliament, but this ban was <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/italian-court-lifts-ban-on-berlusconi-running-for-office-paper-forza-italia/">lifted by a judge</a> in 2018. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A balding man in a dark suit smiles and waves." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/484441/original/file-20220913-3841-jl9ts0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi waves to reporters as he arrives at the Chamber of Deputies to meet Mario Draghi in Rome in February 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alessandra Tarantino)</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>He may be poised to be the kingmaker of the coalition. Running as a more responsible, pro-EU statesman and centrist than his partners, he could have a large say in the direction of governance and policy if the election results are tight, and could threaten to remove his support at a moment’s notice.</p>
<p>This might mean that Meloni’s governing style and hard-right promises will be moderated by her centrist partner. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more important moderating influences will lie within the EU and the international community. Italy has been an important NATO and EU member.</p>
<p>The highly indebted government is also reliant on <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/italys-meloni-on-collision-course-with-brussels-over-eu-recovery-plan/">EU recovery funds and financial markets</a>, so any radical fiscal moves or egregious violations of human rights on the migration front will likely be countered by international and EU pressure. </p>
<p>Time will tell how far right Italy will drift in the coming year and what will happen if it does, and there’s little doubt other far-right parties in France, the Netherlands and Germany will be taking notes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julian Campisi receives funding from SSHRC and the University of Toronto.</span></em></p>Italians will vote soon. A likely victory for the far-right Brothers of Italy could take the country down an uncharted path.Julian Campisi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.