tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/haider-al-abadi-32324/articlesHaider al-Abadi – The Conversation2017-07-17T20:04:29Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/808352017-07-17T20:04:29Z2017-07-17T20:04:29ZMosul is taken back, but Islamic State is not finished yet<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178195/original/file-20170714-14296-11ubgs5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqis celebrate the recapture of Mosul from Islamic State.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Wissm Al-Okili</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-10/battle-for-mosul-whats-been-happening-islamic-state-fighting/8693396">predictable recapture</a> of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS) marks a new milestone in the tumultuous events of the Middle East. It has important ramifications for Iraq, IS and the West.</p>
<p>Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.html">wasted no time</a> claiming victory, entering the ruined city in staged jubilation. Wearing military uniform, al-Abadi was swift to capitalise on the victory, signalling his authority over the entire country. He hopes to keep Iraq united through strengthened political clout on his return to the politically polarised capital of Baghdad.</p>
<p>But the capture of Mosul may in fact accelerate the eventual break-up of Iraq into smaller states. The leader of the autonomous Kurdish regional government, Masud Barzani, has <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/15/masoud-barzani-why-its-time-for-kurdish-independence/">made clear his intentions</a> to hold a referendum on independence by the end of 2017.</p>
<p>Until now, Barzani had to collaborate with the central Iraqi government to clear the IS menace from Mosul and northern Iraq. Now he will have to tread carefully to meet the growing Kurdish expectation of independence and manage al-Abadi’s anticipation of gratitude for the liberation of Mosul.</p>
<p>Barzani and Kurds can see a historic opportunity to create a Kurdish polity in northern Iraq. The gravity of this polity is eventually expected to pull neighbouring Kurdish regions in Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Kurdish dream is to combine these regions to create a larger Kurdish state.</p>
<p>At the same time, al-Abadi will increase pressure on Barzani to remain loyal to a unitary Iraq. While the prime minister will spend most of his time in the safety of the Baghdad green zone, Barzani will collaborate with US forces and heavily armed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to oust IS from its capital, Raqqa. He will also play a key role in further clearing operations in eastern Syria in the second half of 2017 and possibly into 2018.</p>
<p>With the fall of Mosul, the impending <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-06/battle-for-raqqa-begins/8595086">capture of Raqqa</a>, and the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/world/islamic-state-leader-abu-bakr-albaghdadi-killed-report-20170711-gx9ca2.html">confirmed death</a> of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, IS’s days as a caliphate are numbered. Although <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-will-happen-after-abu-bakr-al-baghdadis-death_us_5965885be4b09be68c005641">some argue</a> that IS will transform into a virtual caliphate, without a sovereign state a caliphate is meaningless and Islamically invalid.</p>
<p>This reality has a dramatic impact on the recruiting power of IS. It was able to attract followers with its claim to have resurrected the caliphate abolished by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924. </p>
<p>IS gained an almost miraculous aura <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states">after capturing Mosul</a> with 800 fighters. In their eyes, this was proof that God was on their side. A few weeks after the capture of Mosul, al-Baghdadi declared his caliphate in the city’s historic mosque in June 2014.</p>
<p>For as much as Mosul had symbolic value for an IS caliphate, its loss signals an irreversible trajectory of collapse. Although IS is taking huge blows, there is no reason to believe it will disappear, much like the frustrating persistence of Taliban in Afghanistan since the collapse of its government in 2001.</p>
<p>Nobody should expect mass desertions from IS ranks. Its membership is likely to remain loyal and fight to the end. What remains of IS leadership holds to the theological line that the pledge of allegiance or <em>bay’ah</em> is binding before God, and if they abandon ranks they will die in a state of disbelief.</p>
<p>While this may help retain surviving militants, IS recruiting power around the world will dramatically reduce, as the greatest attraction for recruits was the promise of a utopian Islamic state.</p>
<p>Nevertheless IS, or whatever the group will be called in the future, will adapt and look for new missions to motivate its members and attract recruits. </p>
<p>One possible trajectory is a merger with al-Qaeda. This is a real possibility, as IS emerged from al-Qaeda branches in Iraq and Syria. Without a real caliphate, the line of distinction between IS and al-Qaeda blurs to insignificance, even though their leaderships were <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/">in open hostility</a> and competed for the soul of the violent radical movement.</p>
<p>The ideology and the narrative of IS and al-Qaeda are the same: Western powers and their local collaborators are responsible for the occupation of Muslim territories and the ensuing suffering of Muslim populations; violent military response is the response these enemies understand and the only solution that works.</p>
<p>This ideology is conveniently covered by the same veneer of religious arguments to utilise the persuasive power of Islam in gaining and rallying gullible supporters to their ranks.</p>
<p>The more likely trajectory for IS is to ignore the spectacular failure of its state and cling to the alluring promise of a caliphate. Persisting with its brand of radicalism, IS could exist as a violent insurgent movement positioned in Deir ez-Zor, a Syrian town near the border with Iraq.</p>
<p>For the time being, the US administration seems determined not to leave IS any haven, Deir ez-Zor or elsewhere. </p>
<p>As IS regroups, it is likely to unleash violence on two fronts. The first is in the West. IS will attempt to use its sleeper cells and deploy social media to motivate a new generation of gullible minds to carry out terror attacks in North America, Europe and perhaps Australia.</p>
<p>The second front is where IS is based – Iraq and Syria. The conditions that gave rise to IS in the first place, such as military conflict, political instability, sectarian polarisation, ethnic divisions and corruption, continue to exist in both countries. The situation will not change overnight. </p>
<p>Through a drawn-out insurgency and waves of violence, IS will attempt to destabilise the Iraqi and Syrian governments in the hope of resurrecting its Islamic state. Ironically, the greatest victims will be Islam, Muslims and peace in Muslim lands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80835/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with ISRA Australia. </span></em></p>While Islamic State might be taking significant blows, including the recapture of the key Iraqi city, there is no reason to expect the violent and radical group will disappear.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/807582017-07-10T15:52:28Z2017-07-10T15:52:28ZMosul is ‘liberated’, but the fight against Islamic State and its ideology continues<p>After an offensive lasting nearly nine months, the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/09/iraq-announces-victory-over-islamic-state-mosul">walked</a> through the streets of Mosul on July 9 after Iraqi forces backed by US-led coalition airstrikes “liberated” the city from so-called Islamic State (IS). Abadi was there to congratulate security forces for the victory. </p>
<p>Iraqis have been waiting for this moment for three years, since IS <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-seize-control-mosul">captured</a> the country’s second city and other key areas in 2014. </p>
<p>Since the announcement of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/world/middleeast/iraq-recaptures-al-nuri-mosque-in-mosul-from-isis-but-only-rubble-remains.html">recapture</a> of Mosul’s iconic al-Nuri mosque, <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-years-of-destruction-iraqis-are-rescuing-their-cultural-identity-80019">destroyed</a> by IS in late June, social media has been buzzing with hashatags <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA_%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9">such as #سقطت<em>دولة</em> الخراف</a>ة (the state of myth has fallen), <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%84_%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1">#الموصل_تتحرر</a> (Mosul is being liberated), and <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%AF_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85">#غرد_للسلام</a> (tweet for peace). </p>
<p>The general <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=17s0qiYRysw">reaction</a> in Iraq and on social media to the recapture of Mosul has been one of joy and celebration, yet for many, the feelings are mixed. Although it is a huge blow for IS, the victory does not mean that IS has been defeated across Iraq. Battles are still awaiting in Tel Afar in the north-west, to Hawija and other areas in Anbar Province in western Iraq. And even when these are retaken, IS will <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-if-raqqa-and-mosul-fall-islamic-state-is-far-from-finished-79370">continue</a> its regional and global insurgency. </p>
<p>IS’s territorial caliphate is falling, but its ideology – which argues that its members follow the “true Islam”, fighting heretics and unbelievers – is not.</p>
<p>For Iraqis, smiles are mixed with tears, and optimism mixed with fears. Many thousands of lives have been lost and too much blood shed in the battle against IS. Many more thousands have been displaced and the destruction has been widespread. Iraqis rightfully ask whether all of this could have been avoided and whether those responsible will ever be held accountable. They are aware of the massive challenges ahead, politically, economically, and socially. These include the <a href="https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Report%20Iraq%20at%20War%20%28Again%29%20-%20March%202016.pdf">conflicting interests</a> of the forces fighting on the ground, as well as those of countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US, whose interventions are often seen as destabilising to the Iraqi state. </p>
<h2>Confronting Daeshism</h2>
<p>Daeshism (<em>Daeshia</em> or <em>Daeshna</em> in Arabic) is derived from Daesh – the Arabic acronym for IS – but Iraqis use it to refer to a general act of subjugating outsiders. It is the attempted suppression of beliefs, ideas, behaviour, and appearances on religious grounds – and it is not just IS doing this in Iraq. </p>
<p>Like IS, Daeshim uses an internal narrative of “us versus them”, going beyond sectarian differences to threaten individual liberties viewed as unacceptable by some religious leaders. The recent kidnap, torture, and murder of young artist <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-male-model-karar-nushi-killed-murder-torture-baghdad-good-looks-gay-palestine-street-a7824586.html">Karar Nushi</a> by unknown armed groups in Baghdad, merely because of his appearance, is just the latest in a series of heinous crimes that are an unprecedented threat to civil liberties in Iraq. </p>
<p>These wider repressions are nurtured by radical religious arguments, whether Shia or Sunni, which target art, music, singing, and dance, as <em>haram</em> – things that must be banned. Leaders of Islamic parties are deliberately distorting concepts such as secularism and civil society, tarnishing them as atheism that must be tackled. For example, a radical religious stance <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2015/01/iraq-state-education-religious-curricula.html">has made its way</a> to educational institutions, both in theory and in practice, and to some Iraqi school textbooks.</p>
<p>Daeshism reflects the mindset of sections of Iraqi society and of Arabic Islamic societies in general. Although they may denounce IS’s practices as acts of terrorism, they still oppose and oppress people or actions that do not fit their religious rules. The dilemma for Islamic societies lies in this contradiction. As the Iraqi analyst, Nibras Kazimi, <a href="https://talisman-gate.com/2017/07/07/arriving-at-singularity/">summarises</a>: “Middle Easterners need to fundamentally re-engineer their societies, economies and cultures.” Small steps have been taken on this path by some intellectuals, activists, and religious reformists, but these remain scarce and unconnected.</p>
<h2>Militias and corruption</h2>
<p>Militias and tribes have been empowered across the country after a security vacuum was created following the IS’s capture of Mosul in June 2014. In many areas of Baghdad and the south of Iraq, in particular, their power and influence exceed the already-vulnerable authority of the state. Gang crimes, including kidnappings, theft, murder, and rape, have been <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/01/kidnap-abduction-crime-militias-baghdad.html">on the rise</a> in the capital and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-crime-soars-in-basra-as-army-leaves-to-fight-isis-a6804506.html">southern provinces</a>. In most cases, the perpetrators are unknown and unaccountable.</p>
<p>Corruption is often equated by Iraqis with IS, and corrupt leaders with terrorism. In a new <a href="https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20April%202017%20Survey%20Public%20Final%20%281%29%20%281%29.pdf">survey</a> published in June by the National Democratic Institute across Iraq, participants said they viewed corruption as the main underlying cause that gave rise to IS. Corruption has weakened Iraq’s governance and security, and eaten away at its institutions. If it is not substantially addressed, IS, the threats of militias and tribes, and wider Daeshism will linger.</p>
<p>The solution starts with the Iraqi society, not its governments. Iraqis cannot wait for top-down salvation. They need to undertake a collective effort to combat corruption, with 2018 parliamentary elections as an opportunity towards this goal. The liberation of Iraqi lands from IS, with the sacrifices that it has required, must not be squandered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Balsam Mustafa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iraqis are proud of the victory in Mosul, but worried about the huge tasks ahead.Balsam Mustafa, PhD Candidate in Modern Languages & Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/669592016-10-17T13:03:02Z2016-10-17T13:03:02ZEven if Mosul is liberated, it won’t be the end of Islamic State<p>After weeks of speculation about an attempt to retake the city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State (IS), Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi <a href="http://english.almanar.com.lb/66592">proclaimed</a> the start of the offensive. “God willing, the decisive battle will be soon,” he said at a press conference. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"787873575843815424"}"></div></p>
<p>This could well be a major turning point in the battle against IS. Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, has been under IS’s control <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-sweeps-across-borders-and-takes-grip-of-an-iraq-collapsing-back-into-civil-war-27886">since June 2014</a>, when it became the group’s biggest prize yet. It brought global attention that IS have enjoyed ever since. In the ensuing two or so years, it has ruled over the city’s hundreds of thousands of residents in accordance with a strictly enforced fundamentalist version of Sharia law. </p>
<p>The group’s last major stronghold in Iraq, Mosul is one of the jewels in IS’s crown, and losing it would be a huge blow – especially after the group was routed from Dabiq, the Syrian town whose name graces the IS magazine. Fearing the worst, IS <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-oil-idUSKCN1150UR">set oil refineries on fire</a> to obstruct and delay the oncoming forces, while the Washington Post <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/apocalypse-postponed-isis-flees-the-village-where-it-prophesied-doomsday-battle/2016/10/16/752f4654-93b3-11e6-9cae-2a3574e296a6_story.html">reports</a> that the group has strategically decided to flee Mosul and regroup in Syria, moving from defensive to insurgency tactics. Such a move is facilitated by the strategy coming out of Baghdad, which has encircled Mosul but left a corridor to the West of the city where IS fighters (and supporters) can flee to Syria. This strategy seeks to move the IS problem out of Iraq and into Syria. </p>
<p>The forces assembled to mount the offensive include somewhere in the region of 45,000 troops; they include Iraqi Shias, Sunnis, Christians and Kurds, but also Shia paramilitary groups known as the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/popular-mobilization-iraq-fallujah.html">Popular Mobilisation Units</a>. Supporting and advising this assault are British, American and Turkish special forces, while the US-led coalition has targeted IS mortar positions close to Mosul. </p>
<p>Final authority rests with the Iraqi army – but as is true of the Iraqi state generally, the army’s authority is seriously undercut by the tensions between the country’s different tribal factions. Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, commander of the US’s <a href="http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve">Operation Inherent Resolve</a> against IS in Iraq, <a href="http://www.inherentresolve.mil/News/Article/975205/iraqi-security-forces-begin-battle-for-mosul/">stressed</a> that despite these differences, “the thousands of ground combat forces who will liberate Mosul are all Iraqis”.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, one of the most immediate and serious challenges for the Mosul offensive is to keep this rather motley crew together. Many of them have competing loyalties and goals; they have a long and complex history with each other, and ensuring their unity is paramount. </p>
<p>There’s also the imperative of keeping Mosul’s civilians safe during what promises to be a period of uncertainty, chaos and violence. Stephen O'Brien, under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs at the UN, <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/iraqi-pm-signal-start-of-mosul-offensive/3554344.html">called</a> for all parties “to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect civilians and ensure they have access to the assistance they are entitled to and deserve”.</p>
<h2>The hard work begins</h2>
<p>For all the fanfare, the liberation of Mosul will not mean the end of IS. The group has never been defined by the territory it holds. As <a href="https://twitter.com/royle_s">Stephen Royle</a> and I argue in our book <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Origins-ISIS-Simon-Royle-Marbon/dp/1784536962">The Origins of IS</a>, IS is the product of deep political and sectarian disenfranchisement and of the dire socio-political conditions on the ground in Iraq. </p>
<p>Mosul in particular is a largely Sunni city, and a number of its residents <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/isis-mosul-takeover-residents-blame-iraqi-army.html">welcomed IS</a> in 2014 simply because it broke the authority of the corrupt and sectarian Shia government in Baghdad. That said, opposition to IS’s reign has been steadily growing – documented among others by <a href="https://mosuleye.wordpress.com">Mosul Eye</a>, which has recorded instances of everyday resistance in the city. </p>
<p>The situation on the ground is shifting rapidly, and Kurdish Peshmerga forces have already reportedly <a href="http://aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/peshmerga-forces-capture-8-villages-east-of-mosul/666500">seized control of a number of villages</a> to the east of Mosul. The state of play is extremely fluid, and by the time forces reach the suburbs of the city it will surely look very different.</p>
<p>Despite al-Abadi’s proclamation that the people of Iraq would celebrate the fall of the city as one, the schisms among his people run deep. In the short term, he’s right <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/17/iraqi-forces-begin-assault-on-isis-stronghold-mosul">to stress</a> that “these forces that are liberating you today, they have one goal in Mosul, which is to get rid of Daesh [IS] and to secure your dignity. They are there for your sake”. But in the longer term, the social and political situation in Iraq is not nearly so clear cut. </p>
<p>And while most Iraqis certainly would celebrate the defeat of IS, questions about what comes next – for Iraq, for Syria, and for the Middle East – simply throw up a whole other set of problems. Mosul will be far from the last battle.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66959/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The effort to take back IS’s biggest prize in Iraq has begun at last. But there’s no shortage of other problems to deal with.Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.