tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/harare-29287/articlesHarare – The Conversation2023-08-30T12:40:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121312023-08-30T12:40:58Z2023-08-30T12:40:58ZZimbabwe’s election was a fight between men – women are sidelined in politics despite quotas<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">2023 harmonised elections</a> have largely been depicted as a battle between the two “Big Men” – President <a href="https://apnews.com/article/zimbabwe-elections-emerson-mnangagwa-president-crocodile-56668e87d9459980b9d38b57175c31ce">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> of the ruling Zanu-PF and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/who-is-nelson-chamisa-can-he-win-zimbabwes-election-2023-08-23/">Nelson Chamisa</a> of the leading opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Significant media attention focused on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/315335/zimbabwe-police-ban-92-ccc-opposition-party-campaign-rallies/">uneven playing field</a> between the ruling party and the opposition.</p>
<p>The election results announced on the 26 August are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-embassy-joins-others-voicing-concern-about-zimbabwe-election/7242392.html">being disputed</a> due to <a href="https://www.sadc.int/slide-item/sadc-electoral-observation-mission-2023-harmonised-elections-zimbabwe-launched">reports</a> of delayed voting, voter intimidation and ballot paper irregularities. <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Mnangagwa</a> has been announced as the official winner of the presidential poll, but the CCC has <a href="https://twitter.com/ccczimbabwe/status/1695576909839487050?s=46&t=knTMoeo4WZETacMv4PIpAw">rejected these results</a>. </p>
<p>Another concern distinct to this election was the stark decline in the number of women candidates nominated by the main political parties for direct election. </p>
<p>We are working on a three year research <a href="https://nai.uu.se/research-and-policy-advice/project/making-politics-safer---gendered-violence-and-electoral-temporalities-in-africa.html">project</a> with a focus on the representation of women in politics in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe as well as gendered electoral violence. This project seeks to explore barriers to women’s participation in politics in Africa and pathways forward, initially researched in the book <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/gendered-institutions-and-womens-political-representation-in-africa-9781913441210/">Gendered Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe ranks low in measures of gender parity in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique boast <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS">46%, 44% and 42% women’s participation</a> in parliament, respectively. Zimbabwe’s political parties need to field more women for direct election, outside the confines of the quota, in order to reach gender parity. </p>
<h2>Gender quota</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">constitution in 2013</a> introduced a gender quota to ensure the equitable representation of women in parliament. Zimbabwe’s parliament is composed of a National Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">quota requires</a> that the lower house reserve 60 of its 270 seats (22%) for women representatives. The upper house is to appoint 60 of its 80 senators from a list that alternates between female and male candidates, called the “zebra-list”. </p>
<p>The purpose of the quota is to push the country towards gender parity – 50/50 female/male representation – as directed by the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa">2003 Maputo Protocol</a> and the Southern African Development Community’s 2008 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Protocol_on_Gender_and_Development_2008.pdf">Protocol on Gender and Development</a>.</p>
<p>However, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined since 2013, in spite of the quota. <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">In 2013</a> women made up 33% of the National Assembly and 48% of the Senate. Only 12% of these women were elected directly. In <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">2018</a> the numbers in the National Assembly and Senate fell to 31% and 44%, respectively. </p>
<p>There was a significant decline in the number of women nominated to contest the 2023 elections. Only 68 (11%) of 633 aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/women-stand-up-comedians-in-zimbabwe-talk-about-sex-and-the-patriarchy-156052">Women stand-up comedians in Zimbabwe talk about sex - and the patriarchy</a>
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<p>In spite of these challenges, <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/national_assembly/">23 women were elected into parliament</a> (against 26 in <a href="https://www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/women-make-up-more-than-one-third-of-zimbabwe-s-new-parliament-un-women-1447/">2013</a> and 25 in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>). The 23 newly elected women will be added to the 60 women appointed through the quota, making a total of 83, or 30.7% representation of women, in the lower house. After the appointment of senators, as <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zw/zw038en.pdf#page=52">stipulated by the constitution</a>, the number of women in the full parliament will increase. Though commendable, this still places Zimbabwe below average within the region. </p>
<p>These gains may fail to go beyond the 31% representation achieved in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>. The women in the National Assembly will still be less than 50% of parliamentarians and have limited decision making powers. Moreover, there is little indication of the substantive impact these women will have to empower Zimbabwean women, considering their limited numbers. The country’s record of democratic deficits is another important challenge. </p>
<p>The newly elected women MPs may have limited room for manoeuvre to promote gender equality in this political context. But they are still important as decision makers, legislators and role models for other women to enter politics. </p>
<h2>Looking beyond the quota</h2>
<p>A gendered audit of the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download/government-gazette-extraordinary-vol-64-30-06-2023-electoral-act-2/">published list of nominated candidates</a> for direct elections reveals that Zimbabwe’s political parties did not field enough women to reach gender parity in 2023. </p>
<p>Data shows that 633 registered candidates contested 210 seats through direct election. Of these candidates only 68 were women. That is, only 11% of aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. Of these 68, Zanu-PF fielded 23 women (34%), the CCC fielded 20 (29%), and the remaining 25 women were from small minority parties (27%) and independent candidates (10%).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
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<p>Harare and Bulawayo provinces nominated the highest number of women candidates for election. In Mashonaland Central only one woman was nominated across 18 constituencies. Only two women were nominated in Matebeleland South across 12 constituencies.</p>
<p>It is important to ask why political parties are not fielding more women for direct election. And what this means for the future of representative politics in Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Gender bias within political parties</h2>
<p>The data above indicates a bias against woman candidates that permeates across political parties. Apart from the women nominated through the obligations of the quota, neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF fielded enough women to make gender parity a reality in the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>The active exclusion of women from politics is driven by gendered prejudices. These are informed by social, cultural and religious beliefs <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/29600">rooted in patriarchal values </a> that view women as inherently weak and untrustworthy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/women-bear-brunt-of-political-violence/">threat and use of violence against women candidates</a> continues to be used to coerce and discourage women from contesting elections. As argued by Zimbabwean scholars <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986576?journalCode=jasa">Sandra Bhatasara and Manase Chiweshe</a>, </p>
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<p>patriarchy, intertwined with the increase in militarised masculinities, is producing exclusion with limited spaces for women’s participation. </p>
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<p>A negative perception is also linked to “quota women” as they were not elected by “the people”. These women are often subjected to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/reader/188770530">elite patriarchal bargaining</a>. They primarily serve the needs of their party, rather than representing Zimbabwean women.</p>
<h2>Gatekeeping</h2>
<p>The presence of a gender quota system provides a facade of progress. This conceals the stark reality that neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF is committed to increasing women’s representation outside the confines of the quota. Political parties function as “election gatekeepers”. They determine the level of women’s inclusion in representative politics, outside the quota system.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship</a>
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<p>The number of women elected indicates that, unlike in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">past elections</a>, Zimbabweans seem more willing to vote for women representatives. Political parties should build on these small gains and nominate more women for elections. This will allow the country to move closer to the goals of gender parity, gender equality and democratic plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diana Højlund Madsen is a project leader for the project 'Making Politics Safer - Gendered Violence and Electoral Temporalities in Africa' funded by the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shingirai Mtero works for the Nordic Africa Institute on the project Making Politics Safer. This project receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined in spite of a quota imposed in 2013.Diana Højlund Madsen, Senior Gender Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Africa InstituteShingirai Mtero, Postdoctoral Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1833902022-06-06T15:06:19Z2022-06-06T15:06:19ZArtist Richard Mudariki’s vision for a Zimbabwean contemporary art fair<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465043/original/file-20220524-19-4v4f9u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The artist in his studio. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo courtesy Richard Mudariki</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In the past 20 years, a new generation of Zimbabwean artists has attained international acclaim, or emerged as stars with work showing at top galleries and museums, collected by prominent people such as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-12-20-zimbabwean-artist-draws-inspiration-from-rejection-to-world-stardom/">Jay Z</a>. One of these <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-zimbabwean-artist-kudzanai-chiurai-has-reinvented-the-idea-of-a-library-167163">stars</a>, Cape Town based <a href="https://zeitzmocaa.museum/artists/richard-mudariki/">Richard Mudariki</a>, is now using his growing fame and network to create a contemporary art fair to spotlight emerging artists in Zimbabwe. With it Harare has joined other major African cities like <a href="https://investeccapetownartfair.co.za">Cape Town</a>, <a href="https://biennaledakar.org">Dakar</a>, <a href="https://artxlagos.com">Lagos</a>, <a href="https://www.1-54.com/marrakech/">Marrakech</a> and <a href="https://klaart.org">Kampala</a> in bolstering its contemporary art scene.</em></p>
<p><em>Mudariki co-founded <a href="https://www.artharare.com/">artHARARE Contemporary Art Fair</a> with art historian <a href="https://uk.linkedin.com/in/aya-koudounaris-a28aa2192?original_referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F">Aya Koudounaris</a>. The first editions in 2020 and 2021 took place online in a time of COVID isolation. Now it’s expanding its scope <a href="https://gogetfunding.com/artharare-contemporary-2022/">by fundraising</a> to take place in physical form in Harare sometime in November 2022.</em></p>
<p><em>While fairs are marketplaces where various galleries display art for sale in order to attract collectors, artHARARE is also driven by a sense of community building. It is addressing <a href="https://johannesburg.prohelvetia.org/en/2021/08/10/artharare-contemporary-art/">a lack of infrastructure</a> that continues to force young talent to look elsewhere for support. I spoke with Mudariki about the project.</em></p>
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<h2>Who attends or views artHARARE, from where?</h2>
<p>Because of the power of the internet, our growing audiences for the <a href="https://www.artharare.com/artharare21">two</a> <a href="https://www.artharare.com/artharare20">editions</a> of artHARARE were international. According to the website analytics and reports, we have a huge following from South Africa, Germany, the UK, the US and of course Zimbabwe. Most visitors (87%) came to our site directly, not from a link from another site, while 47% came through Google and 16% through our social media platforms. The majority of our audience are art collectors, curators, art institutions, journalists, art historians, art lovers, art students and artists.</p>
<h2>What kind of model is artHARARE built on?</h2>
<p>The model that artHARARE has adopted is unique in that it is an artist-run contemporary art fair. Artists are our key partners in this venture. Our value proposition is to bring under one umbrella and celebrate all leading contemporary Zimbabwean visual arts and cultural producers in an open, easy to view platform. Our mission is to attract the attention of leading international art collectors, art museums, art foundations, auction houses and corporate collections to acquire and add contemporary Zimbabwean visual art to their collections.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A painting on a wall is brightly coloured showing a figure reclining, faces emerging from the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465097/original/file-20220524-13-h7isq3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">artHARARE 2021 artist George Masarira.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo courtesy Richard Mudariki/artHARARE</span></span>
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<p>Over the past 18 months artHARARE has received tremendous support from the artistic community in Zimbabwe and its diaspora. The platform aims to deliver economic value to both the artist and the collector or art institution by being the go-to platform to showcase and discover art, explore Zimbabwe’s rich artistic heritage and establish competitive primary and secondary market prices. </p>
<p>We are heavily investing in building a robust network of artists, curators, collectors, galleries, art dealers, art historians, and art lovers, a form of social capital, or call it cultural capital. As an entrepreneurial venture, we have a time horizon of five years to develop the brand artHARARE, realise our vision and place it on the international art calendar.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A painting on a wall shows two rural figures." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/465098/original/file-20220524-20-ns5bz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">artHARARE 2021 artist Option Nyahunzvi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo courtesy Richard Mudariki/artHARARE</span></span>
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<p>In our launch year, we saw significant contributions of skill, energy and time by many art professionals in Zimbabwe and in its diaspora, and a dedicated team that worked to launch the online fair in just under four months. A lot of value was created, with many artworks by emerging Zimbabwean visual artists being acquired in local and international private collections. In addition, a number of emerging artists who were showcased in the fair were picked up by international galleries in London and Milan. </p>
<p>Year two saw an increased interest in the activities of the fair both from the artists (more than 30) and art collectors representing all continents. We were privileged to showcase artworks of internationally recognised Zimbabwean artists such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moffat_Takadiwa">Moffat Takadiwa</a> and <a href="https://www.davidzwirner.com/artists/portia-zvavahera/biography">Portia Zvavahera</a>. Their participation allows for the fair to have anchor artists that give it weight. The fair’s art prize was established and we facilitated a programme that brought an emerging female artist <a href="https://www.artsy.net/artist/prudence-prudie-chimutuwah/works-for-sale">Prudence Chimutuwah</a> from Harare to a four week residency in Cape Town.</p>
<h2>Why did you feel an art prize was a necessary intervention?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.artharare.com/artprize">artHARARE Africa First Art Prize</a> was set up to benefit emerging and mid-career artists working in Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean diaspora by increasing their profile. For the inaugural prize, we received a number of high quality submissions and the professional jury team – <a href="https://contemporaryand.com/magazines/fadzai-muchemwa-appointed-curator-at-national-gallery-of-zimbabwe/">Fadzai Muchemwa</a>, Moffat Takadiwa, <a href="https://www.vogue.co.uk/arts-and-lifestyle/article/gallery-1957-accra-ghana">Marwan Zakhem</a>, Serge Tiroche and Richard Mudariki – had a hard time picking the two winners <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBAnoznjI4w">Wilfred Timire and Franklyn Dzingai</a>. A group exhibition of the shortlisted artists was held. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-zimbabwean-artist-kudzanai-chiurai-has-reinvented-the-idea-of-a-library-167163">How Zimbabwean artist Kudzanai Chiurai has reinvented the idea of a library</a>
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<p>It will be run as an annual prize. The sponsors, <a href="https://www.africafirst.art/about">Africa First</a> founded by art investment expert <a href="http://www.tirochedeleon.com/team/serge-tiroche/">Serge Tiroche</a>, share our vision of promoting contemporary art from the continent. </p>
<h2>What have you learnt so far?</h2>
<p>I have learnt these important lessons:</p>
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<li><p>Opportunities exist in the midst of a crisis.</p></li>
<li><p>Working with an energetic, committed and hardworking team makes a difference.</p></li>
<li><p>Zimbabwe is full of fresh talent and the artists are eager to be successful.</p></li>
<li><p>We need to work together and speak as one voice.</p></li>
<li><p>The digital renaissance in the global art market is here to stay.</p></li>
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<h2>In future will you change any aspects of the fair?</h2>
<p>Going forward, the fair will have a physical presence which seeks to activate various spaces in the city (and country) to host creative and artistic interventions. An art education programme is also on the plans to educate and encourage a new generation of young local art lovers and art collectors. This will also be complemented by an artist incubation programme that seeks to develop artists to become professional in their practices.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183390/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Harare aims to join a growing list of African cities hosting high profile events to sell local art and bolster artists.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1705692021-11-02T14:41:14Z2021-11-02T14:41:14ZEconomic reforms won’t fix Zimbabwe’s economy. Ethical leadership is also needed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429585/original/file-20211101-27-1xnt2k8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Public transport drivers haggling over currency exchange in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jekesai Nikizana/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwean economy has continued to experience turbulence, despite having managed to weather a devastating spell of hyperinflation which <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2017/10/28/zimbabwe-hyperinflates-again-entering-the-record-books-for-a-second-time-in-less-than-a-decade/?sh=6a9b67ab3eed">peaked in 2008</a>.</p>
<p>One economic area which has remained a thorn in the flesh for ordinary Zimbabweans has been the volatile currency. The country has struggled to sustain a stable currency. The Zimbabwean dollar (ZWD) was the official currency of Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2009. In the wake of hyperinflation, in 2009, it was retired and the country transitioned to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/forex/z/zwd-zimbabwe-dollar.asp">a basket of mostly regional but also some global currencies</a>. </p>
<p>In early 2019, the multiple currency regime was replaced by a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47361572">new currency</a> which was renamed the Zimbabwe dollar by Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. It is now the only legal <a href="https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/rtgs-dollar">form of tender in the country</a>. </p>
<p>The implication of Zimbabwe’s currency woes has been that the foreign exchange rate has continued to be largely determined by <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-19-currency-crisis-and-wrangling-over-exchange-controls-may-undo-early-economic-progress-in-zimbabwe/">a parallel market</a>. This has its deep roots in speculative activities that were rife during the years of hyperinflation and which have persisted.</p>
<p>Pricing of goods has, thus, <a href="https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/economic-interventions-signal-government-deep-in-crisis">continued being dictated by the parallel market</a> and foreign currency has remained in short supply. Speculators continue to engage in activities that rake in quick profits, at the expense of the economy and Zimbabweans. Speculators include influential political figures, big businesses and ordinary individuals. </p>
<p>In a bid to stabilise Zimbabwe’s currency volatility challenges and ease shortages of foreign currency, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced the foreign exchange auction system in June 2020. But this didn’t liberalise the foreign currency market, as the bank has interfered in the auction <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/currency-crisis-could-undo-zimbabwes-early-progress">in an attempt to control the exchange rate</a>.</p>
<p>In my view economic reforms alone cannot end the country’s economic crisis. Instead of more economic interventions, Zimbabwean society needs to self-introspect and assist in re-setting the country’s ethical compass.</p>
<p>I am arguing for this approach from a sociological perspective of ethics. My <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&citation_for_view=sQSjKP0AAAAJ:Tyk-4Ss8FVUC">doctorate</a> focused on the response of the working class in the capital Harare to Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation and political crisis in the 2000s. One of my key findings was that a lot of workers’ ethical principles had been eroded by hyperinflation which required a repertoire of survivalist responses. These sometimes bordered on corruption and speculative activities. </p>
<p>In addition, in my current academic role I’ve had to grapple with the concept of ethics, not only from a research perspective, but also from a broader societal perspective, since it acts as the moral compass that guides our behaviour. Being an ethics pupil has made me re-visit my thesis on Zimbabwe’s unending economic crisis, in addition to proffering possible solutions to this perpetual challenge.</p>
<h2>Ethical regeneration of Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>To keep pace with hyperinflation, a lot of Zimbabweans had to engage in speculative activities. This relied on hoarding commodities which were in short supply in the 2000s. They would often <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&citation_for_view=sQSjKP0AAAAJ:IjCSPb-OGe4C">re-sell these at inflated prices</a> on the parallel market. This meant that prices of goods continued to spiral, with speculators making a <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&citation_for_view=sQSjKP0AAAAJ:IjCSPb-OGe4C">quick buck</a>.</p>
<p>This behaviour of making quick money through speculation appears to have become ingrained in Zimbabwean society’s social fabric. Foreign currency traders have continued to operate a parallel foreign currency market, <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JMLC-06-2021-0056/full/pdf">despite the taming of hyperinflation</a>. In some instances they act on behalf of business and top politicians.</p>
<p>To eradicate the cancerous scourge of speculative behaviour, Zimbabwean society will have to also rely on societal ethical values as happened successfully in Asian countries such as China, Taiwan and Singapore. These countries <a href="https://www.jois.eu/files/13_Lajciak.pdf">blended</a> Confucianism ethics with business practices.</p>
<p>Confucian ethics dictates hierarchical relationships and an identification with social rules. It also emphasises <a href="https://www.jois.eu/files/13_Lajciak.pdf">‘self control of individuals’</a> in their conduct. </p>
<p>If this value of discipline and good conduct were exercised in Zimbabwe’s business ethics, the country’s economic fortunes might change for the better. </p>
<h2>What’s needed</h2>
<p>To kick-start the much needed ethical regeneration of Zimbabwean society political leaders need to take the lead in the fight against corrupt and speculative activities. </p>
<p>Rhetoric that purports to castigate corruption and putting in place economic measures to alleviate Zimbabwe’s monetary woes, will not suffice. </p>
<p>A Thomas Sankara kind of <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC-f764a1944">ethical
leadership</a> is what’s needed. Sankara, the <a href="https://www.amplifyafrica.org/post/meet-africa-s-che-guevara-thomas-sankara">President of Burkina Faso between 1983 and 1987</a> enforced a rule that the country’s political leaders publicly declare their financial assets and wealth before being sworn into office. </p>
<p>Another good model is the US’s approach to <a href="https://www.oge.gov/Web/278eGuide.nsf">asset declarations by politicians</a>. It forces transparency and ability of civil society to have these asset declarations audited. <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/holding-politicians-to-account-asset-declarations#">Transparency International</a> argues that such ethical practice enables citizens to hold politicians accountable.</p>
<p>In addition, a continuous financial audit while in political office should subsequently be mandatory. The Transparency International <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/holding-politicians-to-account-asset-declarations#">chapter in Georgia</a> has been doing this, and this assists in monitoring any unusual variances in politicians’ asset declarations.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>The government of Zimbabwe should take a leaf from Sankara’s Burkina Faso by expeditiously arresting and prosecuting individuals found guilty of corrupt and speculative activities, regardless of status in society. </p>
<p>South Korea does this. Corrupt leaders are arrested, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55657297">regardless</a> of political or financial clout.</p>
<p>In addition, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission should be given the capacity to execute optimally. It’s meant to curb and expose corruption. But it’s blunted by <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/12/underfunding-npa-zacc-dangerous-mp/">underfunding</a>. </p>
<p>It is also urgent that the Zimbabwean government should promulgate whistle blower protection legislation. Whistle blowers in the private and public sectors need to be protected.</p>
<p>The government also needs to take steps to improve governance practices in the private sector. The head of the the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission, Justice Loice Matanda-Moyo, recently claimed that the private sector <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2021/10/private-sector-major-culprit-of-graft-zacc-boss/">was the biggest culprit of corrupt activities</a> in the country. </p>
<p>The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries and the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, the major representative bodies of business in Zimbabwe, should insist that every company has an ethics or compliance office. Their mandate would be to ensure ethical business conduct. </p>
<p>And it should be mandatory for all company top executives to issue an ethics statement annually, which reflects on their organisations’ ethics practices, good or bad.</p>
<p>Lastly, creating a society that is ethical in its conduct is a process that takes time. It should include inculcating ethical principles in the schooling system. This would mean that from a young age, Zimbabweans are taught about moral and upright behaviour. A model that is worth emulating is <em>dotoku</em>, or moral education, in the Japanese primary and junior high school education. This was introduced in 2018, and is a <a href="https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/167166">full-fledged subject with standardised textbooks </a>.</p>
<p>This approach should be attached to other subjects too, such as science and business.</p>
<p>In other words, the word ‘ethics’, should become synonymous with Zimbabwean society’s interactions and behaviour, and not an alien word.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170569/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>To kick-start ethical regeneration of Zimbabwean society political leaders need to take the lead in the fight against corrupt and speculative activities.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology & Director of the Centre for Data Ethics at the Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1639342021-07-29T15:12:54Z2021-07-29T15:12:54ZDogs in the city: on the scent of Zimbabwe’s urban history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413360/original/file-20210727-17-18tn3qd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A politician argued that the Rhodesian ridgeback was the dog of the ancestors and proposed renaming it the Zimbabwe ridgeback.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dogs are political. Their very existence in modern cities has goaded those in power into trying to discipline them – and their owners. This has happened in the past too: for instance, authorities trying to modernise Paris in the 19th century regarded stray dogs as belonging to the “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/past/article/234/1/137/2965802?login=true">city’s criminal, dirty and rootless dangerous classes – to be slaughtered</a>”. But similar campaigns against stray dogs in Bombay in 1832 resulted in civil protest, used as an opportunity to challenge <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-royal-asiatic-society/article/abs/mad-dogs-and-parsis-the-bombay-dog-riots-of-1832/FAE1BD958098093802B0F278033C6E66">aspects of colonial rule</a>. </p>
<p>Our own <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2021.1929442?journalCode=cjss20">study</a> focused on changes in regimes regulating dogs, especially those owned by Africans, between 1980 and 2017 in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare. We drew on archival sources, newspaper sources and oral interviews to describe how Harare dealt with its urban canine citizens over the years following independence. The story shows how dog management reflected competing visions of the modern city. </p>
<p>The city developed a hybrid dog-keeping regime that mixed elements of long-enduring local knowledge with the self-consciously modern and cosmopolitan, as we show below. For instance, rural practices such as tolerating “stray dogs” came to the city after 1980 because the new government was reluctant to enforce colonial-era by-laws. National leaders, animal welfare organisations, kennel clubs and individual dog-owners and breeders all helped shape a shifting vision of the city.</p>
<h2>Inventing good dogs and bad dogs</h2>
<p>Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers (who were mostly of English stock) established kennel clubs in the first decade of colonial rule. Their mission was to teach Africans to keep fewer and “better” dogs, which meant imported “purebred” dogs. Kennel clubs, animal welfare societies and city councils sustained western regimes of dog-keeping up to independence in 1980.</p>
<p>As middle-class Africans started moving into the (formerly whites-only) suburbs of Harare, so did “free-roaming dogs”. This triggered complaints about malnourished, maltreated, misbehaving “bad dogs”. Irate suburbanites spoke of “wretched animals” – which were not pets and were not walked on leashes but did bark when they chose and freely roamed the leafy streets. They also complained of “mongrel bitches” introduced from rural areas which threatened the purity of breed and sexual health of “well-bred male dogs”. Such intense fears of “mixing” may have been a proxy for anxieties over racial and class order.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Dogs huddled together being fed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/413361/original/file-20210727-18-nbqzpa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Picture of township mongrel dogs feeding.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The period between 2000 and 2017 witnessed the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03057070600655988?needAccess=true">“Zimbabwean crisis”</a>. This period of political instability saw hyperinflation, state-sponsored violence and massive involuntary migrations. It was a time of lawlessness and yet increased crackdowns on law-breakers. Shacks were destroyed, vendors and hawkers were harassed, and those who did not conform to standard citizenship (such as the homeless) were forcibly removed. The city was being reimagined and dogs were part of this reimagining.</p>
<p>It is a pattern we see in many cities around the world. But we found something special in Harare: a young urban “ghetto dog fancy” was part of the reimagining. The “ghetto dog fancy” gave rise to new ideas about breeding dogs and the aesthetic appeal of particular breeds. The Harare City Council blamed the new breeders for the ballooning dog population and for causing rabies <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/harare-declared-rabies-area/">outbreaks</a>. By 2005, the city’s canine <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2021.1929442?needAccess=true&journalCode=cjss20">population</a> was around 300,000 dogs (one dog per five people).</p>
<p>While authorities fretted, youthful dog breeders and owners associated owning particular dog breeds with being cosmopolitan, and being <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-most-expensive-dogs/">part of modernity</a>. Young male African urbanites took up dog breeding as a new survival strategy.</p>
<p>Since the voices of the ghettos do not appear in the public archives, we conducted oral history interviews on the streets. We found that Africans started breeding boerboels, German shepherds and rottweilers and sold them to security companies and anxious home-owners for as much as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/dog-breeding-is-big-business-in-zim-1819770">US$400 each</a> – in an economy where the average worker might bring home about <a href="https://kubatana.net/2018/11/23/2019-national-budget-insult-civil-servants/">US$280–300 per month</a>. There was a shifting interaction between local and so-called western knowledge about dog-keeping, as the breeders learned international practices of breeding but improvised with the local breeding stock and their own knowledge. </p>
<p>One Zanu-PF politician, Tony Monda, insisted on a new kind of breed purity. In 2016, he <a href="https://www.thepatriot.co.zw/old_posts/closer-look-at-the-zimbabwean-lion-dog/">argued</a> that the Rhodesian ridgeback was the dog of the ancestors and proposed renaming it the Zimbabwe ridgeback. There was a nascent nationalism wagging the tail of such endeavours.</p>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2021.1929442?needAccess=true&journalCode=cjss20">research</a>, we interviewed a dog breeder who wanted to create “our very own Zimbred Mastiff” suited to Zimbabwe’s environment, with its own breeders’ association. Yet these hybrid dogs were the product of hybrid bodies of knowledge. Purists within the urban “dog fancy” opposed such experimental breeding, fearing that this would produce monsters: <em>mabhinya embwa</em> (canine thugs or brutes). </p>
<p>Indeed, for some young men in Harare, such dogs operated as projections of their own masculinity. This new investment in dogs – both economic and emotional – created a new economic and social identity for these men. But city authorities worried that they were emulating <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/016059760703100403">“American ghetto culture”</a> based on <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/mans-feared-best-friend/">illegal dog-fighting</a>. Anxiety over dogs mirrored <a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/mans-best-friend-can-be-worst-enemy">anxieties</a> over an urban under-class of dangerous young men. </p>
<h2>Gone to the dogs?</h2>
<p>Our tracing of dog history in Zimbabwe showed that political independence brought to power a regime that was prepared to tolerate African “traditional” dog-keeping in the city. This increased complaints about urban free-roaming dogs and a new African modernity that often challenged white dog-owning. Dog rearing regimes came to blend aspects of western breeding standards and African tradition with shifting ideas from international and local working-class cultures and from African middle-class modernity.</p>
<p>The human residents of Harare imagined dogs in multiple, changing and conflicting ways that were contoured by power relations. Dogs have been useful metaphors in re-figuring the race, gender and class order and re-imagining the political order in a post-colonial state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/163934/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Innocent Dande is affiliated with the International Studies Group, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Sandra Swart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How Harare has dealt with its urban canine citizens over the years following independence reflects the competing visions of a modern city.Innocent Dande, Post-doctoral research fellow in the International Studies Group, University of the Free StateProfessor Sandra Swart, Professor of History, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1649732021-07-24T08:08:29Z2021-07-24T08:08:29ZBuilding an art gallery in the midst of war in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412876/original/file-20210723-19-12podes.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hope Masike performs at Gallery Delta in the documentary Art for Art's Sake.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Granadilla Films</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>After being disenchanted with his work as a detective inspector in Rhodesia’s <a href="https://bsap.org/history.html">British South Africa Police</a>, Derek Huggins quit his job and in 1975 decided to open an art gallery. The venture, <a href="https://gallerydelta.com">Gallery Delta</a>, is now an important institution in Zimbabwe’s art history. His partner and collaborator was his wife, Helen Lieros, a talented <a href="http://zimbosinlimbo.blogspot.com/2014/04/helen-leiros-zimbabwean-artist.html">artist</a> in her own right.</p>
<p>In a documentary, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMCppR8OGw"><em>Art for Art’s Sake: The Story of Gallery Delta</em></a>, released in June 2020, Huggins explained: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>While we knew that a tiny gallery of three rooms in the midst of conflict and war and sanctions would not make a living for us … in those years it was run as a voluntary, part-time, weekends, nights occupation.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>After running the gallery for 46 years, the couple <a href="https://artreview.com/derek-huggins-and-helen-leiros-central-to-the-zimbabwe-art-scene-for-five-decades-1940-2021/">have died</a> in Harare, a week apart, but their legacy will live on. </p>
<p>In the four decades of their stewardship of the gallery they were involved in the curation, organisation, presentation and promotion of approximately 500 exhibitions. Their art magazine, placed in schools, became a vital resource for artists and art historians in Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>A love story</h2>
<p>Huggins, born in Kent, England, moved to Rhodesia when he was 19 to join the British South Africa Police. He writes of his experiences in his 2004 book, <a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/stained-earth"><em>Stained Earth</em></a>. And <a href="http://enthusemag.com/obituary/visual-artist-helen-lieros-obituary/">Lieros</a>, who was of Greek parentage, was born in Gweru, Zimbabwe, where she was a school teacher. </p>
<p>They met at a police station where Huggins was based, while Lieros was engaged as a composite artist who drew images of suspects. Their romance blossomed and they married in July 1966. As a union they extended their influence, amplified everything they achieved and uplifted everyone they interacted with. </p>
<p>I first met them in the early 2000s when I worked as a publishing assistant at Weaver Press, a small publishing house in Harare. Gallery Delta, their enterprise, has always been a favourite venue for book launches in the city. People would congregate there to hear authors read and for the free wine. </p>
<p>In 2018, as an academic researcher, I found a collection of letters between Huggins and the celebrated writer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/apr/27/guardianobituaries.books">Yvonne Vera</a> deposited at <a href="http://www.nelm.org.za">Amazwi South African Museum of Literature</a>. For the past three years we have been exchanging emails, or if I am in Harare, drinking and bonding over tea while we discussed this book of letters I am editing. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a man and a woman, grey-haired and animated as they talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412899/original/file-20210723-27-ofrrq7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Helen Lieros, left, with her husband Derek Huggins, in the 2020 documentary Art for Art’s Sake.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Granadilla Films</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The First Act</h2>
<p>Gallery Delta’s formative years were at Strachan’s building in Manica Road (now Robert Mugabe Road) in downtown Salisbury (now Harare). It was a new, radical space in a city whose art world revolved around the National Gallery of Rhodesia (now the <a href="http://www.nationalgallery.co.zw/index.php/inspire/history/the-gallery-history">National Gallery of Zimbabwe</a>) under Frank McEwen, who was at the time invested in promoting the country’s <a href="https://mg.co.za/friday/2021-06-04-in-praise-of-african-art-how-shona-sculpting-emerged/">Shona stone sculpture</a> tradition while neglecting other art forms. There were small art organisations and societies but no art schools or other exhibition galleries to talk about.</p>
<p>Huggins <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMCppR8OGw">said</a> of the time: “Consequently, we looked for young, talented and aspiring Africans who would rather be painters than sculptors. They were almost non-existent. There were few facilities for serious art study. It meant commencing at the beginning to encourage and promote a new movement in painting. One of the ways in which we undertook this was to promote a <em>Young Artists</em> exhibition at the beginning of every year but nonetheless few, if any, good African painters emerged at this time.”</p>
<p>For Huggins and Lieros, building a community was at the core of their work. Before opening the gallery they had been members of The Circle – a radical group of 12 painters. The group was responding to the political chaos of the decade – as a <a href="https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/postcolonialstudies/2014/06/21/zimbabwes-struggle-for-liberation/">liberation war</a> was being fought by Zimbabweans against white minority rule – but it also became a collective means to deal with the unrest. It was this spirit the new Gallery Delta fostered.</p>
<p>From its inception The Gallery also served as an alternative venue for art exhibitions, multiracial theatre and jazz performances during this tense environment prior to independence in 1980. But when the owners of the Strachan building decided to sell, they were forced out and had to look for a new home.</p>
<h2>The Second Act</h2>
<p>In 1991, Colette Wiles, daughter of the painter <a href="https://gallerydelta.com/artist/robert-paul/">Robert Paul</a>, offered Gallery Delta the old, dilapidated house at <a href="http://www.theheritageportal.co.za/article/history-and-restoration-harares-oldest-house">110 Livingstone Avenue</a> in Harare, which had been his home for nearly 40 years until his death. Built in 1894, it lays claim to being one of the oldest surviving buildings in Harare. From 1991 to 1993, Gallery Delta – with the help of architect Peter Jackson, and many others – repaired and restored the house to its original appearance, and built an adjoining amphitheatre.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A house with palm tree, old red zinc roof and old facade, church-like on green lawns" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=348&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412901/original/file-20210723-27-vapa9a.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gallery Delta today.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screengrab/Granadilla Films</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Besides teaching, mentoring and supporting the production of new art, Gallery Delta also produced and published a visual art magazine under the title of <a href="https://gallerydelta.com/magazine/"><em>Gallery</em></a>. This was a 32 page, glossy quarterly publication, edited by art critic Barbara Murray, and for a short time by the publisher Murray McCartney, which ran to 31 issues. Each edition of the magazine had a print run of 1,000 copies. </p>
<p>Copies of <em>Gallery</em> were distributed free to schools and libraries, and it has become a vital research tool for students and collectors interested in the development of contemporary painting in Zimbabwe in the 1990s. The magazine is <a href="https://gallerydelta.com/magazine/">fully digitised</a> and freely available.</p>
<p>Several contemporary Zimbabwean artists have passed through Gallery Delta, as students or exhibitors. These include Berry Bickle, Andy Roberts, Greg Shaw, Lovemore Kambudzi, Cosmas Shiridzinonwa, Gina Maxim, Misheck Masamvu, Chiko Chazunguza, Masimba Hwati, Hilary Kashiri, Portia Zvavahera, Rashid Jogee, Admire Kamudzengerere, Richard Mudariki and many others.</p>
<h2>The Third Act</h2>
<p>What does the future hold for Gallery Delta? In 2008, in response to the dire economic situation in Zimbabwe at the time, the privately owned gallery was given over by deed of donation into trust to create the Gallery Delta Foundation for Art and the Humanities, governed by an independent board of trustees. </p>
<p>A new generation of stewards will now have to carry forward the work that Derek Huggins and Helen Lieros started. As their late friend Friedbert Lutz <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMCppR8OGw">said</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Gallery Delta is a bit like a lighthouse which stands there quietly and flickers its light in spite of all the storms we have gone through, yesterday, today and maybe tomorrow.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Gallerist and writer Robert Huggins and his wife, the artist Helen Lieros, have passed away. But their lives are a testament to what kind of impact one African art gallery can have.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1508582020-11-25T14:36:36Z2020-11-25T14:36:36ZPasha 88: Lockdown and young people living on the streets of Harare, Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/371262/original/file-20201125-14-dajp7y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">GettyImages</span> </figcaption></figure><p>For many young people living on the streets, lockdown and the COVID-19 pandemic has made their situation worse. The city of Harare in Zimbabwe was no exception. Lockdown made it difficult for young people to find food and make money in the informal economy. Researchers set up a story map – a map with text, images and multimedia content – to hear their voices and understand their experiences.</p>
<iframe src="https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/fa4f51db8f164c938407e058270e245f" width="100%" height="500px" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" allow="geolocation"></iframe>
<p>It’s part of a three-year project called <a href="https://www.dundee.ac.uk/projects/growing-streets">Growing up on the Streets</a>, which worked with young people living on the streets in three African cities (Accra, Bukavu and Harare) alongside NGO partner <a href="https://www.streetinvest.org/resources/growing-streets">StreetInvest</a>. With the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, life on the streets became a lot harder, as young people recount in the story map.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/young-people-living-on-harares-streets-provide-glimpses-into-life-under-covid-19-lockdown-144684">Young people living on Harare’s streets provide glimpses into life under COVID-19 lockdown</a>
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<p>Today’s episode of Pasha has Janine Hunter and Lorraine van Blerk, both at the University of Dundee, discussing the project. With them is the NGO’s Shaibu Chitsiku, with insights from the ground. </p>
<p><strong>Photo:</strong>
A group of children look with curiosity at a team of police deployed in Mbare township July 31 2020. Photo by Jekesai Njikizana/AFP <a href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/group-of-children-looks-with-curiousity-at-a-team-of-police-news-photo/1227851043?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Music:</strong>
“Happy African Village” by John Bartmann, found on <a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/happy-african-village">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1</a>.</p>
<p>“Interludium II”, by Spin Day found on <a href="https://freemusicarchive.org/music/Spin_Day/Spin_Day_and_the_Emotional_Godfather/Spin_Day_-_Spin_Day_And_The_Emotional_Godfather_-_05_Interludium_II">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">Attribution License.</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A story map shows how Harare's young people coped with lockdown in Zimbabwe.Ozayr Patel, Digital EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1098902019-01-15T15:10:32Z2019-01-15T15:10:32ZBold steps Mnangagwa should be taking instead of fiddling with the petrol price<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253840/original/file-20190115-152986-1z00z45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe erupted in violent protest after the government doubled the price of petrol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When economically challenged rulers try to run nations, especially fragile ones, they can easily make mistakes. </p>
<p>In the past few weeks demonstrators have taken to the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman to protest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s removal of subsidies that have long kept <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/sudan-official-death-toll-protests-rises-24-190113065645372.html">bread and fuel affordable</a>. </p>
<p>Now it’s Zimbabwe’s turn. Just before flying off to Russia last weekend, President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">doubled the price of petrol</a>. Doing so brought already impoverished urban Zimbabweans out onto the streets of the capital Harare as well as Bulawayo and a dozen other cities and towns. Protesters blocked roads with tyres, trees and rocks, stopped bus transport, attacked the police, threw canisters of tear gas back at security forces and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/deaths-in-zimbabwe-fuel-protests-says-security-minister-20190115">generally ran amok</a>. </p>
<p>At least five people <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/military-deploys-in-zimbabwe-fuel-hike-protests-5-killed/2019/01/15/d44875f6-18aa-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html?utm_term=.2af9f13b1349">were reported</a> to have been killed. Flights into Harare <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-01-14-fastjet-cancels-flights-as-zimbabwe-unrest-continues-countrywide/">were cancelled</a> and the government <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2019/01/econet-and-telone-shut-down-the-internet-completely-now-its-darkeness/amp/?__twitter_impression=true">closed down the internet</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1085088020640997376"}"></div></p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s excuse for raising prices so abruptly is not clear. Possibly he thinks that more costly petrol will bring more cash into national coffers that are mostly bare. Or perhaps he believes that more petrol will pour into the country via the pipeline from Beira in Mozambique if it is more valuable. Both ideas are barmy. </p>
<p>Before flying off to Russia, Mnangagwa said that the fuel price rise was intended to reduce shortages of fuel that, he indicated, were caused by rises in the use of fuel and what he called <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/anger-as-mnangagwa-raises-gas-prices-in-zimbabwe-20190113-2">“rampant” illegal trading</a> – accusations that make no sense whatsoever. Making petrol purchasing more expensive for poor Zimbabweans – the majority of the nation’s people – simply adds to their hardship and further slows an already crippled economy.</p>
<p>Instead Mnangagwa should do everything his government can to reduce the shortage of real (rather than fake) cash that is crippling the local economy, reducing local production and corporate and consumer cash flows, and driving an already weakened economy <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/zimbabwe-plans-new-currency-as-dollar-shortage-bites-finance-minister">further into recession</a>.</p>
<p>He should also be focused on taking a number of other bold steps to try and reverse the collapse of the country’s economy. Among them are bringing state looting to a halt.</p>
<h2>The cash crisis</h2>
<p>The US dollar is the official currency of commerce. But because Zimbabwe’s economy has essentially ground to a halt, it has few means of bringing new dollars into the country. That, and the steady money laundering of real dollars by high-level officials of the ruling Zanu-PF party, has drained the country of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/10/looting-of-state-resources-to-blame-for-economic-crisis/">currency</a>. </p>
<p>The government has printed $1 bond notes — known as <a href="https://businesstimes.co.zw/dollars-vs-zollars-zim-puts-accounting-standards-to-test/">zollars</a> – for Zimbabweans to use instead of real dollars. They are supposed to be exchangeable at par, but in 2019 they are worth as little as a third of a paper dollar. Many merchants refuse to accept zollars at all.</p>
<p>Bond notes now trade on the black market at 3.2 per dollar, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/no-currency-just-a-currency-crisis-zimbabwe-s-woes-deepen">according</a> to the Harare-based ZimBollar Research Institute.</p>
<p>The stress has also spread to financial markets, with locals piling into equities to hedge against price increases. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa may be <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">attempting to obtain loans</a> from Russia and from shady Central Asian countries <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/04/kazakhstan-at-twenty-five-stable-but-tense-pub-62642">like Kazakhstan</a>. But what the president should be doing is prosecuting and imprisoning his corrupt cronies. That could limit the flight of dollars from Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>He also needs to trim the bloated civil service of excessive patronage appointments. Most of all, if he dared, he should be cutting military expenditures. Zimbabwe has no imaginable need for its large and well equipped a security establishment.</p>
<p>Such bold measures could return confidence to the country’s corporate and agri-business sectors. If coupled with reduced military and other expenditures, and bolstered by funds no longer being transferred overseas, Zimbabwe’s long repressed economy could take off from a very low base.</p>
<h2>Poor leadership</h2>
<p>Raising petrol prices in a land where but a few months ago supplies of petrol were short and motorists <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-27/zimbabwe-suffering-worst-economic-crisis-in-a-decade/10433028">queued for hours and days</a> outside stations is neither politically nor economically wise. The newly aroused protesters will not readily melt away. Putting such a hefty extra charge on an essential commodity, and doing so just when Zimbabwe’s parlous economy was beginning to show signs of stability, shows few leadership skills and little common sense.</p>
<p>Inflation has soared since the national election in July, almost reaching the <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=sudan+70%25+inflation&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwn7u4oO_fAhVMUBUIHVJzAKEQsAR6BAgEEAE&biw=1283&bih=638">Sudanese level of 70% a year</a>. Foreign capital and domestically reinvested capital is avoiding the country. </p>
<p>On top of this, exporters are struggling under draconian Reserve Bank regulations. Only Chinese purchases of ferrochrome, other metals and tobacco, keep the economy ticking over, albeit in an increasingly dilatory manner.</p>
<p>A further drain on confidence and economic rational thinking is the Reserve Bank’s allocation of whatever hard currency there is to politically prominent backers of the president. That is how arbitrage during President Robert Mugabe’s benighted era helped to enrich his entourage while sinking the Zimbabwean economy and impoverishing its peoples.</p>
<h2>Work that needs to be done</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has much more work to do to stimulate sustainable economic growth. He will need to restore the rule of law, badly eroded in Mugabe’s time, put some true meaning into his <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-11-20-socialites-laying-low-as-zimbabwes-government-cracks-down-on-big-spenders/">“back to honest business”</a> promise, and widely open up the economy. That would mean eliminating most Reserve Bank restrictions on the free flow of currency and allowing the entire Zimbabwean economy once again to float.</p>
<p>Most of all, Mnangagwa needs to rush home from Russia and Asia and rescind or greatly reduce the price of petrol. After so many years of repression and hardship, Zimbabweans are out of patience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s decision to double the price of petrol shows very poor judgement and bad leadership.Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006792018-07-27T16:17:05Z2018-07-27T16:17:05ZZimbabwe poll explained: ballot papers galore, and loads of new politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229580/original/file-20180727-106517-sf0fv6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters at a campaign rally addressed by the party leader Nelson Chamisa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Zimbabeans go to the polls they will be voting in what’s been dubbed <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-harmonised-elections-too-close-to-call-15411721">“harmonised” elections</a>.</p>
<p>When I see the word “harmony” used in the context of Zimbabwean politics, I shudder a bit. Instead of turning my gaze to the complicated combination of votes to be cast in this election, the term takes my mind back to the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (Zanu) guerrilla camps based in Mozambique in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273537?src=recsys">mid-1977</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu had been through some tough years. In early 1975, the Lusaka-based national chairman Herbert Chitepo and his Volkswagen Beetle were <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=21858">blown to bits</a> – just after a rebellion had been quelled. Robert Mugabe used the word “harmony” chillingly at the historic Chimoio central committee meeting as he took a large and nearly final step towards consolidating his rule over the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/rMgI4U3XnXMEkDA33t4X/full">fractious party and its army</a>.</p>
<p>Mugabe was referring to the 1974 rebellion and another perceived one in 1976 when he uttered these chilling words, to be printed and published in Zimbabwe News, Zanu’s globally circulated magazine. He <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">warned</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony that binds us all.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, we can forget these menacing words now, when those striving to change the country’s leadership can do so via the ballot box (as long as the slips deposited in it are counted correctly) and a vigorously debated campaign (given no intimidation and open violence). </p>
<p>But the process is complicated. Voters much chose the next president from 23 candidates. They must also choose MPS from over 1 600 candidates for 210 parliamentary seats. Then they will have to chose from thousands more contenders for municipal councillors’ <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_mayor_ele_zim_legisl_131029.pdf">posts</a>. There are also 60 senators – each of the 10 provinces have six each, half of whom are women. But the voters don’t have to choose them: they are on party lists and will fit in according to proportional representation. </p>
<p>All make for a huge number of ballot papers, and a large contingent of new politicians. </p>
<h2>What is a ‘harmonised’ election?</h2>
<p>From 1980 to 2008 Zimbabwean voters experienced a plethora of electoral forms, but not a lot of real choice. There was a prime minister and his ceremonial president surrounded by MPs. Until 1987, 20 of the parliament’s 100 seats were reserved for whites.</p>
<p>After 1987 things became close to one-partyism. Robert Mugabe assumed far-reaching powers and soon had no limits to his terms. This was after the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacre</a> of thousands of Matabeleland-and Midland-based Zimbabweans in which current President Emmerson Mnangagwa played a key <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">role</a>. It also followed Joshua Nkomo’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/content/chapter-two-brief-history-context-zapu-guerrillas">Zapu-PF</a>, the long-time opposition party overwhelmed by Zanu’s violence, being swallowed into Zanu. </p>
<p>By 1990 the presidential race took place every six years and parliament’s twice per decade, including a Senate reinstated after 2005.</p>
<p>The system changed again in 2008 – a game changer year in many respects. Since then, Zimbabwe’s voters have made many electoral choices with one visit to the polling station every five years. They have deposited their choices for presidents, the 210 MPs as well as local councillors in their separate boxes. </p>
<p>The presidential choices in the first round of the 2008 election resulted in less than the 50%+1 majority needed for either Mugabe (at about 43%) or Morgan Tsvangirai (at around 48%) to claim victory. Thus a run-off was <a href="http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin80.pdf">required</a>. </p>
<p>The vengeance wreaked by Mugabe’s henchmen was so bad – at least 170 MDC, and some Zanu-PF voters who split their presidential and assembly votes, were killed and hundreds more <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/200812MPVR.pdf">abducted or beaten</a> – that Tsvangirai withdrew. This led the Southern African Development Community to push for a <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/index.php/store/history-and-%20politics/the-hard-road-to-reform-detail">government of national unity</a>. </p>
<p>Violence like this wasn’t repeated in 2013, although that election was <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717/715">suspect in many ways</a>.</p>
<h2>New goalposts</h2>
<p>Now we have another contest, with new goalposts. No more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-disgraceful-coup-must-be-undone">Mugabe</a>. No more <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Tsvangirai</a>. At last count Nelson Chamisa and Mnangagwa were only separated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">three percentage points</a>. </p>
<p>The other 21 runners – some more or less planted by Zanu-PF to confuse things while others are angry splinters from the main <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/24888-full-list-of-all-the-133-political-parties-that-are-going-to-contest-in-zimbabwes-2018-elections.html">contenders</a> – do not amount to much, unless they help keep the winner’s margin down under 50%. </p>
<p>A runoff? Such a nuisance and so scary. Maybe a wee fudge of counting would make a respectable win for the incumbent amid lots of horsetrading to cool the ardour of the increasingly fiery aspirant.</p>
<p>Aside from the big race, the over 1 600 candidates for MPs (including less than 250 women) were chosen at some fairly shambolic primaries. Some constituencies, such as Bulawayo’s Pelandaba Mpopoma, host 17 candidates including two from the MDC-Alliance (which does not include Thokozani Khuphe’s MDC-T) and Strike Mkandla - who has experienced many bruising moments in his political <a href="https://www.amazon.com/My-Life-Struggle-Liberation-Zimbabwe/dp/1496983238">history</a> - for Zapu. </p>
<p>If the election will be judged by the hundreds of international observers as credible and the parties accept the verdict, then harmony won peaceably – not by a falling axe – would have won. </p>
<p>That would be no small victory in itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans face a complicated array of choices at the polls.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880232017-11-23T11:29:45Z2017-11-23T11:29:45ZWill Mnangagwa usher in a new democracy? The view from Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196100/original/file-20171123-18012-fj36hx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa, President-elect of Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Filckr/UN</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe has a new leader. Robert Mugabe is out. His former ally turned rival, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is in. What now?</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/21/zimbabwe-celebrates-as-mugabe-resignation-announced-in-pictures">ecstatic celebrations to mark Mugabe’s resignation</a> thoughts have began to turn to what comes next. Mugabe may have exited the political scene, but it remains dominated by the same political party – <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/dont-need-opposition-zanupf-business-chinamasa/">Zanu-PF</a> – that sustained his rule.</p>
<p>Moreover, the country’s president-elect, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is hardly a breath of fresh air. Having held a series of cabinet positions under Mugabe, and served as first vice president between December 2014 and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41914768">his sacking in November 2017</a>, he looks more like a force for continuity than change.</p>
<p>As a result, talk in Harare quickly turned to what kind of leader Mnangagwa will be, and the system of government that would best serve ordinary Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>The fork in the road</h2>
<p>My conversations with people on the streets of the capital, Harare, about the political system the country needs suggests that two distinct camps are emerging: those who want elections to be held as soon as possible, and those who say the polls should be postponed and a <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-moves-to-set-up-interim-govt-as-mugabe-is-apparently-ousted/">transitional government</a> established.</p>
<p>Both of these options have genuine “pros” but also strong “cons”. As is so often the case, there is no perfect answer that solves all problems.</p>
<p>It is understandable that many Zimbabweans want a period of calm and orderly government after the twists and turns of recent weeks, and believe that it would be better to form an inclusive government that would feature representatives of all of the main political parties – a kind of <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">power sharing</a> in all but name.</p>
<p>Even though I have consistently argued in favour of the value of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/democracy-in-africa/3FFB8B40059192D449B77A402ADC82A1">democracy and elections in Africa</a>, I have to admit that the “transitioners” have some viable arguments.</p>
<p>The most obvious is that a period of stability and more consensual government might facilitate much needed reform of the economy and also the wider political and legal system. After all, rival parties are unlikely to come to agreement on these issues if they are immediately thrust into an <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387803001329">election campaign</a>.</p>
<p>The “transitioners” also have a point when it comes to democracy. Few people in Zimbabwe believe that it’s possible for elections to be <a href="https://erczim.org/">free and fair</a> if they are held between July and August next year, as currently scheduled. Given this, and the current divisions within the opposition, a rush to elections is likely to result in a convincing victory for Zanu-PF under problematic circumstances.</p>
<p>A transitional arrangement would allow for much needed <a href="http://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/_protected/publications/publication_265.pdf">electoral reforms</a> to be put in place, creating the potential for a better quality process and a more consensual outcome later on.</p>
<h2>Testing the Crocodile</h2>
<p>But there is also another camp that wants to see Mnangagwa, popularly known as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/who-is-emmerson-the-crocodile-mnangagwa-12013101">The Crocodile</a>, to face an election as soon as possible. </p>
<p>Just like their counterparts in the “transitioner” camp, “electioneers”, have some strong arguments. Whatever one wants to call Mnangagwa’s rise to power – from <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mnangagwa-coup-mphoko-missing-chipanga-now-custody-warrent-arrest-mzembi/">a coup</a> to an <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/dont-meddle-in-zanu-pf-affairs-vp-mnangagwa/">internal party squabble</a> – it is clear that it has not been a high quality democratic transition. And while it is clear that the overthrow of Mugabe was hugely popular, we don’t know if the same applies to a Mnangagwa presidency. An election would settle that question.</p>
<p>It would also give the new government a popular mandate to undertake <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/10/14/zim-needs-bold-economic-reforms-us-envoy">economic reforms</a>, whoever wins power. This could be important to the success of the reform project, because things are likely to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/12/2017-looks-gloomier-zim/">get worse</a> before they get better, and the country’s economic medicine may prove to be a bitter pill to swallow.</p>
<p>Holding elections would also do one thing that postponing them will not; it will test the commitment of the new government to democratic norms and values from the get-go. One of the main reasons that Zimbabwean elections have been poor quality is that <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/03/24/zanu-pf-revives-rigging-machinery/">Zanu-PF and the military</a> have intervened to make sure this was the case. As another friend put it, “If they are really committed to doing the right thing, they can do it right away and the elections will not be too bad”.</p>
<h2>Learning from the past</h2>
<p>“Electioneers” are also motivated by scepticism that an inclusive transitional government would get much done. Both Zimbabwe and Kenya have had power-sharing governments in the recent past, and while they both introduced new constitutions they also saw high levels of corruption and limited <a href="https://www.academia.edu/6446844/Power_Sharing_in_Comparative_Perspective">security sector reform</a>. They also both led to elections that were denounced by opposition parties as being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/12/24/2-million-votes-used-to-rig-2013-election-raila_c1478146">unfree and unfair</a>.</p>
<p>It’s fair to ask: why would it be different this time?</p>
<p>The question is particularly pertinent given the current composition of parliament. Because Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change boycotted a <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2016/05/04/mdc-upholds-poll-boycott-stance">series of by-elections</a> on the basis that they would not be free and fair, it has lost many of the seats it won in 2013. As a result, any transitional arrangement that deferred elections and “froze” the current parliament for the next three years would have a big legislative advantage to Zanu-PF.</p>
<p>It is also important to keep in mind that economics cannot be divorced from politics: Zimbabwe’s current economic difficulties stem precisely from an unaccountable political framework that ignored the interests of the people. Given that recent events have <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">emboldened the military</a> and given them an even stronger voice within government, this is a pressing concern.</p>
<p>Deferring electoral reforms in order to focus on economic recovery may therefore prove to be a self defeating strategy.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Ultimately, the form of government that evolves in Zimbabwe will not be a product of popular dialogue. One of the distinctive features of this process is that for the most part it has been conducted behind closed doors by a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/zimbabwean-not-coup/">small elite</a>.</p>
<p>Don’t be fooled by the pictures of tens of thousands of people marching on Saturday – all sides have invoked popular support, but none have actually <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/opinion/press-statement-army-gives-update-negotiations-mugabe/">encouraged ordinary people</a> to say what they want, or given them a seat at the table. This is a worrying sign if strengthening democracy is the long-term goal.</p>
<p>Recent <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122715.html">public statements</a> by the main parties at the time of going to press suggests that they are not converging on an interim administration, and so the “electioneers” may get their wish. That could still change because <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/mdc-calls-mnangagwa-repent-join-big-tent/">talks are ongoing</a> and both sides would gain something from a delay. But if it doesn’t the people will be able to have their say on how they want their country to be run.</p>
<p>Of course, voting will not actually equate to “having a say” unless the country’s new leader follows through on his promise to build a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/emmerson-mnangagwa-to-be-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president-on-friday">new democracy</a>”, and the ruling party can kick the habit of a lifetime. Watch this space.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After the fall of autocratic ruler Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe faces a difficult choice between the stability of a transnational government or a potentially divisive election contest.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/876892017-11-19T09:15:50Z2017-11-19T09:15:50ZMugabe and Dos Santos: Africa’s old men seem, finally, to be fading away<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195298/original/file-20171119-11467-i9mm17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his chosen successor.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philimon Bulawayo/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Soon after Zimbabwe’s army confined President Robert Mugabe to his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-latest-leader-over-years-to-be-placed-under-house-arrest-20171115">palatial Harare home</a> this week – allegedly for his safety – it was announced in Luanda that Angola’s new President, João Lourenço, had relieved Isabel dos Santos of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/angolan-president-sacks-predecessors-daughter-as-state-oil-chief">her position</a> as head of the state-run oil company Sonangol. </p>
<p>While there may not be any direct connection between these two events, they suggest some intriguing comparisons. In both countries ruling families seem to have failed to secure themselves in power. </p>
<p>When Mugabe, as leader of the <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF)</a>, became ruler of Zimbabwe at independence in <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/15/as-he-turns-93-years-old-today-who-is-robert-mugabe/">April 1980</a>, José Eduardo dos Santos was already <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13036738">President of Angola</a>. He had succeeded to that position after the death of Agostinho Neto in <a href="https://afrolegends.com/2011/08/04/agostinho-neto-doctor-poet-president-and-father-of-angolan-independence/">September 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Dos Santos had to deal with <a href="http://www.africansunmedia.co.za/Sun-e-Shop/Product-Details/tabid/78/ProductID/429/Default.aspx">external intervention</a> and over two decades of <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">civil war </a>, during which he ruled dictatorially. Mugabe, despite a facade of constitutionalism and regular elections, also became increasingly dictatorial. He abandoned adherence to the rule of law and his country’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-10-02-hopes-dim-for-zimbabwes-economy/">economy collapsed</a>. Angola became notorious for the scale of the corruption linked especially to its <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-luandas-residents-are-asking-where-did-all-the-oil-riches-go-49772">oil riches</a>. Zimbabwe went from bread-basket to basket-case. With the great majority of the people of both countries living in dire poverty, Dos Santos flew to Europe when he needed medical attention, while Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/10/robert-mugabe-ruling-zimbabwe-from-hospital-bed-says-opposition">went to Singapore</a>. </p>
<p>Though Dos Santos was probably as reluctant as Mugabe to give up power, he decided to quit as president of the country and try to retain influence through the ruling party and members of his family. Mugabe tried to impose his wife on his party as his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">chosen successor</a> and then to cling on to his positions even when the army took effective control of his country.</p>
<p>Given recent developments in Luanda and Harare, it would seem that neither of these two old men have succeeded in securing their family dynasties.</p>
<h2>Dos Santos’s succession plan</h2>
<p>By 2016, suffering health problems that took him to Spain <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/angolan-president-back-home-after-treatment-in-spain">for treatment</a>, Dos Santos announced that he would step down as president of Angola and he <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-unlikely-to-herald-the-change-angolans-have-been-clamouring-for-82851">approved</a> his Minister of Defence, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço as his successor. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195184/original/file-20171117-7547-1lnoizb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, president of Angola.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Fernando Villar</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the victory of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the general election held in August this year, Lourenço took over as <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/09/26/new-angolan-president-joao-lourenco-sworn-in">president</a> in September. But Dos Santos remained president of the MPLA, and clearly expected Lourenço to look after his interests and that of his family, who had become enormously wealthy. </p>
<p>From the action Lourenço has now taken against Dos Santos’ billionaire daughter Isabel, it would seem that he’s becoming his own man. It appears he wishes to distance himself from the Dos Santos family, which for many Angolans is associated with corruption on a vast scale. </p>
<p>The London-educated Isabel has proved herself to be a very capable businesswoman, and though the Angolan economy has been suffering because of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices/oils-bull-run-hides-a-deep-disconnect-crude-traders-warn-idUSKBN0NR1Q320150506">low oil-prices</a>, on top of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/elections_in_angola_time_to_tackle_corruption">massive corruption</a>, it’s unlikely she was sacked to bring in a better chief executive to run the country’s most important state owned company. There is talk in Luanda that Isabel’s brother, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-02-00-angola-whos-who-in-the-palace">José Filomeno dos Santos</a>, will be relieved of his position as head of the country’s large <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-24/angolan-wealth-fund-plans-shift-away-from-external-managers">Sovereign Wealth Fund</a> and that his father, the former president of the country, will be replaced as president of the ruling party, though that may have to wait until a party congress is held.</p>
<h2>Mugabe’s succession plan</h2>
<p>In Zimbabwe Mugabe has sought to arrange that his wife will <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/fall-from-grace-mugabes-wife-was-his-weakness-20171116">succeed him</a>. But <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/gucci-grace-from-benoni-robert-mugabes-biggest-mistake-12024383">Gucci Grace</a> and Robert made the mistake of trying to ensure this by <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">firing</a> Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa. </p>
<p>Though at the time of writing, the 93-year-old Mugabe remains president both of the country and of the ruling Zanu-PF party, it’s widely expected that he will soon be relieved of both positions, probably by Mnangagwa, with the assistance of the army.</p>
<h2>Changes for the better?</h2>
<p>New leadership in Angola and Zimbabwe will have an impact on the region as a whole. </p>
<p>Given Mnangagwa’s record as a long serving member of government in Zimbabwe, and his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">involvement</a> in the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">mass killing of Ndebele</a> in the early 1980s, it is hardly likely that he will emerge as a champion of democracy. </p>
<p>In Angola, Lourenço is still finding his feet as head of government. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=788&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195185/original/file-20171117-7529-16thsny.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=990&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fired Zimbabwean Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is therefore unrealistic to hope that either country will soon move from decades of repressive rule and lack of transparency to greater constitutionalism and closer adherence to the rule of law. </p>
<p>But if we are witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-old-mens-club-out-of-touch-with-continents-suave-burgeoning-youth-48618">in power for decades</a> and tried to secure their continuing influence through their families, and if we are seeing the diminishing importance of liberation movements turned political party, this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for the southern African region as a whole. </p>
<p>It should also hold lessons for those who rule in neighbouring countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Are we witnessing the end of an era in which dictators stayed in power for decades? If so this must be good not only for Angola and Zimbabwe but for southern Africa as a whole.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/815742017-09-17T10:44:01Z2017-09-17T10:44:01ZBritish policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/183734/original/file-20170829-10409-jl5ttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe's clampdown on dissent in Matabeleland claimed up to 20 000 lives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli/ Pool</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January 1983 Robert Mugabe’s government launched a massive security clampdown in Matabeleland. It was led by a North Korean-trained, almost exclusively chiShona-speaking army unit known as the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sabelo_Ndlovu-Gatsheni/publication/237426294_The_post-colonial_state_and_Matebeleland_Regional_perceptions_of_civil-military_relations_1980-2002/links/573ddabf08aea45ee842d9ad.pdf">Fifth Brigade</a>. They committed thousands of atrocities, including murders, gang rapes and <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">mass torture</a>. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s government called the operation <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a>. This is chiShona for “the rain that washes away the chaff (from the last harvest), before the spring rains”. </p>
<p>It is estimated that between <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561?scroll=top&needAccess=true">10 000 and 20 000</a> unarmed civilians died at the hands of Fifth Brigade.</p>
<p>An <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561?scroll=top&needAccess=true">analysis</a> by the author of official British and US government communications relevant to the Matabeleland Massacres has shed new light on the British Government’s wilful blindness to Operation Gukurahundi, including its diplomatic and military team on the ground in Zimbabwe during the atrocities. The information was obtained via <a href="https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-information/what-is-the-foi-act/">Freedom of Information Act </a> requests to various British government ministries and offices and to the US Department of State. </p>
<p>The unique dataset provides minutes of meetings and other relevant communications between the British High Commission in Harare, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s office, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence in London, as well as the US Department of State and the US Embassy in Harare. </p>
<h2>The brutalities</h2>
<p>The attacks’ ramifications continue to be felt by survivors and their families. The children born of rape at the hands of the Fifth Brigade face ongoing discrimination and generally find themselves in hopeless situations.</p>
<p>The catalogue of brutalities committed by the Fifth Brigade include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>One man learned that his child was abducted from school by the Fifth Brigade and forced to catch poisonous black scorpions with his bare hands. He was stung and died before being buried in a shallow grave (interview with survivor TH, 2017). His only “crime” was to be Ndebele. </p></li>
<li><p>Entire families were herded into grass-roofed huts, which were then set alight (interview with survivor AN, 2017).</p></li>
<li><p>In Mkhonyeni a pregnant woman “was bayoneted open to kill the baby”. Also, “pregnant girls were bayoneted to death by 5th Brigade in Tsholotsho”, <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">killing the unborn babies</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>Young Ndebele men between the ages of 16-40 were particularly vulnerable. They were frequently targeted and killed or forced to perform demeaning <a href="http://davidcoltart.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/breakingthesilence.pdf">public sex acts</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Unique dataset</h2>
<p>The data provides a unique insight into the British government’s role in Gukurahundi. It also establishes what information was available to the British government about the persistent and relentless atrocities; what the British diplomatic approach was in response to this knowledge; and what the British government’s rationale was for such policies. </p>
<p>The data evidences, for example, that the British Foreign and Commonwealth offices were aware that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there was much talk – and evidence – of widespread brutality by the Fifth Brigade towards [Ndeble] villagers. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In a cable forwarded to the US embassy in Maputo and Dar es Salaam, then-US Secretary of State <a href="https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/shultz-george-pratt">George Shultz</a> stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>what we are addressing is not simply a bad policy choice by the GOZ [Government of Zimbabwe] to deal with a difficult security situation in a section of their country. What is involved is the very fundamental issue of relations between the two parties, between the Ndebele and the Shona.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The West German ambassador to Zimbabwe, <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=ambassador-dr-richard-ellerkmann-curriculum-vitae">Richard Ellerkmann</a>, thought it “ominous” that “Mugabe, in his latest speech in Manicaland, had used the Shona equivalent of ‘wipe out’ with reference to the Ndebele people, not just ZAPU people, if they didn’t stop supporting the dissidents”.</p>
<p>However, “most poignant for Ellerkmann was the remark of a German Jewish refugee in Bulawayo who said the situation reminded him of how the Nazis treated Jews in the 1930s”. (Cable American Embassy, Harare to Secretary of State Washington DC, 11 Mar. 1983). </p>
<p>There could be no doubt in the minds of the British that Gukurahundi was Zimbabwean government policy. On 7 March 1983 Roland “Tiny” Rowland, a British businessman and chief executive of the Lonrho conglomerate with heavy economic commitments in Zimbabwe, met Mugabe. The documents indicate he subsequently reported to the American ambassador in Harare that he was convinced Mugabe was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>fully aware of what is happening in Matabeleland and it is Government policy. Mnangagwa (Zimbabwean Minister of State Security) is fully aware and he was in the meeting when they discussed the situation in detail. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The author’s analysis provides clear evidence that the British diplomatic and military teams in Harare during Gukurahundi were consistent in their efforts to minimise the magnitude of Fifth Brigade’s atrocities.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=919&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185858/original/file-20170913-23100-xerxnu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1155&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The remains of a victim of the massacre.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anonymous/Supplied by author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is indisputable that this is the general theme of the available cables that were forwarded from the British High Commission in Harare to London during the period analysed. </p>
<p>The analysis also clearly proves that, even when in receipt of solid intelligence, the UK government’s response was to wilfully turn a “blind eye” to the victims of these gross abuses. Instead, the British government’s approach appears to be have been influenced solely by consideration for the white people who were in the affected regions but were not affected by the violence. </p>
<h2>Rationale for realpolitik</h2>
<p>The rationale for such naked realpolitik is multi-layered. It is expressed clearly in numerous communications between Harare and London. One cables notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe is important to us primarily because of major British and western economic and strategic interests in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe’s pivotal position there. Other important interests are investment (£800 million) and trade (£120 million exports in 1982), Lancaster House prestige, and the need to avoid a mass white exodus. Zimbabwe offers scope to influence the outcome of the agonising South Africa problem; and is a bulwark against Soviet inroads… Zimbabwe’s scale facilitates effective external influence on the outcome of the Zimbabwe experiment, despite occasional Zimbabwean perversity.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>One can but assume that “occasional Zimbabwean perversity” refers to Gukurahundi.</p>
<h2>Accountability</h2>
<p>In a more general sense it is quite clear that, apart from the immediate perpetrators, external bystanders also have to be held accountable at least to some extent for the unbridled atrocities that took place in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>With the end of Mugabe’s long reign drawing ever closer, it is imperative that the international community help develop strategies to help Zimbabweans address the prevailing impunity and lack of accountability for the crimes of Gukurahundi. That is critical for the establishment of truth, justice, and accountability for the victims, survivors and their families.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron receives funding from the University of St Andrews (a research grant)</span></em></p>The effects of President Mugabe’s post-independence security clampdown that led to the murder of between 10 000 and 20 000 Zimbabweans, known as the Matabeleland massacre, continue to be felt.Hazel Cameron, Lecturer of International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763392017-04-27T16:09:52Z2017-04-27T16:09:52ZWhy brutalising food vendors hits Africa’s growing cities where it hurts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/165800/original/image-20170419-6388-1rwjcv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fishmonger pleads for customers in a Kenyan market.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In January this year, the Harare City Council in Zimbabwe accused informal food vendors of spreading typhoid. The council then attempted to confiscate, and destroy, all perishable food items that were being hawked in the central business district. Many vendors <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/01/22/police-vendors-clash-in-typhoid-crackdown">fought back</a>, resulting in deadly clashes over a series of days in the opposition run capital city.</p>
<p>Sadly, such violent treatment of workers in informal markets is <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21716032-messy-vital-cracking-down-african-street-vendors">all too common</a> in African cities. Indeed, based on <a href="http://www.acleddata.com/">calculations</a> from the Armed Conflict and Location Event Database, such treatment dramatically increased over the past decade. In 2015, there were more than 250 incidents of violence against informal workers in Africa <a href="https://www.ifpri.org/publication/governance-informal-food-markets-africas-cities">reported</a> in the media, a more than fourfold increase since 2005.</p>
<p>Other examples of these so-called cleanup operations were carried out in Malawi in 2006 and 2015, in Nigeria in 2009, in South Africa in 2013, and in Zambia in 2007 and 2015. These represent just a few examples of concerted “decongestion” efforts to push informal traders off the streets. </p>
<p>These campaigns typically involve authorities arresting and fining informal vendors. But they extend to confiscating merchandise and demolishing makeshift trading stalls. In addition to inflicting violence on a vulnerable population, government shutdowns of informal food markets deprive city dwellers access to a critical source of food. </p>
<p>Food markets in the informal sector are a vital source of both food and income for Africa’s urbanites. Large urban poor populations in Africa rely heavily on the informal economy for accessible, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Food-Safety-and-Informal-Markets-Animal-Products-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa/Roesel-Grace/p/book/9781138818736">affordable food</a>. These include most of their nutrient dense foods like eggs, meat, fish, and milk.</p>
<p>A study of 11 African cities <a href="http://www.alnap.org/resource/6450">found</a> that 70% of households regularly purchase their food from informal markets or street vendors. Despite the key role this sector plays in the well-being of Africa’s urban poor, many countries maintain violent enforcement of colonial era laws that criminalise both buying and selling in informal arrangements.</p>
<p>Rather than resorting to draconian measures, governments across the continent must find ways to engage with informal workers that will ensure Africa’s urban populations have adequate access to safe and nutritious foods.</p>
<h2>Food safety and tax evasion claims</h2>
<p>Often violent shutdowns of informal markets are justified by concerns about food safety and tax evasion. But some <a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/handle/10568/10626">research</a> has indicated that these concerns can be overblown. It has also revealed that violent government responses are counterproductive. </p>
<p>Multi-country epidemiological research conducted by International Livestock Research Institute has found that food safety hazards exist in informal market foods. But the risk of illness is <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Food-Safety-and-Informal-Markets-Animal-Products-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa/Roesel-Grace/p/book/9781138818736">not necessarily higher</a> than it is from foods purchased in supermarkets. Studies in Brazil have suggested frequent crackdowns <a href="http://pensa.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/When_food_safety_concern_decreases_safety_2002.pdf">reduce incentives</a> for informal workers to invest in improved food safety equipment and practices.</p>
<p>Concerns about informal vendors skirting tax payments are also based on misperceptions about how informal markets function. The international development organisation Women in the Informal Economy Globalising and Organising has been conducting research on informal market accounting in six developing countries. It <a href="http://www.wiego.org/budgets/informal-economy-budget-analysis">found</a> that most informal vendors in fact do pay taxes and fees. This is either through a chairperson in charge of their market or directly to city municipal authorities.</p>
<p>The common conditions of informal markets do create real food safety concerns that must be addressed. Vendors often don’t have access to electricity, waste disposal, or clean water. And ensuring they are tax compliant requires accounting systems for collecting taxes and fees. </p>
<h2>Africa’s cities must find better ways</h2>
<p>But several countries have recently begun instituting promising attempts at productively engaging informal vendors. This is done in ways that address government concerns about safety without resorting to complete or violent shutdowns that diminish access to food.</p>
<p>Government sponsored training on food safety is one effective measure. In Kenya, a recently established Dairy Traders Association <a href="http://pubs.iied.org/17316IIED/">provides training</a> on basic hygiene and quality testing for informal milk traders. Those who complete the training receive a certificate for a licence which spares them from fines from the Kenya Dairy Board.</p>
<p>Zambia has taken a different approach by establishing ostensibly inclusive management boards of informal markets. Local authorities, vendors, and consumers, all provide representatives involved in decision making. This has created a transparent environment which also <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/115/72259/Transforming-the-region-Supermarkets-and-the-local">encourages adherence</a> to fee payments for maintenance and sanitation needs, although it has sometimes been prone to political party <a href="http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Hansen-Vol11Is2-3.pdf">interference</a>.</p>
<p>Other regions have also demonstrated successful ways of working with informal vendors that can be applied to an African context. In Vietnam, street vendors and the government have struck a <a href="http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17335IIED.pdf">compromise</a>: vendors can work freely during specific hours so long as they clean up street litter at the end of their allowed time. Informal workers in <a href="http://www.wiego.org/publications/iems-sector-report-street-vendors">Peru</a> are working with the government to develop laws for self-employment and street vending that allow for effective oversight and safety without stifling commerce or access.</p>
<h2>Africa’s future is urban</h2>
<p>In the coming years, these reforms to bring the informal sector under effective oversight will become increasingly important. Urbanisation is currently occurring <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-future-is-urban">more rapidly</a> in Africa south of the Sahara than anywhere else in the world. The continent’s population is expected to be majority urban by 2030. </p>
<p>Yet there’s a general lack of strong urban development plans in most of these countries. This means that the urban population growth will also surely drive growth in the number of people who rely on the informal economy for their food and income.</p>
<p>To feed these developing urban populations, Africa’s cities must find productive ways to work with the informal traders and markets where they get their food.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76339/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danielle Resnick receives funding from the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM) Research Program. The opinions expressed here are her own and do not represent the views of IFPRI, PIM, or the CGIAR. </span></em></p>The harassment of informal food vendors by national and municipal governments remains a major impediment to improving the resilience of the urban poor in African cities.Danielle Resnick, Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/748572017-03-23T15:03:21Z2017-03-23T15:03:21ZFrom London to Harare: an activist yearning for an ounce of practice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162049/original/image-20170322-31217-whydte.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Leo Zeilig's latest novel is set in the Robert Mugabe-ruled Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Philimon Bulawayo/Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>-<em><strong>Book Review</strong>: Leo Zeilig; An Ounce of Practice; Hope Road Publishing, London, February 2017</em></p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=888&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161993/original/image-20170322-31203-o2wmji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1116&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The cover of ‘An Ounce of Practice’.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Writer and Researcher <a href="http://leozeilig.com/">Leo Zeilig</a>’s new novel tells a gripping tale of an intellectual leftie from London, a group of southern African activists in Zimbabwe and England, and the emotional battles of living and acting in the struggles of the 21st century. </p>
<p>Viktor lives in London. His life is bedevilled by inertia, a sense of dying really. His family life disintegrates. It doesn’t help much that he spends his days immersed in his computer. He connects with the world through Facebook and Twitter, writing blogs and posting them on a website of radical politics. </p>
<p>He longs for practice, for life in action. But he remains stuck in theorising, with his comrades at the university, even in his connection with his young daughter. </p>
<p>Tendai is Viktor’s friend. Now trailing a London university campus as a reading worker and strike organiser; he’s been steeled through a life lived in the southern African struggles against colonialism and apartheid. Tendai believes in practice to prevail over theory. He challenges Viktor:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you haven’t seen and lived, what good are you?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Anne-Marie is in Harare. She works with the development NGO set of expats, though deeply cynical about their politics and lavish lifestyle. Her life finds more clarity and radical action through her involvement with the “Society of Liberated Minds”, a small band of self-styled revolutionaries who rename themselves “Lenin”, even “Stalin”, but also “Biko” and “Cabral”. </p>
<p>Anne-Marie’s double predicament is her prominent Congolese family’s expectations towards her womanhood and her unpredictable lover, the Society’s leader. Biko is an activist in Bulawayo. He burns with desire, rage and action. Biko lives the practice and action that Viktor longs for and, at once, shirks. In his personal life he craves connection with his family, his past, his throbbing loneliness driving him to more and more dangerous action. </p>
<p>Zeilig’s characters connect, at first tentatively, in virtual space. Then Viktor, pushed ever deeper into his crisis and persuaded, cajoled and seduced, travels to Zimbabwe. There he hopes to find “some bloody practice”, grabbing a chance to write “at last for a movement, a people struggling against dictatorship and neoliberalism”. And to meet Anne-Marie … </p>
<p>The action heats up in Harare and Bulawayo. Hotter, more raging, more engaging, more dangerous, more violent than he could have ever imagined.</p>
<h2>Credible characters</h2>
<p>As in his 2013 debut novel “Eddie the Kid”, Zeilig draws his characters with a close eye, deep psychological insight and extraordinary empathy. When I interviewed him, he emphasised that he wanted to avoid portraying activists as “iron Lenins”, which he sees as “an unfortunate tendency in left-wing fiction”. </p>
<p>His characters are enormously credible. Description and dialogue convey inner reflection and outward expression in words and action. In their different ways each of the left-wing activists – from the bumbling Viktor through to the passionate if somewhat dangerously zealous Biko – is well-meaning and flawed. </p>
<p>Even the white Zimbabwean businessman and coffee shop owner Louis, who befriends Viktor in Harare, while portrayed as crudely racist is also vulnerable and capable of love. This appears as the main thrust of this beautifully written novel: in the end, it’s love that’s at the heart of resistance and revolution. Of life itself. This is vividly imagined in Viktor’s loving relationship with his young daughter, which, even though somewhat hapless, is depicted in scenes of moving tenderness. </p>
<h2>Breathing authenticity</h2>
<p>Zeilig’s novel breathes authenticity with a superbly crafted cast of characters and poignant dialogue. He also impresses with acute, sensuous observations of place. The sights, smells and sounds of Harare take the reader into the dilapidated resilience of this once opulent, colonial city. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1093&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1093&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/161994/original/image-20170322-31169-1isiega.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1093&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leo Zeilig.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hope Road Publishing</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For “An Ounce of Practice”, Zeilig – who has been an academic and an activist in left-wing politics in both the UK and southern Africa – has drawn inspiration from two seemingly unconnected social and political struggles. When he was working at the University of London a few years ago, he became involved with a <a href="http://www.solfed.org.uk/catalyst/london-cleaners-strike-and-win">strike of cleaners</a> at the university. </p>
<p>His second theme is the “catastrophic fall” of Zimbabwe, caused by the “twin evils” of IMF/ World Bank <a href="http://newsrescue.com/how-the-imf-world-bank-and-structural-adjustment-programsap-destroyed-africa/#axzz4c2iP4k4F">structural adjustment policies</a> and President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/record-levels-of-assault-abduction-and-torture-reported-in-zimbabwe">dictatorship</a>. In Zimbabwe he also witnessed the courageous resistance of small groups of activists. In the novel he connects these stories through crafting a cast of Zimbabwean migrants at the heart of the labour action in London. </p>
<p>Zeilig explained during the interview, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the story is about the connections of the Global North and South, the link between how we live, love and struggle. It also looks at the ‘neo-liberal’ hurricane in both parts of the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>He emphasised the connection of personal and political crisis and, “the hope, if we are to become truly human, of breaking down the barriers to action, connection and hope”.</p>
<h2>Engagement with political activism</h2>
<p>“An Ounce of Practice” succeeds as an imaginative engagement with the predicament of global political activism today. It elegantly weaves nuanced philosophical reflections on the opportunities and dangers presented by social media and the <a href="https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/the-impossibility-of-precarity">precarity</a> of existence in the neo-liberal academy through a vivid narrative of an individual journey, intimate love and life that never loses sight of the “bigger us”. </p>
<p>As the main protagonist of this African <a href="http://www.dictionary.com/browse/bildungsroman">Bildungsroman</a> slowly begins to live by a saying attributed to <a href="http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj65/german.htm">Friedrich Engels</a> that, “an ounce of practice is worth a ton of theory”, Zeilig shows the exhilaration and hope that comes with activism. At the same time we see excruciating pain, despair and loss emerging in the encounter with violent dictatorship and repression. </p>
<p>“An Ounce of Practice” is a brilliant work of literary imagination that takes the reader to new realities in an engaging, moving read, hilariously humorous at times. Zeilig’s new novel is a page turner for readers interested in the profound questions of radical politics and humanity in today’s world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74857/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heike Becker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leo Zeilig’s novel features a superbly crafted cast of characters. It’s a page turner for readers interested in the profound questions of radical politics and humanity.Heike Becker, Professor of Anthropology, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/624522016-07-14T07:31:37Z2016-07-14T07:31:37ZZimbabwe’s riots: the rise of the informal trader and a new political economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/130429/original/image-20160713-12362-3dkhs9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters are standing up against the police's road blocks in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/violent-riots-rock-beitbridge-as-preotesters-demand-reversal-of-import-ban/3400881.html">upheaval</a> sweeping through Zimbabwe comes with a new economic and political reality – the informalisation of the country’s economy. In Zimbabwe today, the informal sector <em>is</em> the economy.</p>
<p>In Beitbridge, on the border with South Africa, furious cross-border traders set fire to a warehouse in protest against import bans recently imposed. In Harare <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-protests-idUSKCN0ZK1DO">taxi operators</a> protested against the cost of continuous police road blocks, where spot fines are extracted.</p>
<p>Both these incidents highlight how Zimbabwe’s economy has changed dramatically. <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36776401">Formal unemployment</a> runs at 90% <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/is-zimbabwes-unemployment-rate-4-60-or-95-why-the-data-is-unreliable/">or more</a>, but this doesn’t mean that all these people are not doing things. They are, but not in the jobs of the past. </p>
<p>Livelihoods are improvised and flexible. Different ways of earning income – farming, trading, dealing, manufacturing, mining, selling services and a host of other distributive activities – have been combined. These shifts are reliant on deeply embedded social relationships.</p>
<p>But little is known about the informal economy. And policies often upset and disrupt, rather than support and nurture. So it is no surprise that the government’s decision to arbitrarily impose import controls – on everything from mayonnaise to body lotion and building materials – was resisted. In the name of domestic manufacturing protection, the livelihoods of many thousands of traders who bring goods from South Africa were affected. No wonder they were angry.</p>
<h2>Nature of the informal economy</h2>
<p>The informalisation of the economy is a pattern across Africa, as <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Lewis-Henry-Morgan-Lectures-Paperback/dp/0822358867/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1468147899&sr=8-1&keywords=ferguson+give+a+man#reader_B00WU4PMAC">James Ferguson eloquently describes</a>. New networks of economic activity have emerged, as has a vibrant spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship. This is in the context of extreme hardship for sure, as economies fail to deliver equitable growth. </p>
<p>Ferguson argues that the improvised livelihoods of the poor are creating a new distributive economy, and with this a distributive politics. This is having a major impact on the way we understand African political economy – and not only in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The shock is perhaps greater in Zimbabwe, as in the past the “formal” sector was larger and stable, where “jobs” and “wages” were expected, especially for men at a certain age. But the post-structural adjustment growth of informality is a phenomenon everywhere; and is accelerating, especially in countries where reliance on a core commodity sector was the economy of the past.</p>
<p>Thus the informal sector – a huge and massively varied category – represents a very substantial proportion of Africa’s economic activity. In the rural areas this has always been the case – small-scale farming dominates and rural dwellers have always engaged in a diverse range of activities, both on and off farm. </p>
<p>Today such complex livelihoods are the norm in town too. The jobs of the past in the factories, mines, farms and so on no longer exist. When they appear, the jobs come temporarily. The alternative is a set of activities that don’t fit the former expectation of a “job” or “employment”, and are so not counted as such.</p>
<p>Ever since <a href="http://www.academia.edu/17730339/20_Africa_s_urban_revolution_and_the_informal_economy">Keith Hart</a> wrote about Africa’s informal economy long ago, many people have pointed to its importance. In recent years, there has been a growth in scholarship that has attempted to grapple with the economic, social, cultural, political and geographical dimensions of informal economies. These include the excellent work of <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=rvd3_sjE4c8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=kate+meagher+informal+economy&ots=WIGp5VaBYS&sig=tLfJcOZU563lHjMKiviXWxrT7lM#v=onepage&q=kate%20meagher%20informal%20economy&f=false">Kate Meagher</a> in Nigeria and <a href="http://www.vumelana.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Document-49-Meagher_WIEGO_WP27.pdf">more broadly</a>.</p>
<h2>Ignored, dismissed, berated</h2>
<p>But in public policy, statistical data collection and media commentary, the new real economy in so many places has been ignored, dismissed or berated. Responses have been inappropriate too. </p>
<p>Formalising the informal is not the point, and attempts at converting everything into a projectified “small enterprise” are misguided. Controlling and regulating will not work, and will be resisted, sometimes violently. And yes, while much activity is outside the ambit of the state, and not taxable, it is the lifeblood of the economy – and certainly is in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/36203/ssoar-afrspectrum-2007-3-meagher-Introduction_special_issue_on_informal.pdf?sequence=1">Yet glorifying and romanticising the informal is not the solution either</a>. Living in the informal sphere is tough. Informal activity is precarious, fragile, sometimes illegal and often subject to arbitrary taxation from those in authority. This is the case with the road blocks affecting informal transport operators across Zimbabwe. Incomes are small and highly variable and the costs of patronage, coercion and control can be high, economically and psychologically.</p>
<p>The events of the last few weeks in Zimbabwe point to the need for a new accommodation between the informal and formal and between the economies and livelihoods of the 90% and the state. A new political economy is emerging, where the class relations of the past are no longer relevant. State-economy-citizen relations must be rethought. </p>
<p>Rather than imagining the informal economy as somehow outside, and needing to be brought in, it has to be thought of as central to development. Providing support, generating legitimacy, assuring accountability and preventing exploitative predatory, patronage relations are all roles for the state; ones that the Zimbabwean state is failing on currently. </p>
<p>This means attempts at controlling, regulating and incorporating have to be avoided, despite the knee-jerk temptations. These are the key lessons from rioting in Beitbridge and Harare. The 90%, after all, are the electorate. They will protest in many ways if livelihoods in increasingly difficult circumstances are jeopardised.</p>
<p>This does not mean that attempts to rebuild the formal sector should cease. Far from it. Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa was in London <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03ztvm3">making that case</a> for Zimbabwe last week to the usual <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2016/07/05/chinamasa-confronted-london/">howls of protest</a>. But the refinancing that will hopefully flow from the International Financial Institutions and other private investors will need to find its way to the new economy, and not just prop up the old.</p>
<p>For in the longer term, it is the informal entrepreneur, the niche market trader, the small-scale artisan and manufacturer and the smallholder farmer who will scale up and multiply the massive, but uncounted and perennially unsupported informal economy.</p>
<p>Managing and supporting such a transition is the central economic challenge of the future. The standard models and forms of expertise derived from the old economy are inadequate. A new politics and economy of the informal urgently needs inventing.</p>
<p><em>A version of this post first appeared in <a href="https://zimbabweland.wordpress.com/">Zimbabweland</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/62452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Scoones receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>The protest by Zimbabweans against police road blocks and banned imports highlights a new political economy that is rising on the back of informalisation of the economy.Ian Scoones, Professorial Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.