tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/idlib-82812/articlesIdlib – The Conversation2020-03-10T11:07:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1325332020-03-10T11:07:49Z2020-03-10T11:07:49ZThe fragmented politics of the Syrian refugee crisis jeopardises the future of millions<p>The Syrian province of Idlib, the remaining holdout of rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad, has experienced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45403334">fierce fighting</a> in recent months as the Syrian army, supported by Russia, has pushed to reclaim the territory. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the expansionist impulses of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in north-west Syria brought Turkey into direct confrontation with Assad’s forces in Idlib and exacerbated tensions with Russia. A ceasefire was agreed in early March, but tensions in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/newsfeed/2020/03/russia-turkey-agree-idlib-ceasefire-200309083037719.html">region remain high</a>.</p>
<p>Even before the military escalation in Idlib, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html">Turkish attack</a> on Kurds in north-eastern Syria in October 2019 had added a layer of complexity to the conflict. Now the recent assaults on Syrians in Idlib have led to the exodus of an estimated <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/nws_flash_update_20200305_final.pdf">1 million civilians</a>. UN officials <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-un/syria-displacement-is-worst-since-conflict-began-un-idUSKBN2051MA">said</a> it was “the fastest growing displacement” they had ever seen in Syria. </p>
<p>Many people fled to Turkey, already home to around 3.5 million Syrian refugees. On February 29, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/28/tensions-rise-between-turkey-and-russia-after-killing-of-troops-in-syria">Turkey opened its border with Greece</a>, apparently to put pressure on Europe to support its operations in Idlib. </p>
<p>Sadly, this wave of migration is only the latest flashpoint in the worst humanitarian crisis since the horrors of the second world war. But even this crisis, with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/turkey-erdogan-holds-talks-with-eu-leaders-over-border-opening">thousands now stuck</a> in no-man’s land on the Greek-Turkish border, hasn’t triggered a way through the regional and domestic blockages that have prevented an end to the bloodshed in Syria. This is something we’ve written about in <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154">a new book on the Syrian refugee crisis</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tensions-mount-at-greek-border-with-turkey-amid-contested-history-of-migration-in-the-aegean-132990">Tensions mount at Greek border with Turkey amid contested history of migration in the Aegean</a>
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<h2>Regional inertia</h2>
<p>Since 2011, the humanitarian consequences of the Syrian crisis have spilled over several Middle Eastern countries. But there has been no collective, regional response – largely because of political fragmentation and competition for power. </p>
<p>One striking illustration of these dynamics is the inertia of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The two organisations have repeatedly failed to provide effective responses to regional issues such as the turmoil in Yemen and Libya or the rise of extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. The Syrian refugee crisis, and more recently the situation in north-west Syria, are no exceptions. </p>
<p>The Arab League has limited its intervention to support for efforts by the international community to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis. As for the GCC, its actions were overshadowed by an <a href="https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/qatar-crisis-its-regional-implications-and-us-national-interest">internal rift</a> and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/06/29/syria-war-saudi-arabia-qatar/">the involvement of Qatar and Saudi Arabia</a> in the Syrian chaos. This means that the humanitarian burden has continued to be borne by countries that host Syrian refugees. </p>
<p>Some may have expected Arab solidarity in the face of a crisis that emerged in the context of wider Arab uprisings. Yet even in the Arab countries that have hosted the bulk of refugees from Syria, such as Jordan and Lebanon, the government and people distanced themselves from their Arab brothers as the crisis became protracted.</p>
<p>The national borders in the Middle East that were drawn up after the first world war still <a href="https://www.rienner.com/uploads/53924248e6ec6.pdf">remain contested </a> by pan-Arab, pan-Islamic and pan-Kurdish movements. Nevertheless, the Syrian refugee crisis showed how these borders and national identities are powerful drivers of everyday politics. </p>
<h2>A crisis politicised</h2>
<p>The stance of the governments in Jordan and Lebanon towards the Syrian conflict shaped the <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154">countries’ refugee policy</a>. What started as a policy of open doors evolved from 2014 when restrictions were imposed on Syrians entering and staying in both countries. Jordan and Lebanon then began to cooperate with the international community to mitigate the refugee crisis in early 2016, and eventually began to <a href="https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/amp/news/2018/8/14/syria-says-deal-struck-with-jordan-to-return-refugees?__twitter_impression=true">actively encourage</a> the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/06/lebanon-syrian-refugees-return-process.html">return of refugees</a> to Syria in 2018. </p>
<p>Lebanon’s ruling elites capitalised on the humanitarian crisis by portraying the Syrian refugees as a <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030350154#">security threat</a>. Pro-Assad political parties Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement used this narrative to undermine anti-Assad political forces in Lebanon, namely a party called the Future Movement. This, in turn, created a sense of urgency which encouraged the flow of foreign aid into the country in an attempt to bring stability. But this foreign aid fed <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/politics/2015/03/lebanon-corruption-syrian-refugees-aid.html">corruption</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-remain-trapped-and-marginalised-by-lebanons-power-sharing-politics-108363">Syrian refugees remain trapped and marginalised by Lebanon's power-sharing politics</a>
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<p>The media has also played an important role in shaping the perception of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon by circulating a twofold government-sponsored narrative about the crisis. On one hand, this narrative tried to reassure Lebanese people of a sense of normalcy and fostered patience and societal strength. On the other, the government framed the refugee crisis as an emergency to convince international donors to channel humanitarian aid to the country. But as we found in our research, it was the second narrative that dominated, causing confusion among Lebanese and Jordanians who have started to ask for their share of the foreign aid. </p>
<h2>Stuck in the middle</h2>
<p>Amid this fragmented regional landscape and the politicisation of the crisis at the regional and national levels, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-forced-to-return-to-syria-face-imprisonment-death-at-the-hands-of-assad-113159">fate of Syrian refugees</a> remains unclear. Russia has offered to facilitate dialogue between host countries – mainly Lebanon – and the Assad regime regarding the return of Syrian populations. But the ongoing process of their return to their home country might now be hampered by diplomatic tensions between Syria and its neighbours, especially Lebanon and Turkey.</p>
<p>The safe return of Syrian refugees will also be restricted by the demographic changes initiated by the Turkish government in efforts to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/19/who-exactly-is-turkey-resettling-in-syria/">eliminate the Kurdish presence</a> along its border. The fate of returnees is also jeopardised by the Assad regime’s policies against those who took part in the uprising, those who didn’t answer the conscription call during the war or those who <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law">own properties</a> in former rebel-held areas. </p>
<p>The Syrian refugee crisis will remain a major card both in the hands of the countries involved militarily in the conflict, and those hosting refugees. As for the Syrian refugees themselves, their lives, rights and future are precarious. They remain the primary victims of the regional competition for power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132533/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juline Beaujouan received funding from AHRC's Open World Research Initiative (OWRI), Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) and Higher Education Funding Council for England (hefce). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amjed Rasheed received funding from the AHRC's Open World Research Initiative (OWRI), the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), and the Higher Education Funding Council for England (hefce).</span></em></p>How the humanitarian consequences of the Syrian crisis have spilled across the region.Juline Beaujouan, Research Associate, Political Settlements Research Programme, The University of EdinburghAmjed Rasheed, Research Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1328382020-03-06T14:36:55Z2020-03-06T14:36:55ZWhy Turkey can’t expect military support from NATO over attacks in Syria<p>A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51763926">ceasefire has begun</a> in the Syrian province of Idlib after an agreement was reached between Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 5. </p>
<p>Conflict had escalated in the province after Syrian government forces, supported by Russian air power, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51667717">killed at least 34 Turkish troops</a> in late February. In response, Turkey, a NATO member, requested support from the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main political decision-making body. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_173927.htm">NATO publicly condemned</a> the air strikes by the Russia-backed Assad regime and urged both Russia and Syria to respect international law, Turkey should not expect the alliance to trigger Article 5 – its collective military response mechanism.</p>
<h2>NATO response</h2>
<p>Back in October 2019, when Turkey launched an offensive in northern Syria, both the EU and NATO <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169576.htm?selectedLocale=en">urged</a> Turkey to show restraint and avoid any unilateral action that might lead to further destabilisation of the region. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the alliance still <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_173931.htm">condemned</a> the late February attack on Turkish troops in Idlib after Turkey invoked <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty</a>. Article 4 is a practical demonstration of the alliance’s political dimension – any ally <a href="http://law.emory.edu/eilr/_documents/volumes/34/special/bumgardner.pdf">can voice an issue of concern</a> to the council whenever its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.</p>
<p>In its history, NATO countries have used this strong political signalling tool only <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm">six times</a> and Turkey initiated five of them. One of these instances was in 2012, after Syrian forces <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18554246">shot down a Turkish fighter jet</a> and Syrian shells killed five Turkish civilians. NATO allies agreed to increase air defence systems to help Turkey protect its population and territory, and expressed strong political support for Ankara. Yet, they <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-syria-nato/24625900.html">didn’t discuss</a> the possible activation of Article 5 – under which an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against them all. </p>
<p>NATO’s reaction to the recent attack was similar to 2012: as well as expressing a strong political support to Ankara, the allies agreed to increase Turkey’s air defence systems to help Turkey protect its population and territory. </p>
<p>This builds on support NATO has been giving Turkey <a href="https://shape.nato.int/nato-assurance-measures">since 2015</a> to improve air surveillance, enhance its maritime presence and increase information sharing among allies. In recent years, Turkey has also <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169574.htm?selectedLocale=en">received</a> more than US$5 billion (£3.8 billion) from NATO to improve its military facilities. </p>
<h2>What governs Article 5?</h2>
<p>NATO has activated Article 5 only once in its 71-year history – <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2006/06/01/invoking-article-5/index.html">in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks</a>. Any invocation of Article 5 requires consensus of all 29 nations. Its geographic application is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">limited by Article 6</a>, which sets out where an armed attack would need to take place to trigger Article 5. Among other areas, it defines Article 5’s ambit as including the territory of Turkey and the forces, vessels and aircraft of NATO members located in the Mediterranean Sea. But it crucially doesn’t cover attacks on Turkish forces on Syrian territory. </p>
<p>This means Turkey cannot invoke Article 5 on the basis of the escalation in Idlib. Only if Turkey were to be attacked on its territory from within Syria, or if Turkish forces were attacked in or over the Mediterranean Sea could Turkey invoke Article 5. </p>
<p>The right to self-defence under <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">UN Charter Article 51</a> only exists where an unlawful armed attack takes place, not for the lawful exercise of self-defence through armed force by an opponent. As NATO’s Article 5 is based on this right, it doesn’t apply to all cases of loss of life in combat. Even if the geographical limit did not exist, if Turkish soldiers died as result of a lawful use of force in self-defence by the Syrian armed forces, Article 5 could not be used to request support.</p>
<h2>Turkey’s limited options</h2>
<p>In the past few years NATO’s cohesion has been weakened, partly because of a lack of trust between Turkey and the rest of the alliance and increasing strategic divergences among the allies. This has left NATO countries <a href="http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1422">unable to effectively the address escalations</a> in the Syrian conflict in a coherent way. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-invasion-of-syria-a-stark-warning-of-how-irrelevant-nato-could-become-125451">Turkey's invasion of Syria a stark warning of how irrelevant NATO could become</a>
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<p>The strained relations between Turkey and the rest of the allies date back to a failed coup against Erdoğan’s government in 2016, since <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">when Turkey</a> has moved away from democratic values. </p>
<p>Turkey cannot hope for direct military support from the US either. Although Turkey has requested a no-fly zone in northern Syria, something also suggested by some <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/28/senator-calls-for-us-to-establish-no-fly-zone-over-syria-after-33-turkish-troops-killed-in-airstrike/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2003.02.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">US senators</a>, this is not being seriously discussed in the US or NATO circles, as it would risk confrontations with Russian air forces. </p>
<p>Washington is yet to formally respond to Turkey’s request for the US to deploy its Patriot missile batteries on Turkey’s southern borders, a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/28/turkey-patriot-missiles-pentagon-118256?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2003.02.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">request backed</a> by the US special representative for Syria. </p>
<p>This kind of American military assistance would be quite paradoxical, since Turkey <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41237812">purchased</a> a Russian S-400 air defence system in 2017. The Russian system is <a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/07/17/us-to-turkey-russian-s-400s-arent-compatible-with-nato-tech">not only incompatible with NATO defence systems</a>, but is also a potential threat to the US-led, multinational fifth-generation fighter jet program, which Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/">was forced to leave</a>. </p>
<p>The discussion surrounding Turkey’s involvement in Syria and its potential for escalation shows the challenges for NATO. While the current situation cannot trigger Article 5, despite these challenges NATO allies will continue to provide support to Turkey within the framework of Article 4. In fact, the possibility of such Article 4 consultations might allow for NATO to support Turkey without provoking escalation by triggering a collective military response – which would bolster the case for the continued relevance of the alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132838/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is a NATO member but that doesn’t mean its NATO allies will come to its support in Syria.Amelie Theussen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkDominika Kunertova, Postdoc, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1329902020-03-04T17:54:10Z2020-03-04T17:54:10ZTensions mount at Greek border with Turkey amid contested history of migration in the Aegean<p>The ongoing refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean has taken a dramatic turn in recent days with an escalating humanitarian situation on the land and sea borders between Greece and Turkey. </p>
<p>After Turkey removed its border restrictions with Greece on February 29, thousands of people began to make their way across the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/just-run-on-the-turkey-greece-border-as-refugees-try-to-break-through">country to the Greek border</a>. They have been met with tear gas, and <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2020-03-02/greek-coast-guard-fire-warning-shots-towards-migrant-boat/">warning shots</a> fired by the Greek coastguard at boats trying to cross the Aegean sea.</p>
<p>The latest “crisis” started suddenly – yet migration in the region has been going on for many years, if not millennia. As an ancient route of cultural and trade interchange, the Aegean has always been a sea of overlapping waves of migrations – and the rich history of this criss-crossing is ever-present in the region today. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://www.isrf.org/about/fellows-and-projects/ilay-ors/">ongoing research</a> in the Greek islands and mainland suggests the living memory of previous experiences of displacement forms a vivid background to the current arrival of refugees, who have been coming since the Syrian civil war intensified in around 2015. </p>
<p>On February 29, Turkey woke up to the news that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51667717">at least 30 of its soldiers</a> had been killed in an air attack at an army base in Idlib in northern Syria. Turkish political leaders responded by promising to retaliate in what is another escalation of the military conflict in the region. </p>
<p>But the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also made good on a previous threat and declared that no migrant attempting to leave the country via the border with Greece would be stopped. This was a major shift in policy since the signing of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-out-of-sight-out-of-mind-two-years-on-from-eu-turkey-deal-93451">2016 deal between Turkey and the EU</a>, under which Erdoğan agreed to regulate and reduce the migrant flows to Europe in exchange for financial support.</p>
<p>In a matter of two days, tens of thousands <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/migrants-at-turkish-greek-border-we-want-another-life/a-52627031">gathered at the main checkpoints</a> at the land and sea borders, only to find that the Greek side was closed. In response, the government announced that Greece would <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-51695468">not accept any more irregular migrants</a>, nor would it process any asylum applications for a month. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e5d08ad4/unhcr-statement-situation-turkey-eu-border.html">criticism</a> from humanitarian agencies and <a href="https://www.guengl.eu/left-meps-tell-council-commission-to-end-greek-border-violence/">European parliamentarians</a> over the legality and legitimacy of such measures, the Greek government stood firm. On March 3, the EU Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, travelled to the border city of Evros and thanked Greece “for being our European <em>aspida</em>.” By using the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_380">Greek word for shield</a>, and reiterating that the Greek borders were European borders, she gave the Greek prime minister a strong message of unity and support.</p>
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<h2>Half open, half closed</h2>
<p>Those who wish to believe that a half-closed border is still half open continue to wait for their ever-slimmer chances to enter Greece. Thousands of people are <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/refugee-crisis-turkey-syria-greece-border-afghanistan-war-latest-a9373211.html">spending days and nights</a> in near freezing temperatures in the buffer zone between the two borders with only limited humanitarian assistance provided by locals and NGOs. </p>
<p>In the Aegean islands, the situation is even thornier. As of January 31, 2020, there were <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/74134">115,600 refugees and migrants</a> in Greece, according to the UNHCR. So far, there have been <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179">8,432 arrivals in 2020</a>. While the numbers are not at the levels they were in 2015, when <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/620777">Greece was caught off guard</a> in the initial phases of refugee flows, it’s not the quantity of the migrants but the changes in the quality of their reception that matters. </p>
<p>In the past five years, the irregular flow of refugees arriving in Greek shores with dinghies has continued with some fluctuations. Greece established five migrant hotspots in its Aegean islands, yet these have not addressed the needs of those arriving. With multiple accounts documenting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/samos-grim-winter-leads-to-protests-by-refugees-living-in-limbo-on-greek-island-110116">appalling conditions</a> in various refugee camps, especially at the Moria camp on the island of Lesvos, this has led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/19/greece-refugee-hotspots-unsafe-unsanitary">criticism</a> of Greece’s ability or willingness to deal with the migration issue.</p>
<p>The new government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Greek prime minister, vowed to take drastic measures and passed a <a href="https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/prosphuges-politiko-asulo/nomos-4636-2019-phek-169a-1-11-2019.html">new migration law</a> in November 2019 which came into effect in January. This was <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/249370/article/ekathimerini/news/construction-of-closed-centers-to-start-next-month-mitarakis-says">followed by a plan</a> to build closed reception centers in the islands of Chios, Samos and Lesvos which would replace the current open camp structures of the hotspots. </p>
<p>These measures have been presented as effective solutions to accelerate the asylum procedures and to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-mayors/greek-island-mayors-press-government-to-lighten-migrants-overload-idUSKBN1ZM1GH">decongest the islands</a>”. But they have been met with anger by locals, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/clashes-over-greeces-migrant-detention-camp-plans-continue">protested extensively</a> against the central government’s decisions, leading to a <a href="https://greece.greekreporter.com/2020/02/25/migrant-crisis-northern-aegean-islands-will-go-on-general-strike-wednesday/">general strike on February 25</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/01/refugee-crisis-in-greece-tensions-soar-between-migrants-and-locals.html">rising tension</a> has heightened the ideological polarisation among the locals on the Aegean islands. Anti-migrant protesters, alongside far-right extremists, have demonstrated that they are prepared to use violent means to protect their borders. In early March, some angry protesters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/islanders-lesbos-block-camp-port-refugee-arrivals-spike-200301181623591.html">tried to block</a> refugee boats from arriving into harbours and block roads. Cars and buildings have been burnt and <a href="https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/03/01/lesvos-locals-mob-migrants-journalists/">journalists attacked</a>.</p>
<p>The opposing camp <a href="https://today.rtl.lu/news/world/a/1477895.html">condemns</a> the use of refugees <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/03/02/inhumane-and-reckless-amnesty-international-condemns-greeces-measures-block-migrants">as bargaining chips</a> for political ends. They are appealing to concepts such as hospitality, civilisation and humanity to underline their stance in solidarity with the migrants, using slogans such as “open the borders” and “no human is illegal”. </p>
<h2>Evoking history</h2>
<p>Both anti-migrant groups and those in solidarity with migrants are using the region’s history to promote their own ideological positions. </p>
<p>Those in solidarity claim that migration is not a crime, but rather an element of the human condition that has occurred repeatedly throughout the region’s history. They recall how during the second world war, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36499727?fbclid=IwAR1yPE-8t16v800lyMgt6W8y0MiphpQVDRyb_UA3JkRaniQNX9T5hylCBUg">thousands of Greeks</a> crossed the Turkish border to escape the German occupation and seek <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/02/the-forgotten-story-of-european-refugee-camps-in-the-middle-east/">refuge in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>The Aegean islands were also where boats filled with Greek Orthodox residents of Asia Minor came in the wake of the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crossing_the_Aegean.html?id=CtDQqKh90YwC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">Convention of the Forced Exchange of Populations of 1923</a> between Greece and Turkey, signed after the first world war. Following the arrival of <a href="http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/turks/Ottomans/ejz18.pdf">more than 1.5 million people</a> in Greece, the population of the islands almost doubled to the extent that many locals still have family members from among the group originally and still known as the “Asia Minor refugees”. </p>
<p>The ongoing tensions in the region have once again made it into a place where complex negotiations take place over ideology and identity. The shifting way the past is being imagined stands as a testimony to how the history of overlapping migrations is currently being kept alive in the Aegean.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilay Romain Ors receives funding from Independent Social Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The Aegean has long been a place of overlapping migration. Now it is facing a new crisis.Ilay Romain Ors, Research Affiliate, Centre of Migration, Policy, and Society, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318302020-03-01T19:04:25Z2020-03-01T19:04:25ZTurkey and Russia lock horns in Syria as fear of outright war escalates<p>As the nine-year Syrian civil war enters its final turn, Turkey and Russia, long-time allies in Syria, are on the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/turkey-vows-drive-syrian-forces-idlib-200226104230214.html">brink of war</a> over the Syrian province of Idlib.</p>
<p>Both sides are sending stern messages of warning as diplomacy to end the conflict has so far failed to de-escalate the situation.</p>
<h2>What has led to the stand-off?</h2>
<p>In September 2018, Turkey, Russia and Iran signed an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-putin-erdogan-hope/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-create-buffer-zone-in-syrias-idlib-idUSKCN1LX1BU">agreement</a> (also called the Sochi accord) to create a de-escalation zone in Idlib, where violent hostilities were prohibited. </p>
<p>Under the agreement, opposition forces were classified as jihadist and mainstream. Mainstream forces were to pull heavy weapons out of the zone and jihadist groups to vacate it completely. All sides, including Turkey, set up military observation posts.</p>
<p>Claiming that jihadist groups did not leave the zone after more than a year, Syrian government forces launched an offensive in December 2019. The offensive displaced more than 900,000 civilians. </p>
<p>This was followed by the Syrian government forces attacking a Turkish observation post and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/03/turkish-soldiers-killed-battle-syria-idlib-assad">killing 13 Turkish soldiers</a>.</p>
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<p>Outraged, Turkey retaliated on February 2 with a counter-attack that killed Syrian soldiers and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/02/03/4-russian-special-forces-officers-killed-in-syria-reports-a69139">four members of Russian special forces</a>. Turkey also intensified its <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-10/turkey-deploys-tanks-commandos-to-break-sieges-in-syria-s-idlib">military build-up</a> in Idlib’s north.</p>
<p>On February 3, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan openly defied Russia with a visit to Ukraine, where he pledged <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200205-turkeys-erdogan-pledges-200m-to-ukraine-army/">US$200 million in military aid</a>. </p>
<p>On February 15, Erdogan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-erdogan/turkeys-erdogan-situation-in-idlib-wont-be-solved-until-syrian-forces-withdraw-idUSKBN2090QB">warned</a>:</p>
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<p>The solution in Idlib is the (Syrian) regime withdrawing to the borders in the agreements. Otherwise, we will handle this before the end of February.</p>
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<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-12/russia-pins-blame-on-turkey-for-first-time-for-syria-escalation">blamed Turkey</a> for failing to meet its obligations and continued to allege Turkey was supplying weapons to what Russia considers terrorist groups. </p>
<p>Erdogan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-kremlin-turkey/russia-accuses-turkey-of-breaking-syria-deals-rejects-erdogan-claim-idUSKBN2061EL">countered</a> these claims by saying Russian and Syrian government forces were “constantly attacking the civilian people, carrying out massacres, spilling blood”. </p>
<p>The greatest fear is an all-out war in Idlib and the inevitable civilian suffering. With more than a million civilians trying to survive in makeshift camps, a United Nations representative has <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2020/02/24/syria-un-warns-bloodbath-idlib/">warned</a> of “a real bloodbath”.</p>
<h2>Why is Idlib so important?</h2>
<p>Capturing Idlib has immense strategic significance for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as it is the last opposition stronghold in Syria.</p>
<p>Backed by Russia, Assad has been conducting a successful military offensive against jihadist opposition forces throughout the country to regain and consolidate his power since 2015. He has allowed remnants of these groups to escape to Idlib as a deliberate strategy to gather all opposition forces in one location.</p>
<p>So far, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45403334">Idlib has been controlled</a> by a range of opposition groups. The most powerful is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was formed by a large faction that split from the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda in 2017.</p>
<p>Capturing Idlib with the help of Russia and clearing the province of all armed opposition would allow Assad to declare victory and end the civil war. </p>
<h2>Turkish and Russian clash of interests in Syria</h2>
<p>Erdogan had three main goals in his Syrian involvement. First, prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria. The Turkish fear such a development could inspire the large Kurdish-populated southeast regions of Turkey to pursue similar ambitions.</p>
<p>The second is to fight a proxy war in Syria through jihadist groups to topple the Assad regime and establish an Islamist government. Erdogan hoped this would extend his political influence in the Middle East and his ambitions to make political Islam dominant would be achieved.</p>
<p>A third aim is to do with maintaining his 18-year rule in Turkey amid political and economic problems. A war in Syria serves to silence critics. </p>
<p>Erdogan calculated he could achieve his goals if he was to have forces in Syria and collaborate with Russia and Iran. The cost was distancing Turkey from the Western block and increasing its international alienation.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">As Turkish troops move in to Syria, the risks are great – including for Turkey itself</a>
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<p>Turkey, Russia, Iran and the Syrian government wanted to balance Western and particularly US power in Syria, and if possible to push US out of Syria. Even though their relationships were <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-russia-and-turkey-the-uneasy-alliance-reshaping-world-politics-71079">fragile</a> from the start, these four countries were extremely careful on the diplomatic table and presented a powerful bloc against US involvement in Syria.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ceasefire-in-syria-is-ending-heres-whats-likely-to-happen-now-125492">Russian strategy</a> in Syria has been clear from the start – support the Assad government until it regains control over all Syrian territory and defeats all opposition forces. Then Russia can control Turkey so it does not cause serious armed conflict with the Assad regime, while protecting Russian interests in Syria and the greater Middle East.</p>
<p>Russia has invested enormous funds in support of the Assad government. The only way to recoup its costs and have return on investment is if Assad achieves a full victory. Nothing short of capturing Idlib will suffice, even if it means open conflict with Turkey.</p>
<h2>What is likely to happen next?</h2>
<p>Erdogan is caught in a dilemma. He is unable to influence the Syrian opposition parties in Idlib, but he is also not prepared to forsake them. If he withdraws support, they may possibly retaliate with terrorist attacks in Turkey.</p>
<p>Another flood of Syrian refugees is a serious problem for Erdogan. He <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-loses-istanbul-reasons-and-implications">lost local government elections</a> in 2019 largely due to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey. </p>
<p>It is hard to predict what Erdogan will do in Syria. He is either bluffing or is determined to stay the course, even if it means war. He has shown he is not afraid to make bold moves, as demonstrated with his October 2019 <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">military operation</a> in northern Syria and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51626743">recent military involvement</a> in the Libya conflict.</p>
<p>Bluffing or not, Putin is not backing down and will not hesitate to take on Turkey in Syria. In doing so, Putin will continue to support the Assad forces with equipment, military intelligence, air power and military expertise, rather than being involved in open military conflict. This strategy allows Russia to claim Syria is exercising its legitimate right to defend its sovereign territory against a foreign Turkish military presence. </p>
<p>It is likely Erdogan will avert the risk of war at the last moment. He has involved the US, which has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-19/trump-backs-erdogan-as-turkey-rejects-russia-s-proposal-on-syria">expressed its support</a> for Turkey and hopes to see Assad gone. He has used his <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-syria-united-states-ankara-change-of-heart-on-nato.html">NATO membership card</a> and the European fear of another Syrian refugee flood to bring European powers onside at the diplomatic table.</p>
<p>Erdogan will be happy and claim victory if he manages to enlarge the safety zone with a continued Turkish presence there. Russia would only accept this on the condition that all jihadist opposition groups leave Idlib. On these terms, both sides could claim a win from the present dangerous tension.</p>
<p>The likely <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/idlib-russia-rejects-truce-as-violence-mounts/a-52530985">Russian response</a> is to go all the way in Idlib, regardless of what Turkey does. Any Turkish military success in Syria is highly unlikely. Russia completely controls the airspace and could inflict serious damage on Turkish ground troops. </p>
<p>It is in Russia’s interests to finish this costly civil war once and for all. It is only a matter of time before the Assad government captures Idlib diplomatically or by force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131830/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and research Academy of Australia.</span></em></p>The contested province of Idlib has become a focus of the conflict, which has become increasingly violent and dangerous.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1318522020-02-19T14:55:25Z2020-02-19T14:55:25ZIn Syria’s Idlib, Turkey is trying to play middle man between Russia and the US – with little success<p>The recent turn of events in Idlib, an opposition stronghold in north-western Syria undergoing bombardment by the Syrian military, has put Turkey in a difficult position. Since the end of January, Syrian regime forces have <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-soldiers-killed-deaths-assad-syria-idlib-attack-a9327831.html">killed 13 Turkish soldiers</a> who were <a href="https://www.ahaber.com.tr/video/gundem-videolari/idlib-saldirisi-sonrasi-abdden-turkiyeye-kritik-ziyaret-suriye-konusu-masada">monitoring a tense ceasefire in Idlib</a>. It now looks like the Syrian army is <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/syrian-regime-offensive-turkey-army.html">gradually winning the battle</a> for Idlib. </p>
<p>For the past few years, Turkey has played its alliances with Russia and the US interchangeably to affect the turn of events in northern Syria. Its goal is to protect its sphere of influence from both Kurdish rebels and the forces of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. But Turkey lacks a long-term strategy to settle the humanitarian crisis in the Idlib province and the military crisis that its allies – the Syrian rebels – face. </p>
<p>Turkey is returning to the go-between role it played during the Cold War, when it sought to <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780230109537">play the West off against Russia</a> and vice versa. It is now looking to make short-term gains, mainly against the Kurds in Syria. But this is having drastic consequences for the people in the region. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-safe-zones-what-is-driving-the-unexpected-rapprochement-between-the-us-and-turkey-122292">Syria safe zones: what is driving the unexpected rapprochement between the US and Turkey?</a>
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<h2>Escalation of military conflict in Idlib</h2>
<p>In 2017, Turkey, Russia and Iran established a trilateral mechanism to maintain stability in northern Syria. At a 2018 summit in the Russian resort of Sochi, the Turkish government promised to control the jihadist groups in Idlib and subsequently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/first-turkish-military-convoy-enters-syrias-idlib-idUSKBN1CH31K">sent troops</a> to observe the de-escalation of conflict between the Syrian regime and the jihadists. </p>
<p>In the latest developments, the Syrian army started military operation against the jihadist groups in Idlib, a province in north-western Syrian near the Turkish border, <a href="http://www.diken.com.tr/abd-idlibde-bir-tasla-uc-kus-vurmak-istiyor/">in December 2019</a>. Some of the city’s residents <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/syrian-troops-close-strategic-idlib-town">fled to reach the safer zones</a> on the Turkish-Syrian border. The advance of the Syrian army, supported by Russian war planes, worried the Turkish political elites who had sought to control Idlib province as buffer zone against the Assad regime’s forces. </p>
<p>Following the deaths of the Turkish soldiers in Idlib, the country’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security/turkey-will-hit-syrian-government-forces-anywhere-if-troops-hurt-erdogan-idUSKBN2061G1">warned the Assad regime</a> of heavy consequences if the Syrian army continued to shell Turkish troops there. </p>
<p>Despite the cosiness between the two authoritarian presidents, this time, Russia has not endorsed the Turkish position. In that sense, the Erdoğan administration is <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/2016-08-25/turkey-intervenes-syria-under-umbrella-russia">exploiting Russian apathy</a> about Turkish incursions into Syria in the past few years. </p>
<p>While there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in recent years, Turkish politicians have made sure that Turkey has not disengaged with US over its Syrian policy either. In return, the US gave tacit approval to the Turkish invasion of northern Syria by pulling its soldiers away from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper-syria-kurds-turkey.html">region in late 2019</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-safe-zones-what-is-driving-the-unexpected-rapprochement-between-the-us-and-turkey-122292">Syria safe zones: what is driving the unexpected rapprochement between the US and Turkey?</a>
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<p>Russia argues that Turkey could not control the jihadist groups in Idlib, and so it in December 2019 it extended its support to the Syrian regime in its attack on Idlib. While Ankara remains <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/07/turkey-intervention-syria-idlib-assad-russia-putin/">adamant it does not want to clash directly</a> with Russia due to ongoing energy and military cooperation projects, it is turning towards the US and its Western allies for support. </p>
<h2>Stakes at play in Idlib province</h2>
<p>Idlib has become a buffer zone between the EU, Turkey and the Syrian regimes in terms of the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2019/12/23/turkey-warns-europe-of-new-refugee-crisis-as-syrian-forces-attack-idlib">region’s refugee crisis</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey already hosts over 4 million Syrian refugees. Conscious of the domestic political costs, the Erdoğan government has made it clear that Turkey <a href="https://tr.sputniknews.com/yasam/201901291037361854-sinir-kentlerindeki-turklerin-yuzde-yetmis-yedisi-suriyelileri-istemiyor/">cannot take any more refugees</a> and has closed the border to stop any refugees coming across from Idlib. Nationalist parties in Turkey have <a href="https://www.wionews.com/opinions-blogs/erdogan-battles-on-multiple-fronts-in-risky-regional-power-bid-280217">encouraged</a> Erdoğan to respond militarily to the Syrian regime. </p>
<p>In the immediate vicinity of the Turkish border, there are almost 2 million internally displaced Syrians. Following the recent clashes, around another 150,000 people <a href="https://www.independentturkish.com/node/134171/d%C3%BCnya/suriye-m%C3%BCdahale-koordinat%C3%B6rl%C3%BC%C4%9F%C3%BC-son-1-y%C4%B1lda-t%C3%BCrkiye-s%C4%B1n%C4%B1r%C4%B1-yak%C4%B1n%C4%B1na-1-milyon-942">moved towards the Turkish border</a>. A spokesperson for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party <a href="https://www.independentturkish.com/node/127766/siyaset/ak-parti-s%C3%B6zc%C3%BCs%C3%BC-b%C3%BCt%C3%BCn-avrupay%C4%B1-etkisi-alt%C4%B1na-alacak-bir-g%C3%B6%C3%A7-tehlikesinin-oldu%C4%9Fu">said the Idlib crisis</a> could unleash a major new migration crisis for Europe. </p>
<p>Both Turkey and Russia are using Syrian migrants as political and economic leverage against Europe. The Putin administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/251d44dc-4cc8-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5">aims to force EU countries</a> to recognise the Assad regime and to extend economic aid for reconstruction in return for halting refugee flows. </p>
<h2>Looking to the US for support</h2>
<p>Although Turkey and the US disagreed over the presence of Kurdish forces in north-eastern Syria, the two countries both had the Assad regime as their common enemy. Following the withdrawal of US troops from the north-east of Syria in late 2019, Turkey is now seeking US support to counteract a possible alliance between the Russian-backed Syrian regime and the Kurds in the region. </p>
<p>The US also needs Turkey to maintain its presence in Idlib. By doing so, it helps weaken the Assad regime’s position in the north-east, where there have been <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2020/02/12/us-troops-clash-with-assad-regime-forces-in-northeastern-syria">recent skirmishes</a> between the Syrian military and US forces still deployed in the country to fight Islamic State. By supporting Turkey, a NATO ally, in Idlib, the US hopes Erdoğan’s government will distance itself from its growing security cooperation with Russia. </p>
<p>It’s no surprise that the US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, <a href="https://twitter.com/SecPompeo/status/1227245058841366528">offered his condolences</a> to the families of Turkish soldiers who were killed by the regime. In a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-turkey-re-evaluate-situation-in-idlib/1731160">message spoken in Turkish</a>, the US special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, also expressed US solidarity with Turkey against the Russian and Iranian backed-Assad regime. </p>
<p>Turkey has sought to align with both rival superpowers, the US and Russia, to protect its interests during the Syrian civil war. But as that war nears its end, Turkey risks clashing with the Assad regime in its bid to remain on Syrian territory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Umut Korkut receives funding from Hoziron 2020 funded project RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Migration in Europe and Beyond. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tarik Basbugoglu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Syrian forces bombard the opposition enclave of Idlib, Turkey lacks an ongoing strategy.Umut Korkut, Chair professor, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityTarik Basbugoglu, PhD Candidate, Glasgow Caledonian UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.