tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/immigration-and-integration-in-britain-33194/articlesImmigration and integration in Britain – The Conversation2016-11-17T10:32:05Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/686102016-11-17T10:32:05Z2016-11-17T10:32:05ZBritain is becoming more diverse, not more segregated<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146274/original/image-20161116-13512-11ecwk6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">IR Stone/www.shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The percentage decline in the white British population in some urban areas of England has been used in <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/ted-cantle-and-eric-kaufmann/is-segregation-on-increase-in-uk">a recent, controversial report</a> to suggest that segregation is on the increase. But ahead of the imminent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/people/louise-casey">publication of a government review</a> into integration which will focus on segregation and extremism, we need to look carefully at the evidence on how ethnic segregation and diversity have changed in recent decades. </p>
<p>Misuses of the loaded terms “segregation”, “polarisation”, “integration” and “diversity” can fuel social divisions and misunderstandings between communities. These issues are receiving renewed political attention, and as a consequence the debate must not be muddied by an uncritical use of terminology or a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/wfd/ted-cantle-and-eric-kaufmann/is-segregation-on-increase-in-uk">lack of clarity</a> on what is being measured. This can create confusion about the ways in which neighbourhoods have changed their ethnic make-up, and what this says about relations between different groups. </p>
<p>We can be clear about several features of ethnic population change. Britain is becoming much more ethnically diverse, and at the same time, less segregated. Taken simply as our likelihood of living next door to someone of a different ethnicity, our neighbourhoods have <a href="http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/medialibrary/briefingsupdated/has-neighbourhood-ethnic-segregation-decreased.pdf">never been more ethnically mixed</a>. </p>
<p>This can be seen in <a href="https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3004437/1/Catney_2016_Urban%20Studies_Segregation_Repos.pdf">analysis of residential segregation</a> for each ethnic group using the “index of dissimilarly” – an indicator of the geographic spread of ethnic groups. Comparing census data in 2001 and 2011 shows a pattern of decreasing segregation between ethnic groups – between each minority ethnic group and between the white British and each minority group. </p>
<h2>Segregation is different to diversity</h2>
<p>It is <a href="http://www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/segregation-isnt-white-minority">critical</a> that segregation is not conflated with diversity.</p>
<p>Take, say, a neighbourhood which in 2001 was 80% white British and 20% Indian, and in 2011 was 25% white British, 25% Indian, 25% Pakistani and 25% black Caribbean. The 2011 neighbourhood should only be understood as more segregated if the proportion of white British is seen as the “gold standard” of ethnic mixing. </p>
<p>Rather, it is more diverse, now home to several ethnic groups. This is the case for numerous census wards where, between 1991 and 2011, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/psp.1954/abstract">diversity spread out geographically</a>, growing in traditionally diverse urban areas and in rural areas. </p>
<p>This spatial diffusion of diversity is down to reasons which are far from headline-grabbing: migration out of cities to suburban and rural areas for a bigger house, green spaces, a quieter lifestyle. This process is much more to do with <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00400.x/full">socio-economic class than ethnicity</a>. And so it highlights the need to tackle the worryingly <a href="https://policypress.co.uk/ethnic-identity-and-inequalities-in-britain#book-detail-tabs-stison-block-content-1-0-tab0">persistent ethnic inequalities</a> between white British and minority groups, which may prevent some from achieving their aspirations for where they want to live. </p>
<p>There is a current focus on a <a href="http://www.socialintegrationappg.org.uk/">“two way street”</a> approach to developing inter-group relationships, which says that both minority groups and the majority are responsible for integration. This is more helpful than focusing on one minority group, which serves only to isolate and stigmatise – something experienced by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-british-muslims-alienated-by-us-versus-them-rhetoric-of-counter-terrorism-46117#comment_800384">UK’s Muslim population</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146256/original/image-20161116-13526-3jwjwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Everyone is responsible for social integration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thinglass/shutterstock.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Sex, death and moving house</h2>
<p>Yet we must be careful that we are not searching for a problem to be solved. Natural demographic momentum – births, mortality, and migration – is bringing people of different ethnic groups together, rather than moving them apart. It is not surprising that there is growth of minority groups in areas where <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/psp.1954/full">they are already populous</a>, since we would expect groups which are increasing their population size (because <a href="http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/medialibrary/briefings/dynamicsofdiversity/what-makes-ethnic-group-populations-grow-age-structures-and-immigration.pdf">they have young age profiles</a>) to grow in the area where they currently live. </p>
<p>The declines in white British populations within many areas will be due to a combination of internal migration, emigration, and mortality in an ageing ethnic group. Movement out of London, and several other large cities, will almost inevitably be to a less diverse neighbourhood since urban areas are much more diverse than the rest of the country. Since minority ethnic groups are <a href="https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3004467/">growing in these less diverse, more rural, locales</a>, the end result is greater ethnic mixing. </p>
<p>While the overall picture is greater sharing of neighbourhoods between people of different ethnic groups, the processes behind this pattern are as ordinary as they get: sex, death and moving house. </p>
<p>This is not to paint an overly rosy picture. The vote for Brexit demonstrates the need to improve social relations and understandings between different communities, and to consider the concerns of disenfranchised groups. But we need to be clear about what the statistics can actually tell us.</p>
<p>Segregation means different things to different people, but tends to conjure images of minority – not white – concentration, and of negative outcomes: deprivation, isolation, and, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech">most dramatically, extremism</a>. It is often seen as undesirable, as something to be solved, whereas concepts like neighbourhood belonging, or local social networks, are generally understood as positive. </p>
<p>Segregation can have both good and bad outcomes, and can be the consequence of both positive and negative processes. Given the different social meanings of segregation and the complexities of its measurement, commentary on this topic needs to be aware of its potential uses and abuses. </p>
<p>There are multiple layers in which people may mix outside their residential environment – they may go to work, socialise, attend religious services, shop, or exercise with others from a myriad of different backgrounds. Combined with the changing ethnic make-up of neighbourhoods, we are more likely than ever to encounter someone with a different ethnicity to our own.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gemma Catney receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust. </span></em></p>And it’s largely to do with sex, death and moving house.Gemma Catney, Lecturer in Human Geography, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/660772016-11-16T13:22:24Z2016-11-16T13:22:24ZThe huge political cost of Blair’s decision to allow Eastern European migrants unfettered access to Britain<p>The future of immigration from the European Union into Britain is likely to dominate the kind of deal Britain gets after Brexit. In a <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-25/brexit-bulletin-britons-care-more-about-immigration-than-trade">survey</a> conducted in mid-October by Survation for ITV news about the post-Brexit future, 56% of respondents were more concerned about immigration than they were about maintaining trade benefits. </p>
<p>To understand why Britain became so opposed to migration from the EU, it’s key to understand a decision made by the Labour government in 2004, which has had lasting political repercussions. </p>
<p>In May 2004, the EU welcomed ten new member states – the majority from Central and Eastern Europe – in what was the largest expansion in the history of European integration. The UK was one of only three member states, alongside Sweden and Ireland, to open its labour market to these new EU citizens immediately. </p>
<p>At the time, Labour’s decision was largely uncontroversial and met with bipartisan support in parliament. Yet this was to be perhaps Tony Blair’s greatest unintended legacy and ultimately a contributor to his party’s electoral defeat in years to come.</p>
<p>Although ten countries became EU member states in 2004, attention focused on the “A8 countries”. These were Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. </p>
<p>While the number of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe into the UK was predicted to be in the region of <a href="http://www.ucl.ac.uk/%7Euctpb21/reports/HomeOffice25_03.pdf">5,000 to 13,000</a> on the assumption that other member states would also open their labour markets, most didn’t. And the flows turned out to be over 20 times the upper end of this estimate. </p>
<p>In 2004 and 2005, <a href="http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/Sopemi_UK_2015.pdf">129,000 migrants from the A8 countries entered Britain</a>, according to research by migration researcher John Salt that takes into account various ways of measuring immigration.</p>
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<h2>Tide turns against free movement</h2>
<p>Labour’s wider <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1045711?journalCode=cjms20">managed migration programme was expansive</a>, a package of reforms designed to expand labour migration routes and above all embrace the positive economic benefits of immigration from around the world. But these reforms paled in significance to this single decision, <a href="http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/Sopemi_UK_2015.pdf">with 112,000 A8 nationals entering the UK in 2007 alone</a>. </p>
<p>Labour’s decision ignited the debate on whether free movement was a wholly positive thing. Since then Britain has had 12 years of public debates on welfare shopping, job displacement and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/06/eu-foreignpolicy">social dumping</a> – the exploitation of cheap labour. UKIP successfully intertwined immigration and EU membership in its appeal to the British electorate. And the Conservative-led coalition government’s framing of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_government.pdf">immigration as a problem</a> paved the way for a public less enthused with free mobility. </p>
<p>Come June 23 2016, the British public decided by a slim majority that the benefits of EU membership did not outweigh the costs, and for many the perceived <a href="https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/epop/files/2016/07/Clarke-Goodwin-and-Whiteley.pdf">cost of free movement was the deciding factor</a>. </p>
<h2>What led to the decision</h2>
<p>So why did the Labour government take such a politically risky decision back in 2004? For a decision which had such large ramifications both politically and on Britain’s population, there was a surprising lack of debate. There were two reasons for this. First, the government had assumed that other member states would open their labour markets and so diffuse migration flows. Second, the decision was perceived and framed among the British political elite as a geopolitical matter rather than one focused on immigration.</p>
<p>While Britain confirmed the decision in late 2002, most other member states did not make the decision until early 2004. The UK economy was booming at this time, leading to demand for workers. Conversely, other states such as Germany <a href="http://fduvell.tumblr.com/post/48683038614/germany-drops-labour-migration-restrictions-f">were suffering from economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment</a>. </p>
<p>In Germany, Austria, France and Italy, months of public debate <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present">led to the imposition of transitional controls</a>, largely because of fears over job displacement, and in turn pressure from <a href="ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14000&langId=en">trade unions</a>. Despite the early rhetoric of embracing free movement from these “old states”, at the eleventh hour, 12 out of 15 of them imposed restrictions to varying degrees, with Germany and Austria imposing the maximum seven-year period. This meant that citizens of the new member states had to wait until 2011 until they could freely work in Germany and Austria. </p>
<p>Given the complexity of migration flows, it’s not possible to say definitively whether more people migrated to the UK from the A8 countries than would have done had more EU member states opened their labour markets in 2004, but this wouldn’t be an unfair assumption. </p>
<h2>Managing migration and building allies</h2>
<p>The decision was certainly presented as part of the British government’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment.../6472.pdf">wider managed migration policy</a> – and within this framework, it made logical sense. </p>
<p>Yet the decision was also conversely part of the wider control agenda to reduce irregular immigration. Visa restrictions for citizens from Eastern European countries <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-europe-past-and-present">had been lifted in 2001, so de facto labour mobility</a> was already taking place. Given that the UK would have no power to deport the new EU citizens, the government’s view was that it would be better to make sure the workers who came did so legally, allowing the government to focus on deporting illegal immigrants. </p>
<p>Yet the main rationale for this decision had very little to do with immigration per se, but rather diplomacy. Britain was a keen supporter and indeed a “driver” of accession of Central and Eastern European countries into the EU from early on, <a href="http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108296">with Margaret Thatcher setting the precedent</a>. This was principally due to trading ties and a foreign policy interest in forging alliances with these states at the EU level. </p>
<h2>The benefit of hindsight</h2>
<p>So one of the largest immigration flows to Britain was not altogether an immigration policy. In retrospect, if the government had known just how large this wave of migration would be, it would have undoubtedly made a different decision, as Jack Straw, the former home secretary, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24924219">admitted in 2013</a>.</p>
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<p>The decision to allow citizens of the A8 countries free movement to come to the UK was <a href="http://voxeu.org/article/fiscal-effects-a8-migration-uk">fiscally sound</a> but politically costly. The unexpectedly large migration from Central and Eastern Europe lent the impression that Labour could not control the borders. This is an issue which continues to dog the Labour party and contributed to electoral defeats in <a href="http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/2769">2010</a> and <a href="http://labourlist.org/2016/05/labours-future-what-we-can-learn-from-the-election-loss/">2015</a>. </p>
<p>Poles and other Central and Eastern European citizens have enriched the UK culturally and economically. Nonetheless, such large and rapid immigration alerted the public to the implications of free movement, and in turn the apparent costs of membership of the EU.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erica Consterdine has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. She currently works on a Fp7 funded project <a href="http://www.temperproject.eu">http://www.temperproject.eu</a> </span></em></p>In 2004 the Labour government allowed citizens of the 10 new EU states labour market access. Why did Blair make this decision?Erica Consterdine, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Immigration Politics & Policy, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/670932016-11-15T11:15:13Z2016-11-15T11:15:13ZBritain’s obsession with net migration makes it a global anomaly<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145806/original/image-20161114-5101-136dbs0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">1000 Words/Shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ever since David Cameron pledged to significantly <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/tory-immigration-pledge-failed-spectacularly-as-figures-show-net-migration-nearly-three-times-as-10071710.html">reduce net migration</a> back in 2010, the term has featured prominently within British political and media debates. The Vote Leave campaign made net migration a central theme in the 2016 referendum on Britain’s EU membership, and migration continues to be one of the <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/projects/migration-and-brexit/">most contentious issues</a> in British politics. </p>
<p>In basic terms, <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6639">net migration</a> is the difference between the number of people arriving to and leaving from an area within a given period of time. On a national scale, it is the balance of immigration and emigration. So if the net migration value is positive it means more people have immigrated to a country than emigrated. Conversely, if the value is negative, more people would have emigrated than immigrated. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016">latest figures for the UK</a> estimate that net migration in 2015 was +327,000, with roughly twice as many people arriving from abroad than leaving.</p>
<p>The current government’s policy is to reduce net migration below 100,000. But the Office for Budget Responsibility <a href="http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/March2016EFO.pdf">projected in March 2016</a> that the net migration rate will be 185,000 in 2021. The UK is the only country in Europe with an official maximum net migration target.</p>
<p>Net migration in the UK is monitored by the Office of National Statistics (ONS), which uses the international standard designation <a href="http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/migration/migrmethods.htm">of long-term migrant</a> (LTM) to classify immigrants and emigrants in the UK. LTM’s are defined as people who resettle in a new country for a period of at least a year. The number of LTM’s arriving and leaving Britain is calculated through the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforhouseholdsandindividuals/householdandindividualsurveys/internationalpassengersurveyips">International Passenger Survey</a>, which has been used since 1961 to collect data from travellers arriving and leaving the UK. </p>
<p>The ONS crosschecks its net migration figures with data from the national census. After the last census in 2011, the ONS published adjusted figures for the period 2001 to 2011 that <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/immigration-by-category-workers-students-family-members-asylum-applicants/">showed</a> overall net migration in that decade was significantly higher than its <a href="https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/304">statistics had initially suggested</a>. For example, in 2008 the ONS estimated net migration at 163,000, while the revised figure using the 2011 census data estimated it was actually 229,000.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145802/original/image-20161114-5078-2w1p6u.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Long-term international migration to the UK, 2006 to 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016">Office for National Statistics</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>How Britain compares</h2>
<p>On a global scale, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/PUBLICATIONS/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2112rank.html">71 countries will have positive net migration in 2016</a>, according to data collated by the CIA in the US. This includes economically advanced counties such as the US, Australia, Germany and the UK but also low income countries such as Botswana and South Sudan. </p>
<p>Relative to its population, per capita net migration to the UK in 2015 was <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do;jsessionid=XkMlgNIm9tm4womLExSthUJckKVf5Ca-n2NncrT1VEC16dUGLkZL!-806456694?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde230">6.1 people per 1,000 inhabitants</a>, which places it behind a number of other northern European countries. </p>
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<p>So while the UK’s net migration rate does not stand out internationally, the debate about this number is markedly more heated than in other developed countries. Most European countries, even those with previously restrictive immigration polices such as <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/new-german-law-skirts-comprehensive-immigration-reform">Germany</a> and <a href="http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/shifting-focus-policies-support-labor-market-integration-new-immigrants-france">France</a>, have gradually recognised that immigration is an essential tool to address an ageing working population. Both countries have subsequently implemented more <a href="http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_41.pdf">liberal immigration</a> policies, particularly in regards to <a href="https://blog.migreat.com/2015/05/22/a-start-up-visa-in-france/">skilled labour migration</a>. </p>
<p>Due to strong public pressure, British immigration policies have been presented, for the most part, <a href="https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/15.3">as a way to</a> prevent demographic growth. Plans to reduce net migration <a href="http://conservativehome.blogs.com/torydiary/files/population.pdf">by current and previous Conservative governments</a> are presented as a strategy to stop the population from reaching supposed unsustainable levels that could lead to housing shortages or increase hospital waiting times. </p>
<h2>Who is coming in and out</h2>
<p>Drilling down into the overall net migration figures, they encompass four broad legal categories of migrants. First, British nationals, moving out and back into the country. Second, citizens of the <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/eu-migration-to-and-from-the-uk/">European Economic Area (EEA)</a>, who have made up almost half of net migration to the UK since 2002. The UK government cannot legally place any limitations on these two groups. </p>
<p>This leaves the third group – non-EEA nationals – as the only ones that the government can currently restrict. The vast majority of <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016">non-EEA arrivals in 2015</a> were either students (204,000) and skilled professionals on work visas (166,000). </p>
<p>While students provide substantial financial contributions to <a href="http://institutions.ukcisa.org.uk/Info-for-universities-colleges--schools/Policy-research--statistics/Policy-and-lobbying/Impact-of-international-students/">British universities</a>, skilled professionals fill vital gaps in the UK labour market. From a purely <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/governmentresponse.pdf">economic standpoint</a>, it makes little sense to limit the migration of students and skilled workers – yet <a href="http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/studentnews/708/6-April-changes-to-the-Immigration-Rules-">significant restrictions</a> have been placed on both visa categories in recent years.</p>
<p>The fourth category is asylum seekers as well as people (spouses, children, parents) joining family members <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/non-european-migration-to-the-uk-family-unification-dependents/">already settled in the UK</a>. There were 44,000 asylum seekers and 38,000 people joining family members respectively in the <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016">year to March 2016</a>. But <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/international-migration-convention/">these two groups are legally</a> protected from immigration restrictions by international human rights norms that the UK adheres to. </p>
<h2>What Brexit would change</h2>
<p>Some politicians in the UK and some other <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/07/migration-crisis-italians-austria-border-fence-germany-merkel">economically advanced countries</a> are under the mistaken belief that immigration policy can be used to <a href="https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22152/1/MPRA_paper_22152.pdf">control migration flows</a> and subsequent net migration numbers. Those campaigning for Brexit heralded the UK’s departure from the EU as a chance to take back control, including control of how many European migrants could come to Britain. </p>
<p>But the push and pull factors that influence global migratory flows are often <a href="https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MHddFbZZKjoJ:https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-effectiveness-of-immigration-policies/%40%40download/file+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=firefox-b">beyond the legislative control</a> of national immigration policies. </p>
<p>The truth is that countries with strong economies attract migrant workers. Studies have shown again and again that employment is the single biggest driver of <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/pulling-power-eu-citizens-migrating-uk/">immigration to the UK</a>, both for skilled and low-skilled workers. Should the UK withdraw from the EU single market <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-brexit-tough-times-theresa-mays-britain-will-be-stretched-at-the-seams-66499">in a “hard Brexit”</a>, it’s possible that the changing economic circumstances and the devaluation of the British pound will serve to make Britain a less attractive destination for migrant workers from the EU and beyond.</p>
<p>Conversely, British skilled professionals and graduates could be motivated to seek career opportunities abroad. Recently both <a href="https://knoema.com/atlas/Ireland/topics/Demographics/Population/Net-migration-rate">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://knoema.com/atlas/Spain/topics/Demographics/Population/Net-migration-rate">Spain</a> have illustrated that changing economic circumstances can radically shift net migration numbers from positive to negative in less than two years. </p>
<p>Ironically, Brexit may very well facilitate a reduction of net migration numbers just as its proponents claim. But this will not be because of reclaimed national sovereignty over immigration from the EU, but because the post-Brexit economic turmoil will simply make Britain less attractive for foreign and domestic workers alike.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67093/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Semmelroggen receives funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada</span></em></p>Some perspective on the government’s net migration target.Jan Semmelroggen, Senior lecturer in Geography, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675872016-11-14T10:41:36Z2016-11-14T10:41:36ZWhat happened to integrating immigrants in Britain?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143320/original/image-20161026-11265-1rs40ye.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/nicksie2008/18412326629/sizes/l">The Nick Page/flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When I first came to the UK from the US in 2004, all the talk was about integration. This was just before Labour first rolled out the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4391710.stm">Life in the UK test</a>, which I took, and passed, in 2010 to secure indefinite leave to remain. That version of the test asked me questions about opening a bank account, landlord and tenant rights, and schooling. Earlier this year I took the test again, now in its <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/07/life-uk-test-has-morphed-barrier-immigration">third iteration</a>, with Labour’s bank account questions replaced by the questions added by the Conservatives about Henry VIII’s wives. I passed and naturalised as a British citizen. </p>
<p>As a sociologist of immigration, I have maintained a professional interest in these debates and discussions about integration over the years. But as an ordinary immigrant, and then citizen, I found myself somewhat less absorbed by all this integration talk. As a way to test – or achieve – integration, the Life in the UK test struck me in turns as feeble, risible, and misguided.</p>
<p>But the fundamental message conveyed to immigrants by all this integration talk was “make yourself at home”. And so I did. I didn’t think much of it at the time, but all that background chatter about integration was probably helping me get on with my life in the UK.</p>
<h2>The immigrant ‘threat’</h2>
<p>Fast forward 12 years to 2016, and there is no longer much discussion about integration. The discussion has moved to immigration. Even though I naturalised as a British citizen earlier this year, I’ve never felt more like a foreigner.</p>
<p>We can debate when immigration reared its nasty head as a political problem. We’ve seen it all before, but the current version seems to have crystallised in the 2015 general election when both the Conservatives and Labour jumped on UKIP’s anti-immigration bandwagon, endorsing the view that immigration required our urgent attention.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"582190342931419137"}"></div></p>
<p>As a political problem, immigration quickly became a growth industry. The debate about the EU soon became a debate about immigration, and at the Conservative party conference in September, the Tories made sure that immigration would dominate Brexit negotiations.</p>
<p>The Tories sought, and found, new categories of problem immigrants: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/03/jeremy-hunt-promises-to-end-nhs-reliance-on-overseas-doctors-after-brexit">NHS doctors</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2016/oct/04/amber-rudd-comes-down-on-immigration-and-foreign-workers-video">foreign workers in firms</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/07/lse-brexit-non-uk-experts-foreign-academics">foreign academic advisers</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/oct/04/conservative-conference-theresa-mays-morning-broadcast-interviews-politics-live?page=with:block-57f39356e4b0a497243b6d6b#block-57f39356e4b0a497243b6d6b">overseas students</a>, and even <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/11805477/Nicky-Morgan-orders-immigration-review-to-examine-education-tourism.html">children of immigrant origin in our schools</a>.</p>
<p>We’re told we only want the “best and the brightest” immigrants. But what about those of us who are a bit thick – are we not welcome here? What about the low-skilled workers serving us our coffee at Costa every morning? Some of them make a mean latte, but others – let’s be honest – could perhaps benefit from a “Barista in the UK” test. Should we be sending them back to the countries whence they came? I don’t think so. </p>
<h2>Not displacing British workers</h2>
<p>For politicians, immigration is a problem that must be urgently dealt with. In her speech to the Conservative party conference in September, the prime minister, Theresa May, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/05/theresa-may-consigns-cameron-to-history-in-populist-speech">said that</a> many people “find themselves out of work or lower wages because of low-skilled immigration”.</p>
<p>But the social scientists studying these very questions (including the Home Office’s own <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/327997/MAC-Migrants_in_low-skilled_work__Full_report_2014.pdf">Migration Advisory Committee</a>) show us that low-skilled European migration has not displaced British workers, <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/labour-market-effects-immigration">lowered their wages, or increased their unemployment</a>. </p>
<p>The problem here is not so much in the economic impact of immigration on British workers, but in the divisive politics of scapegoating. And this immigration problem is in danger of becoming an integration problem. The Eastern Europeans who <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-must-stop-looking-at-eu-migrants-as-coming-from-two-europes-the-east-and-everywhere-else-58007">are at the heart</a> of this immigration debate are here to stay. While we’ve been going on about immigration they’ve been going on about making their lives here, and many of them began doing this a long time ago.</p>
<h2>Made to feel unwelcome</h2>
<p>We should be redoubling our efforts to integrate immigrants into the fold of British society. But we’re too busy reminding ourselves how much of a problem “immigrants” – these very same people – are causing us. We make it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/oct/04/conservative-conference-theresa-mays-morning-broadcast-interviews-politics-live?page=with:block-57f39356e4b0a497243b6d6b">more difficult for them to get jobs</a>, even though there’s <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/labour-market-effects-immigration">no evidence that they compete directly with British workers</a>. We make it <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26254735">harder for them to access in-work benefits</a>, even though European migrants pay more into the system <a href="http://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_22_13.pdf">than they take out in benefits</a>. We <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10358569/End-of-free-NHS-care-for-migrants-under-new-bill.html">limit their access to the NHS</a>, requiring them to pay for services even when they’re making national insurance contributions. And we charge them <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/507609/Master_Fees_Leaflet_2016_03_08_v0_3.pdf">£1,236</a> if they deign to try to join our country as full citizens.</p>
<p>Everything we’re doing is making it harder for them to become full members of British society. Add to this the xenophobia, racially motivated attacks, and toxic political rhetoric, and it’s no wonder that immigrants – myself included – are beginning to feel unwelcome here. </p>
<p>In the past I didn’t think that much about integration. But that was the point, I suppose: it allowed me to quietly get on with the business of integrating, in my own way, at my own pace. All this talk now about immigration is having the opposite effect: it’s getting in the way of integration. Multiply that by several million and you have a recipe for acrimony, division, and suspicion for a generation to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67587/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon Fox received funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>Immigrants used to be told to make themselves at home. Not any more.Jon Fox, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.