tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/iranian-revolutionary-guard-70508/articlesIranian Revolutionary Guard – The Conversation2020-01-13T14:28:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297712020-01-13T14:28:16Z2020-01-13T14:28:16ZThe long history and current consequences of the Iranian-American conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309568/original/file-20200112-103982-13c2pwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4500%2C2701&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters chant slogans and hold up posters of Qassem Soleimani during a demonstration in front of the British Embassy in Tehran on Jan. 12, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Understanding historical cause and effect can be difficult and contentious. The downing of Ukrainian International Airlines Flight PS752 is a prime example. </p>
<p>While there’s now no question about the Iranian regime’s responsibility for attack, the broader blame game is ongoing. Indeed, it is integral to Tehran’s defence in the face of international condemnation and increasing domestic unrest.</p>
<p>Historians trace the state of Iranian-American relations to 1953, when the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/">Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated a coup against Mohammed Mossadegh</a> and installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a puppet ruler for 25 years.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this September 1951 photo, Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh rides on the shoulders of cheering crowds outside Tehran’s parliament building after reiterating his oil nationalization views to his supporters. The U.S. overthrew his government two years later.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo, File</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 1978 Iranian Revolution ensued, ultimately producing the authoritarian theocracy in power today. Iran’s brutal war from 1980 to 1988 with neighbouring Iraq, then an American ally, helped to entrench the Islamist regime and fuelled further enmity with the U.S. </p>
<p>So too has constant American support for Israel and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s wide-ranging <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/iran-uses-proxies-punch-above-its-weight-middle-east-experts-n1008731">“proxy wars” in the Middle East</a> through militias and terrorist organizations. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-invasion-iraq-anniversary-how-it-changed-middle-east-country-2018-3">the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq</a> provided a lightning rod for conflict. It simultaneously threatened Iran with perceived regime change while creating the conditions for the country’s expanded influence in the region <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-shia-shift-why-iran-hezbollah-abandoned-martyrdom-25992">through control of disaffected Shia.</a> <a href="https://apnews.com/a0557de2499d53eb9d298bbea35bb9d8">The subsequent civil war in Syria</a>, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the ongoing conflict in Yemen furthered opportunities for Tehran to project its power.</p>
<h2>Support for reformists</h2>
<p>To be sure, there have been glimmers of hope for a better relationship over the years. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-14/irans-green-movement-never-went-away">The so-called Green Movement</a> in Iran in 2009 signalled that not all was well with the fundamentalist regime. Support for reformists since the late 1990s, while intermittent, also points to a more diverse, progressive society in Iran than is often imagined.</p>
<p>On the international stage, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (better known as the Iran nuclear deal) provided at least an initial framework for dialogue, however debatable its effectiveness. But that process ended with the withdrawal from the protocol in 2018 by Donald Trump’s administration. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/obituaries/qassem-soleimani-dead.html">The more recent decision to assassinate Qassem Soleimani,</a> major general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and commander of the Quds Force — and one of the most important officials in the Iranian government — was an even more obvious hard turn away from any diplomacy with Tehran.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s murder necessitated a response from Iran. </p>
<p>After many threats, that response was Iranian missile attacks on American military bases in Iraq. It was an expected and relatively restrained response from a regime cornered between appearing tough in the face of American aggression and running the risk of a major military escalation with the U.S. that could conceivably imperil its very existence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-vows-revenge-for-soleimanis-killing-but-heres-why-it-wont-seek-direct-confrontation-with-the-us-129440">Iran vows revenge for Soleimani's killing, but here's why it won't seek direct confrontation with the US</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It is of course too early to know if that’s the extent of Tehran’s response. Soleimani’s death is a major blow to Iranian operations in Iraq and Syria, where he served as the political and military point-man. At the head of the Quds Force, he ran myriad clandestine operations through proxies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and Afghanistan. The U.S. ranked him as one of the most important terrorists in the world.</p>
<h2>Soleimani a national hero</h2>
<p>Soleimani’s assassination was taken as a clear, personal attack on the regime and particularly Iran’s theocracy. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this picture released by the official website of the office of the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks to a group of residents of the city of Qom, in Iran on Jan. 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Quite separate from the Iranian military, the IRGC answers directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Historically, the IRGC has also been a kind of barometer of the regime’s integrity with the Iranian populace.</p>
<p>Initially the vanguard of the revolution, the IRGC came to epitomize the oppressive nature of clerical rule and had lost much of its support among Iranians. </p>
<p>Soleimani was key to its rehabilitation, especially in the face of what many saw as American military adventurism in the Middle East.</p>
<p>His status as a national hero was premised largely on the notion that the IRGC was, once again, defending Iranian sovereignty: challenging the U.S. and its allies throughout the region. In many respects he had tapped into an <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iraq-and-iran-have-nationalists-too/604573/">even deeper sense of Persian nationalism</a> — he represented the legitimate regional aspirations of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/08/if-trump-knew-anything-about-iran-he-would-never-have-threatened-its-culture/">an ancient and proud people</a>, long besieged by enemies on all fronts. He was, to some degree, a symbol of unity in a fractured state.</p>
<p>It is dangerous to leap from Soleimani’s death to the downing of Flight PS752, or to ultimately blame Washington as Iran now seeks to do. But cause and effect still cast their shadows. </p>
<h2>Iran feared further escalation</h2>
<p>Clearly Iranian authorities feared military escalation from the U.S. after their reprisal for the assassination. And clearly their fears were exacerbated by incompetency evident now on multiple levels, particularly the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority for not closing airspace over Tehran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">Flight PS752: A deadly combination of Iran's recklessness and incompetence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Most problematic for the regime is that the IRGC — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-crash-missiles-explainer/explainer-missile-system-suspected-of-bringing-down-airliner-short-range-fast-and-deadly-idUSKBN1Z90A1">the only unit with the Russian-made Tor system in question</a> — ultimately bears responsibility for launching the missiles. Admitting to the attack, especially after a series of vigorous denials, has humiliated the regime. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iran-iraq-crash-soleimani-trump-1.5423238">Evidenced by anti-government protests in Iran</a> soon after its admission, it’s also exposed the leadership to precisely what it fears most: the domestic opposition it has been battling for years.</p>
<p>Often overlooked by Westerners in this calculation is the 1988 Iranian Airlines Flight 655 incident, when missiles from the USS Vincennes <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">were mistakenly launched at the civilian jet, killing all on board.</a> </p>
<p>That event became a central pillar of the clerics’ attempts to carve a collective Iranian identity built principally on vehement anti-Americanism, and to consequently legitimize their own control. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this July 1988 file photo, a funeral procession is held for six Pakistani and Indian nationals who were killed aboard Iran Air Flight 655.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Commemorated in speeches, educational curriculums, even postage stamps, Flight 655 reinforced notions that Iran was perpetually under attack. Indeed, just a couple of days before the attack on Ukrainian International Airlines, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/rouhani-tweeted-about-iran-flight-655-before-ukrainian-plane-downed-2020-1">tweets from senior Iranian officials reminded followers about Flight 655</a>. </p>
<p>Now, with Flight PS752, Iran was the attacker. Hypocrisies were revealed, and opportunities to exploit <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/11/they-killed-our-sons-and-daughters-anger-rises-in-iran-over-flight-752">both domestic and international support in the face of American actions were lost</a>.</p>
<h2>Justification changes</h2>
<p>So what about the United States? As Trump so quickly pointed out, the “mistake” most definitely came “<a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/whitehouse/trump-suggests-iran-downed-ukrainian-airliner">from the other side</a>.” But his decisions still loom large in a fair discussion of cause and effect. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-backstory-of-why-trump-ordered-the-killing-of-suleimani-is-becoming-more-clear">There are serious questions</a> about what went into the decision to kill Soleimani. Parallels to Osama bin Laden are inevitable, but neither the context nor the consequences are analogous. </p>
<p>Attacks on Iranian interests have the potential of far greater, and faster, escalation than any involving al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations. And the initial rationale — that Soleimani was planning an “imminent attack” on U.S. interests — has changed. Instead, Trump argued, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/qasem-soleimani-reasons-justifications/index.html">the hit was for past actions</a>. </p>
<p>That’s a very different calculation, especially in the eyes of public opinion. </p>
<p>Even if the assassination is still considered legitimate, questions about possible consequences seem to have been ignored. Soleimani’s status as a national hero doesn’t seem to have registered. A sophisticated understanding of the Iranian regime and its need to respond to any attack on its interests also seems to have been lacking. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest outside of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Historical calculations were probably never even entertained in calculating what might happen after the hit. In an administration notorious for its revolving door of senior officials and advisers, whose expertise was instrumental in making a decision of that magnitude? Was any sought at all?</p>
<p>Regardless of any moral and ethical considerations, the assassination of Soleimani constitutes a dramatic escalation in a region already dangerously volatile, and it was arguably disproportionate to the threat he posed.</p>
<h2>Stephen Harper cut diplomatic ties</h2>
<p>Questions about cause and effect don’t spare Canada, either. The 2012 decision by the government of Stephen Harper to cut diplomatic ties with Iran now significantly complicates Ottawa’s efforts to take part in the investigation of Flight PS752 and to best represent Canadian victims. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-non-diplomacy-puts-canadians-at-risk-in-an-unstable-middle-east-129758">Canada's non-diplomacy puts Canadians at risk in an unstable Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s demands for a full, open, international investigation into the incident are helped by Iran’s belated admissions, but he cannot expect the regime to fully comply in straightforward fashion. A significant improvement in Iranian-Canadian relations remains a distant dream. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more important is the disturbing fact that Ottawa was left in the dark about Trump’s Soleimani intentions. Especially with allies so close, it is customary — and necessary — to consult in matters of national security. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Iranian community break down during a memorial for the victims of the Ukrainian plane disaster in Iran in Edmonton on Jan. 12, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Todd Korol</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Canadians, both soldiers and civilians, who were potentially in danger in the region could have been warned if Ottawa had been informed. It also raises serious questions about the current state of the Canada-U.S. relationship.</p>
<p>Trump’s personal dislike of Trudeau, and evident disregard for Canada, is obvious. Less clear is how the historically high degree of communication and integration between the two countries has changed under Trump’s watch. </p>
<p>Asked directly about whether he thought the U.S. bore some responsibility for the downing of PS752, Trudeau said: “I think it is too soon to be drawing conclusions or assigning blame or responsibility in whatever proportions.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1215365771922214915"}"></div></p>
<p>It was a quiet but obvious suggestion that the Trump administration was not above reproach in a great tragedy with significant international consequences.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arne Kislenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The history of the Iran-United States relationship is complex and often brutal. Understanding it helps put today’s turmoil into sharper focus.Arne Kislenko, Associate Professor of History, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194162019-06-26T12:16:31Z2019-06-26T12:16:31ZUS-Iran tensions: no route for de-escalation in sight<p>Washington and Tehran are <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-is-backing-the-us-into-a-corner-on-iran-119327">locked</a> in a political, economic, and propagandist confrontation – and there is no apparent way out. </p>
<p>One route to de-escalation could be direct talks between the US and Iran, either on a bilateral basis or as part of multilateral discussions. </p>
<p>When US President Donald Trump <a href="https://time.com/5611845/donald-trump-iran-strike/">stepped back</a> from launching airstrikes inside Iran on June 20, he said he was willing to talk and included an offer of phone numbers to Iran’s leaders. But a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-rouhani-calls-white-house-actions-mentally-retarded-190625080055923.html">war of words</a> followed after Trump imposed <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48732672">new sanctions on Iran</a>, including on its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, his administration – which withdrew from a 2015 Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and imposed comprehensive sanctions in November – has based the offer of talks on an effective surrender by the Islamic Republic of its nuclear programme, of its policy and operations in the Middle East, and of its political and economic autonomy.</p>
<p>In early June, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the US was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/pompeo-says-u-s-ready-talk-iran-no-preconditions-n1013051">ready for “unconditional” discussions</a> with Iran. But he actually set <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/mike-pompeo-speech-12-demands-iran-180521151737787.html">12 points as prerequisites</a> for any talks: including Tehran giving up all uranium enrichment, for civil programmes, halting missile development, breaking ties with groups in the Middle East from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Palestine’s Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Iraqi militias, ending its support of Yemen’s Houthi insurgency, and withdrawing its troops from Syria.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Khamenei is not keen on that offer. In May, before <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48627014">the attacks on two tankers in the Gulf of Oman</a> and the downing of a US drone, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190514-irans-khamenei-says-there-not-going-be-war-with-us">he said</a>: “Negotiating with the present American government is doubly poisonous … They are not decent humans, they don’t stand by anything.”</p>
<p>With Khamenei and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards striking firm poses declaring the Islamic Republic’s strength against US weakness, Iran’s “centrist” president, Hassan Rouhani, has had to follow suit, <a href="https://www.presstv.com/DetailFr/2019/06/01/597510/Iran-Rouhani-US-pressure-steadfastness-nation">proclaiming</a> in early June that Iran had “forced the enemies to retreat step by step”.</p>
<p>So has Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian lead negotiator in the 2015 nuclear agreement. He <a href="https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/1135591916660281344">tweeted</a> at the start of June about American sanctions: “This is Donald Trump’s ‘economic war’. And war and talks – with or without preconditions – don’t go together.”</p>
<h2>Rejecting mediation</h2>
<p>A second route is indirect talks, such as contacts via Oman in 2012 to set up negotiations between Iran and the 5+1 powers who brokered the 2015 Iran deal – the US, UK, France, Germany, China, and Russia.</p>
<p>In May, there was flutter about a reprisal of these talks, as Iran’s deputy foreign minister met the Omani Sultan and Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, set up a visit to Tehran after a Tokyo summit with Trump.</p>
<p>But on June 13, just before news about the attack on the two tankers in the Gulf of Oman broke, Khamenei slammed the door shut. When Abe said he was carrying a message from Trump, Khamenei <a href="http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6844/I-don-t-consider-Trump-worth-sending-a-message-to-we-won-t-negotiate">replied</a>: “I do not consider Trump as a person worth exchanging any message with and I have no answer for him, nor will I respond to him in the future.”</p>
<p>So what of the third route, bypassing the US and its hardliners through Iranian links with other countries?</p>
<p>Facing the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and Americans sanctions appearing to seek regime change, the European Union spent months developing a special purpose vehicle for non-dollar trade in Iranian oil and other commodities and goods. In early 2019, the EU launched a limited version of the mechanism, known as <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/instex-europe-sets-up-transactions-channel-with-iran/a-47303580">INSTEX</a>.</p>
<p>But Iran turned down the escape from economic isolation. Officials, undoubtedly guided by the supreme leader’s office, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2019/02/iran-daily-tehran-turns-against-europes-vital-economic-link/">cited “humiliating conditions”</a>.</p>
<p>Those conditions? The EU’s concern over Iran’s continued missile development and launches, activity in the Middle East, and involvement in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190109-eu-sanctions-iran-over-assassinations-peoples-mujahedeen-france-bomb-plot">alleged bomb and assassination plots in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>On June 10, three days before rejecting Japanese mediation, the Iranians did the same with German foreign minister, Heiko Maas. Even before Maas left Tehran, <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2019/06/iran-daily-tehran-rebuffs-germanys-mediation-criticizes-europe-as-well-as-us/">the foreign ministry pronounced</a>: “What the Europeans need to do and what they have done so far have failed to win our satisfaction.” </p>
<p>Khamenei had issued his verdict: he – and 75m Iranians – would endure a crippled economy rather than making any apparent concession over Tehran’s military and political approach.</p>
<h2>Hardliners to the left of me, jokers to the right</h2>
<p>De-escalation requires a willingness to soften a hardline position. At the highest levels of the Iran regime, there is no such desire.</p>
<p>In September 2013, Khamenei acceded to nuclear talks because Rouhani presented him with a dossier about how bad Iran’s economic crisis would become if discussions were not pursued. This time, Khamenei has blocked the path back to discussions, and Rouhani is effectively sidelined. In his place are revolutionary guards who appear to be willing to carry out “pinprick” operations – maybe an attack on tankers, definitely firing on a drone – to push against US sanctions and military capabilities.</p>
<p>But in Tehran, the hardline comes with consistency. In the Trump administration, it comes with unpredictability.</p>
<p>With Trump shifting between a tough-guy pose and his desire for a photo-op in Tehran, the US swings a fist but then leaves it dangling in mid-air.</p>
<p>With no route to de-escalation at the moment, the economic battle – and, as the administration was keen to point out in recent days, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/22/politics/us-iran-cyberattacks-increase-department-homeland-security/index.html">cyber-battle</a> – continues. And so war, which comes not through design but through posturing and escalation, remains on the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119416/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald Trump stepped back from launching US airstrikes inside Iran, but the conflict is unabated and there appears to be no way out of confrontation for now.Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1193272019-06-25T10:07:40Z2019-06-25T10:07:40ZWhy Donald Trump is backing the US into a corner on Iran<p>After Iran shot down a US drone that allegedly entered Iran’s airspace, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48732672">signed new sanctions</a> against Iran on June 24, including against its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. The move came days after the US president <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1142055388965212161">took to Twitter</a> to reveal the US had been ten minutes away from striking back at Iran, but reversed course when Trump found out that 150 people could be killed. </p>
<p>Iran’s recent provocation came after a series of attacks in the busy Strait of Hormuz and the <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/strait-of-hormuz-in-spotlight-after-oil-tankers-attacked-near-worlds-most-sensitive-crude-transport-checkpoint-2019-06-13">sabotage of four vessels</a> travelling through the strait in May. Iran was accused of ramping up its sabotage activity – with <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-news-sabotage-tankers-fujairah-us-donald-trump-warns-iran-live-updates-2019-05-14/">experts pointing to Iran’s involvement</a> due to the precision of the attacks. </p>
<p>Before Trump assumed office, tensions between Iran and the US were finally starting to thaw. This was largely due to the <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>, better known as the Iran nuclear deal, an agreement involving Iran, the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, which aimed to block Iran from building nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief. </p>
<p>Despite Trump’s former secretary of defence, James Mattis, <a href="https://www.apnews.com/a4694920518f4f669c64230707fb474a">testifying to a senate committee that Iran was adhering</a> to the deal in April 2018, the president believed he needed to undo one of the signature policies of the Obama administration – arguing that doing so would bring Iran to its knees. He <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-44044350/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-announces-us-withdrawal">withdrew the US</a> from the deal in early May 2018, saying it: “Didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.” </p>
<h2>No plan B</h2>
<p>But rather than bringing Iran to its knees, Trump’s decision has emboldened Iran to take on more risks. Iran has absolutely nothing to lose and the approach advocated by moderates within the Iranian regime to co-operate with the West has clearly failed. By pulling out of the deal, Trump has no plan B and offers no options for Iran other than to engage in bad behaviour. If Iran believes that complying with international agreements is rewarded in this way, it could lose faith in the benefits of co-operating with the international community at all. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-nuclear-deal-is-hanging-by-a-thread-so-will-islamic-republic-now-develop-a-bomb-117809">Iran nuclear deal is hanging by a thread – so will Islamic Republic now develop a bomb?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>On June 23, Trump <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/trump-war-prods-iran-talks-190624051821716.html">indicated</a> he wants to talk to the Iranians and sent two envoys to the region, including secretary of state, Mike Pompeo. But Khamenei is adamant that no talks will take place unless sanctions against Iran are lifted. Iran’s foreign policy spokesperson, Abbas Mousavi, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-usa-sanctions/iran-says-us-sanctions-on-khamenei-mean-end-of-diplomacy-tweet-idUSKCN1TQ0CD">tweeted</a> on June 24 that imposing sanction against Khamenei: “Is the permanent closure of the path of diplomacy.” </p>
<p>Unlike Trump, whose foreign policy has no focus and seems to change course based on his mood, few leaders have a more singular focus than Khamenei. His 30 years in power have been guided by an <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/us-iran-conflict-driven-trump-and-khamenei/592297/">implacable single vision</a> of resisting US hegemony and imperialism at any cost. Unlike Kim Jong Un of North Korea, Khamenei has no interest in a historic photo-op with the president. </p>
<p>Additionally powerful are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Originally formed after the 1979 Iranian revolution as a paramilitary organisation designed to protect the regime against coup attempts, the IRGC has grown into the most powerful organisation in Iran, dictating Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics. It is as resolute as Khamenei in its commitment to fight against what it perceives to be US arrogance. </p>
<p>In contrast, Trump has <a href="https://m.cnn.com/en/article/h_f397962e403790b4d00a6c51f75dec6b">no clear foreign policy</a> and no coherent process for national security decision making within his administration, as recent events demonstrate. One moment Trump threatened to destroy Iran, the next moment he made apologies for Iran, claiming the drone attack <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48711229">may have been made in error</a> and that he wanted to engage in talks. </p>
<p>Such an erratic approach of provoking a conflict, pushing things to the brink and assuming that others will cave in may work in the world of business, but it doesn’t work in foreign policy. Iran is responding to the uncertainty by taking bigger risks and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-02-13/iran-among-ruins">sowing more chaos in the region</a>. The recent escalation of tensions has made Iran’s leadership more resolute than ever to fight against US aggression. The Iranian regime also understands that Trump wants to avoid a surge in oil prices, which usually happens when tensions rise in the region.</p>
<h2>More sanctions won’t work</h2>
<p>But the hawks within Trump’s administration, such as the national security adviser, John Bolton, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/bolton-keeps-trying-goad-iran-war/592108/">believe a war</a> with Iran is necessary. The US has far greater military capabilities than Iran, whose oil industry is vulnerable to attack. It’s also true that Iran’s economy has been struggling with 13% unemployment, growth rates at under 2% and <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi">inflation at 52%</a>. However, Iran’s economy has struggled in <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2016/may/25/iran-numbers-economy">similar ways before</a> and regime change has not taken place.</p>
<p>The sanctions, which are designed to cripple the Iranian economy, have undermined the middle class and small businesses that are most critical to pushing for positive change, while lining the pockets of the hardliners and justifying their position. The IRGC, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-47857140">designated as a terrorist organisation</a> by Trump in April, is benefiting from the sanctions because of its heavy involvement in black market activity such as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/04/irans-revolutionary-guard-corps-wont-suffer-from-stronger-u-s-sanctions-theyll-benefit-irgc-trump-sanctions/">petroleum smuggling</a>. Wider studies on sanctions show that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/54/2/335/1794854?casa_token=_qqR0jorIwIAAAAA:7a_bulbCAbyfQRC4YmfVBjjzUtSn4VNAThL3XnFDtt42lUnK_Wu4lxjR5STsnoUArfzbYAoZrYCbQA">they are only effective</a> against dictatorships built around the personality of a strong leader and have little effect in regimes where dictatorships are more insitutionalised. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/risk-of-shooting-war-with-iran-grows-after-decades-of-economic-warfare-by-the-us-119272">Risk of shooting war with Iran grows after decades of economic warfare by the US</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The further ramping up of sanctions is highly unlikely to force Iran to back down and commit to talks – or to prevent future attacks that are difficult to directly attribute to Iran. Given the importance and single-mindedness of Iran’s ideology, its leaders will only accept some form of face-saving diplomacy, most notably that the US does a complete U-turn and recommits to the Iran nuclear deal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119327/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has imposed new sanctions against Iran’s top leaders, but its foreign policy has no clear focus.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1160492019-05-09T10:38:20Z2019-05-09T10:38:20ZUS ‘foreign terrorist’ designation is more punishment than threat detector<p>The Trump administration in April designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, a branch of Iran’s military and intelligence services, as a <a href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/hp644.aspx">terrorist group</a>. Any groups designated this way are cut off from potential U.S. funding, communications with Americans, travel to the U.S. and other American “material support.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-73576">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, an Egyptian political party founded on Islamic ideals, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1">may be next</a>.</p>
<p>The IRGC is the first government agency to receive such a designation, which calls attention to the political purposes that often prompts additions and removals from the list. Since its creation in 1997, the State Department’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm">Foreign Terrorist Organizations</a> list has been used to punish enemies, appease allies and advance discrete U.S. foreign policy interests. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">annotated version</a> of this list exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and strategic logic behind the “terrorist” designation, revealing why it’s hardly a master directory of the militant groups most likely to target Americans. </p>
<p><strong><em>This document was edited using <a href="https://genius.com/a/news-genius">Genius</a>. To see an annotation, click or tap the gray-highlighted part of the transcript. <a href="https://genius.com/Us-department-of-state-us-foreign-terrorist-watchlist-annotated">Go here</a> to view the annotations – or add your own – on the Genius website. Common spellings of group names are in parentheses.</em></strong></p>
<p><iframe id="tc-infographic-387" class="tc-infographic" height="400px" src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/infographics/387/38a9b06eebac6cd3b3bd47efa9e146afc25522fc/site/index.html" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116049/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Fleury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A terrorism expert exposes the quirks, inconsistencies and foreign policy strategy behind the State Department’s terrorist watchlist.Eric Fleury, Visiting Assistant Professor, College of the Holy CrossLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.