tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/islamist-14351/articlesIslamist – The Conversation2023-12-06T13:43:37Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913662022-10-11T14:02:01Z2022-10-11T14:02:01ZWhat drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486829/original/file-20220927-24-32z7kt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu where a 30-hour Al-Shabaab siege left 21 people dead in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hassan Elmi/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In response to external – and at times internal – pressure, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia has evolved over time. </p>
<p>Before 2008, Al-Shabaab was a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">small player</a> within the larger Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Union was an umbrella entity that emerged around 2003 to provide justice and security in Mogadishu in the absence of a formal state.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Ethiopia</a> – in support of the transitional Somali government – militarily defeated the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Over the next two years, Al-Shabaab broke away from the Union and rose to prominence in Somalia.</p>
<p>It transformed from a terrorist organisation, fighting Ethiopian occupation, to something of a de-facto state. It gained territory, eventually controlling most of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>Between 2010 and 2013, the group survived <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">military and territorial losses</a>, as well as a significant <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf">leadership crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab adapted and honed its ability to conduct attacks. It also established systems to tax businesses and the public, both inside and outside of the territory it controlled. The group began to provide an alternative justice structure based on a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strict and harsh interpretation</a> of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law">Sharia</a> (Islamic law) – though its understanding of Sharia was highly debatable even among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafi circles</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Al-Shabaab remains the most <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-us-counterterrorism-somalia-necessary-insufficient">formidable challenge</a> to the Somali government, and its regional and international partners. </p>
<p>Despite the shifts it has experienced over 15 years, some things have remained crucial to Al-Shabaab’s mission in Somalia. Scholars have noted <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299149628">three goals</a> that have been continually reasserted:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ridding the country of foreign troops</p></li>
<li><p>implementing Sharia </p></li>
<li><p>defeating the Somali federal government </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fully understanding these motivations, however, can be a challenge. This is because the organisation’s goals can change with time and the views of the leadership can be different from those of recruits. </p>
<p>Yet, examining these motivations offers important and actionable insights into the factors that perpetuate the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">conflict in Somalia</a> or block efforts to resolve it.</p>
<h2>Hostility to foreign troops</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s nationalist stance against foreign troops in Somalia has been a theme throughout its evolution.</p>
<p>Following the US backing of a warlord coalition during the Islamic Courts Union era and Ethiopia’s military intervention, Al-Shabaab began to <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-courts-union#text_block_19602">spread a message</a> in opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Somalia. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">“maximalist and violent pan-Islamist members”</a> within the group’s leadership ranks at the time. However, Al-Shabaab’s outspokenness against foreign forces resonated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">deep-rooted Somali hostility</a> against Ethiopia and broader nationalist narratives that existed, separate from Salafi and extremist trends. Ultimately, this served as an incredible recruitment tool.</p>
<p>After Ethiopia withdrew forces in 2009, Al-Shabaab shifted its focus to the expulsion of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission’s role included <a href="https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/">protecting federal institutions</a>. AMISOM has since been replaced by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-is-still-fragile-what-the-new-african-union-mission-can-do-to-help-stabilise-it-180430">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</a>, which Al-Shaaab continues to oppose. </p>
<p>The group also wants to <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">get rid of the US</a>. This is due to the country’s airstrikes and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61631439">special operations forces in Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey is another <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaabs-expanding-anti-turkish-campaign-in-somalia/">unwelcome foreign power</a> because it supports the Somali federal government. It also advises and trains the military. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab additionally opposes the <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">United Arab Emirates’ economic interests</a> in Somali ports and military bases.</p>
<h2>Implementing Sharia</h2>
<p>Implementing its own version of Sharia (Islamic law) has remained a pillar of Al-Shabaab’s agenda throughout its existence. </p>
<p>The group embraces a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafist interpretation</a> of Sharia. This includes the imposition of harsh punishments for infractions and the rejection of Sufi traditions that many Somalis follow. However, this goal has, as researchers have pointed out, taken “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">different forms according to the situation and the strength of the organisation</a>”. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2006, Al-Shabaab didn’t antagonise Sufi orders in the way it did between 2008 and 2009 because it wasn’t as powerful. As the group began to experience military pressure and territorial losses in the period after 2011-2012, the implementation of Sharia varied across Somalia, with some Al-Shabaab provincial (<em>wilayat</em>) governors operating more reasonably than others.</p>
<p>More recently, in 2019, Ahmed Diriye – Al-Shabaab’s current leader – expressed a tougher stance. He declared that Sharia ought to be implemented without “<a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">concession or compromise</a>”. </p>
<h2>Desire to govern</h2>
<p>Defeating the Somali federal government and federal member states is another important agenda item for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The group sees itself as an alternative to the Somali government. This is evident in its efforts to govern territory. It also provides security, justice and other services that the government <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">has failed</a> to effectively provide. </p>
<p>The organisation’s influence in the sphere of governance is notable in three areas: justice, taxation and dispute mediation. </p>
<p>First, Al-Shabaab’s shadow court system has offered pathways to justice for Somalis. It addresses the problems of the population it controls, including divorce, inheritance and land disputes. It then provides rulings it can actually enforce. </p>
<p>The government’s court and justice system are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">reportedly</a> less consistent. Its rulings aren’t always enforced and it faces issues of corruption.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s courts <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">attract residents</a> from areas outside the organisation’s immediate territorial control. This is because the courts help solve practical problems. </p>
<p>Second, the group maintains a taxation system that has spread beyond government-controlled territories. This <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">likely surpasses</a> the Somali government’s own taxation abilities. </p>
<p>Through its taxation of businesses, transportation, ports and other sectors, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://hiraalinstitute.org/a-losing-game-countering-al-shababs-financial-system/">some services</a>, such as regulating the production of certain export products. However, the main benefit of “taxation” is protection from the group. </p>
<p>The organisation also collects <em>zakat</em>, a charitable contribution required for Muslims. However, it uses much of this collection to bolster its own coffers rather than redistributing it to the community. </p>
<p>Third, Al-Shabaab has presented itself as capable of successfully intervening in clan disputes. In an <a href="https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/in-hearts-and-minds-effort-shabaab-boasts-of-settling-dispute-between-conflicting-tribes-in-southern-somalia.html">October 2020 press release</a>, the organisation claimed it’s “keen to solve the problems and differences that arise between the tribes, and it has shown remarkable success in settling decades-long disputes among them”. </p>
<p>Mediating clan disputes is central to Al-Shabaab’s ambitions to establish a unified Islamic state. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>After 15 years of conflict, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to stability in Somalia and its neighbours, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">like Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>Understanding its motives to expel foreign troops, implement its version of Sharia and defeat the government raises questions on how to end their insurgency. </p>
<p>With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-election-raises-more-questions-than-answers-183833">recent election</a> of Somali president Hassan Mohamud, there appears to be renewed government focus on not just weakening Al-Shabaab, but eliminating it. As part of this effort, the government has “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">hailed</a>” mobilisation efforts by local militia (called Ma'awisley) against the group. </p>
<p>The new administration has called for the expansion of these resistance efforts. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">sent government troops</a> to join local militia in an offensive against Al-Shabaab. Time will tell if this new strategy will strategically alter the course in the fight against the group. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-engagement-al-shabaab-somalia">Political engagement</a> with Al-Shabaab is another potential avenue that could complement military operations. </p>
<p>However, prospects for negotiation are poor. This is because of Al-Shabaab’s reluctance to engage in negotiations, its uncompromising position on foreign troop withdrawal and the government’s commitment to eliminating the group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daisy Muibu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab’s evolution over nearly two decades has been centred around three major goals.Daisy Muibu, Assistant Professor, University of AlabamaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1044712018-10-16T10:41:12Z2018-10-16T10:41:12ZThe mosques that survived Palu’s tsunami and what that means<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/240442/original/file-20181012-109222-15y5ijq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Floating Mosque of Palu that survived after the earthquake.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Indonesia-Earthquake/0e2d8ee2f4884356b817d356e224d943/10/0">AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the <a href="http://www.thesundaily.my/news/2018/10/07/missing-toll-soars-5000-engulfed-indonesia-quake-neighbourhoods">devastation</a> that followed the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the Indonesian city of Palu in Central Sulawesi, many Muslim religious sites were destroyed. </p>
<p>Two mosques, however, survived, with little to no damage to their structure. </p>
<p>In a province where <a href="http://ardi-lamadi.blogspot.com/2013/07/jumlah-penduduk-berdasarkan-agama-di_5795.html">85 percent</a> of the <a href="https://sulteng.bps.go.id">3 million residents</a> are Muslims, the survival of these particular mosques and not others has started a discussion about the very nature of Islam. </p>
<h2>Mosques of Palu</h2>
<p>I came to know Palu well while doing fieldwork in Central Sulawesi in 1984 as part of my research <a href="https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1117&context=bookshelf">on “traditional rituals.”</a> Palu is the administrative and cultural hub for the whole Sulawesi province.</p>
<p>Of the 24 mosques, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tO8IPYkluaU">20 were severely damaged in the tsunami</a>. The worst hit was the <a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/BoTP2oqBMWS/?utm_source=ig_share_sheet&igshid=1j6x68chxh7vw">Baiturrahman Mosque</a>, where 300 people were killed during evening prayers. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="http://alkhairaat.sch.id/sejarah-alkhairaat/">Alkhairaat Mosque,</a> and the Arkham Babu Rahman Mosque, known locally as the <a href="http://bangka.tribunnews.com/2018/09/30/gempa-dan-tsunami-palu-donggala-allahuakbar-masjid-terapung-ikon-kota-palu-tetap-berdiri-kokoh">Floating Mosque</a> survived. The Floating Mosque dominated the Palu Beach with its dramatic walkway from the shore to mosque. After the tsunami, the mosque’s access from the shore has been cut off and it is now literally floating in Palu Bay. </p>
<p>Though partially submerged, its structure remains intact. Palu residents, commenting on Facebook in the first few days after the tsunami, noted how “it remained miraculously untouched.” </p>
<p>At a time when people are trying to make sense of the death and destruction, the survival of Alkhairaat and Arkham Babu Rahman is seen to be a sign of saintly power and the mercy of Allah. Thousands have turned up to pray at Alkhairaat Mosque and walk reverently past the mosque floating in water.</p>
<h2>The mosques that survived</h2>
<p>The history of the Floating Mosque is dedicated to the 17th-century founder of Islam in Palu, <a href="http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/54501/tracing-datuk-karama-the-first-islamic-preacher-in-palu">Datuk Karama</a>. Karama came from the western island of Sumatra and preached Islam to the people of Palu. </p>
<p>The Alkhairaat mosque was erected by a Yemeni merchant
<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/28176852">Sayyid Idrus Al-Jufri</a> in 1930. Al-Jufri also founded religious schools after discovering upon his arrival that many people did not have basic education. The first school eventually became the Alkhairaat University. </p>
<p>The tombs of Al-Jufri and Datuk Karama are located near their mosques, where people come to seek <a href="https://jurnalharmoni.kemenag.go.id/index.php/harmoni/article/view/245">spiritual guidance</a>. The street where Alkhairaat Mosque is located as well as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutiara_SIS_Al-Jufrie_Airport">airport in Palu</a> have been named after Al-Jufri. </p>
<h2>What it means to Palu survivors</h2>
<p>In private comments on Facebook’s instant messenger, people have asserted that the Alkhairaat Mosque and the <a href="http://bangka.tribunnews.com/2018/09/30/gempa-dan-tsunami-palu-donggala-allahuakbar-masjid-terapung-ikon-kota-palu-tetap-berdiri-kokoh">Floating Mosque</a>
survived because of the mystical power of the saints who “guard” these mosques. </p>
<p>These comments have revealed tensions between what people refer to as <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/14/indonesias-moderate-islam-is-slowly-crumbling/">“old Islam” and “reformist Islam.”</a> In Palu, <a href="http://science.jrank.org/pages/8030/Islamic-Reform.html">reformist Islam</a> includes beliefs of Salafis and Wahhabis, who want to go back to a purer form of Islam. They see the belief in saints as a <a href="https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=socanth-faculty-publications">“recent” addition</a> to the original Islam that was <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e207">revealed to Prophet Muhammad</a> in the 7th century A.D. </p>
<p>In fact, during the early 2000s, some of the more <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/04/suicide-bombing-hits-restive-poso.html">radical Wahabi and Salafist</a> sects used extreme, violent methods to convince Central Sulawesians to change their beliefs in the mystical power of saints or “old Islam.” </p>
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<p>The educational institutions led by the <a href="https://alkhairaat.com/">Alkhairaat Foundation</a> have played a considerable role in fostering the old Islamic beliefs. The foundation runs 43 boarding schools, and 1,700 religious schools across Eastern Indonesia and a large university in Palu. All emphasize tolerance. However, Salafi and Wahabi schools, promoted by Saudi funding in the 1990s, argue that the tolerance taught by <a href="https://jurnalharmoni.kemenag.go.id/index.php/harmoni/article/view/245">Alkhairaat was the “wrong kind of Islam.”</a>“ </p>
<p>In 2000, Alkhairaat students at a school in Poso, a port town near the southern coast of Central Sulawesi <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3351481?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">were targeted by terrorists</a>. The region’s 14 percent minority Christians have also been under attack. </p>
<p>Since 2010 there has been no violence, but even as recently as 2016, the Indonesian government has been searching for <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/26/peace-process-ongoing-poso.html">terrorist cells</a> in the mountain jungles of Central Sulawesi.</p>
<h2>Palu’s future</h2>
<p>Despite the reformists’ activity, Alkhairaat’s influence in Palu remains strong. As a major philanthropic organization in Palu and beyond, with many graduates of Alkhairaat University serving in government and private sectors, Alkhairaat has helped counter hate rhetoric and actions. </p>
<p>Some of the comments on Facebook reveal survivors’ loyalty to <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/28176852">Alkhairaat values</a>. Post-tsunami, however, Alkhairaat’s resources are likely strained, as graduates say in private conversations on Facebook with me. </p>
<p>The question is will this tragedy bring outside funds that once again disturb the internal harmony among Muslims? If so, will Palu sustain its spirit of tolerance? </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Nourse receives funding from Fulbright and the University of Richmond Faculty Research Committee. </span></em></p>A majority of the over 24 mosques spread over Palu were damaged in the tsunami. Two of them survived, though one of them is gradually sinking.Jennifer Nourse, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855042017-10-18T15:06:31Z2017-10-18T15:06:31ZWhy Islamist attack demands a careful response from Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190361/original/file-20171016-30979-10vz4fa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique's military responded swiftly following deadly attacks by Islamist gunmen on three police stations recently.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early hours of 5 October 2017 a group of <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/armed-men-attack-police-stations-in-mocimboa-da-praia-aim-report/">30 men attacked three police stations</a> in Mocimboa da Praia, a small <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moc%C3%ADmboa_da_Praia">town</a> of 30,000 inhabitants in Northern Mozambique. They killed two policemen, stole arms and ammunition, and occupied the town. </p>
<p>They told local people they would not hurt them, that their fight was with the state and the police. They explained that they rejected state health and education and refused to pay taxes. The local population calls these men <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/individuals-allegedly-linked-to-al-shabaab-attack-police-station-in-mocimboa-da-praia-mozambique/">“Al-Shabaabs”</a>.</p>
<p>Mozambique’s government’s response was swift. It fought back with forces from other districts and special forces from the provincial capital. The battle <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/life-returns-to-normal-in-mocimboa-da-praia/">lasted several hours and left 16 dead</a>, including two policemen and a community leader.</p>
<p>The attack came as a shock to a country already grappling with <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/2017-war-hidden-debts-economic-stabilisation-carry-next-year-mozambique/">major economic and political problems</a>. The incident is the first confirmed Islamist armed attack in Mozambique.</p>
<p>Information is still sparse and confused. But for now, we can say with some degree of certainty that what happened on 5 October 2017 was not a Somali Al-Shabaab attack nor an externally driven <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710060373.html">international Jihadi plot</a>. Nor was it a state <a href="https://www.facebook.com/unai.kambuma.matsangaisse/posts/522924458056358">conspiracy </a>as some had suggested. </p>
<p>Rather, the attack appears to have been carried out by a group of local young Muslims who formed a sect in 2014 in Mocimboa da Praia which is known as <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46966-jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">“Al-Shabaab”</a>. The group controls two mosques in the town and have told their followers to stop sending their children to secular institutions such as state schools and hospitals. It wants Sharia law applied in their area. </p>
<p>The fact that this first Islamist attack was carried out by Mozambicans makes the event no less shocking, particularly in a country proud of its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations. Until we get more information on the group and what triggered it to attack the state, it’s worth setting the incident within a historical context. </p>
<h2>Islam in Mozambique</h2>
<p>Islam has a very old presence in Mozambique, particularly on the coast and in the Northern parts of the country. Various Sultanates and Sheikdom existed before Portugal occupied the territory in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/Colonial-Mozambique">late 19th Century</a> .</p>
<p>The Portuguese colonialists openly and officially favoured Catholicism, at a time <a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">repressing Islam</a> and other religions. But Islam gained converts and nonetheless grew. By the time of <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/mozambique%E2%80%99s-40-years-independence-past-and-present-challenges">independence in 1975</a> Muslims officially accounted for 13% of the population. The 1997 census gave the figure of 17.8%. Both figures are contested by Muslims who believe them to be higher.</p>
<p>After independence the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxist-Leninism. It attacked all faiths, but Islam was particularly affected. It was a faith most state leaders didn’t understand. This was evident in incidents such as President Samora Machel keeping his shoes when he walked into the main mosque in the country. <a href="https://www.academia.edu/723143/_Lislam_au_Mozambique_apr%C3%A8s_lind%C3%A9pendance_Histoire_dune_mont%C3%A9e_en_puissance_in_Christian_Coulon_ed._LAfrique_politique_2002_Islams_dAfrique_entre_le_local_et_le_global_Paris_Karthala_2002._p._123-146">Another example</a> was the government insisting on pigsties being built in Muslim areas in the name of “development”. Memories such as these are still raw and were raised yet again after the Mocimboa da Praia attack.</p>
<p>After Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and shifted to multiparty democracy, the party began courting all religions to gain electoral support. But tensions still arose from time to time. One involved the government taking steps to officially recognise Islamic holidays. This sparked a crisis in parliament in 1996 and the Frelimo governing party backtracked, adopting a more secular approach from then on. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5854764/_The_1996_Muslim_holiday_affair._Religious_competition_and_state_mediation_in_contemporary_Mozambique_Journal_of_Southern_African_Studies_26_3_2000_pp._409-27">incident</a> served to remind Muslims that they still felt marginalised.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi in Mozambique</a>, with a majority of Muslims belonging to different Turuq (brotherhoods). <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-islam-so-different-in-different-countries-51804">Sufism</a> represents the more mystical side of Islam - opposed by scripturalist Muslims, such as the Wahhabi, who accuse them of deviating from the Koran.</p>
<p>The return of African graduates from Saudi Arabia in the 1970s gave political clout to the reformist and scripturalist movements in Mozambique. They gained control of some mosques and, in collaboration with the Portuguese, expanded their presence. </p>
<p>Today the main national organisation is the reformist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Conselho-Islamico-de-Mocambique-CISLAMO-169928693058683/">Islamic Council</a> which was created after independence by Wahhabi elements and grew in the 1980s and 1990s in partnership with the authorities. </p>
<p>Splinter organisations appeared in the late 1990s and 2000s, particularly in Northern Mozambique. As reformism gained firmer ground in the north, tensions and conflict increased. Controversies emerged in relation to sufi practices, alcohol, education and dress code. There was, however, never any violence against the state.</p>
<h2>Powder keg</h2>
<p>Although no international terror group has been linked to Mocimba da Praia, the incident is very serious. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabo_Delgado_Province">Cabo Delgado</a> is a Muslim-majority province where discoveries of giant oil and gas reserves have brought international conglomerates and their private security, making the area a potential powder-keg.</p>
<p>On top of this, the area is desperately poor. Northern areas of Mozambique have gained little from the economic boom of the 2000s. Mocimboa da Praia is a case in point: little development has been seen even as expectations exploded following the discovery of massive gas and oil reserves in the province. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/mozambique-gas/mozambique-sees-30-bln-investment-for-2018-lng-exports-startup-idUSL5N0QR49C20140821">Billions of dollars</a> have been invested in offshore drilling, with little benefit to local communities.</p>
<p>The government must devise a careful and well-thought response to this new Islamist threat. Downplaying the affair as “banditry” and dealing only with the sect when it’s clear that there are broader religious and social dynamics at play risks seeing the problem reemerge elsewhere. </p>
<p>In turn, going for an all-out repression to eradicate the “Islamist threat” could radicalise other Muslims and root the problem deeper and more widely – think only of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marc_Antoine_Montclos/publication/280592679_Boko_Haram_and_politics_from_insurgency_to_terrorism/links/56c47b8908aeeeffa9e5b663.pdf">Boko Haram in West Africa in 2009</a>. </p>
<p>So far state officials have been careful and moderate in their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46980-vida-e-seguranca-voltam-a-normalidade-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">statements</a>. But practice on the ground needs to follow the same line and some changes in social and religious policy will need to follow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first Islamist attack carried out by Mozambicans in the country is particularly surprising given the pride the country takes in its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations.Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792392017-07-04T23:01:22Z2017-07-04T23:01:22ZIs Indonesia’s ‘pious democracy’ safe from Islamic extremism?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176299/original/file-20170629-21076-360qcq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Jakarta's former Governor Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Dita Alangkara</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The governor of Jakarta, Indonesia – a Christian – was convicted for <a href="http://www.hukumonline.com/klinik/detail/cl4464/penghinaan-terhadap-agama">blasphemy against religion</a> earlier this year and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/jakarta-governor-ahok-found-guilty-of-blasphemy-jailed-for-two-years">sentenced to two years in prison</a>.</p>
<p>The conviction has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/indonesia-governor-ahok-basuki-tjahaja-purnama-blasphemy-islam.html?_r=0">shocked observers</a> around the globe. Since the country’s democratic transition in 1998, American politicians on both sides of the aisle, from Democrat <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-clinton-idUSTRE51H15A20090218">Hillary Clinton</a> to Trump’s Vice President <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2017/0420/Pence-tours-Indonesian-mosque-praises-moderate-Islam-and-calls-for-fairer-trade">Mike Pence</a>, have praised Indonesia as a model Muslim-majority democracy.</p>
<p>Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama was convicted based on comments he made on the campaign trail in September 2016. He had stated that Islamists who cited a <a href="https://quran.com/5/51-61">Quran verse</a> to support their view that <a href="http://www.mizanproject.org/do-not-take-unbelievers-as-your-leaders/">Christians should not hold high office</a> were being <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-politics-idUSKBN1842GE">deceitful</a>.</p>
<p>An edited transcript of his speech, which made it appear as though Ahok was criticizing the Quran itself, was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSF2MJLuzJc">posted online</a>. The video went viral. Islamist vigilante groups seized the moment to rally against the incumbent Christian governor and in support of Ahok’s opponents in the April 19 election. </p>
<p>It was a winning strategy. </p>
<p>They held the <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/">largest rally in Indonesian history</a> “in defense of Islam.” Their movement propelled Ahok’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/15/jakarta-election-challenger-anies-accused-of-courting-islamic-vote-amid-religious-divide">opponent</a> into the governor’s mansion and Ahok into prison. Some observers saw Ahok’s 16-point defeat as a victory for Islamists, and a sign of the influence of an intolerant strain of Islam.</p>
<p>Since Indonesia’s democratization in 1998, it has been widely seen as a model of religious tolerance and pluralism in the Muslim world. Is Indonesia’s tradition of religious tolerance a thing of the past? Will Indonesia <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/523720">backslide into authoritarianism</a> like its neighbors Thailand and the Philippines, or be taken over by Islamists like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia? Or, might militant groups like the Islamic State (IS), which has already gained a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/opinion/isis-philippines-rodrigo-duterte.html">foothold in the Philippines</a>, make <a href="http://www.ucanews.com/news/islamic-state-makes-inroads-into-malaysia-indonesia/79371">further inroads into Indonesia</a>?</p>
<p>Drawing on more than 24 months of field work in Indonesia, I tackled these questions in my <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/south-east-asian-government-politics-and-policy/islam-and-democracy-indonesia-tolerance-without-liberalism?format=PB#reTtpRXOt3xdSx2U.97">book</a> on Islam and tolerance in this massive Muslim-majority democracy.</p>
<h2>Neither secular nor theocratic</h2>
<p>Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, a democracy and the largest country in Southeast Asia. It faces many of the same <a href="https://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Going-for-Growth-Indonesia-2017.pdf">problems</a> as other developing countries, including weak infrastructure, low-quality education and high levels of corruption. Composed of over 17,000 islands, Indonesia is also one of the world’s most diverse countries, which means that protecting minority groups is an <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00927678.2012.704832?src=recsys&journalCode=vasa20#.WVQ9-juamoE.twitter">especially important concern</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/176135/original/file-20170628-31267-zptkeh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A map of Indonesia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LocationIndonesia.svg">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now, to be clear: in my view, Indonesia’s law prohibiting blasphemy or the defamation of religion is oppressive. It suppresses free speech and individual rights. It invites abuse and enforcement by <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/justice-by-numbers/">vigilante groups</a>. But that does not mean Indonesian democracy is destined to become a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/theocracy">theocracy</a> in which government policy is divinely inspired.</p>
<p>It is one of a body of laws that, as my research revealed, have been on the books for decades. Contrary to what some observers have suggested, these laws are not a result of <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/10/saudi-arabia-destabilizing-world/ivMeb7TWGk1fQaVjZWWKGP/amp.html">Islamic extremism from Saudi Arabia</a> or IS. Instead, they <a href="http://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/17/05/19/oq76h3377-nu-dan-muhammadiyah-sepakat-indonesia-negara-kebangsaan">reflect the views of</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/world/asia/indonesia-islam.html">Islamic civil society organizations</a>. These organizations run thousands of schools, health clinics and universities, and provide the backbone for the civil society that <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=gKZP8_Tp27UC&lpg=PP1&ots=5odIsFfKXK&dq=info%3AgyAGockWm8AJ%3Ascholar.google.com&lr&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false">helps make democracy work</a>.</p>
<p>For example, the Indonesian government makes religious education mandatory. Students can choose from Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Roman Catholicism or Protestant Christianity. All six religions are <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0037768605058151">recognized and celebrated by the state</a>. The Indonesian government obliges citizens to declare adherence to one of those recognized religions, restricts interfaith marriage and limits activities that it sees as interfering with communal rights, <a href="https://jeremymenchik.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/menchik_indonesia_democracy_sacralizingnov2016_final.pdf">such as interfaith proselytizing (attempting to convert people) and blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>Americans have a hard time understanding this nonsecular form of democracy. </p>
<p>Based on our own Constitution, we tend to assume that democracy requires a secular state in order to protect religious minorities, who would suffocate under religious rule. But there are many examples of democracies that, like Indonesia, are neither fully secular nor theocratic.</p>
<p>Take Greece, a consolidated democracy. The <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380412331300227">Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ plays a prominent</a> role in Greek state ceremonies, the education system and even the conferring of building permits. In fact, the salaries of clergy are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-greece-churchs-tangled-ties-with-government-raise-questions/2012/05/30/gJQAFySG1U_story.html?utm_term=.c46c8f019683">paid by the state</a>. According to the Greek <a href="http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl25.html#A3">Constitution</a>, alterations or translations of the Bible from Greek are prohibited without permission from the church. And, although infrequent, blasphemy cases can be brought before <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2015/01/blasphemy-law-and-greece">civil and criminal courts</a>. </p>
<p>In India, another democracy, all religions are defined as equal, and major religious communities enjoy state patronage. Religious holidays from several religions are observed as <a href="https://india.gov.in/calendar">public holidays</a>. Religious affiliation is <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-12-10/why-its-not-easy-be-atheist-india">noted on birth certificates</a>. The state subsidizes <a href="http://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/26666/QUESTION+NO467+SUBSIDY+TO+HINDU+AND+SIKH+PILGRIMS">Hindu, Sikh</a> and <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/haj-subsidy-under-examination-by-government-once-again/story-f5K0jfqjv2czBYdnpT5FEP.html">Muslim</a> pilgrimages. And <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/national-laws-on-blasphemy-india">blasphemy</a> is prohibited by the penal code. </p>
<p>Greece, India and Indonesia are examples of democracies that are not quite secular. We might call them “pious democracies.” They promote religious values while trying to synthesize liberal individual rights and group rights. These states are not unusual. Globally, majorities in more than 20 countries say that belief in God is necessary for a person <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/03/13/worldwide-many-see-belief-in-god-as-essential-to-morality/">to have good values</a>. These views shape public policies. </p>
<h2>Moderates and militants</h2>
<p>In Indonesia, the emergence of militant Islamists like <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1358b1f6-39e7-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23">Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</a> and the Islamic State has made it difficult for moderate Muslims to implement their vision for a pious democracy. The high profile of militants makes it difficult for the American public to understand the difference between militants and moderate Muslims. They are similar in that neither militants nor moderates want a secular state. But they are different in that moderates do not want to live in an Islamic state. </p>
<p>Data from a global network of social scientists, the <a href="http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp">World Values Survey</a>, show that in 2006 the overwhelming majority of Indonesians <a href="https://twitter.com/jeremymenchik/status/873361313409400832">did not want a government</a> in which religious leaders tell people how to vote. More recent data suggest not much has changed. A poll <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/06/05/055881503/Most-Indonesians-Oppose-ISIS-HTI-Caliphate-Survey">conducted in May 2017</a> shows most Indonesians oppose replacement of the constitution with a caliphate. More than 80 percent oppose IS, and less than 3 percent support the goals of IS, according to recent data from <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/06/05/055881503/Most-Indonesians-Oppose-ISIS-HTI-Caliphate-Survey">a research and consulting firm based in Jakarta</a>. In other words, most Indonesians, a majority of whom are Muslim, do not want to live in a caliphate.</p>
<p>But they do want mandatory religious education, <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-morality/">leaders who believe in God</a> and a society in which religion is valued by the state. As I discovered through hundreds of interviews, most Indonesian Muslims seek a state and society that promotes religious values and the rights of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/islam-and-democracy-in-indonesia/communal-tolerance/1DF20EBD767FE2708EC815FB32E6B697">religious communities alongside individual rights</a> and religious pluralism. </p>
<p>As my interviewees explained, their goal is a society in which individuals, organizations and the state are partly <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/content/genealogies-religion">responsible for one another’s moral condition</a>. </p>
<p>Putting that vision into practice is exceedingly difficult at a time when secularism is often equated with tolerance, and religion is synonymous with extremists like IS. Whether in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/india">India</a>, <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-08-07/greece-turns-back-religious-minorities">Greece</a> or Indonesia, group rights are challenging to enforce in a just manner – just look at Native American control over their land in the U.S. </p>
<p>But, as India and Greece demonstrate, it is possible. And in that respect, Indonesian Muslims’ war against blasphemy and Ahok’s prosecution is simply another moment in a long struggle to develop a pious democracy while avoiding the templates of secularism or theocracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Menchik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert on Islam and democracy examines the threat to the world’s largest Muslim majority country.Jeremy Menchik, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Boston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/727812017-02-22T02:09:38Z2017-02-22T02:09:38ZThreats of violent Islamist and far-right extremism: What does the research say?<p>On a Tuesday morning in September 2001, the American experience with terrorism was fundamentally altered. Two thousand, nine hundred and ninety-six people were murdered in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania. Thousands more, including many first responders, lost their lives to <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/16/9-11-death-toll-rising-496214.html">health complications</a> from working at or being near Ground Zero.</p>
<p>The 9/11 attacks were <a href="https://9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf">perpetrated</a> by Islamist extremists, resulting in nearly 18 times more deaths than America’s second most devastating terrorist attack – the Oklahoma City bombing. More than any other terrorist event in U.S. history, 9/11 drives Americans’ perspectives on who and what ideologies are associated with violent extremism.</p>
<p>But focusing solely on Islamist extremism when investigating, researching and developing counterterrorism policies goes against what the numbers tell us. Far-right extremism also poses a significant threat to the lives and well-being of Americans. This risk is often ignored or underestimated because of the devastating impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>We have spent more than 10 years collecting and analyzing empirical data that show us how these ideologies vary in important ways that can inform policy decisions. Our conclusion is that a “one size fits all” approach to countering violent extremism may not be effective.</p>
<h2>By the numbers</h2>
<p>Historically, the U.S. has been home to adherents of many types of extremist ideologies. The two current most prominent threats are motivated by Islamist extremism and far-right extremism. </p>
<p>To help assess these threats, the Department of Homeland Security and recently the Department of Justice have funded the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2012.713229">Extremist Crime Database</a> to collect data on crimes committed by ideologically motivated extremists in the United States. The results of our analyses are published in peer-reviewed journals and on the website for the <a href="http://start.umd.edu/publications?combine=ECDB&year%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=">National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism</a>.</p>
<p>The ECDB includes data on ideologically motivated homicides committed by both Islamist extremists and far-right extremists going back more than 25 years. </p>
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<p>Between 1990 and 2014, the ECDB has identified 38 homicide events motivated by Islamist extremism that killed 62 people. When you include 9/11, those numbers jump dramatically to 39 homicide events and 3,058 killed.</p>
<p>The database also identified 177 homicide events motivated by far-right extremism, with 245 killed. And when you include the Oklahoma City bombing, it rises to 178 homicide events and 413 killed.</p>
<p>Although our data for 2015 through 2017 are still being verified, we counted five homicide events perpetrated by Islamist extremists that resulted in the murders of 74 people. This includes the <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/482322488/orlando-shooting-what-happened-update">Pulse nightclub massacre</a> in Orlando, which killed 49 people. In the same time period, there were eight homicide events committed by far-right extremists that killed 27 people. </p>
<p>These data reveal that far-right extremists tend to be more active in committing homicides, yet Islamist extremists tend to be more deadly.</p>
<p>Our research has also identified violent Islamist extremist plots against 272 targets that were either foiled or failed between 2001 and 2014. We are in the process of compiling similar data on far-right plots. Although data collection is only about 50 percent complete, we have already identified 213 far-right targets from the same time period.</p>
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<p>The locations of violent extremist activity also differ by ideology. Our data show that between 1990 and 2014, most Islamist extremist attacks occurred in the South (56.5 percent), and most far-right extremist attacks occurred in the West (34.7 percent). Both forms of violence were least likely to occur in the Midwest, with only three incidents committed by Islamist extremists (4.8 percent) and 33 events committed by far-right extremists (13.5 percent).</p>
<p>Targets of violence also vary across the two ideologies. For example, 63 percent of the Islamist extremism victims were targeted for no apparent reason. They just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, often visiting symbolic locations or crowded venues such as the World Trade Center or military installations. </p>
<p>In contrast, 53 percent of victims killed by far-right extremists were targeted for their actual or perceived race or ethnicity. Far-right extremists, such as neo-Nazis, skinheads and white supremacists, often target religious, racial and ethnic, and sexual orientation and gender identity minorities.</p>
<h2>Motives and methods</h2>
<p>There are also differences in violent extremists across demographics, motives and methods. For instance, <a href="http://start.umd.edu/publication/twenty-five-years-ideological-homicide-victimization-united-states-america">data show</a> that guns were the weapon of choice in approximately 73 percent of Islamist extremist homicides and in only 63 percent of far-right extremist homicides. We attribute these differences to far-right extremists using more personal forms of violence, such as beating or stabbing victims to death.</p>
<p>We have also found that suicide missions are not unique to Islamist extremists.</p>
<p>From 1990 to 2014, we identified three suicide missions in which at least one person was killed connected to Islamist extremism, including the 9/11 attacks as one event. In contrast, there were 15 suicide missions committed by far-right extremists.</p>
<p>Our analyses found that compared to Islamist extremists, far-right extremists were significantly more likely to be economically deprived, have served in the military and have a higher level of commitment to their ideology. Far-right extremists were also significantly more likely to be less educated, single, young and to have participated in training by a group associated with their extremist ideology.</p>
<h2>Threat to law enforcement and military</h2>
<p>Terrorists associated with Islamist and far-right extremist ideologies do not only attack civilians. They also pose a deadly threat to law enforcement and military personnel. During the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel were killed by members of Al-Qaida. On April 19, 1995, 13 law enforcement officers and four military personnel were killed when the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was bombed by an anti-government far-right extremist in Oklahoma City.</p>
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<p>Outside of these two events, Islamist extremists are responsible for the murders of 18 military personnel in three incidents, and seven law enforcement officers were killed in five incidents between 1990 and 2015. Far-right extremists have murdered 57 law enforcement officers in 46 incidents, but have never directly targeted military personnel. </p>
<p>Far-right extremists, who typically harbor anti-government sentiments, have a higher likelihood of escalating routine law enforcement contacts into fatal encounters. These homicides pose unique challenges to local law enforcement officers who are disproportionately targeted by the far right.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The events of 9/11 will continue to skew both our real and perceived risks of violent extremism in the United States. To focus solely on Islamist extremism is to ignore the murders perpetrated by the extreme far right and their place in a constantly changing threat environment. </p>
<p>Some have even warned that there is <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2010.514698">potential for collaboration</a> between these extremist movements. Our own <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2010.514698">survey research</a> suggests this is a concern of law enforcement.</p>
<p>Focusing on national counterterrorism efforts against both Islamist and far-right extremism acknowledges that there are differences between these two violent movements. Focusing solely on one, while ignoring the other, will increase the risk of domestic terrorism and future acts of violence.</p>
<p>Both ideologies continue to pose real, unique threats to all Americans. Evidence shows far-right violent extremism poses a particular threat to law enforcement and racial, ethnic, religious and other minorities. Islamist violent extremism is a specific danger to military members, law enforcement, certain minorities and society at large. It remains imperative to support policies, programs and research aimed at countering all forms of violent extremism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Parkin receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security. He is affiliated with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Gruenewald receives funding from the National Institute of Justice. He is also affiliated with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua D. Freilich receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). He is affiliated with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and is a member of its executive committee.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Chermak receives funding from National Institute of Justice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brent Klein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Data on violent incidents in the US reveal that our focus on Islamist extremism since 9/11 may be misguided.William Parkin, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Seattle UniversityBrent Klein, Doctoral Student, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State UniversityJeff Gruenewald, Assistant Professor of Public and Environmental Affairs, IUPUIJoshua D. Freilich, Professor of Criminal Justice, City University of New YorkSteven Chermak, Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/696052016-12-13T16:20:40Z2016-12-13T16:20:40ZFar right threat has slipped under the radar of a counter-extremism strategy targeting Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149643/original/image-20161212-26056-7ljim4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looking the right way?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Yorkman/shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In late November, Ben Wallace MP, the security minister, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-10-31/debates/D67A3442-5433-4F42-A51D-38618DF4FBC8/OnlineRadicalisation">told British parliamentarians</a> that there had been an increase in the number of people from the far-right being referred to deradicalisation programmes. This followed the conviction of Thomas Mair for the murder in June of the MP Jo Cox, who had been outspoken in her support for her constituency’s ethnic and religious diversity. The judge <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-found-guilty-of-jo-cox-murder">said</a> Mair’s act of “lone-wolf” terrorism was inspired by “an admiration for Nazis and similar anti-democratic white supremacist creeds”. </p>
<p>On December 12, the government <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/national-action-british-neo-nazi-group-to-be-classed-as-terror-organisation-and-banned-first-time-a7468136.html">moved</a> to proscribe a neo-Nazi group called National Action. This is welcome, particularly as in recent years the government’s counter-extremism strategy has been heavily targeting those suspected of “Islamist” extremism, and not doing enough to stop those who espouse anti-Muslim hate and anti-Semitism online. </p>
<h2>Most affected group</h2>
<p>The government has two tools it can use to address the growth of extremism in the UK. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year">A deradicalisation programme</a> called Channel was piloted in 2007 to deal with those people suspected of being drawn into extremism. Since then, the programme has expanded significantly. In 2015, the government introduced the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf">Prevent</a> duty, a requirement on schools and universities to report those vulnerable to radicalisation. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://faith-matters.org/2016/05/18/numbers-counter-terrorism-powers-disproportionately-affect-ethnic-religious-minorities-britain/">analysis</a>, based on a freedom of information disclosure from the <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/099%2015%20Channel%20Referrals.pdf">National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC)</a>, showed that before the Prevent duty was introduced, Muslims were already far more likely to be referred to the Channel programme than non-Muslims. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/069%2016%20Channel%20Referrals.doc">NPCC data</a> demonstrates that counter-extremism powers continue to be used disproportionately on individuals with Muslim backgrounds. For example, the referral of Muslims aged under 18 far outpaces the referral of their counterparts from any other religion. Across England and Wales, Muslims were 50 times as likely as Christians to be referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016.</p>
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<p>While these calculations are only indicative, the absolute number is more revealing: of the 1,747 under-18s referred to Channel between March 2014 and March 2016, 1,194 of them (68%) were Muslim. To put this in context, just over 8% of under-18s in England and Wales are Muslim, according to the <a href="http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/DC2107EW">2011 Census</a>. </p>
<p>Another <a href="http://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/NPCC%20FOI/CT/043%2016%20NPCC%20response%20att%2001%20of%2001%2014042016.pdf">NPCC disclosure</a> shows that from March 2012 to the end of March 2016, the vast majority of referrals were for “Islamist” extremists. During this period, the number of “Islamists” referred to the Channel deradicalisation programme increased at a much higher rate than referrals for the “far right”, as the graph below shows. </p>
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<p>In 2015-16, the first financial year in which the Prevent duty applied – there was an 82% increase in referrals for “Islamists” and a 74% increase in referrals for the “far right”. While referrals for right-wing extremism have also increased, the increase has not kept pace with referrals for “Islamism”.</p>
<p>Of all people referred to Channel from 2012 to 2016, 40% of them were judged by Channel panels, composed of police officers and officials from the local authority, the NHS, and other safeguarding bodies, not to be in any need of deradicalisation support. The remaining 60% were recommended for <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-happens-to-people-who-are-suspected-of-being-radicalised-53652">deradicalisation programmes</a>.</p>
<h2>An outdated strategy</h2>
<p>Prevent and Channel are optimised for detecting and referring Muslims that might be under the influence of extremism. While there is improvement with regard to referring right-wing extremists, much is going unchallenged. The <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/">Tell MAMA (Monitoring anti-Muslim Attacks)</a> charity, where I am also a senior researcher, records increasing numbers of anti-Muslim incidents and crimes every year. </p>
<p>Part of the problem is the government’s outdated understanding of the dynamics of contemporary right-wing extremism and white supremacy. The current <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf">Counter-Extremism Strategy</a> cites the Stormfront forum, a neo-Nazi site started by a Ku Klux Klan member in the early 1990s. Stormfront is certainly an important site for right-wing extremists to communicate, but they have started to rely more on social media platforms to spread their ideology. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are the primary platforms of right-wing radicalisation – just as they are for <a href="https://theconversation.com/heres-how-radical-groups-like-islamic-state-use-social-media-to-attract-recruits-58014">“Islamist” extremism</a>. </p>
<p>Britain First, for example, fashions itself as a group of “patriots” who use a massive Facebook following of over 1.5m to disseminate anti-Muslim memes as well as videos of their “Christian patrols” in Muslim neighbourhoods. Other blogs such as Farenheit 211, recently <a href="http://www.fahrenheit211.net/2016/11/20/have-you-played-pakemon-yet-catch-and-deport-them-all/">advertised</a> a <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/anti-jihadi-frog-account-linked-racist-pokemon-stickers-london/">grossly offensive campaign</a> in which racist stickers were placed on London’s public transport network and which led to an arrest in <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/man-arrested-over-racist-pmon-stickers-found-on-tube-network-a3409901.html">early December</a>.</p>
<p>Twitter took down <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online">125,000 pro-ISIS extremist accounts</a> after political pressure between mid-2015 and early 2016. Yet in the past, Tell MAMA <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895458/Facebook-Twitter-allowing-Islamophobia-spread-refusing-report-offensive-postings.html">struggled</a> to suspend an account that calls for the mass deportation of Muslims. To Twitter’s credit, it has now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/17/alt-right-fake-black-twitter-accounts-hate-speech-ban">started to act</a> on blocking “alt-right” accounts, but this has been too little, too late. </p>
<p>It is time for politicians and social media platforms to take more responsibility for countering right-wing extremist content on social media platforms. Some might object, suggesting that these groups are non-violent, pose no threat to the safety of the public and that religiously-motivated extremists are surely the bigger threat. Yet, <a href="https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-terrorism-final-report">research has demonstrated</a> that ideological networks can lead to lone-actor terrorism such as the massacre perpetrated by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 and Mair’s murder of Cox in 2016. Research has also <a href="http://www.springer.com/gb/book/9789400729803">shown</a> that right-wing extremists constitute the largest proportion of lone-actor terrorists and are the most deadly. </p>
<p>In light of the threat, it is imperative that the government understands that right-wing extremism plays a significant threat to the stability of diverse communities across the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bharath Ganesh is a Senior Researcher at Tell MAMA, a project of Faith Matters. His doctoral studies in Geography at University College London, focussing on multiculturalism, race, and tolerance, were funded by The Bonnart Trust (<a href="http://www.fbbtrust.org.uk">www.fbbtrust.org.uk</a>). Views expressed in this article are the author's own do not represent those of Tell MAMA or Faith Matters.</span></em></p>Despite the growing threat from far-right groups, deradicalisation programmes have been largely targeting Muslims.Bharath Ganesh, Researcher in multiculturalism, hate crime, and extremism, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/588072016-05-12T13:39:39Z2016-05-12T13:39:39ZNigeria faces new security threat fuelled by climate change and ethnicity<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/122099/original/image-20160511-18150-3dh5o6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tensions between cattle herders and crop-farming communities in Nigeria have escalated in the past few months.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Akintunde Akinleye</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forging national unity has been a perennial challenge to Nigeria’s evolution as a country. Since independence from Britain <a href="http://global.britannica.com/place/Nigeria">56 years ago</a>, the country continues to weather severe existential storms that strike at its very core. </p>
<p>These make national cohesion and political stability largely elusive. They include: a bloody civil war in the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=wqN9BgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=nigeria,+civil+war+in+the+1960s,&ots=MNQBqSFHzE&sig=FliM_Tj9ThQpF9sdp-bk8d5UbnQ#v=onepage&q=nigeria%2C%20civil%20war%20in%20the%201960s%2C&f=false">1960s</a>; decades of corrupt military dictatorships; perennial inter-ethnic distrust; occasional religious strife and political insurrection; minority and resource rights agitation; and a trademark corrupt political and ruling class.</p>
<p>Recently, Nigeria’s sociopolitical and geopolitical tensions have taken on another dimension. This is evident in the escalating bloody clashes between nomadic cattle herders and farmers. Though there are <a href="http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/eke/050816.html">alternative narratives</a>, the ongoing tensions reflect, in a way, climate change-induced resource scarcity that threatens food and national security.</p>
<p>Nigeria is by far Africa’s most ethnically diverse country. It has an estimated <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=x3gAB7A6-bgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA243&dq=nigeria,+250+ethnic+nationalities&ots=xhCGc2w5-M&sig=7eiVMD-9mY2Iu36ffpnT-PCxhno#v=onepage&q=nigeria%2C%20250%20ethnic%20nationalities&f=false">250 ethnic nationalities</a>. Its most visible faultline is its stark religious divide between the Islamic North and Christian/animist South. This is a less accurate simplification of a complex dynamic. </p>
<p>Before <a href="http://global.britannica.com/place/Nigeria">Nigeria’s independence</a>, the British in 1914 coupled independently administered protectorates of southern and northern Nigeria by fiat as an act of convenience, before bowing out 46 years later in 1960.</p>
<h2>Boko Haram</h2>
<p>Triggered by a complex mix of factors, Nigeria’s security challenges continue to escalate. In the past eight years the Boko Haram insurgence has placed the country on the global <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-boko-haram-is-the-worlds-deadliest-terror-group-54216">jihadist map</a>. </p>
<p>The failure to rescue the nearly 250 <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/13/africa/chibok-girls-new-proof-of-life-video/">Chibok girls</a> Boko Haram abducted is a scar on the conscience of the government.</p>
<p>And a recent skirmish between the military and members of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35342215">Shiite Islamic sect</a> points to the escalating security crisis. The military is accused of extrajudicial killings of Shiite adherents.</p>
<p>The development puts Nigeria’s abysmal <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/nigeria">human rights record</a> under stress. It also potentially places the country in the middle of muscle-flexing by competing Islamic powers outside its borders. For example, Iran was quick to express concern over the Shiite <a href="http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2015/12/16/massacre-of-shia-in-northern-nigeria-an-opening-for-iran/">incident</a>. Iran is a leading Shiite nation, with its eyes on the treatment of a Shiite religious minority in a country with majority Sunni adherents.</p>
<p>While the Boko Haram insurgence keeps mutating, Nigeria is experiencing another dangerous chapter in its security challenge. </p>
<h2>A new security threat</h2>
<p>In the past several months <a href="http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/203225-herdsmenfarmers-clashes-nigerian-govt-proposes-ranches-herdsmen-insist-grazing-routes.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">tensions have escalated</a> between nomadic cattle herders and traditional crop-farming communities. Some traditional and farming communities in central and southern Nigeria have been overrun by herders who are accused of grazing their cattle on crop fields. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/04/04/the-agatu-massacre/">country’s media</a> is dominated by reports of maiming, killings, rape and other forms of banditry associated with highly armed nomadic herders. Unofficial figures put the death toll from one such incident in Enugu State, in the south-eastern region, at <a href="http://pulse.ng/local/in-enugu-many-killed-as-suspected-fulani-herdsmen-invade-community-id4959890.html">about 100</a>.</p>
<p>In the absence of state protection, these events have fuelled affected communities’ support for ethnic or regional militias as a civic defence strategy. The clashes between herdsmen and farmers strike at the core of Nigeria’s vulnerable ethno-political faultlines. They also have ramifications for climate change and food security.</p>
<p>Crop farmers produce more than 80% of Nigeria’s food. Leaving this critical lifeblood of the country’s economic and cultural life at the mercy of herders and their cattle is not an option. Farmers, the majority of whom are women, constitute the bedrock of the country’s <a href="http://www.unilorin.edu.ng/publications/lawalwa/IMPACT%20OF%20INFORMAL%20AGRICULTURAL%20FINANCING%20ON%20AGRICULTURAL%20PR.pdf">informal economy</a>. And the unofficial farming sector is the country’s <a href="http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/01/integration-of-agriculture-informal-sectors-into-economy-could-increase-insurance-penetration-mokwunye/">highest employer</a> of labour. Now this key economic sector is under siege.</p>
<p>Itinerant herding is an age-long practice. Like all aspects of culture and civilisation, its purveyors must adapt to new realities. In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, coexistence, and not conquest, is a sacred code of social cohesion. </p>
<p>The ongoing resource and environmental tension represented by the clash between herders and crop farmers has embedded religious significance. Most itinerant herders are northerners and adherents of the Islamic faith. Their clashes with farmers happen mainly in the central and southern regions, where most people are Christian and animist.</p>
<h2>Climate change, religion and ethnicity</h2>
<p>Perennial ethnic and religious suspicion in Nigeria often fuels apprehensions of an ulterior jihadist agenda. This has a significant security dimension that can easily be exploited. There is a perception of state impunity for the herders, given the evident lack of resolve to rein them in. Noble Laureate Wole Soyinka <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201604290228.html">has said</a> the government’s response </p>
<blockquote>
<p>smacks of abject appeasement and encouragement of violence on innocents. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Nigeria needs an urgent response before the current crisis festers like the Boko Haram malaise. </p>
<p>The herder-farmer crisis demonstrates the reality of the climate change and resource control interface, and its embedded security challenges. The scarcity of water and shrinking of grazing fields in the desert north appear to be pushing herders southwards to the grasslands of the savannas and forests.</p>
<p>The skirmish over natural resources, namely water and grazing fields, could become more dire as the impact of climate change takes hold. That struggle has significant security implications for Nigeria and other African countries. Its resolution requires thoughtful intervention. This should include a combination of policy options rooted in technology and innovation, as well as political and sustainability policy responses.</p>
<p>Nigeria could be a perfect test case of the intersection of these interrelated elements. A national strategy based on innovation, security, sustainability and political will is urgently required. It needs to be designed to mediate the present agro-ecological tension that threatens Africa’s <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-06/nigerian-economy-overtakes-south-africa-s-on-rebased-gdp">largest economy</a> and its <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/africa-population/">most populous nation</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58807/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chidi Oguamanam receives funding from the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council . He is affiliated with the Open African Innovation Research (Open AIR) Network </span></em></p>Escalating clashes between herders and farmers in Nigeria threaten the country’s national and food security. A response based on innovation, sustainability and political will is urgently needed.Chidi Oguamanam, Professor of Law, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/531962016-01-22T10:41:00Z2016-01-22T10:41:00ZBombings aside, Indonesia is still battling over the role of political Islam<p>After a lull of more than six years, Indonesia’s capital Jakarta was once again been hit by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-attacks-is-islamic-states-presence-in-south-east-asia-overstated-52735">deadly terror attack</a>. This one was apparently mounted by a number of individuals believed to be connected with the so-called Islamic State (IS), in a tradition that emerged with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19881138">2002 Bali bombings</a>: violent attacks by terrorist cells operating in Indonesia, but claiming links with global militant Islamist organisations. </p>
<p>The almost immediate outpouring of defiant messages and hashtags in the social media condemning this latest atrocity points at the presence of a robust <a href="http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/indonesia-takes-muslim-counter-narrative">counter narrative</a> shared by the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims. They want to preserve the plurality of what is alternately referred to as Indonesia’s brand of “cultural”, “civil” or “cosmopolitan” Islam.</p>
<p>Historically, Indonesia has been no stranger to religiously inspired political violence, but it tended to be a domestic phenomenon. </p>
<p>In the 19th century, Islam played a role in resisting increasingly invasive <a href="https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/explore-the-collection/timeline-dutch-history/1820-1950-indonesia-and-decolonisation">Dutch colonialism</a>. After independence was declared in 1945, Indonesia was confronted with an armed insurgence by the <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/op-eds/jones-darul-islams-ongoing-appeal.aspx">Darul Islam</a> (DI) movement in West Java. </p>
<p>A breakaway from the main Islamic party, the <a href="http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/p-9460-9789971698430.aspx">Masyumi Party</a>, the DI rejected the latter’s agenda of gradually Islamising Indonesia by democratic means and instead aimed to establish a full-fledged Islamic state. From 1948 until 1962 it challenged the central government, which tried to safeguard the plurality of the country’s multi-ethnic and religious demographic make-up through the so-called <a href="https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:ohiou1205159848">Pancasila</a> or “five principles” doctrine, encompassing the territorial integrity of Indonesia, humanitarianism, social justice, democracy and the requirement of every Indonesian citizen to believe in a single supreme being.</p>
<p>As far as the DI was concerned, this last principle – which included the acceptance of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Hindu-Buddhism as state-acknowledged religions – did not go far enough in affirming the Islamic identity of a majority Muslim country.</p>
<p>After losing a protracted armed confrontation with the central government, the DI uprising was defeated in 1962. However, remnants of DI went underground, and pockets of like-minded extremists with international connections have surfaced occasionally over the ensuing decades. But for now at least, homegrown violent Islamism nonetheless remains mostly a fringe movement, and the idea of religious pluralism has essentially endured ever since.</p>
<h2>The massive mainstream</h2>
<p>To this day, tens of millions of Indonesians are members of the country’s two Islamic mass organisations: the modernist-reformist <a href="http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/muhammadiyah">Muhammadiyah</a> and traditionalist <a href="http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/nahdlatul-ulama">Nahdlatul Ulama</a> (NU), which have both operated legally in Indonesia since their foundation in late colonial times. They are both larger and older than their counterparts elsewhere, including the <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9948.html">Muslim Brotherhood</a> in Egypt and Pakistan’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamaat-e-Islami">Jamaat-e-Islami</a>. </p>
<p>Focused on the emancipation of Indonesia’s Muslims through education and religious propagation, Muhammadiyah and NU continue to shape a pluralist Indonesian Islam which is sensitive to the country’s complex social, cultural and political settings. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/108437/original/image-20160118-31821-vp9mh9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesian Muslims praying at a saint’s shrine in North Java.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carool Kersten</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both organisations played a key role in the dramatic regime change of 1998-99, which <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/903024.stm">ended more than 40 years of autocratic rule</a> under first <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/how-we-destroyed-sukarno-1188448.html">Sukarno</a> and then <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28suharto.html">Suharto</a>. NU leader <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/asia/31wahid.html?_r=0">Abdurrahman Wahid</a> subsequently became the country’s first democratically elected president, while Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais became speaker of the <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/10/07/inside-indonesias-consultative-assembly-the-short-answer/">People’s Consultative Assembly</a>.</p>
<p>The sudden opening up of Indonesian society also led to the emergence of an array of Islamic political parties. But, unlike the popular individual leaders of Islamic mass organisations, these parties didn’t perform well. In the four national elections since 1999, their share of the vote has hovered at around 30%. </p>
<p>Islamist splinter parties have also failed in their attempts to introduce Islamic law into the country’s national legal system due to a lack of support from the larger Muslim parties associated with the Muhammadiyah or NU. They think the new constitution offers adequate protection for the religious rights of all Indonesians. </p>
<p>Islamist politicians developed different tactics to further Islamise Indonesia. These included taking advantage of the devolution of powers to regional and local authorities as part of the decentralisation of government administration. This has resulted in the passing of religious bylaws, imposing – largely symbolic – aspects of Islamic law in certain puritan Muslim regions and localities.</p>
<h2>On the edge</h2>
<p>A more serious challenge to Indonesia’s cultural Islam came in the form of a <a href="http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/2/202.short?rss=1&ssource=mfc">fatwa</a> in the summer of 2005. Issued by the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI), it condemned the concepts of secularism, pluralism and liberalism as “un-Islamic”. </p>
<p>Combined with a “<a href="https://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/publication/1806">conservative turn</a>” in the top echelons of the Muhammadiyah, and to some extent also the NU, reactionary Muslim politicians felt vindicated for their increasingly intolerant attitudes towards Indonesia’s cultural Islam. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/asia/20iht-indonesia20.html">Islamist vigilante organisations</a> used it as a license to persecute and even kill people they considered “deviants” – members of Indonesia’s tiny shia minority, or of the Ahmadiyyah Movement. </p>
<p>The fault lines of this intra-Muslim polarisation became clear when progressive Muslims responded with a “<a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tnheCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT166&lpg=PT166&dq=%22Declaration+of+Indonesianness%22&source=bl&ots=DCZLci2eX0&sig=ZqymMPYbrOdkOsORmc4Ux1eH7KY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2y_2jnbvKAhWEzxQKHV2PBAwQ6AEIHzAA#v=onepage&q=%22Declaration%20of%20Indonesianness%22&f=false">Declaration of Indonesianess</a>”. Issued on Pancasila Day 2006, it rejected the fatwa as being in conflict with principles enshrined in the constitution and Pancasila doctrine. The declaration advocates a measured secularisation of the political process and the protection of religious plurality and toleration. </p>
<p>Against the background of indecisive government and hesitant law enforcement, the <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/islam-in-indonesia/">contest</a> between progressive and reactionary Muslims over society, ideas and values has become edgier. But while isolated extremists occasionally succeed in inflicting atrocities, they still have to swim against the strong current of a tolerant, democratic Indonesian Islam.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/53196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carool Kersten has held an AHRC-funded fellowship (2013)</span></em></p>Indonesia has both the world’s largest Muslim population and a vibrant young democracy.Carool Kersten, Senior Lecturer in the Study of Islam & the Muslim World, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/516152015-12-08T14:54:20Z2015-12-08T14:54:20ZIs Algeria really spring cleaning its ‘deep state’?<p>The trial was fast and efficient: after only four hours, Algeria’s notorious former counter-terrorism chief Abdelkader Ait-Ouarabi, better known as General Hassan, was unceremoniously <a href="http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/le-general-hassan-condamne-a-5-ans-de-prison-27-11-2015-308589_109.php">sentenced</a> to five years in prison. </p>
<p>This was the country’s first prosecution of a high-ranking secret service officer since the 2011 Arab uprisings, and just the most recent visible sign of a concerted effort to remake the Algerian state – and to finally make good on some still unfulfilled presidential promises.</p>
<p>Elected for the first time in 1999 after a devastating <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2010/11/2010118122224407570.html">civil war</a>, for many Algerians, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is still the herald of national reconciliation. He is also the one who famously <a href="http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/52764/uho_algeria_profile.pdf">declared</a> that he would not allow his power to be restricted by the military. </p>
<p>And yet, his first two terms were marked by a de facto alliance with the head of military intelligence, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34268565">General Mohamed Mediene</a> (also known as “General Toufik”), in which Mediene wielded the real influence. The balance has only begun to shift in the last few years, as a number of key figures in the military and secret service were progressively retired and replaced. </p>
<p>The process has culminated in the discharge of two powerful figures in Algeria’s infamous “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/algeria-military-court-intelligence-oficial-151124040909790.html">parallel state</a>”. First, Hassan was arrested in August, and while grounds for the official charges of “disobeying military orders” and “destroying documents” were not made public, the Algerian press came up with several hypotheses, among them an unauthorised <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/11/26/general-hassan-proces-toufik_n_8652350.html?utm_hp_ref=algeria">undercover action</a> across the border with Mali. He also ran the special unit, <a href="http://www.impact24.info/le-scorat-change-de-commandement/">Scorat</a>, which dealt quite controversially with the terrorist <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31645967">attack on the In Amenas oil plant</a> in January 2013. </p>
<p>And in September it was the turn of General Mediene himself, who after 25 years was removed from office and forced to retire. Many feared that such an abrupt dismissal would unleash violent retaliation, but for the moment, there seem to have been no visible consequences.</p>
<h2>Blurred boundaries</h2>
<p>Some observers see these replacements and trials as part of an effort to promote <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/10/changing-guard-algiers-151006101714778.html">stronger civilian control</a> of the country’s institutions. But to many <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22347/the-changing-nature-of-the-algerian-political-syst">other analysts</a>, the weakening of the military doesn’t necessarily mean Algeria is getting any more pluralistic. Instead, it might also point to the growing power of Bouteflika’s clan over the rest of the country. </p>
<p>The clan is backed by an increasingly influential new business class, and by yet another military wing, this one led by General <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22839/de-dramatizing-algerian-politics">Gaid Salah</a>. That means the “new civilian trend” narrative cannot work as long as Algerian civil society, fragmented by decades of repression, violence, and clientelism, remains too weak to truly counterweight the country’s power elite.</p>
<p>This might also explain why many key figures in the country have reacted to the recent power shift with a mix of surprise and concern. </p>
<p>Longstanding political opponents of Bouteflika still <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/une-epuration-politique-pour-crimes-de-non-allegeance-233941">prefer the army to its “civilian” alternative</a>, taking the side of General Hassan. Even the secretary of the workers’ party, Louisa Hanoune, has claimed that the imprisonment of General Hassan would “weaken the military and <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/louisa-hanoune-une-grave-scission-au-sommet-de-letat-231979">affect the credibility of the state</a> with foreign allies”.</p>
<p>For an example of just how contorted the effort to “clean up” the state really is, look at the re-emergence of former head of the armed <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/01/algeria-banned-islamists-apply-1.html">Islamic Salvation Front</a>, Madani Mezrag. Whereas General Hassan, Mezrag’s opponent during the civil war, is now imprisoned, Mezrag is now not only tolerated but even <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/06/08/islamistes-pouvoir-opposition-algerie_n_5469416.html">recognised by the government</a>, and often appears in the <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/10/15/madani-mezrag_n_8300080.html">national media</a>. This and similar cases have the press <a href="http://www.algerie1.com/actualite/le-general-hassan-en-attente-dune-autre-juridiction-pour-etre-juge/">questioning the secret services’ ability and intention</a> to curb the influence of terrorists old and new.</p>
<h2>Managing the crisis</h2>
<p>On the surface, it may seem like the Algerian state is playing the same old game, using the spectre of Islamism <a href="http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21988/a-dangerous-dualism_the-myth-of-two-algerias">to justify authoritarian rule</a>. On the other hand, for the last 15 years Algeria has tried hard – and sometimes successfully – to mediate between opposing forces inside and around the country. </p>
<p>Given the general instability across North Africa and the Sahel, declaring open war on all violent Islamist groups might well trigger violent retaliation, such as the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/in-amenas-murders-coroner-finds-algerian-gas-plant-had-security-flaws">In Amenas gas field attacks</a>, which were supposedly payback for Algerian support to France in Mali. </p>
<p>In addition, while most Algerians are deeply disturbed by the advent of new armed Islamist groups, they do not necessarily approve of alliances with Western powers, understandably fearing their destabilising influence in the region. Algerian officials are all too aware of that distrust, and they usually downplay the importance of anti-terrorist alliances with the EU and the US.</p>
<p>There are enormous challenges ahead. Algeria must find a way to better cope with the pressure caused by migrants, who are coming mainly from Mali. A recent <a href="http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/11/25/incendie-de-ouargla-letat-decide-de-nouvelles-mesures-de-prises-en-charges-des-migrants-africains_n_8645264.html">fire in the refugee camp in Ourgla</a> resulted in 18 deaths. Then there’s the urgent need to reform the economy and save the country from a dire economic crisis, given that it still relies <a href="http://www.gmfus.org/publications/algeria-three-years-after-arab-spring">almost exclusively on oil revenues</a>. And a new financial bill just approved by parliament despite <a href="http://www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/scenes-de-revolte-a-lassemblee-237477">fierce opposition</a>, allows for the privatisation of several state companies, which could be profoundly destabilising without a parallel social welfare strategy. </p>
<p>Since Bouteflika’s poor health keeps him from appearing in public more than once a year, the assorted possible post-Bouteflika scenarios are naturally being discussed. The president’s brother Saïd, who some say is now the real decision-maker, could either <a href="http://www.impact24.info/said-bouteflika-se-prepare-a-succeder-a-son-frere/">step forward personally</a> or continue to promote the clan’s interest behind the scenes. </p>
<p>If a real transition begins, bowing to the pressure from the country’s younger and more educated generations, Algeria could consolidate its role as a crucial mediator in a truly unstable part of the world. The way its government evolves over the next few months will have a major impact on the stability of the whole region – and on the world beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Viola Sarnelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The “deep state” has been a problem in Algeria for decades, but at last it’s being turfed out. Or is it?Viola Sarnelli, Researcher - Middle East and North Africa Studies, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/417172015-05-13T09:58:13Z2015-05-13T09:58:13ZBangladesh blogger killings have roots in independence struggle<p><a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/12/asia/bangladesh-blogger-killed/">Ananta Bijoy Das</a>, who was murdered in a brutal roadside machete attack in north-east Bangladesh, is the third secularist blogger to be killed by Islamist extremists since February 2015. But this is a less recent development than it seems. Militant attacks on so-called “atheists” have been accelerated in Bangladesh since 2013.</p>
<p>Militant violence against critics of Islam has been increasing ever since February 2013, when the <a href="http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/indexdetails.php">International Crimes Tribunal</a> (ICT) set up in 1973 mainly to handle war crimes cases relating to Bangladesh’s independence struggle, handed down a life sentence to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21332622">Abdul Qadir Molla</a>, the senior member of the far-right Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, for crimes committed during the war of independence from Pakistan in 1971. </p>
<p>The human cost of this tragic episode is estimated by official state sources to be <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30288785">up to 3m lives</a> – and 44 years on, the nation has never quite dealt with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16111843">trauma</a>. </p>
<h2>Public outrage</h2>
<p>Molla and his party affiliates were advocates for Bangladesh remaining part of Pakistan, and were accused of acting as on-the-ground sources for the Pakistan Army during the nine-month guerrilla war. Some pro-Pakistan elements headed paramilitary militias, which were allegedly responsible for the systematic <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2014/apr/15/silence-bangladesh-birangona-women-of-war-play">rape</a> and execution of civilians.</p>
<p>Molla, known as the “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/13/shahbag-protest-bangladesh-quader-mollah">Butcher of Mirpur</a>”, was considered by many people to have escaped justice in the aftermath of independence, since he and others had never been formally tried in a court of law. When he was eventually found guilty of rape, murder and mass murder – including the killing of more than 350 unarmed civilians – and given only a life sentence, there was a public outcry and widespread calls for his execution. </p>
<p>Such was the outrage that in September 2013, the ICT upgraded his sentence to death, and he was ultimately <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/bangladesh-executes-top-islamist-leader-abdul-quader-molla-for-war-crimes-544338">executed</a> that December.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the ICT’s verdict, a massive spontaneous <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21332622">protest</a> erupted at a busy road junction in Shabagh, in the capital Dhaka. Over the subsequent weeks, this “<a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/indiaatlse/2013/03/21/the-paradoxes-of-bangladeshs-shahbag-protests/">Shahbagh Movement</a>” brought together a bricolage of secular political activists, women’s organisations, students, and religious minorities which called for the execution of all those responsible for the atrocities in 1971. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Vk45b8znWuk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A Shabagh movement protest in 2013.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In response, over the course of the following two years, a number of high-profile Islamists have been tried, sentenced and executed. And while those attaching themselves to the Shahbagh Movement rejoiced, the Islamists, feeling victimised and persecuted, have pursued a course of violent and periodic street protests, accompanied by targeted executions of anti-Islamist bloggers.</p>
<p>But while this apparent polarisation of Bangladeshi society can be viewed as a classic left-versus-right story, the truth is somewhere in between. </p>
<h2>Ambivalence</h2>
<p>Despite the fact that the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bg.html">majority of Bangladeshis (90%) are Muslim</a>, the vast majority supported independence and deplore the war collaborators of 1971. They want to see justice meted out to those who betrayed their fellow countrymen, but at the same time, they are loyal to the tenets of Islam. </p>
<p>This fault line means that there is a degree of ambivalence about a blogger who supports the trials against war collaborators, but is also vociferously critical of Islam.</p>
<p>Speaking to people during my research in Sylhet, where Ananta Bijoy Das was murdered, I found a lot of support for sentencing war criminals – but everyone I spoke to qualified their opinion with the insistence that any trial should be fair and not politically influenced. When I asked them if they thought the ICT was well placed to provide such a service, the overwhelming response was no. </p>
<p>In Sylhet, a relatively conservative part of the country, the ICT trials were seen as a vanity project for the government and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25618108">Awami League</a>, a key player in the independence movement that was often accused of pursuing a historic <a href="http://www.nirapadnews.com/english/2015/02/25/news-id:9021/">vendetta</a> against the pro-Pakistan religious right. </p>
<p>And in this part of the country, feelings towards “atheist bloggers” – some of whom have attacked the reputation of the Prophet Muhammad – are not so warm. The majority of my respondents maintained that it was unacceptable for anyone to desecrate the honour of the Prophet in a Muslim society. Ananta Bijoy Das’s murder appears to be the latest episode in the conflict between two of Bangladesh’s extreme political factions. </p>
<p>While many international observers are rightly outraged by the naked brutality of the attack, it is important to think about where the unfettered emotion behind it came from. The killing shows how Bangladesh is still struggling with the bloody memories of its independence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashraf Hoque received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Research Council.</span></em></p>Three secular political bloggers have been killed in Bangladesh since the start of 2015 – but the outrage behind the murders started a long time ago.Ashraf Hoque, Research Associate, Dept of Anthropology, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/361142015-01-13T10:27:56Z2015-01-13T10:27:56ZThe attack on Charlie Hebdo: the problem is the Middle East, not Islam<p>The deadly attack in Paris by French Islamists with ties to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provokes several basic responses. </p>
<p>One major response is a broad affirmation that the actions of the violent few in no way represent Islam as a global religion of over 1 billion adherents. </p>
<p>Indeed, the vast majority of Muslims are no less broadly humane and no more fanatic than anyone else, as was clear in Paris with the heroic actions of a Muslim employee of the besieged Kosher grocery store, or the death of a French Muslim police officer defending Charlie Hebdo. </p>
<p>Underscoring that this is the case might be less necessary if <a href="http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/upload/islamophobia/2013/en/islamphobia_report_2013.pdf">Islamophobia were not a genuine global issue.</a></p>
<p>But, however true, the response that Islam is not about violence is unlikely to satisfy. </p>
<p>People are asking why – at least at this moment in global history – the most frequent and dramatic violence explicitly undertaken in the name of religion seems to occur in Middle East and North Africa countries and/or in the name of a particular branch of Islam. </p>
<p>Even for a scholar like myself – who has studied the diversity of orientations in Islam – and has many Muslim friends, the question still nags: why are a tiny minority of Muslims with connections to the Middle East and North Africa committing violent attacks against religious and other pluralism? </p>
<p>The answer may actually be the MENA geographic piece of the equation, rather than the Muslim one.</p>
<h2>What is special about the Middle East and North Africa?</h2>
<p>Put it this way: if Islamist violence linked to the Middle East and North Africa is the issue, then looking at the regional, rather than religious piece of the puzzle may be more fruitful, particularly in light of the diversity of Islam worldwide. </p>
<p>The question of why the MENA has bred so much recent violence might have many answers, but there is one that I want to highlight here. </p>
<p>Colonialism in the region and the authoritarian governments that followed the withdrawal of the British, French and Ottoman empires, have specifically prioritized the violent suppression of dissent. It is this violent clampdown that has influenced many of today’s Islamist opposition movements.</p>
<p>Several points from “Middle Eastern Politics 101” are worth keeping in mind, </p>
<p>First, there is the idealization of Islamic civilization before colonialism and nostalgia for its intellectual and cultural pre-eminence – think the oft-cited example of the Arab-invented navigational tool, the <a href="http://www.astrolabes.org/">astrolabe.</a> In contrast, relations with Europe were never easy – they were, in fact, violent from the beginning. And this only got worse with the arrival of colonial rule. </p>
<p>The relative aimlessness of today’s states in the Middle East and North Africa is often blamed on the legacy of such colonial practices as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">European powers’ drawing arbitrary borders</a> and <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/stop-blaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle-easts-problems/279561/">practicing “divide and rule” to help their control</a> over the region’s diverse ethnic and religious groups. All of this helps explain why political cohesion in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen has not survived the fall of coercive dictators. </p>
<p>Second, <a href="http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Eva-Bellin_Robustness-of-Authoritarianism-in-the-Middle-East.pdf">although Middle Eastern authoritarianism can not be completely blamed on the colonial legacy</a>, it’s convenient for Middle Easterners to say the West’s past and present actions have contributed to the relative lack of democracy in the MENA. Citizens’ political and economic aspirations are repressed across the region. This widespread frustration, in turn, had much to do with the 2011 Arab uprisings – as well as with the backlash that followed in Egypt and elsewhere. </p>
<p>Third, this repression has been particularly acute in the arena of free expression, where governments – and the opposition movements they have spawned – have often justified harsh treatment of political dissenters and journalists in the name of enhancing social solidarity.</p>
<p>What all of this means in a nutshell is that the Middle East and North Africa has been a region with an unusual level of popular resentment towards governments, and with many examples of force being used against any open opposition to political orthodoxy. </p>
<h2>Before and after the Arab spring</h2>
<p>Before 2011 the usual pattern was to force Islamist political groups underground. This often resulted in these groups being a mirror image of the states that had outlawed them.</p>
<p>With the broad disillusionment after the uprisings of 2011, states like Egypt have gone back to their pattern of violently repressing groups – mostly Islamist – who, it is claimed, undermine social solidarity. </p>
<p>At the same time, and somewhat ironically, Egypt, and several other MENA states, have been in the forefront of <a href="https://cpj.org/blog/2014/11/egypts-journalists-speak-out-against-repression-se.php">clamping down on journalists</a> whom they deem dangerous to national values or cohesiveness. Journalistic self-censorship, and media censorship more generally, have been a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/she-said/2014/oct/19/fighting-censorship-in-the-middle-east-is-nothing-new-but-the-battleground-has-changed">well-known aspect of MENA politics</a> for decades.</p>
<p>Given this regional context, violent actors like the Islamists in France are not as much representative of Islam, as they are of a specific political context with far too many concrete and well known examples of using of violence to silence dissent. </p>
<h2>An alternative perspective</h2>
<p>If violence can breed violence, then the legacy of both Western colonialism and post-colonial repressive authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa should be confronted – and more clearly connected to the broader context of the tragedy of Paris.</p>
<p>Emphasizing the influence of repressive political structures in the modern Middle East and North Africa is an approach that does not get to the social psychological issues of the attackers or the particular context of contemporary French culture.</p>
<p>However, acknowledging that authoritarian repression of dissent in the Middle East and North Africa replicates itself elsewhere, and that it fosters networks that can abet terrorist attacks globally, offers an alternative view on last week’s shooting of the journalists at Charlie Hebdo. It is a different argument to the usual one that the problem lies in Islam or with Muslims – an argument that is only likely to further heighten conflict. </p>
<p>The key point is that excessive repression by a politically-dominant group (governmental or non-governmental) is central to breeding violence, in the Middle East and elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36114/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The deadly attack in Paris by French Islamists with ties to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provokes several basic responses. One major response is a broad affirmation that the actions of the violent…David Mednicoff, Assistant Professor of Public Policy Director, Accelerated Degree Programs, Center for Public Policy and Adminstration Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/360192015-01-12T00:15:55Z2015-01-12T00:15:55ZAll of Islam isn’t intolerant, nor did the West always accept blasphemy<p>The tradition of freedom of expression on religious matters is not quite so venerable as many seem to imagine in the outcry at the killing of Charlie Hebdo journalists and cartoonists in Paris. While modern Western nations do not make blasphemy punishable by death, many had blasphemy laws for centuries. Severe penalties were imposed even in the last century. </p>
<p>In the last successful prosecution in Australia, in Victoria in 1919, journalist Robert Samuel Ross <a href="http://www.takver.com/history/rsross.htm">was charged</a> with posting blasphemous literature. This took the form of a satirical article:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Bolshevism has broken out in Heaven; God abdicates. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The court <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/60905230">sentenced Ross</a> to six months’ hard labour for publishing a “vile and indecent attack on Christian Religion”.</p>
<p>While this is obviously not remotely comparable to murdering people, it does remind us that societies and cultures evolve, as do various strands of Islam and other religions that shape societies. <a href="https://theconversation.com/cultural-muslims-like-cultural-christians-are-a-silent-majority-32097">“Secular Muslims”</a> and “secular Christians” are both more tolerant than their fundamentalist brethren, and tolerance of religious offence exists along a continuum that historically crosses religious lines.</p>
<p>Charlie Hebdo stands in a long tradition of French satirical literature aimed at criticising religion, specifically Catholicism. Given that France is home to approximately <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_France#Religion">five million Muslims</a>, 7.5% of the population, the magazine had turned part of its attention to the Muslim faith in the same spirit. </p>
<p>Muslim nations around the world <a href="http://www.judaism-islam.com/muslim-reaction-to-the-charlie-hebdo-massacre/">have condemned</a> the attack as “cowardly”, dissociating the act from “true Islam”. It is especially important for Muslims to continue voicing their objection to Islamic extremism because they <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-truth-about-whether-islam-is-a-religion-of-violence-or-peace-32437">choose peace over violence</a> for their religion. As Jenny Taylor, of Lapido Media, <a href="http://www.christiantoday.com/article/charlie.hebdo.attack.is.religion.to.blame/45538.htm">said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Your religion is not what you say, it is what you do. If you shoot innocent people in the course of their work in the name of God, that is a religious act and you can’t deny it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Actions do speak louder than words and religion is almost always defined in the context of social and political action. It is important, though, to question assumptions that the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine and other acts of terrorism is purely religious. </p>
<p>Religion has a long history in world civilisations and its story is not simple or straightforward. Much of religious history is interlaced with social and political history. It is the combination of religion and politics, in particular, that is at play here. </p>
<h2>A religion marked by diversity</h2>
<p>Islam has a long legal tradition that dates back to the ninth century. And its tradition is based on jurist opinion derived from legitimate Muslim sources.</p>
<p>Today, Muslim opinion is as diverse and its enforcement as multifaceted as it has ever been. There are a number of schools of law that distinguish themselves based on their interpretation of tradition.</p>
<p>Also, this division cuts across the broadly defined sectarian divides between two branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi’a. Traditionally, Shi’a are more flexible in attitude toward visual representation of figures of importance to Islam. While Sunni follow scholarly opinion in their <a href="http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/251132/Hadith">Hadith</a> collections that forbid the creating of images of humans, nothing in the Qur’an prohibits visual representation. </p>
<p>It would be difficult for any member of the Muslim community to convey an absolute opinion on any matter without recourse to extended dialogue and factual verification.</p>
<p>Certain radical Muslim community figures may incite the populace with their extremist opinion, as British activist <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/anjem-choudary-on-the-charlie-hebdo-attacks-muslims-do-not-believe-in-the-concept-of-freedom-of-expression-9965400.html">Anjem Choudry</a> has done. And particular organisations or movements like Islamic State and al-Qaeda have espoused a <em>takfiri</em> (those Muslims who claim other Muslims as apostates) position with their extremist view and subsequent acts of violence. This makes them no more or less “Muslim”, but it does make the point that Muslim opinion varies. </p>
<p>What constitutes the opinion of Muslims is in fact laced with social, cultural and political sensibilities. </p>
<h2>Majority must answer the challenge</h2>
<p>The Charlie Hebdo cartoons, which do not single out Islam and which are produced and disseminated in a democratic context that permits freedom of the press (and freedom of speech), present two important issues for us to think about. </p>
<p>The first is that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cultural-muslims-like-cultural-christians-are-a-silent-majority-32097">majority of the world’s Muslims</a> uphold societal values of liberty and freedom of expression. Only a minority Islamist ideology rejects this.</p>
<p>The first issue is compounded by the second, however, which is that an alleged official Muslim reaction to insults aimed at the Prophet is raised. While none of the texts conclusively warrant “payback”, <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-states-medieval-ideology-owes-a-lot-to-revolutionary-france-31206">Islamist ideology</a> appears successful in presenting a view that approves murder as a legitimate reaction to what is considered insults to the person of Muhammad.</p>
<p>The Paris attack demonstrates the now-frightening reach of Islamist militancy in the heart of Europe. It also emphasises the ideological challenge to the values of liberal democratic society by an emerging strand of <a href="https://theconversation.com/islam-blasphemy-and-free-speech-a-surprisingly-modern-conflict-36003">political Islam</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36019/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Milad Milani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The tradition of freedom of expression on religious matters is not quite so venerable as many seem to imagine in the outcry at the killing of Charlie Hebdo journalists and cartoonists in Paris. While modern…Milad Milani, Lecturer, History and Political Thought, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.