tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/jihadist-insurgency-74640/articlesJihadist insurgency – The Conversation2022-12-06T13:14:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956192022-12-06T13:14:41Z2022-12-06T13:14:41ZJihadists and bandits are cooperating. Why this is bad news for Nigeria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498444/original/file-20221201-26-pce5tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents fleeing a village in Plateau State, north central Nigeria, after an attack by armed bandits. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Nigerian state has come under severe security stress in recent times. It has faced multiple national security threats: <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/b180-after-shekau-confronting-jihadists-nigerias-north-east">jihadist groups</a> in the north-east; <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/29/who-are-the-armed-bandits-of-northwest-nigeria">armed bandits</a> in the north-west; <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2022/05/01/how-ipob-esn-is-promoting-insecurity-in-nigeria-nigerian-army/">militia secessionists</a> in the south-east; and <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-delta-young-men-face-exclusion-and-violence-in-one-of-the-most-polluted-places-on-earth-142109">militancy</a> in the south-south. </p>
<p>Thousands of people have died or been displaced.</p>
<p>Hardly a day goes by without reports of kidnappings for ransom, thefts, cattle rustling or sexual violence by armed bandits in the troubled north-west region. </p>
<p>Armed bandits have become so emboldened as to stage <a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-attack-kaduna-abuja-highway-abduct-scores">highway attacks</a> and set <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/471996-exclusive-bandits-ambush-nigerian-troops-kill-seven-soldiers-injure-five-others.html">ambushes</a> against the country’s security forces. Concern is increasing about the threat they pose to peace and security in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Much has been written about this banditry, including its linkages to the country’s <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence">farmer-herder crisis</a> – the tensions over grazing for livestock. But there appears to be a new trend in the bandits’ way of operating which warrants attention. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">a previous article</a> I explored the factors that contribute to the spread of violence in Nigeria and across the Sahel region. These include poverty, inequality, high unemployment and illiteracy rates, weak institutions and poor governance, to mention a few. Taking these factors into account, I argue in this article that the interests of bandits and jihadists are converging. This poses a formidable threat to Nigeria’s national security.</p>
<p>The large number of bandits offers a significant pool of potential fighters for jihadists.</p>
<h2>Why the bandit threat is real</h2>
<p>Bandits are mostly known for their pursuit of economic opportunism. They are mostly interested in enriching themselves rather than taking other kinds of power.</p>
<p>Jihadist groups such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram">Boko Haram</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/islamic-state-west-africa-province-iswap-0">Islamic State in West Africa Province</a> are rather driven by political ideology.</p>
<p>But there are pointers that armed bandits <a href="https://dailytrust.com/bandits-boko-haram-terrorists-working-together-says-fg">may be willing</a> to <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/boko-haram-terrorists-now-training-bandits-in-kaduna-other-north-west-states-military-sources/">work alongside jihadists</a> in the north-west. The government has said this may have been the case in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/21/over-160-passengers-still-missing-from-train-attacked-in-nigeria">attack</a> on an Abuja-Kaduna bound train. More than 160 commuters were abducted in a jihadi-style attack.</p>
<p>There have also been records that point to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem">arms trading</a> between bandits and terrorists in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The jihadist group <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ansarus-comeback-in-nigeria-deepens-the-terror-threat">Ansaru</a>, which broke away from Boko Haram in 2012, has recently re-emerged. This proscribed group is known for its <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11455.doc.htm">deadly attacks </a> on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, in 2013. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> affiliated group now mostly operates within Birnin Gwari, a local government area in north-west Nigeria’s Kaduna state. The group has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/4/19/are-nigerias-bandits-a-new-boko-haram-cell-or-rival">sought</a> the cooperation of armed bandits in the pursuit of its goals and objectives, which it claims are to protect Muslims across Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests.</p>
<p>Though there have been occasional <a href="https://dailytrust.com/breaking-bandits-ansaru-terrorists-clash-in-kaduna">clashes</a> between bandits and jihadists, the quest for strategic relevance among jihadist groups implies a willingness to form new alliances and bolster existing ones. Bandits could confer strategic relevance on jihadists by providing them with the manpower and economic resources required in the pursuit of their goals.</p>
<p>The Nigerian military’s <a href="https://army.mil.ng/?tag=operation-hadarin-daji">Operations Hadarin Daji</a> and <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/09/air-force-launches-operation-thunder-strike-2-against-boko-haram/">Thunderstrike</a> inflicted operational defeats on the jihadists. They have since embarked on an intensified effort to recruit fighters into their fold, including <a href="https://punchng.com/boko-haram-iswap-recruiting-child-soldiers-army/">child soldiers</a>.</p>
<p>Numbering over <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north">30,000</a> across the northern region, armed bandits could fill the void.</p>
<h2>An attractive option</h2>
<p>Armed bandits and jihadists in Nigeria have a common enemy – the Nigerian security forces. </p>
<p>Armed bandits are interested in exploiting governance gaps.</p>
<p>The jihadists’ objective is to establish sharia rule and an Islamic caliphate.
The groups differ among themselves on how exactly to achieve this. This explains the internal rift within Boko Haram which led to the emergence of ISWAP in 2015. In May 2021, ISWAP staged an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/islamic-state-west-african-province-says-nigerias-boko-haram-leader-is-dead-2021-06-06/">assault</a> on Boko Haram’s leader <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57378493">Abubakar Shekau</a>, resulting in his death. </p>
<p>What they have in common however is a hierarchical leadership structure from which they derive their instructions. ISWAP has ties with the Islamic State, and Ansaru and Boko Haram have ties with Al-Qaeda. </p>
<p>The absence of such external leadership structures for armed bandits means it might be difficult to achieve an ironclad partnership between them and jihadists in the long run. </p>
<p>As armed bandits become more assertive, however, they might adopt a political ideology. This is evident from their recent attack on an <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/bandits-attack-immigration-patrol-base-one-officer-killed-two-injured/">immigration base</a> and their attempted attack for the <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/511043-military-foils-another-attack-in-nda-kills-20-bandits.html">second time</a> on the Nigerian Defence Academy - both of which represent institutions of the state. A potential trigger for this is the <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/fg-declares-bandits-as-terrorists/">proscription</a> of armed bandits as terrorists by the federal government. </p>
<p>Armed bandits could potentially formalise whatever existing strategic partnerships they have with jihadist groups such as Ansaru, given its proximity to them, if they resolve their <a href="https://punchng.com/two-die-as-bandits-terrorists-clash-in-kaduna/">recurring differences</a>. </p>
<p>Doing so would guarantee steady sources of funds and arms for both armed non-state actors.</p>
<p>A second trigger could be the effect of ransom payments to kidnappers being made <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-27/nigerian-senate-passes-law-banning-ransom-payments-to-kidnappers">illegal</a>. The Nigerian government recently enacted this law. </p>
<p>As the law takes effect, families of kidnapped victims will be less willing to pay ransom – the major financial resource for armed bandits. Bandits could potentially become desperate and set aside their differences with jihadists, choosing to partner with them. </p>
<p>A synergy between armed bandits and jihadists would lead to more civilian deaths, displacement, and destruction of property. </p>
<p>It could attract more foreign terrorist fighters, too, given Nigeria’s porous borders, who would be keen on recruiting combat-ready terrorists for armed conflict across the Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions. </p>
<p>This also has serious implications for external state actors such as the United States, France and the European Union in the long run. That’s because the activities of terrorists in the region could jeopardise their economic interests.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>To avert this, the federal government of Nigeria must act fast. It must intensify covert action to disrupt the potential consolidation of partnerships between armed bandits and jihadist groups. </p>
<p>In doing so, it must however be careful not to rely solely on the use of force, which tends to result in the over-militarisation of an already complex issue. It ignores the triggers and drivers of terrorism and has the unintended effect of terrorists becoming adaptive over time. </p>
<p>Efforts must be directed at addressing underlying socio-economic, environmental and political <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/521768-unpunished-crimes-poverty-others-fuel-banditry-in-nigerias-northwest-report.html">root causes</a> of the country’s farmer-herder crisis, which contributes to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the region.</p>
<p>Lastly, poor governance must be replaced with <a href="https://republic.com.ng/june-july-2022/citizens-over-terrorists/">people-centric governance</a>, given that the former has <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/521768-unpunished-crimes-poverty-others-fuel-banditry-in-nigerias-northwest-report.html">contributed</a> to the emergence of both jihadism and “banditism” across Nigeria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The interests of bandits and jihadists are converging in Nigeria and this poses a formidable threat to the country’s security.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900092022-09-18T08:51:11Z2022-09-18T08:51:11ZHow coastal West Africa can stem the jihadist wave<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482789/original/file-20220905-2133-l6l9n6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger soldiers conduct a simulated mounted patrol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Holman/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Jihadist conflicts are now a part of West Africa’s political makeup, as militant Islamist groups resist numerous campaigns to counter them. </p>
<p>In 2021, three of the ten countries most affected by terrorism globally were Sahel countries – Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, <a href="https://imctc.org/en/eLibrary/INTReports/Pages/report18052022.aspx">according to</a> the 2022 Global Terrorism Index. Similarly, ten of the 20 deadliest attacks of 2021 occurred in the region. In 2022, most member states of the <a href="https://ecowas.int/">Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</a> are dealing with some form of militant Islamist presence. </p>
<p>This presence is strengthening southwards in coastal West African countries, especially those that border the Sahel countries. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220211-death-toll-in-benin-national-park-attacks-rises-as-france-opens-terror-probe">Benin</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/togo-looks-like-west-africas-new-frontier-of-violent-extremism-183304">Togo</a>, for example, have experienced recent attacks.</p>
<p>These developments come with a staggering cost. Aside from deaths, injuries and displaced persons, confidence is waning in countries’ ability to govern and to support healthy economies. Countries have therefore initiated regional programmes to counter terrorism, such as the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/african-cooperation/accra-initiative/">Accra Initiative</a> (2017), and several national legal and policy frameworks. These range from border security to intelligence gathering and building community resilience.</p>
<p>These measures are necessary – but not enough. Coastal West African countries must think differently to prevent jihadist conflicts from worsening. They must move away from traditional counter-terrorism practices which respond to the threat in the short term, towards nation building interventions that prevent it in the long term. There must be a more comprehensive look at the threat, taking into account the governance issues that have led to the present.</p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>Militant Islamist groups have undergone many changes: splits, alliances and shifting allegiances to global projects such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.</p>
<p>Between 2010 and 2017, campaigns to counter militant Islamist groups were mainly geographically focused on individual groups such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/greater-african-union-support-needed-to-fight-boko-haram">Boko Haram</a>, <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-dine">Ansar Dine</a>, <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/mujao">MUJAO</a>, and <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-mourabitoun">al Mourabitoun</a>. As the threat becomes more regional and less national, there is less mention of individual groups. Jihadist coalitions such as the Islamic State in West Africa Province <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa/topics/islamic-state-west-africa-province-iswap-78318">ISWAP</a>, and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimin">JNIM</a> have become more prominent.</p>
<p>This shows that Islamist militant groups are consolidating their presence. They are defying national boundaries and numerous counter-terrorism efforts. </p>
<p>Moreover, over time, the activities of militant Islamist groups are increasingly presenting them as criminal cells engaging in profiteering and destructive politics. They act less like grievance-based organisations seeking religious puritanism and alternative politics.</p>
<p>Still, they could continue to strengthen their reach and increase and threaten multiple levels of security. </p>
<h2>A new approach to violent extremism</h2>
<p>West African countries need a different approach to countering violent extremism.</p>
<p>They must see the enablers of terrorism in different shades and degrees. The ease with which Islamist groups are strengthening across the West African sub-region indicates that coastal countries’ socio-political, geographical and historical makeup is not very different from that of Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger, in terms of the conditions that give rise to terrorism.</p>
<p>Countries also need to appreciate that jihadist groups are not all the same as each other. The elements and actors of Islamist militancy differ regarding the type of presence, modus operandi, fundamental and strategic motives and the balance of power between them and others. </p>
<p>Coastal West African countries must therefore disaggregate the threat and respond accordingly. Sustainable and comprehensive counter-terrorism must cover more ground and have short-term, medium-term and long-term measures. </p>
<p>What works in one place doesn’t necessarily work elsewhere. Military campaigns may work in Iraq, but not necessarily in the Sahel. Similarly, coastal West African countries may not need the same prevention measures as Mali.</p>
<p>The days when Islamist groups were simply “Islamic”, “Middle Eastern” and “anti-West” are also over. They are active political actors, even if they are aberrations to the norm. And jihadist and non-jihadist conflicts are more alike than they are different.</p>
<p>Violent Islamist extremist groups are also as African as they are global, if not more so. The Sahel situation challenges claims that jihadist groups are fundamentally external. For this reason, Islamist militancy in coastal West African countries is not a “coming” threat; it’s “already here”, as part of the present. </p>
<p>Seeing it this way allows countries to look inward rather than outward to counter violent extremism. It also takes the emphasis away from border security and puts it on human security to prevent groups from growing within countries. </p>
<h2>Some solutions</h2>
<p>Coastal countries must recognise that decisions and statements could be part of the problem. For instance, the dragnet attack on suspected Boko Haram members in 2009, leading to the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20090730-nigerian-islamic-sect-leader-mohammed-yusuf-killed-detention-">death of leading member Mohammed Yusuf</a>, pushed the group to become more militant. </p>
<p>Political statements and policies can also fuel Islamophobia and legitimise the rhetoric of militancy. Surveillance practices can backfire. Certain words can turn counter-extremism insights into insults that undermine national security. </p>
<p>That’s why, without careful implementation, even Ghana’s “<a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/see-something-say-something-campaign-launched.html">See Something, Say Something” campaign</a> could create more problems. Security agencies, therefore, require training in cultural diversity, religious sensitivity and national belonging during their work.</p>
<p>Then there is the need for African leadership in response policies. For example, <a href="https://mz.usembassy.gov/the-united-states-released-the-2020-country-report-on-terrorism/">counterinsurgency by Mozambican forces</a> in conjunction with Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community has resulted in a reduction in terrorism deaths. </p>
<p>In this sense, the Accra Initiative is vital. However, regional power dynamics could also defeat counter-terrorism efforts. This happened in the Lake Chad basin with the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/291-what-role-multinational-joint-task-force-fighting-boko-haram">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Multilateral partnerships in counter-terrorism are crucial, especially through intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and ECOWAS. But actors must acknowledge the different political settings and not impose a “universal” logic on “particular” local contexts. </p>
<p>Local grievances and governance deficits are the key causes of political extremism. That’s why governments must take some blame for the conditions that foster extremist political sentiments.</p>
<p>It is also why West African countries must not only <em>defeat</em> terrorism, they must also <em>resolve</em> the conditions that produce it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190009/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>West African governments need to be clearer about the similarities and differences of violent extremist groups.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Lecturer (Sessional) in International Relations, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785112022-05-06T12:32:38Z2022-05-06T12:32:38ZBillions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461093/original/file-20220503-28209-o2b2fh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Machmudi 'Yusuf' Hariono, left, a former Indonesian terrorist, holds a book about former terrorists with an Islamic jihadist.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy of Yusuf Hariono</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the U.S. government has sent aid to countries plagued by terrorism, believing that the money could help other nations tackle extremism. Money matters, but it alone isn’t enough to prevent terrorism.</p>
<p>An explosion <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html">at a mosque</a> in northern Afghanistan killed more than 30 people on April 22, 2022, just days after blasts at schools in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-schools-attacked.html">Kabul killed six</a>.</p>
<p>These were the latest in a long string of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-tops-2021-global-survey-of-islamic-state-casualties-/6415735.html">Islamic State conducted</a> 365 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that caused 2,210 casualties in 2021 alone.</p>
<p>The United States, meanwhile, has spent approximately <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-the-us-spend-in-aid-to-afghanistan/">US$91.4 billion</a> on foreign aid to Afghanistan since 2001, while other countries gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804">billions more</a>. Most of this money went toward Afghanistan’s military. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov">spent more than</a> $1.1 billion on Afghanistan in fiscal 2021, and $1 billion on aid in fiscal 2020.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/frederick-bernard-loesi/">a doctoral candidate</a> researching how to get militants to adopt more moderate positions and stop committing violence, I have spoken with 23 former Indonesian terrorist detainees since October 2020 to study their experiences. These people planned, facilitated or otherwise took part in bombings and attacks on civilians. </p>
<p>My research shows that international aid does not stop terrorists from carrying out violent acts, because most counterterrorism projects do not directly involve or appeal to detained and released terrorists. </p>
<h2>Speaking with terrorists</h2>
<p>I have found that listening to ex-terrorists is the best approach to understanding how and why they walk away from terrorism.</p>
<p>When I spoke with former Indonesian terrorists through video meetings and calls, they all told me that they once cared only about exterminating America and its allies. This is because they thought these countries were trying to repress Muslims worldwide. </p>
<p>They also justified their violent jihad as a way to enforce a caliphate, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/10/5884593/9-questions-about-the-caliphate-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask">a term</a> that refers to an all-encompassing Muslim state. </p>
<p>Less than half of the 23 former terrorists that I spoke with participated in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf">deradicalization programs</a>, designed to move people away from extremism, while they were in prison. But all of them were part of such programs, sponsored by nonprofit organizations and the Indonesian government, after their release. </p>
<p>All of the former terrorists also went on to receive vocational training, and some also got money from the Indonesian government and nonprofits to start small businesses. </p>
<p>Others received psychological counseling, or participated in talks on religion. Some participated in outdoor retreats organized by the Indonesian police, with hiking and other recreational activities. </p>
<p>A few of the ex-terrorists I spoke with acknowledged that the government helped them pay for their children’s school tuition. </p>
<p>These people began to shift their views, and move away from extremism, after they developed a strong sense of community support and respect for government and police authorities. </p>
<p>“I started to change when the police treated me well, and my community accepted me for who I am,” explained one female former terrorist who was a “bride” – a term used to describe a suicide bomber. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/04/indonesian-women-being-radicalised-into-would-be-suicide-bombers-report">The police captured her</a> just before she could carry out an attack in Bali in 2016. </p>
<h2>Terrorism funding</h2>
<p>Parts of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population, are considered a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-indonesia">haven for terrorism</a> – though the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/indonesia-becomes-sixth-member-state-brief-ctc-developments-july-2019-follow-visit">has recently declined</a> there. It remains a transit and destination hub for Islamic militants. </p>
<p>Indonesia received <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Supplementary-Tables.pdf">almost $5 million in 2020</a> from U.S. Agency for International Development alone to contain violent extremism. It received the third largest amount of money from the U.S. for this kind of programming after Somalia and Bangladesh. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf">spent an estimated</a> $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism from fiscal 2002 through 2017, according to the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>But even extensive international aid isn’t a sure fix for ending terrorism. </p>
<p>Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-humanitarian-assistance-for-iraq/">Iraq are</a> two examples of countries that receive big donations from the U.S. and other countries each year but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">still struggle with violent radicalism</a>.</p>
<p>Most of this money and work focuses on helping governments and local organizations carry out programs to fight extremism. These might include workshops for government officials focused on addressing terrorism and training sessions for women on how to start small businesses. </p>
<p>However, these programs typically do not directly involve former terrorist inmates and their families. This matters, because it mattered to the individuals I spoke with when they were included in counterterrorism projects. This is one of the big reasons they changed their ways, they told me. </p>
<h2>Aid doesn’t reach former terrorists</h2>
<p>Major donor countries like the U.S. have increasingly acknowledged <a href="https://institute.global/policy/role-aid-and-development-fight-against-extremism">the role of foreign aid</a> in fighting against extremism. Many countries, including the U.S., see that extremism can be politically destabilizing and pose international security concerns. </p>
<p>But at the same time, <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Aid%20as%20Counterterrorism.pdf">the incidence of terrorism in countries</a> that get large amounts of international funding, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/aswp.12184">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263">Mali</a>, shows that international aid is an insufficient counterterrorism measure.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, the USAID gave $24 million from 2018 to 2023 for an anti-extremism project called Harmoni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfcg.org/harmoni-towards-inclusion-and-resilience/">This project</a> carries out workshops for state officials about prison management and handling terrorist detainees, among other programs. </p>
<p>But Harmoni does not include a key constituency – <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/download/L3NpdGVzL3B1c2F0L0RvY3VtZW50cy9KdXJuYWwvSnVybmFsJTIwSHVidW5nYW4lMjBMdWFyJTIwTmVnZXJpLyhGSU5BTCklMjBKVVJOQUwlMjBWT0wlMjA2JTIwTk8lMjAyLnBkZg==">detained or released terrorists</a> and their families – in their work. </p>
<p>This kind of strategy makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually reform extremists.</p>
<p>This model, according to my research, is common in counterextremism projects funded by international aid. </p>
<h2>Involving terrorists</h2>
<p>Donor countries, governments and partner organizations working to prevent extremism can involve released terrorists and their families in various ways – including providing vocational, financial, psychological, religious, educational and even recreational programs. </p>
<p>Many countries still need international aid to fight terrorism, but it will work more effectively only when also embracing former terrorist convicts and their families. </p>
<p>Without targeted, inclusive interventions in extremism, I believe the world will continue to see more wasted aid when addressing terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Loesi receives funding from Southeast Center, the University of Washington. </span></em></p>The US gives money to help Indonesia and other countries fight terrorism. But research shows that this money might not be effective, unless it directly reaches former extremists.Bernard Loesi, PhD Candidate, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1681232021-09-19T08:26:19Z2021-09-19T08:26:19ZHow big is the Islamist threat in Mozambique? And why are Rwandan troops there?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421880/original/file-20210917-15-rk96di.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Military intervention by Rwanda and SADC only buys time for Mozambique to address lack of development in its northern region</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EMIDIO JOZINE/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-58079510">has sent troops</a> to Mozambique to assist the government in fighting against a four-year Islamist militant insurgency. Political scientist Phil Clark provides insights into the threat and why Rwanda is supporting Mozambique.</em></p>
<h2>Do the insurgents in Mozambique represent a new front of Islamic terrorism on the continent?</h2>
<p>Since 2017, jihadist militias in the northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2021/the-islamist-insurgency-in-mozambique">have mounted</a> an armed insurgency against the Mozambican government. Their <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">stated objective</a> is to instil Sharia law across northern Mozambique. This is said to be in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy-Brief-The-rise-and-root-causes-of-Islamic-insurgency-in-Mozambique-1.pdf">response</a> to the region’s chronic poverty, unemployment and weak public services under the Frelimo-led government in Maputo. </p>
<p>The Mozambican insurgents represent a new armed Islamic front, with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56773012">entirely local</a> motivations and command structures. However, their propaganda invokes common tropes of regional and global jihad. </p>
<p>They often claim responsibility for attacks using the <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/the-evolution-and-escalation-of-the-islamic-state-threat-to-mozambique/">name given</a> to them by the local population, ‘Al-Shabaab’. But there is no evidence that they have any direct links to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. </p>
<p>Recently, Islamic State (ISIS) <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack.html">claimed</a> responsibility for jihadist attacks in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But, again, there appears to be little direct connection between the Mozambican jihadists and the Islamic State. ISIS has previously <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/un-finds-no-evidence-islamic-state-control-over-congo-militia-2021-06-16/">attempted to claim responsibility</a> for attacks by unassociated Islamist groups elsewhere in Africa, for example the Allied Democratic Forces in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo </p>
<h2>How big a threat do they represent?</h2>
<p>The jihadists pose a significant threat to local civilians and foreign economic interests in Cabo Delgado. The four-year low-intensity civil war <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/aug/18/i-ran-my-heart-was-broken-inside-mozambiques-evolving-cabo-delgado-conflict">has</a> killed more than 3,000 civilians, displaced 800,000 and caused widespread food insecurity. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the energy giants ExxonMobil and Total <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/frances-total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project-2021-04-26/">have suspended</a> their liquid natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado. ExxonMobil <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxonmobil-mozambique-lng-exclusive-idUSKBN285326">is investing US$30billion</a> and <a href="https://mzlng.totalenergies.co.mz/en/about-mozambique-liquefied-natural-gas-project">Total US$20billion</a>. </p>
<p>The insurgents have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54183948">cited</a> the perception that local people will fail to benefit from government deals with the multinational companies as one catalyst for their attacks.</p>
<p>The combination of widespread violence and threats to foreign businesses have led to a patchwork of international military and security interventions. This <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html">includes</a> <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/oil--gas_corporate-strategy/2020/06/01/total-brings-in-former-military-man-to-head-lng-plant--security-unit,108407836-art">reports</a> of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the Mozambican government’s use of Russian and South African mercenaries </p></li>
<li><p>the presence of Portuguese military trainers, and </p></li>
<li><p>Total’s hiring of a former French foreign legionnaire to coordinate security for its gas plant on the Afungi peninsula. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) –- including South African special forces – <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/south-african-special-forces-arrive-in-mozambique/">have deployed</a> peacekeepers to Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>This raises major concerns over a seeming lack of coordination among these armed actors.</p>
<h2>Why is the Rwandan government getting involved?</h2>
<p>There is vociferous debate about this. </p>
<p>The Rwandan government <a href="https://www.gov.rw/blog-detail/rwanda-deploys-joint-force-to-mozambique">frames this</a> as a ‘responsibility to protect’ mission. This, it argues, has been inspired by the international community’s <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwanda-why-the-international-community-looked-away/a-4157229">failure to protect</a> civilians in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. </p>
<p>The Rwandan intervention in Mozambique came shortly after French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Kigali in May 2021. Some commentators have <a href="https://zitamar.com/what-does-rwanda-stand-to-gain-from-its-mozambique-deployment/">suggested</a> that Rwanda, <a href="https://newscentral.africa/2021/09/06/rwanda-denies-total-energies-france-funded-mozambique-operation/">funded by France</a>, has intervened to shore up France’s interests, principally the gas reserves of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Total-SA">French-owned Total</a>.</p>
<p>The Rwandan government has chafed against the claim that it is simply doing France’s neo-colonial bidding. It <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/rwandas-intervention-on-cabo-delgado-not-financed-by-third-parties-says-president-kagame-further-africa-200443/">has stressed</a> the humanitarian basis of its intervention.</p>
<p>There is scant evidence of direct French backing for Rwanda’s military campaign. Nevertheless, France held a series of high-level talks with Rwanda and South Africa about the Cabo Delgado conflict in the months preceding their interventions in Mozambique. This suggests close coordination between Paris and these actors, reflecting the enormous French interests at stake.</p>
<p>In May this year Macron <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202105190780.html">discussed</a> military solutions to the crisis with a number of African heads of state at a summit in Paris. They included Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Rwandan President Paul Kagame. This was <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/french-president-macron-arrives-in-sa-to-talk-vaccines-trade-and-mozambique-insurgency-20210528">succeeded</a> by similar talks with Kagame and Ramaphosa in Kigali and Pretoria several weeks later.</p>
<p>Crucial to Rwanda’s involvement in Cabo Delgdao are <a href="https://www.ktpress.rw/2018/07/rwanda-mozambique-sign-trade-skills-exchange-agreements/">growing ties</a> between Rwanda and Mozambique after the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 2018. </p>
<p>Earlier this year Nyusi made a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-nyusi-flew-to-rwanda-for-talks-with-kagame-fight-against-terrorism-at-the-top-of-the-agenda-watch-190901/">lightning-stop visit</a> to Kigali to ask for Rwanda’s military assistance in Cabo Delgado. Nyusi had previously <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mozambiques-push-failed-to-involve-rwanda-directly-in-sadc-matters-20210530">stated</a> his preference for bilateral rather than multilateral military intervention. He is perhaps concerned about ceding too much control to a SADC mission led by regional powerhouse South Africa.</p>
<p>He also noted Rwanda’s track record of conducting highly disciplined and effective peacekeeping missions. These have included Rwandan battalions <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108040261.html">operating</a> in the Central African Republic outside the broader UN peacekeeping mission, similar to Rwanda’s current support for Mozambican forces outside of SADC.</p>
<p>Alongside its humanitarian objectives, the Rwandan government stands to benefit in security and diplomatic terms from its involvement in Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>The intervention fits a pattern of Rwanda’s ‘responsibility to protect’ role in peacekeeping missions in Darfur, Mali, CAR and Haiti. These have bolstered its international image and afforded it considerable international leverage. For example, in 2010 when foreign donors considered prosecutions and suspending aid to Rwanda because of its alleged crimes in eastern Congo, Kigali <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11417721">threatened</a> to withdraw its peacekeepers from Darfur.</p>
<p>The Cabo Delgado campaign is also consistent with Rwanda’s recent talk of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/37f38a17a8a140c39a20b15c5983068d">tackling Islamist threats at home and in the wider region</a>.</p>
<p>In regional geopolitical terms, Rwanda will have delighted <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/113311/mozambique-rwandan-troops-celebrate-first-success-south-africa-forces-arrive/">in reports</a> that its troops in northern Mozambique have <a href="https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_politics/2021/08/31/in-cabo-delgado-rwandans-fight-sadc-troops-sit-tight-mozambicans-look-to-the-future,109688059-art">proven more effective</a> than those of SADC, with which it has often had a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-19-sadc-slams-rwanda-for-drc-interference/">testy relationship</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, Rwanda’s intervention bolsters its bilateral relations with Mozambique and France. A key catalyst for Rwanda’s diplomatic push with Mozambique in recent years has been the concern that Maputo had become a launching pad for exiled Rwandan dissidents. This has included members of the opposition Rwanda National Congress. Closer security ties have included Rwanda’s request that Mozambique rein in opposition members <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/trade-security-define-kagame-s-african-diplomatic-offensive--1357608">on its soil</a>.</p>
<p>Kagame has for years lambasted France for failing to apologise for its complicity in the 1994 genocide. It therefore took some genocide survivors by surprise when he warmly welcomed <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210526-macron-seeks-reset-with-rwanda-on-africa-visit-after-years-of-tensions">Macron’s remarks</a> on the issue. They had misgivings about whether Macron had fully acknowledged and apologised for France’s role in the genocide.</p>
<p>Kagame’s warm comments preceded <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/27/france-and-rwanda-strengthen-relations-increase-cooperation/">the announcement of a new €500 million </a> French development package to Rwanda.</p>
<h2>What are the implications of its involvement?</h2>
<p>The Rwandan forces have so far proven effective in tackling the jihadist insurgents. This has led the Mozambican government to claim that Rwanda’s entrance has fundamentally altered the direction of the conflict and improved the security situation for civilians and foreign companies.</p>
<p>The concurrent operations by Rwandan and SADC forces, however, could pose problems in the coming months. Various SADC leaders – as well as Mozambique’s largest opposition party Renamo – <a href="https://www.chronicles.rw/2021/06/01/sadc-opposes-deployment-of-rwandan-troops-in-mozambique/">have criticised the arrival of Rwandan troops</a>. They argue that this should have been an exclusively SADC effort.</p>
<p>These issues were clearly on the mind of Rwandan Foreign Minister Vincent Biruta who travelled to Pretoria in early June <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/rwanda-proposes-co-operation-with-south-africa-on-mozambique-20210605">to discuss Rwanda-South Africa cooperation in Mozambique</a>. This came shortly after Rwandan military chiefs conducted their first reconnaissance trip to Cabo Delgado. </p>
<p>But military force can achieve only so much. This has been made clear in comparable cases of Islamist violence in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria and the Sahel. </p>
<p>Systemic political and socio-economic interventions are necessary to address years of Frelimo neglect in northern Mozambique. These have produced the deprivation and marginalisation that underpin the insurgency. </p>
<p>Mozambicans themselves are clearly the key actors in this situation. Nevertheless, Rwanda and SADC should use their diplomatic leverage to encourage Nyusi to address the structural causes – and not only the violent manifestations – of the conflict. This includes ensuring that the immense natural gas wealth that will flow once the conflict abates benefits not only Nyusi’s government and multinational corporations but, most importantly, everyday Mozambicans.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Phil Clark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique’s war against Islamic insurgents has included a request that Mozambique rein in Rwandan opposition members on its soilPhil Clark, Professor of International Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661382021-08-29T07:49:22Z2021-08-29T07:49:22ZMozambique insurgency: focus needs to shift to preventing criminality at sea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418068/original/file-20210826-6524-fyv73z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambican soldiers on patrol in Palma,
Cabo Delgado, following the terrorist attack in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joas Relvas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has been placed firmly in the international spotlight since radicals linked to Islamic State launched their audacious attack on the town of Palma <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mozambique-insurgency-pemba-idUSKBN2BS0R4">in March</a>, killing over 50 people.</p>
<p>A large <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/mozambique/all-news/mozambique-nyusi-confirms-arrival-of-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado-watch">Rwandan military and police contingent</a> and <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-air-force-freighter-unloads-military-logistics-at-pemba-airport-noticias-198278/">troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC)</a> have entered the theatre. These are helping Mozambique’s army and police to stem the tide and step up their act over the longer term.</p>
<p>There is also support from the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/us-military-providing-additional-training-to-mozambican-armed-forces">US and the European Union</a>, largely in the form of training assistance. This adds to training support promised by Angola and Zimbabwe as part of the <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/64130-latest-on-deployment-of-zimbabwean-special-soldiers-in-mozambique-story-fresh-details-emerge.html">SADC contingent arriving in Cabo Delgado</a>. </p>
<p>But there’s a problem. </p>
<p>The combined military response against the insurgents is primarily on land, with very limited maritime response capabilities. But the insurgent threat is not limited to the interior. Insurgents stormed and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 and attacked communities on nearby <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-terrorists-attack-island-off-palma-coast-aim-report-171133/">islands off Palma, halting its tourism flows</a>.</p>
<p>The fixation on landward efforts ignores the fact that the insurgency also poses a maritime threat. Significantly, the insurgency has hobbled the energy sector. This was set to make Mozambique an important global energy player following the discovery of <a href="https://www.africanglobe.net/business/oil-gas-discoveries-mozambique">large offshore gas fields</a>. The discoveries hold regional and global implications. Mozambique could well become a gas emirate in southern Africa, and bringing the industry on line could propel Mozambique into the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/03/africa/mozambique-oil-and-gas-hub/index.html">top seven global gas producing countries</a>. </p>
<p>These optimistic outlooks all depend on whether Mozambique can contain the impact of the ongoing violent insurgency in Cabo Delgado. This precondition extends offshore.</p>
<h2>Maritime security</h2>
<p>Mozambique’s future economy relies heavily on maintaining a safe offshore domain. To this end the government must make use of every opportunity to build the required <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2019/08/an-analysis-of-mozambiques-maritime-security/">capacity and partnerships</a> to maintain the rule of law at sea.</p>
<p>Bringing gas production on line has been severely disrupted because of the insurgency. Much of the landward activity and construction of infrastructure has come to a standstill.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://totalenergies.com/media/news/press-releases/total-declares-force-majeure-mozambique-lng-project">Totalenergies</a>, the French energy multinational, declared a force majeure. This was after the insurgents occupied and held the port of Mocímboa da Praia in 2020 and attacked Palma early in 2021. </p>
<p>The port is of significance for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53756692">delivery of goods by sea and air</a> for the construction projects under way to develop onshore infrastructure in support of the gas industry. It has since been reclaimed by the <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/africa/mozambican-rwandan-forces-retake-port-town-from-insurgents/">Mozambique and Rwandan forces</a>. But given how risk perception unfolds, construction remains stalled. </p>
<p>In my view Mozambique’s ocean territories must receive due attention for three reasons. These are: events on land spilling offshore, perceptions of dangerous seas off Mozambique, and criminality at sea left unchecked.</p>
<h2>Cost of insecurity at sea</h2>
<p>First, insecurity on land has maritime repercussions. This is the reality in the waters off Somalia, Nigeria, Libya and Yemen. Weak security governance on land affects the maritime economy, with shipping and resource extraction particularly vulnerable. </p>
<p>This land and sea interplay is a potential risk facing Mozambique’s decision-makers.</p>
<p>Second, perceptions of dangers in the waters off Mozambique hold negative repercussions. This is even more so if international measures are implemented to mitigate a threat to shipping. A <a href="https://maritimecyprus.com/2015/12/18/anti-piracy-update-updated-chart-for-hra-available-to-download/">high risk area</a> at sea akin to those off Somalia and Nigeria directs shipping to take preventive actions. This has multiple knock-on effects.</p>
<p>Higher insurance costs are incured; shipping must follow longer routes, increasing the cost of doing business; private security personnel are often taken on; and the safety and livelihoods of crews are at higher risk. All this is evident in the demarcated danger zone now operational off Nigeria. </p>
<p>Third, the waters off Cabo Delgado must not be allowed to become a playground for criminals to enter and exploit. If ungoverned, this sea space offers the potential for criminal syndicates and insurgents to prosper side by side. </p>
<h2>Connecting the dots: five risks to mitigate</h2>
<p>The insurgency has resulted in or compounded the following problems: </p>
<p><strong>Transnational criminal syndicates:</strong> These already operate into Cabo Delgado. If weak governance on land is mirrored at sea, syndicates become dangerous competitors, and even more so if allied with insurgent elements as in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.</p>
<p><strong>Illegal oil trafficking:</strong> Energy infrastructure for gas and oil are difficult to take over. Nevertheless illegal oil trafficking from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/26/libya-calls-on-un-to-block-illegal-oil-sale">rebel-held territories in the east of Libya</a> shows how brazen non-state actors can take over or infiltrate energy infrastructure and port facilities and use this to join an illegal industry.</p>
<p><strong>Attacks on infrastructure and shipping at sea:</strong> Sri Lanka provides a good example. The Sea Tiger wing of the insurgent movement <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2007/6/11/sri-lanka-battles-tigers-at-sea">attacked</a> Sri Lanka’s navy with suicide vessels for several years. </p>
<p><strong>Drone attacks:</strong> The <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/gulf-shipping-attacks-leave-global-economy-vulnerable-trade/">recent drone attack</a> on a commercial vessel passing through the Gulf of Oman, with Yemen and Iranian connections, must also serve as a warning. There have been allegations of the presence of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/unmanned-aerial-vehicles/iss-drones-in-the-hands-of-insurgents-how-africa-can-prepare/#:%7E:text=In%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20the%20Congo%2C%20insurgents,drones%20for%20precision%20targeting%20in%20Cabo%20Delgado%20province">drones in Cabo Delgado</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Drug smuggling:</strong> Insecurity at sea off Cabo Delgado carries the risk of compounding the problem posed by <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202006080902.html">drug smuggling networks</a> operating in the area. No effort should be spared to prevent the insurgents and the smugglers cooperating.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Children attend a class sitting on the ground under a tree." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418072/original/file-20210826-15-1qcut5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displaced children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, learn under a tree.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Joao Relvas</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Overall, the tactics I’ve outlined call for a comprehensive response, one most probably beyond anything the Mozambique authorities can mobilise on their own. </p>
<p>Some small steps with a maritime focus have taken place.</p>
<p>Two small, lightly armed <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-equipment-spotted-in-mozambique/#:%7E:text=In%20addition%20to%20vehicles%20on%20land%2C%20naval%20vessels,Development%20Community%E2%80%99s%20intervention%20brigade%20%28SADC%20Mission%20in%20Mozambique%29.">South African naval patrol vessels</a> arrived in Pemba harbour for patrols off Cabo Delgado.</p>
<p>A training team from the <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2021/August/unodc-and-mozambique-cooperate-to-promote-maritime-security.html">United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</a> recently arrived to help train maritime personnel from Mozambique to increase maritime security governance.</p>
<p>The Rwandan military contingent includes a <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Rwandan-Mozambican-forces-retake-port-from-16374076.php">limited small boat capability</a> to extend their presence off the coast, albeit only near harbour patrols. </p>
<p>Fourth – in recapturing Mocímboa da Praia from the insurgents in early August 2021, the operation included a <a href="https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-most-important-mission-yet-to-come-says-army-commander-aim-198891/">surprise attack by a small contingent of Mozambique soldiers from the sea</a>. </p>
<h2>Looking forward: what needs to happen</h2>
<p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia and the rebel-held territories in Libya. Allowing this would hold dire implications for international shipping and subsequently for Mozambique and the landlocked countries in the region. </p>
<p>It is precisely this threat that underscored <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-question/14632/">the need for cooperation</a> between South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to prevent piracy from gaining a foothold in Mozambique. Ongoing maritime operations between South Africa and Mozambique also need to be maintained.</p>
<p>Cooperation with a wide array of partners to promote maritime security governance over the longer term must remain a priority. This is a long term objective to be addressed in the context of the current armed insurgency, and sustained beyond the present volatility. </p>
<p>Stability on land and at sea must be addressed simultaneously.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://news.africa.com/south-african-military-deploys-troops-to-pemba-northern-mozambique-1635.html">South African Navy</a> and UN Office on Drugs and Crime are the first naval and capacity building respondents to arrive. But the SADC should seriously consider using its Standing Maritime Committee to assist Mozambique. The aim would be to bring about a formal regional arrangement for cooperation to secure regional economic and security interests in the southwestern Indian Ocean over the longer term.</p>
<p>Mozambique is in no position to contribute significantly to the broader array of maritime security endeavours. That’s why international partners need to play a role. </p>
<p>The SADC must now pass the acid test of stemming the insurgent threats from spilling over and threatening the region’s wider landward and maritime interests.</p>
<p>The intervention forces currently fighting the insurgents should extend their role offshore to prevent a collapse of security at sea off Mozambique or at the minimum, any such perception among the international maritime community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Francois Vreÿ receives funding from Stellenbosch University and the National Research Foundation.</span></em></p>The maritime situation in Mozambique must not be allowed to emulate the maritime threats found off Nigeria, Somalia, and the rebel-held territories in Libya.Francois Vreÿ, Research Coordinator, Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.