tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-53692/articlesJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action – The Conversation2020-01-08T10:30:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294172020-01-08T10:30:30Z2020-01-08T10:30:30ZIt’s time for the UK to review its support for the Iran nuclear deal – nuclear expert<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308807/original/file-20200107-123385-ff0bs3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=125%2C80%2C5865%2C3889&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An atomic energy exhibition in Tehran. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/tehran-iran-29-january-2018-atomic-1021048681">Inspired by Maps/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The US killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s announcement that it will <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-05/iran-will-no-longer-observe-limits-on-uranium-enrichment-fars">no longer abide by restrictions</a> on enrichment agreed under the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement mean that it’s now time for the UK to reexamine its support for that deal.</p>
<p>Agreed in 2015 between Iran, the UK, US, France, Russia, China, Germany and the EU, the nuclear agreement – known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – provided a basis for a better relationship with the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>The agreement helped ensure that Iran didn’t move forward with its interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. It was painstakingly negotiated by leading powers, benefiting heavily from the UK’s technical expertise on nuclear matters, including my own. The deal was hard won – the result of years of increasing economic pressure and coordinated diplomatic initiatives. It effectively cut off every pathway for Iran to get the bomb.</p>
<p>These facts led the UK and its European allies, France and Germany, (known as the E3) to continue to support and champion the agreement even after the US president, Donald Trump, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newsnow-iran/special-briefing-u-s-withdraws-from-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1I939V">withdrew the US</a> from the agreement in 2018. With the UK’s support, the E3 created new mechanisms to skirt reintroduced US sanctions, including a payment system to allow continued trade <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/six-european-countries-join-eu-iran-financial-trading-mechanism-instex/">called INSTEX</a>. The UK took this action in spite of US pressure because it was clear that upholding the JCPOA was in the UK’s interests.</p>
<p>We are only a few days into 2020 but already circumstances have changed such that the UK’s full-throated support of the JCPOA must now evolve. That is not to say that the UK should withdraw its support – at least not yet. Instead, I believe it should change its stance so that it is reviewing its position while watching for signs that Iran is committed to implement the letter and spirit of the agreement.</p>
<p>This nuanced wording is intended to provide the UK with flexibility while also pursuing specific interests.</p>
<h2>Why the situation has changed</h2>
<p>Before examining these, it’s useful to recap the two key recent developments. First, regardless of your reaction to the US airstrike in Baghdad which killed Soleimani, this use of force creates a new paradigm for relations with Iran that cannot be ignored. The killing of a uniformed military official of a foreign country is a de facto act of war, and Iran said it <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/05/middleeast/iran-soleimani-khamenei-adviser-intl/index.html">would retaliate</a>. While escalation is not in the British national interest, nor would be continuing to support the JCPOA if Iran were to commit egregious acts against the US.</p>
<p>Second, on January 5, a few days after the killing, Iran announced it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51001167">was taking another step back</a> from full implementation of the JCPOA – this time by unilaterally removing the restrictions on enrichment capacity which were a central element of the agreement. This was but the latest <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/iran-eases-nuclear-restrictions-an-environment-for-miscalculation-and-escalation">in a series of step backs</a> from Iran’s commitments intended to pressure other parties to fully implement the agreement including with regards to the easing of sanctions. </p>
<p>It is understood that the Iranian action <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/is-iran-abandoning-2015-nuclear-agreement-jcpoa/">was already planned before</a> Soleimani’s killing to pressure the EU to further facilitate circumvention of the ongoing US economic sanctions. However, the step must also be understood in the context of Iran’s domestic political need to respond to Soleimani’s assassination.</p>
<p>This leads to the question of what approach the UK should now take. Britain is an important player with regards to Iran, not least because of its formal role in the JCPOA and seat on the UN Security Council. Britain holds the power to unilaterally cancel the agreement and reintroduce sanctions against Iran. Britain’s decision-making calculus will be influenced primarily by Iran’s compliance (or otherwise) with the terms of the agreement. But in practice, the UK’s position will be informed by broader aspects, including Iran’s actions outside of the agreement.</p>
<h2>A nuanced position</h2>
<p>It is for this reason that I argue that the UK should now evolve its stance on the JCPOA into one in which it is reviewing its position. This would allow the UK to pursue a number of otherwise competing objectives.</p>
<p>First, this move to review the UK’s stance could be taken without prejudice to any E3 decision to formally trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism in the weeks and months ahead – an approach which is <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-nuclear-france/european-powers-to-decide-in-coming-days-on-iran-dispute-mechanism-french-minister-idUKKBN1Z51XR">now being discussed</a>. The modalities of that process mean that, once triggered, it is likely to lead to a formal end of the JCPOA. </p>
<p>Second, it could support maintenance of the JCPOA – at least in the immediate weeks ahead, and perhaps for longer. If the UK were to fail to take any action now to mark its objection to Iran’s breach of the agreement, its ability to object later on would be hindered. </p>
<p>Third, the UK should state that it is looking for signs that Iran intends to comply with the letter and spirit of the JCPOA in creating an enduring improvement in relations with an Iran free of nuclear weapons. This phrasing is carefully chosen. Iran would understand that any egregious action against US forces would be taken in the UK as a negative sign. But the UK would maintain a degree of ambiguity regarding the level of Iranian action which might trigger it to withdraw from the JCPOA. While the nuclear issue should be kept separate from other issues, for example, the illegitimate imprisonment of British dual-nationals in Iran such as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42252741">Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe</a>, the Iranian regime would also understand that its actions were under scrutiny.</p>
<p>This approach should buy the UK some time to see how the situation evolves and whether escalation would necessitate a further re-evaluation. But the UK needs to help find a path forward. The purpose of the JCPOA was never to fully solve the Iran nuclear issue in the long term – its purpose was to buy time for relations to improve and broader understandings with Iran to be achieved. </p>
<p>Based on the timeline set out in the agreement, restrictions on <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/2015-08/section-3-understanding-jcpoa">Iran’s activities are scheduled</a> to start easing from later 2020, despite no parallel signs of relations improving. Over the course of the weeks and months ahead the UK must decide whether the JCPOA is salvageable, whether a broader understanding can be achieved and what the implications are if not. The UK will have to engage with the US, its European partners and Iran in order to understand the outlook for the agreement. It can’t assume that it’s a positive one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129417/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian J. Stewart runs one the largest non-proliferation research organisations worldwide and receives funding from a wide range of grant-making organisations including foundations and national governments. </span></em></p>Iran has withdrawn from key elements of the 2015 nuclear deal. The UK should respond with caution – and flexibility.Ian J Stewart, Head, Project Alpha, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1217902019-08-14T11:08:43Z2019-08-14T11:08:43ZWhat US wants from UK on security after Brexit – and why this puts Britain in a tricky position<p>Even before Boris Johnson became prime minister, the Trump administration has been on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/trump-boris-johnson-britain-trump-uk-prime-minister">a charm offensive</a> towards the UK and him in particular. When Britain’s Johnson met US National Security Advisor John Bolton on August 12 in London, <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-britain/trump-adviser-bolton-u-s-would-enthusiastically-support-a-uk-choice-for-no-deal-brexit-idUKKCN1V20W3">they discussed</a> the UK-US trading relationship, including a proposed post-Brexit free trade agreement, alongside the critical security interests that the two nations have in common.</p>
<p>The UK now has to make difficult choices in terms of its national interest and relations with its closest strategic partners. Both narrow national and wider international conditions and events have made this particularly tricky for the UK, especially given the overarching difficulties of Brexit and the recent change in leadership. Recent events in the Straits of Hormuz and the overall trajectory of the Iranian nuclear agreement are a case in point.</p>
<p>On July 4, the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1 was detained by British Royal Marines off the coast of Gibraltar on suspicion of violating EU sanctions by taking oil to Syria. On July 19, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards then seized the British-flagged ship the Stena Impero. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-what-the-law-of-the-sea-says-about-detaining-foreign-ships-in-transit-120816">Iran: what the law of the sea says about detaining foreign ships in transit</a>
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<p>These incidents and the ratcheting up of tension in the Gulf have compelled the UK to look for additional strategic partners to help safeguard shipping in that region. This is where the rubber has hit the road in terms of the nexus between the UK’s interests and strategic partnerships with both the US and its European allies. </p>
<p>In May 2018, the Trump administration announced that the US <a href="http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/05/us-withdrawal-iran-nuclear-deal-one-year/">would pull out</a> of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sets limits on Iran’s nuclear programme to ensure that it cannot produce nuclear weapons. Until recently, the UK remained committed, along with the EU, to the JCPOA. However, Bolton’s visit to the UK was, in part, aimed at trying to persuade the UK to rethink that commitment to the nuclear deal as well as to substantiate <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/05/uk-joins-us-in-mission-to-protect-oil-tankers-in-gulf">Johnson’s recent decision</a> to join the US naval mission Operation Sentinel to protect oil tankers in the Gulf. </p>
<h2>Policing the Gulf</h2>
<p>In one of his last acts as British foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt indicated that the UK should pursue a European-led maritime security force in the Gulf. However, this was subsequently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-joins-international-maritime-security-mission-in-the-gulf">rejected by Johnson</a> in favour of cooperation with the Americans. </p>
<p>To date, the Europeans, as well other US allies, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/23/jeremy-hunt-sides-with-eu-over-us-in-plan-to-address-gulf-crisis">remain uncommitted to joining the new task force</a> despite recent overtures from both the US and the UK. The UK now finds itself in a difficult position between not wanting to completely renounce its commitment to the JCPOA and its post-Brexit security interests with the EU, while also looking for partners that will actually deliver on its requirement to bulk-up protection of shipping in the straits.</p>
<p>As expected in the current politically polarised UK context, there are varying attitudes and opinions on how the UK should navigate this challenge. There are those who argue that both the UK and the EU (and <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/08/bill-for-america-first">even the US</a>) are all in weaker international positions and this is just one example that exposes that reality. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/79567">analysts have argued</a> that Britain’s weakness and preoccupation with Brexit, Europe’s lack of strategic foresight and defense capabilities, and a transatlantic relationship struggling to find common ground are all exposing frailties in the wider US-UK relationship. Others have <a href="https://britishinterest.org/how-should-british-policy-change-in-the-gulf/">proposed a two-track approach</a> for the UK to boost the Royal Navy and move towards the US position on Iran – and the JCPOA in particular. </p>
<h2>Naval strength</h2>
<p>What’s clear is that the UK will still have to invest in its own naval capabilities if it wants to safeguard shipping in the Gulf whether independently or through multilateral missions. In July, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/25/in-a-naval-confrontation-with-iran-great-britain-can-find-neither-ships-nor-friends/">warned the UK</a> that the responsibility falls to the UK to take care of its ships. </p>
<p>So what is the UK’s capacity to do this? Currently, the Royal Navy has fewer than 80 ships and is at about <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/21/cuts-britains-military-mean-no-longer-rule-waves-fleet-halved/">half of the capacity</a> it was during the Falklands War. This is partly because the Royal Navy pursued a strategy of replacing capacity with high-end capability; the US Navy has taken a similar path, though it started from a much stronger position. However, for the UK, this has <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/25/in-a-naval-confrontation-with-iran-great-britain-can-find-neither-ships-nor-friends/">led to a need to strike a balance</a> between those capacities necessary to win wars and to preserve peace. Protecting routine maritime shipping very much falls into the latter category. </p>
<p>The UK approach is purposefully designed to plug into US operational capacity in times of crisis management operations or great power conflicts. The force is set up to support a carrier strike-group and not to patrol global shipping routes. </p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Johnson will be open to investing the required capital to grow the Royal Navy substantially. He certainly seems ready to work more closely with the Americans in the Gulf. However, the long-term shape of the UK-EU security partnership as well as UK bilateral cooperation with the larger European military powers will reveal itself in time.</p>
<p>This will only be determined by the circumstances and attitudes surrounding Brexit and the ability to repair the current fractures in the wider transatlantic relationship – and not just on what particular maritime task force the UK decides to contribute.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121790/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon J Smith receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council for research on the Drivers of Military Strategic Reform.</span></em></p>Tensions in the Gulf are a stark reminder of the choices ahead for the UK on security cooperation after Brexit.Simon J Smith, Associate Professor of Security and International Relations, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/964492018-05-14T21:56:33Z2018-05-14T21:56:33ZTrump’s high-stakes gamble on the Iran nuclear deal could work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218869/original/file-20180514-100703-1ktq69u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranian protestors burn a representation of a U.S. flag during a gathering after their Friday prayer in Tehran, Friday, May 11, 2018. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets in cities across the country to protest U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with world powers. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. President Donald Trump has announced the United States’ intent to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. </p>
<p>Even though the <a href="https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/">U.S. State Department confirmed </a> Iran had adhered to the terms of the agreement, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html">Trump refused to certify that Iran was compliant.</a> </p>
<p>Iran has every economic and political motive to sustain the agreement. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-trump.html">country is unlikely to reinstate its efforts to enrich uranium</a> since the start-up costs are significant, the promise of a payoff is so small and, most importantly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/04/03/why-iran-wont-rush-to-a-bomb-if-trump-pulls-out-of-the-nuclear-deal/?utm_term=.b04ec0866224">such steps would impel the Europeans to abandon the agreement.</a> </p>
<p>Though Israel provided a great deal of proof that Iran had lied about its nuclear program in the past, no evidence was offered that Iran was continuing the past record of deceit. The vast majority of experts agree that there is a greater likelihood of an arms race in the Middle East without the agreement than with it.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/full-transcript-iran-deal-trump/559892/">Trump claimed:</a> “The Iranian regime is the leading state sponsor of terror. It exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda.” </p>
<p>I am a strong supporter of the agreement. I believe the treaty is better than any of the alternatives. Yet I still want to offer a possible defence of withdrawal. There is a chance the reimposition of sanctions could work. However, it is a high-risk gamble.</p>
<p>What makes defending these moves difficult is that Trump’s actions are often immersed in lies and distortions. It is simply not true that Iran has been violating the agreement and secretly preparing to resume the production of nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>What is true is that the deal did not allow an unqualified right to inspect military facilities. It did not address the regime’s development of missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads. It did not constrain Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region. In a worst-case scenario, Iran could ramp up not only its uranium enrichment, but its regional military aggression. </p>
<h2>Not a bilateral agreement</h2>
<p>When Trump signed the presidential memorandum reinstating sanctions, he provided an additional opportunity to clarify and strengthen the agreement.</p>
<p>But not one of the other six signatories to the agreement believe that it would be possible, let alone to do so in the 120 days before American sanctions were actually reimposed. They continue to support the nuclear deal and recently lobbied Trump not to withdraw.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218870/original/file-20180514-100693-p9s1xe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Trump delivers a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House on May 8, 2018, in Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evan Vucci)</span></span>
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<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2018/iran-180511-presstv01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e2289%2edm0ao0750i%2e23vc">reaffirmed their commitment to preserving the 2015 nuclear agreement</a>. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced the U.S. pullout as a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini committed the 28-nation bloc to the nuclear agreement.</p>
<p>Trump, meantime, has <a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/reinstatement-of-iran-sanctions-22228/">begun the process</a> of reimposing sanctions, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/.../full-transcript-iran-deal-trump/559892">targeting not only nuclear activities but Iranian energy, petrochemical and financial sectors </a>. </p>
<p>Some sanctions target only Iranian entities; others punish third countries doing business with Iran. Not only would foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies be banned from dealing with Iran, <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2018/05/president-trump-withdraws-us-from-iran">but there would be secondary sanctions on foreign companies</a> engaged in Iranian financial, nuclear and petrochemical transactions.</p>
<p>European financial and petrochemical companies will be in a quandary, caught between the policies of their own governments and the dark cloud of sanctions launched by the Americans.</p>
<h2>A flawed deal</h2>
<p>Trump has three sets of explanations for withdrawal.</p>
<p>First, he promised to tear up this “worst of all deals” and the “most one-sided transaction into which the U.S. has ever entered” when he was running for president.</p>
<p>Second, he’s a critic of the contents of the deal. </p>
<p>Third, he implies that Iran has not abided by its terms. But as mentioned, he offers no evidence.</p>
<p>There’s no question the deal has flaws. Four months ago, when Trump announced that he would not lift sanctions again, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/11/us-president-trump-could-pull-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal.html">he offered four areas where improvement was required</a>:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>All sites requested, not just nuclear sites previously identified, must be available to international inspection;</p></li>
<li><p>The agreement must guarantee that Iran will never again come close to possessing nuclear weapons;</p></li>
<li><p>Trump implied that when the expiration date of some of the terms pass, Iran would resume preparing for and producing nuclear weapons;</p></li>
<li><p>The deal must include new provisions to impel Iran to curtail its program of missile development; if not, Iran would be in breach of a new, revised agreement. </p></li>
</ol>
<h2>A chance to improve deal?</h2>
<p>The deal would benefit from such clarifications and inclusions. The agreement could, in fact, be much more explicit that the limitations on Iran developing a <em>military</em> nuclear program are intended to be “eternal.”</p>
<p>The negotiations on the existing agreement were never able to overcome the dilemma of how to allow Iran to develop and produce nuclear material for peaceful versus military purposes.</p>
<p>The inspection system could also be improved since the existing one does not provide a monitoring strategy that would prevent the development of new sites.</p>
<p>The previous negotiations failed to limit Iran’s development of its international missile program. Iran argued the program is necessary for its conventional, non-nuclear defence system, and could not be included in a nuclear agreement.</p>
<p>Iran convinced previous negotiators this issues was a deal-breaker, and the decision was made to focus only on nuclear, not on conventional military developments.</p>
<p>It’s this threat, rather than all the noise about the nuclear dimensions of Iran’s militarization, that <a href="http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/israel/2018/may/netanyahu-on-iranian-nuclear-deal-fix-it-or-nix-it">upsets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the most</a>. </p>
<h2>Trump’s strategy</h2>
<p>Trump’s tactics and strategy do have a rationale. Iran, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are newly emergent bullies in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia largely sees eye-to-eye with the U.S. Turkey, though no longer an ally in practice, greeted the American withdrawal from the nuclear deal as an economic opportunity for the Turks.</p>
<p>Iran, on the other hand, is still considered an implacable enemy and, more seriously, a direct threat to America’s strongest ally in the region, Israel.</p>
<p>There’s a chance that the U.S. tactic could work and result in a stronger deal given a number of factors: The degree to which Iran is over-extended in the Middle East, the degree to which those who benefited enormously from the lifting of Iranian sanctions now have a vested interest in not restoring them, and the poor state of the Iranian economy even after sanctions were lifted due to risk-averse potential investors nervous about what Trump was planning.</p>
<p>Many worry that the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal sends the wrong signal to North Korea that America cannot be trusted to commit to any deal. Others argue, with some legitimacy, that it was Trump’s strong-arm tactics that forced North Korea to the bargaining table regarding its own nuclear arsenal.</p>
<p>As South Korea did in Asia, it’s possible Europeans can play the “good cop” role to back up Trump’s “bad cop” in the Iranian situation.</p>
<p>But that possibility seems remote. The Europeans have been working tirelessly to try to get the Iranians to offer concessions but have been unsuccessful. More publicly, they have been openly critical of Trump’s tactics and rationale and have insisted they’ll stay in the deal.</p>
<p>The prospects of correcting the deal are dim. However, they exist. Do we want to play high-risk poker over the issue of nuclear weapons?</p>
<p>Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has signalled that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-prepared-for-all-scenarios-if-trump-nixes-nuclear-deal-officials-say/2018/05/08/531047a0-5241-11e8-a6d4-ca1d035642ce_story.html?utm_term=.0118a87eec09">he won’t abandon the deal</a> as long as the Europeans stay in it, suggesting that the U.S. reimposition of sanctions won’t set Iran down the road to resuming its nuclear program.</p>
<p>The U.S. will now have to put enormous pressure on European companies and banking institutions to comply. It may become apparent that the Europeans no longer have faith in American leadership and are prepared to launch an effective resistance program to U.S. unilateral action. </p>
<p>Merkel recently stated that Europe could no longer rely on the U.S. for protection and must take its destiny into its own hands. </p>
<p>France has insisted that Europeans cannot continue as “vassals,” as the EU scrambled to save the accord and the billions of dollars in trade it unleashed. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said Europe should not accept that the U.S. is the “world’s economic policeman.” </p>
<p>On the military front, Israel has been emboldened and is now attacking Iranian facilities in Syria openly and widely, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-says-iran-hit-in-syria-after-iranian-rockets-golan-heights-2018-5-10/">especially after Iranian forces in Syria unleashed 20 Grad and Fajr</a> rockets against Israel.</p>
<p>Perhaps Trump doesn’t care. Perhaps he only wants to demonstrate he’s a tough guy who keeps his campaign promises.</p>
<p>Trump is engaged in a high-stakes gamble. If he’d demonstrated any sign that he understands the risks, it would be easier to give him the benefit of the doubt. But almost all evidence suggests that his gambit is based more on his disposition than on a well-considered strategy.</p>
<p>The possibility of hope seems drowned out by the enormous tears to be shed — as we lose one more initiative towards a better, even if very flawed, world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96449/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Howard Adelman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>President Donald Trump’s move to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal has been met with dismay by the Europeans. But could his high-stakes gambit actually work in getting a better deal?Howard Adelman, Professor Emeritus Philosophy, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.