tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/kaiser-wilhelm-28567/articlesKaiser Wilhelm – The Conversation2019-02-26T14:12:25Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1118642019-02-26T14:12:25Z2019-02-26T14:12:25ZWhen political leaders choose catastrophe – how Europe walked willingly into World War I<p>Some political catastrophes come without warning. Others are long foretold, but governments still walk open-eyed into disaster. As the possibility of a no-deal Brexit looms, most analysts agree that there will be <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-no-deal-brexit-would-be-less-costly-for-the-eu-than-the-uk-110407">severe economic</a> and political consequences <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-deal-seven-reasons-why-a-wto-only-brexit-would-be-bad-for-britain-102009">for the UK</a> and the EU. And yet a no-deal Brexit still remains an option on the table. </p>
<p>The July crisis in 1914 that lead up to World War I, which I’ve analysed <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0968344517736082">in a recent paper</a>, provides a timely case study of how politicians chose a catastrophic path. World leaders knew that that a European war would most likely bring economic dislocation, social upheaval, and political revolution – not to mention mass death – but they went ahead anyway. Far from thinking that the war would be short – “over by Christmas” as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/dec/09/first-world-war-over-by-christmas">cliché goes</a> – leaders across Europe shared the view expressed by the British chancellor, David Lloyd George that war would be “armageddon”. </p>
<p>So why did European leaders not swerve away from catastrophe in 1914? A toxic mix of wishful thinking, brinksmanship, finger-pointing, and fatalism – features currently increasingly evident in the Brexit dénouement – conspired to make the risk of catastrophic war appear a legitimate, even rational, option.</p>
<p>First, a small number of leaders, mainly generals, believed that war would cleanse society of its materialist and cosmopolitan values. The more terrible the consequences, the more effective the war would be in achieving national renewal. War, they argued, would bolster the values of self-sacrifice and cement social cohesion. Instead, material shortage led to <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/russian_empire">military defeat and social disintegration</a> in Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany.</p>
<p>Second, some politicians believed that the prospect of catastrophe could be used to lever their opponents into concession. Kurt Riezler, adviser to the German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, had coined the term <em>Risikopolitik</em>, or risk policy. He predicted that, faced with the possibility of a European war, the great powers with less at stake would back down in any given crisis. But this logic broke down if both sides considered their vital interests in danger and if both sides faced similarly catastrophic consequences from war. This led to absurdities in the July crisis, such as the <a href="https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/wilhelm_ii_german_emperor">comment</a> from Germany’s Kaiser William II that: “If we should bleed to death, at least England should lose India.”</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=344&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/260413/original/file-20190222-195870-190ujwj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A cartoon published in the Chicago Daily News in 1914.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/The_army_worm._-_Luther_D._Bradley.jpg">Luther Daniels Bradley</a></span>
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<h2>Shifting blame</h2>
<p>Third, politicians framed the crisis as a choice between two catastrophes. If they backed down, they feared the permanent loss of status, allies, and, ultimately, security. For Austro-Hungarian leaders, compromise rendered them vulnerable to further Serbian provocations and the slow disintegration of the Habsburg empire. War became the lesser of two evils, a highly risky strategy that might, but probably would not, avert certain ruin. As states began to mobilise, military and political leaders feared that whichever side moved first could gain a significant military advantage. Waiting too long risked the dual catastrophe of being at war and suffering an initial defeat. This logic was particularly important in the spiral of mobilisation on the eastern front, between Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany.</p>
<p>Fourth, as war became increasingly likely, leaders began to deny their own ability to resolve the conflict. Politicians began to allocate blame for the coming conflict on their opponents. Lloyd George, who went on to become prime minister in 1916, later famously claimed that Europe had <a href="http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2014/02/the-kaiser-and-the-first-world-war/">“slithered” into war</a>. The denial of agency encouraged the sense of fatalism that facilitated the outbreak of war. If leaders perceived war as inevitable, this inevitability made it psychologically easier to accept the appalling consequences.</p>
<p>Fifth, individual decisions, such as allies assuring their unfailing loyalty to their partners, were often intended to avoid war by forcing the other side to back down. Yet, instead of making concessions, states doubled down on their demands and stood full-square by their allies, without urging compromise. The outcome was the rapid escalation of the crisis into war.</p>
<h2>Seasoned diplomats at the helm</h2>
<p>Most of the key diplomats in July 1914 had recently resolved major international crises, notably during the Moroccan Crisis in 1911 and the remaking of the Balkans during regional wars in 1912 and 1913. They had the diplomatic skills to avoid disaster. </p>
<p>Yet, by framing the July crisis in terms of an existential test – of status, territorial integrity, and the value of alliances – leaders in all the great powers trapped themselves in a spiral of escalating tensions and decisions. This meant they began to rationalise war as a possible option from early July.</p>
<p>Although the consequences of a no-deal Brexit will be much less terrible, there are similarities in certain patterns of thinking and political behaviour, from the few who embrace disaster to the systemic pressures which prevent compromise. Avoiding disaster in 1914 would have required framing the stakes of the July crisis in less zero-sum ways and refusing to rationalise a general European war as an acceptable policy option. It required leaders with enough courage to compromise, even to accept defeat, and for states to offer rivals the prospect of long-term security and future gains in exchange for accepting short-term setbacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111864/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Mulligan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A toxic mix of wishful thinking, brinksmanship, finger-pointing, and fatalism in July 1914 bear similarities to Brexit.William Mulligan, Professor, School of History, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/991212018-07-11T11:14:00Z2018-07-11T11:14:00ZTrump isn’t the first leader to rattle the world order<p>Donald Trump’s recent trip to the G-7 summit <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-floats-end-to-all-tariffs-threatens-major-penalties-for-countries-that-dont-agree/2018/06/09/a06350be-6bf1-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c92efef70139">smashed expectations of how world leaders should behave</a>. </p>
<p>Trump’s actions in Canada included exacerbating the growing trade war and accusing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of lying. Summit participants described the President as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/world/europe/trump-nato-summit-g-7.html">“angry, mocking, wandering and rude</a>.” Trump left the G-7 to meet in Singapore with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. This only added to G-7 members’ apprehension, as many believe the American leader is more apt to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-kim-summit-trump-says-we-have-developed-a-very-special-bond-at-end-of-historic-meeting/2018/06/12/ff43465a-6dba-11e8-bf86-a2351b5ece99_story.html?utm_term=.061062be8a64">befriend dictators than allies</a>.</p>
<p>As the President begins the NATO summit, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ahead-of-nato-and-putin-summits-trumps-unorthodox-diplomacy-rattles-allies/2018/07/06/16c7aa4e-7006-11e8-bd50-b80389a4e569_story.html?utm_term=.7c67f895b399&wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1">many allies fear</a> that he will unilaterally take actions that will further call into question America’s support for their countries. Trump has already sent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news">“sharply worded”</a> letters to multiple NATO allies ahead of the summit, admonishing them to spend more on defense. </p>
<p>The President’s decision to hold a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/europe/trump-putin-helsinki-meeting.html">summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> days after the Brussels meeting only heightens alliance worries.</p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://isd.georgetown.edu/McFarland">diplomatic historian</a> and practitioner of foreign affairs. History shows us that Trump isn’t the first leader to take a brutish approach to international affairs. It is worth looking back at some historical actors who ignored international norms and acted unilaterally and defiantly. </p>
<p>It’s also worth considering the results of their behavior.</p>
<h2>Kaiser Wilhelm’s follies</h2>
<p>Wilhelm II, German leader from 1888 to 1918, is an interesting and tragic historical figure, who has recently been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/12/the-donald-trump-kaiser-wilhelm-parallels-are-getting-scary/">compared</a> to President Trump. Those references include one article entitled <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/what-happens-when-a-bad-tempered-distractible-doofus-runs-an-empire">“What Happens When a Bad-Tempered, Distractible Doofus Runs an Empire</a>?” Wilhelm was the grandson of England’s Queen Victoria. But he did enough to sour relations that even his family ties couldn’t stop Germany and England from <a href="http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/greatwar/g2/backgroundcs1.htm">going to war in 1914</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1577&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226992/original/file-20180710-70045-m4a76v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1981&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kaiswer Wilhelm II.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=438189">Public domain</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Like his country, Wilhelm was both ambitious and insecure. “Deep into the most distant jungles of other parts of the world, everyone should know the voice of the German Kaiser,” <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/crips-column/2009/01/germany-wilhelm-war-austria">he once wrote</a>. “Nothing should occur on this earth without having first heard him.” </p>
<p>Wilhelm hated being questioned. One historian, Margaret MacMillan, describes how he “deliberately shook hands too hard <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/105817/the-war-that-ended-peace-by-margaret-macmillan/9780812980660/">with his strong right hand</a>.” MacMillan also wrote that he liked slapping male monarchs on their behinds and his adolescent playfulness appalled his fellow royals. </p>
<p>Wilhelm had numerous indiscretions and poor policy decisions prior to World War I. His infamous <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Kruger-telegram">“Kruger telegram” of 1896</a> infuriated London when he congratulated a group of independent south Africans for repelling a British-backed military raid. His decision to expand the German navy and the publication of an infamous <a href="https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Daily_Telegraph_Affair">1908 Daily Telegraph “interview”</a> that was insulting and perplexing to British readers also sparked rifts. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/105817/the-war-that-ended-peace-by-margaret-macmillan/9780812980660/">MacMillan succinctly states that</a> “Wilhelm’s erratic behavior, his changeable enthusiasms and his propensity to talk too much and without thinking first helped to create an impression of a dangerous Germany.” </p>
<p>Ultimately, that perception helped lead to war.</p>
<h2>Saddam’s plans go awry</h2>
<p>Before <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/war-in-iraq-begins">America attacked Iraq in 2003</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/17/world/meast/saddam-hussein-fast-facts/index.html">ousted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein</a>, the strongman from Tikrit had already earned the international community’s ire with his August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. </p>
<p>That invasion came after a decade of regional instability with Saddam as a troublesome central player. </p>
<p>From 1980-1988, Saddam, angry at and fearful of Iranian interference in Iraq domestically, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War">fought Iran</a> in a vicious war that also sought territorial gains. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were afraid that Iran’s revolution would spread. Acting on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” they <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war">heavily funded Saddam’s war effort</a>.</p>
<p>Iraq was worn down and heavily indebted to Arab benefactors following the war’s end in 1988. For some time after, Saddam switched his focus to Kuwait. He laid claim to some of the country’s vast oil deposits and tried to wrest away ports that provided better sea access for oil tankers and cargo ships. </p>
<p>Saddam’s claims to these rich areas, which he called <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/A_History_of_the_Modern_Middle_East.html?id=LYe0CwAAQBAJ">Iraq’s “19th province”</a>, were accompanied by his demands for Kuwait to forgive billions of dollars of debt owed by Iraq. Saddam then claimed Kuwait was siphoning off oil from a shared oil field. Most egregious for Saddam, who was dependent on higher oil prices to rebuild Iraq, was Kuwait’s decision to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/08/business/new-opec-limits-meet-resistance.html">produce more oil than OPEC quotas</a> had set, driving prices down.</p>
<p>With no solution in sight, <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/iraq-invades-kuwait">Saddam invaded and occupied Kuwait</a> in August 1990. </p>
<p>The Cold War was just ending and the United States was trying to usher in a <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/22029/a-world-transformed-by-george-hw--bush-and-brent-scowcroft/9780679752592/">“new world order”</a>, which, it was hoped, would make possible better cooperation among the great powers. That meant Washington and the international community would not, and could not, let Saddam’s actions stand. Ultimately, a military a coalition led by the United States <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0227.html">decimated Iraqi forces</a> and Kuwait was freed. Saddam’s grip on his country and the region would never be as strong.</p>
<p>Like many other leaders who disrupted diplomatic norms, Saddam’s actions ultimately failed.</p>
<h2>The Rough Rider lives up to his name</h2>
<p>An assassin’s bullet <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0906.html">killed President William McKinley</a> and made Theodore Roosevelt president in 1901. </p>
<p>The assassination brought a new kind of presidency to the United States: Not only was Roosevelt the youngest president ever, his boldness and his views of the office introduced what we now know as the “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/political-bookworm/post/the-inevitability-of-the-imperial-presidency/2011/04/22/AFTRBoPE_blog.html?utm_term=.5fc1c0ff0f99">imperial presidency</a>.” </p>
<p>Freakishly bright and full of boundless energy, Roosevelt ran roughshod over his contemporaries, some of whom called him <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Major_Problems_in_American_Foreign_Relat.html?id=spA88Rt23soC">an imperialist and militarist,</a> while one described him as <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">“the mere monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and monstrous noise</a>.” He proclaimed to live by the motto: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/226998/original/file-20180710-70066-9i9uvz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=948&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Theodore Roosevelt.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Public domain</span></span>
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<p>This was probably most apparent in Latin America. Seeking a U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">Roosevelt bullied and cajoled</a> both regional and European nations when Washington’s interests were threatened, using threats of military <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">action and diplomatic pressure</a>. </p>
<p>Roosevelt’s bullishness <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/117455/theodore-rex-by-edmund-morris/9780812966008/">was felt in Venezuela</a>, where Britain and Germany had mounted a blockade over Venezelua’s unpaid debts to those countries. Roosevelt pushed the Europeans to <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs">arbitrate rather than blockade</a>, fearing European ambitions for Venezuelan territory. <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/117455/theodore-rex-by-edmund-morris/9780812966008/">It was felt in Panama</a>, where he promoted Panamanian independence from Colombia in order to ensure U.S. <a href="https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/foreign-affairs">control over a canal</a> that would be built across Panama. That canal, in use to this day, would connect the Atlantic and the Pacific, although it is no longer under U.S. control.</p>
<p>His most famous, and likely most lasting, influence came with his 1904 “corollary” to the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe">Monroe Doctrine</a>.
President James Monroe’s 1823 proclamation stated America’s aim to be in predominant control of the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. </p>
<p>Roosevelt went further. </p>
<p>Now, not only would the United States diplomatically oppose European intervention in the region, the U.S. would also directly intervene in Latin American countries if Washington felt it would forestall European intervention. </p>
<p>Roosevelt’s action, in part, led to numerous American regional actions in the following decades, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/from-colony-to-superpower-9780195078220?q=George%20Herring&lang=en&cc=us">in places such as Haiti, Mexico and the Dominican Republic</a>. These actions, left mostly unchecked by European powers, created a negative Latin American view of the United States as an imperialistic power, lasting in some quarters to this day. </p>
<p>These examples are by no means precise comparisons to today. But they do highlight that history is replete with leaders acting bullishly, with singular confidence in their path and lack of concern for the opinions of others, including allies. </p>
<p>And history is also filled with the mixed results – at best – of those actions.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the title of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kelly McFarland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO leaders meet in Belgium today; many are worried about US President Trump’s habit of breaking diplomatic norms. History is filled with other leaders acting bullishly, often with poor results.Kelly McFarland, Director of programs and research, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/612292016-06-20T12:31:10Z2016-06-20T12:31:10ZVote Leave views of Europe’s future are not attractive – if you know your history<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127310/original/image-20160620-8875-1ru7tv1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Whither Europe after Brexit?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/s/europe+future/search.html?page=2&thumb_size=mosaic&inline=384377665">Wiliam Potter</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the EU referendum, those urging Britons to vote to leave see two possible outcomes for Europe in the event of a Brexit. Either it would integrate further and become a superstate or it would fall apart, restoring a Europe of nation states. Both can’t be true. And when you take a historical perspective, neither would be in the UK’s interests.</p>
<p>Let’s start with integration. The <a href="https://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/111027161740-SenseofSovereignity1991.pdf">longstanding fear</a> of many Brexiters is a European federal superstate. They <a href="http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/the_five_presidents_report_and_the_next_eu_treaty">cite</a> the European Commission’s “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/publications/five-presidents-report-completing-europes-economic-and-monetary-union_en">Five Presidents’ Report</a>” of last year as unsettling progress – it proposes deeper financial, fiscal and political union, chiefly in the eurozone, by 2025. Some in Vote Leave <a href="http://johnredwoodsdiary.com/2016/02/28/economic-uncertainty-and-the-eu/">argue that</a> the departure of the eurosceptic British would make such deeper intergration and even a superstate more likely. </p>
<p>Any move by Britain to encourage this would run counter to five centuries of foreign policy. Britain has always been deeply intertwined with the continent in everything from politics to culture to religion. Hence it has been a longstanding policy goal to maximise influence there and prevent a single power dominating. </p>
<p>This was one reason Elizabeth I of England <a href="http://faculty.history.wisc.edu/sommerville/123/123%20254%20elizabeth%20diplomacy%202.htm">supported</a> the Dutch protestants’ revolt in the 1580s against the king of Spain and Habsburg emperor, Philip II. It was equally behind Britain’s wars against <a href="http://www.louis-xiv.de/index.php?id=23">Louis XIV</a> and <a href="http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_napoleonic.html">Napoleon Bonaparte</a> of France; its <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/mirror01_01.shtml">declaration of war</a> on Germany in 1914 to support Belgian neutrality; and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/churchill_decides_to_fight_on">its refusal</a> to make peace with Hitler after France fell in 1940. Splendid isolation has rarely been judged a viable proposition. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127311/original/image-20160620-8856-1pqvghn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=641&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Not quitters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bigot44/17492665161/in/photolist-sDLtVc-8psCaQ-gGa64y-8ehe9F-maw7ar-rthwtX-qMTrZG-gascqn-5Z4FVu-qH7Bdz-4scdho-rbhKmm-fWujWw-fsbFa4-6bQ6D1-fA6zbg-d3GsAo-6bKWDv-9TFC7w-sadZhM-orXbVt-kzbz7e-9q9Ne1-oq1jsK-8yofaw-ka7V8Q-qstuoM-4sccA1-5m8co3-i75iib-8nxr6e-nXbuy7-5Fp8qo-weifm-5FEKPn-eANU4x-5FEKuZ-weic6-hVYK1L-3go5X-23Ct83-5FK4k5-5FEJPa-o5do4-8jn33y-5FEKd4-8WADFt-4scbKh-5zL9bb-HLqZry">Franck Berthelet</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In reality, a European superstate is a distant prospect. Notwithstanding a small core of federalists, European integration <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VJzdndGbO7wC&printsec=frontcover&dq=milward+european+rescue+of+the+nation+state&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwii8Y_73bHNAhVLAsAKHTY_B9AQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=milward%20european%20rescue%20of%20the%20nation%20state&f=false">has primarily</a> been about strengthening its nation states through collective action. The UK has <a href="http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/62cd6534-f1a9-442a-b6fb-0bab7c842180">not been the only state</a> to guard its sovereignty. This is why, for example, the idea of a European Defence Community with a single army was <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm">too much</a> for the French in the 1950s – and why <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/26/plans-to-create-an-eu-army-kept-secret-from-voters/">rumours of new plans</a> for an EU army are unlikely to succeed either.</p>
<p>It seems far <a href="http://www.cer.org.uk/in-the-press/unnoticed-brexiteers-idea-eu-super-state-quietly-dying">more likely</a> the EU minus the UK would remain a prosaic supranational bloc built on nation states. From outside, it would be harder to maintain the influence that the UK has generally judged crucial.</p>
<h2>A Europe of nation states</h2>
<p>An alternative vision from leavers such as the UK justice secretary <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/662384/EU-referendum-Brexit-Michael-Gove-speech-liberate-Europe-Brussels-Vote-Leave">Michael Gove</a> and UKIP leader <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/678138/Brexit-EU-referendum-trigger-end-Eropean-Union-Nigel-Farage">Nigel Farage</a> is that a Brexit would trigger the collapse of the EU. Europe would then flourish as a patchwork of coexisting sovereign states, they argue. After even a cursory glance at 19th and 20th century European history, this looks hopelessly romantic. </p>
<p>Nineteenth-century Europe was a collection of nation states and empires. The nation state dominated in the west after <a href="http://study.com/academy/lesson/the-unification-of-italy-summary-timeline-leaders.html">Italian</a> and <a href="http://www.historyhome.co.uk/europe/unific.htm">German</a> unification in 1870 and 1871, while eastern Europe remained largely the preserve of multi-national empires such as the Ottoman and Austria-Hungary. </p>
<p>Economic cooperation certainly blossomed in that era. Between 1870 and 1914 – sometimes <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/globalization-and-history">described by historians</a> as the “first age of globalisation” – labour, capital and goods all moved freely enough. But there were limits. A free-trade honeymoon in the mid-century <a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/5293/discussions/130285/blog-brexit-free-trade-and-perils-history-imperial-global-forum">gave way</a> to protectionism in the 1880s. And while <a href="https://archive.org/details/greatillusionstu00angerich">some argued</a> in the pre-war years that economic interdependence had made conflict irrational, this made little difference in 1914. </p>
<p>What really underpinned peace by the early 20th century was the system of alliances between the great powers. Yet it struggled to contain their rival ambitions, not least those of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/wilhelm_kaiser_ii.shtml">Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany</a>. The crumbling Ottoman Empire let loose competing nationalisms in the Balkans. When Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Gavrilo-Princip">assassinated</a> the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28 1914, a showdown between Serbia and Austria-Hungary rapidly descended into the great war the alliances were intended to deter. </p>
<p>Yet the drive for a continent-wide state system based on national sovereignty reached its zenith after 1918. Led by Woodrow Wilson, the US president, the victorious allies applied the principle of “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/fourteen_points.shtml">national self-determination</a>” to eastern as well as western Europe – even if the patchwork of ethnicities meant compromises were necessary to build viable states. It meant unions such as Yugoslavia and large minority enclaves such as German-speaking Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia. Inter-state tensions and the potential for conflict were ever present. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127312/original/image-20160620-8889-1nepc2n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=579&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Big four at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: (L to R) David Lloyd George, Vittorio Orlando, Georges Clemenceau and Woodrow Wilson.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bigot44/17492665161/in/photolist-sDLtVc-8psCaQ-gGa64y-8ehe9F-maw7ar-rthwtX-qMTrZG-gascqn-5Z4FVu-qH7Bdz-4scdho-rbhKmm-fWujWw-fsbFa4-6bQ6D1-fA6zbg-d3GsAo-6bKWDv-9TFC7w-sadZhM-orXbVt-kzbz7e-9q9Ne1-oq1jsK-8yofaw-ka7V8Q-qstuoM-4sccA1-5m8co3-i75iib-8nxr6e-nXbuy7-5Fp8qo-weifm-5FEKPn-eANU4x-5FEKuZ-weic6-hVYK1L-3go5X-23Ct83-5FK4k5-5FEJPa-o5do4-8jn33y-5FEKd4-8WADFt-4scbKh-5zL9bb-HLqZry">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Inter-war Europe had only weak mechanisms to smooth things over. In place of the system of great-power alliances the new <a href="http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/league-of-nations/">League of Nations</a> pursued collective security and cooperation, though with limited power to bind its members. It proved too weak to prevent protectionism resurging in the 1920s or the rise of fascism. Great-power politics re-emerged and the continent plunged into an even bloodier war in 1939. </p>
<p>No wonder so many British and continental leaders since World War II have supported European integration. Winston Churchill <a href="http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html">spoke airily</a> of a “United States of Europe” in 1946. A Europe of sovereign nation states had proved a failure twice, and the second failure had been worse than the first. </p>
<h2>All in the past?</h2>
<p>Brexiters might argue Europe <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/brexit-boris-johnson-david-cameron-security-nato-eu-457370">could now</a> return to separate sovereign states because its stability is underpinned by the American-designed international framework of the UN, NATO, IMF and World Trade Organisation that emerged after 1945. </p>
<p>None of these other organisations provides a specifically European system of cooperation, however. They are not designed to tackle the common problems of a small, densely populated and combustible continent. This is why successive US presidents, most recently <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/21/as-your-friend-let-me-tell-you-that-the-eu-makes-britain-even-gr/">Barack Obama</a>, have generally supported the European project and UK participation. </p>
<p>When those who back Vote Leave conjure these competing visions of a European superstate or a patchwork of sovereign states, they are effectively offering the UK either impotence or instability in its own neighbourhood. Even if the more likely outcome is probably a diminished EU with the UK on the sidelines, let’s be clear: none of these three alternatives looks attractive for either the UK or the rest of Europe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Dilley is supported by an AHRC Early Career Fellowship, but this article reflects entirely his own views.
</span></em></p>Those who favour Brexit imply it would be followed either by a European superstate or the collapse of the EU. Here’s why neither is in UK’s interests.Andrew Dilley, Senior Lecturer, History, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.