tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/katrina-19921/articlesKatrina – The Conversation2021-09-02T21:50:39Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1670772021-09-02T21:50:39Z2021-09-02T21:50:39ZHurricane Ida shows the increasing impact of climate change since Katrina<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419147/original/file-20210902-23-karva1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=41%2C0%2C5432%2C3397&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hurricane Ida made landfall in Louisiana 16 years to the day after Hurricane Katrina.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Hilary Scheinuk/AP Pool) </span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 175px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/hurricane-ida-shows-the-increasing-impact-of-climate-change-since-katrina" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Sixteen years to the day that Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Hurricane Ida struck at Port Fourchon, La., on Aug. 29, as a Category 4 hurricane with 240 kilometres per hour winds. Given the date and location of the area affected, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-ida-vs-hurricane-katrina-key-differences-explained/">Katrina and Ida comparisons</a> are being made.</p>
<p>While no two disasters are the same, looking at differences between past and present disasters can help us to better understand what is needed to prepare for future disasters. As a professor of emergency management, I was on the ground in New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina, making observations to study aspects of the hurricane’s impact and <a href="https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1365">hurricane evacuations</a>. </p>
<p>Given the scope of the emerging impacts of Hurricane Ida, we see that while this is not a repeat of a Katrina disaster, questions are being raised about <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/30/weather/hurricane-ida-climate-change-factors/index.html">the effect of climate change</a> and the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/01/weather/tropical-depression-ida-wednesday/index.html">resiliency of lifeline infrastructure like electricity</a>.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3vwqALaBk70?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">NBC News looks at Hurricanes Ida and Katrina.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Remembering Katrina</h2>
<p>When Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 hurricane in 2005, its associated storm surges were among its most significant impacts. The levees that separated New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain failed. Katrina’s toll was <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/we-still-dont-know-how-many-people-died-because-of-katrina/">1,833 killed</a> with US$163 billion in economic losses, making it the <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/weather-related-disasters-increase-over-past-50-years-causing-more-damage-fewer">costliest weather disaster in the past 50 years</a>.</p>
<p>In looking back at Katrina, forces of nature were not the only causative factors for the disaster. Human-caused circumstances, such as a <a href="https://islandpress.org/books/catastrophe-making">history of economic and engineering decisions</a> that over time replaced natural coastal wetland buffers against storm surges with a 120-kilometre long industrial canal, were in part to blame for the disaster.</p>
<p>In addition, <a href="https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/using-organizations-the-case-of-fema/">numerous disaster response debacles complicated the immediate aftermath of Katrina</a>. The disaster exposed racial- and class-based segregation that resulted in <a href="https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/toxic-soup-redux-why-environmental-racism-and-environmental-justice-matter-after-katrina/">disproportionate disaster impacts being felt by racialized populations</a>. What started as a natural disaster played out more like a complex humanitarian emergency. </p>
<p>As the aftermath of Hurricane Ida continues to play out, it remains to be seen if the disaster recovery and the economic losses will approach those of Katrina.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a damaged car and building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/419030/original/file-20210902-21-hvb2cy.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward in April 2006.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Jack Rozdilsky)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Differences in hurricane behaviour</h2>
<p>A hurricane’s behaviours related to disaster damage include the combination of the effects of high-speed damaging winds, intense periods of rainfall and storm surge flooding in low lying coastal areas. </p>
<p>Katrina’s behaviour is remembered for its devastating water-related hazards with storm surges inundating New Orleans neighbourhoods such as the Lower Ninth Ward.</p>
<p>For Ida, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/08/31/how-ida-katrina-compare-wind-fingerprints/">the entire breadth of the storm’s wind field stood out as significant</a>. The storm’s behaviour will be remembered for its wind-related hazards. Ida had a slow path of inland movement with <a href="https://www.wftv.com/weather/eye-on-the-tropics/tropical-storm-ida-continues-strengthen-expected-become-hurricane-by-this-weekend/DRSUX54QFNFBTCMSXOZGEY56MA/">highly destructive sustained winds of 200 kilometres per hour for eight hours</a> over a 120-kilometre long path through portions of Jefferson and LaFourche parishes. </p>
<p>In 2005, Katrina crossed a cooler water column in the Gulf of Mexico as it neared the shore, weakening it from a Category 5 to a Category 3 storm at landfall. In 2021, Ida did not encounter any cooler waters, resulting in its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-climate-rapid-intensification-revved-up-hurricane-ida/2021/08/31/cfb0b5be-0a63-11ec-a7c8-61bb7b3bf628_story.html">rapid intensification</a>. <a href="https://www.wwno.org/coastal-desk/2019-09-30/un-climate-report-suggests-major-changes-in-store-for-gulf-coast">Rising water temperatures in the Gulf of Mexico</a> are related to climate change. </p>
<h2>New preparedness challenges</h2>
<p>While the situation remains tenuous in hurricane-stricken locales, at least Ida’s casualty count appears to be nowhere near that of Katrina. As of Sept. 1, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-ida-death-count-rescue-damage/">Ida’s death toll was at six and counting</a>. It is too early to estimate Ida’s economic losses.</p>
<p>Unlike the situation in 2005 with Hurricane Katrina, the levees and drainage systems protecting New Orleans held up under the stress of Ida’s storm surge. Since Katrina, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/explainer-orleans-protected-hurricane-79693042">the U.S. federal government has spent $14.5 billion on levees, pumps, seawalls, floodgates and drainage</a>. Apparently, in the case of Hurricane Ida, that investment in hazard mitigation paid off. </p>
<p>However, while preparations to protect against Katrina-like storm surge flooding appeared to be successful, other aspects of preparation did not fare as well. The region’s electrical grid did not remain functional under the hours of sustained hurricane force winds. Local utilities serving Louisiana said it would take days to assess the damage to their equipment and weeks to fully restore service across the state as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/08/31/ida-entergy-hurricane-louisiana-power/">problems with the electrical grid continue</a>. All the eight main transmission lines bringing electricity from power plants into New Orleans were knocked out, and more than one million people remain without power three days after landfall. </p>
<p>Without power, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/09/01/ida-recovery-power/">the situation is becoming increasingly desperate</a>. As one example of the collateral damages related to a lack of electricity, the <a href="https://www.nola.com/news/hurricane/article_22652816-0b78-11ec-a80d-3bd9b75da4ca.html">gasoline distribution system imploded</a>. As conditions degrade due to a prolonged electrical outage, people who did not evacuate during the storm may be forced to, and those who evacuated will be prevented from returning.</p>
<p>Looking at the aftermath of Hurricane Ida illustrates how <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-ida-aftermath-climate-change-making-hurricanes-devastating/story?id=79727034">climate change is making hurricanes more devastating</a>. While <a href="https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-18-0194.1">studies continue to assess the climate change contribution to hurricane intensity</a>, there is little doubt that the increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes impacting the Gulf Coast of the U.S. is being influenced by global warming. </p>
<p>Sixteen years of additional climate change since Hurricane Katrina adds to preparation needs. Even if we are doing better with challenges like protecting against storm surge flooding, the impacts of future hurricanes call for additional measures. These include increasing the resiliency of our infrastructure to better meet the risks of a changing climate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167077/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack L. Rozdilsky is a Professor at York University who receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research as a co-investigator on a project supported under operating grant Canadian 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Rapid Research Funding.</span></em></p>Sixteen years after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Category 4 storm Hurricane Ida reached Louisiana. Planning for future hurricanes must include the need to build resiliency to climate change.Jack L. Rozdilsky, Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/767712018-08-13T10:22:07Z2018-08-13T10:22:07ZWalmart tried to make sustainability affordable. Here’s what happened<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231517/original/file-20180810-2894-1eljuak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Can Walmart go green while maintaining its commitment to low prices?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Tom Uhlman</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>What a difference the birth of a granddaughter can make. </p>
<p>For Lee Scott, who ran Walmart from 2000 to 2009, the arrival of his granddaughter not only <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=NZWrBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT32&lpg=PT32&dq=lee+scott+walmart+sustainability+%22granddaughter%22+born&source=bl&ots=v0C2lpjRxW&sig=w0DDA9Vqi8haEptJfVu8-oNYOuA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiG09Si3r_cAhVD6lMKHXHeAscQ6AEwDHoECAMQAQ#v=onepage&q=lee%20scott%20walmart%20sustainability%20%22granddaughter%22%20born&f=false">convinced</a> him the threat of global warming was real but set him on a course that altered the very DNA of the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall">world’s largest retailer</a>. He decided he wanted to use its size and resources to make the world an “even better place for all of us,” changing the way millions shop in the process. </p>
<p>In 2005, midway through his tenure, he challenged his employees: “What would it take for Walmart to be that company, at our best, all the time?” </p>
<p>The answer became Walmart’s <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/sustainability/">sustainability program</a>, an ambitious effort to figure out how to get its budget-conscious customers to buy more sustainable products. Of course, it was more than Scott’s granddaughter that pushed the retailer in this direction. A <a href="https://topdocumentaryfilms.com/wal-mart-the-high-cost-of-low-price/">dismal perception</a> among the public as well as a <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/WMT/chart?p=WMT#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%3D">stagnant stock price</a> also played roles in prodding Scott and other Walmart officials to take the company in a more environmentally aware direction. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cvvmqUAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">We</a> <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Hyatt5">spent</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0008125617695287">five years</a> studying the program – speaking with Walmart’s sustainability leaders, its suppliers and others who have a stake in the company’s activities such as environmental groups and farmers. Our findings highlight both the promises and perils of what one Walmart executive optimistically termed the “democratization of sustainability.”</p>
<h2>Glaciers, landfills and shopping bags</h2>
<p>During our extensive research into the implementation of Walmart’s sustainability program, we found many executives from the CEO on down who were passionate about making the company more environmentally friendly. Before the retailer even began its program, corporate executives traversed the globe to better understand what was at stake. </p>
<p>We were told stories of Scott’s summer 2005 trip to the top of Mount Washington in New Hampshire, where <a href="https://www.mountwashington.org/research-and-product-testing/past-projects/climate-change-and-air-pollutant-impacts-to-new-englands-rare-alpine-zone.aspx">scientists take measurements</a> of the ice and the wind to measure the effects of climate change and air pollution. There he met with Environmental Defense Fund President <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-krupp/walmart-the-awakening-of_b_9253920.html">Fred Krupp</a> and some of the scientists to discuss the company’s environmental impact and what it could be doing differently. On that same trip, he also met with maple syrup farmers who explained how climate change was affecting their harvests. </p>
<p>Other company leaders made trips to parched cotton fields, landfills covered with Walmart shopping bags and melting Arctic glaciers, all with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of sustainability and engaging with environmental groups, journalists and critics.</p>
<p>But it still wasn’t clear where all this was going until August of that year, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/hurricane-katrina-8452">Hurricane Katrina</a> hit New Orleans, causing extensive human suffering and property damage along the coast.</p>
<p>Walmart, in an unusual move, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501598.html">gave local managers wide discretion</a> in helping communities respond and, along with a few other large retailers, worked hard to get needed supplies to the area. In the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-that-have-changed-about-fema-since-katrina-and-5-that-havent-83205">widely reported government failures</a> during the crisis, Walmart <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-scott/how-hurricane-katrina-cha_b_8043692.html">received praise</a> for its actions – a far cry from the usual criticism Scott received from social and political activists. </p>
<p>After Katrina, Scott had an epiphany, which culminated in that <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/executive-viewpoints/twenty-first-century-leadership">speech</a> he made in October 2005 near Walmart’s headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, during which he announced the project: </p>
<p>“What if we used our size and resources to make this country and this earth an even better place for all of us: customers, associates, our children and generations unborn?”</p>
<h2>Seeking sustainability</h2>
<p>In the speech, Scott laid out Walmart’s sustainability vision to Walmart employees and suppliers. He called for reducing waste, using more renewable energy and selling products that “sustained people and the environment.” </p>
<p>In a way, these goals sounded easy. Simply cut down on waste, become more efficient, convince its legions of suppliers to make more sustainable products and sell them at its “low, low prices.” Sustainability goes up, costs go down, everybody wins. But as Scott and his successors learned, this was easier said than done. </p>
<p>Some aspects were relatively straightforward. The company’s efforts to operate more efficiently produced <a href="http://corporate.walmart.com/2017grr/performance-highlights">significant environmental value</a> – and helped its <a href="https://www.environmentalleader.com/2012/10/walmart-to-save-150m-with-sustainability-initiatives-in-fy13/">bottom line</a>. The efficiency of its fleet of trucks doubled within a decade. Walmart <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/2018grr/">has now converted 28 percent</a> of the energy sources powering its stores and operations globally to renewables. </p>
<p>And last year, the <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/2018grr/reducing-waste">company diverted 78 percent</a> of its global waste from landfills, instead finding ways to recycle, reuse or even sell the garbage. Its goal is to eventually get to 50 percent renewables and zero waste in Canada, Japan, the U.K. and U.S. by 2025.</p>
<p>Selling products that “sustained people and the environment” was harder. By 2008, its was clear that progress was not being made as fast as the company had expected. </p>
<p>Walmart had a challenging job. While the <a href="https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2017/report-shows-a-third-of-consumers-prefer-sustainable-brands.html">market</a> for sustainable products is large and growing, it has primarily catered to people with a lot of disposable income <a href="http://www.nielsen.com/eu/en/insights/reports/2015/the-sustainability-imperative.html">who can afford</a> to pay the “goodness” <a href="https://www.luxurysociety.com/en/articles/2018/02/how-luxury-brands-are-practicing-sustainability-creative-ways">premium</a> for things like Toyota Priuses and organic foods. </p>
<p>What about the majority of consumers who usually see the <a href="https://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/downloads/consumer-science-research-compendium/">high price of sustainability as a barrier</a>? Are sustainable products a luxury good only attainable by the well off? </p>
<p>The questions and challenges of selling sustainable products escalated over time. What is a sustainable product? How could it be measured effectively and efficiently? And how could this information create value for the company and customers? Would people be willing to pay for it if it was impossible to keep the costs down?</p>
<p>Two interconnected challenges it faced are particularly illuminating: the lack of a sustainability standard and how to convince suppliers and customers to go along. </p>
<h2>What’s ‘sustainable’ anyway?</h2>
<p>Walmart leaders quickly learned that the absence of a credible sustainability standard hampered their ability to market new products. </p>
<p>Back then, marketing products as “sustainable” was anything goes. While a few marketing attributes, like “organic,” are <a href="https://www.usda.gov/topics/organic">verified</a> by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for the most part companies were free to call their products “sustainable,” “natural” or “good for you,” regardless of whether it was true or not. </p>
<p>The need for a standard crystallized when Walmart asked suppliers for proposals for a <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-archive/2008/04/21/wal-mart-consumer-behavior-shows-buying-green-is-going-mainstream">2008 Earth Day promotion</a>. It wanted to specifically promote products that were sustainable. Suppliers responded with such a vast range of claims that Walmart managers could not figure out which products to include. Examples of traits that made a product “sustainable” ranged from having “reduced” packaging material – though there was no gauge as to what it was reduced from – to the use of non-toxic ingredients or the product’s overall recyclability. </p>
<p>A subsequent promotion of Campbell’s soup with a green “Earth Day” label (instead of its customary red one) generated external criticism and accusations of “greenwashing.” That is, some <a href="https://thewashcycle.wordpress.com/2009/04/13/campbell%E2%80%99s-is-going-green-or-are-they%E2%80%A6/">bloggers</a> claimed sustainability at Walmart simply meant taking existing products and putting green labels on them.</p>
<p>Lessons like these led Walmart to seek a way of defining what sustainable means for all its products – a mammoth scale given that the company had over 60,000 direct suppliers and a single store could sell about <a href="https://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-archive/2005/01/07/our-retail-divisions">142,000 products</a>. So, in 2009, the company helped establish the <a href="https://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/">Sustainability Consortium</a>, a collaboration of retailers, suppliers, universities, environmental groups and others to create a data-driven index of sustainability.</p>
<p>The consortium would eventually produce a sustainability “toolkit” with key performance indicators and guidance for achieving sustainability at the product category level whether these be laundry care products, computers or beer. </p>
<p>Such indicators could then be used by consortium members in communications with their suppliers, typically in a sustainability scorecard that the supplier would complete. For instance, a manufacturer might be asked if it had plans for reducing harmful emissions – and if it didn’t, the thinking initially went, this type of information could eventually be passed on to consumers who could then make their own judgments.</p>
<p>The problem was, relying on customers didn’t work.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/231584/original/file-20180812-2909-r28tvo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Getting its budget-conscious customers to choose sustainable products was one of Walmart’s biggest challenges.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Images for Walmart/Gunnar Rathbun</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Focusing on suppliers – not consumers</h2>
<p>Most corporate efforts to become more sustainable are based on the premise that <a href="https://ashtonmanufacturing.com.au/66-of-consumers-willing-to-pay-more-for-sustainable-goods-nielsen-report-reveals/">consumers are willing</a> to pay more for eggs that are organic or coffee that is sustainably sourced. </p>
<p>This posed a dilemma for Walmart since its margins are so thin and most of its customers shop there for the ultra-low prices. How could they be convinced, en masse, to pay a bit more because something is tagged as sustainable? And what would be the best way to let them know a particular product was more sustainable than another? Company leaders believed, based on internal surveys, that although its customers desired (or would in the future desire) more sustainable products, many did not have the means or desire to pay extra. </p>
<p>And while Walmart’s implementation of sustainability metrics into its supplier scorecards gave it insight into supplier practices, they did not provide detailed, verifiable information required for a customer-facing label.</p>
<p>This led Walmart to focus less on consumers and more on suppliers. If it could just make sure its products were more sustainable or at least that it was able to offer more options – without a meaningful increase in price – it could go a long way toward achieving its goals. And consumers wouldn’t even realize they’re helping make the world a better place. </p>
<p>Walmart’s merchants were ready to listen. The supplier scorecards that started rolling in 2012 helped Walmart identify inefficiencies in its supplies’ own supply chains, just as the retailer had found in its own operations years earlier. Walmart used them to push suppliers to seek out similar low-cost innovations in their operations – so they could become more sustainable without altering product price tags – and aligned 5 percent of its employees’ performance goals on sustainability improvements, thus incentivizing buyers to ask about, and suppliers to report on, sustainability metrics. </p>
<p>Early indications are that Walmart’s supplier-focused product sustainability strategy has been influential. A 2014 <a href="http://purestrategies.com/downloads/the-path-to-product-sustainability">study</a> by sustainability consultancy Pure Strategies surveyed a broad range of 100 companies such as Timberland, General Mills and Coca-Cola to better understand what it takes to operate sustainably. It found that Walmart was the top-cited retailer driving suppliers’ investments in product sustainability, with 79 percent identifying the retailer as influential. </p>
<h2>It’s ‘complicated’</h2>
<p>Many of the primary lessons that Walmart has learned so far relate to an emergent understanding of the complexity of selling low-cost sustainable products.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229464/original/file-20180726-106511-ug5gwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Walmart Chairman Rob Walton.‘</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Walmart-Shareholders-Meeting/0197bc33de7440539e20c974b65a96a6/5/0">AP Photo/Gareth Patterson</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Commenting about the difficulty developing its sustainability index quickly, Rob Walton, Walmart chairman and son of the founder, <a href="http://fortune.com/2012/04/17/wal-mart-chairman-how-we-came-to-embrace-sustainability/">told a panel</a> in 2012: “But good gosh, this is really complicated stuff, and it’s giving our buyers information to inform decisions and compare products. It will be a great day when we can give consumers that information.”</p>
<p>Walmart’s efforts showed that balancing cost and sustainability is possible but difficult to implement. For companies, labeling a low-cost product as “sustainable” makes it harder to justify charging a higher price for a similar good that bears that label. And retailers would prefer not to waste limited shelf space providing those options.</p>
<p>Customers may <a href="https://www.unilever.com/news/press-releases/2017/report-shows-a-third-of-consumers-prefer-sustainable-brands.html">prefer</a> sustainable practices yet be unable to pay the premium, even when it’s very little. So, while Walmart can push in this direction, it probably cannot create a mass market for low-cost sustainable products on its own. The retailer and others who wish to develop such a market will likely continue to struggle with what counts as “sustainable enough” for price-conscious customers. </p>
<p>Until that question is answered, sustainable products are likely to remain “luxury” goods that fail to penetrate into the mainstream.</p>
<p>But if we care for the next generation, as Lee Scott did when he decided Walmart was going green, Walmart’s goal of bringing greater scale and scope to the typically niche market of sustainability is a vital one. </p>
<p>“As you become a grandparent,” Scott <a href="https://grist.org/article/griscom-little3/">told a journalist</a> in 2006, “you just become more thoughtful about what will the world look like that she inherits.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Graham Hyatt is affiliated with the University of Arkansas, which in partnership with Arizona State, founded the Sustainability Consortium with a lead gift from Walmart. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Spicer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two business professors spent five years studying Walmart’s ambition project to bring sustainability to its millions of budget-conscious customers – a plan that began with the birth of a granddaughter.Andrew Spicer, Associate Professor of International Business, University of South CarolinaDavid Graham Hyatt, Research Associate Professor of Supply Chain Management, University of ArkansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/909512018-02-05T14:20:51Z2018-02-05T14:20:51ZWhy treating water scarcity as a security issue is a bad idea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204583/original/file-20180202-162077-e1tfhf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C118%2C1801%2C1084&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Helen Zille, the Premier of the Western Cape in South Africa, has made two startling claims about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-driving-cape-towns-water-insecurity-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-81845">water crisis</a> in the province. She says there will be anarchy when the taps run dry, and that normal policing will be <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-22-from-the-inside-the-countdown-to-day-zero/#.WnLXMq6Wbcs">inadequate</a>. </p>
<p>She stated this as fact. Neither claim has any basis in truth. But they reflect an <a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article/87/2/993/2235528">“elite panic”</a>: society’s elite’s fear of social disorder. We see this when public officials and the media draw on stereotypes of public panic and disorder, or, in Zille’s words, “anarchy”. </p>
<p>Research <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2002/08/020808075321.htm">shows</a> that mass hysteria and lawlessness during disasters is actually remarkably rare. Yet elite panic can lead to security taking priority over public safety. Preventing criminal activity is then treated as more important than protecting people from harm.</p>
<p>The more society’s response leans towards security, the closer the situation gets to “securitisation”. In the field of security studies, securitisation is the notion that nothing is a threat until someone <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2011/10/09/does-security-exist-outside-of-the-speech-act/">says</a> it is. This “framing” happens in many ways, including the words politicians choose to describe a situation. A militarised response, for example, can be triggered by an issue being portrayed as a threat so severe that it requires extraordinary measures beyond normal political processes. </p>
<p>Zille’s characterisation of the water crisis is a classic example of this process. A major part of her communication about the preparation for Day Zero has been about securing the province and outlining the police and military strategy <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-24-zille-police-army-will-help-secure-day-zero-water-distribution-points">to prevent criminal activity</a>.</p>
<p>This approach gets in the way of more constructive responses to disaster. It can even trigger the very disorder it seeks to avoid. In other words, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs which has serious consequences for a community and the humanitarian response to a disaster.</p>
<h2>False framing</h2>
<p>According to Zille, the day Cape Town runs out of water is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFiPfLGNu3g">“disaster of disasters”</a>. It</p>
<blockquote>
<p>exceeds anything a major City has had to face anywhere in the world since the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-22-from-the-inside-the-countdown-to-day-zero/#.WnLXMq6Wbcs">Second World War or 9/11</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The panic in her tone, and her choice of examples, are telling. The Second World War and 9/11 were not natural disasters, they were consequences of war and terrorism. By invoking these national security events she frames the threat as one that needs to be managed using extraordinary means. </p>
<p>Zille imagines</p>
<blockquote>
<p>many other foreseeable crises associated with dry taps, such as conflict over access to water, theft of water, and other criminal acts associated with water, not to mention the outbreak of disease.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She has asked President Jacob Zuma to declare a national state of disaster. It would enable the country’s intelligence agencies, the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Service to make a shared plan with the province and the private sector</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to distribute water, defend storage facilities, deal with potential outbreaks of disease, and keep the peace.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Military and disaster</h2>
<p>It’s not uncommon for the military to get involved in disaster relief. During the Fukushima/Daichi disaster following the tsunami that struck Japan in 2011, the Japanese military played a critical role in providing aid and relief. But they were not there to <a href="http://fukushimaontheglobe.com/the-earthquake-and-the-nuclear-accident/whats-happened/the-japan-us-military-response">defend or guard</a> people and property.</p>
<p>The South African National Defence Force played a similar role during <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-natural-disasters-floods">serious floods in Mozambique</a> in 2000, and again during flooding <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti%20cle&id=37789:job-done-in-mozambique-sandf-safely-back-home&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242">in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>But Zille’s intention to involve the military and State Security Agency in Cape Town’s disaster management is different. </p>
<p>They won’t be there in a humanitarian capacity, such as setting up infrastructure or distributing water, but to guard against anarchy. Her aim is to legitimise security measures, or, more bluntly, the use of force. </p>
<p>Her approach should be resisted.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Hurricane Katrina</h2>
<p>Author and humanitarian worker Malka Older, who studied the disaster response in the US to <a href="http://www.revue-rita.com/traitdunion9/securitization-of-disaster-response-in-the-united-states-the-case-of-hurricane-katrina-2005.html">Hurricane Katrina in 2005</a>, found that an obsession with security was legitimised through unsupported claims of widespread violence and looting.</p>
<p>She writes: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The story of Hurricane Katrina is one of security overtaking and overriding disaster management from preparedness through response.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>She concludes that the shift from safety to security – where armed guards were sent to shelters and distribution points – actually reduced the city’s capacity to respond to the disaster. The security emphasis tied up human resources. And the focus turned away from helping those affected by the flooding to controlling them. </p>
<p>On top of this, the securitised response reflected prejudices about race and class. Jamelle Bouie, chief political correspondent for Slate Magazine and a political analyst for CBS News, has <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/08/hurricane_katrina_10th_anniversary_how_the_black_lives_matter_movement_was.html">argued that</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Black collective memory of Hurricane Katrina, as much as anything else, informs the present movement against police violence, ‘Black Lives Matter.’</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Thinking differently</h2>
<p>Water scarcity, like any issue, can be thought of in several ways. </p>
<p>It can be imagined as a hardship that many Capetonians in poor, black townships have <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/water-restrictions-its-nothing-new-us-say-residents-informal-settlements/">endured all their lives</a>.</p>
<p>People can consider staying calm and being resilient and resourceful as they make plans to source and store water. They can even imagine a new community spirit as they find ways to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-southern-africa-can-learn-from-other-countries-about-adapting-to-drought-90876">share this scarce resource</a>, help the most vulnerable and receive help from around the country. </p>
<p>Part of this imagining depends on leaders staying level headed. Citizens need public communication, not scaremongering that equates the worst case scenario with objective reality. They don’t need to be paralysed by a mindset of suspicion and dread.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s leaders should remain calm and help the people to act collectively in a democratic spirit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90951/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joelien Pretorius does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mass hysteria and lawlessness during disasters are remarkably rare, contrary to Western Cape Premier Helen Zille’s prediction of anarchy when Cape Town’s taps run day.Joelien Pretorius, Associate Professor in Political Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/468342015-08-28T21:30:03Z2015-08-28T21:30:03ZDisappearing acts: reflecting on New Orleans 10 years after Katrina<p>In this season of anniversaries, no two are more stark in their parallels than Ferguson a year after the <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/michael-brown-ferguson-missouri-timeline/14051827/">shooting</a> of Michael Brown and New Orleans 10 years after Hurricane Katrina killed 1,800 and displaced thousands.</p>
<p>Both involve the senseless loss of black lives and the public horror at revelations long known in many isolated communities. Each said a lot about race relations in a country where the “postracial” election of the first black president suggested that we were too far beyond Katrina to produce Ferguson. Each also speaks of structural inequality and the idea of disappearance.</p>
<p>But for the moment, let’s focus on Katrina and New Orleans’ slow journey through grief and devastation. </p>
<p>Disappearance was both symbolic and very real when that category 3 hurricane failed to veer away from the magical city, crashed the levees and inundated the low-lying areas populated overwhelmingly by the city’s African Americans. </p>
<h2>The disappearance of whole neighborhoods</h2>
<p>From its impoverished but <a href="http://www.journalofamericanhistory.org/projects/katrina/Landphair.html">historic Lower Ninth Ward</a> to its middle-class but geographically vulnerable New Orleans East, whole neighborhoods disappeared. Some people died and floated adrift down the rivers of streets. Some waited on rooftops or at the Superdome for rescuers that would not come. And some left town and waited to return. Many are still waiting. New Orleans has <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/magazine/why-new-orleans-black-residents-are-still-under-water-after-katrina.html?_r=0">lost 100,000 black residents</a> since the storm.</p>
<p>Academics like me were fascinated and horrified by the public reaction to so many instantaneous deaths; we knew that slow deaths of similarly situated Americans across the nation receive little attention. I edited a collection of essays on the disaster’s meaning called <a href="http://thenewpress.com/books/after-storm">After the Storm:</a> Black Intellectuals Explore the Meanings of Hurricane Katrina and wondered what recovery would look like in New Orleans. </p>
<p>The consensus worry among the authors was that a Democratic city in a Republican state, with such a large number of blacks living in dangerous conditions, would, with the cooperation of surrounding parishes and federal disaster policy, jettison the survivors, ignoring their needs in the rebuild and remake itself as a thriving “Disney on the Mississippi.” </p>
<p>When I visited the empty city 100 days after the storm, I could see that it was already clear that real estate on dry ground was being bought up in a feverish investment market. Certain areas were prepared to profit from the billions in federal aid that was pledged, while others saw sparse activity.</p>
<p>The larger question was whether the singular spectacle of black suffering the nation had witnessed in 2005 would give rise to a set of 21st-century solutions to the spatial problems of segregation, predatory policing, concentrated poverty, awful schools and wide income inequality.</p>
<h2>Did the burst of national attention produce real results?</h2>
<p>The results of New Orleans’ 10-year recovery appear mixed, in a racially familiar way. The city is no doubt a different place. A <a href="https://sites01.lsu.edu/wp/pprl/files/2012/07/Views-of-Recovery-August-2015.pdf">survey</a> by the Public Policy Research Lab at Louisiana State University found that four out of five whites believe the city has mostly recovered, while three out of five blacks do not. The results seem an accurate reflection of segregated realities in a gentrified city. The New Orleans is whiter and wealthier now. </p>
<p>The federal money helped it withstand the Great Recession better than most, and it has become a hotbed of social entrepreneurism; many new companies grew out of the immense outpouring of public sympathy after Katrina. The suffering clearly stirred consciousness and drew many to the Gulf to help. High start-up rates have attracted college grads under 40. Mayor Mitch Landrieu, the first white mayor in many years, is <a href="http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/neworleansnews/12494710-123/mayor-mitch-landrieu-gives-state">cautiously giddy</a> about his city on the rise.</p>
<p>Black survey responses reflect black realities in New Orleans. According to figures provided by the <a href="http://www.datacenterresearch.org">Data Center</a> (formerly the Greater New Orleans Data Center), median income for black households in 2013 was 20% below that for whites. The difference between them – a measure of income inequality – is 54%, higher than the national average. Black male employment is 57%, compared to 77% for whites. Incarceration rates have dropped, but are still sky-high. Poverty rates are returning to pre-Katrina levels. The schools are a laboratory in the charter school revolution, with mixed academic results and a labor legacy of many teacher firings. (See the report <a href="http://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/new-orleans-index-at-ten/">here.</a>) </p>
<p>These trends reflect deeper fissures for many black New Orleanians, already disproportionately displaced by the storm.</p>
<h2>The hard-hit Ninth Ward remains blighted</h2>
<p>In the hard-hit Ninth Ward, only 36% of residents have returned, and the area remains deeply blighted. These homeowners suffered from the fate of having only informal property documents or they lost them altogether, with many parcels passing deedless through generations of family members.</p>
<p>Like many black homeowners, Ninth Ward residents were discriminated against by the rules of the federal <a href="https://www.road2la.org">Road Home</a> project, which compensated for the prestorm market value of the property rather than the cost of repair. A successful <a href="http://dev.gnofairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/11-12-08_citybusiness_Lawsuit_filed_against_Road_Home1.pdf">lawsuit</a> by the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center and others reversed those rules in 2011, but for many the changes came too late. </p>
<p>And New Orleans East, the sprawling middle-class black community that grew up in the 1980s despite white flight, still lacks 20% of its residents. The <a href="http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2011/08/decision_pending_on_mass_firin.html">mass firing</a> of so many mostly black teachers by the state legislature had a devastating effect on the area’s black middle class.</p>
<p>Still, some factors indicate a trend toward gentrification of New Orleans since Katrina. But gentrification is a funny and complicated thing. </p>
<h2>Displacement and disappointment</h2>
<p>In my <a href="http://thenewpress.com/books/after-storm">essay,</a> “Many Thousands Gone, Again,” the best scenario I could predict was that federally financed rebuilding would produce lots of construction employment and a land grab. I proposed a jobs trust on behalf of displaced, underskilled New Orleanians and a land trust to ensure affordable places to return. </p>
<p>I had also hoped that survivors would find at least temporary housing in the surrounding parishes of the New Orleans metropolitan area, so that they could participate in the planning processes that were forecast.</p>
<p>Not much of any of that happened. Instead the public housing that had been such a killing field for poor black New Orleanians was shuttered – not because it was uninhabitable. Projects like <a href="http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/05/bw_cooper_housing_sites_slow_m.html">B W Cooper</a>, which sits within sight of the Central Business District on higher ground, were razed or transformed to become mixed-income housing. A good idea? In theory, but only as long as there is provision for all residents who once lived there. There was not, and many remain displaced.</p>
<h2>The role of the suburbs</h2>
<p>Did the suburbs welcome the survivors? Not particularly. Three surrounding parishes became home to a growing Latino population, mostly from Honduras, whose labor was instrumental in the rebuilding. By 2012, eight of the surrounding 13 parishes saw no increase in the number of poor households at all, a sign that desperate survivors did not move there. In fact, these areas saw improved growth, according to the <a href="http://www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/new-orleans-index-at-ten/">Data Center.</a> </p>
<p>The metro suburbs did see an increase in overall poverty relative to the city – a trend that mirrors the nation – but that may be because the city is pricing poor people out, and many elderly either stayed in suburbs on fixed incomes or left the city when it became unaffordable.</p>
<p>It’s hard to gauge from any distance the complexity of a city’s 10-year recovery from a disaster that multiplied across families, neighborhoods and institutions. Statistics miss the continuing effects of trauma suffered by thousands of New Orleanians who saw horror, survived despite unimaginable fear and struggled through long periods of homelessness, neglect, anger and longing. Sudden death leaves even the most resource rich among us forever changed.</p>
<p>A few conclusions seem warranted. First, the city’s recovery was not transformative for the very citizens whose spectacular suffering occasioned the wave of resources pledged to match the storm. The pre-Katrina normalcy of low black wealth and incomes, high unemployment, housing instability and economic vulnerability has resettled in southern Louisiana. The <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/08/26-post-katrina-new-orleans-liu">output per capita trends </a>reported by the Brookings Institute, for instance, indicate that the economy was hottest for new residents and cooled to familiar low wages for more recent returning natives. </p>
<p>For all the federal government’s prodigious activity in New Orleans, we cannot tell a story of economic revitalization for the city’s majority black population. </p>
<p>The gentrification of multiple New Orleans neighborhoods and the suburbanization of poverty present yet another argument for the regionalization of certain public services, such as affordable housing, education and social services. Urban gentrification pushed some of the poor to surrounding parishes, where more affordable suburbs had to shoulder social service costs the city would have had to bear. </p>
<p>Those parishes that could resist an influx of poor households did, if through discriminatory real estate practices, unconstitutional ordinances (eg, “blood-only” deed restrictions) or just the higher housing costs associated with their own prosperity. Those that couldn’t probably suffered in tax base and market attractiveness.</p>
<p>This burden-shifting dynamic occurred more quickly in the New Orleans metro area because of the storm and federal money; it has happened more slowly in other areas of the country. The unfairness of winner and loser municipalities across the region is manifest. Democratic participation – a hallmark of sovereignty – demands that all citizens across a relevant region have some say in the public institutions paid for with their tax dollars. The regionalization of institutional obligations therefore requires greater regional voice in their governance.</p>
<p>Re-disappearance is a formidable cruelty made possible by something too systemic to ignore. The idea that people whose poverty we didn’t know would appear before us in shocking desperation, engage our sympathy and billions later disappear again into the same cycle of marginalization is unthinkable.</p>
<p>Of course, we should be proud of the affluence and ingenuity that brought back so many parts of New Orleans. But we should be worried that the same people once marginalized are still being left out of our best efforts.</p>
<p>We are not yet finished, and we have much still to learn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David D. Troutt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ten years after Katrina, recovery in New Orleans is mixed – divided in familiar patterns between white and black, rich and poor. The same groups that suffered the brunt of the storm still struggle.David D. Troutt, Professor of Law and Justice John J Francis Scholar, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.