tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/kyrgyzstan-21517/articlesKyrgyzstan – The Conversation2024-03-11T12:39:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165722024-03-11T12:39:48Z2024-03-11T12:39:48ZIn Kyrgyzstan, creeping authoritarianism rubs up against proud tradition of people power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580831/original/file-20240310-16-c1fdtm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C31%2C6995%2C4962&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Sadyr Japarov of Kyrgyzstan loom over the people of Bishkek.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kyrgyz-women-walk-past-to-an-electronic-panel-with-photo-of-news-photo/1719479860?adppopup=true">Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of Kyrgyzstan have a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/10/kyrgyzstan-its-easier-start-revolution-finish-it">well-earned reputation</a> for “street democracy.” </p>
<p>Since emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, citizens in the Central Asian republic have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">taken it upon themselves to oust presidents</a> who attempt to overstay their welcome or engage in corruption. </p>
<p>Indeed, between 2005 and 2020, the country experienced five presidential transitions – <a href="https://doi.org//10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_20">three as a result of popular protests</a> and two through the peaceful democratic transfer of power.</p>
<p>But a new trend appears to be in the air of Bishkek, the country’s capital. In contrast to how he is viewed in some other former Soviet states, <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">Russian President Vladimir Putin</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/february_2019_kyrgyzstan_poll.pdf">is popular</a> <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-tajikistan-full-of-putin-fans-new-poll-says">among Kyrgyz</a>, and his strongman style appears to be <a href="https://rsf.org/en/kyrgyzstan-s-japarov-seeks-putin-style-media-legislation">influencing the country’s rulers</a>. In recent weeks, <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">legislation has been advanced</a> to extend their authority and crack down on dissent.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/3172586">scholar of democracy, civic activism and post-Soviet geopolitics</a>, I’ve long known about Kyrgyzstan’s distinctive trajectory – and wondered how this track record of people power squares with recent moves toward authoritarianism. I learned more during a visit to the country in the fall.</p>
<h2>Protest spaces</h2>
<p>The epicenter of Kyrgyz street politics is Bishkek’s Ala-Too Square and the adjacent White House, which historically served as the official presidential office building.</p>
<p>In 2005, Kyrgyz citizens gathered there to protest against their first post-Soviet president, Askar Akayev, when he tried to circumvent term limits and extend his power. The “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/25/world/asia/president-flees-from-protests-in-kyrgyzstan.html">Tulip” revolution</a> drove Akayev into exile in Moscow. </p>
<p>Five years later at the same location, people gathered for the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-opposition-riots/26942558.html">People’s April Revolution</a> against corruption-charged President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. </p>
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<img alt="A monument shows two people pushing a structure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580567/original/file-20240307-22-nefob5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to ‘Those Who Died For Freedom’ in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bakiyev authorized <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/17/court-chaos-kyrgyzstan-trial">deadly force against protesters</a> before being toppled. About 90 protesters who were killed are commemorated to this day with a striking monument on Ala-Too Square. </p>
<p>The square became an epicenter of discontent again in 2020, when anti-government <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/world/asia/kyrgyzstan-election-protests.html">protests overturned what many citizens saw as a stolen election</a> and forced President Sooronbai Jeenbekov from power. </p>
<h2>A new brand of politics</h2>
<p>Kyrgyzstan’s current president, Sadyr Japarov, knows this history well: He lived it. </p>
<p>After serving in Bakiyev’s administration, he helped lead <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/31/what-was-true-cause-of-kyrgyz-demonstrations-pub-49853">mass demonstrations in 2012</a> against newly elected President Almazbek Atambayev.</p>
<p>After participating in an <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-nationalist-mps-and-rioters-attempt-to-storm-parliament">armed attempt to storm Parliament</a>, Japarov fled the country. Upon his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/1/12/sadyr-japarov-from-a-prison-cell-to-the-presidency#:%7E:text=In%202017%2C%20Japarov%20returned%20to,victim%20of%20the%20corrupt%20elites.&text=While%20in%20prison%2C%20he%20wrote,and%20vision%20for%20the%20country.">return to Kyrgyzstan in 2017</a> he was jailed, but he established a new political party from prison. </p>
<p>In January 2021, Japarov won the presidential election with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/kyrgyz-nationalist-wins-landslide-victory-presidential-poll-2021-01-10/">almost 80% of the vote</a>, having run on a populist platform that included pledges to crack down on corrupt elites and foreign corporations. </p>
<p>But Japarov also stressed the importance of Kyrgyzstan’s special relationship with Russia. And increasingly his style of leadership has taken a leaf out of Putin’s playbook. The presidential vote in 2021 was <a href="https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-referendum-on-the-constitution-of-the-kyrgyz-republic/">accompanied by a referendum</a> that increased the power of the office and reduced the importance of Parliament.</p>
<p>Japarov is making that shift concrete: He is constructing <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-japarov-the-builder">a new presidential building</a> about 5 miles south of the city center, reducing the potential for street politics to factor so largely in the country’s future.</p>
<p>During my October visit, other signs were apparent of Japarov’s determination to reshape Kyrgyz politics. On Oct. 4, 2023, security forces <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-infamous-underworld-figure-killed-in-security-services-operation">shot and killed leading crime boss Kolya Kolbaev</a> in a Bishkek pub he owned. State media represented this as a crackdown on organized crime, consistent with Japarov’s election promises. But to many Bishkek citizens, it was less of a crackdown and more a takeover of Kolbaev’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/voices-of-doubt-unraveling-the-ambiguities-surrounding-kolbaevs-killing/">lucrative criminal operations by the Kyrgyz state</a>.</p>
<p>A week later, there was another potential display of Kyrgyzstan’s drift away from people power. Bishkek’s kindergartens, schools and colleges were abruptly <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/13/anti-drone-protection-internet-disruptions-in-bishkek-as-putin-seeks-to-restore-influence-among-allies-a82755">ordered to close or operate only</a> online on Oct. 12 and 13.</p>
<p>The measure coincided with Bishkek’s hosting the annual meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which Putin, making his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-putin-visits-kyrgyzstan-first-foreign-trip-since-icc-arrest-warrant-2023-10-12/">first international trip</a> since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest, was due to attend.</p>
<p>Officially, the closures were simply to ease congestion. But I heard locals speculate that authorities acted to forestall any youth-led protests against the country’s prominent and potentially divisive guest. The authorities instituted a similar measure on Oct. 25 and 26 <a href="https://24.kg/english/278139_Educational_institutions_switch_to_online_classes_for_2_days_due_to_summits/">during a visit by China’s Premier Li Qiang</a>.</p>
<p>Also in October, Parliament discussed proposed laws that closely resemble legislation introduced by Putin in Russia. The bills would <a href="https://24.kg/english/287535_Repressive_laws_represent_major_setback_for_Kyrgyzstans_democratic_future/">curtail freedom of expression and empower the government to prosecute or shut down</a> any organization it identifies as being a “foreign representative.” </p>
<p>Despite protest from Kyrgyz and international media freedom groups, the <a href="https://kyrgyzstan.un.org/en/251211-un-special-rapporteur-expresses-concerns-draft-mass-media-law-kyrgyz-republic">United Nations</a> and the U.S. – which expressed its concerns in a letter, prompting Japarov to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-japarov-accuses-us-interfering-internal-affairs-blinken/32815575.html">accuse Washington of meddling</a> – the laws keep moving forward. In a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/in-farcical-vote-kyrgyz-foreign-representative-law-moves-ahead-again/">controversial Parliament vote in late February</a> 2024, 62 votes to advance the law were passed by the 50 members present, some of whom cast votes for their absent colleagues.</p>
<h2>The resilience of memory</h2>
<p>In intimidating Parliament, eliminating powerful rivals and cracking down on free media, Japarov is not only adopting many of Putin’s methods, he is taking a calculated bet against the country’s recent history of democratic activism. </p>
<p>On the surface, the odds are in the government’s favor. Compared with other post-Soviet states, Putin still <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/505793/empire-twilight-russia-loses-support-own-backyard.aspx">commands high approval ratings in Kyrgyzstan</a>. After a decade and a half of political turbulence – as well as widespread corruption and organized crime – Japarov’s “strongman” persona is appealing for many.</p>
<p>But for many other Kyrgyz citizens, cozying up to Russia raises concerns. </p>
<p>After all, Georgia and Ukraine were also founder members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both have since been attacked by Putin’s Russia.</p>
<p>The 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">brutal invasion of Ukraine</a> has sparked direct parallels with Russian and Soviet attempts to eliminate Kyrgyz culture over two centuries.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A structure shows three pillars" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1334&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580569/original/file-20240307-16-o7yhja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Monument to the 1916 Urkun rebellion at the Ata-Beyit memorial complex in Bishkek.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bishkek – then known as Pishpek – came under Russian rule in the 1850s as the czar conquered a patchwork of Central Asian city-states and nomadic tribes under the guise of a “civilizing mission.”</p>
<p>The Kyrgyz people continued to defend their distinctive nomadic way of life. But overt resistance against Russian rule was met with brutal force. In 1916, when imperial Russia began forcibly conscripting Kyrgyz men to fight in World War I, <a href="https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/project/the-central-asian-revolt-of-1916-%EF%BB%BFa-collapsing-empire-in-the-age-of-war-and-revolution/">Kyrgyz rebelled</a>. In the crackdown that followed, over <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-1916-russia-mass-killings-genocide/27926414.html">100,000 Kyrgyz were killed</a>. Many women and children died crossing the Tian Shan mountains to seek refuge in China from Russian repression. </p>
<p>Soviet rule ostensibly offered the promise of better relations with Moscow. And in 1926, the Kyrgyz gained autonomy; full republic status followed in 1936. </p>
<p>In common with much of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz citizens suffered from Stalin’s purges. In 1938, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/stalin-s-killing-of-kyrgyz-intellectuals-remains-vivid/2124089">138 Kyrgyz intellectuals were killed</a> and buried in a mass grave outside Bishkek, where Stalin’s victims are remembered, alongside other Kyrgyz patriots, at the <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2023/12/ata-beyit-memorial-complex-near-bishkek-safeguards-sorrowful-past-and-honors-repressed/">Ata-Beyit memorial</a> near Bishkek. </p>
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<img alt="TKTK" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/558417/original/file-20231108-25-5ak74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A frieze at Ata-Beyit depicting Soviet police arresting Kyrgyz intellectuals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Brown</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This commitment to preserving memory, combined with a deep distrust of authoritarian overreach, anchors Kyrgyz citizens. But it rubs up against where the country finds itself today: in a pivotal place amid shifting geopolitics.</p>
<p>The U.S. and Russia are vying for influence in Central Asia, while China, Turkey and the Persian Gulf states are also making significant investments in the region.</p>
<p>As Kyrgyzstan’s leaders seek to maintain sovereignty, develop and diversify the economy and improve the country’s standing in the world, they face difficult choices. For now, they seem to be following Putin’s path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Brown is Director of the Melikian Center, which receives funding from the US Departments of Education, Defense and Education. He traveled to Bishkek as part of a research project that is supported by the U.S. Russia Foundation, a legacy organization of the U.S. Russia Investment Fund, founded by the U.S. Government.</span></em></p>Recent laws and pro-Putin sentiment by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov have sparked concern that the Central Asian country is backsliding on democracy.Keith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1584042021-06-07T12:35:16Z2021-06-07T12:35:16Z‘Bride kidnapping’ haunts rural Kyrgyzstan, causing young women to flee their homeland<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403393/original/file-20210528-22-ah8da2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4672%2C2853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek, on April 8, 2021, after a young woman abducted for marriage was found dead. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-hold-pictures-as-they-attend-a-rally-for-womens-news-photo/1232176999?adppopup=true"> Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are many types of forced marriage in this world, but perhaps the most dramatic is marriage by abduction, or <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20EGMGPLHP%20_Cheryl%20Thomas%20revised_.pdf">bride kidnapping</a>. </p>
<p>Bride kidnapping is common in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In rural Kyrgyzstan, where over 60% of the country’s population lives, surveys suggests <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-015-0393-2">1 in 3 marriages begins with a kidnapping</a>. </p>
<p>There, bride kidnapping is known as “ala kachuu,” which translates as “to take and run away.” It became illegal in <a href="https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/bride-kidnapping-kyrgyz-republic">1994</a>, but the practice continues today, especially in rural areas. </p>
<p>And our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1931062?src=">research</a> on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Z7Xve00AAAAJ&hl=en">labor migration</a> in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=5HRNTzAAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">the country</a> suggests bride kidnapping may push young women to leave their rural communities to avoid forced marriage.</p>
<h2>What is bride kidnapping?</h2>
<p>Kyrgyzstan, a Central Asian country of 6.5 million, is one of the world’s epicenters of marriage by abduction. </p>
<p>A typical bride kidnapping occurs in a public place. A group of young men locates the young woman that one has chosen for his wife – whom he may know, but perhaps not well – and carries her, screaming and struggling, into a waiting car. </p>
<p>The kidnapping victim is taken to the groom’s family home, where the women of the family attempt to talk her into consenting to the marriage. At this stage, some victims are rescued by their father or other male relatives. More often, though, having been kidnapped is so shameful that the victim or her family agrees to marriage rather than risk the stigma of being a “used” woman. </p>
<p>Sometimes, grooms use <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/kyrgyzstan-new-rape-case-highlights-need-for-immediate-action-to-end-appalling-bride-kidnapping-practice/">rape or other physical violence</a> to coerce women to consent to marriage – though that’s not the norm. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Woman holds a drawing depicting a scared woman being taken away in a car" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3746%2C2448&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402882/original/file-20210526-21-uw77qk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Violent bride kidnappings have triggered several protests in Kyrgyzstan in recent years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-holds-a-picture-as-she-attends-a-rally-for-womens-news-photo/1232177367?adppopup=true">Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Many Kyrgyz people, especially those in older generations, still see bride kidnapping as a harmless tradition, according to our interviews. </p>
<p>“It’s a very old custom,” a 60-year-old woman told us. “Even I was married that way, and I’m happy with my family life. My husband never beat me, and everything turned out well.” </p>
<p>People younger than 50 are more likely to reject “ala kachuu,” our research shows, especially when the couple are complete strangers. But they also believe that bride kidnapping is a thing of the past, and that such events today are “pretend” – staged kidnappings. </p>
<p>Several Kyrgyz women confirmed for us that they had agreed to be kidnapped before marriage, to uphold a tradition they see as romantic. </p>
<p>But some kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan are clearly nonconsensual. Since 2018 at least two women, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/09/another-woman-killed-scourge-kyrgyzstan-bride-kidnappings">Aizada Kanatbekova</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/31/young-womans-murder-kyrgyzstan-shows-cost-tradition">Burulai Turdaaly Kyzy</a>, were killed by their kidnappers when they attempted to resist the marriage. </p>
<p>Both murders spawned <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56675201">protests nationally and in their hometowns</a>, some of the largest rallies against bride kidnapping seen in Kyrgyzstan since visible public opposition began in the 1990s. </p>
<h2>Migrating to ‘escape’</h2>
<p><a href="http://forumofwomenngos.kg/ru/women-and-violence/">Kyrgyz women’s rights groups</a> say the line between “pretend” and “real” kidnappings is fuzzy, because a woman can’t truly consent to a kidnapping if she knows her boyfriend can easily disregard her wishes. </p>
<p>The United Nations considers any kind of forced marriage to be a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/MinimumAgeForMarriage.aspx">human rights violation</a>. About 15.4 million people worldwide are wed without giving their free, full and informed consent, according to a <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_575479/lang--en/index.htm">2016 International Labour Organization estimate</a>. </p>
<p>A growing body of <a href="https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol41/20/default.htm">research</a> supports the argument that “ala kachuu” is not a harmless national tradition in Kyrgyzstan. </p>
<p>For example, survey data from Kyrgyzstan finds that the birth weights of the first children born to mothers who married by kidnapping are <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-017-0591-1">significantly lower</a> than those of other first-borns, likely because of higher stress levels among kidnapped mothers. </p>
<p>In Alay district, a rural region of southern Kyrgyzstan, we found that the young adult daughters of parents in a kidnapping-based marriage were 50% more likely to migrate for work, both within Kyrgyzstan and internationally. Our regression analysis controlled for other factors that could push young women to migrate, such as household size, education and wealth. </p>
<p>Survey questions generally cannot distinguish between “pretend” and “real” bride kidnappings, so these findings may understate the negative effects of forced marriage on infant health and migration. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Circular hut constructed of basic materials with a gorgeous mountain backdrop" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402884/original/file-20210526-23-jdkkq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A traditional Kyrgyz house in Sary Tasch village, Alay, Kyrgyzstan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/village-sary-tasch-in-alaj-valley-part-of-pamir-mountain-news-photo/1288033047?adppopup=true">Martin Zwick/REDA&CO/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Based on this research, we believe Kyrgyz women use migration to escape the possibility of being kidnapped themselves.</p>
<h2>Why women leave Kyrgyzstan</h2>
<p>In rural Kyrgyzstan, a young woman’s chances of avoiding a forced marriage depend largely on her parents’ willingness to intervene on her behalf after kidnapping. A girl from a family that began with a bride kidnapping can reasonably surmise that her parents are unlikely to help her. </p>
<p>And since Kyrgyzstan has Central Asia’s highest rates of women’s labor emigration – women make up [40% of all Kyrgyz migrants in Russia], a <a href="https://kyrgyzstan.iom.int/news/current-migration-situation-and-trends-kyrgyzstan">much higher share</a> than those from neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – migration would be a socially acceptable way to move somewhere where kidnapping is rare.</p>
<p>Other researchers have hypothesized that Kyrgyz women migrate at such high rates because of <a href="https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/journals/15644278/32/2/3">their Russian language proficiency and Kyrgyzstan’s less restrictive gender norms</a>. </p>
<p>But bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan seems to play at least as critical a role in this trend. Living in a household headed by a kidnapping-based couple is one of the strongest predictors of women’s migration, our research found. Household size and whether the family owns land are other main factors. </p>
<p>No one we interviewed in Kyrgyzstan mentioned that young women migrated to avoid a forced marriage, nor have we seen this argument made by other academics or the Kyrgyz media. </p>
<p>However, we did find that people commonly described women’s migration in terms of “escape.” </p>
<p>Explaining why his daughter moved to Russia after separating from her abusive husband who married her through kidnapping, one father told us, “A new place and a new life were what she needed.” </p>
<p>Men’s migration, in contrast, is usually spoken of in economic terms. </p>
<p>Women’s migration <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=KG">plays an important economic</a> role in Kyrgyzstan, and many other countries, too. But our research suggests it can be an escape route for women who don’t want to follow their mothers into a forced marriage.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guangqing Chi receives funding from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture and Multistate Research Project.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erin Hofmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In rural Kyrgyzstan, 1 in 3 marriages begins with an abduction. Older generations see this as a harmless tradition, but two brides have been killed since 2018. A study finds other problems, too.Erin Hofmann, Associate Professor, Utah State UniversityGuangqing Chi, Professor, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1482022020-10-21T14:40:40Z2020-10-21T14:40:40ZExplainer: making sense of Kyrgyzstan’s latest political power grab<p>In a dramatic turn of events after ten days of violence that followed Kyrgyzstan’s disputed and later <a href="https://shailoo.gov.kg/ru/news/3702/">annulled parliamentary elections</a>, nationalist politician <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/who-is-who-in-kyrgyzstan-after-the-latest-tumultuous-uprising/30882154.html">Sadyr Japarov</a> has gone from prisoner to prime minister after the ousting of the sitting president, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sooronbai-Jeenbekov">Sooronbay Jeenbekov</a>. </p>
<p>The power grab was orchestrated by a network of nationalist politicians, many them loyal to the previous regime of <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-hollow-regime-collapses">Kurmanbek Bakiev</a>, who was himself driven from power after a violent rebellion swept into the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek in early April 2010. Japarov, who was serving an 11-year sentence for kidnapping, has also assumed the role of acting president after forcing Jeenbekov’s resignation on October 15.</p>
<p>Sitting on China’s western borders, Kyrgyzstan has developed one of the most open and pluralistic – if occasionally volatile – political systems in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-profiles-post-soviet-states">post-Soviet region</a>. This is a country rich in minerals, whose natural resource wealth has failed to translate into better standards of living for its 6.3 million people. In fact, Japarov’s rise to prominence goes back to his early-2010s campaigns for <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/8661">nationalising the Kumtor goldmine</a>, the country’s main source of hard currency and vital contributor to its GDP.</p>
<h2>What happened?</h2>
<p>On October 4 2020 Kyrgyzstan held parliamentary elections. Of the 16 contesting parties only four passed the 7% threshold to make it into the parliament. Three of them were <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/protests-in-kyrgyzstan-follow-parliamentary-election-denounced-as-dirtiest-in-history-by-opposition/">Birimdik</a> (meaning Unity, which included the then president Jeenbekov’s brother on its party list), <a href="https://mekenimkyrgyzstan.kg">Mekenim Kyrgyzstan</a> (meaning My Homeland Kyrgyzstan, bankrolled by businessmen rumoured to have ties to <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/the-matraimov-kingdom/30868683.html">organised crime</a>) and the <a href="https://24.kg/vlast/167283_partiya_kyirgyizstan_15_pobedim_vmeste/">Kyrgyzstan Party</a>, all parties which were reportedly close to Jeenbekov. </p>
<p>The fourth party gaining seats was <a href="http://butun.kg/">Butun Kyrgyzstan</a> (United Kyrgyzstan) led by nationalist politician <a href="https://24.kg/english/167907_Coordination_Council_headed_by_Adakhan_Madumarov_formed_in_Kyrgyzstan_______/">Adakhan Madumarov</a>. The results stood in stark contrast to the mood of the country, where frustration is mounting over the government’s poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>Twice before popular protests have led to the ousting of sitting presidents, first in <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/remembering-kyrgyzstans-revolutions/">2005 and again in 2010</a>, though in both cases initial breakthroughs failed to introduce substantial change – and corruption, cronyism and links with crime remain rampant in politics and the economy.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4mcsdygu9s8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>Chaos, confusion, complexity</h2>
<p>This time, as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-54481063">protests turned violent</a>, power appeared to slip away from Jeenbekov, who signalled his intention to resign as soon as order could be restored. The government disintegrated: former prime minister Kubatbek Boronov resigned on October 6, followed by the speaker of the parliament Dastan Jumabekov. The speaker’s position is especially important as the post-holder takes over in cases of presidential resignation or impeachment. </p>
<p>Kyrgyzstan has experienced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2016.1138286">abrupt descents into violence before</a>, followed by a swift return to stability. What made the October events especially dangerous was the fact that in this multi-cornered fight no single faction appeared strong enough to assert itself and control the situation – at least until very recently. </p>
<p>At one point during the drama there were three self-proclaimed coordination councils supposedly in charge of restoring order in the transitional phase, though it was unclear what the country was transitioning to. </p>
<p>By Sunday 10 October, Japarov’s position appeared to be more solid after a vote by enough members of parliament confirmed his appointment. Although Jeenbekov initially refused to sign off the appointment, <a href="https://24.kg/english/169122_President_Jeenbekov_questions_legitimacy_of_Japarovs_approval_as_Prime_Minister/">questioning the legitimacy and the constitutionality</a> of the parliamentary vote, on 14 October he gave in, paving the way to Japarov’s seizure of power.</p>
<p>But any talk of a fight between the Jeenbekov and Japarov camps is a gross simplification of a more complex reality on the ground. Groups loyal to former president <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kyrgyzstan/History">Almazbek Atambayev</a> (2011-2017) and former prime minister Omurbek Babanov – himself no ally of Atambayev – have opposed both Jeenbekov and Japarov.</p>
<p>A coalition of 13 opposition parties and social movements found itself uneasy with all other factions, and <a href="https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/43129/protests-over-stolen-elections-in-kyrgyzstan?cHash=b34d35f840d29de925c1a9b16277bb47">demanded “lustration”</a> – essentially a purge of elites associated with previous regimes. As well as Bakiev loyalists, Japarov, himself from the eastern provinces, has the backing of a powerful group of southern nationalist politicians.</p>
<p>This power grab has unfolded against a backdrop of very real socioeconomic grievances and growing public frustration with an administration seemingly incapable of handling an extremely serious public health and economic crisis. </p>
<h2>Regional and international response</h2>
<p>The triggers for this year’s unrest are purely domestic – there is no grand geopolitical plan at work somewhere behind these events. Although one remarkable move, prompt in its timing and rare display of unity across the region, was the <a href="https://tashkenttimes.uz/world/5804-mirziyoyev-tokayev-rahmon-and-berdimuhamedov-make-joint-statement-on-kyrgyzstan-event">joint statement</a> by the presidents of the other four Central Asian republics, expressing support for the people of Kyrgyzstan and a swift return to peace and stability – a move that appeared rather noncommittal on the future of Jeenbekov.</p>
<p>The local US embassy <a href="https://intellinews.com/kyrgyzstan-s-president-jeenbekov-resigns-as-us-embassy-warns-of-organised-crime-swaying-nation-s-politics-194254/">publicly expressed its support</a> for the now-ousted president, before lamenting the rampant corruption and role of criminal groups. It is difficult to see what, if anything, the west can currently offer to help.</p>
<p>Beijing has considerable interests in the local minerals sector, and has invested heavily in local infrastructural projects. At £1.38 billion, almost half of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt is with China. Beijing has still to issue a statement on the situation.</p>
<p>The two main security organisations of which Kyrgyzstan is a member state – the <a href="http://eng.sectsco.org">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> (SCO) and the <a href="http://odkb-csto.org">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> (CSTO) have been muted, apart from a generic invitation by the SCO’s secretary general for a peaceful resolution of the situation. </p>
<p>Russia’s initial reaction consisted of the Kremlin’s spokesperson referring to the events as “resembling chaos”. Moscow has plenty on its plate, with months of protests in Belarus and, more dangerously, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. An emissary for Vladimir Putin visited Bishkek on October 13, where he <a href="https://24.kg/english/169115_Jeenbekov_meets_with_Deputy_Head_of_Presidential_Administration_of_Russia/">met with Jeenbekov</a>, emphasising the stabilising role of President Jeenbekov.</p>
<p>Clearly, the Kremlin backed the losing horse. Moscow has long regarded Kyrgyzstan’s competitive political system and its proneness to instability as a source of concern, and will hope that Japorov will be able to assert control swiftly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matteo Fumagalli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Struggling to handle a pandemic and general economic crisis, Kyrgyzstan has just seen its president ousted by an ex-convict as Russia and China watch from the sidelines.Matteo Fumagalli, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1384982020-05-21T13:33:19Z2020-05-21T13:33:19ZHow Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes have used coronavirus to their advantage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336773/original/file-20200521-102632-1s618y9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C10%2C790%2C488&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Business as usual for the Tajik president, Emamoli Rakhmon, at the new year 'Nowruz' celebration in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Press service of the president of Tajikistan.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The authoritarian Central Asian state of Tajikistan <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-finally-confirms-its-first-15-coronavirus-cases">admitted to its first cases of COVID-19</a> in late April. This followed a World Health Organization (WHO) decision to dispatch a team to investigate previous claims that the country was coronavirus-free.</p>
<p>To the west, Tajikistan’s near neighbour Turkmenistan, known as the North Korea of Central Asia, continues <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/10/turkmenistan-coronavirus-pandemic-denial-strongman-berdimuhamedov/">to report no COVID-19 cases</a> and has <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/coronavirus-limits-turkmenistan">avoided use of the word coronavirus</a> as much as possible in order to deter the spread of information about the pandemic. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/coronavirus-turkmenistan-ban-masks-word-a9438266.html">Turkmen police</a> have reportedly arrested citizens found to be discussing coronavirus in public, or wearing protective masks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Belarus – which has earned the moniker of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2QERR5wyks">“Europe’s last dictatorship”</a> – the president, Alexander Lukashenko, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/30/europe/soviet-strongmen-coronavirus-intl/index.html">advocated vodka, hockey, and folk medicine</a> against the virus and in April <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-belarus/nobody-will-die-from-coronavirus-in-belarus-says-president-idUSKCN21V1PK">reassured Belorussians</a> that “nobody will die from coronavirus in our country”. As of May 21, Belarus has already registered more than <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/belarus/">32,000 coronavirus cases and 179 deaths</a>. </p>
<p>Censorship, repression, and disinformation are hardly new strategies for post-Soviet regimes. Just like many of their counterparts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/authoritarians-exploiting-coronavirus-undermine-civil-liberties-democracies/">elsewhere in the world</a>, Central Asia’s authoritarian strongmen have weaponised the pandemic to further consolidate their hold on power – those, that is, who have acknowledged the virus threat in the first place.</p>
<p>Just as COVID-19 has offered opportunities to authoritarian – and would-be authoritarian – leaders, so it also presents significant challenges. Authoritarian rule is sustained by a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">range of tools and mechanisms</a>, from coercion to co-option, but can rarely survive a major crisis without offering something more. Authoritarian regimes often <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/authoritarianism-and-securitization-development-africa">define</a> this “something more” as strength and stability, and this has also been the case during COVID-19. For example, Kazakhstan’s state and state-aligned media has been replete with references to <a href="https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/central_asia/page_211350_central-asia-keeps-up-the-fight-with-covid19">“discipline”</a> in recent weeks.</p>
<p>A global pandemic can play into the hands of authoritarian rulers in this regard, but it can also leave them dangerously exposed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">Data from Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When repression isn’t enough</h2>
<p>In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, authorities have enforced lockdown and quarantine measures in a typical Soviet military style. Soldiers equipped with guns and armoured vehicles are patrolling public spaces and restricting the movement of citizens and traffic between, and within, cities.</p>
<p>In Uzbekistan, the <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/04/06/covid-diary/">General Prosecutor’s office</a> recommended that citizens keep personal diaries of who they meet, when and where. Given the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2020">extensive power of the General Prosecutor’s Office</a>, such a “recommendation” should be perceived by Uzbek citizens as an obligation.</p>
<p>Kazakhstan is actively using <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-experiments-with-surveillance-technology-to-battle-coronavirus-pandemic/">intellectual facial recognition technologies</a> and a video camera system called <em>Sergek</em>, which means “sharp eye” in Kazakh, to catch and fine citizens who violate quarantine restrictions.</p>
<p>The Kazakhstani authorities are planning to introduce a new mobile application, developed by the Ministry of Health Care and local government of Nur-Sultan city, called <a href="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/38384-svoboda-vo-vrema-cp.html">Smart Astana</a> to track physical movement of citizens who are in quarantine. In the context of these Central Asian regimes in particular, the use of such technologies presents a high risk of data abuse and manipulation by the authorities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Entry post to Nur-Sultan city, the capital of Kazakhstan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Saltanat Janenova</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the risks, citizens from Central Asian countries have flooded social media with photos and videos complaining about the devastating conditions in hospitals and <a href="https://cabar.asia/en/i-fear-to-be-infected-how-ca-authorities-meet-and-quarantine-their-citizens/">quarantine facilities</a> within days of the outbreak. Some 170 people being held in quarantine at a former US military base in Kyrgyzstan complained of bad smells, a lack of heating, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-quarantine-quarters-called-horribly-cold-and-dirty-/30499760.html">“horribly cold and dirty” conditions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/kazakh-journalists-harassed-over-covid-19-reporting">Kazakhstan</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/media-restrictions-blow-covid-19-coverage-kyrgyz-journalists-say">Kyrgyzstan</a> and <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-coronavirus-information-lockdown-prompts-questions">Uzbekistan</a> swiftly enforced state of emergency legislation prohibiting photo and video recordings in medical institutions and quarantine facilities. They threatened people who disobeyed with prosecution for “spreading false information”. Some civic activists, bloggers and journalists have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-kazakh-activists-coronavirus-human-rights-economy/30542645.html">already been imprisoned</a> on the same charge. </p>
<h2>Trust issues</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/04/23/life-carries-on-as-usual-in-tajikistan-and-turkmenistan">Tajikistan, Turkmenistan</a> and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/22/belarus-denies-danger-coronavirus-outbreak-football-matches/">Belarus</a>, governments have continued to operate as if business were carrying on as usual. They have denied the pandemic and given a green light to large celebrations such as the New Year (“Nowruz”) celebrations at the end of March in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-feast-in-the-time-of-coronavirus">Tajikistan</a>, World Health Day in April in <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/turkmenistan-celebrates-world-health-day-unwisely/">Turkmenistan</a>, and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52574749">military parade in Belarus</a> in May. </p>
<p>In the absence of a strong government public health response, many <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/05/russias-post-soviet-neighbors-belarus-and-turkmenistan-face-coronavirus-as-leaders-deny-problem-a70188">Turkmens and Belarussians are limiting their contacts</a> and avoiding mass gatherings voluntarily. </p>
<p>More widely, there has been a gradual loss of public trust in Central Asian <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-030-03008-7_55-1">governments’ competence</a> in recent years, resulting from weak policy implementation capacity, rampant corruption, and limited citizen engagement. </p>
<p>In this context, the authoritarian governments in the former Soviet bloc have responded to the pandemic by reinforcing their grip on power even further. Temporary measures introduced during the emergency, such as harsh legislative measures and new surveillance tools, are likely to remain a permanent feature of the new normal. But at the same time, the pandemic has left these regimes dangerously exposed to the risks of rising public discontent unless they take measures to regain the trust of their citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saltanat Janenova is also affiliated with the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher receives research funding from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and WhatsApp (Research Awards for Social Science and Misinformation) and has previously received funding from the AHRC, British Academy, ESRC, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch University, and is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State.</span></em></p>Censorship, repression and disinformation have characterised Central Asian responses to COVID-19.Saltanat Janenova, Teaching Fellow in Public Policy and Management, University of BirminghamJonathan Fisher, Director, International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1311302020-02-06T13:45:06Z2020-02-06T13:45:06ZThe 6 countries in Trump’s new travel ban pose little threat to US national security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313845/original/file-20200205-149802-yx1arb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The new ban applies to citizens of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/american-flags-flag-usa-located-airport-455640031">Ingus Kruklitis/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past two decades, how many people have been killed in the U.S. by extremists from the six countries on the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/">new travel ban</a> list? </p>
<p>The answer is zero, according to <a href="http://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim-american-terrorism/annual-report/">data I have collected</a> from Department of Justice records and other sources. Immigrants from these countries constitute less than 1% of <a href="https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/terrorism/monthlysep19/gui/">terrorism cases</a> in the United States, and none of the cases in the last two years.</p>
<p>The same is true for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-travel-ban-in-numbers-why-families-and-refugees-lose-big-99064">original travel bans</a> imposed in 2017. There were, and still are, zero fatalities in the United States caused by extremists from the countries on those lists, too.</p>
<h2>One attempted attack in decades</h2>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html">new ban</a>, which begins on Feb. 22, citizens of Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania will no longer be able to apply for immigrant visas. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/">The White House says</a> these countries “must satisfy basic security conditions outlined by America’s law-enforcement and intelligence professionals” in order for the ban to be lifted. </p>
<p>However, there is no evidence that immigrants from these six countries pose a national security threat to the United States.</p>
<p>In fact, only one citizen from any of these countries has attempted a terrorist attack in the United States: 11 years ago, a man from Nigeria tried but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab">failed to ignite explosives in his underwear</a> as his flight approached Detroit. Nobody was injured, apart from the would-be bomber. </p>
<p>In recent years, Nigeria has “actively cooperated with the United States and other international partners” to prevent further attacks, according to <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2018/">a State Department report</a> last October. </p>
<p>The new ban wouldn’t have stopped the underwear bomber, in any case, because he was traveling on a tourist visa, and the new ban applies only to immigrant visas.</p>
<p><iframe id="8MMZE" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8MMZE/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Immigrant extremism versus domestic extremism</h2>
<p>Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and many of his administration’s policies have played on the trope of threats posed by <a href="https://vimeo.com/262486734">refugees</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3502556">asylum seekers</a> and other <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919865131">migrants</a>. </p>
<p>However, the administration’s own security agencies view homegrown and domestic terrorism as a greater threat than extremist violence by foreigners. </p>
<p>“We now assess the most predominant terrorist threat to the Homeland to emanate from U.S.-based lone actors,” the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center <a href="https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Travers-2019-11-05.pdf">testified</a> to Congress in November.</p>
<p>For more than a decade, under three administrations, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony">the FBI’s annual briefing</a> on worldwide terrorist threats has rated American extremism as a greater concern than foreign operatives. The director of the FBI repeated this point in <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-oversight-020520">congressional testimony</a> several days after the new travel ban was announced.</p>
<p>The travel ban would not have prevented the country’s deadliest <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2017&end_yearonly=2018&dtp2=all&country=217&charttype=line&chart=overtime&expanded=no&ob=TotalNumberOfFatalities&od=desc#results-tabl">terrorist attacks</a> in recent years, which were committed by right-wing Americans, not immigrants: the anti-immigrant extremist who killed 22 shoppers <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769013051/el-paso-walmart-shooting-suspect-pleads-not-guilty">at a store in El Paso</a>; the white supremacist who killed 17 students and teachers at <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/feature/parkland-florida-school-shooting/">a school in Parkland, Florida</a>; or the anti-Semite who killed 11 worshipers <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting-death-penalty.html">at a synagogue in Pittsburgh</a>.</p>
<p>The travel ban also would not have prevented the most recent attack by a foreign national – the Saudi officer who killed three sailors <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/naval-air-station-pensacola-shooting-called-act-of-terrorism-011320">at a naval air base in Pensacola</a>. The officer did not arrive on an immigrant visa, and the ban specifically exempts Saudi Arabia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313838/original/file-20200205-149796-jrt9vt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport protest the Trump administration’s first travel ban in January 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Travel-Ban-Atlanta/bac2d38253a94dbab6af1bf31f6b0366/61/0">AP Photo/Branden Camp</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Fanning fears</h2>
<p>National security has a special status in government policy – policymakers are given extra leeway on security issues in order to safeguard against existential threats. </p>
<p>A generation ago, during the Cold War, those threats involved nuclear missiles and million-man armies. After 9/11, the primary threat was mass casualty attacks by nongovernmental organizations. Today, fortunately, those threats have diminished to the point that the latest <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf">National Security Strategy</a> of the United States focuses on lone individuals with small arms, homemade explosives, vehicles and knives. </p>
<p>This violence is a concern, but not a leading threat to public safety. Terrorists were responsible for only one-fifth of 1% of the 290,000 murders in the United States since 9/11, according to data from the <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">Global Terrorism Database</a> and the FBI’s <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications">Uniform Crime Reports</a>. The government’s counterterrorism dragnet, involving thousands of agents over many years, has discovered <a href="https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/terrorism/monthlysep19/gui/">fewer and fewer plots</a> in recent years.</p>
<p>Still, many Americans do not feel safe. Half of the respondents in <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/267383/americans-equally-worried-mass-shooting-terrorism.aspx">recent</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023119856825">surveys</a> <a href="https://blogs.chapman.edu/wilkinson/2018/10/16/americas-top-fears-2018/">say</a> they worry about being the victim of a terrorist attack.</p>
<p>Trump’s new travel ban asks Americans to believe that they will be more secure without immigration from Nigeria and five other countries. In my view, that is an insult both to those countries and to the country that calls itself the home of the brave.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Charles Kurzman received funding from the National Institute of Justice for early phases of his research on violent extremism.</span></em></p>Immigrants from Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania constitute less than 1% of terrorism cases in the United States, and none of the cases in the last two years.Charles Kurzman, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel HillLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105022019-03-18T20:44:16Z2019-03-18T20:44:16ZBreeding young men for export in poor countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257070/original/file-20190204-193199-1584lpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Because male migrants earn more money to send back home than females, families in some post-communist countries are strongly tempted to use sex-selective abortion to improve their lives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Johann Walter Bantz/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large-scale migration from the poorest countries of Europe, and parts of Asia, began immediately <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/1989-twenty-years-end-communism-and-fate-eastern-europe">following the collapse of communism in 1990.</a></p>
<p>State pensions and public health provisions are paltry in these countries, and domestic job opportunities scarce.</p>
<p>That means the migration of young people has become an important part of household survival strategies as younger family members leave and then send wages back home. Those wages are known as “remittance” income. </p>
<p><a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf">The majority of all international migrants are male</a>. The reasons for this may be partly cultural and partly economic. </p>
<p>Male migrants generally earn higher wages. And there’s some evidence that reality is serving as an incentive for families in these struggling economies to use <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/gender-biased-sex-selection">sex-selective abortion to try to improve their lives.</a></p>
<h2>Sons responsible for their parents</h2>
<p>The lack of domestic jobs in post-communist countries makes bearing sons even more important to the security of parents as they age. Even before international migration was possible, responsibility for aging parents resided with adult sons. </p>
<p>And so in the absence of functioning social security and health systems, and with the lack of local jobs, the motivation for bearing sons has undoubtedly increased. </p>
<p>In fact, among women aged 40 and older in 2002, 40 per cent had at least one son living abroad. My calculations, using data from the Albania Institute of Statistics and the 2012 World Bank Living Standards Monitoring Survey, suggest that each additional male birth increases <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283200">the number of sons residing abroad by about 0.18 per cent</a> </p>
<p>The data also show that more than 50 per cent of women with sons abroad had received remittances in the previous year. Only 23 per cent of daughters residing abroad had sent wages back home.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Albanian university students protest outside the education ministry in Tirana in December 2018 demanding lower tuition fees and a bigger education budget. Increasing numbers of male babies are being born in the eastern European nation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/ Hektor Pustina)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Within migrant-sending countries, the availability of prenatal technology and sex-selection abortion has made the economic incentives to bear sons more apparent. </p>
<p>Masculinized sex ratios at birth have been well-documented for <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00513.x">Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia</a>, <a href="https://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(11)00013-2/pdf">for Nepal</a> and for Albania, where increasing numbers of male babies are being born into both Christian and Muslim families.</p>
<h2>Male-to-female birth ratio not typical</h2>
<p>In both more traditional and tribal Albanian regions of the country, and in its urbanized central and south regions, there are more male births than the biological norm of 105:100 male-to-female live births. According to the 2011 census, the ratio for children under five was 109 boys to 100 girls, while the ratio for children aged five to nine was 119:100.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2016 photo, a woman breaks down after seeing the body of her son, a migrant worker who died in his sleep in a village in Nepal. The number of Nepali workers going abroad has more than doubled since the country began promoting foreign labour in recent years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>International migration and increased household size also appear to be household survival strategies that transcend cultures, religion and recent economic history.</p>
<p>And the prevalence of multiple generations living in one household appears to be common to countries that are receiving lots of remittance income. </p>
<p>Nepal, for example, does not share the recent communist history of some eastern European or mid-Asian countries, but it also has both a high fraction of GDP from remittance income (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">28.3 per cent in 2017)</a>) and a high number of multiple-generation households. </p>
<p>More than 95 per cent of Nepalis <a href="https://nepal.iom.int/jupgrade/images/stories/CoM/LabourMigration_for_Employment-A_%20StatusReport_for_Nepal_201516201617_Eng.PDF">obtaining permits to migrate are male</a>. Remittance income in 2017 was greater than the sum of official development assistance and foreign direct investment.</p>
<p>The economic motives for son preference, therefore, appear to trump religious and cultural considerations. As mentioned, wages of unskilled males, after all, are much higher in destination countries than at home.</p>
<h2>Brides live with in-laws</h2>
<p>The trend underscores the difficult lives of women in countries that are reliant on remittance income from the boys and men who have gone abroad.</p>
<p>Cultural norms that dictate brides go live with the family of their new husbands are particularly strong in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596712000881">Albania, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan</a>. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, young men leave to work in Russia within months of marrying. The newlywed bride resides with the young groom’s parents and bears responsibility for most domestic <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233715176_Tajik_Male_Labour_Migration_and_Women_Left_Behind_Can_They_Resist_Gender_and_Generational_Hierarchies">tasks in the new household</a>. But remittance money is sent by the young man to his parents, not to his wife.</p>
<p>Daughters <a href="https://glm-lic.iza.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/glmlic-wp040.pdf">seldom work,</a> and are not welcomed back into their birth homes in the <a href="http://www.iom.tj/pubs/abandoned_wives_English.pdf">event of divorce</a>. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00305.x">Children receive relatively little schooling, since resources are focused on the oldest generations.</a></p>
<h2>Why is this happening?</h2>
<p>Nearly 30 years after market liberalization began, most post-communist countries have failed to create environments in which private sector employment thrives. </p>
<p>As a result, remittances from international migration remain a major source of household income. Household members are sent abroad to provide a steady flow of international currency to support those remaining. </p>
<p>Wage gaps among the countries in the region are a key driver for international migration. Wages are much higher in nearby Russia than in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example. They are also much higher in Italy and Greece than in Albania. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters, one of them holding a Kyrgyz national flag, are seen during a protest in Barskoon, Kyrgyzstan in 2013. Hundreds of protesters stormed the office of the Kumtor gold mine run by a Canadian-based company, demanding its nationalization and more social benefits.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Abylay Saralayev)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2013, remittances reached a high of 49 per cent of <a href="https://www.news.tj/en/news/world-bank-tajikistan-world-s-most-remittance-dependent-country">GDP in Tajikistan</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, Kyrgyzstan was the country most dependent on remittances. Nearly 33 per cent of the country’s 2017 GDP came from this <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">this source</a>. And in Albania from 2008-2017, remittances averaged <a href="https://www.bankofalbania.org/rc/doc/Remitancat_Revista_eng_12103.pdf">9.1 per cent of GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Migration and remittances provide many benefits to receiving households and countries. Migrants provide insurance against shocks to household income, such as poor harvests or illness of household members. As well, they improve the spending power of remaining household members.</p>
<h2>Eases pressure to create jobs</h2>
<p>But there are several less desirable effects of reliance on remittance income. Governments are less pressed to create jobs, for example. Those who might foment unrest — young unemployed males — are outside the country. They’re not around to participate in protests to demand better living conditions and job opportunities.</p>
<p>Remittances are not often spent on investments in children’s education or to start up new businesses in home countries. Instead, the money largely goes to housing and the purchase of imported goods. This does not create long-run growth or generate tax revenue for the construction of social safety nets.</p>
<p>The value of remittances varies with economic and political conditions in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-national-bank-governor-analyzes-effects-of-russian-downturn">migrant-receiving countries</a>. As well, migration may have major demographic consequences.</p>
<p>The nature of markets for unskilled labour is likely important. For example, female Tajik migrants in Russia are concentrated in low-paying service industry jobs. To take such jobs, they must speak Russian. Males are concentrated in the construction sector, where Russian language knowledge is less essential, and wages much higher.</p>
<h2>How the West can affect change</h2>
<p>Through tax-financed contributions to organizations including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, western nations can support policies that reduce reliance on migration. </p>
<p>Institutional environments that foster private sector job creation may both reduce the importance of international remittances and increase the relative status of women in society. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/696073">evidence from Vietnam</a> that changes in local labour market conditions may also change attitudes towards female children. </p>
<p>As a condition of concessional international loans, the boards of international organizations should press hard for reforms that will create jobs domestically. </p>
<p>Breeding young men for export has never been and should never be a successful economic development strategy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Grogan receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p>Breeding young men for export has never been a successful economic development strategy. Policies that improve local labour market opportunities could increase the status of women.Louise Grogan, Professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/853462017-10-24T09:27:43Z2017-10-24T09:27:43ZKyrgyzstan: migrant women workers and a ‘lost generation’ of children<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/191026/original/file-20171019-1045-x4r4nt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kyrgyz women have gradually replaced men in various tasks, at home but also as migrant labourers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Asel Murzakolova</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Dilya-eje, a secondary school teacher in the border village of Samarkandek, Kyrgyzstan, often visits the houses of her neighbourhood to record the children who should attend school the next year. She always indicates the status of their parents in her notebook. More than half of the parents are labelled as <a href="http://iom.kg/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Migration-Profile-Extended-Kyrgyzstan-Rus-2010-2015.pdf">migrants</a>. </p>
<p>When men migrate, women take on the usual male roles: today most agricultural labour in the villages is done by women. But in Kyrgyzstan there are also a high number of women migrants. <a href="http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/labour/">In 2016, women accounted for about 40%</a> of total Kyrgyz labour migrants to Russia. Some are divorced or married women and some are very young girls who begin to earn money just after graduating from high school. Women migrating to Russia are usually employed in the service sector. </p>
<p>Because of these trends, traditional notions of femininity and masculinity are now often in conflict. Despite the fact that these women are sometimes the main source of income in their families, they have to face misogynistic behaviour – and violence. </p>
<h2>‘A real woman is willing do housekeeping’</h2>
<p>Labour migration is always accompanied by a dichotomy between economic benefits and social consequences. </p>
<p>According to a 2016 <a href="http://kyrgyzstan.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/GSPS_english.pdf">United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) survey in Kyrgyzstan</a>, migrant women face deep contempt when returning home.</p>
<p>Among 6,000 households interviewed, it was found that more than half of respondents (51% of women and 61% of men) believe that a “wife’s career is less important than the career of her husband”. Meanwhile, 43% of men and 38% of women felt that a “woman’s work has negative impact on family and children”. Most respondents agreed that “a real woman is willing do housekeeping - it is a pleasure for her”.</p>
<p>Women returning from labour migration also face problems of reintegration into the family and alienation of children. At the same time, <a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp6293.pdf">studies</a> have shown that remittances home are mostly spent on regular consumption, such as food, medicines and clothes. Large amounts of savings go towards buying the likes of homes or cars.</p>
<p>It is difficult to trace what part of the remittances are made by migrant women, but it should be noted that migrants from Kyrgyzstan transferred an average annual amount of <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI11KGA156NWDB">a third of the country’s GDP</a> between 2012 and 2014.</p>
<h2>Independence and experience</h2>
<p>Despite the negative public attitude to women’s labour migration, it helps many women to gain financial independence and gain experience of making their own choices of partner, budget, and investments which they could not do in traditional rural patriarchal communities from which they mostly come. Labour migration also remains the most accessible way of socialisation for them.</p>
<p>Migration transforms gender relations in modern Kyrgyz society, in which the Soviet emancipation of women, the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1006/reli.1999.0173">renaissance of Islam</a> and capitalism compete in forming a new national identity.</p>
<p>Today, such changes are perceived as a threat by many Kyrgyz men, some of whom turn to violence. This new environment has allowed the emergence of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-migrant-women-brutally-assaulted-in-patriotic-videos/24599390.html">nationalistic Kyrgyz male groups called “Patriots”</a>, who form “moral police” to pursue Kyrgyz women who lead what they regard as an immoral lifestyle in Russia.</p>
<p>According to the UNFPA survey, such actions are supported by a majority of the Kyrgyz population: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>over half of the respondents support the work of nationalist organisations … stripping, raping them [the migrant women] and uploading their photos and ‘punishment’ videos for bad behaviour. At the same time, 22% of women and 26% of men do not consider it immoral for a man to create a new family in migration, if he continuously takes care of the first family left behind in his country of origin.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Criticism was only concentrated in the circle of the liberal minority. </p>
<p>“What the girls are blamed for is the result of poverty and marginalisation. But no one has the right to give a moral assessment of their behaviour. If these guys were real patriots, then they would … help them find jobs, look for housing”, <a href="https://24.kg/archive/ru/community/129788-marazm-ura-patriotov.html/">claimed Nurgul Asylbekova, an United Nations Development Programme representative</a>. </p>
<p>Beyond attacks, the underlining issue is a public conflict about what a Kyrgyz woman should be, and what it means to be a Kyrgyz man. It reveals a deep fracture in Kyrzgyz society.</p>
<h2>Hostages of a patriarchal culture</h2>
<p>The country as a whole has a high level of violence against women: <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/28/call-me-when-he-tries-kill-you/state-response-domestic-violence-kyrgyzstan">nearly one-third of women and girls, age 15-49 face violence</a>. In this context, violence against migrant women does not seem to be anything outrageous.</p>
<p>Husbands of migrant women are also hostages of patriarchal Kyrgyz culture. Childcare and household management lowers their social status in society. They also, experience pressure in their communities. As a result, public condemnation mixed with physical separation often leads to the disintegration of the women’s families.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that there are more than 15,000 registered NGOs in a country of <a href="http://stat.kg/media/publicationarchive/469a3c9e-4229-4e67-9d4a-a88947a21e93.pdf">six million people</a>, none specifically addresses the problems faced by migrant women. Most migrant women who return home need employment, psychological aid and medical care.</p>
<p>It is obvious that female migration in Kyrgyzstan is not a temporary phenomenon. The teacher, Dilya-eje, uses her own definition for migrant children: “a lost generation”. Such a definition does not exist in the language of the government, international organisations and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan. Women’s migration is still an invisible phenomena. Yet an open public debate is needed to address the new gender order and the deep societal changes that are fostered by migration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85346/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asel Murzakulova was an expert of the UN-Women national research "Gender in the society perception study" (2016)</span></em></p>Traditional notions of femininity and masculinity are in conflict, resulting in a surge of violence against Kyrgyz women.Asel Murzakulova, Senior Research Fellow, Mountain Societies Research Institute, University of Central Asia Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757222017-04-05T13:16:45Z2017-04-05T13:16:45ZWhy China’s $1 trillion new Silk Road plan is being greeted coolly by the West<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163873/original/image-20170404-5725-jxkgva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A bridge too far?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/two-words-china-europe-united-by-135128720?src=5Bf5oxzjnZe_-wcNh3H1-A-1-18">sibgat</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing is gearing up for a major diplomatic offensive in May as it welcomes Vladimir Putin among 20 international leaders for <a href="http://english.cctv.com/2017/01/17/ARTIdF912TLb6wOkkYQNBoTg170117.shtml">a summit</a> on building a “new Silk Road” to bring China closer to the world. This is the One Belt, One Road project – the centrepiece of Chinese international engagement. </p>
<p>It involves a US$1 trillion (£804 billion) <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">mega-investment</a> to transform China’s transport and trade links through Eurasia and South-East Asia. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">The aim</a> is for China to become a global pillar of trade and free markets and secure its place as a 21st-century superpower. </p>
<p>So far, however, no Western leaders have confirmed their attendance at the summit. What should we read into this, and what does it mean for the success of the project?</p>
<p>One Belt, One Road was <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml">unveiled by</a> Chinese president Xi Jinping four years ago. It aims to increase the country’s influence at a time when Europe is still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis and the US is revising its role as promoter of economic liberalism under the Trump administration. </p>
<p>The project has two strands – “one road”, which is road and rail connections, and “one belt”, which is about the sea. The sea element is focused on everything from a <a href="http://www.aninews.in/newsdetail-MTY/MzA2MTcw/china-039-s-one-belt-one-road-policy-picks-up-pace.html">harbour development</a> in Malaysia to a new free trade agreement <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">with New Zealand</a>, while the land part has primarily focused on Central Asia as the most realistic route to Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unlocking Central Asia</h2>
<p>China’s routes through five former Soviet states are currently beset with border delays, hefty customs fees, poor roads and railways, and formidable geographic hurdles – notably mountain ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. </p>
<p>There should also be benefits to these landlocked republics from tackling these difficulties. Better links to Europe and the Middle East and potential access to seaports point to greater trading opportunities and extra revenues from transit fees to and from China. Each republic has been enthusiastic about participating, and there have so far been <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">railway lines completed</a> from China to Iran and Afghanistan via the region. </p>
<p>Other planned investments include a <a href="http://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/174939-news24.html/">new highway</a> connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan and a <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2016-07/21/content_38929557.htm">highway</a> between it and Uzbekistan. There is also the “Angren-Pap” <a href="http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infrastructure/single-view/view/two-presidents-open-angren-pap-railway.html">railway tunnel</a> in Uzbekistan, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2422311.html">gas pipeline</a> and the “Dushanbe-Kulyab-Khorog-Kulma-Karokurum” <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/tajik-leader-in-china-building-roads/">highway</a> in Tajikistan. </p>
<p>China’s diplomatic relations with the republics are very warm – in some cases more so than those of Russia, which can sometimes behave like the overlord it once was. Yet problems may loom for One Belt, One Road all the same. </p>
<p>Investments may be slowed down by unfinished border demarcation and disputes in several unsettled areas, especially between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is also a cautious and sometimes hostile attitude towards Chinese migrants and workers from local people, especially <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103">in Kazakhstan</a>. This is a potential problem given that the price of investment from Beijing is often Chinese companies winning contracts and supplying labour and equipment. </p>
<p>The Chinese may therefore have to extend their diplomatic efforts to Central Asian people more generally. The leaders of the five republics may also need to be more transparent with their citizens about how they plan to carry One Belt, One Road forward, contrary to the frequently opaque business operations in the region. </p>
<p>Russia is closely interested despite hosting no initiatives to date. Relations between China and Russia tend to be “coldly cordial”, turning on mutual support on some international issues such as Syria, and peaceful coexistence in Eurasia. </p>
<p>Chinese investments in Central Asia are a potential flashpoint, since Russia keeps Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-mulls-eeu-feels-pull-of-russia/27893070.html">soon Tajikistan</a> in its orbit through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia can benefit from improved connectivity and therefore stability in the region, but it wants guarantees that One Belt, One Road won’t undermine the economic relevance of the EEU. </p>
<p>Russia and China adopted a <a href="http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-Construction-of-Joint-Eurasian-Economic-Union-and-the-Silk-Road-Projects/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3ABV.htm">joint statement</a> on EEU and Silk Road projects in 2015, but it was vague and cautious. The Chinese will be pleased that Putin is attending next month’s summit, but his enthusiastic backing would be better. </p>
<h2>The Western dimension</h2>
<p>The EU has been remarkably silent on One Belt, One Road. This is despite the project’s obvious geopolitical and economic importance – trade with China <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2016/04/01/content_281475318738444.htm">was</a> US$593 billion in 2015 – and the existence of a <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2258_en.htm">EU-China Connectivity Platform</a>. Europe’s attitude can partly be explained by Brexit; rising nationalism in several European states; compatibility with European labour norms and standards; the still unclear degree of Chinese companies’ involvement; and the general distraction of the eurozone crisis. </p>
<p>The EU also seems unable to speak with a single voice to China, with member states usually preferring bilateralism or <a href="http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/161-framework-and-economic-relations-between-china-and-ceec/">sub-regional frameworks</a> of cooperation. And from an economic point of view, One Belt, One Road is potentially a double-edged sword. Connectivity should benefit everyone, but more competitive Chinese goods flooding Europe is a potential threat unless EU members can coordinate their response. Increased connectivity may also encourage illegal traffickers, organised crime and counterfeiters. </p>
<p>Other Western nations have been lukewarm, too. When New Zealand <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">announced</a> its involvement with One Belt, One Road last month, it was one of few Western states to have done so (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-hungary-idUSKBN0ON01W20150607">Hungary</a> and the <a href="http://www.czech.cz/cz/Aktuality/Czech-Republic-and-China-ink-investment-boosting-m">Czech Republic</a> are on board). <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e30f3122-0eae-11e7-b030-768954394623">Australia declined</a> to follow suit, despite a visit from the Chinese premier on the same trip. </p>
<p>Evidently China still has much work to do to persuade the world of the merits of its big initiative. Political and security issues could yet prove insurmountable unless Beijing can win round neighbours and major rivals alike. </p>
<p>This will need both political and diplomatic patience, and next month’s summit is more likely to be about bridge building than major new announcements. The irony is that while One Belt One Road is aimed at facilitating infrastructure and connectivity, its implementation looks like a long and very bumpy road.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filippo Costa Buranelli is affiliated with the Higher Education Academy.</span></em></p>China’s One Belt, One Road initiative is holding international summit in Beijing, but no Western leaders have said they are coming yet.Filippo Costa Buranelli, Lecturer, International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/544242016-04-11T13:29:03Z2016-04-11T13:29:03ZHow big a threat is Islamic State in Central Asia?<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is seen as a growing threat throughout much of the world, its influence extending to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-islamic-state-is-moving-its-egyptian-battle-from-sinai-to-cairo-46439">North Africa</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/catch-up-why-islamic-state-targeted-paris-and-why-its-changing-tack-50731">Europe</a>, and even as far as <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-attacks-is-islamic-states-presence-in-south-east-asia-overstated-52735">Indonesia</a>. Yet for the post-Soviet Central Asian republics the potential consequences of the rise of radical Islamism are not clear.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/jihads-new-frontier-tajikistan.html?_r=4">For some</a>, IS is simply the latest version of the “Islamic threat” to Central Asian security. The <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2015/europe/syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx">International Crisis Group</a>, for example, links growing support for violent extremism with the last few decades’ <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/19/reviving-central-asia-s-religious-ties-with-indian-subcontinent-jamaat-al-tabligh">Islamic revival</a> in Central Asia. Others in the media <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/how-many-tajik-isis-recruits-were-arrested-in-turkey/">have been more sceptical</a> about the influence of IS in the region, and the attitude of some Western officials has, more than anything, been rather <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73836">cheerful</a>. </p>
<p>Yet Central Asian governments have continued to use the “war on terror” as an excuse to <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74061">crack down on opposition</a>, whether Islamic or otherwise. Oppressive security policies towards Islam in Central Asia are often just short-sighted “fixes” that do little to address the long-term structural problems, and if anything, only aggravate them. In their attempts to deal with perceived threats to civil stability, Central Asian governments may actually end up deepening the very problem they seek to resolve.</p>
<h2>What is the threat?</h2>
<p>Very little is known about IS’s involvement in the countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. What we hear is often alarming, or perhaps alarmist.</p>
<p>Kyrgyz authorities cite a raid they mounted on the home of alleged terrorists in July 2015 as <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74326">evidence of an IS cell in the capital, Bishkek</a>. The recent defection to IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tajikistan/11636529/Missing-Tajikistan-police-chief-defects-to-the-Islamic-State.html">of Tajik special forces commander</a>, Gulmorod Khalimov, was also understood as an example of “radicalisation”. While the full context of these events has not been made clear, it’s doubtful that they indicate a broad trend of IS activity in the region. In the case of Khalimov, at least, his defection was probably more tied to his falling out <a href="http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2015/05/31/halimov/">with the regime</a> than to any jihadist conviction.</p>
<p>Estimates of the number of Central Asians recruited by IS vary. Most are <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">migrant labourers</a> with little religious background, recruited from Russia and other intermediary countries. Unlike wealthier Muslims in Europe and in neighbouring Middle Eastern states, in remote Central Asian villages, where the internet is less accessible, residents have less opportunity to join IS.</p>
<h2>Why are Central Asians joining IS?</h2>
<p>Despite limited opportunities and their small numbers, the Central Asian recruits who have joined the extremist group deserve attention. </p>
<p>The absence of widespread political violence in Central Asia since the 1990s may explain why recruitment is lower in this region than in the Middle East and North Africa, where war and brutality have been common features for many years. But violence is more than physical. Threats to a person’s ethnic and gender identity and to their daily survival can be, and have been, just as much of an incentive. </p>
<p>There also appears to be a link between domestic violence and sympathy for violent extremism, which is particularly visible in the highly <a href="https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/2b68cbff89b84558b78ffe9fe4b2a250/semiotics-forced-marriages-domestic-violence--final-report.pdf">patriarchal societies</a> that prevail in much, but not all, of Central Asia.</p>
<p>This points to another crucial factor, which is altogether more personal, more gendered and probably more important: feelings of alienation and exclusion. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32960340">Noah Tucker</a>, who has surveyed the social media accounts of Uzbek IS recruits, notes that “young people who go want to belong to something bigger than themselves, often in a situation in which they feel isolated and alone. They are looking for meaning in their lives, for something significant to be a part of.” In many cases, rather than a gradual process of becoming more and more religious, the shift in opinion to support of jihad occurs rapidly.</p>
<h2>The politics of counter-radicalisation</h2>
<p>It seems that IS’ political ideas about the repression of Muslims, at home and abroad, are more important for many <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">Central Asian recruits</a> than its religious beliefs and practices. The political ideas of IS can be held by someone with little or no knowledge of Islamic moral code and with no commitment to its practice in prayer, worship or other rituals. </p>
<p>This distinction between politics and religion – a distinction found neither in the extremist ideology itself, nor in much secular analysis of it — is narrow but important. The existence of this distinction is crucial to make sense of why IS attracts many Muslims, and even some non-Muslims, with little or no knowledge of Islam.</p>
<p>The politics of counter-radicalisation are far more significant than radicalisation itself to Central Asia, which has, so far, been free of IS-inspired terror attacks. Authoritarian governments in the region have increasingly used the hysteria surrounding IS as a pretext to crack down on their non-violent religious and political opponents. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, for example, the country’s only real opposition party, the Islamic Revival Party (IRPT), was banned and its leaders charged with terrorism offences in September 2015. And then in January 2016, the <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76696">IRPT’s</a> exiled leader travelled to Iran and met with the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. At first glance, this supposed connection with violent extremism and move to associate with the regime in Iran, widely <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/un-summit-isis-iran-not-invited-state-sponsor-terrorism-label">condemned as a state sponsor of terror groups</a>, may seem like evidence of radicalisation – but in reality, the IRPT (very moderate Sunni) and Khameini (a highly conservative Shia) don’t share much religious common ground.</p>
<p>Even so, it is bad news for Central Asia that political and religious opposition can only exist in exile, and with foreign support. Central Asia’s counter-radicalisation policies may end up being a greater threat to democracy than IS-inspired radicalisation itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Heathershaw receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK and the British Council in the USA. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Montgomery has received funding from American Councils, IREX, and the British Council.
He is affiliated with CEDAR--Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion. </span></em></p>Islamic State has been spreading its influence beyond the Middle East – and Central Asia could be in the firing line.John Heathershaw, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of ExeterDavid W. Montgomery, Visiting Scholar at the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490342015-10-14T05:29:18Z2015-10-14T05:29:18ZWhat are Russia’s grand designs in Central Asia?<p>While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">involved</a> in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.</p>
<p>Even before the shock of the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-city-of-kunduz-largely-under-taliban-control-1443447706">Taliban occupation of Kunduz</a> in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia’s large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/isis-trained-russians-foiled-moscow-terror-attack">uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow</a> apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.</p>
<p>Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia’s southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings – the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> (CSTO) and the <a href="http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> (SCO).</p>
<p>The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/07/us-russia-tajikistan-defence-idUSKCN0S10TT20151007">more attack helicopters</a> to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-far-outpost-of-great-powers/27141036.html">well-developed defence system</a> against cross-border infiltration.</p>
<h2>Crisis and opportunity</h2>
<p>Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia’s security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I <a href="https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18208/Lewis%20Russia%20and%20Kyrgyzstan%202015.pdf?sequence=1">explored in a recent paper</a>, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.</p>
<p>If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/4058733/Uzbekistan_s_challenging_withdrawal_from_the_CSTO">pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow’s embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently <a href="http://www.uzmetronom.com/2015/10/07/tovarishhi_po_oruzhiju.html">paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007</a>.</p>
<p>There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan’s heavily censored press. Instead, the <a href="http://www.ng.ru/cis/2015-10-08/1_ashabad.html">newpapers led on a summit</a> with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Friends reunited</h2>
<p>Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">to share experiences of “fighting terrorism”</a>. If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia’s general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75486">broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia</a> from the south.</p>
<p>Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region – with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran – and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.</p>
<p>More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow’s new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a “<a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en">Greater Eurasia</a>”, linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China. </p>
<p>This may be just another of Russia’s historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council project 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia'.</span></em></p>A renewed security focus on Afghanistan is part of Vladimir Putin’s plan to re-energise Russia’s vision of a ‘Greater Eurasia’.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.