tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/military-drones-77125/articlesMilitary drones – The Conversation2024-02-03T13:35:03Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226952024-02-03T13:35:03Z2024-02-03T13:35:03ZUS launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria − a national security expert explains the message they send<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573164/original/file-20240202-17-gyzhww.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Joe Biden attends the arrival of the remains of three U.S. service members killed in a drone attack in Jordan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-attends-the-dignified-transfer-of-the-news-photo/1973658835?adppopup=true">Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The United States mounted more than 125 retaliatory strikes against Iranian forces and Iranian-backed militias at seven military sites in Iraq and Syria on Feb. 2, 2024, after a drone strike <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-three-us-service-members-killed-drone-attack-us-forces-jordan-2024-01-28/">killed three U.S. soldiers</a> and injured 34 more in Jordan on Jan. 28.</em> </p>
<p><em>The retaliatory strikes, <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria/">which U.S. military officials say hit 85 targets, including command</a> and control operations centers, intelligence centers and munition supply chain facilities, are the latest chapter in the Middle East conflict, which President Joe Biden has tried to avoid escalating.</em></p>
<p><em>Biden announced on Jan. 30 that he had decided how to respond to the drone strike that killed the soldiers and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75WsnYkuTlI">said</a>, “I don’t think we need a wider war in the Middle East.” The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68063741">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, while Iran denied any direct involvement in it.</em> </p>
<p><em>The U.S. retaliatory strikes happened hours after the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-witness-return-remains-us-soldiers-killed-jordan-2024-02-02/">remains of the American soldiers</a> were returned to the U.S.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. spoke with <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/profile/gregory-treverton/">Gregory Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to understand the strategic thinking behind this retaliatory attack.</em> </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A satellite image shows a cleared area in a desert with beige and grey buildings, seen from high in the sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573167/original/file-20240203-21-258l39.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=535&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A satellite image from 2022 shows Tower 22, the U.S. military base where three U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more were wounded on Jan. 28, 2024, in a drone strike by an Iranian-backed militia group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/maxar-satellite-imagery-of-tower-22-which-houses-a-small-news-photo/1963648340?adppopup=true">Satellite image (c) 2024 Maxar Technologies</a></span>
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<h2>What are some of the factors that likely played a role in the US deciding to launch a retaliatory strike and when to launch it?</h2>
<p>Regarding timing, the president may have wanted to get the bodies of the service people who were killed in Jordan back home and give some time for everyone to think. In the last few days, we saw that Iran and Iraq did put pressure on some of the proxy groups to wind down their operations. In one case, one of these Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/30/middleeast/kataib-hezbollah-suspend-military-ops-us-intl/index.html">agreed to cease operations</a> this last week. Iran also said that they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/01/31/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news">do not want a wider war</a> with the U.S. </p>
<p>With the time it took Biden to authorize the strike, it also gave the Iranian soldiers and others time to move out of harm’s way, if they wanted to leave the military bases. </p>
<p>More strategically, Biden already committed earlier this week to make some kind of response, and he was under all kinds of political pressure to do something. But he still appears to be trying to avoid further escalating the conflict.</p>
<p>Biden, for example, avoided striking Iranian territory directly, though some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-pressure-biden-to-strike-iran-directly-after-deadly-drone-strike/">Republicans had pressured</a> him to do so. </p>
<h2>Iran says it wants to avoid a war with the US. But its proxy group just struck a US military base. Does that imply some sort of internal friction there?</h2>
<p>In our own country’s experience with proxy groups, we know that they have their own interests, and there are also the interests that we share. Sometimes, proxy groups that the U.S. has backed act in a way we don’t like and are just in their own interest. These proxy relationships are always complicated, in that sense. </p>
<p>Even if Iran wants to avoid further escalation with the U.S., my guess is that many of these groups would not mind a broader conflict happening, if their goals are more apocalyptic, such as destroying Israel. </p>
<h2>What do these retaliatory strikes accomplish?</h2>
<p>I think they accomplish fulfilling the Biden administration’s commitment to do something significant and respond to the drone strike killing U.S. soldiers. The response itself is measured enough so far that it is unlikely to escalate the conflict dramatically, though we could be surprised by that. </p>
<p>Overall, it is a calibrated measure that plainly is not going to entirely degrade the military capacity of any of these groups. But it should still have a pretty significant effect and weaken their military capabilities, at least to some extent. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms carry a casket draped in an American flag on a grey day. President Joe Biden stands nearby in a dark jacket." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573162/original/file-20240202-19-xitmbb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">On Feb. 2, 2024, U.S. President Joe Biden watches as U.S. Army soldiers carry the remains of Army Sgt. Kennedy Sanders, who was killed in a drone strike in Jordan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/army-carry-team-moves-a-flagged-draped-transfer-case-news-photo/1980832024?adppopup=true">Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>What else is most important to understand about these retaliatory strikes?</h2>
<p>The wider context here is that the U.S. strikes make it all the more important to get to some cease-fire in Gaza. At least then, these proxy forces would lose that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-iranian-backed-militias-do-political-signaling">rationale – of Israel’s attacks</a> on Gaza – to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bolsters-defenses-around-jordan-base-as-it-readies-response-to-drone-attack/7468786.html">justify what they are doing</a>. </p>
<p>It seems to me we are still seeing no real sign from the Israelis of a sense of an endgame in this war. We presume that the Israeli government is thinking about some way to reform the Palestinian Authority or consider some coalition of Arab states, maybe the U.S. and European countries, to govern Gaza once the war ends. But we have not seen any sign of that publicly. </p>
<p>So, as long as the war continues in Gaza and as long as Palestinians are being killed, these proxy groups see this as their only way to respond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US attacks on military sites in Iraq and Syria are unlikely to further escalate conflict in the Middle East, he writes.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067972023-06-01T13:44:45Z2023-06-01T13:44:45ZMoscow drone attacks are a morale booster for Ukraine and a warning for Russia – here’s why<p>A wave of approximately 30 drones <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-do-we-know-about-ukraines-drone-strike-moscow-2023-05-30/">appeared</a> in skies around the Russian capital, Moscow, on May 30. Though widely sensationalised as a major attack against the heart of the Russian government, they caused only <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65753825">minor damage</a>, mostly to high-rise buildings.</p>
<p>These drones were not intended to cause major destruction. Rather, they were meant to send a message that Ukraine – which has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/d6ab357a-feb2-11ed-be2d-6982544ae552">not claimed</a> responsibility for the strikes – has both the capacity and will to strike back at the capital of its enemy invader.</p>
<p>Although different in scale, this is not the first such strike against Moscow. In early May, Russia alleged that Ukraine had targeted Vladimir Putin with a drone strike, which Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, promptly <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65471904">denied</a>. And Ukraine is thought to have been behind a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-drones-are-transforming-the-conflict-bringing-russia-on-to-the-frontline-196229">drone strikes against airbases</a> in Russia’s Kursk, Saratov and Ryazan regions, up to 300 miles inside Russian territory.</p>
<p>More recently, the Russian defence ministry <a href="https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12468312@egNews">claimed</a> that a Ukrainian drone attack on one of its spy ships the Black Sea, the Ivan Khurs, had failed. There have also been drone strikes against Russian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-drone-sparks-fire-russian-refinery-governor-2023-05-31/">oil pipelines and refineries</a> including near the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/fire-oil-refinery-russias-krasnodar-likely-caused-by-drone-governor-2023-05-31/">crucial</a> oil export hub for Russia. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-drone-attack-on-kremlin-logic-suggests-a-false-flag-to-distract-russians-ahead-of-victory-day-on-may-9-204960">Ukraine war: drone 'attack' on Kremlin – logic suggests a false flag to distract Russians ahead of Victory Day on May 9</a>
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<p>Drone strikes are not the only way in which the war has come home to Russia. The Belgorod region, to the north of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, has seen a spectacular <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65674773">ground assault</a> raid by the so-called <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b57c31b-814d-4554-91d8-d49b066cea69">Russian Volunteer Corps and Free Russia Legion</a> (two Ukraine-based far-right Russian militia groups), which took the Russian military two days to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/175720c7-9312-4a56-964a-d20f8ec5377a">repel</a>.</p>
<p>Because of its strategic location as a training and staging ground, Belgorod has repeatedly come under attack. In October 2022, two gunmen <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63273599">killed</a> 11 soldiers at a training ground, wounding a further 15. The region has also been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-belgorod-drone-explosion-ukraine-border/32358759.html">repeatedly</a> struck by Ukrainian artillery, missiles and drones since the beginning of Russia’s invasion in February 2022. These <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belgorod-governor-says-eight-wounded-by-ukrainian-shelling-civilians-be-2023-06-01/">strikes</a> have become more frequent and intense in recent weeks.</p>
<h2>Intensifying air war</h2>
<p>The bigger picture that emerges from all this has two important dimensions. First, it suggests that at the moment, there is a lull in the ground war and an intensification of the air war. This comes after Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group finally <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-wagner-army-starts-handing-bakhmut-over-regular-troops-2023-05-25/">captured</a> the embattled city of Bakhmut on May 20.</p>
<p>The costs of the intensifying air war are particularly borne by Ukraine, which has endured <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/three-dead-further-nighttime-kyiv-attack-city-officials-2023-06-01/">daily waves</a> of drone and missile attacks since then, including on its capital Kyiv. </p>
<p>None of this has been a gamechanger for either side. If anything, it has demonstrated Russian vulnerabilities that expose the Kremlin’s version of the “special military operation” for what it is – a full-on war in which even the Russian capital is not safe from air strikes, let alone areas closer to the border with Ukraine. </p>
<p>But it has also made it easier for Kyiv to lobby western allies successfully for more military support, demonstrating the need for, and usefulness of, both air defence systems and advanced attack drones and missiles – such as the UK’s Storm Shadow missiles which, <a href="https://twitter.com/DefenceU/status/1662906502410018816?s=19&t=0dSwrrGfhk9DkVeHtWhVLw">according</a> to Ukraine’s defence minister Oleksii Reznikov, “hit 100% of their targets”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-zelenskys-diplomatic-tour-has-improved-the-ground-for-a-fresh-military-offensive-but-it-needs-to-come-soon-206206">Ukraine war: Zelensky's diplomatic tour has improved the ground for a fresh military offensive – but it needs to come soon</a>
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<h2>Deportation plans</h2>
<p>The second dimension is this: while the air war and protracted battle over Bakhmut have captured most media attention, Russia has dug in deep in the Ukrainian territories that it captured and now illegally occupies. Defences against an expected Ukrainian offensive have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-65615184">massively fortified</a> along the around 1,000km of frontline and along the beaches of Crimea.</p>
<p>But Russia is also digging in in other ways. On April 27, Putin signed a decree that <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-ukraine-passport-forced-citizenship-donetsk-luhansk/">forces</a> residents in the occupied territories either to accept Russian citizenship or become stateless. And at the end of May, the Russian president <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3715634-putin-legalises-elections-deportation-on-occupied-territory-of-ukraine.html">approved</a> amendments to existing legislation of martial law, including forcible population transfers and holding of elections in territories where martial law has been declared.</p>
<p>This suggests that Russia is unlikely to attempt to capture additional Ukrainian territories – at least, not for now. Rather, the Kremlin seeks to consolidate its hold on what it already has illegally annexed. This is most likely an attempt to withstand Ukrainian pressure during <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/16/ukraine-spring-offensive-russia-war-putin/">Kyiv’s anticipated offensive</a> until it runs out of steam.</p>
<p>A failure by Ukraine to regain significant ground on the battlefield, in the Kremlin’s logic, might increase the chances of a ceasefire that would further strengthen its territorial control. Such an outcome might also fracture the west’s united front of support for Ukraine, especially ahead of another winter war and as the US is heading into a fiercely contested presidential election in 2024.</p>
<h2>Ukraine’s message to Russia</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s best chance of avoiding such an outcome is to make significant gains in its counteroffensive campaign. The drone strikes on Moscow can be seen as preparations for that. They will provide a boost to morale for the Ukrainian army and people, ahead of what is likely to be a costly and painful military push. They demonstrate that Ukraine is ready to take the fight to the enemy, and that no one is invulnerable to their retribution.</p>
<p>In attacking deep inside Russia, these strikes will also force Russia to keep air defences close to symbolically and strategically important assets, rather than deploying them closer to the frontline with Ukraine. </p>
<p>The attacks also send a message to the Russian people that the “special military operation” is making them less, not more, secure. Putin has so far presented the war as something that has had little impact on Russian daily lives. These drone attacks and the coming counteroffensive, with all the destruction and casualties it is sure to bring, will puncture that lie.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206797/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Drone strikes in Moscow are just one sign of an intensifying air war ahead of Ukraine’s offensive.David Hastings Dunn, Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of BirminghamStefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067412023-05-31T12:40:17Z2023-05-31T12:40:17ZDrone strikes hit Moscow and Kyiv – in the growing world of drone warfare, anything goes when it comes to international law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529174/original/file-20230530-21-ynq73b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian security forces take measures near a damaged site following a drone strike on May 30, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1258281328/photo/drone-attack-in-moscow-damages-several-buildings-with-no-casualties.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=fFRqMsFBSdxa7qh4flT00Xviw-RiQwO4Yhrtho9x0LE=">Sefa Karacan/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At least eight drone <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-air-defences-battle-fresh-wave-russian-attacks-2023-05-30/">strikes hit Moscow</a> in the early morning of May 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/several-moscow-buildings-damaged-in-drone-attack-mayor-says#xj4y7vzkg">damaging several buildings</a> and injuring civilians.</p>
<p>This follows Russia’s targeting residential buildings in Ukraine with a wave <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news#russia-ukraine-kyiv-strikes">of drone attacks</a> in late May, killing civilians.</p>
<p>While Ukraine has said it is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-05-30-23/h_c2b6c6339841c69d4e2ebc3543598043">not “directly” responsible</a> for the strikes on Moscow, Russia’s government has called the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/05/30/world/russia-ukraine-drones-news">strikes a “terrorist attack</a>.” </p>
<p>For more than a year, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/drone-attacks-russia-bryansk-kursk-ukraine-kyiv-missiles-1800525">daily life in Ukraine</a> has been marked by aerial vehicles <a href="https://rmas.fad.harvard.edu/unmanned-aircraft-systems-drones">known as drones</a> littering the sky, creating unease and inflicting real damage in the war with Russia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165260201/russian-drone-strike-ukraine">Both Russia</a> and Ukraine are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-army-revamps-commercial-drones-attack-russian-tanks-trenches-2023-05-16/">using drones</a> in this war to remotely locate targets and drop bombs, among other purposes.</p>
<p>Today, drones are used in various <a href="https://www.deseret.com/23663271/things-you-can-do-with-a-drone">other conflicts but</a> are also used to <a href="https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/drone-delivery-services/">deliver packages</a>, <a href="https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2687/Drones-are-helping-scientists-understand-major-weather-events">track weather</a> and entertain drone hobbyists.</p>
<p>Military drones range from small consumer quadcopters to remotely piloted warplanes – and all types are being used by militaries <a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612">around the world</a>. </p>
<p>As a scholar of <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">public diplomacy</a> and foreign policy – and a former United States undersecretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs – I know how important it is for people to understand drones and their proliferation, given the risks of war, terrorism and accidental drone clashes in the world today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing camouflage clothing and a green hat extends his hand and a small drone flys away from him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone from his hand in November 2022 in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1448799062/photo/drone-school-instructors-teach-ukrainian-military-aerial-reconnaissance-and-drone-control-in.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Ck4_N_iB9fcDwMnGvQwUHnv658v0CFkv2WTjIDaZEqE=">Elena Tita/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A buying spree</h2>
<p>The U.S. is among more than 100 countries using drones in times of conflict. </p>
<p>Terrorists have also been <a href="https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/2118451e-vt-mod5-unmanned_aircraft_systems_final-web.pdf">known to deploy drones</a> because they are relatively low-cost weapons with high degrees of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/nov/18/killer-drones-how-many-uav-predator-reaper">civilian damage</a>.</p>
<p>Consumer drone shipments, globally, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234658/worldwide-consumer-drone-unit-shipments/">topped 5 million units</a> in 2020 and are expected to surpass 7 million by 2025.</p>
<p><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/how-doctrine-and-delineation-can-help-defeat-drones/">Sales of drones globally</a> were up 57% from 2021 to 2022. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1754">the exponential rise</a> in drone purchases over the last few years, there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-drones.html">few constraints for buyers</a>, creating a wild, wild west of uncontrolled access and usage. </p>
<p>Each country is free to decide when and where drones fly, without answering to any other country or international authority governing drones. There is little on-the-ground guidance on the rules of the sky. </p>
<h2>Different purposes</h2>
<p>Each country has a unique interest in getting and using drones.</p>
<p>China is increasingly <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2022/11/23/the-chinese-drones-over-washington-00070641">using sophisticated drones</a> for covert surveillance, especially in international waters to patrol the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">disputed islands in the South China Sea</a>. Its expanding drone program has influenced other countries like the U.S. to also invest <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike-video.html">more in the technology</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey’s military has a highly sophisticated drone, the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a>, which is capable of carrying laser-guided bombs and small enough to fit in a flatbed truck.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates imports drones from China and Turkey to <a href="https://drones.rusi.org/countries/united-arab-emirates">deploy in Yemen and Libya</a> to monitor warlords in case conflict breaks out.</p>
<p>And South Korea is considering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-vows-advance-creation-military-drone-unit-2022-12-27/">starting a special drone unit</a> after it failed to respond to a recent North Korean drone incursion. When North Korea deployed five drones toward its southern neighbor in December 2022, South Korea <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/10/south-korea-drone-defense-leaked-documents/">had to scramble its fighter jets</a> to issue warning shots.</p>
<h2>No rules in the air</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-with-armed-drones/#:%7E:text=Over%20three%2Ddozen%20countries%20in,produced%20their%20UCAVs%20at%20home.">countries with armed drones</a> are individually navigating their own rules instead of an international agreed-upon set of regulations.</p>
<p>International law prohibits the <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/use-of-force-under-international-law/">use of armed force</a> unless the United Nations Security Council authorizes an attack, or in the case of self-defense.</p>
<p>But short of launching a full war, drones can legally be deployed for counterterrorism operations, surveillance and other non-self-defense needs, creating a <a href="https://news.nd.edu/news/the-future-of-us-drone-policy-a-conversation-with-international-law-professor-mary-ellen-oconnell">slippery slope to military conflict</a>.</p>
<p>Figuring out the national and international rules of the sky for drone usage is hard.</p>
<p>For 20 years, experts have tried to create <a href="https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf">international agreements</a> on arms – and some countries supported an informal <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_1_scope_holtom.pdf">2016 U.N. agreement</a> that recommends countries document the import and export of unmanned aerial vehicles.</p>
<p>But these efforts never evolved into <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2020/drones-and-the-development-of-international-standards/">serious, comprehensive standards and laws</a> that kept pace with technology. There are several reasons for that. In order protect their national sovereignty, governments do not want to release drone data. They also want to avoid duplication of their technology and to maintain their market share of the drone trade.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large gray drone is stationary in front of a large American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A MQ-9 Reaper drone awaits its next mission over the U.S.-Mexico border in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1439274747/photo/u-s-customs-and-border-protection-agents-pursue-migrants-along-mexico-arizona-border.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=PCc0OCblARHnSxxDsQj9lsCHBVb4wYSRfOL1LTAA7vk=">John Moore/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US and drones</h2>
<p>The U.S. has wrestled with how to balance drone warfare as it became involved in overseas operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and other conflict zones.</p>
<p>The U.S. killed a top al-Qaida leader with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-carried-out-drone-strike-afghanistan-us-officials-say-2022-08-01/">a drone strike</a> in Afghanistan in 2022.</p>
<p>But there have been other instances of drone strikes that resulted in unintended casualties and damage.</p>
<p>In 2021, The New York Times reported that a U.S. drone strike <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/asia/us-air-strike-drone-kabul-afghanistan-isis.html">on a vehicle thought to contain an Islamic State bomb</a> resulted in the deaths of 10 children – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/drone-strikes-biden-trump.html">not three civilians</a>, as the U.S. said might have happened.</p>
<p>There is scant public opinion research on how American feel about the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/us-faces-immense-obstacles-to-continued-drone-war-in-afghanistan/">use of drones overseas</a>, which makes building public support for their military use difficult.</p>
<h2>Drone dangers</h2>
<p>Drone dangers are real. </p>
<p>Many drone experts, including myself, believe it is <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=jlia#:%7E:text=A%20drone%20can%20be%20considered%20a%20weapons%20platform%20or%20a,the%20use%20of%20certain%20weapons.">unsafe for each country’s military</a> to make its own decisions on drones with no rules guiding drone transfers, exports, imports and usage – and no major forum to discuss drones, as the technology continues to evolve.</p>
<p>Multiple drones can communicate with each other remotely, creating shared objectives rather than an individual drone path or pattern. Like a swarm of bees, these drones form a deadly and autonomous aerial army ripe for accidents.</p>
<p>With the advent of artificial intelligence and more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles, drones can change speed, altitude and targeting in seconds, making them even more difficult to track and investigate. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html">Attacks can happen</a> seemingly out of the blue.</p>
<p>Drone detection is another complication, especially on the battlefield. </p>
<p>Ukrainian and Russian forces each want to know exactly where a drone originated. That can be difficult to determine, especially at night, as drones are fast-moving vehicles. Traditional radar detection has grown more sophisticated with new drone detection platforms to more accurately decipher the exact location of the drone operator.</p>
<p>In my view, the world needs new and consistent rules on drone usage for the decade ahead – better international monitoring of drone incursions and more transparency in the outcome of drone attacks.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-drones-are-swarming-the-skies-of-ukraine-and-other-conflict-hot-spots-and-anything-goes-when-it-comes-to-international-law-205898">article originally published on May 19, 2023</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206741/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As drone strikes become a more routine part of warfare, a set of rules or standards that can help determine how they are used in warfare is needed, writes a former US diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2058982023-05-19T12:40:28Z2023-05-19T12:40:28ZMilitary drones are swarming the skies of Ukraine and other conflict hot spots – and anything goes when it comes to international law<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527106/original/file-20230518-18-dm2vgk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Ukraine military tests drones near Kyiv in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1242279354/photo/ukraine-russia-conflict-war-drones.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=VmHMKj7OfOt5cnoqTZMjOFl62epW1tqBsI998tNSS2c=">Sergei Supinsky/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Loud explosions rock the evening sky. Streaks of light appear like comets. Missiles rain down. Below, people scramble for cover. The injured are taken on stretchers – the dead, buried.</p>
<p>That is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/drone-attacks-russia-bryansk-kursk-ukraine-kyiv-missiles-1800525">daily life in Ukraine</a>, where pilotless vehicles <a href="https://rmas.fad.harvard.edu/unmanned-aircraft-systems-drones">known as drones</a> litter the sky in an endless video gamelike – but actually very real – war with Russia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165260201/russian-drone-strike-ukraine">Both Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-army-revamps-commercial-drones-attack-russian-tanks-trenches-2023-05-16/">Ukraine are using drones</a> in this war to remotely locate targets and drop bombs, among other purposes.</p>
<p>Today, drones <a href="https://www.deseret.com/23663271/things-you-can-do-with-a-drone">are used in various other conflicts, but</a> are also used to <a href="https://www.insiderintelligence.com/insights/drone-delivery-services/">deliver packages</a>, <a href="https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2687/Drones-are-helping-scientists-understand-major-weather-events">track weather</a>, <a href="https://ohioline.osu.edu/factsheet/fabe-540">drop pesticides</a> and entertain drone hobbyists.</p>
<p>Welcome to the world of drones. They range from small consumer quadcopters to remotely piloted warplanes – and <a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-what-the-war-means-for-the-future-of-remotely-piloted-aircraft-in-combat-197612">all types are being used by militaries around the world</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/tara-sonenshine">scholar of public diplomacy</a> and foreign policy – and a former United States under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs – I know how important it is for people to understand drones and their proliferation, given the risks of war, terrorism and accidental drone clashes in the world today.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing camouflage clothing and a green hat extends his hand and a small drone flys away from him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527107/original/file-20230518-21-rp7ann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier launches a drone from his hand in November 2022 in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1448799062/photo/drone-school-instructors-teach-ukrainian-military-aerial-reconnaissance-and-drone-control-in.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=Ck4_N_iB9fcDwMnGvQwUHnv658v0CFkv2WTjIDaZEqE=">Elena Tita/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A buying spree</h2>
<p>The U.S. is among more than 100 countries using drones in times of conflict. </p>
<p>Terrorists have also been <a href="https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/2118451e-vt-mod5-unmanned_aircraft_systems_final-web.pdf">known to deploy drones</a> because they are relatively low-cost weapons with high degrees of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/nov/18/killer-drones-how-many-uav-predator-reaper">civilian damage.</a></p>
<p>Consumer drone shipments, globally, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1234658/worldwide-consumer-drone-unit-shipments/">topped 5 million units</a> in 2020 and are expected to surpass 7 million by 2025.</p>
<p><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/how-doctrine-and-delineation-can-help-defeat-drones/">Sales of drones globally</a> were up 57% from 2021 to 2022.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1754">the exponential rise</a> in drone purchases, there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/world/asia/china-taiwan-drones.html">few constraints for buyers</a>, creating a wild, wild west of uncontrolled access and usage. </p>
<p>Each country is free to decide when and where drones fly, without answering to any other country or international authority governing drones. The skies are often filled with drone swarms, with little on-the-ground guidance on the rules of the sky.</p>
<h2>Different purposes</h2>
<p>Each country has a unique interest in getting and using drones.</p>
<p>China is increasingly <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/huddle/2022/11/23/the-chinese-drones-over-washington-00070641">using sophisticated drones</a> for covert surveillance, especially in international waters to patrol the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">disputed islands in the South China Sea</a>. Its expanding drone program has influenced other countries like the U.S. to also invest <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/us/politics/afghanistan-drone-strike-video.html">more in the technology</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey’s military has a highly sophisticated drone, the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a>, which is capable of carrying laser-guided bombs and small enough to fit in a flatbed truck.</p>
<p>The United Arab Emirates imports drones from China and Turkey to <a href="https://drones.rusi.org/countries/united-arab-emirates">deploy in Yemen and Libya</a> to monitor warlords in case conflict breaks out.</p>
<p>And South Korea is considering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-yoon-vows-advance-creation-military-drone-unit-2022-12-27/">starting a special drone unit</a> after it failed to respond to a recent North Korean drone incursion. When North Korea deployed five drones towards it southern neighbor in December 2022, South Korea <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/10/south-korea-drone-defense-leaked-documents/">had to scramble its fighter jets</a> to issue warning shots.</p>
<h2>No rules in the air</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/who-has-what-countries-with-armed-drones/#:%7E:text=Over%20three%2Ddozen%20countries%20in,produced%20their%20UCAVs%20at%20home.">countries with armed drones</a> are individually navigating their own rules instead of an international agreed-upon set of regulations.</p>
<p>International law prohibits the <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/use-of-force-under-international-law/">use of armed force</a> unless the United Nations Security Council authorizes an attack, or in the case of self-defense.</p>
<p>But short of launching a full war, drones can legally be deployed for counterterrorism operations, surveillance and other non-self defense needs, creating a <a href="https://news.nd.edu/news/the-future-of-us-drone-policy-a-conversation-with-international-law-professor-mary-ellen-oconnell">slippery slope to military conflict.</a></p>
<p>Figuring out the national and international rules of the sky for drone usage is hard.</p>
<p>For 20 years, experts have tried to create <a href="https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TheArmsTradeTreaty1/TheArmsTradeTreaty.pdf">international agreements</a> on arms – and some countries supported an informal <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/att_first_six_1_scope_holtom.pdf">2016 U.N. agreement</a> that recommends countries document the import and export of unmanned aerial vehicles.</p>
<p>But these efforts never evolved into <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2020/drones-and-the-development-of-international-standards/">serious, comprehensive standards and laws</a> that kept pace with technology. There are several reasons for that: To protect their national sovereignty, governments do not want to release drone data. They also want to avoid duplication of their technology and to maintain their market share of the drone trade.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large grey drone is stationary in front of a large American flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527108/original/file-20230518-19-wf6fbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A MQ-9 Reaper drone awaits its next mission over the U.S.-Mexico border in November 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1439274747/photo/u-s-customs-and-border-protection-agents-pursue-migrants-along-mexico-arizona-border.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=PCc0OCblARHnSxxDsQj9lsCHBVb4wYSRfOL1LTAA7vk=">John Moore/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US and drones</h2>
<p>For decades, the U.S. has wrestled with how to balance drone warfare as it became involved in overseas operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and other conflict zones.</p>
<p>The U.S. killed a top al-Qaida leader with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-carried-out-drone-strike-afghanistan-us-officials-say-2022-08-01/">a drone strike</a> in Afghanistan in 2022.</p>
<p>But there have been other instances of drone strikes that resulted in unintended casualties and damage.</p>
<p>In 2021, The New York Times reported that a U.S. drone strike <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/asia/us-air-strike-drone-kabul-afghanistan-isis.html">on a vehicle thought to contain an Islamic State bomb</a> resulted in the deaths of 10 children – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/07/us/politics/drone-strikes-biden-trump.html">not three civilians,</a> as the U.S. said might have happened.</p>
<p>There is scant public opinion research on how American feel about the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/us-faces-immense-obstacles-to-continued-drone-war-in-afghanistan/">use of drones overseas</a>, which makes building public support for their military use difficult.</p>
<h2>Drone dangers</h2>
<p>Drone dangers are real. Many drone experts, including myself, believe it is <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=jlia#:%7E:text=A%20drone%20can%20be%20considered%20a%20weapons%20platform%20or%20a,the%20use%20of%20certain%20weapons.">unsafe for each country’s military</a> to make its own decisions on drones with no rules guiding drone transfers, exports, imports and usage – and no major forum to discuss drones, as the technology continues to evolve.</p>
<p>Multiple drones can communicate with each other remotely, creating shared objectives rather than an individual drone path or pattern. Like a swarm of bees, these drones form a deadly and autonomous aerial army ripe for accidents.</p>
<p>With the advent of artificial intelligence and more sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles, drones can change speed, altitude and targeting in seconds, making them even more difficult to track and investigate. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/22/un-talks-to-ban-slaughterbots-collapsed-heres-why-that-matters.html">Attacks can happen</a> seemingly out of the blue.</p>
<p>In my view, the world needs new and consistent rules on drone usage for the decade ahead – better international monitoring of drone incursions and more transparency in the outcome of drone attacks.</p>
<p>Information about the impact of military use of drones is not just important for historical purposes, but also to engage societies in action and temper the impulse to engage in conflict. It is time to talk seriously about drones.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tara Sonenshine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the drone market continues to expand, a set of rules or standards that can help determine how they are used in warfare is needed, writes a former US diplomat.Tara Sonenshine, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976122023-02-23T13:14:51Z2023-02-23T13:14:51ZDrones over Ukraine: What the war means for the future of remotely piloted aircraft in combat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511803/original/file-20230222-25-gdqlsc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5000%2C3323&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Ukrainian soldier uses a commercial drone to monitor the front line in eastern Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-soldier-operates-a-drone-from-a-house-on-the-news-photo/1246245227">Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past year, images from Ukraine have often portrayed a war resembling other conflicts from the past half-century. Russian forces deploy tanks, fighter planes, warships, amphibious vehicles and attack helicopters. Ukrainians fight back with anti-tank weapons, grenade launchers and anti-aircraft missiles. This is how much of the war appears on the ground.</p>
<p>But there’s another side to the conflict – a hypermodern battleground where drones play a crucial role in surveillance, reconnaissance and combat missions. These technologies may foreshadow a world in which armed conflicts are conducted largely by remote control – and perhaps someday, by artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>What lessons does the drone war in Ukraine hold for the future? </p>
<h2>Commercial and portable drones</h2>
<p>One lesson is that <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-democratization-of-drone-warfare/458184/">drones have been democratized</a>, accessible to anyone with a few hundred dollars and a bit of technical knowledge. In Ukraine, DIY hobbyists have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/10/world/europe/ukraine-drones.html">modified and weaponized small, inexpensive commercial drones</a> by outfitting them with high-resolution cameras and explosives. </p>
<p>Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/28/the-drone-operators-who-halted-the-russian-armoured-vehicles-heading-for-kyiv">Aerorozvidka air reconnaissance unit</a> made headlines early in the war when its drones helped stop a Russian convoy headed for Kyiv. Aerorozvidka personnel use spiderlike hexacopters, octocopters and other remote-controlled devices as weapons.</p>
<p>These gadgets typically fly at low altitudes – less than 1.5 miles (2.4 kilometers) – and limited distances – less than 19 miles (31 kilometers). Russia’s fighter jets aren’t designed to prevent attacks from such small drones.</p>
<h2>‘Suicide’ drones</h2>
<p>Both sides in the war have also unleashed <a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/02/CSD-Loitering-Munitions.pdf">loitering munitions</a> — sometimes called “suicide” drones. These self-destructing devices can circle around targets for hours before attacking. Ukraine’s arsenal includes U.S.-made <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/21/mystery-drone-air-force-new-weapon-ukraine-00026970">Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost models</a>, while Russian forces use domestically manufactured <a href="https://www.military-today.com/aircraft/lancet.htm">Lancet-3 drones</a>. Some of these weapons are small enough to fit in a backpack. Ukrainian forces have also <a href="https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1617716493210497024">fashioned DIY loitering munitions</a> by attaching explosives to off-the-shelf quadcopters.</p>
<p>Russian troops have also used Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-russia-is-using-iranian-killer-drones-to-spread-terror-in-ukraine">recently terrorized Kyiv</a>. At about 11 feet (3.5 meters) long, these fixed wing drones resemble a small plane. Loitering munitions typically cost US$10,000-$20,000 each, and have a longer range – 932 miles (1,500 kilometers) or more – than cheap commercial drones. Most have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ISPDS51347.2020.00041">swarming capability</a>, which allows multiple drones to attack a target and inflict greater damage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a small light gray delta wing aircraft against a clear blue sky" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511804/original/file-20230222-703-qo5l8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian-made Shahed-136 suicide drone seconds before it hit buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarIsraelsDilemma/2ae5098134ae4d73939da1f2585c47df/photo">AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the Ukraine war, it’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/19/financial-toll-ukraine-downing-drones-vastly-exceeds-russia-costs">much more expensive to intercept loitering munitions than to deploy them</a>. Using MiG-29 jet fighters, C-300 cruise missiles and other Cold War-era weapons to stop these drones far exceeds the cost of the disposable robots. New high-tech battles of attrition could become a regular feature of future conflicts, with each side attempting to exhaust its enemy’s resources.</p>
<p>Loitering munitions hold another lesson. When used against civilians, low-altitude drones can unnerve an entire city. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-drones-shahed-136-iran/">Russia’s October 2022 drone attacks on Kyiv</a> not only killed four people, but they terrorized thousands more. A <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/publications/living-under-drones-death-injury-and-trauma-to-civilians-from-us-drone-practices-in-pakistan/">Stanford-NYU research project</a> on the long-term impact of America’s drone war in Pakistan reveals that it has deeply traumatized civilian populations.</p>
<h2>Remotely piloted aircraft</h2>
<p>Another class of drones includes those capable of flying longer distances – 124 miles (200 kilometers) or more – and at higher altitudes – 2.5 to 5 miles (4 to 8 kilometers) – than those mentioned above. They can also be armed with laser-guided missiles, boosting their lethality. In the Ukraine war, these drones – essentially remotely piloted fighter planes – include the Turkish-produced <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a>. The Ukrainian military has acquired several dozen, at a cost of about $5 million each. </p>
<p>Some call it the “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/948605a1-cf6c-40ea-b403-9a97d72be2cf">Toyota Corolla of drones</a>” because of its affordability and reliability. Among other things, the Bayraktar TB2 inspired a <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2022/07/22/what-ukraines-viral-drone-song-says-about-modern-day-warfare-and-resistance/">Ukrainian rap song</a> that went viral, pointing to the potential propaganda value of new technologies.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a small uncrewed aircraft flies just above a runway" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511807/original/file-20230222-1774-rvumv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=469&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian forces have made extensive use of the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-bayraktar-tb2-drone-is-pictured-flying-on-december-16-news-photo/1189007249">Birol Bebek/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russian forces have used comparable drones, most notably the domestically produced <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38446/russias-predator-style-drone-with-big-export-potential-has-launched-its-first-missiles">Orion series</a>. Other drones in this class (none of which have been used in Ukraine) include the Israeli <a href="https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/hermes-multirole-high-performance-tactical-uas/">Hermes 450</a>, the American-made <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/mq1c-gray-eagle-uas-us-army/">MQ-1C Gray Eagle</a>, China’s recently unveiled <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-drones-swarm-market-2017-11">Wing Loong 3</a> and dozens more. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/how-china-became-the-worlds-leading-exporter-of-combat-drones">China now surpasses Israel</a> as the world’s biggest drone exporter. Drone proliferation is likely to accelerate their battlefield presence.</p>
<h2>High-end military drones</h2>
<p>High-end drones aren’t likely to be used in Ukraine anytime soon. It’s hard to imagine that the Rolls-Royce of drones, the U.S.-made <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/aircraft/GlobalHawk/performance.html">RQ-4 Global Hawk</a>, will ever be deployed in Ukraine, given its high cost. (The $200 million behemoth is, in fact, powered by a Rolls-Royce AE 3700 turbofan engine).</p>
<p>But it’s plausible that one day, the U.S. government might provide Ukraine with <a href="https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/">RQ-9 Reapers</a>, which cost about $50 million apiece. And although China has so far been reluctant to send weapons to Russian forces, its state-of-the-art <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ch-5.htm">CH-5 Rainbow</a> strike drones could dramatically alter the course of the war. This advanced aircraft would provide Russian troops with far greater firepower, endurance and range than its current drones.</p>
<h2>How drones are changing war</h2>
<p>Over the past 20 years, researchers have observed that drone warfare <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262534413/drone/">simultaneously stretches and compresses the battlefield</a>. It does so both physically and psychologically by increasing the geographic distance between targeter and targeted. When American forces launch drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen, the attacks are secret, targeted assassinations, more like <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/theory-of-drone">a form of hunting</a> than airstrikes on military targets. </p>
<p>But the ways in which drones are being used in Ukraine are strikingly different from how the U.S. has deployed them in the war on terror. In Ukraine, both sides use drones as a tactical technology for a range of missions, including battlefield surveillance, artillery spotting and attacking armored vehicles and missile launchers. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/dgrX8w9Adao?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An interview in the field with Ukrainian drone pilots.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One year on, missiles and drones dominate the air war over Ukraine, raising the question: <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/02/1153438336/russia-and-ukraine-battle-daily-in-the-sky-so-where-are-the-pilots">Where are the pilots</a>? Future wars may incorporate yet more advanced drones — and <a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/projects/counter-drone-systems-project/counter-drone-systems-2nd-edition/">counter-drone systems</a> for jamming command or GPS signals, or intercepting drones before they strike. Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/lesson-from-a-year-at-war-in-contrast-to-the-russians-ukrainians-master-a-mix-of-high-and-low-end-technology-on-the-battlefield-197853">failure to adequately use such systems</a> gave Ukrainian forces an edge in the early months of the war.</p>
<h2>Flying ‘killer robots’</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most troubling prospect is the possibility of a new global arms race in which the U.S., China, Russia, Iran, Israel, the European Union and others <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-accelerates-global-drive-toward-killer-robots-198725">rush to develop fully autonomous drones</a>. The U.S. Air Force is already testing an <a href="https://arstechnica.com/cars/2023/02/the-us-air-force-successfully-tested-this-ai-controlled-jet-fighter/">AI-controlled fighter jet</a>.</p>
<p>Several factors are driving this process. As GPS and control signal jammers become more sophisticated, drones are likely to become less reliant on remote control and more autonomous, using <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/s16050666">systems that incorporate AI</a>, such as <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/engproc2021012067">simultaneous location and mapping</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6080185">LiDAR technology</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6080207">celestial navigation</a>. </p>
<p>Another factor propelling the long-term adoption of autonomous weapons is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/us/drones-airstrikes-ptsd.html">psychological impact of remote-controlled warfare on drone pilots</a>, many of whom suffer from serious mental illnesses like post-traumatic stress disorder
after killing targeted people. To some observers, <a href="https://www.wired.com/2012/06/drone-pilot-ptsd/">autonomous drones might seem to offer a way of eliminating the psychological trauma of killing remotely</a>. Yet many rank-and-file soldiers and pilots are reluctant to use autonomous weapons because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2018.1481907">they don’t trust them</a>, something confirmed by <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520384767/war-virtually">my own research</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, there are ethical concerns: Autonomous weapons <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190905033.003.0008">tend to absolve humans of any responsibility for life-and-death decisions</a>. Who will be held accountable when an autonomous drone kills civilian noncombatants? </p>
<p>As the Ukraine war drags on — and as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/20/part-of-the-kill-chain-how-can-we-control-weaponised-robots">autonomous weapons research</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-accelerates-global-drive-toward-killer-robots-198725">surges forward</a> — the possibility of a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/drone-advances-amid-war-in-ukraine-could-bring-fighting-robots-to-front-lines">robot war</a> looms on the horizon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197612/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roberto J. González does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Ukraine has dramatically increased the use of drones in warfare, from repurposed consumer quadcopters to flying bombs to remotely piloted warplanes.Roberto J. González, Professor of Anthropology, San José State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1978532023-02-22T12:53:50Z2023-02-22T12:53:50ZLesson from a year at war: In contrast to the Russians, Ukrainians master a mix of high- and low-end technology on the battlefield<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511520/original/file-20230221-24-t77eb7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2582%2C1540&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In war, it's not the size or sophistication of the technology, but how it's used – especially in combinations.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainian-military-assists-operator-in-launching-drone-from-news-photo/1448799061">Elena Tita/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In less than a year, Ukraine’s military has emerged as a modern, effective fighting force in large part due to an abundance of technology provided by the United States and its NATO allies. </p>
<p>On Feb. 24, 2022, the date of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-invades-ukraine-5-essential-reads-from-experts-177815">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>, the Ukrainian military was still dependent on Russian-made military equipment, much of which was antiquated. Today it fields high-tech Western weapons systems like <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/01/himars-what-are-the-advanced-rockets-us-is-sending-ukraine">High Mobility Artillery Rocket System</a> (HIMARS) and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-quietly-gives-ukraine-anti-radar-missiles-to-fight-russia-2022-8?op=1">anti-radar missiles</a>. </p>
<p>However, it is not technology alone that wins battles. Ukraine has managed to receive <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/20/1150264976/u-s-nato-countries-announce-massive-weapons-package-for-ukraine">a large assortment of NATO equipment</a>, learn how to use it and bring it to the battlefield with impressive speed and effectiveness. The past year has seen Ukraine become a technical fighting force, able to combine different levels of technology in support of a cohesive strategy. </p>
<p>In contrast, this year has shown that Russia, despite having modern technology and weapons, has been unable to use its seeming technological advantage due to poor leadership, bad strategy and <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a41968636/what-happened-to-russias-wonder-weapons/">lack of competence</a>. </p>
<p>Much of the attention on Western-furnished technology has focused on top-tier systems like the <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/patriot-missile.htm">Patriot missile battery</a>, HIMARS, High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) and <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/fgm-148-javelin/">Javelin portable antitank missile</a>, and other precision anti-tank weapons. This does not do justice to the scale of technology Ukraine is using on a daily basis across the war zone.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of soldiers on a city street with the soldier in the foreground holding a long tube over his shoulder" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/511518/original/file-20230221-14-nmhttt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=510&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Advanced anti-tank weapons like the U.S.-made Javelin and the British-made NLAW, seen here, have helped the Ukrainian military fend off large numbers of Russian armored vehicles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineShiftingGoals/3ac596df7213407ca46a4c41385ca51e/photo">AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Three tiers</h2>
<p>Military technology in the war in Ukraine can be categorized in three tiers. The weapon systems mentioned above fall in the high-end tier. These systems have proved to be powerful weapons in the hands of Ukrainians, but have somewhat limited utility due to cost and training requirements. These factors limit the number of systems available to Ukrainian forces. Ukraine now fields <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/18/himars-production-war-ukraine-00062301">20 HIMARS</a>, and will get only a single battery of the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3264235/ukrainian-troops-headed-to-us-for-patriot-missile-training/">Patriot system</a>. </p>
<p>The Patriot alone requires several months of training in the U.S. In addition to the training burden, these weapons require a large support system of highly specialized parts and maintenance. The long logistics tail for the highest tech systems decreases their utility. These high-end systems are critical to Ukraine’s fight, but need to be supplemented by mid- and low-tier systems that can be delivered and used in large numbers. </p>
<p>The mid-tier systems include drones like Turkey’s <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare">Bayraktar TB2</a> and the American-made Switchblade and ScanEagle. These systems have been provided in the hundreds and come with minimal outside training requirements, while offering an immediate advantage on the battlefield. This level of technology requires less training, which means it can enter the battlefield much more quickly and be put in more hands.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/S4qUsPCFV28?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone is less capable than sophisticated American-made drones but considerably more affordable.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ability to provide weapons systems that are more cost-effective and less training-intensive has supported the efforts to get high-end systems into Ukrainian hands by buying the Ukrainian military time. With mid-level technology as a stopgap, Ukraine has been able to meet the immediate Russian threats while preparing to use high-tech systems. </p>
<p>The low-end tier of systems should not be mistaken as less important than the other classes of weapons and capabilities. This tier includes commercially available, off-the-shelf products that have proved to be game changers in Ukraine, products like commercial quadcopter drones and Starlink <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/22/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war/">satellite internet terminals</a>. </p>
<p>Commercial technology has allowed Ukrainian forces to equip themselves with capabilities that dramatically improve command and control, communications and overall situational awareness. <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11805.pdf">Command and control</a> in a military context refers to battlefield commanders being able to efficiently direct the forces and systems under their command. <a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/5436/chapter/5#44">Situational awareness</a> in a military context refers to knowing battlefield conditions, including the positions and status of friendly and enemy forces.</p>
<h2>Putting it together</h2>
<p>Ukraine’s success has come by figuring out how to integrate these three tiers of weapons and technology into a cohesive battlefield strategy. They use Starlink to ensure connectivity between commanders, personnel who identify targets and front-line units who attack those targets. </p>
<p>Drones based on commercial quadcopters that have been retrofitted for military use and mid-tier drones provide critical targeting and surveillance data in real time. This connectivity and airborne intelligence allows small, mobile units to use their limited supplies of precision high-end munitions to greatest effect. </p>
<p>The speed with which Ukraine has taken this hodgepodge of technology and capabilities and mastered their integration and use is remarkable. It provides a stark contrast to Russia’s use of technology.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1617716493210497024"}"></div></p>
<h2>Russian mismanagement</h2>
<p>In February 2022, Russia appeared to be technologically superior to Ukraine <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a41968636/what-happened-to-russias-wonder-weapons/">on the battlefield</a>. The Russian military has continually failed to capitalize on this advantage because of poor command and control, lack of expertise and <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">dismal performance</a> of troops in the field.</p>
<p>Russia has faced many of the same pressures as Ukraine to adapt to new technology and has come to some similar solutions. Russian forces have also used quadcopter drones for tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, and, like the Ukrainians, have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/02/drones-russia-ukraine-air-war/">fitted some with grenades</a>. They have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-62225830">hit civilian as well as military targets</a> with Iranian-made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/17/world/europe/russia-ukraine-iran-drones.html">Shahed-136 drones</a>, which are a form of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/loitering-munitions-preview-the-autonomous-future-of-warfare/">loitering munition</a> that can fly overhead until a target is identified and detonate on impact. </p>
<p>Russia has embraced mid-level technology because it has been hesitant to commit its most advanced weapons systems like the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/su57-why-russia-wont-send-new-stealth-fighter-to-ukraine-2022-6?op=1">beleaguered Su-57 fighter jet</a> or the <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-14-armata-main-battle-tank/">T-14 Armata tank</a>, which was only recently <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-wants-armata-tank-ukraine-but-scared-to-use-combat-2023-1">deployed in Ukraine</a>. Russia has been unable to secure <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/uk-defense-ministry-russia-s-lack-of-air-superiority-exacerbated-due-to-poor-training/6823338.html#:%7E:text=%22Russia's%20aircraft%20losses%20likely%20significantly,to%20regenerate%20combat%20air%20capability.%22">air superiority</a> or destroy Ukraine’s air defenses or long-range artillery, which means committing Russia’s best weapons puts them at great risk. </p>
<p>However, Russia still maintains an advantage in long-range precision strike weapons like cruise missiles. Despite the size of its arsenal, Russian forces have continued to squander their technological advantage and rely on <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/regional-impact-irans-drones-ukraine">low-quality</a>, foreign options like the Shahed. The Russian military has failed to suppress Ukraine’s robust defenses while simultaneously relying on poor <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-russia-got-wrong-moscow-failures-in-ukraine-dara-massicot">tactics, leadership and training</a>. </p>
<h2>Lessons from the war</h2>
<p>While Russian forces continued to mismanage their technology, Ukraine was mastering theirs. This provides the key lesson for the West. The mere existence of cutting edge technology and high-tech weapons does not provide a military with a guarantee of success. </p>
<p>Western militaries can look to Ukraine for an example of how to integrate technologies and weapons to remain agile and adaptable. At the same time, they can look to Russia as an example of the dangers of lack of competence and poor command and control.</p>
<p>Ukraine is a window into future warfare. The next wars will also hinge on which side can better use all levels of technology and integrate them into a coherent strategy. Technology is a game changer, but only for those who make the best use of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197853/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author is an officer in the United States Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Air Force or Department of Defense.</span></em></p>A year ago, the Ukrainian military was largely equipped with Soviet-era weapons. It has since seen an influx of high-tech weapons. But it’s less what than how that’s made a difference.Laura Jones, Doctoral Student in International Relations, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987252023-02-21T13:24:17Z2023-02-21T13:24:17ZWar in Ukraine accelerates global drive toward killer robots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510915/original/file-20230217-593-z3je8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4021%2C2924&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It wouldn't take much to turn this remotely operated mobile machine gun into an autonomous killer robot.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marine_Corps_Warfighting_Laboratory_MAGTAF_Integrated_Experiment_(MCWL)_160709-M-OB268-165.jpg">Pfc. Rhita Daniel, U.S. Marine Corps</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. military is intensifying its commitment to the development and use of autonomous weapons, as confirmed by an update to a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3278076/dod-announces-update-to-dod-directive-300009-autonomy-in-weapon-systems/">Department of Defense directive</a>. The update, released Jan. 25, 2023, is the first in a decade to focus on artificial intelligence autonomous weapons. It follows a related <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_208376.htm">implementation plan</a> released by NATO on Oct. 13, 2022, that is aimed at preserving the alliance’s “technological edge” in what are sometimes called “killer robots.” </p>
<p>Both announcements reflect a crucial lesson militaries around the world have learned from recent combat operations in <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/drone-advances-amid-war-in-ukraine-could-bring-fighting-robots-to-front-lines#:%7E:text=Utah%2Dbased%20Fortem%20Technologies%20has,them%20%E2%80%94%20all%20without%20human%20assistance.">Ukraine</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/30/army-pentagon-nagorno-karabakh-drones/">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>: Weaponized artificial intelligence is the future of warfare.</p>
<p>“We know that commanders are seeing a military value in loitering munitions in Ukraine,” Richard Moyes, director of <a href="https://article36.org/">Article 36</a>, a humanitarian organization focused on reducing harm from weapons, told me in an interview. These weapons, which are a cross between a bomb and a drone, can hover for extended periods while waiting for a target. For now, such semi-autonomous missiles are generally being operated with significant human control over key decisions, he said. </p>
<h2>Pressure of war</h2>
<p>But as casualties mount in Ukraine, so does the pressure to achieve decisive battlefield advantages with fully autonomous weapons – robots that can choose, hunt down and attack their targets all on their own, without needing any human supervision.</p>
<p>This month, a key Russian manufacturer <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/01/russian-robot-maker-working-bot-target-abrams-leopard-tanks/382288/">announced plans</a> to develop a new combat version of its Marker reconnaissance robot, an uncrewed ground vehicle, to augment existing forces in Ukraine. Fully autonomous drones are already being used to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2023/01/27/friday-january-27-russias-war-on-ukraine-daily-news-and-information-from-ukraine/">defend Ukrainian energy facilities</a> from other drones. Wahid Nawabi, CEO of the U.S. defense contractor that manufactures the semi-autonomous <a href="https://www.avinc.com/tms/switchblade">Switchblade drone</a>, said the technology is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drone-advances-6591dc69a4bf2081dcdd265e1c986203">already within reach</a> to convert these weapons to become fully autonomous. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1446461845070549008"}"></div></p>
<p>Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s digital transformation minister, has argued that fully autonomous weapons are the war’s “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/drone-advances-ukraine-bring-dawn-killer-robots-96112651">logical and inevitable next step</a>” and recently said that soldiers might see them on the battlefield in the next six months. </p>
<p>Proponents of fully autonomous weapons systems <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2019/11/15/autonomous-weapons-systems-the-utilize-artificial-intelligence-are-changing-the-nature-of-warfare-but-theres-a-problem/#_ga=2.7414138.976428111.1676666580-169995920.1676666580">argue that the technology will keep soldiers out of harm’s way</a> by keeping them off the battlefield. They will also allow for military decisions to be made at superhuman speed, allowing for radically improved defensive capabilities. </p>
<p>Currently, semi-autonomous weapons, like loitering munitions that track and detonate themselves on targets, require a “human in the loop.” They can recommend actions but require their operators to initiate them. </p>
<p>By contrast, fully autonomous drones, like the so-called “<a href="https://fortemtech.com/products/dronehunter-f700/">drone hunters</a>” now <a href="https://u24.gov.ua/news/shahed_hunters_defenders">deployed in Ukraine</a>, can track and disable incoming unmanned aerial vehicles day and night, with no need for operator intervention and faster than human-controlled weapons systems. </p>
<h2>Calling for a timeout</h2>
<p>Critics like <a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/stop-killer-robots/facts-about-autonomous-weapons/">The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots</a> have been advocating for more than a decade to ban research and development of autonomous weapons systems. They point to a future where autonomous weapons systems are designed specifically to target humans, not just vehicles, infrastructure and other weapons. They argue that wartime decisions over life and death must remain in human hands. Turning them over to an algorithm amounts to the ultimate form of <a href="https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/stop-killer-robots/digital-dehumanisation/">digital dehumanization</a>.</p>
<p>Together with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots">Human Rights Watch</a>, The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots argues that autonomous weapons systems lack the human judgment necessary to distinguish between civilians and legitimate military targets. They also lower the threshold to war by reducing the perceived risks, and they erode meaningful human control over what happens on the battlefield. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a soldier crouches on the ground peering into a black box as to small projectiles with wings are launched from tubes on either side of him" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=662&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=662&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=662&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510910/original/file-20230217-18-gpr6qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=831&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This composite image shows a ‘Switchblade’ loitering munition drone launching from a tube and extending its folded wings.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Switchblade.jpg">U.S. Army AMRDEC Public Affairs</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The organizations argue that the militaries <a href="https://research.northeastern.edu/autonomous-weapons-systems-the-utilize-artificial-intelligence-are-changing-the-nature-of-warfare-but-theres-a-problem-2/#:%7E:text=They%20found%20that%20there%20are,dollars%20into%20this%20arms%20race.">investing most heavily</a> in autonomous weapons systems, including the U.S., Russia, China, South Korea and the European Union, are launching the world into a costly and destabilizing new arms race. One consequence could be this dangerous new technology falling into the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/FP_20211122_ai_nonstate_actors_kreps.pdf">hands of terrorists and others outside of government control</a>.</p>
<p>The updated Department of Defense directive tries to address some of the key concerns. It declares that the U.S. will use autonomous weapons systems with “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3278076/dod-announces-update-to-dod-directive-300009-autonomy-in-weapon-systems/">appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force</a>.” Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/review-2023-us-policy-autonomy-weapons-systems">issued a statement</a> saying that the new directive fails to make clear what the phrase “appropriate level” means and doesn’t establish guidelines for who should determine it.</p>
<p>But as Gregory Allen, an expert from the national defense and international relations think tank <a href="https://www.csis.org/">Center for Strategic and International Studies</a>, argues, this language <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/01/31/what-is-the-pentagons-updated-policy-on-killer-robots/">establishes a lower threshold</a> than the “meaningful human control” demanded by critics. The Defense Department’s wording, he points out, allows for the possibility that in certain cases, such as with surveillance aircraft, the level of human control considered appropriate “may be little to none.” </p>
<p>The updated directive also includes language promising ethical use of autonomous weapons systems, specifically by establishing a system of oversight for developing and employing the technology, and by insisting that the weapons will be used in accordance with existing international laws of war. But Article 36’s Moyes noted that international law currently does not provide an adequate framework for understanding, much less regulating, the concept of weapon autonomy. </p>
<p>The current legal framework does not make it clear, for instance, that commanders are responsible for understanding what will trigger the systems that they use, or that they must limit the area and time over which those systems will operate. “The danger is that there is not a bright line between where we are now and where we have accepted the unacceptable,” said Moyes.</p>
<h2>Impossible balance?</h2>
<p>The Pentagon’s update demonstrates a simultaneous commitment to deploying autonomous weapons systems and to complying with international humanitarian law. How the U.S. will balance these commitments, and if such a balance is even possible, remains to be seen. </p>
<p>The International Committee of the Red Cross, the custodian of international humanitarian law, insists that the legal obligations of commanders and operators “<a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/reflections-70-years-geneva-conventions-and-challenges-ahead">cannot be transferred to a machine, algorithm or weapon system</a>.” Right now, human beings are held responsible for protecting civilians and limiting combat damage by making sure the use of force is proportional to military objectives.</p>
<p>If and when artificially intelligent weapons are deployed on the battlefield, who should be held responsible when needless civilian deaths occur? There isn’t a clear answer to that very important question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am not connected to Article 36 in any capacity, nor have I received any funding from them. I did write a short opinion/policy piece on AWS that was posted on their website.</span></em></p>The technology exists to build autonomous weapons. How well they would work and whether they could be adequately controlled are unknown. The Ukraine war has only turned up the pressure.James Dawes, Professor of English, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1975652023-01-16T19:11:50Z2023-01-16T19:11:50ZRussia is using drones to target Ukrainian electricity and erode morale<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504762/original/file-20230116-20-9tv9k7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C6000%2C4059&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents watch a burning infrastructure project hit during a massive Russian drone night strike in Kyiv, Ukraine, in December 2022.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/russia-is-using-drones-to-target-ukrainian-electricity-and-erode-morale" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-invasion-ukraine-intelligence-putin/31748594.html">Russian officials</a>, as well as many outside observers, believed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, would be a rapid affair. The war, however, has defied these expectations. </p>
<p>As we approach the one-year anniversary of the conflict, Russia instead finds itself stuck in a protracted conflict with <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-ukraine-war-rages-on-without-a-clear-end-in-sight-here-are-6-ways-the-conflict-with-russia-could-play-out/ar-AA13Nqe4">no easy exit</a>. Russia, in order to achieve the off-ramp it desperately seeks, is now more than ever focusing on targeting the Ukrainian home front.</p>
<p>Russia’s changing strategy for the conflict is the result of the weakness of its conventional forces. The Russian army, in short, possessed severe <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-military%E2%80%99s-failure-ukraine-no-surprise-206016">structural problems</a> that limited its offensive capabilities. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Russia’s efforts to win the war in a rapid manner while minimizing strain on its people meant that units designed to be supported by large numbers of conscripts instead went directly to the front. The result was that these units suffered overwhelming casualties in the initial phases of the conflict.</p>
<h2>Russian losses</h2>
<p>The loss of these soldiers for Russia, with <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-defense-chief-releases-numbers-putin-russia-war-losses-ukraine-2022-12">estimates of more than 100,000 dead, injured or deserted</a>, has proven devastating for the army.</p>
<p>Russia’s efforts to replace these soldiers have become increasingly desperate. Even the Wagner Group, a highly trained mercenary unit that was unofficially part of the Russian army, has resorted to <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/inside-wagner-group-criminals-contractors-putins-war-1770392">recruiting criminals</a> in an effort to replace their depleted manpower.</p>
<p>The Russian state even went so far as to enact a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022. This proved highly damaging for Russian morale, with men <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/27/we-want-to-run-russian-men-fleeing-conscription">fleeing the country</a> to avoid conscription. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russians-flee-the-draft-as-the-reality-of-the-war-in-ukraine-hits-home-191491">Russians flee the draft as the reality of the war in Ukraine hits home</a>
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<p>This decline occurred despite indications that Russian authorities <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-10-07/putins-conscription-drive-targets-russias-ethnic-minorities.html">focused their mobilization efforts</a> on the Russian Federation’s minorities in order to minimize the impact on ethnic Russians. While the effort was initially devastating for Russian morale, it did stabilize the front lines of the conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men on bicycles wave and smile." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504251/original/file-20230112-11-pm4jwk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two Russians wave at a photographer after they crossed the border between Georgia and Russia at Verkhny Lars in Georgia in September 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Shakh Aivazov)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ukraine has the advantage of morale</h2>
<p>Stabilization, however, is not enough for Russia. The longer the war continues, the more damaging it is for both the Russian state and its leadership. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/10/politics/russian-artillery-fire-down-75-percent-ukraine/index.html">There are also indications</a> that the Russian army is severely lacking equipment. It needs the war to end sooner rather than later. </p>
<p>In order to win, or at least declare victory, it needs to undermine Ukraine’s greatest strength: the morale and spirit of the Ukrainian people.</p>
<p>Ukrainian morale has been the country’s greatest asset in the conflict. Despite the devastating effects of modern war, morale in Ukraine <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/under-fire-from-russia-ukrainian-morale-remains-high/ar-AA14BniU">remains high</a>. It directly transfers to the battlefield, and has been <a href="https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/03/25/90-percent-morale-10-percent-force-ukraines-not-so-secret-weapon/">a strength</a> of the Ukrainian army since the war’s outset.</p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/after-russians-retreat-scarred-ukrainian-village-recounts-month-of-terror">deplorable actions in occupied Ukraine</a>, furthermore, have stoked Ukrainian sentiment against Russia.</p>
<p>With Russia’s military unable to meet the government’s political objective of a quick end to the war, Russia has redoubled its efforts to weaponize the Ukrainian population. This is not a new development. Russia had sought to weaponize Ukrainian refugees at the outset of the conflict.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-fuels-a-refugee-crisis-that-could-help-putin-win-the-war-177951">Russia's invasion of Ukraine fuels a refugee crisis that could help Putin win the war</a>
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<h2>Targeting civilians</h2>
<p>Now, with <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/russian-military-gear-insufficient-harsh-winters-leads-soldiers-dying-hypothermia">winter conditions and inadequate supplies</a> preventing the Russian army from fully continuing conventional operations, it is directly targeting Ukraine’s civilian population. </p>
<p>The target of Russian attacks, as a result, is public infrastructure, especially electricity, with the aim of causing demoralizing hardship for Ukrainian civilians. </p>
<p>Direct attacks against civilians contravene the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949">Fourth Geneva Convention</a> and its subsequent amendments. These amendments, however, contain a significant flaw. Attacks that cause harm to civilians are allowed so long as it is not disproportionate to the “<a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977">direct military advantage anticipated</a>.”</p>
<p>This loophole in the Geneva Conventions is what Russia now exploits in Ukraine. Russia in the fall started <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63681401">systemic bombing efforts</a> to target Ukraine’s power grid and infrastructure in an effort to break Ukrainian morale. While such a campaign would normally be cost-prohibitive, especially given Russia’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/26/russia-firing-ageing-cruise-missiles-because-stocks-are-depleted-mod-suggests">declining missile stocks</a>, it is employing a 21st-century weapon: drones.</p>
<p>Drones are both cheap and hard to defend against when employed en masse, at least in a manner that’s not <a href="https://worldcrunch.com/tech-science/can-terrorists-use-drones">cost-prohibitive</a>. With <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-may-be-contributing-to-widespread-war-crimes-in-ukraine-by-providing-drones-to-russia-white-house/ar-AA168KrR">probable aid from Iran</a>, Russia has flooded the country with this cheap, and deadly, weapon.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two people walk along a darkened street with no streetlights at night as a car approaches them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1017%2C5000%2C2223&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/504250/original/file-20230112-43582-897utl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">People are illuminated by a car headlight as they walk during a power outage in Kyiv, Ukraine, in December 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Felipe Dana)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Electricity disruptions</h2>
<p>With electricity in Ukraine constantly disrupted by <a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3645183-eu-employing-all-available-mechanisms-to-help-ukraine-get-through-winter-maasikas.html">Russian attacks</a>, the Ukrainian population faces a difficult choice — to remain in the country under such conditions or flee abroad. </p>
<p>This choice, and the helplessness it instils, is Russia’s plan. The Ukrainian government has already been <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukrainian-refugees-told-not-to-come-home-because-theres-not-enough-electricity-12730221">forced to ask</a> refugees from the conflict to remain abroad due to the limited electricity. </p>
<p>Ukrainian determination, if anything, has become <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/10/entertainment/volodymyr-zelenskyy-golden-globes-sean-penn-cec/index.html">more resolute</a> in the face of such tasks. </p>
<p>Morale, however, is a concept as fragile as it is strong. Concerted efforts must be made, both in Ukraine and abroad, to keep it high in the face of such attacks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197565/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With electricity in Ukraine constantly disrupted by Russian attacks, the Ukrainian population faces a difficult choice — to remain in the country under such conditions, or flee abroad.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1921702022-10-16T19:02:23Z2022-10-16T19:02:23Z‘Killer robots’ will be nothing like the movies show – here’s where the real threats lie<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489521/original/file-20221013-12-lm966h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=143%2C201%2C1386%2C862&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghost Robotics Vision 60 Q-UGV.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/7351259/ghost-robotics-vision-60-q-ugv-demo">US Space Force photo by Senior Airman Samuel Becker</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You might suppose Hollywood is good at predicting the future. Indeed, Robert Wallace, head of the CIA’s Office of Technical Service and the US equivalent of MI6’s fictional Q, has recounted how Russian spies <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a12043/4267549/">would watch the latest Bond movie</a> to see what technologies might be coming their way.</p>
<p>Hollywood’s continuing obsession with killer robots might therefore be of significant concern. The newest such movie is Apple TV’s forthcoming <a href="https://www.thewrap.com/florence-pugh-dolly-movie-murderous-sex-robot-apple-tv-plus/">sex robot courtroom drama Dolly</a>.</p>
<p>I never thought I’d write the phrase “sex robot courtroom drama”, but there you go. Based on a <a href="https://apex-magazine.com/short-fiction/dolly/">2011 short story</a> by Elizabeth Bear, the plot concerns a billionaire killed by a sex robot that then asks for a lawyer to defend its murderous actions.</p>
<h2>The real killer robots</h2>
<p>Dolly is the latest in a long line of movies featuring killer robots – including HAL in Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, and Arnold Schwarzenegger’s T-800 robot in the Terminator series. Indeed, conflict between robots and humans was at the centre of the very first feature-length science fiction film, Fritz Lang’s 1927 classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Metropolis-film-1927">Metropolis</a>.</p>
<p>But almost all these movies get it wrong. Killer robots won’t be sentient humanoid robots with evil intent. This might make for a dramatic storyline and a box office success, but such technologies are many decades, if not centuries, away.</p>
<p>Indeed, contrary to recent fears, robots may never be sentient.</p>
<p>It’s much simpler technologies we should be worrying about. And these technologies are starting to turn up on the battlefield today in places like Ukraine and <a href="https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-analyzing-the-data/">Nagorno-Karabakh</a>.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-over-ukraine-fears-of-russian-killer-robots-have-failed-to-materialise-180244">Drones over Ukraine: fears of Russian 'killer robots' have failed to materialise</a>
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<h2>A war transformed</h2>
<p>Movies that feature much simpler armed drones, like Angel has Fallen (2019) and Eye in the Sky (2015), paint perhaps the most accurate picture of <a href="https://theconversation.com/eye-in-the-sky-movie-gives-a-real-insight-into-the-future-of-warfare-56684">the real future of killer robots</a>. </p>
<p>On the nightly TV news, we see how modern warfare is being transformed by ever-more autonomous drones, tanks, ships and submarines. These robots are only a little more sophisticated than those you can buy in your local hobby store. </p>
<p>And increasingly, the decisions to identify, track and destroy targets are being handed over to their algorithms. </p>
<p>This is taking the world to a dangerous place, with a host of moral, legal and technical problems. Such weapons will, for example, further upset our troubled geopolitical situation. We already see <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/amirhusain/2022/06/30/turkey-builds-a-hyperwar-capable-military/?sh=1500c4b855e1">Turkey emerging as a major drone power</a>.</p>
<p>And such weapons cross a moral red line into a terrible and terrifying world where unaccountable machines decide who lives and who dies. </p>
<p>Robot manufacturers are, however, starting to push back against this future.</p>
<h2>A pledge not to weaponise</h2>
<p>Last week, six leading robotics companies pledged they would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/07/killer-robots-companies-pledge-no-weapons">never weaponise their robot platforms</a>. The companies include Boston Dynamics, which makes the Atlas humanoid robot, which can <a href="https://youtu.be/knoOXBLFQ-s">perform an impressive backflip</a>, and the Spot robot dog, which looks like it’s <a href="https://youtu.be/wlkCQXHEgjA">straight out of the Black Mirror TV series</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1578400002056953858"}"></div></p>
<p>This isn’t the first time robotics companies have spoken out about this worrying future. Five years ago, I organised <a href="https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/science-tech/world%E2%80%99s-tech-leaders-urge-un-ban-killer-robots">an open letter</a> signed by Elon Musk and more than 100 founders of other AI and robot companies calling for the United Nations to regulate the use of killer robots. The letter even knocked the Pope into third place for a <a href="https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/science-tech/unsws-toby-walsh-voted-runner-global-award">global disarmament award</a>.</p>
<p>However, the fact that leading robotics companies are pledging not to weaponise their robot platforms is more virtue signalling than anything else.</p>
<p>We have, for example, already seen <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7gv33/robot-dog-not-so-cute-with-submachine-gun-strapped-to-its-back">third parties mount guns</a> on clones of Boston Dynamics’ Spot robot dog. And such modified robots have proven effective in action. Iran’s top nuclear scientist was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-fakhrizadeh-assassination-israel.html">assassinated by Israeli agents</a> using a robot machine gun in 2020.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lethal-autonomous-weapons-and-world-war-iii-its-not-too-late-to-stop-the-rise-of-killer-robots-165822">Lethal autonomous weapons and World War III: it's not too late to stop the rise of 'killer robots'</a>
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<h2>Collective action to safeguard our future</h2>
<p>The only way we can safeguard against this terrifying future is if nations collectively take action, as they have with chemical weapons, biological weapons and even nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Such regulation won’t be perfect, just as the regulation of chemical weapons isn’t perfect. But it will prevent arms companies from openly selling such weapons and thus their proliferation. </p>
<p>Therefore, it’s even more important than a pledge from robotics companies to see the UN Human Rights council <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/10/human-rights-council-adopts-six-resolutions-appoints-special-rapporteur-situation">has recently unanimously decided</a> to explore the human rights implications of new and emerging technologies like autonomous weapons. </p>
<p>Several dozen nations have already called for the UN to regulate killer robots. The European Parliament, the African Union, the UN Secretary General, Nobel peace laureates, church leaders, politicians and thousands of AI and robotics researchers like myself have all called for regulation. </p>
<p>Australian is not a country that has, so far, supported these calls. But if you want to avoid this Hollywood future, you may want to take it up with your political representative next time you see them.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-could-take-a-global-lead-in-controlling-the-development-of-killer-robots-so-why-isnt-it-166168">New Zealand could take a global lead in controlling the development of 'killer robots' — so why isn't it?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192170/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toby Walsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The sentient, murderous humanoid robot is a complete fiction, and may never become reality. But that doesn’t mean we’re safe from autonomous weapons – they are already here.Toby Walsh, Professor of AI at UNSW, Research Group Leader, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1822662022-05-06T12:32:22Z2022-05-06T12:32:22ZUkraine receives weapons support from around the world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460859/original/file-20220502-14-hjq48t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C1920%2C1069&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Javelin anti-tank missiles, T-72 tanks and Bayraktar TB2 drones are just some of the weapons that other nations have sent to Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images, Associated Press, Wikimedia Commons, U.S. Department of Defense</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many of the world’s nations have sought to support Ukrainians by <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/west-weapons-flow-ukraine-military-fight-russia-rcna26082">sending weapons</a>. Even before that, though, <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/Ukraine">many countries were offering limited help</a> as a result of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082">Russian takeover of Crimea</a>, in southern Ukraine, in 2014.</p>
<p>The United States has given more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-60774098">US$3 billion</a> in military aid and has sold an additional <a href="https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-non-standard-ammunition">$165 million worth of weapons</a> to the country. <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/04/28/congress-passes-bill-to-loan-us-military-equipment-to-ukraine-and-allies/">New legislation</a> suggests that this number will continue to rise, both through a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-congress-revives-world-war-two-era-lend-lease-program-ukraine-2022-04-28/">streamlined process</a> of lending or leasing equipment to Ukraine and an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/28/biden-to-ask-congress-for-33-billion-to-support-ukraine-through-september-.html">additional $20 billion in military aid</a> Biden has asked Congress to approve.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.forumarmstrade.org/emerging-experts.html">arms trade researcher</a> and a policy analyst at the Cato Institute, I have observed that some countries have supplied items like <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/04/26/poland-confirms-t-72-tank-delivery-to-ukraine-with-challenger-2-tanks-to-fill-gap/">tanks</a> and <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-is-using-mi24-flying-tank-helicopters-to-fight-russia-2022-4">helicopters</a>. These help Ukraine prevent Russia from capturing and holding Ukrainian territory. But they are not the majority of weapons transfers. The <a href="https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html">four main categories of weapons</a> that the West has sent Ukraine are basic guns and ammunition, missiles, attack drones and artillery. </p>
<p><iframe id="MfMol" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/MfMol/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Firearms</h2>
<p>Guns and ammunition make up a large amount of the transferred weapons. The U.S. has sent Ukraine over 50 million rounds of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-united-states-run-out-javelins-russia-runs-out-tanks">ammunition</a> for handguns, rifles and artillery. Canada, Greece, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia have <a href="https://www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html">also supplied</a> ammunition.</p>
<p>The usefulness of guns and ammunition is fairly straightforward: Without them, Ukrainian soldiers – and the civilians who have joined them – cannot defend themselves. This equipment is also simple to learn how to use, and relatively small and lightweight, making it easy to ship large amounts from one country to another.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Images of three weapons in use" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460861/original/file-20220502-16-96kyv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian forces have received howitzers, transport vehicles like HMMWVs, and Kalashnikov rifles from other nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images, Associated Press, Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Missiles</h2>
<p>Countries have provided Ukraine with anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, most notably the <a href="https://inkstickmedia.com/in-ukraine-the-javelin-is-more-than-a-weapon/">anti-tank Javelin</a>. To date, the U.S. has provided more than <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-united-states-run-out-javelins-russia-runs-out-tanks">7,000 Javelins</a> to Ukraine, and Ukrainian troops are <a href="https://www.audacy.com/connectingvets/news/inside-the-deadly-javelin-anti-tank-program-in-ukraine">reportedly finding them effective</a> against Russian tanks.</p>
<p>Anti-tank missiles like the Javelin are easy to use, with military experts claiming it takes only <a href="https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/ukraine-javelin-stinger-missiles-russia/">30 minutes to learn</a>. Moreover, once fired, the Javelin requires no input from the gunner. This means that the user can fire the weapon and then flee combat without needing to steer the missile to its target. </p>
<p>The U.S. is currently shipping more Javelins to Ukraine <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-united-states-run-out-javelins-russia-runs-out-tanks">than it can easily replace</a>, so the U.S. supply may soon dwindle.</p>
<p>In addition, other countries are sending anti-aircraft missiles and missile systems to Ukraine. Stinger missiles are the anti-aircraft equivalent of the Javelin anti-tank weapon, light enough for one person to carry and fire, with <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/stinger.htm">no steering needed after firing</a>. They can hit targets a maximum of only <a href="https://science.howstuffworks.com/stinger.htm">about 5 miles</a> away.</p>
<p>German-made <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/germany-military-sends-gepard-tanks-ukraine-russia-war-olaf-scholz-2022-4">Gepard air-defense tanks</a> are fast-moving armored anti-aircraft vehicles that can hit aircraft as far away as 10 miles.</p>
<p>The S-300 launching system, originally developed for the Soviet Union but now also used in Asia and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/08/ukraine-is-losing-several-s-300-anti-air-launchers-per-week-but-it-still-has-hundreds-left/?sh=6f23e9493ba8">by Slovakia and Slovenia</a>, among other eastern European nations, is being <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/world/europe/ukraine-russia-nato-s300.html">transferred by Slovakia to Ukraine</a>. It has a range of nearly 125 miles. </p>
<p>The S-300s and the Gepards are better than Stingers at fighting Russian <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/ai-drones-russia-ukraine/">drones</a>, which Russia is using to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/04/26/germany-sending-gepard-air-defense-tanks-to-support-ukraine-defense/">fire bombs and missiles at distant targets</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Transfers of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/15/neptune-ukraine-moskva/">anti-ship missiles</a> by <a href="https://www.navaltoday.com/2022/04/11/uk-to-send-anti-ship-missiles-to-ukraine-to-help-combat-russian-warships/">the United Kingdom</a> to Ukraine aim to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/04/28/britain-send-anti-ship-missiles-ukraine-prevent-blockade-black/">prevent</a> Russia from blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Images of a weapon, a helmet and a helicopter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460862/original/file-20220502-16-lben97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stinger missiles, helmets and Mi-17 helicopters are among the military supplies shipped to Ukraine from around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images, Associated Press, Wikimedia Commons, U.S. Department of Defense</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Attack drones</h2>
<p>Ukraine is using so-called “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3175427/pacifist-japan-eyeing-attack-drones-used-ukraine-russian-threat">attack drones</a>” made by the U.S. and Turkey to destroy Russian tanks and artillery. These weapons tend to be small – for example, the <a href="https://www.popsci.com/technology/switchblade-drones-explained/">Switchblade drone</a> that the U.S. is sending is <a href="https://www.avinc.com/tms/switchblade">2 feet long and weighs 6 pounds</a>. They range in capabilities but can <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/are-ukraines-cheap-slow-drones-successful-russian-targets-rcna19982">destroy Russian tanks and artillery emplacements</a>. Additionally, they <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/15/neptune-ukraine-moskva/">were used</a> to distract Russian missile defenses as decoys when attacking Russian ships.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The U.S. is considering sending more advanced drones, such as the <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/">MQ-9 Reaper</a>, which is twice as fast as the drones Ukraine is using now. The Reaper is also able to be controlled from <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2022/04/13/ukraine-may-get-us-mq-9-reaper-strike-drones/?sh=7ac8e4045b3b">more than 1,000 miles away</a> – unlike the smaller drones, which need a controller to be within about 100 miles. There are concerns about whether <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/04/27/ukraine-wants-armed-drones-is-the-u-s-ready-to-deliver-00028317">international law might limit U.S. shipments</a> of Reapers to Ukraine – and whether it would further entangle NATO in the war.</p>
<h2>Artillery</h2>
<p>Finally, countries have also recently begun sending Ukraine artillery, or large-caliber guns used for land warfare. The reason for sending these more advanced systems is that Russia is trying to “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220425-us-ships-artillery-to-ukraine-to-destroy-russian-firepower">use long-range shelling</a> to drive back most of Ukraine’s forces and only then send in ground troops and tanks to secure the land,” according to one analysis.</p>
<p>In this situation, artillery, while requiring more advanced training and more than one person to operate, has greater range than traditional ammunition and can help Ukraine continue to wear down the Russian forces, who <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/despite-west-s-help-ukraine-forces-vastly-outnumbered-by-russia/ar-AAUfvnb">still outnumber them</a>.</p>
<p>The international military support for Ukraine is preventing Russia from holding land and establishing air superiority. If this continues, Russia will need to figure out a different way to wage war, one in which it can take and hold Ukrainian territory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182266/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Cohen is a Policy Analyst in Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and a PhD candidate in political science at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. He is also an emerging expert at the Forum on the Arms Trade.</span></em></p>An arms trade expert explains the wide variety of military aid nations around the world have sent to Ukraine.Jordan Cohen, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1673932021-09-07T10:48:10Z2021-09-07T10:48:10Z9/11’s legacy of drone warfare has changed how we view the military<p>In October 2001, nearly one month after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, a US Air Force pilot made history as the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2015/12/how-rogue-techies-armed-the-predator-almost-stopped-911-and-accidentally-invented-remote-war/">first person</a> to conduct a lethal strike with a modern drone – <a href="https://sts-program.mit.edu/book/robots-robotics-myths-autonomy">the Predator</a>.</p>
<p>In the months and years following that first strike, the drone – or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), as it is referred to by military professionals – has become the <a href="https://www.littlebrown.com/titles/lieutenant-colonel-wayne-phelps-usmc-ret/on-killing-remotely/9780316628297">“weapon of choice”</a> for the states who can afford them. </p>
<p>The “war on terror” that ensued demanded the use of military means, but did not have the legal or conceptual <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/stares_yacoubian_terror.pdf">legitimacy required</a> to convince the public in Nato countries that human casualties were necessary. The “war on terror”, due to its elusive nature as a war with blurry and unachievable objectives, has resulted in the west fighting an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/31/how-the-us-created-a-world-of-endless-war">“endless war”</a>.</p>
<p>The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a nonprofit news organisation, estimates that <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Q1eBZ275Znlpn05PnPO7Q1BkI3yJZbvB3JycywAmqWc/edit#gid=1997258237">since 2015</a>, the US has conducted more than 14,000 <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data">drone strikes</a> in Afghanistan alone.</p>
<p>The relentless push by governments for more drone strikes has led to three key military developments. First, the global development of drones has expanded, as evidenced by the use of drones by major global powers – such as China and Russia – as well as <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/introduction-how-we-became-a-world-of-drones/#:%7E:text=More%20than%20ten%20countries%20have,armed%20drones%20in%20their%20arsenals">regional ones</a>. Many US allies and specifically Nato members are equipping their armed forces with drones, either for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) missions, or to arm them and use them in combat functions. </p>
<p>In the European defence environment, some countries are <a href="https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/cws/files/cws_military_drones_in_europe_report.pdf">developing their own</a> drone production programmes. </p>
<h2>Fighting from afar</h2>
<p>The second development is a natural consequence of the first: in order to use drones, someone has to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/19/australian-pilots-drafted-to-help-fly-uk-drones-over-syria-and-iraq">fly them</a>. In a way that is hardly different from manned aircraft, a crew is required for the operation of drones. Military professionals who have been trained on the particular type of aircraft they are operating do so from within a cockpit, according to the relevant codes of conduct and <a href="https://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/images/documentation/DIA/20200529_NP_DIA-3.3.8_ESDAO_VF.pdf">laws of war</a>.</p>
<p>The third development is the arming of the drone. The US began this after 9/11, but recently other countries, such as <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-french-turn-to-armed-drones/">France, have armed</a> their military drones as well.</p>
<p>Drones are not a modern invention – they were created very soon after the birth of aviation, with the 1920s and 1930s seeing a spike in the efforts to create a weapon that can <a href="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/title/problem-pilots">kill from a distance</a>. Enter the guided missile, which was remotely guided, expendable and had no surveillance capabilities. </p>
<p>What makes the modern drone so different is that its crew is protected from harm. It can be precise enough to avoid collateral damage compared to more indiscriminate weapons, and it is connected to a network that allows the real-time view of its feed by military and technology professionals. </p>
<p>The crew has to follow, survey and collect information about a target for months and sometimes years before conducting a strike. Then, drone crews have to sit through the aftermath of their attack for a “bomb hit assessment”. </p>
<p>There is a lack of transparency around drone operations, attributed to the highly sensitive nature of information regarding military operations. One process not often discussed publicly is the request and confirmation of authorisation (from top officials, such as the US president) before a crew engages lethally, as well as the circumstances and criteria behind target selection. </p>
<h2>Misconceptions</h2>
<p>This secrecy has led to popular misconceptions about drones, how drone operations are conducted, and drone pilots themselves.</p>
<p>These military professionals are pilots, either allocated to fly drones, or recruited and trained exclusively for that function. While they have responsibility and accountability for their actions on a mission, both the military profession and society views them unfavourably. </p>
<p>Flying drones has been mockingly compared to <a href="https://geographicalimaginations.com/2013/09/15/theory-of-the-drone-10-killing-at-a-distance/">playing video games</a>, and drone pilots are being denied the <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA624215">same career opportunities</a> as fighter pilots, as demonstrated by the lack of drone pilots in the higher echelons of the various forces that <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1756.html">use drones</a>.</p>
<p>Drone pilots <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315530659">experience PTSD symptoms</a>, but are hardly taken seriously even by their <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/reexamination-distance-modern-warfare/">military colleagues</a>. At the same time, society’s view on drone strikes is highly ambivalent: while for some it is a necessary evil that can protect our own forces from having to deploy and engage in risky situations, for others it spells the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2011.596085">death of military virtue</a>. </p>
<p>Our <a href="http://www.uapress.ua.edu/product/Drone-Warfare-and-Lawfare-in-a-Post-Heroic-Age,6228.aspx">post-heroic</a> societies no longer tolerate losses of our own people. At the same time, they demonise or ostracise the very people who strive to operate in hostile environments <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA627394">from a distance</a>.</p>
<p>Both sides have arguments in their favour, but while this discussion is taking place, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/29/asia/afghanistan-kabul-evacuation-intl/index.html">latest drone strike</a> of August 31 in Afghanistan resulted in ten civilian deaths, seven of whom were children. This tragedy is only the latest in the death strikes that started with the attacks of 9/11 and have exacerbated society’s desensitisation of war casualties and lowered trust in international law.</p>
<p>Victims of drone strikes are often killed indiscriminately and without prior trial or fulfilling Geneva conventions criteria for the status of “combatant”. Two decades later, the legacy of 9/11 has been a completely changed international security environment, a distrust towards governments and their respect for human rights, and the way we fight our wars.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span><a href="mailto:karyoti@sam.sdu.dk">karyoti@sam.sdu.dk</a> receives funding from the Carlsberg Foundation (Carlsbergfondet).</span></em></p>The first modern, lethal drone strike took place one month after 9/11. Twenty years later, our view of warfare and military personnel has completely changed.Vicky Karyoti, PhD Candidate at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1658222021-08-12T02:12:07Z2021-08-12T02:12:07ZLethal autonomous weapons and World War III: it’s not too late to stop the rise of ‘killer robots’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415601/original/file-20210811-13-fvcs86.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=615%2C0%2C1023%2C675&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The STM Kargu attack drone.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.stm.com.tr/en/kargu-autonomous-tactical-multi-rotor-attack-uav">STM</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last year, according to a <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2021/229">United Nations report</a> published in March, Libyan government forces hunted down rebel forces using “lethal autonomous weapons systems” that were “programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition”. The deadly drones were <a href="https://www.stm.com.tr/en/kargu-autonomous-tactical-multi-rotor-attack-uav">Turkish-made quadcopters</a> about the size of a dinner plate, capable of delivering a warhead weighing a kilogram or so. </p>
<p>Artificial intelligence researchers like me have been <a href="https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/">warning</a> of the advent of such lethal autonomous weapons systems, which can make life-or-death decisions without human intervention, for years. A <a href="https://iview.abc.net.au/video/NC2103H026S00">recent episode of 4 Corners</a> reviewed this and many other risks posed by developments in AI.</p>
<p>Around 50 countries are <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/02/killer-robots-urgent-need-fast-track-talks">meeting</a> at the UN offices in Geneva this week in the latest attempt to hammer out a treaty to prevent the proliferation of these killer devices. History shows such treaties are needed, and that they can work.</p>
<h2>The lesson of nuclear weapons</h2>
<p>Scientists are pretty good at warning of the dangers facing the planet. Unfortunately, society is less good at paying attention.</p>
<p>In August 1945, the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing up to 200,000 civilians. Japan surrendered days later. The second world war was over, and the Cold War began.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/world-politics-explainer-the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-100452">World politics explainer: The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</a>
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</em>
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<p>The world still lives today under the threat of nuclear destruction. On a dozen or so occasions since then, we have come within minutes of all-out nuclear war.</p>
<p>Well before the first test of a nuclear bomb, many scientists working on the Manhattan Project were concerned about such a future. A <a href="https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/szilard-petition">secret petition</a> was sent to President Harry S. Truman in July 1945. It accurately predicted the future:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.</p>
<p>If after this war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation. All the resources of the United States, moral and material, may have to be mobilized to prevent the advent of such a world situation …</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Billions of dollars have since been spent on nuclear arsenals that maintain the threat of mutually assured destruction, the “continuous danger of sudden annihilation” that the physicists warned about in July 1945.</p>
<h2>A warning to the world</h2>
<p>Six years ago, thousands of my colleagues issued a <a href="https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/">similar warning</a> about a new threat. Only this time, the petition wasn’t secret. The world wasn’t at war. And the technologies weren’t being developed in secret. Nevertheless, they pose a similar threat to global stability.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/open-letter-we-must-stop-killer-robots-before-they-are-built-44577">Open letter: we must stop killer robots before they are built</a>
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<p>The threat comes this time from artificial intelligence, and in particular the development of lethal autonomous weapons: weapons that can identify, track and destroy targets without human intervention. The media often like to call them “killer robots”.</p>
<p>Our open letter to the UN carried a stark warning.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable. The endpoint of such a technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/worlds-deadliest-inventor-mikhail-kalashnikov-and-his-ak-47-126253">World's deadliest inventor: Mikhail Kalashnikov and his AK-47</a>
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<p>Strategically, autonomous weapons are a military dream. They let a military scale its operations unhindered by manpower constraints. One programmer can command hundreds of autonomous weapons. An army can take on the riskiest of missions without endangering its own soldiers. </p>
<h2>Nightmare swarms</h2>
<p>There are many reasons, however, why the military’s dream of lethal autonomous weapons will turn into a nightmare. First and foremost, there is a strong moral argument against killer robots. We give up an essential part of our humanity if we hand to a machine the decision of whether a person should live or die. </p>
<p>Beyond the moral arguments, there are many technical and legal reasons to be concerned about killer robots. One of the strongest is that they will revolutionise warfare. Autonomous weapons will be weapons of immense destruction. </p>
<p>Previously, if you wanted to do harm, you had to have an army of soldiers to wage war. You had to persuade this army to follow your orders. You had to train them, feed them and pay them. Now just one programmer could control hundreds of weapons.</p>
<p>In some ways lethal autonomous weapons are even more troubling than nuclear weapons. To build a nuclear bomb requires considerable technical sophistication. You need the resources of a nation state, skilled physicists and engineers, and access to scarce raw materials such as uranium and plutonium. As a result, nuclear weapons have not proliferated greatly. </p>
<p>Autonomous weapons require none of this, and if produced they will likely become cheap and plentiful. They will be perfect weapons of terror. </p>
<p>Can you imagine how terrifying it will be to be chased by a swarm of autonomous drones? Can you imagine such drones in the hands of terrorists and rogue states with no qualms about turning them on civilians? They will be an ideal weapon with which to suppress a civilian population. Unlike humans, they will not hesitate to commit atrocities, even genocide.</p>
<h2>Time for a treaty</h2>
<p>We stand at a crossroads on this issue. It needs to be seen as morally unacceptable for machines to decide who lives and who dies. And for the diplomats at the UN to negotiate a treaty limiting their use, just as we have treaties to limit chemical, biological and other weapons. In this way, we may be able to save ourselves and our children from this terrible future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Toby Walsh is a Laureate Fellow and Scientia Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science and author of the recent book, “2062: The World that AI Made” that explores the impact AI will have on society, including the impact on war. </span></em></p>Like atomic bombs and chemical and biological weapons, deadly drones that make their own decisions must be tightly controlled by an international treaty.Toby Walsh, Professor of AI at UNSW, Research Group Leader, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1546082021-05-12T14:20:17Z2021-05-12T14:20:17Z‘Almost divine power’: the lawyers who sign off who lives and who dies in modern war zones<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400004/original/file-20210511-24-fjouzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C22%2C4985%2C2784&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/shot-squad-soldiers-running-forward-atacking-675995536">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When we think of war, we might think of soldiers on the front line – or those pulling the trigger – as the ones responsible for the death or injuries of those they are targeting. But my <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-war-lawyers-9780198842927?cc=gb&lang=en&">research</a> suggests that over the past few decades an unlikely profession has become deeply involved in the conduct of war: lawyers.</p>
<p>Legal advisers (also called military lawyers) are trained as soldiers and are also qualified lawyers. It’s a military lawyer’s job to interpret the myriad rules of war, weigh the legal risk of a proposed action and provide preferably pithy advice and a range of lawful options for military activities to harried commanders. This could include guidance on the type of weapons that should be used, the timing of an attack to reduce the risk of casualties, or whether commanders should hold off and wait for more intelligence before proceeding.</p>
<p>State militaries have employed lawyers for decades – even centuries. But since the start of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-53156096">war on terror</a>” in 2001, military lawyers have played an increasingly vital role in deciding who lives and who dies in modern conflict zones. </p>
<p>I spent several years interviewing military lawyers at various locations in the Middle East, Europe and North America – from military bases, bustling cafes and even their own homes and gardens. They spoke candidly about how commanders had come to rely on their legal advice in lethal military operations, but also about their unease as lawyers in wielding this newfound power and the impact it has on their mental health.</p>
<p>Legal advisers told me how they often find themselves in situations where they are called into operations rooms in the middle of the night, asked to rapidly review the situation and give their bottom line. </p>
<p>One described being “the sole remaining impediment to a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/no-legal-objection-per-se/">sentence of death</a>”. And although military lawyers receive specific training before being assigned to roles, my research suggests it’s not always sufficient to prepare them for the highly stressful work of effectively advising on who should live and who should die in war zones.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Listen to Craig Jones talk about his research on <a href="https://theconversation.com/judge-jury-and-executioner-why-holding-militaries-to-account-for-alleged-war-crimes-is-so-hard-podcast-164117">The Conversation Weekly podcast</a>.</em> </p>
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<h2>‘Getting humans to kill’</h2>
<p>Legal advisers are not decision-makers: their job is to advise. It remains the responsibility of military commanders to decide, for example, whether or not a strike goes ahead. But from my research, it seems that in many instances, commanders sometimes look to lawyers for something approximating permission, or even psychological and moral support, as well as for <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263775815598103">legal advice</a>.</p>
<p>One military lawyer described to me how his advice seemed to have an “almost divine power” that could cause commanders to hesitate or to depart from their intuition. Another lawyer wrote about the reality of <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/no-legal-objection-per-se/">the power he holds</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I, as the legal advisor, am being asked by the commander whether he may legally kill these humans. I am the judge — he the jury and executioner. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another lawyer disclosed to me that he felt “more like a chaplain than a lawyer” because commanders came to him not only for legal advice but also for moral absolution. While another lawyer told me that his legal support was a vital component in “getting human beings to … kill other human beings in the name of the state”.</p>
<h2>Advice under pressure</h2>
<p>The US first pioneered the use of legal advisers in aerial targeting operations in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20761834">early 1990s</a>. But now many other nations, including <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263775815598103">Israel</a>, the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716822/20180614-doctrine_uk_legal_spt_jdp_3_46.pdf">UK</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200069">Australia</a>, <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1152&context=ils">Canada</a>, <a href="https://ihl-in-action.icrc.org/case-study/iraq-availability-legal-advisers">France</a> and the Netherlands, along with other <a href="https://www.ismllw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Legal-Gazette-Special-Issue.pdf">NATO member states</a>, regularly consult legal experts before, during and after launching military strikes.</p>
<p><a href="https://twitter.com/thewarspace">My research</a> focuses specifically on the US and Israel and looks at the extent to which legal advisers are involved in various stages of aerial targeting – known colloquially as the “<a href="https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-60/3-60-D17-Target-Dynamic-Task.pdf">kill chain</a>” – a process whereby a target is identified, tracked and ultimately killed or destroyed.</p>
<p>In recent decades, as surveillance technologies have become more sophisticated and widespread, the kill chain has been <a href="https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0303killchain/">compressed</a>. A process that once took <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/lines-of-descent/">several weeks</a> (and sometimes months) can take place, in theory, in hours and minutes. This means that military lawyers often operate in high-pressure environments – where there is no real time for deliberation or second opinions. </p>
<p>And sometimes military lawyers and commanders <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0609webwcover_0.pdf">get it wrong</a>. Like in 2016, when heavily armed US aircraft repeatedly fired on a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/searching-for-ground-truth-in-the-kunduz-hospital-bombing/">hospital run by aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières</a> in Afghanistan thinking it was an enemy building. Or in 2002, when the Israel Air Force killed <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28500/RSCAS%20PP%202013_17.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">thirteen civilians</a> in Gaza, including eight children, with a one-tonne bomb meant for a single military leader. On another occasion in Gaza, more than 20 members of one family were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/21/gaza-hospital-shelling-air-strike-israel-idf">killed</a> in a single strike. </p>
<p>In fact, a <a href="http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/07/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-airstrikes">study</a> by the non-profit organisation Human Rights Watch found that time-sensitive targeting operations tend to cause more civilian casualties than pre-planned operations – where more time is available for decision making.</p>
<h2>The wrong target</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man poses for photo in city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/399705/original/file-20210510-5566-xeig7g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Basim Razzo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Basim Razzo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I wanted to learn more about the real-world consequences of aerial targeting and legal advice. What did it look like on the ground to those beneath the barrage of bombs? So as part of my research, I also spoke to several people who had lost family members and their homes as a result of military airstrikes. </p>
<p>In one well-documented <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html">strike in Mosul</a>, Iraq, in 2015, an innocent civilian, Basim Razzo, lost his whole family to a military strike orchestrated by the US and executed by the Dutch Air Force as part of the war against <a href="https://airwars.org/conflict/coalition-in-iraq-and-syria/">Islamic State</a>. </p>
<p>The US military claimed the “target” was an Islamic State compound producing car bombs, but in reality, it was two homes – one where Basim lived with his wife, Mayada, and daughter, Tuqa, and adjacent, another where his brother, Mohannad, lived with his wife, Azza, and son, Najib. Basim was the sole survivor and following lengthy investigations the US military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/16/magazine/uncounted-civilian-casualties-iraq-airstrikes.html">offered him US$15,000</a> (£10,600) as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010615592111">compensation</a> – which he refused.</p>
<iframe frameborder="0" class="juxtapose" width="100%" height="700" src="https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/juxtapose/latest/embed/index.html?uid=88d48130-b170-11eb-b7bf-95443c729a29"></iframe>
<p>I spoke to Basim in April 2019, over three and a half years later. He told me how difficult day-to-day life still was. He suffers from chronic pain and has had several surgeries. He’s unable to work and earn a living because of his ongoing injuries, and he grieves the loss of his family. </p>
<p>As Basim put it, “there are no words to describe what happened to me”. Five years after the attack and still unable to walk or work, the Dutch government eventually made a “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/09/mosul-civilian-first-to-be-compensated-for-mistaken-coalition-bombing">voluntary offer</a>” of compensation to Basim, which he accepted.</p>
<h2>Haunted by advice</h2>
<p>Given the implications of their work, accounts are beginning to emerge – perhaps unsurprisingly – that some military lawyers are haunted by <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/moral-injury-the-crucial-missing-piece-in-understanding-soldier-suicides_b_1686674">moral injury</a> and <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/06-2019.pdf">post-traumatic stress disorder</a> (PTSD).</p>
<p>Then there’s also the issue that when military lawyers give advice that commanders don’t want to hear, they are often told to “stay in their lane”. As one lawyer told me, his advice should “maximise the space for the commander to make a decision” – but sometimes that advice goes unheard.</p>
<p>And herein lies the problem, the boundaries of the law, porous though they are, might temporarily demarcate the space of allowable violence, but it is not always helpful for navigating right from wrong – particularly when it concerns the decision to end human life.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Craig Jones receives funding from the Independent Social Research Foundation.</span></em></p>Military lawyers told me how they must make split-second decisions that weigh military variables against real human lives.Craig Jones, Lecturer in Political Geography, @thewarspace, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1517302020-12-10T20:24:48Z2020-12-10T20:24:48ZExperts suggest US embassies were hit with high-power microwaves – here’s how the weapons work<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374276/original/file-20201210-24-1t13yaa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C0%2C1255%2C675&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Several countries are developing microwave weapons, like this U.S. Air Force system designed to knock down drones by frying their electronics.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.wpafb.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1969142/enemy-drone-operators-may-soon-face-the-power-of-thor/">AFRL Directed Energy Directorate</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some of the cases of the mystery ailment that has afflicted U.S. embassy staff and CIA officers off and on since 2016 in Cuba, China, Russia and other countries <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/02/external-energy-source-may-explain-havana-syndrome-panel-finds-renewing-questions-about-possible-foreign-attack/">most likely were caused by pulsed electromagnetic energy</a>, according to <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2022/item/2273-complementary-efforts-on-anomalous-health-incidents">a report by a panel of experts</a> convened by national intelligence agencies.</p>
<p>The report’s findings are similar to those of another <a href="https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25889/an-assessment-of-illness-in-us-government-employees-and-their-families-at-overseas-embassies">report released by the National Academies</a> in 2020. In that report, a committee of 19 experts in medicine and other fields concluded that directed, pulsed radiofrequency energy is the “most plausible mechanism” to explain the illness, dubbed “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/us/politics/diplomat-attacks-havana-syndrome.html">Havana syndrome</a>.”</p>
<p>Neither report is definitive, and their authors don’t address who targeted the embassies or why they were targeted. But the technology behind the suspected weapons is well understood and dates back to the Cold War arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. High-power microwave weapons are generally designed to disable electronic equipment. But as the Havana syndrome reports show, these pulses of energy can harm people, as well.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DXWQnZYAAAAJ&hl=en">an electrical and computer engineer</a> who designs and builds sources of high-power microwaves, I have spent decades studying the physics of these sources, including work with the U.S. Department of Defense. Directed energy microwave weapons convert energy from a power source – a wall plug in a lab or the engine on a military vehicle – into radiated electromagnetic energy and focus it on a target. The directed high-power microwaves damage equipment, particularly electronics, without killing nearby people. </p>
<p>Two good examples are Boeing’s <a href="https://www.boeing.com/features/2012/10/bds-champ-10-22-12.page">Counter-electronics High-powered Microwave Advanced Missile Project</a> (CHAMP), which is a high-power microwave source mounted in a missile, and <a href="https://afresearchlab.com/technology/directed-energy/successstories/counter-swarm-high-power-weapon/">Tactical High-power Operational Responder</a> (THOR), which was recently developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory to knock out swarms of drones. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Ogi_o8dszrk?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A news report about the U.S. Air Force’s high-power microwave anti-drone weapon THOR.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Cold War origins</h2>
<p>These types of directed energy microwave devices came on the scene in the late 1960s in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. They were enabled by the development of <a href="http://www.pulsedpower.eu/">pulsed power</a> in the 1960s. Pulsed power generates short electrical pulses that have very high electrical power, meaning both high voltage – up to a few megavolts – and large electrical currents – tens of kiloamps. That’s more voltage than the highest-voltage long-distance power transmission lines, and about the amount of current in a lightning bolt.</p>
<p>Plasma physicists at the time realized that if you could generate, for example, a 1-megavolt electron beam with 10-kiloamp current, the result would be a beam power of 10 billion watts, or gigawatts. Converting 10% of that beam power into microwaves using standard microwave tube technology that dates back to the 1940s generates 1 gigawatt of microwaves. For comparison, the output power of today’s typical microwave ovens is around a thousand watts – a million times smaller.</p>
<p>The development of this technology led to a subset of the U.S.-Soviet arms race – a microwave power derby. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, I and other American scientists gained access to Russian pulsed power accelerators, like the SINUS-6 that is still working in my lab. I had a fruitful decade of collaboration with my Russian colleagues, which swiftly ended following Vladimir Putin’s rise to power.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a machine in a laboratory with a rectilinear funnel-shaped structure in the foreground and a long metal pipe receding into the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/374243/original/file-20201210-16-1cqrvik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This high-power microwave generator built in the Soviet Union continues to operate in Edl Schamiloglu’s lab at the University of New Mexico.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Edl Schamiloglu, University of New Mexico</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Today, research in high-power microwaves continues in the U.S. and Russia but has exploded in China. I have visited labs in Russia since 1991 and labs in China since 2006, and the investment being made by China dwarfs activity in the U.S. and Russia. Dozens of countries now have active high-power microwave research programs. </p>
<h2>Lots of power, little heat</h2>
<p>Although these high-power microwave sources generate very high power levels, they tend to generate repeated short pulses. For example, the SINUS-6 in my lab produces an output pulse on the order of 10 nanoseconds, or billionths of a second. So even when generating 1 gigawatt of output power, a 10-nanosecond pulse has an energy content of only 10 joules. To put this in perspective, the average microwave oven in one second generates 1 kilojoule, or thousand joules of energy. It typically takes about 4 minutes to boil a cup of water, which corresponds to 240 kilojoules of energy. </p>
<p>This is why microwaves generated by these high-power microwave weapons don’t generate noticeable amounts of heat, let alone cause people to explode like baked potatoes in microwave ovens. </p>
<p>High power is important in these weapons because generating very high instantaneous power yields very high instantaneous electric fields, which scale as the square root of the power. It is these high electric fields that can disrupt electronics, which is why the Department of Defense is interested in these devices.</p>
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<h2>How it affects people</h2>
<p>The National Academies report links high-power microwaves to impacts on people through the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1152/jappl.1962.17.4.689">Frey effect</a>. The human head acts as a receiving antenna for microwaves in the low gigahertz frequency range. Pulses of microwaves in these frequencies can cause people to hear sounds, which is one of the symptoms reported by the affected U.S. personnel. <a href="https://www.healthline.com/health-news/what-do-we-know-about-havana-syndrome#Strange-Sounds-and-Neurological-Symptoms">Other symptoms</a> Havana syndrome sufferers have reported include headaches, nausea, hearing loss, lightheadedness and cognitive issues.</p>
<p>The report notes that electronic devices were not disrupted during the attacks, suggesting that the power levels needed for the Frey effect are lower than would be required for an attack on electronics. This would be consistent with a high-power microwave weapon located at some distance from the targets. Power decreases dramatically with distance through the <a href="https://www.khanacademy.org/science/electrical-engineering/ee-electrostatics/ee-electric-force-and-electric-field/a/ee-inverse-square-law">inverse square law</a>, which means one of these devices could produce a power level at the target that would be too low to affect electronics but that could induce the Frey effect.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The Russians and the Chinese certainly possess the capabilities of fielding high-power microwave sources like the ones that appear to have been used in Cuba and China. The truth of what actually happened to U.S. personnel in Cuba and China – and why – might remain a mystery, but the technology most likely involved comes from textbook physics, and the military powers of the world continue to develop and deploy it.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on December 10, 2020.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/151730/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edl Schamiloglu receives funding from AFOSR, DARPA and ONR to perform basic research on the development of high power microwave sources. He also receives support from industry (Verus Research, General Atomics Electromagnetic System Division).
He serves as Chair of IEC SC77C, which develops civilian standards to protect equipment and infrastructure from IEMI.
Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force or the DOD.</span></em></p>High-power microwave weapons are useful for disabling electronics. A new report says they ‘plausibly explain’ some ailments suffered by US diplomats and CIA agents in Cuba, China and other countries.Edl Schamiloglu, Distinguished Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of New MexicoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1346672020-03-31T05:54:25Z2020-03-31T05:54:25Z‘Pandemic drones’: useful for enforcing social distancing, or for creating a police state?<p>People in Western Australia may soon see more than birds in the sky, as the state’s police force <a href="https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/wa-coronavirus-live-wa-to-see-if-premier-adopts-two-person-rule-as-cruise-debacle-escalates-20200329-p54f35.html">has announced plans</a> to deploy drones to enforce social distancing. The drones will visit parks, beaches and cafe strips, ensuring people comply with the most <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/mar/30/australia-coronavirus-shutdown-rules-stage-3-not-lockdown-what-is-closed-open-restrictions">recent round of gathering rules</a>. </p>
<p>As COVID-19 restrictions tighten around the world, governments are harnessing the potential of drones. From delivering medical supplies, to helping keep people indoors – drones can do a lot in a pandemic.</p>
<p>Since the outbreak began, China has used drones to deliver <a href="https://www.terra-drone.net/global/2020/02/07/terra-drones-group-company-antwork-helps-fighting-corona-virus-with-drones/">medical supplies</a> and <a href="https://kr-asia.com/jd-com-uses-logistics-drones-as-coronavirus-disrupts-traffic-in-china">food</a>, <a href="https://apnews.com/PR%20Newswire/084d73b9bc8644301e02ef2d8e809597">disinfect villages</a>, and even provide <a href="https://www.dezeen.com/2020/02/20/drones-robots-coronavirus-china-technology/">lighting</a> to <a href="https://www.dezeen.com/2020/02/03/coronavirus-hospital-complete-wuhan-china-news/">build a hospital in Wuhan in nine days</a>. <a href="https://www.gpsworld.com/china-fights-coronavirus-with-delivery-drones/">Drone medical deliveries</a> have cut transit times, reduced the strain on health personnel and enabled contactless handovers, reducing the risk of infection.</p>
<p>It’s clear drones are helping combat COVID-19, as governments use them to control and monitor. </p>
<p>But these measures may be difficult to rollback once the pandemic passes. And safeguards will be needed to prevent unwanted surveillance in the future.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aerial-threat-why-drone-hacking-could-be-bad-news-for-the-military-124588">Aerial threat: why drone hacking could be bad news for the military</a>
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<h2>Drone use: clever, quirky and sometimes concerning</h2>
<p>With cities on lockdown, drones have shown <a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-the-uncanny-melancholy-of-empty-photographs-in-the-time-of-coronavirus-133615">uncanny</a> images of emptied urban landscapes from <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/wuhan-coronavirus-drone-video-abandoned-city-quarantine-2020-2?r=US&IR=T">Wuhan</a> and <a href="https://futurism.com/drone-footage-haunting-emptiness-cities-under-quarantine">metros across the globe</a>. </p>
<p>Social distancing has inspired some quirky uses by individuals, including walking the dog and <a href="https://nypost.com/2020/03/23/brooklyn-guy-uses-drone-to-hit-on-a-gal-during-coronavirus-lockdown/">asking for a date</a>.</p>
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<p>But the main game has been about control. China is using drones to enforce quarantine rules and deter gatherings that violate social distancing rules. </p>
<p>One viral video showed a drone scolding an elderly woman for not wearing a mask. In some cases, traffic police and municipal officials used drones fitted with speakers to <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6535353/china-coronavirus-drones-quarantine/">order people home and break up mahjong games</a>.</p>
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<p>Flying at high altitudes, drones can help police and other officials monitor large areas to identify those violating restrictions. Similar tactics are being used in <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/spanish-police-using-drones-to-ask-people-stay-at-home-2020-3">Madrid</a> and <a href="http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20200322-french-police-deploy-drones-helicopters-to-enforce-coronavirus-restrictions-covivd-19-lockdown">Nice</a>, with talk of deployment in many other places.</p>
<h2>A defence for the ‘good drone’?</h2>
<p>There are huge advantages in sending drones into disaster zones such as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/gallery/2020/feb/11/drones-thermal-imaging-australia-koalas-bushfire-crisis">bushfires</a>, or remote landscapes for <a href="https://www.dezeen.com/2019/05/11/rega-autonomous-rescue-drone/">search and rescue</a>. Pilots can safely stream crucial vision from a drone’s optical and thermal cameras. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drones-help-track-wildfires-count-wildlife-and-map-plants-125115">Drones help track wildfires, count wildlife and map plants</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But while “good drones” can be valuable in disaster, they have been criticised for giving drone warfare an ethical veneer by association with humanitarian work. Some have even argued that using drones at all risks tainting relief work, because militaries <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Good-Drone-1st-Edition/Sandvik-Jumbert/p/book/9781472451118">have played a major role in developing drone technologies that are also responsible for humanitarian tragedies</a>. </p>
<p>Like all technologies, the question with drones should be about how they are used. For instance, inspecting the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/04/inside-the-drone-missions-to-fukushima/237981/">breached nuclear reactor at Fukushima</a> with drones is sensible. But embedding systems of control that can be turned against civilians is its own disaster in the making.</p>
<h2>Normalising surveillance</h2>
<p>With high definition and infrared images streamed to command stations, China’s drones may be able to use <a href="https://www.wsj.com/video/china-deploys-drones-citizens-and-big-data-to-tackle-coronavirus/40590C07-FB56-46CE-8C25-72471A5ECD39.html">facial recognition</a> to identify specific individuals using its <a href="https://time.com/collection/davos-2019/5502592/china-social-credit-score/">Social Credit System</a>, and fine them for indiscretions. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hundreds-of-chinese-citizens-told-me-what-they-thought-about-the-controversial-social-credit-system-127467">Hundreds of Chinese citizens told me what they thought about the controversial social credit system</a>
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</em>
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<p>This level of social control may be appealing in a pandemic that could cost millions of lives. But it could also have chilling effects on social and political life.</p>
<p>Surveillance tools typically work best for social control when <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=aXXlAAAAQBAJ">people know they are being watched</a>. Even in liberal societies, people might think twice about joining climate or racial justice protests if they know they’ll be recorded by a drone overhead.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/323423/original/file-20200326-132995-1ycz5w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used drones to capture scenes from the 2017 Black Lives Matter protests in Baltimore.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">FBI / ACLU</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Feeling like you’re constantly being watched can can create a kind of atmospheric anxiety, particularly for marginalised groups that are already closely monitored because of their religion or welfare status.</p>
<p>Putting more drones in the sky raises concerns about trust, privacy, data protection and ownership. In a crisis, those questions are often ignored. This was clear after 9/11, when the world learnt the lessons of surveillance systems and draconian national security laws.</p>
<h2>The impact would hit home</h2>
<p>Police in the west are already <a href="http://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2017/04/CSD-Public-Safety-Drones-Web.pdf">deploying drones</a> for various purposes, including at <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/police-drones-to-monitor-crowds-at-footy-public-events-from-next-month-20190709-p525jf.html">sporting events in Australia</a>. Our defence force is buying Reaper MQ-9B drones because they are cleared for use in <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/mq-9b-sky-guardian-chosen-over-reaper">civilian airspace</a>.</p>
<p>We might be fine with <a href="https://wing.com/australia/canberra/">delivery drones in Canberra</a>, or disaster drones ferrying urgent medical supplies, but how would we feel if they were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-50262650">indistinguishable</a> from drones piloted by police, the military or private security companies?</p>
<p>A team at the University of South Australia is currently designing a <a href="http://theleadsouthaustralia.com.au/industries/technology/pandemic-drone-could-detect-virus-symptoms-in-crowds/">“pandemic” drone</a> to detect virus symptoms such as fever and coughing from a distance. Valuable as that is now, this tool could easily be used to intrusively manage the public’s health after the crisis is over.</p>
<p>It can be difficult to see the long term impacts of choices made in an emergency. But now is the best time for policymakers to set limits on how drones an be used in public space. </p>
<p>They need to write sunset clauses into new laws so that surveillance and control systems are rolled back once the pandemic eases, and create accountability mechanisms to ensure oversight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134667/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Richardson receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>While ‘good drones’ have been valuable in this pandemic, using drones to embed new systems of surveillance could be a dangerous and slippery slope.Michael Richardson, Senior Research Fellow, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294112020-01-07T15:58:43Z2020-01-07T15:58:43ZIran attack: how Reaper drones really carry out airstrikes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308786/original/file-20200107-123403-wityew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/las-vegas-nov-17-mq9-reaper-1572510682">Kit Leong/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent killing of senior Iranian general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/03/baghdad-airport-iraq-attack-deaths-iran-us-tensions">Qassem Soleimani</a> has been widely reported as conducted by an <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/">MQ-9 Reaper</a> drone. But what does such an operation actually involve? While the ultimate decision to carry out the attack has clearly been placed with <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-the-us-and-iran-on-the-brink-of-war-the-dangers-of-trumps-policy-of-going-it-alone-become-clear-129295">the Trump administration</a>, much of the reporting and commentary has still bought into the misleading idea that drones enable instant killing using machines that take away the risks and responsibilities of warfare from military personnel.</p>
<p>The US and other militaries that use attack drones are generally very secretive about their operations, adding to the lingering false perceptions. As such, no official statements have confirmed the use of the Reaper in this instance, although <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html">several reports</a> include quotes from unnamed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-pentagon/pentagon-says-iranian-commander-soleimani-was-developing-plans-to-attack-americans-idUSKBN1Z2056">government sources</a> that do so. However, a drone strike seems likely in this case because of the precise nature of the attack, and the Reaper is the only publicly known attack drone now operated by the US military.</p>
<p>I spent <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reaper-Force-Inside-Britains-Drone/dp/1789460786/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">two years working</a> with two RAF Reaper squadrons to research the people who fly this aircraft. This included watching real-time lethal strikes alongside crews at Creech Air Force Base and RAF Waddington. It also included 90 interviews with people who work with Reapers. Based on what I learnt, here are the key things you need to know about how such an attack would probably play out, and the importance of understanding the role of human military operators.</p>
<p>First, Reapers aren’t launched at the touch of a button from <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7852845/BBC-NORTH-AMERICA-EDITOR-JON-SOPEL-Decision-Trumps-White-House.html">thousands of miles away</a>. It takes up to two seconds for a satellite control signal to reach a Reaper on another continent, so such a delay would cause crashes on take-off or landing. </p>
<p>Instead, the Reaper has to be taken off within the line of sight of a nearby launch and recovery pilot. This happens in or near the location where the drone’s mission will take place. Once the Reaper is safely airborne, control can be transferred to a crew thousands of miles away. </p>
<p>One report claimed that the drone used in the Soleimani killing “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7852845/BBC-NORTH-AMERICA-EDITOR-JON-SOPEL-Decision-Trumps-White-House.html">was overhead</a> Baghdad airport” when its missile was launched. True, Soleimani was killed at Baghdad airport and a Reaper may have been orbiting the target area. But Hellfire missiles are not fired straight downwards, and nor does a Reaper hover like a helicopter or the smaller <a href="https://www.dji.com/uk/phantom-3-adv">DJI Phantom drone</a>.</p>
<p>The Reaper is an aircraft with a 20-metre wingspan. It is <a href="https://www.aerospacengineering.net/flight-control-surfaces/">piloted using flight control surfaces</a> like flaps and ailerons, which are moved via satellite signal. For a successful missile firing, the Reaper needs to be up to a few kilometres away from its target and then pointed towards it to create the right firing angle. The missiles typically take around 30 seconds to hit their target, depending on the launch height and distance.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308704/original/file-20200106-123381-1cuqbxf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dr Peter Lee spent two years researching the MQ Reaper and the people who operate it.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Lee</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once a target is identified, it’s up to the human operators to launch the attack. Reapers are not autonomous, decision-making weapon systems that select victims or choose how and when to kill them. Soleimani <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/laser-guided-hellfire-missile-traveling-230-mph-killed-qassem-soleimani">was killed by a Hellfire laser-guided missile</a> that may have come from a drone, but it would have been fired by a pilot in a ground control station located in the US.</p>
<p>Each missile would then have been guided by a sensor operator onto Soleimani’s car or his escort vehicle. This represents the final stage in a highly human operation. Sometimes we get the impression that the drone does it all. It doesn’t.</p>
<h2>Not a video game</h2>
<p>This is important to understand because drones are often portrayed as turning killing “<a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-7852247/PETER-HITCHENS-killing-Iranian-General-Qasem-Soleimani-state-murder.html">into a video game</a>”. But that’s not an accurate analogy. </p>
<p>At a purely ergonomic level, the controls of an MQ-9 Reaper drone are actually neither as sophisticated nor as sensitive as state-of-the-art gaming controllers. The MQ-1 Predator, on which the MQ-9 Reaper is based, was <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Seeking-Security-Insecure-World-3/dp/1442252146/ref=sr_1_2?keywords=Seeking+Security+in+an+Insecure+World&qid=1578301089&s=books&sr=1-2">rushed into service after 9/11</a> and typical military aircraft testing and development was not carried out because of time constraints. As a result, the controls were not developed to be as user-friendly as they will be in the Reaper’s successors.</p>
<p>More important is the human dimension. When Reaper crews have followed someone for days or weeks, their target is not just pixels on a screen but a living human being. Operators watch targets spend time with family and friends and even playing with their children.</p>
<p>Crews, commanders and image analysts also continue to watch from above after a missile or bomb strike, conducting battle damage assessment. They see the bits of bodies being collected and taken for burial. They see grieving, devastated family members. And they know it is no game with a reset button.</p>
<p>As a result, operating a drone carries real risks. For one thing, terrorists have tried to target Reaper pilots and <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-hackers-publish-hitlist-of-drone-pilots-xz59sq5bb">published a hit-list</a>. But more prevalent is the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33384526">psychological risk</a> in repeatedly witnessing traumatising events and lethal strikes in close-up detail. A senior Reaper commander has described the impact of this as “<a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33384526">far greater</a> than it ever was with a manned cockpit”. These psychological effects are not yet fully understood but the risk is there. </p>
<p>As one sensor operator <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reaper-Force-Inside-Britains-Drone/dp/1789460786/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr">I interviewed said</a>: “If anybody on the Reaper fleet says it doesn’t affect them, then they’re lying. It does. It has to.”</p>
<p>Remotely piloted aircraft like the Reaper will provide key air force capabilities for generations to come. For people to debate this technology in a useful way, they need to know what they can and cannot do. And understand that their governments are not using autonomous drones to kill random victims. Human operators are making life-and-death decisions with huge consequences for everyone involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129411/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lee is the author of Reaper Force: The Inside Story of Britain's Drone Wars.</span></em></p>The drone probably used to kill Iranian general Qassem Soleimani doesn’t take away all risks and responsibilities from military personnel.Peter Lee, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director, Security and Risk Research, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1242492019-12-10T18:01:16Z2019-12-10T18:01:16ZWhat can drones do to protect civilians in armed conflict?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305957/original/file-20191209-90592-jegcky.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=112%2C348%2C1135%2C479&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.N. technicians prepare an unarmed drone for flight over the Democratic Republic of Congo.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/monusco/11189522286/">MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Drones are usually in the news for bad reasons, like controversial <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/15/targeted-killing-secrecy-drone-memos-excerpt">killings of suspected terrorists</a> in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html">bombings of Saudi oil facilities</a> or <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-45073385">an assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro</a>.</p>
<p>What many people may not know is that United Nations peacekeepers use drones to protect civilians from violence. These drones are different: They don’t carry weapons.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/person/michael-yekple/">followed the U.N.’s use of drones</a> since its beginning in 2013 and have spoken with peacekeepers and U.N. officers who are familiar with their use. I believe drones have the potential to save lives. </p>
<p>But that doesn’t mean they necessarily will.</p>
<h2>Violence is common</h2>
<p>The U.N. is often called in to <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en">help calm trouble spots</a> around the globe, sending soldiers, police and other officials from U.N. member countries to conflict zones to keep warring groups separate and reduce violence.</p>
<p>In countries with civil wars and sectarian conflict, civilians are often caught up in the violence, either by accident or targeted intentionally by armed fighters.</p>
<p>In July 2016, for instance, fighting between armed militias in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/10/south-sudan-capital-juba-violence-salva-kiir">pinned U.N. soldiers in their own base</a>, leaving them unable to help protect civilians. When more than two weeks of fighting ended, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20339&LangID=E">73 civilians were dead, 217 women and girls were sexually assaulted</a> and <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/sudan-violence-displaced-over-36-000-people-since-102212618.html">36,000 civilians fled into refugee camps</a>.</p>
<p>Just a year later, in 2017, in the Central African Republic, more brutalities against civilians under U.N. protection left <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/27/central-african-republic-civilians-targeted-violence-surges">188 dead, 25 women and girls raped, and many more displaced</a>, according to the Human Rights Watch advocacy group.</p>
<p>These types of incidents are common throughout the U.N.’s many decades of peacekeeping efforts, with civilians slaughtered, raped or displaced even while supposedly under U.N. protection.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305962/original/file-20191209-90557-tu2blt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">U.N. peacekeeping forces defend their base from a militia attack in Democratic Republic of Congo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/monusco/7684325750/">MONUSCO/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Help may be in the air</h2>
<p>Since 2014, the U.N. has been using drones in the conflict zones of <a href="https://undocs.org/S/RES/2098(2013)">Democratic Republic of Congo</a> and more recently in <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2016/drones-are-effective-protecting-civilians">Mali and Central African Republic</a> to gather information, in hopes of directing peacekeepers to people and places under threat.</p>
<p>This sounds good in theory, but there are no known cases where drones have actually triggered troop movements that saved lives. At least not yet. </p>
<p>The U.N. has a history of trying new ways to protect civilians that <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/09/twenty-years-on-time-for-accountability-system-protection-civilians/">end up not working out</a>. For instance, plans to protect civilians in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1635591.pdf">South Sudan</a> <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2018-01-24/note-correspondents-findings-central-african-republic">or Central African Republic</a> were not ultimately followed by the U.N. troops on the ground. So it’s not certain that new methods would, in fact, work better.</p>
<p>For one thing, getting drones in the right places can be complicated. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there were <a href="http://drones.newamerica.org/primer/DronesAndAerialObservation.pdf#page=87">five drones to cover more than 900,000 square miles</a>, but there was money to <a href="http://drones.newamerica.org/primer/DronesAndAerialObservation.pdf#page=90">operate only one at a time</a>. On the ground, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping">there is one peacekeeper for each 50 square miles</a>. This is too small to guarantee a quick response to crises. </p>
<p>Even if drones are in key places, the information they gather has to get to peacekeeping soldiers quickly enough that a response can arrive and prevent violence. To be fast enough to save lives, drone pilots, intelligence analysts and the peacekeepers themselves have to coordinate closely. </p>
<p>The U.N.’s drones are unarmed, so the people who fly them by remote control have to <a href="http://drones.newamerica.org/primer/DronesAndAerialObservation.pdf#page=90">write reports and send data to intelligence units</a> to determine whether there are any threats to civilians, and, if so, what the peacekeepers should do about them. Most U.N. missions <a href="http://drones.newamerica.org/primer/">don’t have enough people or equipment</a> to analyze drone footage, so the process can take days or weeks.</p>
<p>The 15 U.N. intelligence officers working in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, <a href="http://drones.newamerica.org/primer/">say they have enough work to occupy hundreds</a> more colleagues. <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1608_Demystifying-Intelligence.pdf">However, the U.N. has historically avoided intelligence activity</a> because of its association with covert operations, which run counter to the organization’s intentions of operating openly and without deception.</p>
<p>Even if peacekeepers do get timely information, they may not respond quickly to prevent civilians from being harmed if they do not have enough soldiers or patrol vehicles or helicopters to respond. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/305961/original/file-20191209-90557-b6wb04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.N. peacekeepers from Benin patrol in the Democratic Republic of Congo, on the lookout for local armed militia groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/monusco/24306912128/">MONUSCO/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Drones still have potential</h2>
<p>All these problems don’t mean drones are useless at protecting civilians. For instance, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20150409-un-drones-future-peacekeeping-democratic-republic-congo-fdlr-humanitarian-drc">U.N. drones discovered armed groups smuggling gold</a> believed to be providing funding for the armed groups and their activities. That was news to the U.N., and authorities stopped the smuggling. Drones also <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/05/467632-un-mission-helps-rescue-shipwrecked-passengers-eastern-dr-congo">helped save 14 people</a> in Democratic Republic of Congo after their boat capsized.</p>
<p>I believe these efforts and others aimed at preventing violence could be more effective with more support from U.N. member nations. In recent years, though, wealthy countries have <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-27/u-s-and-china-quietly-agree-on-un-cuts-as-they-feud-over-trade">slashed their contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping budget</a> and <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping">reduced the number of soldiers</a> they’ll send on missions. That has left peacekeeping missions to do their work with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping">ill-equipped, poorly trained soldiers from poor nations</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124249/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Yekple does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Drones could help United Nations peacekeepers save civilians’ lives – but there are obstacles.Michael Yekple, Ph.D. Candidate in Security Studies, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1245882019-10-07T19:11:55Z2019-10-07T19:11:55ZAerial threat: why drone hacking could be bad news for the military<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295733/original/file-20191007-121060-wgs9s1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C0%2C5089%2C2866&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are military drones a security threat to their own operators?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/military-staging-base-army-engineer-soldiers-761939488">Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly called drones, are now a <a href="https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/equipment-of-the-army/surveillance/unmanned-aerial-vehicles">fundamental part of defence force capability</a>, from intelligence gathering to unmanned engagement in military operations. But what happens if our own technology is turned against us?</p>
<p>Between 2015 and 2022, the global commercial drone market is <a href="https://store.frost.com/analysis-of-the-drone-delivery-landscape-and-the-evolving-business-opportunities-2018.html">expected to grow from A$5.95 billion to A$7.47 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Drones are now being used in a host of applications, including <a href="https://esriaustralia.com.au/esri-australia-blog/using-drones-in-agriculture-how-to-get-started-blg-160">agriculture</a>, <a href="https://dronelife.com/2018/08/07/drones-are-becoming-a-filmmakers-tool/">media</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&node=8037720011">parcel delivery</a>, and <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/technology/aircraft/intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance/mq-4c-triton-unmanned-aircraft">defence</a>. </p>
<p>However, as with all IT technology, manufacturers and users may leave the digital doors unlocked. This potentially leaves <a href="https://threatpost.com/drones-breach-cyberdefenses/143075/">opportunities for cyber-criminals</a> and perhaps even cyber-warfare.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/police-drones-can-we-trust-the-eyes-in-the-skies-53981">Police drones: can we trust the eyes in the skies?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Imagine a defence operation in which a drone is sent out to spy on enemy territory. The enemy identifies the drone but instead of disabling it, compromises the sensors (vision, sonar, and so on) to inject false data. Acting upon such data could then result in inappropriate tactics and, in a worst case scenario, may even lead to avoidable casualties.</p>
<p>UK cybersecurity consultant James Dale <a href="https://www.paconsulting.com/newsroom/expert-quotes/threat-post-drones-are-quickly-becoming-a-cybersecurity-nightmare-25-march-2019/">warned earlier this year</a> that “equipment is now available to hack drones so they can bypass technology controls”.</p>
<p>Drones are relatively cheap technologies for military use – certainly cheaper than the use of satellites for surveillance. Off-the-shelf drones can be used to gather intelligence, without any significant development effort.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, governments have cracked down on illegal civilian drone use, and imposed no-fly zones around secure infrastructure such as airports. Drone manufacturers have been forced to provide “geofencing” software to avoid situations such as the recent <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/kamikaze-drones-believed-used-in-saudi-arabia-oil-field-strike-2019-9?r=US&IR=T">drone strike in a Saudi oil field</a>. However, cyber criminals are smart enough to bypass such controls and openly provide services to help consumers get past government and military-enforced no-fly zones.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=302&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/295544/original/file-20191004-52796-g71sle.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It doesn’t cost much to skirt around the no-fly rules.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russian software company <a href="http://www.coptersafe.com/">Coptersafe</a> sells such modifications for a few hundred dollars. Anyone can buy a drone from a retail store, purchase the modifications, and then send their drone into no-fly zones such as military bases and airports. Ironically, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/2127577/mysterious-drone-swarm-attacks-military-base-syria-exposing">Russia’s military base in Syria came under attack from drones last year</a>.</p>
<h2>Australia on the frontline</h2>
<p>Australia is at the frontier of the military drone revolution, equipping itself with a fleet of hundreds of new drones. Lieutenant Colonel Keirin Joyce, discussing the program in a recent <a href="https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/strike-air-combat/2151-podcast-eye-in-the-sky-keirin-joyce-lieutenant-colonel-so1-uas-army-uas-drone-sub-program-manager">defence podcast</a>, declared Australia will soon be “the most unmanned [air vehicle] army in the world per capita”.</p>
<p>It will be essential to safeguard every single component of this sophisticated unmanned aerial fleet from cyber attack.</p>
<p>When drones were developed, cyber security was not a priority. Let’s explore a few potential threats to drone technology:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>drone navigation is based on the Global Positioning System (GPS). It’s possible an attacker can break the encryption of this communication channel. Fake signals can be fed to the targeted drone and the drone effectively gets lost. This type of attack can be launched without being in close physical proximity</p></li>
<li><p>with knowledge of the flight controller systems, hackers can gain access using “brute force” attacks. Then, the captured video footage can be manipulated to mislead the operator and influence ground operations</p></li>
<li><p>a drone fitted with sensors could be manipulated by injecting rogue signals. For example, the gyroscopes on a drone can be misled using an external source of audio energy. Cyber criminals may take advantage of this design characteristic to create false sensor readings</p></li>
<li><p>drones’ onboard control systems are effectively small computers. Drone control systems (onboard and ground-based controllers) are also vulnerable to malicious software or Maldrone (malware for drones). The founder and CTO of CloudSEK, Rahul Sasi discovered a backdoor in the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parrot_AR.Drone">Parrot AR.Drone</a>. Using malicious software, an attacker can establish remote communication and can take control of the drone. Attackers can also inject false data to mislead the operators. This type of malware can be installed silently without any visible sign to the operators. The consequences are significant if the drones are used for military operations.</p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eye-in-the-sky-and-the-moral-dilemmas-of-modern-warfare-56989">Eye in the Sky and the moral dilemmas of modern warfare</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As with traditional cyber-crime, it’s likely 2019 will see a sharp rise in drone-related incidents. However, these security breaches should not discourage the use of drones for personal, industrial or military applications. Drones are great tools in the era of <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/drones-in-smart-cities-55717/">smart cities</a>, for instance. </p>
<p>But we should not forget the potential for cyber crime – and nowhere are the stakes higher than in military drone use. Clearly, the use of drones needs to be carefully regulated. And the first step is for the government and the Australian Defence Force to be fully aware of the risks.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Drones are now an integral part of defence force capability, from intelligence gathering to unmanned theatre engagement. But what happens if our own technology is turned against us?Mohiuddin Ahmed, Lecturer of Computing & Security, Edith Cowan UniversityPaul Haskell-Dowland, Associate Dean (Computing and Security), Edith Cowan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/711192017-01-12T11:50:07Z2017-01-12T11:50:07ZDrones delivering packages in cities won’t take off – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152302/original/image-20170110-29024-1ri1w1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/pic-326291684/stock-photo-drone-delivers-the-goods-against-the-background-of-new-york.html?src=czklxhMby9ir5uQFl5KwNA-1-8">Who is Danny</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>You may have gasped with disbelief the first time you saw a photograph of a drone home-delivering a box from Amazon or cakes from a bakery or carrying a bag of crisps. Until recently, this was the stuff of science fiction. Your initial reaction was probably: “Amazing … but will it ever take off?”</p>
<p>Drones – or unmanned aerial vehicles, as we once called them – have now become capable of lifting and delivering on the back of continued research and technological ingenuity. Amazon has recently been trialling drones <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-17/australian-startup-flirtey-takes-on-google-in-drone-race/7416004">in Australia</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNySOrI2Ny8">the UK</a>, but don’t get too excited: this is likely to be an exception rather than a norm. The practical reality of using drones in cities remains far away and is getting ever more distant. </p>
<p>There are already too many potential problems to let drones fly with sufficiently loose restrictions in cities to make a delivery business viable. One major issue is drones interfering with aircraft, thanks to surging numbers of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36734096">near-misses</a>. Drones are also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-37152665">increasingly</a> being used to fly drugs and other contraband into prisons.</p>
<p>In the US, there have been <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-drones-paparazzi-20140820-story.html">fears about</a> camera-equipped drones stalking celebrities for paparazzi. There have also been stories about invasive drone surveillance, both on behalf of <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-rapid-rise-of-federal-surveillance-drones-over-america/473136/">the state</a> and <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/168164-daniel-saulmon-drone-camera/">private individuals</a>. </p>
<h2>Drone law</h2>
<p>The biggest backlog of legal cases in the US <a href="http://jrupprechtlaw.com/tag/part-48">is reportedly</a> drone claims over issues including safety, noise, damage, personal intrusion and privacy. The whole area is a growing business for lawyers, with <a href="http://dronelawjournal.com">drone law journals</a> springing up and fierce debates over whether, <a href="http://motherboard.vice.com/read/is-flying-a-drone-illegal-a-comprehensive-guide-to-americas-drone-laws">for example</a>, drones fall within the definition of aircraft for legal purposes. </p>
<p>New US flight rules introduced last August did lead some optimists to <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/29/faas-new-drone-laws-go-into-effect-monday-allowing-us-companies-to-innovate.html">predict</a> a new business opportunity that could create 100,000 new jobs, but the reality is that the whole sector is in a mess. The US Federal Aviation Authority <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36584515">has explicitly</a> said drone deliveries are off limits, at least pending further research into their consequences. </p>
<p>At the same time, technologies are emerging that are designed to down drones. Your initial reaction might be that these will never work either, but I’m not so sure. </p>
<p>A great recent <a href="http://openworksengineering.com">British engineering invention</a> is the SkyWall100. It looks like a bazooka gun and uses laser-guided targeting to fire a ball. This opens into a net that engulfs the drone and brings it to earth under a parachute. It went on sale late last year and is retailing at between £50,000 and £65,000 depending on the size of the order. So far, it has attracted a promising level of interest. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/M6tT1GapCe4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>The SkyWall100 is safer and less messy than shooting down drones with bullets, yet it opens up a cavern of legal ambiguities. In the UK, for example, it’s classed as a firearm so can only be owned by someone with the appropriate licence – restricting them mainly to the police or military. The US has looser firearm restrictions, of course, but firearms still generally can’t be discharged within city limits. However, the SkyWall100 is not classified as a firearm in the US, so it can be discharged anywhere. </p>
<p>Among <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X27-2WDIZR00">other techniques</a> for taking out drones, one is the Battelle DroneDefender, which is a large gun that fires a “cone of energy” at a device that disrupts GPS systems. So far, these are only in use by the military and not permitted for public sale. </p>
<h2>Going down …</h2>
<p>If the likes of the SkyWall100 are going to let people prevent drones from moving over their private property to avoid their nuisance, noise and frankly hazard of failure, a new sport of “drone downing” could easily become extremely popular in the coming years – at least in America. Drone-downing raises the alluring prospect of capturing free booty if it strays illegally into your property. So what constitutes illegal?</p>
<p>While I stress I am no lawyer, the US rules for protecting your drone from such potshots <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36584515">would appear</a> to be <a href="http://www.mensjournal.com/gear/articles/the-laws-you-need-to-know-before-flying-your-drone-w210915">as follows</a>. It must weigh less than 25kg and can’t be out of your line of sight or higher than 400ft in the air. It can only be flown in daylight, and at dawn and dusk it needs special lights to make it visible. It also can’t be flown over groups of people or near stadiums or airports. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152305/original/image-20170110-29024-1n24is3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=833&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mission: impossible?</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/pic-512167573/stock-vector-drones-delivery-presents-vector-illustration-isolated.html?src=czklxhMby9ir5uQFl5KwNA-1-91">Alex Kee</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the UK, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/04/18/drone-laws-in-the-uk--what-are-the-rules/">the rules</a> are similar, but with slightly tougher weight restrictions and additional requirements – it must be at least 150 metres from a building and 50 metres from a person or vehicle. If I was planning to build a shopping or pizza delivery business based on using drones that delivered to homes in cities, restrictions like these would make me more than a little jittery. </p>
<p>Put all this together and it’s virtually impossible to see drone deliveries becoming viable in cities. It might be a different story in remote locations where special deliveries may be deemed acceptable and welcomed, but otherwise I’m afraid this is one vision of the future that has no chance of coming to pass. It is an example of a clearly brilliant concept that is colliding badly with human nature and reality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Andrew Williams does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tremendous technology is on a collision course with reality.Richard Andrew Williams, Principal and Vice Chancellor, Heriot-Watt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.