tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/municipal-elections-2021-79794/articlesMunicipal elections 2021 – The Conversation2021-12-08T15:27:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1733382021-12-08T15:27:27Z2021-12-08T15:27:27ZHere are five factors that drove low voter turnout in South Africa’s 2021 elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436313/original/file-20211208-25-myoagt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Abstention in the 2021 local government election was largely driven by a combination of individual and administrative barriers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Guillem Sartorio/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Why do so few South Africans vote? The 2021 local government elections witnessed the lowest turnout for democratic elections in South Africa: <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/csir-predicts-48-voter-turnout-for-2021-local-government-elections/">just under half</a> of registered voters came to the polls. This reflects a longer trajectory of declining voter turnout, which has been in evidence since <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608">at least 2009</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa is not alone in facing declining voter participation. Internationally, this is a trend that has been documented <a href="https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/voter-turnout-trends-around-the-world.pdf">since the 1990s</a>. Nonetheless, falling turnout is a critical barometer of the health of the post-apartheid democratic project. How people vote is a signal of their political and ideological preferences – but whether they vote at all tells us something about people’s approval or disapproval of the institution of democracy itself, as they experience it. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608">Most of the available research</a> into the barriers to voting and motivations for abstention has used social attitudes surveys, either conducted before or some time after an election. While valuable, such surveys cannot capture the mood of the people in the period immediately after the election. </p>
<p>This is what we set out to do. <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Methods+brief.pdf/23b045d3-4368-ad32-41d6-78797dae92da?version=1.0&t=1638353453174">With our team</a> we conducted 3,905 telephone interviews, talking to both voters and non-voters in five metropolitan municipalities: eThekwini, Nelson Mandela Bay and the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane. People were asked about their participation in the 2021 and 2016 local government elections, as well as the 2019 national and provincial election.</p>
<p>Five main reasons emerged for not voting. The most common were individual barriers and administrative barriers, followed by complaints about service delivery and corruption, uninterest or disillusionment, and a lack of political alignment. </p>
<p>Our research supports <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589346.2020.1715161?journalCode=cpsa20">other analysis</a> highlighting that the South African electorate is becoming less tied to race and identity based voting but are increasingly making a wider evaluation of the performance of political incumbents.</p>
<h2>Who are non-voters?</h2>
<p>Electoral non participation was a <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Voter+abstention.pdf/f68bc266-00e4-8070-f074-3b466ac5119f?version=1.0&t=1638354848974">much more fluid phenomenon</a> than we had anticipated. </p>
<p>When looking at voter abstention amongst eligible voters across the last three elections, we found that only 14% of those surveyed had abstained in all three of the last elections – a category to whom we referred as “hardened abstainer”. </p>
<p>Of those who abstained in the 2021 poll, more than half (58%) had voted in at least one of the last two elections. In contrast, 59% of those surveyed who had abstained in the previous two elections opted to vote in the 2021 election. This highlights that, while we know that more people are choosing to abstain, this is also a complex phenomenon: people are making largely context-based decisions on whether to vote or not.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/Voter+abstention.pdf/f68bc266-00e4-8070-f074-3b466ac5119f?version=1.0&t=1638354848974">Our research</a> showed that non-voters were more likely to be young (under 35), and students – 59% of whom abstained from the 2021 local government election within the five municipalities. They are also more likely to be black African, Indian or coloured than white. Non-voting was also higher at both the lowest and highest income groups. </p>
<p>But voter abstention is driven by much more than a socio-demographic profile: it reflects how people assess the political landscape.</p>
<h2>Five key reasons</h2>
<p>We asked participants to explain in their own words why they chose not to vote. Five main reasons emerged.</p>
<p>A third (34%) of the responses cited an individual barrier. The most common were not being in their registered voting district on election day, being at work or simply being too busy. </p>
<p>A further 22% indicated some form of administrative barrier. The most common reasons here were not being registered or not having an ID. Of this group, about a quarter had attempted to vote but encountered a problem at the voting station; either they found they were not registered or were registered in a different voting district. </p>
<p>The third most common explanation was what we termed performance evaluations – reasons related to complaints about service delivery and corruption. This accounted for 19% of explanations and centred on people not having seen changes for themselves or their communities. </p>
<p>One respondent said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…according to me … this thing of voting is useless because there is corruption and we are not working. This voting this is not working for us.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Performance evaluations were more frequently cited by black African non-voters and by the unemployed. They also featured more prominently in the explanations provided by those living in informal settlements (30%), backyard rooms (27%) and township and government-provided RDP houses (21%) than in those offered by people living in suburban houses (11%) and of those living in flats, apartments or townhouses (12%).</p>
<p>A further 17% were uninterested or disillusioned with voting. Men spoke of this more often than women, as did those with higher levels of education. Levels of self-reported uninterest and disillusionment also seemed to increase with income: 32% of those earning more than R40,000 a month reported being uninterested and disillusioned, about double the rate of those earning under R10,000 a month.</p>
<p>A lack of political alignment was the least common reason, accounting for only 4% of explanations overall. However, it is interesting to note that this reason was more commonly expressed among high income earners. </p>
<h2>The future of voter turnout</h2>
<p>Overall, then, abstention in the 2021 local government election was largely driven by a combination of individual and administrative barriers. Not registering to vote is a preemptive disengagement from electoral democracy, while being “too busy” suggests that participating in electoral democracy is not strongly valued by some. These reasons are deeply suggestive of a particular form of disengagement from electoral democracy</p>
<p>Encouragingly, our findings seem to suggest that voter abstention is a fluid phenomenon. Abstaining in one election does not necessarily mean disengagement with the electoral process forever. This, perhaps, puts the onus on political parties to connect with those who disengaged from the 2021 local government election and speak to their concerns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carin Runciman received funding from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this research. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Bekker received funding from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for this research. </span></em></p>The South African electorate is becoming less tied to race and identity-based voting but are increasingly making a wider evaluation of the performance of political incumbents.Carin Runciman, Director, Centre for Social Change, University of JohannesburgMartin Bekker, Computational Social Scientist, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726962021-12-06T13:54:51Z2021-12-06T13:54:51ZPost-election pact failure: echoes of fraught history between South Africa’s ANC and Inkatha<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434197/original/file-20211126-25-exc37x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African president Cyril Ramaphosa (L) is congratulated by leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party Mangosuthu Buthelezi (R) after being elected president of South Africa during the swearing in of new members of the National Assembly.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nic Bothma </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s governing party and the minority Inkatha Freedom Party with a stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal agreed to form governing coalitions <a href="https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-11-17-ifp-anc-agreement-breaks-deadlock-in-21-hung-kwazulu-natal-councils/">in hung municipalities</a> in the KwaZulu-Natal Province following the 1 November local government elections.</p>
<p>The two parties had agreed that where one had the majority of seats, the other would support it to form the municipal government.</p>
<p>This deal failed. The <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-11-24-ifp-blames-anc-for-collapse-of-coalition-agreement-in-kzn/">IFP blamed the ANC</a> for fielding candidates in isiNquthu (Nqutu), Jozini in northern KwaZulu-Natal and other places where the IFP had the majority of seats. Similarly, the ANC accused the IFP of fielding candidates in uMhlathuze District in northern KwaZulu-Natal, eThekwini – the economic hub in coastal KwaZulu-Natal and other municipalities. </p>
<p>This fallout negatively affected the ANC more than the IFP as it won more seats in many hung municipalities. After this fallout, the IFP led coalitions in many of these municipalities.</p>
<p>Had the deal succeeded, it would have seen the ANC increase the number of municipalities under its control. It would have also helped in mending relations between the two parties. Its failure will increase mistrust between them.</p>
<p>The failure of the pact brings to mind the history of <a href="https://africasacountry.com/2017/12/the-rise-fall-and-retirement-of-mangosuthu-buthelezi">fraught relations</a> and “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/i-grew-up-in-the-anc-youth-league--mangosuthu-buth">unfinished business</a>” between the two parties. </p>
<h2>History of fraught relations</h2>
<p>Before establishing Inkatha Freedom Party <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/inkatha-freedom-party-ifp">in 1975</a>, <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/24">Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a> <a href="https://www.ifp.org.za/prince-mangosuthu-buthelezi-timeline/">received the blessings</a> of the ANC through its leader, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-is-celebrating-the-year-of-or-tambo-who-was-he-85838">Oliver Tambo</a>. This was made possible by two reasons.</p>
<p>Firstly, Buthelezi had been a member of the ANC Youth League while a student at the University of Fort Hare from 1948 – 1950. He joined the League <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/how-the-anc-and-inkatha-fell-out--mangosuthu-buthe">in 1949</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a> and the Pan Africanist Congress (<a href="https://pac.org.za/">PAC</a>), the historical liberation movements, had been banned by the apartheid government <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanist-Congress-of-Azania">since 1960</a>.</p>
<p>The ban left a political vacuum which Buthelezi decided to fill. Because he and the ANC were determined to defeat the apartheid government, it made logical sense that he should take the baton of sustaining the liberation struggle. He revived Inkatha ka Zulu (the coil of the Zulu nation), a movement which had been established by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/king-dinuzulu">Zulu King Dinizulu</a> in 1922. </p>
<p>Once Inkatha was established, Buthelezi used to travel to the exiled ANC’s headquarters in Zambia to report on progress. Gradually, some within the ANC <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-buthelezi-it-cuts-me-to-the-heart-to-be-unjustly-labelled-an-enemy-of-my-people/">became sceptical of his intentions</a>. They associated him with the Bantustan establishment which saw a number of political leaders becoming puppets of the apartheid regime.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">Bantustans</a> were “self-governing” and “independent” states established by the apartheid regime with the intention to weaken black people by dividing them into little compartments called “states”. Leaders who accepted this “independence” became presidents in those states but remained financially dependent on South Africa.</p>
<p>In 1979 Buthelezi led a delegation to London <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%203.pdf">to meet the ANC</a> to discuss differences of opinion between the ANC and Buthelezi regarding protest politics, economic sanctions and the armed struggle. </p>
<p>Tambo promised to meet Buthelezi again. However, this turned out to be the last formal meeting between the two parties. There are divergent views regarding this development. One version is that the ANC accused Buthelezi of <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/how-the-anc-and-inkatha-fell-out--mangosuthu-buthe">leaking details of the meeting to the media</a>. The other version is that Tambo was advised by the ANC to cut ties with Buthelezi because he could not be trusted.</p>
<p>The 1980s were turbulent moments in South Africa. The formation of the <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03188/06lv03222.htm">United Democratic Front </a>(UDF) in August 1983 further soured relations between the ANC and Inkatha. Buthelezi blamed the UDF, which was allied to the ANC, for tarnishing his name and labelling him a traitor who <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA02562804_232">colluded with the apartheid government</a>. </p>
<p>Buthelezi argued that by agreeing to lead KwaZulu Government but not taking full “independence” <a href="https://theconversation.com/mangosuthu-gatsha-buthelezi-a-reappraisal-of-his-fight-against-apartheid-144212">as other leaders had done</a>, he had opted to <a href="https://www.ifp.org.za/prince-mangosuthu-buthelezi-timeline/">fight the system from within</a>.</p>
<p>The ascendance to power of President FW De Klerk <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/frederik-willem-de-klerk">in 1989</a> marked a new political epoch in South Africa. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/fw-de-klerk-made-a-speech-31-years-ago-that-ended-apartheid-why-he-did-it-130803">February 1990</a> he lifted the ban on liberation movements, set their leaders free and opened the door for negotiations that would lead to a new political dispensation. </p>
<h2>The 1990s and South Africa’s road to democracy</h2>
<p>The 1990s marked a critical juncture in relations between the ANC and the IFP. By now, Buthelezi had established himself as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/721987">force to be reckoned with</a>. As <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02104/06lv02106.htm">negotiations to end apartheid</a> began <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ZA_900806_The%20Pretoria%20Minute.pdf">in 1990</a>, it became impossible to sideline him and Inkatha.</p>
<p>Violent skirmishes between the two parties – which were fuelled by apartheid operatives – further soured relations between the two parties. At least <a href="https://theconversation.com/archive-documents-reveal-the-us-and-uks-role-in-the-dying-days-of-apartheid-120507">20 000 people are estimated to have died</a> between 1984 and 1994.</p>
<p>As the negotiations began, Inkatha initially showed no interest in them – arguing that the deal was between the ANC and the apartheid government. After joining the discussion, Buthelezi halted the process midstream. Firstly, he wanted South Africa to be a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-07-secret-details-of-the-land-deal-that-brought-the-ifp-into-the-94-poll/">federal state</a>. He later settled for there being six provinces, which <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-sa/south-africas-provinces">later became nine</a>. </p>
<p>Secondly, Buthelezi wanted <a href="https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Govern_Political/ANC_18598.html">a place for the Zulu King</a> and the Zulu Kingdom. He managed to secure <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-08-07-secret-details-of-the-land-deal-that-brought-the-ifp-into-the-94-poll/">Ingonyama Trust </a>, which reserved land for the Zulu King to control. In his view, the ANC was not honest with him and undermined Inkatha and the Zulu nation thus forcing him to boycott the negotiations. </p>
<p>Through intense negotiations, the ANC and the IFP eventually found each other. <a href="https://theconversation.com/archive-documents-reveal-the-us-and-uks-role-in-the-dying-days-of-apartheid-120507">Professor Washington Okumu</a> from Kenya successfully appealed to Buthelezi to contest the first democratic election on 27 April 1994. By then, the ballot papers had already been printed and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/04/20/buthelezi-ends-boycott-of-s-african-vote/ec9c8d56-5eb9-4a35-8f50-03fcb595e731/">IFP’s name was pasted</a> at the bottom of the ballot paper.</p>
<p>The ANC disputed election results <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a84aa.html">in KwaZulu-Natal</a>. Later, the two parties found each other and even formed a coalition through a “grand alliance”. </p>
<p>To mend the wall between the ANC and the IFP, President Nelson Mandela appointed Buthelezi into his <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-government-national-unity-gnu-1994-1999">Government of National Unity</a> cabinet, which existed from April 1994 to February 1997. Buthelezi was Minister of Home Affairs until 1999 under Mandela and continued in this portfolio <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/person-details/24">from 1999 to 2004</a> under President Thabo Mbeki. </p>
<p>Buthelezi <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/buthelezi-to-act-as-president-again-14903">served as the Acting President</a> more than any of his cabinet colleagues. This was significant, not only because he had enough administrative experience from leading the KwaZulu Government, but also in terms of improving relations between the ANC and the IFP.</p>
<p>Since then, relations between the ANC and the IFP have been relatively stable but not without moments of mistrust as evidenced in the aftermath of the 2021 local elections.</p>
<h2>Lost opportunity</h2>
<p>The initial announcement that both parties had agreed to support each other to form municipal governments in hung municipalities brought a glimmer of hope that they were amenable to working together. </p>
<p>When the IFP <a href="https://www.news24.com/witness/politics/kznprovincial/high-drama-as-ifp-snubs-anc-in-kzn-hung-councils-20211122">announced </a> that it was no longer going to work with the ANC, this raised concerns about potential renewal of the historic feud.</p>
<p>For me, three issues could have saved this agreement. Firstly, the parties should have agreed to divide the four KwaZulu Natal economic hubs (eThekwini, uMsunduzi, uMhlathuze and Newcastle), between themselves. Secondly, the ANC should have agreed to change the Umlazi road from Griffiths Mxenge back to Mangosuthu Highway as the IFP had demanded outside of the formal discussions. </p>
<p>Thirdly, the IFP should have agreed to let the ANC keep the name of one of its regions as Mzala Nxumalo region - named after <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/recipient/jabulani-nobleman-nxumalo-1955-1991">Jabulani Nobleman “Mzala” Nxumalo</a>, an ANC and SA Communist Party stalwart. This failed deal serves as a reminder about fraught relations between the ANC and the IFP.</p>
<p>However, on many occasions, these two parties have been able to find each other, albeit temporarily. The failure of the 2021 post-election deal was a missed opportunity for them to work together.</p>
<p>Despite other political parties having made inroads in KwaZulu-Natal, such as the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters, they are ideologically miles apart from the ANC and the IFP, who remain the key players. Thus, the future of KwaZulu-Natal depends in large part to close relations between the ANC and the IFP.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bheki Mngomezulu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The failure of the 2021 post-election deal is a missed opportunity for the African National Congress and Inkatha to work together.Bheki Mngomezulu, Professor of Political Science, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1726472021-11-29T14:08:08Z2021-11-29T14:08:08ZWhy South African political parties must find a balance between rural versus metro support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434404/original/file-20211129-27-jnd5yy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mxolisi Kaunda mayor of eThekwini. If parties or individuals succeed in the politics and practicalities of governing a metro, the rewards are considerable.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren Stewart/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The trouble with metropolitan cities, or metros, is that, even in the best of times, they are hellishly difficult to govern. By metros I mean large, complex and dynamic urban agglomerations that are recognised internationally as metropolitan. In South Africa the definition includes small agglomerations of Buffalo City (on the east coast) and Mangaung (in the central interior). </p>
<p>In at least five of South Africa’s six largest metros the challenges of governing are compounded by political fragmentation and uncertainties of governing as a minority or through a coalition. A host of new mayors are about to take up their posts <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/president-cyril-ramaphosa-calls-up-new-mayors-to-congratulate-them-on-being-elected-9d57361b-716e-4444-a2da-f3a9a9024a87">following local government elections</a>. </p>
<p>The new mayors in these metros may have been handed a poisoned chalice.</p>
<p>The difficulties in governing rest in at least two realities. First, metros are local government writ large, and local government deals with immediate, concrete issues that cannot be obfuscated in the generalities of policy. If a national department falters, the failings may be concealed for a long time through political bravado. If local government fails, the consequence is visible, directly affecting the lives of residents. Local government has nowhere to hide. </p>
<p>Secondly, metros are complicated because their citizens are contrarian. They are, on average, more aware of their rights, more informed, and more educated, than elsewhere, and less likely to vote based on historical loyalties. The media spotlight is generally intense, and interests are diverse and shifting, making it difficult for a single party to maintain a dominant position for long. </p>
<p>In South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) held on to five of the six metros <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/historic-losses-anc-mark-new-era-south-african-politics">for over two decades</a>. But as its electoral support waned the large metros were among the first to fall. </p>
<p>Metros may be a graveyard for political ambition. But if parties or individuals succeed in the politics and practicalities of governing a metro, the rewards are considerable. A metro may be a springboard to national power.</p>
<p>South Africa’s recent municipal election has amplified trends at play since at least the 2011 municipal election. It has revealed more sharply than before a shifting political geography with consequences for the character and prospects of major parties including the ANC. </p>
<h2>Global examples</h2>
<p>In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party has dominated national politics since 1955, and there are enduring electoral loyalties. Nevertheless, an independent candidate was elected <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/tokyos-governor-throws-in-with-a-new-political-party/">Governor of Metropolitan Tokyo</a>. </p>
<p>In India, the National Capital Territory of Delhi rejected the country’s two dominant parties – Modi’s Bharatiya Janata and the Congress Party – and voted the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/asia/indias-governing-party-heads-for-crushing-defeat-in-delhi-elections.html">Aam Aadmi Party</a> (translated literally as the Common Man’s Party) into power. </p>
<p>In Tanzania, the dissonance between national and metro politics provoked <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202102250209.html">President John Magufuli</a> to disband the City Council of Dar es Salaam in February 2021. </p>
<p>In Russia, Vladimir Putin’s <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1340299">United Russia</a> battles to retain control of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which is gradually dragging down the fortunes of the party. </p>
<p>More positively for political ambition, the UK’s prime minister <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/6/10/18638824/boris-johnson-tory-leader-prime-minister-brexit">Boris Johnson</a> was able to use his position of Mayor of London to achieve national high office, and in a different political system, <a href="http://en.people.cn/leaders/jzm/biography.htm">Jiang Jemin</a>, advanced from Mayor of Shanghai to National President.</p>
<p>The fickleness of metro voters presents a political risk, but it also requires political formations to remain agile with potential long-term advantage. A rural base with loyal voters does not have this effect. In the 1987 general election, South Africa’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/05/01/running-for-change-in-s-africa/9fd3633a-ed08-431c-b587-40f6f63398ba/">National Party suffered erosion in its metro base</a>. Wynand Malan, Dennis Worrall, Esther Lategan, and others, abandoned the party, taking metro voters with them. This helped catalyse a pragmatic response by a faction of party leaders. But the party never recovered. </p>
<h2>The shifting political geography</h2>
<p>South Africa’s 2021 municipal election reveals a wide difference in the geographic base of parties. Around 37% of South Africa’s population lives in the six large metros. But these municipalities only accounted for <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">27% of the voters in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>This reflects the degree of alienation in the metros. </p>
<p>The population in secondary, or <a href="https://iudf.co.za/knowledge-hub/documents/">intermediate cities</a>, is 9%, followed by large towns at 16%, and rural and small towns at 38%. </p>
<p>If a party receives significantly more support from one of these categories than the population share, then it has established within this category a geographic base.</p>
<p>Over time such a base may shape the character of the party. A party with a metro base may be oriented more towards social liberalism, as voters engage with diversity on a daily basis. But this is not always the case. A response to ethnic diversity may be a populist embrace of xenophobia or a retreat into some form of sectarianism. A party may have a dual base, metro and rural, for example, and while this allows for a larger pool of potential voters, it also adds to complexity of its internal politics.</p>
<p>In 2021, the ANC <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-04-the-finish-line-crushing-blows-to-anc-less-severe-punches-for-the-da-and-some-significant-surprises/">saw only 26%</a> of its support coming from the large metros, <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">down from 32.4% in 2011</a> when it had a political base spread across different geographies.</p>
<p>The political base of the ANC is now the rural Eastern Cape and Limpopo, followed by Mpumalanga and North West, reflecting <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/opinion/2021-11-07-corruption-and-incompetence-have-turned-the-anc-into-a-bantustan-party/">loyalties in rural areas</a>. The exception is KwaZulu-Natal where the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has made a comeback in the north and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has made inroads in the south. </p>
<p>Over time, this is likely to shift the orientation of the ANC, and further reduce its ability, and willingness, to engage with the intensity of metropolitan dynamics. Furthermore policies may eventually change to reflect its more traditional and conservative base.</p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance (DA) is a metro-based party with 58.5% of its electoral support in 2021 coming from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/blow-anc-opposition-da-mayors-elected-major-safrican-cities-2021-11-23/">the big six metros</a>. Its secondary base are the large towns of the Western Cape, with inroads elsewhere such as in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. The major challenge for the DA is the narrowness of its base within the metros, where it’s still supported predominantly by white people. </p>
<p>Only 33% of the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-10-road-to-2024-eff-makes-a-splash-in-local-poll-but-no-red-wave/">EFF’s support</a> comes from the metros. Its support in the Gauteng metros tracks its support nationally, with party support significantly underrepresented in Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay. Its highest support in proportional terms comes from Polokwane and surrounds, although there was some decline here, and the industrial towns of the Mpumalanga and northern Free State. There is no red wave for the EFF in the metros.</p>
<p>Among the smaller parties, the IFP has a rural base, with only 13% of its support from the large metros although the 2021 elections did indicate a slight rise in its support within eThekwini and Johannesburg. </p>
<p>Action SA is currently 100% metro, and it remains to be seen where it will broaden its base in a bid for national power. The FF+ has an urban base but much of this is on the industrial and mining fringes of Gauteng, in the Vaal, West Rand, and Mpumalanga Highveld rather than in the metro core.</p>
<p>The geographical base of a party matters, although this intersects with other dimensions of a political base such as class, race, age, and gender. The rural and small town vote cannot be ignored as 38% of the electorate is significant. There are also intense linkages between the rural and the urban in South Africa, and geographic concerns cannot be easily separated. Also, having a metro base is risky because of the complexity of governing at this scale in the face of a demanding electorate. However, turning away from the metros may pose a serious risk for long term prospects, as a party separates from a potent source of political vitality. </p>
<p>The ANC must beware.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Harrison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Metros may be a graveyard for political ambition. But if parties or individuals succeed, the rewards are considerable.Philip Harrison, Professor School of Architecture and Planning, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1713112021-11-05T14:28:41Z2021-11-05T14:28:41ZSouth Africa’s local government is broken: could the 2021 election outcomes be the turning point?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430506/original/file-20211105-10010-1o3i5eq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of main opposition Democratic Alliance wave the national flag ahead of the 2021 local elections. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">2021 local government elections</a> are set to go down in history as a watershed moment in the country’s politics. Electoral support for the African National Congress (ANC) dropped below 50% for the first time since the party ascended to government 27 years ago. Although it won <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/glen-mashinini-final-results-municipal-elections-4-nov-2021-0000">161</a> of the 213 contested municipalities, the number of councils without a clear majority of any party nearly quadrupled from 18 to 70.</p>
<p>A significant portion of voters stayed away from voting stations. Most were former ANC voters, <a href="https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/10543300/The+South+African+non-voter+-+An+analysis.pdf/acc19fbd-bd6d-9190-f026-8d311078b670?version=1.0&t=1608">continuing the trend from previous elections</a>.</p>
<p>Counting all eligible voters rather than only those who registered, voter withdrawal has reached a critical level. Less than a third of eligible voters –- 12 million out of 42.6 million -– <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/glen-mashinini-final-results-municipal-elections-4-nov-2021-0000">made their crosses</a>. Rather than apathy, this represents a “deliberate” stayaway vote, as the political analyst Moeletsi Mbeki <a href="https://www.enca.com/analysis/sas-crisis-wont-be-solved-soon-moeletsi-mbeki">has argued</a>.</p>
<p>This concerted withdrawal should be read against the results of a recent survey by <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, an independent pan-African surveys network. It found that local councils garnered the least trust <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad474-south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low-afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf">out of 17 institutions in South Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Almost three-quarters –- 72% –- of respondents trust local councils “a little or not at all”.</p>
<p>This staggeringly low level of trust has to do with deepening socioeconomic misery. The South African economy was in recession before the COVID-19 pandemic. The economic destruction caused by the pandemic has pushed the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/8/24/south-africas-unemployment-rate-is-now-the-worlds-highest">unemployment rate to 44.4%</a>, when using the expanded definition that includes jobless people who have ceased seeking work.</p>
<p>The everyday struggle to survive becomes even harder in the face of a terminal deterioration in the provision of basic services by municipalities, such as water and sanitation, combined with corruption and infrastructural collapse that pose further threats to lives and livelihoods.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-voters-are-disillusioned-but-they-havent-found-an-alternative-to-the-anc-171239">South African voters are disillusioned. But they haven't found an alternative to the ANC</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A truism oft heard from politicians is that government cannot solve South Africa’s problems by itself. But what to do with a government that places impediments in the way of its citizens? This reality at local government level needs to be fixed for South Africans to regain their trust in the democratic process.</p>
<h2>Local government is broken</h2>
<p>More than half of people canvassed by market research group Ipsos believe that local governments <a href="https://www.enca.com/press-release/party-over-urgent-delivery-key">do not work optimally</a>. Voter perception of malfunctioning municipalities is confirmed by the oversight <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/201920/2019%20-%2020%20MFMA%20Consolidated%20GR.pdf">reporting of the Auditor-General</a>, Tsakani Maluleke.</p>
<p>She reported irregular expenditure of R26 billion (US$1.7billion) at municipalities in the 2019 to 2020 financial year. Only 27 out of the country’s 257 municipalities received clean audits. Moreover, 57 of municipalities failed to even submit the legally required audits.</p>
<p>Maluleke pointed to a lack of monitoring and supervision underpinning a lack of accountability, with resources being mismanaged and services not provided as they should be. </p>
<p>The Auditor-General’s conclusions accord with voter perceptions. The Ipsos survey found that almost a quarter of respondents thought that local councillors were incompetent or corrupt.</p>
<p>The perception of incompetence is further borne out by a <a href="https://www.ber.ac.za/knowledge/pkviewdocument.aspx?docid=15008">recent study</a> by the Bureau for Economic Research. It revealed that only about half of senior government officials and financial managers had qualifications appropriate to the posts they held.</p>
<p>The ANC’s controversial policy of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">“cadre deployment”</a> plays a significant factor. The policy entails appointing party apparatchiks to key state positions. Selection is not done transparently. The result is civil servants deeming themselves to be accountable to the party rather than to voters.</p>
<p>This leads to incompetent people being put in charge of finances, including income management, debt collection and municipal projects. The Bureau for Economic Research found operational budgets were over-spent, while capital expenditure stalled at the 2009 level.</p>
<p>As a result, environmental and health catastrophes have hit many municipalities, including raw sewage polluting drinking water.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-local-elections-new-entrants-likely-to-be-the-big-winners-170804">South Africa's local elections: new entrants likely to be the big winners</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The geographically central province of the Free State, a water catchment area, <a href="https://www.ufs.ac.za/templates/news-archive/campus-news/2021/june/research-to-fight-water-pollution-in-the-eastern-free-state">is in dire straits</a>. Residents in small towns, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/news/day-and-night-we-smell-it-sewage-spills-make-life-hell-for-deneysville-residents-8e066221-2e91-4801-a2f0-a59d490c9c28">from the northern</a> to the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/free-state-community-up-in-arms-over-constant-sewage-spills/">southern parts</a> of the province, have struggled for years with untreated human waste and other pollution flooding residential areas.</p>
<p>The crucial <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Vaal-River">Vaal River</a>, the border between the economic heartland of Gauteng province and the Free State, has become severely contaminated. As one of only three major rivers in a water-scarce country, it provides drinking water to <a href="https://www.groundwork.org.za/Documents/water/The_Vaal_Inquiry_Final_Report_15022021_MHP.pdf">45% of Gauteng’s population</a>. Apart from the risk to human health, scarce fish species have been pushed close to extinction.</p>
<p>The disaster is due to perennial failure on the part of the Emfuleni municipality to sustain <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-29-a-story-of-south-africa-emfuleni-residents-fed-up-with-vaal-river-pollution-inertia/">maintenance at its wastewater treatment plants</a>. </p>
<p>In a similar case, the Kgetleng Residents Association in Koster, North West province, won their <a href="https://cer.org.za/virtual-library/judgments/high-courts/kgetlengrivier-concerned-citizens-another-v-kgetlengrivier-local-municipality-others-interim-order-and-agreementcourt-order">court bid</a> in 2020 to take control of the municipal waterworks. The high court found that the municipality had violated its constitutional obligation of supplying potable water. </p>
<p>This is one among a number of cases in which residents step in where municipalities fail. But, as the Socio-Economic Rights Institute <a href="https://www.ber.ac.za/knowledge/pkviewdocument.aspx?docid=15008">argues</a>, this is not a sustainable solution.</p>
<p>Companies that attempted to bear the overwhelming costs of failing municipal services have eventually faltered. For example, one of the country’s largest poultry producers, Astral Foods, was <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/treasury-gives-the-poorly-run-lekwa-municipality-three-years-to-get-its-finances-in-order-after-publishing-financial-recovery-plan-5ed746e6-a5ec-46b3-afd8-7a592b11a233">pushed into technical insolvency</a> after spending millions to compensate for the collapse in electricity and water provision in Standerton in Lekwa municipality, Mpumalanga province.</p>
<p>Infrastructure collapse has also had a major economic impact in Lichtenburg in Ditsobotla municipality, North West province. After years of engaging the local council with no result, dairy company Clover closed the country’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/clover-closes-sas-biggest-cheese-factory-due-to-municipal-woes-in-the-north-west-20210608">largest cheese factory in Lichtenburg</a> and moved its operations to an existing factory elsewhere. The economically depressed region lost 330 jobs. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anc-dips-below-50-but-opposition-parties-fail-to-pick-up-the-slack-171253">South Africa's ANC dips below 50%. But opposition parties fail to pick up the slack</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Residents’ despair is exacerbated by corruption.<a href="https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/">Corruption Watch</a>, an NGO that tracks corruption, found that one in six reports received from whistleblowers fingered local government. Irregularities occurred in procurement and staff appointments. Bribery was a common form of corruption, amounting to an extra <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-corruption-is-fraying-south-africas-social-and-economic-fabric-80690">tax on the poor</a> for state services that remain inefficient.</p>
<h2>Political appetite</h2>
<p>Given the colossal crises besetting local government, it remains to be seen whether newly elected councillors can win back the trust of the electorate. As these crises were in many cases created by the country’s political class, many voters will be sceptical about whether the appetite even exists to turn the dismal state of local government around. </p>
<p>But perhaps the plunging election turnout – particularly shocking in a country where people struggled for democracy – may finally jolt the political elite into action.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christi van der Westhuizen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2021 local government elections signals widespread disillusionment with representative democracy that only a sea change in service delivery can fix.Christi van der Westhuizen, Associate Professor, Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy (CANRAD), Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1712532021-11-04T15:37:07Z2021-11-04T15:37:07ZSouth Africa’s ANC dips below 50%. But opposition parties fail to pick up the slack<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430304/original/file-20211104-23-1hwhf09.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans queue to vote in the 2021 local government elections in Centurion, Tshwane, Pretoria. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s 2021 local government elections were momentous. They mark the first time that the now ruling party and erstwhile liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">slipped below the 50% milestone</a> of the vote. </p>
<p>Overall, the parties retained their positions relative to one another. The largest was the ANC; in second place the official opposition the Democratic Alliance (DA) followed by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+).</p>
<p>The results raise the real possibility that the ANC could be looking at another defeat in the 2024 general elections. This is despite the fact that opposition parties usually do best in municipal elections and the ANC does best during general elections. </p>
<p>The poll pointed to a steep decline in voter interest. It was the lowest percentage poll ever in <a href="https://elections.sabc.co.za/elections/2021-lge-news-flashes/csir-predicts-48-voter-turnout-for-2021-local-government-elections/">South Africa’s democratic epoch</a>. This indicates that some citizens feel alienated from the political elite regardless of party, and sceptical of the ability of any incoming municipal government to deliver. </p>
<p>It is ironic that ANC supporters punished Cyril Ramaphosa given that he’s the ANC leader who has done most to purge kleptocrats from the party and the government, and appoint new, ethical prosecutors to bring the corrupt to trial. </p>
<p>But the voters clearly want to first see the results of this before voting for the ANC again.</p>
<p>Overall, South Africa will from now on share the situation of other countries with proportional representation electoral systems – coalitions galore – unlike two party systems such as the UK and US.</p>
<h2>The fate of the Democratic Alliance</h2>
<p>Why did the Democratic Alliance (DA) get a lower vote? </p>
<p>One reason is that the <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/">Freedom Front Plus</a>, a conservative, Afrikaner party, is winning over Afrikaner voters from the DA. It might also be that <a href="https://www.actionsa.org.za/">ActionSA</a>, the new party of <a href="https://www.africanleadershipacademy.org/staffulty/speakers/herman-mashaba/">Herman Mashaba</a> (the former Free Market Foundation chair, and former DA mayor of Johannesburg), vacuumed up many of the DA’s black voters in Soweto, the country’s largest black urban area. </p>
<p>Then, there are various mixed messages. For example, during the 2019 election, DA activists were canvassing voters with the argument that
“if you vote for the ANC they will form a coalition with the EFF”.</p>
<p>Yet, the DA itself was simultaneously in <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">effective coalitions</a> with the EFF – the self-styled “<a href="https://effonline.org/">radical and militant</a>” party whose revolutionary views the DA is diametrically opposed to – in Johannesburg and Tshwane metropoles.</p>
<p>Another is the gap between the DA’s election slogan that it’s the party that “<a href="https://www.da.org.za/the-da-gets-things-done">gets things done</a>” and reality. For example, the DA, which has run Cape Town <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/adriaanbasson/adriaan-basson-will-de-lille-give-the-da-a-good-run-for-its-money-in-cape-town-20211003">since 2006</a>, has failed in a number of areas. One of these is in controlling pollution.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s well-heeled lake-front property owners around the Rietvlei-Milnerton Lagoon, Zeekoeivlei and Zandvlei dare not dip a toe into those lakes due to sewage contamination. Businesses and lodges that focus on water sports are shuttered.</p>
<p>The DA’s Cape Town metro government has failed over the years to launch the needed <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/city-of-cape-towns-water-treatment-plant-meets-halfway-mark-dbcdec2e-339e-57c1-9c86-bd55bc4a2e23">doubling of sewage treatment plants</a>. Instead, it took the illiberal step of suddenly demanding that ratepayers who asked for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-e-coli-17503">E. coli</a> measurements be denied them unless they <a href="https://www.noseweek.co.za/article/4392/We-wont-take-this-sh!t-anymore,-says-Milnerton">signed a non-disclosure contract</a>. E. coli in water <a href="https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/e-coli/symptoms-causes/syc-20372058">can cause severe illness</a>. </p>
<p>The DA will, however, be celebrating that it has retained control of the Midvaal municipality in Gauteng province and the Kouga municipality in Eastern Cape province, and won the Umngeni municipality in KwaZulu-Natal. These are its beach-heads outside the Western Cape province.</p>
<p>Another feature of the election was that local parties in some regions sustained a resilient presence over decades against the big national parties. An example was the Advisieskantoor (Advice Office) in the ostrich ranching and tourist town of Oudtshoorn.</p>
<p>One consequence of the showing by smaller parties at local level is that there are likely to be hung councils. Even prior to the most recent poll Oudtshoorn had <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-07-02-oudtshoorn-anatomy-of-a-municipal-disaster/">a year without any functioning council</a>.</p>
<p>There were some other developments worth noting.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Signs of a backlash against statutory <a href="https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/28248/03chapter3.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y">affirmative action</a> favouring Africans were prominent during electioneering by the new Patriotic Alliance and the Cape Coloured Congress parties.</p></li>
<li><p>The good showing by ActionSA, with its campaign for <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/actionsa-this-is-how-we-plan-to-address-immigration-and-revitalise-inner-cities-78bbec7c-0c6c-4b56-aaa0-817ad70907a7">tough law enforcement</a> against the African diaspora, showed, disturbingly, that xenophobia is a vote-catcher.</p></li>
<li><p>The Inkatha Freedom Party demonstrated that it will survive following the passing of the baton by its founder and longtime leader <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-08-24-prince-mangosuthu-buthelezi-steps-down-as-ifp-leader-after-44-years-at-the-helm/">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a>. Intriguingly, its core votes are in the borders of the former Zulu kingdom as they stood at the start of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/shaka-zulu">King Shaka</a>’s reign. Districts he later conquered, such as <a href="https://geographic.org/geographic_names/name.php?uni=-1872847&fid=5617&c=south_africa">Tongaland</a> and chiefdoms south of the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/place/tugela-river-and-waterfalls-drakensberg">Tugela River</a>, now mostly vote ANC.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>The more splintered outcome of the poll means that there are likely to be many more coalitions that will need to be formed. But these will only last if enforced by the national executives of the parties concerned. Written treaties are not infallible – the DA and United Democratic Movement had that in Nelson Mandela Bay since the previous local election in 2016 – but will certainly minimise breakups. </p>
<p>Such contracts need to specify dispute resolution mechanisms, in addition to actual policy compromises.</p>
<p>Right now, the national executives of both the ANC and DA will be debating tough judgement calls. If they form municipal coalitions with each other, will this alienate voters to whom each marketed their party as a bulwark against the other? Also, in five years’ time, can each persuade their followers that successes were only due to them, and failures due only to their coalition partners? These hard choices will be paramount in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay.</p>
<p>Looking more broadly at the way in which the election was run, there were clear signs that cutting the budget of the electoral commission <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/iec-plans-one-voter-registration-weekend-due-to-budget-cuts-aaf09467-2c97-4713-ab82-b199609d979a">by R118 million</a> was a false economy. Elections are priceless in democracies. More thorough training, and hiring ethical and experienced election veterans, will be indispensable to the legitimacy of the coming 2024 general election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is a member of the ANC, but writes this analysis in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>The election results raise the real possibility that the ANC could be looking at another defeat in the 2024 general elections.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1712392021-11-04T13:38:31Z2021-11-04T13:38:31ZSouth African voters are disillusioned. But they haven’t found an alternative to the ANC<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430245/original/file-20211104-13-1quzfr9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the campaign trail.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gianluigi Guercia/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa’s historic <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">2021 local elections</a> have highlighted a deep hole in its party politics – the governing party is in decline, but most voters will not vote for its rivals.</p>
<p>The elections are historic because they are the first since democracy’s advent in 1994 in which the governing <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress (ANC)</a> has won <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">less than 50%</a> of the national vote. This is less earth-shaking than it sounds – the ANC vote has been in decline for over a decade and in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Downloadable-results/Detailed-results-data--2016-Municipal-Elections/">local elections of 2016</a> it lost control of several large cities. The election of Cyril Ramaphosa as president stemmed the tide in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-saves-the-ancs-bacon-but-this-could-be-its-last-chance-116903">2019 national ballot</a> but the municipal elections show this was only a temporary reprieve.</p>
<p>But, while it was not a bolt from the blue, this milestone has been greeted with breathless excitement by media as the beginning of a new era of vigorous party competition. Since the ANC is deeply unpopular among the urban middle class from which reporters and pundits are drawn, no one seemed to notice that it might also usher in a period of political instability.</p>
<p>While the ANC is losing support, no other party is gaining anything like the numbers needed to assemble a national government. Even in its worst election showing ever, the ANC has <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">more than double the vote</a> of the next biggest party, the Democratic Alliance. The DA has twice the support of the third biggest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which won only one in ten votes.</p>
<p>If this result is repeated in the next national elections, in 2024, the only way the ANC could be relegated to the opposition benches is if just about all other parties agreed to govern together. Since the opposition, inevitably, comprises parties of various political hues, a governing alliance between them would be just about impossible – and would not last very long if it was, by some miracle, established. The DA has, for example, insisted it <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/politics/2021-10-24-listen--well-work-with-any-party-but-the-eff-says-das-steenhuisen/">will not govern with the EFF</a> and this alone takes a united non-ANC national government off the table.</p>
<h2>Understanding voters’ choices</h2>
<p>Voters’ choices are chiefly shaped by identities – citizens support the party which they feel speaks for people like them. In most democracies, the idea of the voter as a human computer, calculating what they can get from each party, is a fiction: in very old democracies – such as the United Kingdom and the United States – voters have supported parties for decades regardless of what they offered them.</p>
<p>In South Africa, this is particularly strong. The ANC has represented the majority identity and, for many voters, to support another party is to change their identity. And so, its disaffected voters have tended not to shift to another party but to opt out of voting.</p>
<p>The ANC’s local election setback has been – accurately – laid at the door of a lower than usual voter turnout. The percentage poll dropped significantly compared to 2016 – from 57% to 48% <a href="https://elections.sabc.co.za/elections/2021-lge-news-flashes/csir-predicts-48-voter-turnout-for-2021-local-government-elections/">according to projections</a> by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. But in the suburbs, where opposition voters tend to live, the drop was small. In low-income townships, where ANC voters tend to live, it was sharp.</p>
<p>Lower turnout was not a statement by all voters – it was a message from ANC supporters.</p>
<h2>Unnecessary hand-wringing</h2>
<p>South Africans who shape the political debate enjoy hand-wringing and so the lower turnout has been widely labelled as a sign that citizens reject democracy. Not only are they staying away from polls but there has been little enthusiasm recently for registering to vote. A voter registration weekend in <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/electoral-commission-18-19-september-registration-weekend-20-sep-2021-0000">mid-September</a> failed to register anything like the expected numbers and one analyst pointed out that fewer voters are registered now than in 2019.</p>
<p>But a 48% turnout in local elections is high by <a href="https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-voter-turnout-municipal-elections.html">international standards</a> and COVID-19 may have made voter registration more difficult.</p>
<p>South African electoral democracy has defied all the dire predictions about its durability – faced with its worst result ever, the ANC reacts not by trying to abridge democracy to cling onto power: it holds discussions on how to win back voter trust.</p>
<p>Voting is also only one aspect of democracy. South Africa remains, as it has been since 1994, a country in which around one third express themselves vigorously and the rest are reduced to spectators – not by law but by the prejudices and power of the politically engaged minority. This has not changed. Increasing numbers are unhappy with party politics not because they think it does not work, but because they are disillusioned with the ANC but have no alternative.</p>
<p>This reality is likely to make the brave new world created by the end of the ANC majority messy and difficult. The new reality is not one in which another party will form stable governments in municipalities where the ANC has slipped below 50%. The gap between the ANC and its rivals will make it one of <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">unwieldy coalitions of convenience</a> in which small parties are interested less in representing voters than in looking after themselves.</p>
<p>In some places, it may mean no elected government at all because parties cannot agree. In that case, administrators may be appointed to run cities: ironically, the era of greater party competition could be one in which municipalities are run by appointed officials.</p>
<p>How might this change?</p>
<h2>Possibilities</h2>
<p>One possibility is that the ANC will reconnect with its voters and win stable majorities. But this is unlikely. It has tried to deal with its key problem – that economic realities prompt many of its politicians to look after themselves <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africas-ramaphosa-testify-inquiry-into-zuma-era-corruption-2021-04-28/">rather than voters</a> – but its leadership is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-fails-to-show-leadership-as-difficult-and-decisive-year-looms-129762">finding this difficult</a>. Precisely because it is a symptom of stubborn realities, it may not find change any easier now. </p>
<p>Around the world, once parties which have dominated elections for decades start sliding, it is very difficult to reverse the decline, at least until they lose a national election.</p>
<p>Current opposition parties are highly unlikely to become credible challengers for the majority vote. The Democratic Alliance also lost support in this election – it <a href="https://results.elections.org.za/dashboards/lge/">dropped around six percentage points </a> compared to 2016. The EFF improved by around two percentage points, as it does at all elections. But at its current rate of growth, it will be 60 years before it can achieve a majority. If neither can win much larger chunks of the vote when the ANC is in deep trouble, we can assume that they will continue to overestimate their own importance.</p>
<p>So, South African politics will remain in limbo until a new party emerges which can convince people who voted ANC to support it rather than staying at home. How that might come about is a topic South Africans need to begin debating.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turnout was low. But not equally so across the board. Patterns show it was not a statement by all voters – it was a message from ANC supporters.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708862021-10-29T14:05:23Z2021-10-29T14:05:23ZSouth African local government elections: why a great deal hangs on the outcome<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429362/original/file-20211029-21-1xi6v7s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Economic Freedom Fighters's campaign emphasises national issues. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 250 local elections will be held in each one of South Africa’s municipalities on <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">1 November</a>. More than 10,000 councillors have to be elected. For this reason, more than 95,000 candidates have been nominated, including more than <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/in-numbers-this-years-elections-sees-the-most-ever-number-of-participating-candidates-20211026">1,500 independent candidates</a>. </p>
<p>How they have communicated it to the public during their campaigns has been largely determined by their <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-01-political-party-manifestos-haul-out-the-promises-oops-its-now-commitments-to-woo-voters/">election manifestos</a>, the media debates between the parties, their election advertisements and their impromptu comments during the campaign.</p>
<p>The scale of the election makes it impossible to reduce it to a single answer of what is at stake and how the different parties articulate it. It would also be incorrect to assume that the parties’ presentation of the essence of the election is the same as that of the public.</p>
<p>The main parties – the <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">African National Congress</a> (ANC), <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance</a> (DA) and the <a href="https://effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a> (EFF) – portrayed the election in different terms, which is in itself important to analyse. </p>
<p>Two approaches have dominated the election campaign. The African National Congress and Economic Freedom Fighters concentrated on national issues and used national campaigns to reach the voters. The Democratic Alliance also used a national campaign but concentrated much more on local issues of service delivery.</p>
<p>This interplay between the national and the local is an important contributor towards developing an understanding of what this election is about.</p>
<p>The election is not only about who will govern the municipalities. It will also show what is happening in party politics in South Africa, what the latest trends are, how the still relatively new leaders of some parties are performing, whether identity politics is emerging as a feature of South African politics, and whether coalition governments are a long-term feature or a transitional phenomenon. </p>
<h2>African National Congress</h2>
<p>The African National Congress is the governing party at national level, and in most of the provinces and majority of local councils. Its <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ANC-LGE-2021-Manifesto.pdf">election manifesto</a> and pronouncements by its main leaders concentrated very much on economic development and job creation. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-local-elections-new-entrants-likely-to-be-the-big-winners-170804">South Africa's local elections: new entrants likely to be the big winners</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since 1994, its election slogan has been <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-ancs-1994-election-manifesto">“a better life for all”</a> and now it is; <a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ANC-LGE-2021-Manifesto.pdf">“Building better communities together”</a>.</p>
<p>Its emphasis is, therefore, on socio-economic improvement, which depends on policies developed in the national and provincial spheres. </p>
<p>Local authorities have less capacity for economic development but can provide the local infrastructure and services to enable that development. The African National Congress’s electoral approach has been to avoid a focus on local service delivery and municipal infrastructural development. That’s because this is the governance sector in which mismanagement and lack of capacity are most visible. </p>
<p>Where it is unavoidable to address it, African National Congress President Ramaphosa has apologised for the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/elections-2021-ramaphosa-begs-voters-to-give-anc-a-second-chance-20211020">bad state of affairs</a> and distanced himself from the malpractices of the past.</p>
<p>A feature of this election was how most parties tried to concentrate on their own records of government in the past and their successes. The African National Congress and Ramaphosa, therefore, used the African National Congress government’s successes with the economic and social relief programme during the COVID-19 pandemic as a blueprint for its local recovery initiatives.</p>
<p>It, therefore, approached this election as a national scale and its local candidates did not feature much in the campaigns.</p>
<h2>Democratic Alliance</h2>
<p>The main thrust of the Democratic Alliance’s campaign has been that they can deliver the results at local level: </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/the-das-2021-local-government-election-manifesto">The DA gets things done</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These results are mainly in the form of local services and infrastructure. Their record of governance in the councils where they are the majority party has been their main reference point in the campaign. It is, therefore, meant to convince the voters that their track record should be expanded to councils controlled by the African National Congress and other parties.</p>
<p>The African National Congress and commentators challenged this approach by claiming that these successes only apply to the areas of higher-income residents and business areas, and not to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-09-21-what-have-you-done-for-me-lately-despite-its-outstanding-delivery-record-the-da-is-its-own-worst-enemy">informal settlements and townships</a>. The notion of a racial divide at local level is, therefore, the African National Congress’s rebuttal of the Democratic Alliance’s messaging.</p>
<p>Controversial in this election was the Democratic Alliance’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-inflammatory-election-posters-say-about-south-africas-democratic-alliance-169743">poster debacle at Phoenix </a> in KwaZulu-Natal. Though not part of its main campaign strategy, it exploited identity politics in an <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/phoenix-election-posters-steenhuisen-makes-about-turn-community-says-damage-already-done-20211008">Indian and African context</a>. It is per definition a divisive and high-risk approach, which exposed the problematic elements of nationalist politics.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-inflammatory-election-posters-say-about-south-africas-democratic-alliance-169743">What inflammatory election posters say about South Africa's Democratic Alliance</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Democratic Alliance is one of the protagonists of coalition politics at local level, but its experiences – especially in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/marriages-of-inconvenience-the-fraught-politics-of-coalitions-in-south-africa-167517">Gauteng metropolitan councils</a> – motivated it to campaign for absolute majorities. Coalition negotiations after the elections will, however, become a major task for the DA. Its federal chairperson, Helen Zille’s earlier pronouncements on the African National Congress as a likely partner, lately attracted <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-10-27-helen-zille-addresses-viral-audio-clip-on-das-anc-coalition-plans/">quite some attention</a>. Zille indicated that the African National Congress do not share the Democratic Alliance’s values and therefore a coalition with them will be inconceivable. Other Democratic Alliance leaders, however, want to be more pragmatic and not foreclose any of the options.</p>
<h2>Economic Freedom Fighters</h2>
<p>The Economic Freedom Fighters staged a very visual campaign with prominent posters and billboards. Defining itself as a socialist party in its election manifesto of <a href="https://effonline.org/2021-lgemanifesto/">more than 570 pages</a>, it found it difficult to identify a niche area of itself left of the African National Congress.</p>
<p>Its focus on the past on land and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-05-31-expropriation-without-compensation-anc-eff-toenadering-on-state-land-custodianship-its-all-about-the-politics/">expropriation without compensation </a> could not evolve into a national campaign issue. Its lack of experience in local government also made it difficult to use the approach of the other parties of presenting their track records as a justification for their support.</p>
<p>The Economic Freedom Fighters followed the African National Congress in concentrating on national issues. Its campaign, however, did not develop a central theme. Because there were not really controversial political eruptions during the election campaigns, there were no real opportunities for the Economic Freedom Fighters capitalise on them.</p>
<p>The smaller parties like <a href="https://www.actionsa.org.za/manifesto/">ActionSA</a> and the <a href="https://www.vfplus.org.za/manifesto-2021">Freedom Front Plus</a> pursued local or provincial campaigns and concentrated on local issues. It presents a view of how these parties approach local government as part of the family of governments.</p>
<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>The 2021 election will define for citizens important aspects of South Africa’s political future. What is the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/28/local-polls-a-test-for-the-future-for-south-africa-s-anc/">African National Congress’s future</a> and what was the impact of Ramaphosa on this election?</p>
<p>In which direction are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-19-as-anc-and-da-face-obstacles-its-the-effs-elections-to-lose/">the Economic Freedom Fighters</a> and Democratic Alliance moving? Is there a future for independent candidates in South African politics, especially in the 2024 election?</p>
<p>Will the voter turn-out follow the decline in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">2016 elections</a>? Will the coalition dynamics of 2021 differ from those after the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/three-gauteng-metros-important-this-election-f148a2a6-dffc-4abd-a151-d3d0bae7c037">2016 elections?</a>.</p>
<p>This is what the 2021 election is actually about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The 2021 election will define for citizens important aspects of South Africa’s political future. What is the governing ANC’s future, and what was the impact of President Ramaphosa on this election?Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708052021-10-29T14:00:03Z2021-10-29T14:00:03ZSouth Africa’s voting dynamics have changed: it’s no longer a race between the big three<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429313/original/file-20211029-23-13y8ddi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The number of political parties in South Africa has increased significantly from the 19 that participated in the first democratic election <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">in 1994</a>. Both <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=3408&name=Elections&LeftMenuId=100&BreadCrumbId=220">2011</a> and <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/2016-Municipal-Elections/2016-Municipal-Election-Publication/">2016</a> saw the number of political parties grow. But this year the number has increased exponentially. </p>
<p>Over 500 are currently registered with the Independent Electoral Commission. Over 300 will be participating in the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">November 2021 local government election</a>. In addition, more than 1,500 independent candidates will participate in the poll.</p>
<p>Against this background, there are divergent views about the uniqueness of this election compared to the previous ones. </p>
<p>Despite the increased number of participants in this election, some see the race as still being <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/10/28/south-africas-municipal-elections-a-referendum-on-political-parties-and-local-democracy/">between</a> the African National Congress (ANC), which dominates the National Assembly and runs the country, and the two big opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).</p>
<p>A counter view is that the political landscape has widened, thus expanding the competition <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-local-elections-new-entrants-likely-to-be-the-big-winners-170804">beyond the three major parties</a>. </p>
<p>Based on my academic work as a political scientist and a historian who specialises in African historical and political issues, I think either of these positions is plausible. But I think it’s more plausible that the smaller political parties will upset the top three parties, given the changed political landscape. </p>
<p>The rise in political parties putting forward candidates, and the explosion in the number of independents, means it’s no longer simply a race among the three big ones.</p>
<h2>Factors at play</h2>
<p>Firstly, it’s important to remember that this is a municipal poll, not national and provincial elections. Local elections provide a platform for a wider range of political parties. </p>
<p>Secondly, the fact that the number of new political parties has increased significantly could mean that the plans of the three main parties are derailed. In the main, the new parties are formed by politicians who were once associated with the three main parties. Some even enjoy a good following.</p>
<p>In all probability, their supporters and their sympathisers might vote for them, drawing away votes from the big players.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the increased number of independent candidates poses a challenge to the three main political parties. Even if none of them attract a larger following, they might take enough from the three main political parties to deny them control of municipalities.</p>
<p>Depending on the popularity of the ANC, DA and EFF in a given municipality, independent candidates might win seats or simply take enough votes to deny any of the three main parties an outright majority.</p>
<p>Fourthly, with so many political parties and so many independent candidates, the prospect of coalitions in certain municipalities is a reality that cannot be ignored. While it is true that the ANC, DA and EFF enjoy more support compared to the other parties, there is a possibility that smaller parties could gang up against the big three to run some municipalities. </p>
<p>Fifthly, not all provinces are the same. In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) cannot be ignored. In fact, it poses a bigger threat to the ANC than the DA and the EFF combined.</p>
<p>Apart from the fact that the Inkatha Freedom Party has strategically retained its founder Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi as its <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/kwazulu-natal/uproar-over-using-retired-buthelezi-as-face-of-the-ifp-in-upcoming-elections-9c2183d8-47c2-45dc-820a-438e84799c78">face and a draw card</a>, it has also benefited from the mistakes made by both the ANC and the National Freedom Party. The National Freedom Party did well <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/dynamic.aspx?id=1822&name=elections&leftmenuid=100&breadcrumbid=464">in 2011</a> but did not participate in the <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/local-elections-game-over-for-nfp-2016-07-04">2016 elections</a>. </p>
<p>Internal squabbles within the ANC and the National Freedom Party benefited the Inkatha Freedom Party <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-08-05-lge2016-results-ifp-makes-a-surprise-comeback/">in the 2016 local elections</a>. Some of their members and followers did not vote or simply voted for the Inkatha Freedom Party. </p>
<p>While there may have been a slight change in each of these parties as they tried to regroup, the reality is that they are still not united.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the Inkatha Freedom Party seems to be sailing smoothly in KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore, in this election, it is likely to win more municipalities than it did in 2016.</p>
<h2>Voter apathy</h2>
<p>Another factor which is hard to ignore is voter apathy. While it is true that many South Africans are either members or supporters of the ANC, DA and the EFF, the bad state of local municipalities – a lack of water, sometimes none, broken infrastructure and neglect – has dampened the spirit of the electorate.</p>
<p>Voters might just elect to stay away. Already, some <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-27-broken-joburgs-voters-get-ready-to-hang-the-council/">have indicated</a> that they will not vote due to lack of service delivery.</p>
<p>Another related point is that other political parties could win a municipality due to a combination of factors. They would count on their own members, other sympathisers who do not belong to any political party, new voters, as well as some disgruntled members from the three main political parties. </p>
<p>It’s therefore too simplistic to argue that the race for the 2021 local government elections is only between the ANC on the one hand and the DA and the EFF on the other. It remains indisputable that at national level, the DA and the EFF are the second and third largest political parties. </p>
<p>But when it comes to local elections, this trend isn’t guaranteed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170805/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bheki Mngomezulu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise in political parties and the explosion in the number of independents means that it’s no longer simply a race among the three major parties.Bheki Mngomezulu, Professor of Political Science, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1708042021-10-28T15:39:56Z2021-10-28T15:39:56ZSouth Africa’s local elections: new entrants likely to be the big winners<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/429093/original/file-20211028-23-18vy1um.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Election posters on street poles in Cape Town. The top one in Afrikaans says 'Cape Town Works. Let's do more'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Nic Bothma</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Though a ritual, elections yield new insights about the state of the citizenry and the political elite. Life changes, either for the better or worse. Electoral outcomes are a statement about how citizens feel at that moment and signal their inclination to take charge of their future.</p>
<p>The level of turnout and the political choices voters make indicate whether citizens have resigned themselves to their problems, or are actively seeking solutions. And the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">2021 local government elections</a> in South Africa are certainly more about the citizenry than about the political elite.</p>
<p>Municipalities are in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-revolting-against-inept-local-government-why-it-matters-155483">shambolic state</a>, and have been for a while. The auditor-general’s latest assessment <a href="https://www.agsa.co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/201920/2019%20-%2020%20MFMA%20Consolidated%20GR.pdf#page=9">report</a> reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most municipalities are in a worse position than at the beginning of this administration’s term in 2016-17.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was always expected that some municipalities in rural and small towns would be worse off than others. Their revenue base is small and thus cannot meet all their needs. But grants from the fiscus are available to cater for new infrastructure and free services for the indigent.</p>
<p>The root causes of the deterioration are not structural and beyond their control. They are man-made. Most hardly spend their grants in full. What they certainly excel in is paying salaries, including paying for overtime that can hardly be proven or justified. This happens even at the expense of paying major service suppliers <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/eskom-posts-net-loss-of-r189-billion-but-cuts-debt-20210831#:%7E:text=De%20Ruyter%20said%20that%20since,1%20billion.">such as Eskom</a>, the power utility. The consequence is lack of both power and new infrastructure, while the existing infrastructure degenerates. And the repercussions don’t end there. Even the self-generated revenue becomes threatened.</p>
<h2>Failing municipalities</h2>
<p>Just this past June, Clover, the cheese making company, closed its largest factory at Lichtenburg, North West province. Clover explained the <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/clover-closes-sas-biggest-cheese-factory-due-to-municipal-woes-in-the-north-west-20210608">decision to relocate</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>For years the Lichtenburg factory has been experiencing water and power outages and the surrounding infrastructure has not been maintained by the municipality. Despite numerous efforts to engage the municipality on these matters, the issues have not been resolved.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This means loss of jobs and revenue for the Ditsobotla Municipality. Because existing infrastructure is maintained from self-generated revenue, the capacity of the municipality to fulfil this task is eroded even further. This is a common story in most towns. It’s a vicious cycle.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">Small towns are collapsing across South Africa. How it's starting to affect farming</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>A deteriorating quality of life, however, doesn’t necessarily translate into loss of interest in voting. Turnout at the last election in 2016 was highest, at <a href="https://www.elections.org.za">58%</a>. Though a minor improvement from the 57.11% in 2011, it sustained an upward movement that started in 2011. </p>
<p>That 57.11% turnout represented a whopping jump of 9% from the previous two elections. Admittedly, the level of voter registration in this election – at 65% of eligible voters, compared to 75% in 2016 – is <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/opinion/jp-landman-local-government-elections-what-to-watch-for-20211011">worrisome</a>. It also hasn’t helped that the campaign period was shortened. But the compressed campaign period due to COVID-19 doesn’t seem to have translated into less visibility. Instead, parties seem to have been campaigning almost every day since the start of this month.</p>
<p>Besides the energised campaigns, the staggering growth in number and range of candidates and parties may just improve turnout. The number of parties contesting this election has risen from 205 in 2016 to 325. The number of independents has also almost doubled to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">1,546</a> from the previous election. </p>
<h2>The Ramaphosa factor</h2>
<p>New contestants may entice new voters to the polls. The prospects of independents winning are much higher this time than previously, when they hardly registered a dent. Their relative failure has been due to lack of support, both organisationally and financially. Now they seem to have both, including training on electioneering, provided by the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/mmusi-maimane-has-plans-to-become-sas-first-independent-candidate-to-contest-a-national-election-20211025">One SA Movement</a> of Mmusi Maimane, former leader of the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance. Maimane’s organisation accounts for over 300 of independents.</p>
<p>Independents obviously hope to capitalise on the widespread distrust of political parties. The governing African National Congress (ANC) has been most affected by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-revolting-against-inept-local-government-why-it-matters-155483">lack of trust</a> in parties. This is a hangover from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zuma-isnt-a-man-with-a-cause-just-a-wily-politician-trying-to-evade-the-law-163660">Jacob Zuma</a> years. </p>
<p>The ANC shielded him despite his many <a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zuma-when-did-erstwhile-south-african-revolutionary-lose-his-way-163872">misdemeanours</a> and were eventually forced by popular disquiet to let him go. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/municipalities-can-play-a-key-role-in-south-africas-economic-development-heres-how-169952">Municipalities can play a key role in South Africa's economic development. Here's how</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Fortunately for the party, its current president, <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/profiles/president-cyril-ramaphosa%3A-profile">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/politics/ramaphosa-way-more-popular-than-anc-20211009">has a better approval rating than the organisation</a>. This explains why the party wasn’t keen, this time, to announce mayoral candidates. In the last election, mayoral candidates were announced in advance partly to make up for Zuma’s unpopularity. Mayoral candidates became the face of the party in their localities. Now Ramaphosa’s face is the only one on the party’s posters and T-shirts.</p>
<p>Whether Ramaphosa’s approval rating rubs off on the party remains to be seen. He was able to improve his party’s fortunes in the 2019 national election up to <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/National-and-provincial-elections-results/">57%</a>, from the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36985339">54%</a> it had gained in the 2016 local election. Previous electoral trends had shown that national and election results were not too dissimilar from each other. Thus the 57% tally the ANC got in 2019 was an improvement. </p>
<p>Times have changed, however. Coming so soon after Zuma’s removal, Ramaphosa’s approval ratings had a lot to do with a sense of relief and his uplifting <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000">message of renewal</a>. Changes that quickly followed, especially new appointments in state institutions, uplifted the public mood and created a sense of optimism. Reforms, however, have not been consistent or felt throughout government. Revelations of corruption by Ramaphosa’s own high-ranking allies, such as <a href="https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/zweli-mkhize-challenges-corruption-findings/">Zweli Mkhize</a> and <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/court-suspends-public-protectors-report-on-premier-oscar-mabuyane-cdc284ed-3364-4956-82fa-243b3ca0d3d7">Oscar Mabuyane</a>, create some doubt that he is succeeding in instilling ethical leadership in his party.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/water-power-cuts-and-neglect-are-taking-their-toll-on-south-africas-top-hospitals-163897">Water, power cuts and neglect are taking their toll on South Africa's top hospitals</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What complicates Ramaphosa’s mission even more is the dearth of ethical leaders within the ANC in various municipalities. In this past financial year alone, the auditor-general tells us that officials, politicians and their families secured contracts worth close to R2 billion (US$132 million).</p>
<p>They rigged the process to benefit themselves, which explains why the Enoch Mgijima municipality can unveil an open patch of ground pretending to be <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/news-eish/2639251/enoch-mgijima-municipality-says-r15m-stadium-pictures-provided-minimal-detail/">a stadium worth R15 million</a> (about US$1 million). Ramaphosa’s message of a renewed ANC doesn’t resonate with local experience, nor is it reflected in the calibre of leaders at the local level. Even the respected former deputy president of the ANC, Kgalema Motlanthe, had a tough time ensuring that suitable candidates were selected. Rigging, disruption and violent killings marred the party’s selection <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2021-09-22-anc-finally-submits-list-of-local-election-candidates/">process</a>. These are hardly signs of a renewed party that inspires optimism.</p>
<h2>What to expect</h2>
<p>But the ANC has nothing to fear from its biggest rival, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The official opposition is re-consolidating as a party of minorities and conservative voters. This was affirmed just recently when it issued <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-inflammatory-election-posters-say-about-south-africas-democratic-alliance-169743">racially insensitive posters</a>, and its leader appeared to approve of a radio host’s <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-10-25-poll--do-you-think-nandos-terminating-its-sponsorship-of-gareth-cliffs-show-was-enough/">dismissal</a> of a black woman’s experience of racism.</p>
<p>Julius Malema, leader of the third largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), benefits from “<a href="https://theconversation.com/white-privilege-what-it-is-what-it-means-and-why-understanding-it-matters-166683">white denialism</a>”. It fans bitterness at the failures of the post-apartheid settlement, which the party offers to assuage by “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/we-are-cutting-the-throat-of-whiteness--julius-mal">cutting the throat of whiteness</a>”. But the party’s limited appeal to youth (under 30 years old), which is a marginal segment of registered voters at roughly 15%, restrains its growth.</p>
<p>This election is likely to yield diverse winners, rather than enable one party to gain in any significant way. New entrants are likely to be the big winners. Though some may be motivated by financial benefits, the increased and diverse number of contestants shows a citizenry that is unwilling to leave its fate in the hands of ineffective incumbents. Voters will most likely take advantage of the wider choice of parties as they explore different remedies to their hardships.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/170804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mcebisi Ndletyana receives funding from the National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences.</span></em></p>The increased and diverse number of contestants shows a citizenry that is unwilling to leave its fate in the hands of ineffective incumbents.Mcebisi Ndletyana, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692952021-10-17T08:39:09Z2021-10-17T08:39:09ZHow Johannesburg’s suburban elites maintain apartheid inequities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426438/original/file-20211014-13-1dr49qx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Braamfontein in central Johannesburg has benefited from the city's urban renewal programme in recent times.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Days before his <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2021-07-09-joburg-mayor-geoff-makhubo-dies-of-covid-complications/">death</a> in July, the African National Congress (ANC) mayor of Johannesburg, Geoff Makhubo, wrote <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-06-30-johannesburg-is-not-falling-apart-it-is-in-the-process-of-rebirth-after-the-demise-of-a-white-city/">an article</a> responding to critics of the city’s managers. The critics say Johannesburg is in decline and <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/joburg-is-dying">falling apart</a>. He emphasised the legacies of apartheid in the continuing inequality in South Africa’s “city of gold”.</p>
<p>His short essay envisioned a future Johannesburg as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a site where one tax base for one city will be used to ensure that people … know they have as good a chance of success regardless of whether they are from Diepsloot or nearby Fourways.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It would be absurd to argue against the view that apartheid bequeathed South Africa a <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/09/23/unpicking-inequality-in-south-africa">highly unequal society</a>. But to identify the historical roots of injustice is quite different to identifying how it is reproduced or reduced. </p>
<p>Makhubo’s reference to Diepsloot and Fourways, respectively among the poorest and richest areas in Johannesburg’s north, was curious. These neighbourhoods have <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Diepsloot/k_hyuQAACAAJ?hl=en">grown primarily in the post-apartheid era</a>. </p>
<p>What Makhubo did not mention is that the aspiration for <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/09/the-struggle-to-govern-johannesburg/376455/">“one tax base for one city”</a> is long-standing. It’s been held by successive ANC governments – and social movements – in the city since the early 1990s, as talks to end apartheid got off the ground. </p>
<p>The idea was for the wealthy and overwhelmingly white areas of the city’s northern suburbs to subsidise the development of the poor, and overwhelmingly black areas of the city’s southern and northeastern peripheries.</p>
<h2>Weapons of the strong</h2>
<p>In the early 1990s, South Africa was considered ripe for transformative change. This meant undoing the racialised structure of wealth and the highly divided geography that rationed access to the benefits of city life.</p>
<p>The ANC government entered power at all levels with <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1995/09/the-struggle-to-govern-johannesburg/376455/">extremely high degrees of political legitimacy</a>. It was verboten to attack the basic tenets of social transformation it placed on the political agenda.</p>
<p>At the national level, there were critical successes in building the kinds of state capacity normally seen as fundamental to reducing inequality.</p>
<p>Tax collection has largely tracked or even beaten averages of countries <a href="https://www.oecd.org/ctp/revenue-statistics-in-africa-2617653x.htm">in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</a>. A third of South Africans receive <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-social-grants-matter-in-south-africa-they-support-33-of-the-nation-73087">one of three major social grants</a>. </p>
<p>But the structure of apartheid-era cities has largely been reproduced. It is this structure that, in many ways, was the <em>raison d’être</em> of the apartheid state — <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520206519">to serve the white urban minority</a>. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1535684121994522">newly-published research</a> conducted between 2015 and 2018, I examined why Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest and richest city, has reproduced spatial inequalities since 1994. In particular the distribution of housing, sanitation and transport remains unequal.</p>
<p>I tried to answer this question through 115 semi-structured interviews with local politicians, bureaucrats, activists and private developers in the city.</p>
<p>I augmented the data with hundreds of documents collected through archival research in government and NGO publications, the <a href="https://www.saha.org.za/">South African History Archive</a> and newspaper articles.</p>
<p>I identified two relatively hidden strategies that traditional white elites – property developers and property owners – used to undermine the capacity of Johannesburg’s black majority local government to redistribute urban goods. I call these strategies “weapons of the strong”.</p>
<p>Strikingly, these hidden strategies top the political agenda ahead of the <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/">November municipal elections</a>. They speak precisely to the unfinished work of realising “one city with one tax base”.</p>
<h2>Echoes of the 1990s in 2021</h2>
<p>Mpho Phalatse, the Johannesburg mayoral candidate of the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has emphasised her <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-09-09-relooking-at-city-improvement-districts-as-a-key-way-to-revitalise-johannesburg/">desire to expand City Improvement Districts</a>. Through these, individual neighbourhoods contribute to funding urban management services that are only for their specific areas.</p>
<p>This echoes the first of the strategies that undermined municipal state capacity. I categorise this strategy as “ring-fencing” – area-based hoarding of taxes for local infrastructure improvement. </p>
<p>By “ring-fencing”, wealthy neighbourhood associations undercut attempts at municipal unification. Revenues are taken out of a general municipal funding stream, and put towards investments that reproduce disparities in the provision of public goods. </p>
<p>The founder of one of the first City Improvement Districts in the suburb of Illovo in the mid-1990s described the motivation for establishing them: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We definitely weren’t going to give our contributions to the city, because there would be no guarantee that it would be spent in the area (p. 200).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This strategy became a key means by which wealthier suburbs could ensure a much higher standard of urban management than that in poorer areas. The tax payments were held by the <a href="https://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu26ue/uu26ue0h.htm">interim municipal “sub-structures”</a> in the first years after apartheid.</p>
<p>Another key strategy I identified was “venue-shopping”. This is a process by which property developers sought construction approvals from the Gauteng provincial government - under which Johannesburg falls - to undercut the <a href="https://doi.org/10.18772/22014107656.8">“urban development boundary”</a> that the City of Johannesburg was attempting to enforce. </p>
<p>The relatively austere capital expenditures of the city throughout the 2000s, and the lack of institutional capacity to enforce both land use regulations and inter-agency coordination, meant that private developers were still able to shape the spatial trajectory of the city.</p>
<p>The terms of this year’s mayoral debate in Johannesburg therefore expose battles that were once subterranean. </p>
<p>The ANC imagines that a redistributive agenda for the city can be built on references to the apartheid past, and top-down delivery through the state. The DA de-emphasises redistribution altogether, adopting strategies for fragmenting urban management. This will only benefit the largely white wealthy homeowners and property developers.</p>
<h2>The missing protagonist: movements</h2>
<p>What is missing is a role for housing movements to challenge the growing power of developers and wealthy property owners. These were once so militant they <a href="https://doi.org/10.3406/cea.1985.1735">helped bring down apartheid</a>.</p>
<p>These movements have been demobilised and cast aside under the ANC. Government is supposed to deliver, and to do so alone. But, without a social movement base, municipal government has struggled to mobilise the bureaucratic power necessary to deliver housing, sanitation, and spatial transformation.</p>
<p>This is because city authorities don’t have political allies who can counter the often hidden power of homeowners and property developers. As a result, this group’s “weapons of the strong” undercut local government authority.</p>
<p>As I <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1535684121994522">found</a> in my research, housing movements are extremely fragmented and localised. To move beyond the highly unequal urban stalemate will require a long-term political project to reconnect movements to the local state in a way that has not happened since the dawn of democracy in 1994.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169295/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin H. Bradlow has received funding from the National Science Foundation, American Council of Learned Societies, and the Fulbright Program, for research related to this article.</span></em></p>The city’s government wanted the wealthy and overwhelmingly white areas of the city to subsidise the development of the poor and overwhelmingly black areas.Benjamin H. Bradlow, Lecturer on Sociology, Harvard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1697432021-10-12T15:40:03Z2021-10-12T15:40:03ZWhat inflammatory election posters say about South Africa’s Democratic Alliance<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425982/original/file-20211012-27-14uk6y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Democratic Alliance has been accused of inflaming racial tensions in Phoenix. Local residents belonging to a protection group stand watch in July 2021 at the height of the violence. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Is “liberal” in South Africa another way of saying “right-wing”?</p>
<p>Liberalism’s apparent representative in the country’s party politics is the official opposition, the <a href="https://www.da.org.za/">Democratic Alliance (DA)</a>. Its current leadership does not flaunt its liberalism, and most of its voters are not liberals. But it is affiliated to the <a href="https://liberal-international.org/">Liberal International</a> and the <a href="http://africaliberalnetwork.org/">Africa Liberal Network</a>, alliances of liberal parties. So, it identifies itself as liberal and liberal politicians around the world agree.</p>
<p>Other liberal parties may be less eager to identify with the Democratic Alliance after it <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/siyakhumalo/siya-khumalo-the-case-for-putting-the-das-campaign-posters-back-up-20211011">distributed posters</a> in eThekwini (Durban), KwaZulu-Natal, which were seen by just about everyone outside the party – and some within it – as at best racially insensitive, at worst bigoted and divisive.</p>
<p>They were erected in Phoenix, an area which houses mainly people of Indian descent, and was hit by violent clashes between Indian and black people <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-28-phoenix-massacre-what-really-happened-in-the-deadly-collision-of-brutalised-communities/">in July</a>. Phoenix residents who are blamed for the violence say they were protecting themselves from violent attack. Many black people insist they were racial vigilantes. The DA’s response was to erect two posters. One read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/siyakhumalo/siya-khumalo-the-case-for-putting-the-das-campaign-posters-back-up-20211011">The ANC called you racists</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The other:</p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/siyakhumalo/siya-khumalo-the-case-for-putting-the-das-campaign-posters-back-up-20211011">The DA calls you heroes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even at face value, the posters were inflammatory and insensitive. In an area crying out for a calming of racial tensions, they chose sides and inflamed them. </p>
<p>They become worse if we recognise that, in a racially divided society, what people read is filtered through stereotypes which are rarely expressed but are deeply felt. The posters reflected a (false) view common among racial minorities – that black people (the majority) are always responsible for violence; minorities are always defending themselves against them.</p>
<h2>Fallout over posters</h2>
<p>The DA’s leader in KwaZulu-Natal, the province in which Phoenix is situated, has <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/breaking-da-apologises-for-controversial-elections-posters-in-kwazulu-natal-removes-them-20211007">apologised</a> for the posters, for which he was reportedly responsible, and said they would be removed. But he did this only after its Johannesburg mayoral candidate, Mpho Phalatse, urged that <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times-daily/politics/2021-10-06-da-joburg-mayoral-candidate-breaks-ranks-with-party-boss-on-phoenix-posters/">they be taken down</a> and DA politicians in KwaZulu-Natal said he had not consulted them.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-liberals-are-failing-to-wrap-their-heads-around-race-127029">South Africa's liberals are failing to wrap their heads around race</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The DA’s leader, <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/john-henry-steenhuisen/">John Steenhuisen</a>, said he would <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2639680/john-steenhuisen-will-not-apologise-for-da-election-posters-in-phoenix/">not apologise for the posters</a>; he endorsed their content while claiming, implausibly, that they were not racially biased.</p>
<p>While several DA politicians, and media commentators sympathetic to it, rejected the posters, its leader finds nothing wrong with them and it seems likely that his view is shared by others in the DA leadership. </p>
<p>The posters were not a bolt from the blue. They were consistent with messages the DA’s current leadership has been sending out for some time.</p>
<p>Its federal chair and former leader, <a href="https://www.da.org.za/people/helen-zille-2">Helen Zille</a>, has become notorious for Twitter outbursts which sound like those of Donald Trump. She has complained that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/3/16/outrage-over-helen-zilles-colonialism-tweets">colonialism’s benefits are unappreciated</a> and that there were <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/Analysis/helen-zille-says-there-are-more-racist-laws-today-than-under-apartheid-we-compared-them-20200623">fewer racial laws under apartheid</a> than now. A DA MP claimed black members of parliament enjoyed singing because they were <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/backlash-against-da-mp-after-she-said-anc-struggle-songs-in-parliament-were-irritating-20190523">no good at thinking</a>.</p>
<p>Nor is the DA the only supposedly liberal vehicle which <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-14-the-battle-for-the-soul-of-the-south-african-institute-of-race-relations/">echoes the global right-wing</a>: the South African Institute of Race Relations, which recently filed court papers <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2021/29.html">supporting the DA’s position</a> in a dispute with the electoral commission, has moved from a pillar of the liberal establishment to a loud vehicle for hard right positions, so much so that 80 people, including some former employees and members, signed an open letter <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/letters/open-letter-we-are-concerned-about-the-direction-the-irr-is-taking-20210919">protesting at its right-wing stances</a>.</p>
<h2>Liberalism and white supremacy</h2>
<p>To many of liberalism’s critics in South Africa, the fact that two of its core vehicles seem closer to the global right than the Liberal International is no surprise. Liberalism, they insist, may talk of freedom for all, but is another form of white supremacy. Reality is more complicated.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africas-white-liberals-dodge-honest-debates-about-race-127846">How South Africa's white liberals dodge honest debates about race</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The Canadian political philosopher <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100124539">CB Macpherson</a> argued that there were two liberalisms. The first he called “<a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198717133.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198717133-e-42">possessive individualism</a>”. It was an ideology of the property owner who believed that they enjoyed wealth and power not because they were privileged but because they were better than others. Liberals of this type were horrified at the thought that all adults should be allowed to vote because that would, they feared, give power to the ignorant poor. </p>
<p>The second he labelled “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3230297">developmental liberalism</a>” – it favoured votes and rights for all.</p>
<p>Both liberalisms have played a role in South Africa’s history, although the divide between them has a racial flavour. The “possessive individualists” believe in white supremacy but think that “educated” black people – those who see the world as they do – could also be admitted to the circle of the privileged. Developmental liberals campaigned for votes for all and engaged in civil disobedience and, in some cases, armed resistance to minority rule.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/liberal-party-south-africa-lpsa">Liberal Party</a>, which was active in the 1960s, housed both types. When it disbanded in the late 1960s to avoid implementing a new law which banned non-racial parties, its possessive individualists joined the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20111123105655574">Progressive Party</a>, one of the DA’s ancestors, which advocated votes only for black people who owned property and had formal qualifications.</p>
<p>So, the DA is a product of the liberalism that believes only some black people are equal to whites. So is the South African Institute of Race Relations, which was known during apartheid for <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-institute-race-relations">high quality research</a> but also for limiting its opposition to apartheid to convening discussions between whites and some black professionals.</p>
<h2>DA’s rightward lurch</h2>
<p>The DA’s rightward lurch is not its first – in 1999, the party fought an election using the slogan <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/das-history-of-identity-crises-1611459">Fight Back</a>. While it claimed it was rallying voters to oppose the governing African National Congress, it sounded very much like it was urging racial minorities to fight majority rule.</p>
<p>Later the DA tried, when Zille was leader, to shed its <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-helen-zilles-departure-means-for-south-africas-main-opposition-party-40104">white, suburban baggage</a>. But its white leadership found a liberalism that might allow for independent black leadership not to its taste. It has moved ever rightward since, despite the fact that this is likely to exclude it from government in most of the country forever: its current leaders clearly believe that their idea of whiteness is more important not only than liberalism but also than winning support.</p>
<p>But that does not mean the posters indict South African liberalism. Reactions to them suggest that the DA has become too right-wing even for many “possessive individual” liberals. It has arguably not been a liberal party for a while: even those who embrace the narrower form of liberalism may have begun to notice this. And, even in its liberal phase, it represented only one liberal strand – the other continues to influence South Africans, including many who are not liberals. It lacks a political vehicle but is found in the constitution and public debate.</p>
<p>So, the posters tell us much about the biases of the DA’s current leadership. They say far less about liberalism and its future in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Friedman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Democratic Alliance posters were not a bolt from the blue. They were consistent with messages the party’s current leadership has been sending out for some time.Steven Friedman, Professor of Political Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1675172021-09-14T16:10:37Z2021-09-14T16:10:37ZMarriages of inconvenience: the fraught politics of coalitions in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420279/original/file-20210909-21-zmb5t2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former Nelson Mandela Bay Mayor Athol Trollip, from the DA, third from left, and his deputy Mongameli Bobani, from the UDM, extreme right, help clean up a street in 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">by Werner Hills/Foto24/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The popularity of the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994">the end of apartheid in 1994</a>, has slipped in successive elections from its high of over <a href="http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2291_94.htm">60%</a>. First it declined to under <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">60% </a>, then to below <a href="https://www.eisa.org/eu/eu2016main.htm">50%</a> in the cities of Tshwane, Johannesburg, and Nelson Mandela Bay in 2016. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition, shows no sign of benefiting from the ANC’s slack – hardly reaching even 30% of the votes cast. Instead, the ANC’s numbers have been absorbed by small, mostly new parties.</p>
<p>Inevitably, South Africa is in for many decades of coalitions. This is the central theme of a new <a href="https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MISTRA-Marriages-of-Inconvenience-layout-FA-chap-10.pdf">book</a>, <em>Marriages of Inconvenience: The Politics of Coalitions in South Africa</em>, which takes a forward-looking view of the country politics but also a historical one.</p>
<p>Political scientist <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/susan-booysen-197872">Susan Booysen</a> and the <a href="https://mistra.org.za/">Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection</a>, the independent think tank, have done themselves proud by assembling a team of 15 scholars to publish this authoritative 528 page volume. It shows both the nation’s track record of previous municipal and provincial coalitions, and what factors will influence future successes and failures in the new round of coalitions that will come after the <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/local-government-elections-be-held-1-november">1 November 2021 local government elections </a>.</p>
<p>South Africans ought, at the least, to remember their former Government of National Unity <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-government-national-unity-gnu-1994-1999">between 1994-97</a>: this was a grand coalition of the then three largest parties in Parliament – the ANC, National Party, and the Inkatha Freedom Party – diverse in policies, but united in the intention to defuse the threat of continued civil war. </p>
<p>From 1983-89 South Africa was in a low-level civil war, including rioting, petrol-bombing, assassinations, wildcat general strikes, and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/covert-operations">massacres</a>.</p>
<p>The political future will be markedly different, the authors say. In short, voters face a mix of parties winning an outright majority in some towns, but increasingly requiring coalitions to hold power in other towns. For this reason, South Africa will increasingly, but variably and intermittently, enter into interparty coalition arrangements in the years to come. (p.6)</p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>Part of this book examines coalitions in other countries, whose lessons South Africa could heed. At one extreme, Mauritius had a coalition which lasted 15 years (p.453). At the other, Italy has suffered 30 prime ministers after World War II - of whom only four lasted five years or more. Belgium took 13 attempts over 493 days to negotiate a coalition in 2019; after their 2010 election, they took 541 days to succeed in forming a coalition. (p.462)</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-two-books-have-to-say-about-the-political-lifespan-of-south-africas-anc-103377">What two books have to say about the political lifespan of South Africa's ANC</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>South Africa’s political parties would do well to learn from Ireland, where the three largest political parties negotiated a coalition treaty over one hundred pages long. This stipulated measures and mechanisms for conflict resolution, plus agreed compromise policies on health care, education, housing, and foreign policy.</p>
<h2>Sobering experiences</h2>
<p><a href="https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MISTRA-Marriages-of-Inconvenience-layout-FA-chap-10.pdf">Marriages of Inconvenience</a> examines South Africa’s sobering experiences with coalitions in the Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal; and in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane, Johannesburg, and Cape Town.</p>
<p>The rarest of all the country’s coalitions – so far – have been short ANC-DA coalitions in Beaufort West and Kannaland, (pp.52, 60) though these parties are adjacent on the country’s political spectrum. The most unlikely have been the Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Mandela Bay DA-Economic Freedom Front “confidence and supply agreements”. This is political science jargon for a minimalist agreement where one party agrees to vote with the other only on votes of no confidence, and on passing the annual budget.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/421853/original/file-20210917-27-mzohjk.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nelson Mandela Bay, in the Eastern Cape, provides readers with a grim lesson of all the reasons to wish to minimise or best of all avoid coalitions. Two authors in this book have each previously written a book about this city’s governance. The DA, African Christian Democratic Party, Congress of the People, Freedom Front Plus, and the United Democratic Movement (UDM) did indeed have a “co-governance agreement” between them both on substantive issues, such as not allocating public works jobs on party lines, through to procedures for consultation. (p.269)</p>
<p>Eagerness for power left both the DA and ANC vulnerable to extortion from the smallest parties. The UDM (with only two councillors) and the Patriotic Alliance (with only one councillor) both in turn demanded - and got – the mayoralty.</p>
<p>The UDM’s <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/obituaries/obituary-mongameli-bobani-port-elizabeths-mayor-who-was-both-loved-and-loathed-20201112">Mongameli Bobani</a>’s first action on becoming mayor was to demand lists of all contracts up for tender, and all vacant managerial positions – flashing red lights. He fired the city manager, and appointed a further seven acting city managers, in his attempts to get his way. (pp. 383-4)</p>
<p>All DA appeals to UDM national leader <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/person/bantubonke-harrington-holomisa/">Bantu Holomisa</a> to replace Bobani fell on deaf ears. The inevitable result was the collapse of the DA-led coalition; a collapse of the following coalition; then a period with no mayor. This put many day-to-day operations into a tailspin.</p>
<h2>Dangers of political interference</h2>
<p>This is not the only instance where the vulnerability of municipal staff to political threats from their mayor hurt South Africa. Prior to 2000, the post of city manager - then called <a href="https://open.uct.ac.za/handle/11427/16765">town clerk</a> – was on permanent staff. This was then changed to a maximum contract of five years, to expire one year after municipal elections.</p>
<p>The city manager is the CEO of the entire administration of a metropolis, where the buck should stop when anything malfunctions or ceases to work.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/who-stands-to-win-or-lose-if-south-africa-were-to-hold-all-elections-on-the-same-day-145333">Who stands to win or lose if South Africa were to hold all elections on the same day</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since 2000, the city manager has been appointed on a contract limited to a maximum of five years (p.297). This means that no city manager may dare refuse an illegal order from a mayor about appointments or tenders for fear of their contract not being renewed, or even being fired from their career job.</p>
<p>In practice, the situation is worse – municipal managers average only three and a half years before they are squeezed out by their political bosses; in the large <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/government-system/local-government">metropolitan councils</a> they average a mere 15 months before being purged. (p.277). The consequences are devastating – the bleeding away of competent leadership, and appointment of unqualified and sometimes unethical party hacks to, for example, run the sewage treatment plant.</p>
<p>Political interference in appointments and tenders are the prime drivers of corruption. South Africa urgently needs to return to city managers as permanent staff as speedily as possible. This will require a statutory revision.</p>
<p>Another lesson from the book is that all political parties in the country centralise power. No municipal nor provincial coalition will survive unless it is supported by the national leadership of all the political parties involved.</p>
<p>This book will be valuable on every bookcase. It could not be more timely – the country is now a mere two months away from the next local government election, in which there are certain to be far more coalitions than ever before.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk is an ANC member, but writes this review in his professional capacity as a political scientist.</span></em></p>South Africa’s political parties would do well to learn from Ireland, where the three largest political parties negotiated a coalition treaty that stipulated mechanisms for conflict resolution.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1453332020-09-06T09:27:40Z2020-09-06T09:27:40ZWho stands to win or lose if South Africa were to hold all elections on the same day<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/355574/original/file-20200831-16-bc6bxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Failure to campaign due to COVID-19 has fuelled calls to synchronise polls.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa usually follows an electoral schedule of national and provincial elections taking place two calendar years before the municipal elections. The next municipal elections should be held <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/elections/2321148/2021-municipal-elections-set-down-for-4-august-iec/">in 2021</a>, about 15 months after the national and provincial elections held <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/app/dashboard.html">in 2019</a>. </p>
<p>Now, for the first time, there’s discussion about <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/407507/anc-and-eff-agree-on-new-election-changes-for-south-africa-report/">synchronising all the elections</a>, <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/407507/anc-and-eff-agree-on-new-election-changes-for-south-africa-report/">prompted</a> by the governing African National Congress (ANC) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the third largest party. They want all elections to be held on the same day, presumably in 2024.</p>
<p>The Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party, <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/anc-eff-agree-on-postponing-local-elections-20200613">does not</a> support the idea. Most smaller parties have not yet taken a public position on it.</p>
<p>The debate raises two important questions: the first, why now?; the second, who stands to benefit from the synchronisation? </p>
<p>Those in favour have presented several motivations. One is that doing so would result in <a href="https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/anc-eff-agree-on-postponing-local-elections-20200613">cost saving</a> for political parties and the Electoral Commission of SA.</p>
<p>Campaign fatigue, because of elections being held almost every 30 months, has also been mentioned. Both are perennial issues. The next question, therefore, is: why now?</p>
<h2>Not ready to campaign</h2>
<p>One can start with the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on politics in South Africa. </p>
<p>Most of the political parties’ preparations for the 2021 campaign <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-05-08-covid-19-could-impact-south-africas-2021-local-elections/">have been delayed</a> since the country went into lockdown in March, to curb the spread of the pandemic.</p>
<p>Moreover, the ANC has had to <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-03-16-all-anc-conferences-postponed-for-three-months/">postpone</a> its national general council conference, due to have been held in June. The council meets midway between the party’s five-yearly elective conferences, to evaluate progress in <a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/politics/2020-01-03-five-political-stories-that-will-shape-2020/">implementing the party’s conference resolutions</a>, among <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/understanding-the-ancs-national-general-council-ngc/">other things</a>. </p>
<p>The same happened with the DA. Its <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2329426/das-virtual-federal-congress-to-take-place-on-31-october/">federal congress</a> and the party’s leadership elections have also been postponed. </p>
<p>The major parties are, therefore, not in a good position to wage election campaigns.</p>
<p>The ANC faces even more woes.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa is at a delicate point in his efforts to turn the tide against corruption. Evidence is already emerging of a fight-back campaign by several leading ANC members, <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/zuma-rubbishes-ramaphosas-open-letter-to-anc-members/">including former president Jacob Zuma</a>, whose <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2351444/anc-nec-meeting-masina-demands-ramaphosas-resignation/">vested interests are threatened</a> by Ramaphosa’s anti-corruption drive. The decisions by the ANC’s national executive committee meeting at the end of August could be regarded as an endorsement of the Ramaphosa strategy and therefore a serious setback for its opponents. </p>
<p>Previous experiences of acrimonious nomination processes in the ANC during municipal elections raise red flags for a similar process in the near future. In the past, the process exposed deep divisions within the party, even <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-political-killings-have-taken-hold-again-in-south-africas-kwazulu-natal-143908">political killings</a>. </p>
<p>An election in 2021 would also pose a challenge for the parties as they could not yet successfully address the negative consequences of the 2016 municipal elections. These saw the ANC <a href="http://702.co.za/articles/15703/anc-s-losses-in-key-metros-high-on-agenda-at-nec-4-day-meeting">lose its absolute majorities</a> in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Ekhurhuleni metros.</p>
<p>At the same time, the DA’s coalitions and cooperation with the EFF in most of these metros <a href="https://theconversation.com/turmoil-in-south-africas-capital-city-points-to-the-need-to-overhaul-local-democracy-139565">have failed</a>. The EFF could not sustain its <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2018-08-30-eff-kingmaker-strategy-means-it-abdicates-any-duty-for-governance/">kingmaker role</a> in these the metros, and also failed to secure executive positions for its councillors. Neither of these parties has since improved its position in the metros.</p>
<p>Another development in favour of synchronisation is that the appetite of private donors for funding political parties is in decline, affecting their ability to finance election campaigns. The new legislation on <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/political-party-funding-bill-signed-law">political party funding</a>, which forces parties to disclose all donations <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-new-south-african-law-wont-end-the-toxic-mix-of-money-and-politics-121461">above R100,000</a>, removes the confidential nature of the relationship between funders and parties, and is expected to further discourage private funding for parties. </p>
<p>With this in mind, the parties expect to have less money to campaign in future. A reduction in the number of campaigns would therefore benefit them. At this stage it is almost impossible to predict the cost implications of a decline in private donations versus the financial gains of synchronised elections. </p>
<h2>Who would benefit from synchronisation?</h2>
<p>For parties participating simultaneously in elections at different levels, synchronisation would enable more centralised and coordinated election campaigns. The bigger parties which contest elections at all three levels would benefit the most. It would not reduce the number of candidates who would have to be nominated. It might even complicate coordination of several nomination processes at the same time. But it would be only once in five years instead of every 30 months.</p>
<p>For them, it would mean one nomination process for candidates, one publicity campaign, one process to produce election manifestos, and potentially only one campaign message. Human and financial resources could be used more effectively. </p>
<p>Currently, electoral legislation can accommodate all of this. What would have to change, however, would be section 159(1) of the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>, to extend the five-year term for municipalities until 2024. The test would be whether the voters accepted a one-fits-all approach.</p>
<p>Based on past experiences, the majority of parties are <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Parties/Political-party-list/">registered for municipal elections only</a>. Thus, they would not share in these “economy of scale” benefits. Whether they would be disadvantaged by the bigger parties’ savings cannot be accurately predicted. That would depend on whether local campaigns were overtaken by national campaigns, or maintained a character of their own.</p>
<p>Smaller, local parties would most probably be disadvantaged by the bigger parties merging their campaigns at the different levels into one “national” campaign. Municipal issues would then receive much less attention and local parties might be “swamped” by the national character of the campaigns. National leaders could be more visible outside the national centres and make an impression on voters who were only used to their local candidates. </p>
<p>Were this to happen, it would see the demise of smaller local parties. But it would also reduce the irritation of having fragmented and unstable coalition governments which often depend on these parties.</p>
<h2>Splitting of votes</h2>
<p>The arguments presented so far presume that voters would be consistent in voting for the bigger parties in all three spheres. But if voters were motivated to split their votes and vote for different parties at the different levels, that would create opportunities for smaller parties to perform better.</p>
<p>Evidence shows that South Africans split their votes between the 2014 national and the 2016 municipal elections. Three metros in provinces controlled by the ANC voted for a DA coalition. In the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/vote-splitting-the-new-voter-strategy/">2019 national and provincial elections</a> in both Gauteng and the Western Cape, about 3% of the DA supporters voted for the ANC at national level, but for the DA at provincial level.</p>
<p>There’s also the Constitutional Court <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2020-06-11-concourt-ruling-opens-door-for-independent-candidates-to-stand-for-election-in-sa/">judgment in June 2020</a> which instructed Parliament to amend the electoral system to allow for independent candidates to contest national and provincial elections. It could change electoral practices in many respects. How that would happen is not easy to predict. But that change, coupled with election synchronisation, means a radical change in electoral dynamics can be expected in South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Kotze does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The bigger parties which contest elections at all three levels would benefit the most – but voters might split their votes.Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1284892019-12-10T14:08:27Z2019-12-10T14:08:27ZLocal council turmoil shows South Africa isn’t very good at coalitions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305645/original/file-20191206-90592-gudof3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters Julius Malema (C) addresses the media after local elections in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Kim Ludbrook</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa entered the world of coalition politics in earnest three years ago. In the local election in 2016 three major cities found themselves without a majority party in charge. This forced the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africans-come-off-second-best-as-politicians-play-havoc-with-coalitions-102671">formation of coalition governments</a> in Johannesburg, the country’s economic capital; Tshwane, the capital city; and Nelson Mandela Bay, a port city in the southeast of the country.</p>
<p>Over the past month all three have fallen apart spectacularly. The African National Congress <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/live-election-of-new-joburg-mayor-to-take-place-20191204">“took back”</a> the City of Johannesburg, the United Democratic Movement’s Mongameli Bobani was <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-12-05-mongameli-bobani-voted-out-as-nelson-mandela-bay-mayor/">unceremoniously booted out</a> as executive mayor in Nelson Mandela Bay, and Stevens Mokgalapa was deposed as mayor of Tshwane following an alleged <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/12/05/stevens-mokgalapa-voted-out-as-tshwane-mayor">sex scandal, corruption allegations and a water crisis</a>.</p>
<p>Each of the developments has been triggered by different events. In Johannesburg, the resignation of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-10-21-mashaba-resigns-i-cannot-reconcile-myself-with-a-group-who-believe-that-race-is-irrelevant/">Herman Mashaba as executive mayor</a>, in protest at the return of Helen Zille as leader of the Democratic Alliance’s federal council, opened the space for the African National Congress to take the reins of power in the city. </p>
<p>In Tshwane, a cloud of controversy over the Democratic Alliance’s Mokgalapa created an opening for the <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-12-05-stevens-mokgalapa-voted-out-as-tshwane-mayor/">African National Congress and the Economic Freedom Fighters</a> to push for his removal as mayor. Through this move, the two parties demonstrated their control over council decisions. </p>
<p>In Nelson Mandela Bay, Bobani – who is a member of the small United Democratic Movement – created a governance crisis. He took far too long to manage the impact of a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-11-nelson-mandela-bay-water-shortage-becomes-crisis-as-second-largest-dam-is-close-to-running-dry/">severe drought</a>. And he was embroiled in fighting<a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/hawks-swoop-on-bobanis-home-over-nmb-tender-fraud-20552250"> allegations of corruption</a>. His tenure created a political problem for the African National Congress, which had helped get him into power. The party could no longer turn a blind eye to serious allegations of corruption against him. </p>
<h2>Balancing act</h2>
<p>Coalitions are notoriously difficult. Governing by coalition requires individuals, and the parties they represent, to cooperate and compromise. It requires developing a set of informal rules that enable the day to day business of governing to take hold.</p>
<p>It is a delicate balancing act between advancing party goals and creating administrative and political stability to govern with the people in mind. </p>
<p>A key element for a successful coalition government is the rationale for working together in the first place. Was it merely to get the governing party out? Are parties <a href="https://za.boell.org/sites/default/files/background_paper_-_7_may_symposium_-_political_party_cooperation_and_the_building_and_sustaining_of_coalitions.pdf">working together</a> with the aim of bringing administrative and political stability? What did political parties <a href="https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/1ee35e7f-5643-4b16-8423-cb83a71ecf7e.pdf">bargain for</a> when the coalitions were formed?</p>
<p>Looking at coalition dynamics in South Africa, it is clear that the rationale for “working together” was to get the African National Congress out of power in local councils. The aim of the coalition governments was not necessarily to create administrative and political stability. It was to prove that any party could do a better job than the African National Congress. </p>
<p>This is problematic because it undermines the principles needed to make coalitions work: cooperation, compromise and managing diverse policy agendas. </p>
<p>It’s no surprise that cracks quickly began to emerge.</p>
<h2>Smaller parties can wreck the show</h2>
<p>Smaller parties are the kingmakers in coalitions because they hold the reins of power in councils. They can hold councils hostage by using their vote to support or undermine the coalition government. </p>
<p>We have already seen this dynamic play out in Nelson Mandela Bay. The Patriotic Alliance, a small political party that ran on a ticket of representing South Africa’s marginalised and poor, flexed its political muscle by <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1662715/patriotic-alliance-pulls-out-of-nelson-mandela-municipal-coalition-government/">pulling out of a coalition</a> with the Democratic Alliance when it did not get the deputy mayorship. </p>
<p>Similarly, after <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-08-27-breaking-athol-trollip-removed-as-nelson-mandela-bay-mayor/">Athol Trollip was ousted</a> as executive mayor in Nelson Mandela Bay, the Patriotic Alliance <a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/politics/2018-09-13-just-in--patriotic-alliance-pulls-its-support-from-the-da-and-coalition-partners/">pulled out of the legal bid</a> to challenge council’s decision that removed him from the post. </p>
<p>And, having gained no <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/patriotic-alliance-committed-to-nelson-mandela-bay-coalition-until-2021-2018-04-11">significant political benefit</a> under a Democratic Alliance coalition, the Patriotic Alliance used its position to “negotiate” the deputy mayorship with the African National Congress, but <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/patriotic-alliance-seeks-to-oust-nelson-mandela-bays-bobani-19522139">initiated motions of no confidence</a> against the mayor for sidelining smaller parties in council.</p>
<p>Similar dynamics played out in <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-07-02-eff-will-no-longer-vote-with-da-and-anc-in-municipalities/">Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg</a>. Flexing its political muscle, the <a href="https://effonline.org/">Economic Freedom Fighters</a>, a radically populist party and the third largest in the country, decided it would no longer vote in the two councils because it was “denied” an executive political seat in the name of power-sharing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…the Democratic Alliance don’t want to vote for us but they want us to vote for them. We cannot keep on voting for people who can’t vote for us, power sharing means give and take. From 2016, still the Democratic Alliance doesn’t appreciate that (we voted for them).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In both these situations, the action of a small party rendered the councils hung. This meant that that couldn’t make decisions. Over time this will affect ordinary citizens as service delivery and developmental projects grind to a standstill.</p>
<h2>Political trust</h2>
<p>These examples show that, in South Africa’s case, party interest – rather than governing for the good of the people – shapes coalition politics. More importantly, these dynamics show that the country’s political leaders do not have the political maturity to look beyond party interests for the greater good of the people.</p>
<p>The showdowns in the three metropoles show parties are interested only in gaining as much as possible, and that they are willing to bring governance and development to a standstill. The behaviour of all the parties involved speaks of an all-or-nothing approach in a situation that requires compromise, building relationships, negotiation and cooperation. </p>
<p>Events to date show that coalitions are about <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-is-learning-the-ropes-of-coalition-politics-and-its-inherent-instability-96483">acquisition,</a> at the cost of sharing and building.</p>
<p>South Africa will hold another round of <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-06-27-cabinet-sets-up-committee-to-prepare-for-2021-municipal-election/">local government elections in 2021</a>. Political mistrust in the country is high. Last time round the country’s two biggest parties, the African National Congress and Democratic Alliance, were unable to mobilise their voters to win an outright majority in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg.</p>
<p>Playing a zero-sum game within councils and turning local government into a political theatre has further undermined political trust. This is bound to lead to increased apathy among voters, threatening to place both parties at even greater risk to smaller ones in the next round of polling.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/128489/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joleen Steyn Kotze receives funding from the National Research Foundation. </span></em></p>Political mistrust is high as the country looks to the next municipal elections in 2021.Joleen Steyn Kotze, Senior Research Specialist in Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery at the Human Science Research Council and a Research Fellow Centre for African Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.