tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/nicaragua-9050/articlesNicaragua – The Conversation2024-01-18T13:27:58Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210762024-01-18T13:27:58Z2024-01-18T13:27:58ZNicaragua released imprisoned priests, but repression is unlikely to relent – and the Catholic Church remains a target<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569921/original/file-20240117-20-1jrits.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C1%2C1017%2C656&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A priest and Catholic worshippers pray in front of an image of 'Sangre de Cristo,' burned in a fire on July 2020, at the Metropolitan Cathedral in Managua.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/priest-and-catholic-faithful-pray-in-front-of-an-image-of-news-photo/1242786617?adppopup=true">Oswaldo Rivas/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Bad news has been the norm for Catholics in Nicaragua, where clergy and church groups have been frequent targets of a wide-ranging crackdown for years. But on Jan. 14, 2024, they received a happy surprise: The government unexpectedly released two bishops, 15 priests and two seminary students from prison and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/14/nicaragua-bishop-rolando-alvarez/">expelled them</a> to the Vatican.</p>
<p>Those released included <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/religious-prisoners-conscience/forb-victims-database/rolando-alvarez">Bishop Rolando Álvarez</a>, a high-profile political prisoner who was detained in 2022 for criticizing the government and then sentenced to 26 years in prison for <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/nicaraguan-bishop-rolando-alvarez-receives-26-year-sentence/">alleged treason</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/dictatorship-banishes-monsignor-rolando-alvarez-and-18-other-religious-political-prisoners-to-the-vatican/">They also included</a> priests <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-arrests-four-more-priests-intensifies-crackdown-catholic-church-2023-12-30/">detained by</a> President Daniel Ortega’s government in late December 2023 <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2024-01/priest-arrested-in-nicaragua-following-mass-on-new-year-s-eve.html">for expressing solidarity</a> with Álvarez and other political prisoners. Days later, Pope Francis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/01/world/europe/nicaragua-pope-francis-church.html">criticized the regime</a> in his New Year’s message and then <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/pope-francis-reiterates-concerns-about-crisis-in-nicaragua/">called for</a> “respectful diplomatic dialogue.”</p>
<p>Nearly six years after <a href="https://infobuero-nicaragua.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PUBLICADO-200908.-FUNIDES.-Nicaragua-en-movimiento-2016-2020-SEI_2020_01-2.pdf">mass protests erupted</a> against Ortega and then were brutally repressed, these prisoner releases offer some hope to Nicaragua’s opposition. As <a href="https://www.global.ucsb.edu/people/kai-m-thaler">my research</a> <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003197614-16/nicaragua-rachel-schwartz-kai-thaler">has shown</a>, however, <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IICx95ZZzKjfHqiU-oVEityK70vwBv5f/view?usp=sharing">the Ortega regime is unrelenting</a> in trying to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0023">retain power</a>, which suggests this is not necessarily a turning point. In fact, the government reportedly <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/dictadura-secuestra-al-sacerdote-ezequiel-buenfil-tras-el-destierro-de-19-religiosos/">took yet another priest into custody</a> on Jan. 16.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several rows of people seated in church pews, all looking ahead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569652/original/file-20240116-25-c9w6ji.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Nicaraguans attend mass in San Juan de Oriente on June 24, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-attend-a-mass-during-celebrations-in-honour-of-san-news-photo/1259026822?adppopup=true">Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Why target the church?</h2>
<p>Ortega first led Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, after his left-wing revolutionary organization, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN, spearheaded the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. In the 1980s, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.16993/ibero.38">FSLN clashed with the Vatican</a> and church hierarchy over the group’s socialist politics, even as many <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3712105">poorer Nicaraguan Catholics embraced them</a>.</p>
<p>When Ortega took office again in 2007, however, he did so <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20788575">with the blessing of Christian leaders</a>. During the 2006 elections, he had turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.16993/ibero.38">alliances with Catholic</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s41603-017-0005-6">Protestant elites</a> to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0032">return to power</a> in exchange for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X08326020">adopting</a> conservative social policies like <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61545-2">banning abortion</a>.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, <a href="https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16281740895086">Ortega remained popular</a>, presiding over economic growth in collaboration <a href="https://doi.org/10.15517/aeca.v43i0.31556">with business leaders</a> and developing new public infrastructure and services.</p>
<p>Yet he and the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2010.00099.x">FSLN party he controlled</a> were also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2019.64">consolidating power</a> and <a href="https://search.worldcat.org/title/regimen-de-ortega-una-nueva-dictadura-familiar-en-el-continente/oclc/967515148">governing in an increasingly authoritarian</a> manner. Ortega won <a href="https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/americas/nicaragua_2011_report_post.pdf">reelection in 2011</a> and then retained power in <a href="http://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0032">fraudulent elections</a> in 2016. Opposition candidates were disqualified, and Ortega’s running mate was his wife, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/americas/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-rosario-murillo-house-of-cards.html">Rosario Murillo</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/pal.112.0083">Unexpectedly</a>, Ortega’s popularity and his relationship with the church came crashing down in April 2018, when the government announced cutbacks in social security benefits for retirees. Nicaraguans from <a href="https://doi.org/10.5129/001041522X16281740895086">all backgrounds</a> <a href="https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=7549585">took to the streets</a>, and Ortega and Murillo responded with a <a href="https://gieinicaragua.org/#section04">furious crackdown</a>, unleashing police and pro-government paramilitaries <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/9213/2018/en/">armed with military-grade weapons</a>.</p>
<p>Cathedrals and churches <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/news/bishops-journalists-attacked-church-nicaragua">tried to</a> <a href="https://www.proquest.com/openview/41597a7a2b9356e668ff2b579dc7cb1d/1">offer refuge</a> to protesters, but <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/302.asp">over 300 people were killed</a>. Church leaders facilitated a national dialogue between the government and an opposition coalition, <a href="https://www.ncronline.org/news/nicaraguan-bishops-end-role-mediators-national-dialogue">but withdrew</a> as <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/nicaragua-aumenta-la-violencia-y-la-represion-estatal-a-pesar-de-los-multiples-esfuerzos-de-dialogo/">repression continued</a>.</p>
<p>When popular Catholic leaders <a href="http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/38768/">criticized violence</a> against protesters, the regime began viewing the church <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/world/americas/nicaragua-protests-catholic-church.html">as a rival</a> threatening Ortega’s waning legitimacy. Police, paramilitaries and FSLN supporters started <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-23/exiles-arrests-and-740-attacks-nicaragua-redoubles-its-persecution-of-the-catholic-church.html">harassing and attacking</a> clergy and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-religion-arson-rosario-murillo-latin-america-82bb721aa3ec25e4af34a26e75568599">Catholic institutions</a>.</p>
<p>In 2019, the pope <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-9016f14a1a9b476ab5cb1d61397fc273">recalled Silvio Báez</a>, the auxiliary bishop of Managua and a prominent critic of Ortega, from Nicaragua. Yet other bishops and priests still found themselves <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/nicaraguan-president-daniel-ortega-goes-catholic-church-latest-effort-rcna44618">in the regime’s crosshairs</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people in baseball hats hold posters with pictures of a man in clerical robes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569647/original/file-20240116-15-mbn4il.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Nicaraguan citizens in Costa Rica demonstrate in front of the Nicaraguan Embassy in August 2022 to protest the detention of Bishop Rolando Alvarez.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nicaraguan-citizens-hold-a-demonstration-in-front-of-the-news-photo/1242597067?adppopup=true">Oscar Navarrete/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Some <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nicaragua-catholic-priests-exile-ortega-f5ae508a4295f7ae5b359f96064eea46">fled into exile</a> or were blocked <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/sacerdote-desterrado-silencio-de-los-obispos-no-ha-detenido-la-persecucion/">from entering</a> Nicaragua if they traveled abroad. Others who stayed were kept under surveillance. Priests who expressed support for political prisoners or continued to criticize the regime, even in vague terms, could be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/catholic-clergy-report-surveillance-beatings-amid-nicaraguas-crackdown-2023-07-07/">arrested or beaten</a>. </p>
<p>The government expelled 12 formerly detained priests to the Vatican <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-sends-catholic-priests-rome-after-talks-with-vatican-2023-10-19/">in October 2023</a> after what the regime called “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-sends-catholic-priests-rome-after-talks-with-vatican-2023-10-19/">fruitful conversations</a>.” But Álvarez, the highest-profile political prisoner, was still held by the government and was stripped of his citizenship after <a href="https://apnews.com/article/politics-united-states-government-caribbean-daniel-ortega-rosario-murillo-c7930c6340472867148ca7e79e09f1eb">refusing to go into exile</a> in February 2023.</p>
<h2>Broader patterns of repression</h2>
<p>Attacks on the church <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/nicaragua-crackdown-religious-actors-further-imperils-return-democracy">are a symptom</a> of the Ortega regime’s absolute intolerance for dissent.</p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/nicaragua">over 3,000 nongovernmental organizations</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-has-kicked-out-hundreds-of-ngos-even-cracking-down-on-catholic-groups-like-nuns-from-mother-teresas-order-190222">shut down</a> since 2018, the church has become Nicaragua’s only <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/23/world/americas/nicaragua-catholic-church-daniel-ortega.html">major nonstate institution</a> with nationwide reach. </p>
<p>In a country where <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/Nicaragua/#report-toc__section-1">over 40% of the people</a> identify as Catholic, many normally turn to the church in times <a href="https://popolna.org/realidades-municipales-presentadas-en-informe-de-red-local/">of need</a>. Suppressing Catholic institutions means Nicaraguans must turn to the state for aid, which <a href="https://www.divergentes.com/nicaragua-un-espia-en-cada-esquina/">monitors citizens</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2013.10">has been accused of denying</a> services for perceived disloyalty.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/universidad-de-jesuitas-en-nicaragua-suspende-operaciones-tras-ser-acusada-de-ser-un-centro-de-terrorismo-/7227873.html">At least 27</a> Catholic and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/09/group-experts-nicaragua-finds-escalating-persecution-against-dissent-and-crackdown?sub-site=HRC">secular universities</a> have also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/17/nicaragua-seizes-catholic-university-accused-of-being-centre-of-terrorism">been closed or seized</a> by the government, as have <a href="https://latamjournalismreview.org/news/daniel-ortegas-war-against-journalism-54-media-outlets-have-been-shut-down/">more than 50</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-shuts-catholic-radio-stations-led-by-bishop-critical-regime-2022-08-02/">media outlets</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="T-shirts with pictures of a man in a blue jacket making a 'V' sign with his fingers, and shirts that say 'FSLN,' hang on display outside." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/569651/original/file-20240116-22672-62jpa1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">T-shirts depicting Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega for sale in Managua in July 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/shirts-depicting-nicaraguan-president-daniel-ortega-are-news-photo/1539099812?adppopup=true">Oswaldo Rivas/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The government’s decision to expel clergy on Jan. 14 is also in line with its tendency to either <a href="https://www.articulo66.com/2022/09/29/estos-son-los-nicaraguenses-desterrados-por-el-regimen-ortega-murillo-en-lo-que-va-de-2022/">block opponents’ reentry</a> into Nicaragua or force them <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/husband-and-son-of-former-miss-nicaragua-director-expelled-and-banished/">into exile</a>. In many cases, Nicaragua has then revoked critics’ citizenship, as when it expelled 222 political prisoners <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/09/nicaragua-frees-222-political-prisoners-flies-to-us">in February 2023</a> to the United States.</p>
<p>When imprisonment or threats have not shaken critics’ resolve, Ortega and Murillo appear to have decided that <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/nicaraguas-political-repression-will-continue-despite-prisoner-release">keeping them abroad is best</a>. Not only does this reduce the risks of anti-regime action in Nicaragua, but it may diminish international scrutiny of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/10/government-critics-languish-nicaraguan-prisons">political prisoners’ mistreatment</a>.</p>
<h2>Cautious criticism</h2>
<p>Since 2018, repression in Nicaragua has come in waves, with the brutal violence that repressed the protests shifting toward <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/nicaragua">an environment</a> of <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/five-years-of-police-state-in-nicaragua-ban-on-assembly-protests-free-speech-and-elections/">constant surveillance</a>, legal actions against independent institutions and opponents, and periodic arrests. Moments of seeming calm, however, have often been followed by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/4631/2021/en/">harsh crackdowns</a>, such as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/nicaragua-trumped-charges-against-critics">a slew of arrests</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0023">ahead of the 2021 elections</a>.</p>
<p>Even as repression has mounted, the Vatican has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pope-worried-about-nicaraguan-bishop-s-prison-sentence-/6959873.html">been cautious</a> about criticizing Ortega and Murillo, and some Nicaraguans and <a href="https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/why-is-pope-francis-quiet-about-nicaragua">Catholics abroad</a> <a href="https://cruxnow.com/church-in-the-americas/2022/08/nicaraguan-ngos-urge-pope-francis-to-speak-out-on-oppression">have urged the pope to do more</a>. Yet the Vatican’s restraint has not appeared to decrease <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/ortega-represses-151-priests-and-nuns-imprisonment-banishment-and-exile/">threats against clergy</a> or limits on activities <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-police-ban-catholic-procession-church-crackdown-2022-08-12/">like religious processions</a>.</p>
<p>In January 2024, however, Francis pointedly <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/pope-francis-reiterates-concerns-about-crisis-in-nicaragua/">called attention to the crisis</a> during two speeches, days after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-arrests-four-more-priests-intensifies-crackdown-catholic-church-2023-12-30/">a dozen priests</a> were arrested. One week later came the release of Álvarez and his colleagues – free to leave Nicaragua, but not to come back. </p>
<p>Catholic leaders remain Nicaragua’s <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/obispos-alvarez-brenes-y-baez-con-mas-alta-opinion-favorable-en-nicaragua/">most popular figures</a>, according to independent polling. This makes them a continued threat to Ortega and Murillo’s quest for <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/ortega-a-nicas-en-redes-sociales-si-publican-contra-mi-van-presos/">total control</a>. Ezequiel Buenfil Batún, the priest detained Jan. 16, belonged to a religious order <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/dictadura-secuestra-al-sacerdote-ezequiel-buenfil-tras-el-destierro-de-19-religiosos/">whose legal status was revoked</a> that same day, along with several other nongovernment organizations.</p>
<p>As many Nicaraguans <a href="https://confidencial.digital/english/luis-haug-nicaraguans-feel-they-are-hitting-rock-bottom/">lose hope</a> of conditions improving and dozens of political prisoners <a href="https://confidencial.digital/nacion/dictadura-mantiene-tortura-a-presos-politicos-que-realizaron-huelga-de-hambre-en-la-modelo/">remain jailed</a>, any positive news like the priests’ release is welcome. But it holds no guarantees of broader change ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221076/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai M. Thaler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When President Daniel Ortega returned to power in 2006, church figures supported him. Violent repression after the 2018 protests has soured the relationship and made clergy targets for intimidation.Kai M. Thaler, Assistant Professor of Global Studies, University of California, Santa BarbaraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155202023-10-30T19:03:52Z2023-10-30T19:03:52ZDarien Gap: As migrants take deadly risks for better lives, Canada and the U.S. must do much more<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/darien-gap-as-migrants-take-deadly-risks-for-better-lives-canada-and-the-us-must-do-much-more" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Canadian Immigration Minister Marc Miller recently announced that as many as 15,000 displaced people with extended family connections in Canada — most of them from Colombia, Haiti and Venezuela and located in Central or South America or the Caribbean — <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/10/statement-from-minister-miller-on-canadas-commitment-to-support-migrants-in-the-americas.html">are now eligible to apply to immigrate to Canada</a> on a humanitarian basis. </p>
<p>By announcing this measure, Canada affirmed its commitment to <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/27/fact-sheet-us-government-announces-sweeping-new-actions-manage-regional-migration">a joint initiative, known as Safe Mobility</a>, launched by the United States in April 2023 to stem the irregular crossings of hundreds of thousands of people into the U.S. by offering alternatives.</p>
<p>These 15,000 people represent a small number of as many as <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/americas-migration-crisis-panama-texas-1.6982215">400,000 displaced people</a> expected to cross the Darien Gap, a 100-kilometre stretch of treacherous jungle shared by Colombia and Panama, in 2023 in search of safety, security and protection.</p>
<p>Forced to migrate by political instability, repression and other hardships, people from Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador and Haiti represent most of the displaced people who have crossed the Darien Gap in the last few years. </p>
<p>As many migrants told us when <a href="http://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2441">we interviewed </a> them in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12701">Tijuana</a> in northern Mexico and Tapachula in the south of Mexico between 2018 and 2022, crossing the continent is not for the faint of heart. </p>
<p>They may experience harassment, extortion or detention by migration authorities, violence perpetrated by criminals and abuse by deceitful unscrupulous smugglers. The number of lives lost in the Darien Gap, including children and adolescents, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(23)01635-5">is increasing</a>. </p>
<h2>Cracking down in Costa Rica</h2>
<p>In the past, at least for Venezuelans, it was not necessary to cross the jungle. They were able to travel to Costa Rica, for instance, by air. As many as 12,533 Venezuelans <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/costa-rican-migration-immigrant-integration-policy">applied for refugee status</a> in Costa Rica between 2015 and August 2021. </p>
<p>But to curtail this flow, the Costa Rican government introduced a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wss.2023.100151">visa requirement</a> in 2022 for Venezuelans, forcing people who wished to travel to the country to undertake the dangerous journey through the Darien Gap.</p>
<p>But the problems for Venezuelan asylum-seekers don’t end there. As the migrants and NGO representatives in our study told us, the current wait time for the first eligibility interview with Costa Rican immigration officials is 10 years. The Costa Rican refugee unit is <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/costa-rican-migration-immigrant-integration-policy">severely under-resourced and heavily reliant on international assistance</a>. </p>
<p>Further curtailing refugee rights, Costa Rica introduced <a href="https://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC&param2=1&nValor1=1&nValor2=98356&nValor3=133735&strTipM=TC&lResultado=2&nValor4=1&strSelect=sel">reforms in late 2022</a> that prevent asylum-seekers who have travelled through third countries from making refugee claims.</p>
<h2>Nicaraguan refugees</h2>
<p>Ironically, the vast majority of the refugee applications Costa Rica receives today are not from people who cross the Darien Gap. The <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/03/17/nicaragua-on-the-brink-protests-elections-and-mass-atrocity/">political violence and repression in Nicaragua since 2018</a> have propelled many to flee to Costa Rica. </p>
<p>As of June 2022, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/record-emigration-nicaragua-crisis#:%7E:text=The%20erosion%20of%20democracy%20and,of%20the%20Cold%20War%20era.">Costa Rica hosted</a> 205,000 asylum seekers — 89 per cent of them from Nicaragua. </p>
<p>To deter new arrivals from Nicaragua from presenting refugee claims or obtaining the status, the Costa Rican reforms announced on December 2022 changed certain rules and regulations. These measures were criticized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and NGO representatives we interviewed in Costa Rica in 2023. In fact, the <a href="https://delfino.cr/2023/02/sala-iv-condena-al-estado-por-decreto-de-chaves-que-limita-libertad-de-transito-de-refugiados">Costa Rican Supreme Court</a> found some provisions of these reforms unconstitutional.</p>
<h2>The scene in Mexico</h2>
<p>Unlike Costa Rica, Mexico, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-creating-a-comprehensive-regional-framework-to-address-the-causes-of-migration-to-manage-migration-throughout-north-and-central-america-and-to-provide-safe-and-orderly-processing/">under pressure from the U.S.</a>, encourages migrants in transit toward the U.S. border to seek asylum in Mexico. </p>
<p>By the end of 2022, the <a href="https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/792337/Cierre_Diciembre-2022__31-Dic.__1.pdf">number of refugee claimants</a> in Mexico from other Central American countries, Haiti, Venezuela and Cuba had reached 120,000. </p>
<p>However, they were forced to remain in the southern state of Chiapas while their claims were reviewed, and the migrants we interviewed reported harassment by official authorities and destitution.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FINAL-Struggling-to-Survive-Asylum-Seekers-in-Tapachula.pdf">Other studies</a> support their claims. Furthermore, most migrants we interviewed in Mexico told us they had no intention of staying in Mexico even if recognized as refugees because they did not consider the country safe.</p>
<h2>U.S., Canada, must step up</h2>
<p>In April 2023, the U.S. State Department and the Department of Homeland Security announced new measures to deport all migrants and asylum-seekers who crossed the southern U.S. border by irregular means. The U.S. also introduced the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/27/fact-sheet-us-government-announces-sweeping-new-actions-manage-regional-migration">Safe Mobility initiative</a> to process applications for admissions submitted in offices set up in Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica and Guatemala.</p>
<p>The U.S. promised to admit up to <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV">30,000 people</a> a month from <a href="https://movilidadsegura.org/en/">Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cuba and Haiti</a>. Not only is this protection status temporary — a two-year <a href="https://helpspanish.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-1639?language=en_US#:%7E:text=Humanitarian%20Parole%20is%20granted%20to,reason%20or%20significant%20public%20benefit.">humanitarian parole</a> rather than permanent residency — but it’s conditional upon a “supporter” present in the U.S. </p>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2023/10/statement-from-minister-miller-on-canadas-commitment-to-support-migrants-in-the-americas.html">recent announcement</a> fails to make it clear whether admitting 15,000 displaced people is a one-off measure or whether Canada is setting an annual target.</p>
<p>Regardless, it doesn’t come anywhere close to meeting the needs of the displaced people in the Americas. Canada should consider expanding its refugee resettlement program to assist more asylum-seekers in desperate conditions in this region, not only those with family ties in Canada.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tanya Basok receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guillermo Candiz receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. </span></em></p>Migrants who cross the treacherous Darien Gap between Panama and Colombia often experience violence and abuse, extortion or detention by migration authorities.Tanya Basok, Professor, Sociology, University of WindsorGuillermo Candiz, Assistant Professor, Human Plurality, Université de l'Ontario françaisLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2011192023-05-17T12:39:52Z2023-05-17T12:39:52ZHow China uses ‘geostrategic corruption’ to exert its influence in Latin America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526566/original/file-20230516-23-rcqcyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C95%2C5762%2C3746&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The successful courting of Honduras is the latest example of China's influence in Latin America.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-foreign-minister-qin-gang-and-honduras-foreign-news-photo/1476447324?adppopup=true">Lintao Zhang/Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Corruption has long been a <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/01/radical-transparency-the-last-hope-for-fighting-corruption-in-latin-america%EF%BF%BC/">scourge in parts of Latin America</a>. </p>
<p>Traditionally, it has funneled down domestic routes, with <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2022-corruption-perceptions-index-cycle-corruption-organised-crime-instability-americas">local politicians, business interests</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels">drug lords</a> benefiting from graft and dodgy dealings. Indeed, a 2022 report from Transparency International found that 27 out of 30 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have shown <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">stagnant corruption levels</a> with no improvement in recent years.</p>
<p>But over the last two decades, a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption">new form of corruption</a> has taken hold in countries in the region, a phenomenon we call “geostrategic corruption.” </p>
<p>It is characterized by external countries using corrupt methods – no-bid contracts, insider financial deals, special relations with those in power – to become stakeholders in multiple facets of the politics, economy and society of a country. China is <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/08/12/adm-faller-china-exploiting-corruption-in-latin-america-493948">a master of the art</a>; the United States, less so.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/political-science-graduate-students/valeriia-popova1/valeriia-popova.html">scholars of</a> <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/faculty-a-z/eduardo-gamarra1/eduardo-gamarra.html">Latin American politics</a>, we have seen how China has used geostrategic corruption to gain a foothold in the region as <a href="https://time.com/6186494/americas-summit-biden-china/">U.S. influence has waned</a>.</p>
<h2>What is geostrategic corruption?</h2>
<p>Geostrategic corruption builds on <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">traditional pervasive patterns</a> of clientelism and patronage. In Latin America in particular, the growth of the drug gangs since the 1980s introduced “narco-corruption” in which police and local officials collude with organized gangs, which are able to “<a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2021-Report-Resisting-corruption-along-drug-trafficking-routes-Crimjust.pdf">buy protection</a>” from prosecution. </p>
<p>As a result, police, local governments and elected representatives are considered by watchdogs as among <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/latin-america/corruption-on-the-rise-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean">the most corrupt political entities</a> in Latin America, with the region consistently scoring low in annual global <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">corruption perception rating</a>.</p>
<p>This pattern of corruption has coincided with a period in which the U.S. has turned its attention away from Latin America and toward <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/07/reflections-on-the-long-term-repercussions-of-september-11-for-us-policy-in-the-middle-east/">first the Middle East</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy">and then Asia</a>.</p>
<p>The vacuum has largely been filled by China. Trade between the region and China skyrocketed from <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america/">US$10 billion worth of goods in 2000</a> to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">$450 billion in 2021</a>. China is now the top trading partner of South America, making up to 34% of total trade in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">Chile, Brazil and Peru</a>.</p>
<p>China’s expansion in the region is largely driven by the country’s <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/">search for resources</a> such as cobalt, lithium, rare earths, hydrocarbons and access to foodstuffs, which are abundant in Latin America. In the past 20 years, China has also poured <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">massive investments</a> into infrastructure, energy and financial sectors of Latin America.</p>
<p>And China isn’t alone in upping its interest in Latin America. The last two decades have also seen an increase in investment and influence in the region <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228">from Russia</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/foreign-authoritarian-influence-in-latin-america-irans-growing-reach/">and Iran</a>. </p>
<p>These countries have found Latin America a fertile ground due in no small part to the region’s culture of corruption and weak institutions, we argue. Local criminal networks and the disregard of democratic norms on the ground have made it easier for countries that themselves are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/bribes-transparency/chinese-and-russian-firms-fare-worst-in-bribery-index-idINL5E7LV31T20111101">perceived to be dogged by corruption</a> to gain a foothold in Latin America.</p>
<h2>US-China global competition</h2>
<p>China’s presence in the region forms part of the country’s long-term strategic objective to <a href="https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-embajador-stanley-admitio-que-eeuu-necesita-mas-herramientas-para-poder-competir-con-china-en-nid04052023/">challenge U.S. influence across the globe</a> through economic, military, financial and political means.</p>
<p>That process has been aided by global trends. Countries such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-brazil-lula-xi-jinping-91c34b4a9fb78f263d6f81f1e9a16f49">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/argentina-china-in-americas">Argentina</a> have increasingly sought to diversify bilateral relationship and become less dependent on U.S. trade.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russian aggression in Ukraine has seemingly given China more weight on the international scene, with Beijing positioning itself as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-saudi-arabia-iran-global-mediator-45ec807c8fd2b2aa65eef4cc313b739d">alternative diplomatic force</a> to Washington, especially to countries that feel nonaligned to the West. A recent example was seen in March, when Honduras announced it would <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/27/1166177955/honduras-establishes-ties-with-china-after-break-from-taiwan">establish diplomatic relations with Beijing</a> and break off ties with Taiwan – a development that Taiwanese officials say followed the “<a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202303230006">bribing” of Honduran officials</a>.</p>
<p>What gives China an added competitive edge as it extends its influence is that it is able to eschew constraints that bind many would-be investors in the West – such as environmental concerns or hesitation over a country’s labor rights and level of corruption. Chinese companies are <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road">judged by international watchdogs to be</a> <a href="https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_transparencyincorporatereporti?e=2496456/37122985">among the least transparent</a> in the world, and bribery watchdogs have long noted Beijing’s <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2018_Report_ExportingCorruption_English_200402_075046.pdf">reluctance to prosecute Chinese companies or individuals</a> accused of bribery in regard to foreign contracts. A 2021 study found that <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road">35% of China’s “Belt and Road” projects</a> worldwide have been marked by environmental, labor and corruption problems.</p>
<p>The U.S. administration, in contrast, is more restricted by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/29/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-abiding-commitment-to-democratic-renewal-at-home-and-abroad/">commitments to encourage democratic development</a> as well as public pressure and international image. Washington does not have the same privilege of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm">diplomatic pragmatism</a> as China. </p>
<p>U.S. companies are, of course, not spotless when it comes to engaging in corrupt practices overseas. But unlike China, the U.S. government is bound to an <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm">international treaty</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/governments-turn-a-blind-eye-to-foreign-bribery-transparency-international/a-55252806">prohibiting the use of bribes</a> to win contracts. Moreover, the U.S. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78dd-1">Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</a> strictly prohibits American companies from bribing foreign officials; China has no such equivalent.</p>
<h2>Chinese corruption in the region</h2>
<p>Chinese investment <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/populism-china-and-covid-19-latin-americas-new-perfect-storm">has been easier where populist regimes govern</a> and where the rule of law has long been undermined, such as <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Argentina">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Bolivia/">Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Venezuela%2C%20RB/">Venezuela</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in Bolivia during the 14-year tenure of President Evo Morales, Chinese companies <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium-china/bolivia-picks-chinese-partner-for-2-3-billion-lithium-projects-idUSKCN1PV2F7">achieved a major foothold</a> in key sectors of the economy that has translated into a monopoly over the lithium industry there, despite a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-consortium-to-develop-lithium-deposits-in-Bolivia">strong anti-mining movement in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Geostrategic corruption in Argentina is firmly rooted at the local level, in provinces and regions across the country, <a href="https://icaie.com/2023/03/new-report-the-prc-feudal-governors-and-no-accountability-lithium-mining-in-argentinas-northwest-district/">feudal-like governors</a> have enabled a <a href="https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-retains-low-score-in-global-corruption-ranking.phtml">sophisticated corruption network</a> that China has seemingly used to invest in everything from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/argentina-wants-china-fully-fund-83-bln-nuclear-plant-amid-cash-shortfall-2022-04-05/#:%7E:text=The%20South%20American%20nation%20signed,faces%20a%20tighter%20fiscal%20outlook.">nuclear plants</a> and building lithium battery plants to constructing a satellite-tracking <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-chinese-run-space-station-in-argentina/">deep-space ground station</a>, railroads, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/23/argentina-china-us-imf-bri-debt-economy-summit-americas/">hydroelectric plants</a>, research facilities and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3213774/argentina-revives-possibility-chinese-fighter-jet-purchase-renewing-beijings-hopes-jf-17-south">maybe even fighter jets</a>.</p>
<p>In Ecuador, such projects <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html">include a dam</a> built in exchange for <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/12/latin-america-and-china-choosing-self-interest/">oil contracts</a>; the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-power-china-idUSL1N2OW10M">developed massive cracks soon after construction</a>; and the Quijos hydroelectric project, which <a href="https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/empresa-china-electrica-ecuador-incumplida.html">failed to generate promised volumes of power</a>. Similarly, the Chinese-financed Interoceanic Grand Canal in Nicaragua was estimated by opponents of the project to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/nicaraguas-chinese-financed-canal-project-still-in-limbo/">irreversibly impact the ecosystem and displace about 120,000 people</a>, while local activists faced <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/6515/2017/en/">harassment, violence and unlawful detention</a>. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, China initiated but never completed construction of a multibillion dollar <a href="https://apnews.com/article/3367297bb5cc4fc497579164f679ec75">bullet train line</a>, and an iron mining deal not only allowed the Asian country to buy Venezuela’s iron ore at a price 75% below market, but also turned out to be an instance of Chinese predatory financing, leaving Venezuela in a catastrophic <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/40016-a-dream-deal-with-china-iron-ore-that-ended-in-nightmarish-debt-for-venezuela/">$1 billion debt</a>. Likewise, in Panama, port concessions and a high-speed train line were <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/34472-has-chinas-winning-streak-in-panama-ended/#:%7E:text=A%20Chinese%20proposal%20for%20a%20US%244.1%20billion%20high,was%20cancelled%20and%20recast%20as%20a%20public-private%20partnership">frozen or canceled</a>, while the investor is under <a href="https://www.newsroompanama.com/business/big-time-chinese-investor-in-panama-under-probe-cloud">investigation</a> in China.</p>
<p>Throughout the region, Chinese firms have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-corruption/venezuela-charges-five-officials-with-embezzling-china-funds-idUSBRE9670VW20130708">cited in numerous</a> <a href="https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/bolivias-roads-agency-raided-following-bribe-allegation">cases involving bribery</a> <a href="https://cuencahighlife.com/attorney-general-opens-bribery-investigation-of-chinese-construction-company-projects/">and kickback schemes</a> that have enriched local officials in return for contracts and access.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for the US?</h2>
<p>This use of geostrategic corruption works to the direct detriment of U.S. interests. </p>
<p>In Argentina and Bolivia, Chinese expansion means that sectors that are crucial for the success of the U.S.’s green energy goals are increasingly under Beijing’s hold. It also undermines U.S. efforts to counter corruption and human rights abuses in the region. </p>
<p>And U.S. companies are unable to compete. The Biden administration has set <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Nearshoring%20and%20Renewable%20Energy-%20Building%20on%20the%20Los%20Angeles%20Summit%20of%20the%20Americas.pdf">high standards for U.S. investment</a> in the very sectors where the Chinese have a strong foothold. These include <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">transparency and accountability</a>, as well as commitments to environmental, labor and human rights standards.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden has stated that adherence to these standards is what distinguishes U.S. foreign investments from its competitors. But it does hamstring American companies when it comes to competing with China.</p>
<p>In the meantime, while the U.S. is looking for answers and trying to figure out how to reestablish influence in Latin America, China is quietly and pragmatically increasing its presence in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As an academic and as director of a university research center, I've received funding from foundations, US government agencies, and multilateral institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valeriia Popova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As US influence in Latin America has waned, Beijing has been able to expand business interests in the region on the back of shady practices.Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityValeriia Popova, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1902222022-09-30T12:26:24Z2022-09-30T12:26:24ZNicaragua has kicked out hundreds of NGOs – even cracking down on Catholic groups like nuns from Mother Teresa’s order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487153/original/file-20220928-24-dggq1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=143%2C83%2C3850%2C2287&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nicaragua's lawmakers have closed NGOs in a string of decrees.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/general-view-of-nicaraguan-parliament-during-a-session-in-news-photo/1239277687">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/07/24/nature-of-democratic-backsliding-in-europe-pub-76868">countries around the world are becoming less democratic</a> as leaders in places such as <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/02/16/recent-downfall-of-democracy-in-nicaragua/">Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/03/07/what-happens-to-a-democracy-deferred-malis-delayed-democratic-elections/">Mali</a>, <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/04/20/viktor-orbans-hungary-a-democracy-backsliding/">Hungary</a> and <a href="https://www.democratic-erosion.com/2022/06/11/freedom-of-speech-and-media-in-bangladesh-the-exploitation-of-media-and-restriction-of-free-speech-as-a-tool-to-advance-electoral-autocracy-by-ezgi-nalci/">Bangladesh</a> seek to increase their power and diminish the ability of the courts, legislatures and independent institutions to constrain them.</p>
<p>It’s a process that scholars in political science refer to as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abb2434">democratic backsliding</a>” or “<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/719009">democratic erosion</a>.” We’ve been studying this situation in Nicaragua, and we see it as emblematic of the global trend.</p>
<p>Unlike <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/on-democratic-backsliding/">the regime changes of the 20th century</a>, in which dictatorships sprang up overnight after violent revolutions and military coups, today’s autocrats more subtly and gradually undermine the foundations of democracy. They rig the rules in their favor by weakening checks and balances in their nations and by engaging in manipulation that keeps them in power. </p>
<p>One method that today’s autocrats and the governments under their control are increasingly using to strengthen their grip on power is to crack down on nongovernmental organizations. They are branding these often foreign-funded groups, known as NGOs, as <a href="https://nonprofitrisk.org/resources/articles/foreign-agent-registration-funding-restrictions-for-ngos/">foreign agents</a>. Another tactic is to cast them – usually falsely – as <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf">money launderers and terrorists</a>.</p>
<p>All of these designations undermine the NGOs’ credibility and create a pretext for restricting their operations.</p>
<h2>Why NGOs are in the crosshairs</h2>
<p>It’s true that many powerful governments like the United States <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12041">fund NGOs</a>. Typically, this money pays for clearly beneficial work such as building roads, wells and schools or increasing access to health care.</p>
<p>Globally funded independent organizations, like the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/americas/nicaragua">Red Cross</a>, also fill these gaps and often rush in supplies and support after disasters strike. </p>
<p>However, many NGOs focus on assistance that buttresses democracy, by encouraging voting and other forms of civic engagement. And because of those efforts, they have <a href="https://nonprofitrisk.org/resources/articles/foreign-agent-registration-funding-restrictions-for-ngos/">become subjected to</a> tight government supervision and auditing. </p>
<p>This is especially happening in countries that are undergoing democratic backsliding, such as <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/democratic-backsliding-in-poland-and-hungary/8B1C30919DC33C0BC2A66A26BFEE9553">Poland</a> and <a href="https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/62-special-issue/the-challenge-of-indias-democratic-backsliding/">India</a>.</p>
<p>Democratic backsliding is <a href="https://www.psa.ac.uk/psa/news/nicaragua%E2%80%99s-democratic-backsliding">well underway in Nicaragua</a> under President Daniel Ortega’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/nicaraguas-shift-towards-dictatorship-is-part-of-a-latin-american-backslide-11636476080">increasingly authoritarian leadership</a>. Especially in 2022, his government has been clamping down on NGOs and Catholic institutions.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman walks by a mural of a man holding his fist in the air" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=442&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487155/original/file-20220928-15-uzv3g3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Daniel Ortega, who led Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, returned to power in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-walks-past-a-mural-with-the-image-of-daniel-ortega-news-photo/1236426762?adppopup=true">Orlando Valenzuela/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stacking the deck in Nicaragua</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-former-revolutionary-daniel-ortega-now-resembles-the-dictator-he-helped-overthrow-171235">Ortega first rose to power</a> in 1979. He stepped down from the presidency after losing a closely monitored election in 1990, only to become president again after a 2006 win. He has since been reelected three times, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1053275827/nicaragua-may-be-holding-presidential-elections-but-it-is-edging-toward-dictator">most recently in 2021</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/11/07/1053275827/nicaragua-may-be-holding-presidential-elections-but-it-is-edging-toward-dictator">This phase of his leadership</a> has been rocked by waves of <a href="https://usoas.usmission.gov/oas-resolution-condemns-ortega-regime-in-nicaragua-2/">domestic turmoil and repression</a>.</p>
<p>One of the most troubling moments came in 2018, when the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/27/nicaragua-protests-leave-deadly-toll">authorities attacked</a> people who were taking part in <a href="https://apnews.com/article/e049398b9d9e495cb64eefe5134a4c62">widespread protests</a> over proposed safety-net reforms.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2021/302.asp">Estimates from outside observers</a> indicated that over 350 people were killed by the Nicaraguan police force, with thousands more imprisoned.</p>
<p>Nicaragua has since cracked down harshly on NGOs operating there, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/nicaragua-cancels-non-governmental-organizations-civil-society">prohibiting more than 1,600 of them</a> so far.</p>
<p><iframe id="YofuJ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/YofuJ/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>More NGOs expelled</h2>
<p>A series of legislative decrees passed by the National Assembly, over which <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nicaragua/nicaragua-ortega-murillo-regimes-goal-obliterate-space-independent-civil-society">Ortega wields much influence</a>, have stripped these organizations’ rights to exist and operate in the Central American country. This status is known there as “legal personhood.”</p>
<p>The most far-reaching of these decrees were issued in 2022, sometimes with <a href="https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/nicaragua-strips-legal-status-from-another-100-ngos">100 NGOs or more</a> losing their rights at one time. For example, decrees number <a href="http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/xpNorma.xsp?documentId=8A1E857C6C19099606258893006829EE&action=openDocument">8823</a> through <a href="http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/Normaweb.nsf/xpNorma.xsp?documentId=EFC0DCAF996C6E53062588B00075B5F7&action=openDocument">8827</a>, passed between July and August, removed legal recognition from 100 organizations at a time, for a total of 500.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, lawmakers have issued a large number of decrees in 2018 and 2019 granting recognition to domestic NGOs. The largely religious and community-based organizations may have been encouraged to carry on the operations of NGOs that were being pushed out of Nicaragua. We have been unable to learn much about how these new groups are faring so far.</p>
<p>Throughout 2019 and 2020, <a href="https://www.ned.org/2021-democracy-award/colectivo-de-derechos-humanos-nicaragua-nunca-mas/">several outspoken NGOs</a> were forced to stop operating by legislative decrees, resulting in the seizure of their assets and often the imprisonment or expulsion of their leadership. This was accompanied by legislation that included the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nicaragua-passes-controversial-foreign-agent-law/a-55291712">Foreign Agents Law passed in October 2020</a>, which mirrored word for word language <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/13/kremlins-repressive-decade">used by Russia</a> and other backsliding countries.</p>
<p>Nicaragua then picked up the pace of its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/19/nicaragua-government-dismantles-civil-society">NGO closures</a>, including the expulsion of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nicaragua">human rights groups and development agencies</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/nicaragua-expels-red-cross-representative-without-giving-reason-2022-03-25/">health care organizations</a>. Even <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-62076784">some Catholic institutions</a> have been sent packing, with nuns from the order founded by Mother Teresa leaving the country on foot.</p>
<p>Nicaragua has also <a href="https://www.catholicherald.com/article/global/nicaragua-expels-the-vatican-ambassador/">expelled the apostolic nuncio</a> – who serves essentially as an ambassador of the Catholic Church – in a move the Vatican called “incomprehensible.” </p>
<p>Among countries recently experiencing democratic backsliding, not all have such an adversarial relationship with major religious organizations. In Hungary, for example, Viktor Orbán has <a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2022/april/orban-hungary-evangelical-election-voices-choice-conservati.html">considerable support from Evangelical Christians</a>. </p>
<p>However, in Nicaragua, Ortega has cast a wide net in clamping down on civil society, as demonstrated by the legislation used to restrict the ability of NGOs and other organizations to operate freely. This is part of a broader effort to weaken the electorate’s ability to prevent his further consolidation of power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>These crackdowns are occurring around the world in countries that are becoming less free because of what’s known as ‘democratic backsliding.’Kelsey Martin-Morales, Doctoral Student in Political Science, University of South CarolinaMatthew Wilson, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1864942022-07-11T13:45:31Z2022-07-11T13:45:31ZHow The Clash’s Joe Strummer inspired progressive politics in his fans<p><a href="https://www.joestrummer.com/about">Joe Strummer</a>, lead singer and lyricist for the seminal punk band, <a href="https://www.theclash.com/">The Clash</a>, died 20 years ago this December. Strummer, the son of a British senior civil servant and whose real name was John Graham Mellor, wrote songs that did not shy away from the politics of the Thatcher era or situations affecting society around the world.</p>
<p>The Clash had six studio albums, which featured 16 top-40 hits, including Rock the Casbah and I Fought the Law. After his death, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/dec/23/artsfeatures.clash">the Guardian noted</a> that Strummer was a “political inspiration for a generation” and “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/dec/24/arts.artsnews1">the political conscience of punk</a>”.</p>
<p>I spoke to more than 100 individuals of different ages and genders from different generations, countries and continents for my book: <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526148988/">The punk rock politics of Joe Strummer: Radicalism, resistance and rebellion</a>, I found that his music has had a profound impact on the politics of many, leading some to left-wing activism. Among their number are many union leaders in Britain today, including <a href="https://www.tuc.org.uk/person/matt-wrack">Matt Wrack</a> of the <a href="https://fbu.org.uk/">Fire Brigades Union</a>, who <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/london-s-calling-tribute-to-mark-ten-years-since-last-show-of-clash-s-joe-strummer-7792858.html">said</a>): “Firefighters are immensely proud of our links with Joe Strummer and what he stood for politically and as a musician.”</p>
<p>According to many of those I spoke to, the lyrics in the music of The Clash provided them with an effective but unconventional initial education about issues in Britain and further afield such as unemployment and sub-standard housing in Britain as well as various political causes globally, such as the struggle of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in the 1980s. </p>
<h2>Political lyrics</h2>
<p>Two Strummer songs stand out in particular for those that I spoke to. The first is Spanish Bombs from the band’s third album, London Calling (1979), which was primarily about the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939, Strummer sings: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The freedom fighters died upon the hill<br>
They sang the red flag<br>
They wore the black one…<br>
The hillsides ring with “Free the people”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a song about the democratically elected Republican government’s struggle against Francisco Franco’s fascist military coup, it recounts how socialists, communists, republicans and anarchists fought together for freedom, liberty and equality. Spanish Bombs led many who gave me testimonials to read the likes of George Orwell’s <a href="https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/george-orwell-homage-to-catalonia">Homage to Catalonia</a>. </p>
<p>The song also provided a historical example of active resistance to fascism when a hard right nationalism was <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/services/library/mrc/studying/docs/racism/1970s/">on the rise in Britain</a> in the late 1970s. The fringe National Front political party ran on an extreme anti-immigrant platform in the 1970s, using racist slogans and pamphlets to attract members. This was in turn met with an increasingly vocal reaction from musicians like Strummer and the Rock Against Racism movement.</p>
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<h2>An international outlook</h2>
<p>The band’s fourth album, Sandinista!, released in 1980, embraced the cause of the Sandinista rebels against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua and attacked US attempts to underime the revolution. The Somoza family headed up a murderous and repressive dictatorship from the 1930s, which was propped up by the US and which fell in 1979 as a result of a popular armed rebellion led by the Sandinistas.</p>
<p>Strummer’s song Washington Bullets references the anti-democratic effects of American imperialism in central and south America, from the 1959 Cuban Revolution to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas of the 1980s, with mention of America’s aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and the assassination of Chile’s Salvador Allende at the hands of the Chilean military dictatorship in 1973. In it, he sings:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As every cell in Chile will tell<br>
The cries of the tortured men<br>
Remember Allende</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The song then details what happened when the US withdrew its support from the Nicaraguan Somoza regime:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>When they had a revolution in Nicaragua<br>
There was no interference from America<br>
The people fought the leader<br>
And up he flew<br>
Without any Washington bullets, what else could he do?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Strummer explains that despite repression, resistance is possible – and can be successful. His anger in the song is not just directed against Washington but also against British, Chinese and Russian imperialism. Not only did some of those I spoke to join the Nicaragua Solidarity Committee but a few also went to work as volunteers in Nicaragua to support the Sandinista revolution. </p>
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<h2>Seeking knowledge</h2>
<p>Many of those I spoke to recounted to me that before the era of the internet, they went to public libraries to find out more about these issues. From there, they started to form radical worldviews and began to join campaigns such as the anti-apartheid movement and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Many also joined trade unions and left-wing political parties such as the Labour Party. And, with their interest piqued, they began to read widely.</p>
<p>Strummer was able to reach people through his music. His songs not only made people dance but through their radical messages, they were able to inspire some fans to action. Whether it be fascism and imperialism or over environmental destruction (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfK-WX2pa8c&ab_channel=theclashVEVO">London Calling</a>), fighting racism (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lt4O-EHNnw&ab_channel=theclashVEVO">Working for the Clampdown</a>) and Thatcherism (<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4YtR9SsY2Q&ab_channel=Crustdisplacement">This is England</a>) he moved people. </p>
<p>Strummer was seldom explicit about what listeners should then do – his songs tended to be more informative and inspirational than instructional. But he was nevertheless always clear that activism was positive and necessary to effect change. The Clash’s first single in 1977, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IvG3is7Bm1w&ab_channel=theclashVEVO">White Riot</a>, encouraged disaffected young white people to fight against political corruption and police brutality as their black brethren had. In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xu1EkzulHCM&ab_channel=accounthaver">Working for the Clampdown</a> from the band’s 1979 album London Calling, he issued this call to arms: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Kick over the wall, cause governments to fall.<br>
How can you refuse it?<br>
Let fury have the hour, anger can be power.<br>
Do you know that you can use it?</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregor Gall is a member of the Facebook group, Clash Fans Against The Right.</span></em></p>From songs on the Spanish revolution to others on American Imperialism, Strummer’s lyrics inspired a generation of music-lovers to action.Gregor Gall, Affiliate Research Associate, School of Political and Social Sciences, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1712752021-11-09T13:42:01Z2021-11-09T13:42:01ZWhy Nicaragua’s slide toward dictatorship is a concern for the region and the US, too<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430871/original/file-20211108-23-1p53sd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C21%2C4695%2C3344&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nicaragua's power couple, Vice President Rosario Murillo and husband President Daniel Ortega.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/nicaraguan-vice-president-rosario-murillo-gestures-next-to-news-photo/1021529244?adppopup=true">INTI OCON/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega “<a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/politica/informe-cse-proclama-a-ortega-para-cuarto-mandato-tras-farsa-electoral-sin-competencia/">won</a>” a fourth straight term on Nov. 7, 2021 – the second in a row with his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, as running mate.</p>
<p>The vote has been <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/07/americas/nicaragua-election-nov-7-intl-latam/index.html">called a sham</a> by the international community, with President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/07/statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-on-nicaraguas-sham-elections/">dismissing it as</a> a “pantomime election that was neither free nor fair, and most certainly not democratic.”</p>
<p>And for good reason. Ortega and Murillo’s government has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/06/22/critics-under-attack/harassment-and-detention-opponents-rights-defenders-and">systematically</a> arrested leading opposition presidential contenders, leaving only government-aligned “<a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/satellite-parties-in-nicaragua-accomplices-of-daniel-ortegas-electoral-farce/">satellite parties</a>” facing them in the election. An estimated 81% of Nicaraguans <a href="https://100noticias.com.ni/politica/111265-urnas-abiertas-abstencion-elecciones-nicaragua/">abstained</a> <a href="https://marketresearchtelecast.com/after-arresting-seven-opposition-candidates-and-eliminating-three-parties-daniel-ortega-is-reelected-in-nicaragua-with-75-of-the-votes/197280/">from the vote</a>.</p>
<p>As Biden’s immediate condemnation may suggest, the election is also a challenge for the region and a headache for the United States. As a <a href="https://kaithaler.com/">specialist on political unrest in Latin America</a>, I believe that Nicaragua’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/nicaraguas-upcoming-election-highlights-need-long-term-forms-pressure-ortega-regime">deepening autocracy</a> makes a mockery of efforts to support democracy and human rights while also raising the risk of furthering a refugee crisis.</p>
<h2>From revolutionary to oppressor</h2>
<p>The result of Nicaragua’s election – with the Ortega-controlled electoral commission claiming he’s <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20211108-nicaragua-s-ortega-wins-fourth-term-in-election-slammed-as-pantomime">winning around 75% of the vote</a> – cements the ruling couple’s continued hold on power amid increasingly repressive tactics.</p>
<p>Once a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-former-revolutionary-daniel-ortega-now-resembles-the-dictator-he-helped-overthrow-171235">leftist revolutionary</a> who helped lead Nicaragua in the 1980s, Ortega desperately <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2010.00099.x">sought to return</a> to power after Nicaragua’s 1990 democratization. After cutting deals to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2019.64">reshape the political system</a>, Ortega won the 2006 elections and has been in power since, with <a href="https://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/5283">fraud accusations</a> around every subsequent vote.</p>
<p>Mass pro-democracy protests in 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">shook</a> the regime’s foundation but were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/19/crackdown-nicaragua/torture-ill-treatment-and-prosecutions-protesters-and">brutally repressed</a>, with hundreds killed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protester leans out of a car holding a anti-Ortega banner reading 'do not kill us.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/430873/original/file-20211108-17-6c9zva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protester holding a poster attends a protest against Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s government in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protester-holding-a-poster-attends-a-protest-against-news-photo/991760770?adppopup=true">Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nicaragua’s people are left with a government that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-protests/nicaraguan-opposition-says-dozens-arrested-in-banned-protests-idUSKCN1RU040">bans protests</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/23/ortega-allies-threaten-as-opponents-are-arrested-flee-nicaragua">threatens journalists</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77602-2_4">ignored and denied</a> the COVID-19 pandemic’s severity.</p>
<p>The Ortega-Murillo family and their friends in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) party <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/the-model-of-corruption-and-impunity-in-nicaragua/">rake in</a> millions of dollars from <a href="https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-04-20/nicaraguas-political-dynasty-heirs-in-a-golden-cage.html">government-supported businesses</a>, while most Nicaraguans remain impoverished.</p>
<p>In the face of repression, the <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/the-challenge-facing-nicaraguas-opposition-to-reorganize-without-freedom-and-under-persecution/">opposition</a> has fragmented and struggled.</p>
<h2>Dangerous precedent for region</h2>
<p>This slide into dictatorship poses challenges for the United States and pro-democracy international actors. After winning the presidency in 2006, Ortega <a href="https://journalofdemocracy.org/articles/nicaragua-a-return-to-caudillismo/">steadily eroded</a> the country’s democratic institutions, using the courts to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-25937292">remove term limits</a> and enable his perpetual rule.</p>
<p>The Ortega-Murillo family has established <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/nicaragua-politics-ortega/">a media empire</a> and taken over <a href="https://english.elpais.com/usa/2021-04-20/nicaraguas-political-dynasty-heirs-in-a-golden-cage.html">government posts</a> as it seeks to create what <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/09/23/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-labyrinth/">looks like</a> an authoritarian family dynasty.</p>
<p>Successive U.S. governments have cooperated with Ortega on issues such as <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta">free trade</a>, <a href="https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/nicaragua-and-u-s-cooperate-to-fight-drug-trafficking/">anti-drug trafficking efforts</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nicaragua-cuba-idAFKCN0T502A20151116">halting northbound migrants</a> at Nicaragua’s southern border. But the tougher stance indicated by Biden’s comments on the election reflect the reality that Nicaragua’s decline has the potential to further destabilize the region.</p>
<p>Democracy’s demise in Nicaragua is part of a deeper crisis in Central America. The formerly leftist Ortega <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-28/ortega-y-juan-orlando-hernandez-una-extrana-alianza-preelectoral.html">has embraced</a> Honduras’s repressive right-wing President Juan Orlando Hernández, who may be <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/politica/tratado-joh-ortega-mandatario-hondureno-busca-refugio/">seeking refuge</a> in Nicaragua from drug trafficking and corruption charges. El Salvador’s brash president Nayib Bukele, described by critics as Latin America’s first “<a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0031">millennial authoritarian</a>,” has been following Ortega’s democratic erosion playbook by <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/02/10/804407503/troops-occupy-el-salvadors-legislature-to-back-president-s-crime-package">using the military</a> to intimidate opponents and <a href="https://latinoamerica21.com/en/bukele-forever-and-the-smoke-of-bitcoin/">replacing</a> independent officials with loyalists.</p>
<p>El Salvador’s and Honduras’ problems are their own, but Ortega has set a <a href="https://americasquarterly.org/article/nicaraguas-sham-election-is-over-what-should-the-world-do-now/">dangerous precedent</a> for the region by retaining power through political manipulation and violence.</p>
<h2>Sanctions and refugees</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/nicaragua-related-sanctions">U.S.</a>, <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/11/nicaragua-eu-sanctions-prolonged-for-one-year/">European Union</a> and other democratic countries like <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/nicaragua.aspx?lang=eng">Canada</a> and <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-extend-sanctions-on-nicaraguan-officials/46866166">Switzerland</a> have sanctioned Ortega-Murillo government officials and associated companies. </p>
<p>These targeted sanctions have been <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/the-last-financial-arm-of-ortegas-regime-shaken-by-u-s-sanction/">a costly thorn</a> in the regime’s side, but as <a href="https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/political-marketplace-framework-sanctions-in-the-political-market">often happens</a> with sanctions, they <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/uses-sanctions-foreign-policy-nicaraguas-elections-2021">have not led</a> to regime collapse; Ortega and Murillo have instead shuffled assets and associates to <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/07/sanctions-nicaragua-crisis/">protect their power</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/comit-aprueba-proyecto-de-ley-renacer-para-que-el-rgimen-de-ortega-rinda-cuentas-por-socavar-la-democracia-en-nicaragua">RENACER Act</a> that the U.S. Congress passed on Nov. 3 calls for considering <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/10/26/nicaragua-costa-rica-blinken-517056">Nicaragua’s suspension</a> from the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, and there is pressure on the International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/us-congresspeople-ask-the-imf-not-to-grant-loans-to-the-ortega-regime/">to end</a> its loans to the Nicaraguan government. Yet such moves <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/nicaragua-dealing-dangers-one-sided-poll">might hurt</a> poor and middle-class Nicaraguans more than the regime.</p>
<p>Regardless of new international measures, the election itself will inhibit foreign investment and deepen Nicaragua’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-economy/nicaraguas-economy-contracts-sharply-amid-political-crisis-imf-idUSKCN20K0JG">economic crisis</a>.</p>
<p>This could spur more Nicaraguans to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/lost-hope-ortegas-crackdown-nicaragua-stirs-fast-growing-exodus-2021-09-02/">flee the country</a>. Over 100,000 people <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/4/6079cd184/unhcr-calls-support-nicaraguans-forced-flee.html">have left</a> since 2018, primarily to Costa Rica. Many are now making the dangerous journey north toward the U.S., too.</p>
<p>Thousands of Nicaraguans sought to enter the U.S. <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/americas_turmoil-home-more-nicaraguans-flee-us/6208907.html">in recent months</a> amid Ortega and Murillo’s preelection crackdown.</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/politics-weekly-74/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=politics-important">Get The Conversation’s most important politics headlines, in our Politics Weekly newsletter</a>.</em>]</p>
<p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/biden-harris-strategy-root-causes-migration-and-fragility-central-america">has said</a> it wants to reduce migrant arrivals from Central America. But without security, political freedoms and economic opportunity at home in Nicaragua, people will likely continue to seek a better, safer life elsewhere.</p>
<h2>A Russian red herring?</h2>
<p>While the potential for a refugee crisis is a real concern for the United States, one issue addressed by the RENACER Act – Russian relations with Nicaragua – is, I believe, <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/politica/ivan-kentros-nicaragua-es-la-entrada-de-rusia-a-centroamerica/">of limited concern</a>. Russian support is not critical to the Ortega-Murillo government’s survival. The Nicaraguan army, police and paramilitaries have <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2019/02/12/analysis-of-nicaraguas-paramilitary-arsenal/">more than enough weapons</a> to control the country.</p>
<p>And while Russian <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2017/05/19/nicaragua-insists-russian-satellite-station-not-for-spying/">surveillance</a> and cyberwarfare <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/nacion/convenio-de-seguridad-de-la-informacion-con-rusia-una-nueva-arma-del-regimen/">capabilities are no doubt welcomed by Ortega</a>, they merely augment the Nicaraguan government’s preexisting <a href="https://www.confidencial.com.ni/english/ortega-spies-using-israeli-technology/">spyware</a> and robust <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2021/11/october-2021-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-report/">online troll network</a>.</p>
<p>Russian support matters most in blocking action against Nicaragua at the U.N. Security Council. But rather than Cold War-like ideological struggles, Russian ties with Ortega simply reflect <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Authoritarian-Diffusion-and-Cooperation-Interests-vs-Ideology/Bank-Weyland/p/book/9780367587161">autocrats cooperating</a> with each other. With Nicaragua’s government rejected by most countries in the Americas and Europe, other pariah regimes are natural allies.</p>
<p>Following the latest blow of the “sham” election, the short-term prospects for democratization in Nicaragua appear slim. For international actors such as the U.S., Nicaragua’s tragedy serves as a warning: Once a country starts slipping toward dictatorship, it can be difficult to stop.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171275/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai M. Thaler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rule of Daniel Ortega has become increasingly authoritarian. Sanctions and repression could destabilize the region and result in increased numbers of refugees.Kai M. Thaler, Assistant Professor of Global Studies, University of California, Santa BarbaraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1712352021-11-05T13:43:29Z2021-11-05T13:43:29ZNicaragua: former revolutionary Daniel Ortega now resembles the dictator he helped overthrow<p>Nicaraguans go to the polls on Sunday November 7 with former revolutionary leader, Daniel Ortega, hoping to win a fourth consecutive term in office. He’s not leaving much to chance, though. Prominent opposition figures (including presidential candidates) and critics have been <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/nicaragua-trumped-charges-against-critics">imprisoned</a> or forced into <a href="https://elpais.com/cultura/2021-10-21/sergio-ramirez-inicia-un-nuevo-exilio-en-espana.html">exile</a> and newspaper offices have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-58212024">raided</a>.</p>
<p>It seems likely that his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) will receive a significant portion of the popular vote and Ortega – together with his wife and vice-president Rosario Murillo – will continue to rule Nicaragua for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Ortega has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15544315">come a long way</a> from the young left-wing revolutionary in the 1970s who fought in the guerrilla war against the US-backed anti-communist dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza, whose family had been in power in Nicaragua for more than four decades. After the Sandinistas led a popular revolution to topple the Somoza dictatorship on July 19 1979, Ortega became a member of the revolutionary junta. It embarked on a radical programme of social change, including <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27861851">land reforms</a> and a successful <a href="http://www.icwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CLS-1.pdf">literacy</a> campaign. </p>
<p>In 1984, with vice-presidential candidate Sergio Ramírez, Ortega won the first presidential <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/05/world/sandinistas-hold-their-first-elections.html">elections</a> since the revolution with a landslide. The 1980s were a period of economic hardship and counterinsurgency at the hands of the Contra rebels. There was also international pressure, principally from the United States, which mined Nicaragua’s harbours in 1984 and provided financial backing to the Contras through the 1980s.</p>
<p>To the surprise of international observers, but largely as a result of a decade of hardship and turmoil, Ortega lost the presidency in 1990 as the Nicaraguan people voted for the opposition coalition led by Violeta Chamorro.</p>
<h2>International acclaim</h2>
<p>If their popularity at home often came into question, in Europe and the Americas the youthful and optimistic Sandinistas were immensely popular throughout the 1980s. Left-wing activists organised solidarity campaigns, fundraisers and protests to support healthcare reform, educational programmes and agricultural projects in Nicaragua. European social democrats including former German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González even launched a committee to <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112717.pdf?v=fc264a634cf81184586955102bec6d68">defend the revolution</a> from “external infringements and influences”. </p>
<p>In Britain, Ortega and the Sandinistas were the darlings of the cultural scene. Leading rock group The Clash released a triple album entitled Sandinista! in 1980 while in 1989, when Ortega made an official visit to the UK, playwright Harold Pinter threw Ortega <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/mar/12/the-evening-graham-greene-introduced-himself-at-a-smart-london-party">a soirée</a> at his London home, where the Nicaraguan leader met a who’s who of arts identities.</p>
<p>Acclaimed novelist Salman Rushdie, who travelled to Nicaragua in 1987 to observe the unfolding revolution, shared his rose-coloured view of the Sandinistas in a non-fiction book entitled <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jaguar_Smile">The Jaguar Smile</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Father Miguel, Sergio Ramírez, Daniel Ortega: were these dictators in the making? I answered myself: no. Emphatically, no. They struck me as men of integrity and great pragmatism, with an astonishing lack of bitterness towards their opponents, past or present.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Ruthless in power</h2>
<p>On Daniel Ortega, Rushdie could not have been more wrong. Since returning to power in 2007, the Sandinista leader has slowly and ruthlessly consolidated his power over the FSLN and the Nicaraguan state. Seeking to avoid a repetition of past mistakes, Ortega formed alliances with former enemies, including the Catholic church (declaring himself a Christian and banning <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr430012009en.pdf">abortion</a>), and business organisations such as <a href="https://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4760">COSEP</a> (the Superior Council for Private Enterprise) which had been a strong opponent of the FSLN in the 1980s.</p>
<p>Combining social policies with a neoliberal economic model that received <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20150320003016/http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13508.htm">praise from</a> the International Monetary Fund and the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nicaragua">World Bank</a>, the Ortega regime kept the country stable and improved living standards. Not even the US, despite the occasional outburst on the state of Nicaraguan democracy, put much pressure on the FSLN leader. After all, the Sandinista government had adopted a strong stance against narcotics and implemented violent but effective policies to stop migrants and <a href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0187-69612019000100117&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=en">refugees</a> travelling to the US. That all this came at the cost of transparency and democracy in Nicaragua did not seem to matter as much.</p>
<p>But in April 2018, these alliances with the church and the business sector broke down in the wake of a popular protest which was then <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/9213/2018/en/">violently crushed</a> by the police and groups of Sandinista paramilitaries, leaving more than 300 mostly young people dead. From that moment it became impossible to deny that Ortega was starting to look more and more like the dictator he had overthrown.</p>
<h2>Popular support</h2>
<p>But Ortega and Murillo have managed to cling on to power. There are many reasons for their political survival, including the opposition’s fragmentation, a repressive state apparatus, and a lack of international pressure. What is too often overlooked, though, is that for many Nicaraguans, the FSLN remains the only political party that represents the interests of the poor.</p>
<p>Freedom of speech and independent media are vital elements of a functioning democracy, but they matter less to the voter who is concerned about food, clean water, a stable house and healthcare. Even though the Sandinistas’ social programmes are embedded in a neoliberal economic model, they still made a difference to the daily lives of many Nicaraguans. </p>
<p>If the opposition is serious about challenging the Ortega-Murillo regime, the answer lies perhaps in building a broad alliance that includes all sectors of society, particularly the marginalised. This, at least, was what the Sandinista revolutionaries needed to finally bring an end to decades of Somocista rule in 1979.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171235/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eline van Ommen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Once a Sandinista revolutionary, Ortega’s oppressive neoliberal regime now imprisons opponents and raids newspaper offices.Eline van Ommen, Lecturer in Contemporary History, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1581062021-04-02T12:17:47Z2021-04-02T12:17:47ZThe situation at the US-Mexico border is a crisis – but is it new?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392952/original/file-20210331-21-gqa87d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C1%2C1010%2C672&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Border Patrol detains tens of thousands of the families and children who try to cross U.S. borders every year.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Julio Cortez</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/us/texas-border-facility-migrants.html">The media</a> create the impression that there is an unprecedented crisis at the U.S.-Mexico border, with droves of children arriving alone, as well as families flooding to the border.</p>
<p>There is a crisis. </p>
<p>But as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=Randi+Mandelbaum&btnG=">a law professor who studies child migration</a>, I can tell you that it’s nothing new.</p>
<p>Children and families have been fleeing to the U.S. for years, particularly from Mexico and the so-called Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. </p>
<p>Yet aspects of the current situation are different from the past. And whether more individuals are attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border “than have been in the last 20 years,” as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/16/statement-homeland-security-secretary-alejandro-n-mayorkas-regarding-situation">Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas</a> predicted, remains to be seen. </p>
<p>The situation is best explained by looking at the number of migrants who have arrived at the border, <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions">as reported by U.S. Customs and Border Protection</a>, a law enforcement agency that is part of the Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p>Customs and Border Protection puts arriving noncitizens in three categories: unaccompanied children, families and single adults. Children are designated as unaccompanied if they are under the age of 18 and arrive at a U.S. border without lawful status and without a parent or legal guardian. </p>
<p>The numbers of children like these and families have been steadily increasing in recent years. Examining those numbers puts the current circumstances at the U.S.-Mexico border into context.</p>
<h2>A steady stream</h2>
<p>Except for fiscal year 2020, which started on Oct. 1, 2019, the number of children and families migrating to the U.S. has been escalating since 2013, with highs in 2014 and 2019, and a slight dip in 2015. Overall, the number of arriving unaccompanied children has been above 40,000 every year since 2014. In most yearsit was above 50,000. For arriving families, the numbers have hovered around 70,000 each year, with surges in 2018 and especially 2019. </p>
<p><iframe id="1E5qV" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1E5qV/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Scholars of migration look to many “<a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/UnaccompaniedMinors-Factsheet-FINAL.pdf">push and pull factors</a>” that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241700500402">draw migrant children to the U.S. border</a>. These include family and community violence, sexual assault, government corruption, agricultural disease, drought, discrimination against indigenous populations and extreme poverty.</p>
<p>The vast majority of the migrating families, and almost all (95%) of the unaccompanied children, are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. </p>
<p>So is anything different about what is taking place now? Why are <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/16/statement-homeland-security-secretary-alejandro-n-mayorkas-regarding-situation">government officials like Mayorkas</a> calling the situation “difficult” and “complicated?” </p>
<p>There are three interrelated issues to watch.</p>
<h2>1. Rapid increase</h2>
<p>From January to February 2021, there was a 61% uptick in the number of arriving unaccompanied children, and a 163% increase in arriving families. The numbers for March 2021 have not yet been formally reported, but they are expected to be high. </p>
<p>If this trend continues, fiscal year 2021 has the potential to surpass the high numbers that were seen in fiscal years 2014 and 2019. However, this is not yet clear, as migration flows tend to increase in the spring months and reduce a bit in the hotter, late summer months. </p>
<p><iframe id="JPEBL" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/JPEBL/6/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>2. Push and pull factors</h2>
<p>There are additional push and pull factors that could give rise to increased migration. </p>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/policy-brief-addressing-covid-19-fragile-cities-northern-triangle-central-america">Relief agencies</a> <a href="http://southernvoice.org/covid-19-has-exacerbated-poverty-and-inequality-in-northern-triangle-countries/">report</a> the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened economic conditions in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico – which have always been dire.</p>
<p>Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua suffered through <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/13/overwhelming-central-america-braces-for-new-storms-in-wake-of-hurricane-eta">two Category 4 hurricanes within a two-week span in November 2020</a> that killed hundreds of people and left millions in need. </p>
<p>Also, asylum-seeking children and families <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/immigration/biden-immigration-changes-raise-hopes-concerns-us-mexico-border">may have some sense</a> that the current U.S. administration will be more welcoming than the prior one. This might motivate more migrants to make the dangerous journey to the U.S. in search of safety and protection.</p>
<h2>3. The U.S. government was not prepared</h2>
<p>Advocates celebrated when the Biden administration exempted unaccompanied minors from the current <a href="https://covidseries.law.harvard.edu/unprecedented-expulsion-of-immigrants-at-the-southern-border-the-title-42-process/">Title 42 expulsion policy</a> that expels migrants based upon a public health law. But government officials were ill-prepared for the surge of arriving children that followed. </p>
<p>By law, Border Patrol agents have 72 hours to turn children over to the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a unit of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Yet the Office of Refugee Resettlement currently lacks capacity to house all the children in need of shelter, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/unaccompanied-child-arrivals-earlier-preparedness-shortfalls">in part because many of their facilities were dismantled under the Trump administration</a>. </p>
<p>The Office of Refugee Resettlement is rallying to construct more shelters and to release children as quickly as possible to relatives, but the backlog is huge, and many children have had to remain in Border Patrol custody for far longer than 72 hours. Whether and when the Office of Refugee Resettlement will be able to get the situation under control remains unclear.</p>
<p>So, is there anything different about what is taking place now? </p>
<p>So far, not really, although there are serious concerns about the conditions for the recently arriving children, and many hope that the expulsion policy will soon be lifted for all migrants. But time will tell whether this is an unprecedented year or not.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Randi Mandelbaum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Children and families have been fleeing to the US in rising numbers for nearly a decade. So why is the current situation at the US-Mexico border being viewed as something new?Randi Mandelbaum, Distinguished Clinical Professor of Law, Rutgers University - NewarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1399322020-06-22T12:18:57Z2020-06-22T12:18:57ZGeorge Floyd protests aren’t just anti-racist – they are anti-authoritarian<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343031/original/file-20200620-43191-19tukjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2875%2C1918&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters cross the Brooklyn Bridge on June 19, 2020 – Juneteenth – in the United States' third straight week of protest.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-cross-the-brooklyn-bridge-on-june-19-2020-news-photo/1250972730?adppopup=true">Pablo Monsalve / VIEWpress via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The massive protests that erupted across the United States – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/world/europe/yorkshire-tea-pg-tips-black-lives-matter.html">and beyond</a> – after the police killing of George Floyd are billed as anti-racist mobilizations, and that they are. Demonstrators are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/">denouncing police violence in minority communities</a> and demanding that officers who abuse their power be held accountable. </p>
<p>But I see something more in this wave of American protests, too. As a sociologist specializing in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=QZrcxXwAAAAJ">Latin America’s human rights movements and policing</a>, I see a pro-democracy movement of the sort more common south of the border.</p>
<h2>The Latin Americanization of United States</h2>
<p>Normally, U.S. protests have little in common with Latin America’s. </p>
<p>Demonstrations in the U.S. are usually characterized by pragmatic, specific goals like protecting abortion access or defending gun rights. They reflect, for the most part, an enduring faith in the constitution and democratic progress. American protests are rarely nationwide, and even more rarely persist for weeks.</p>
<p>Latin America protests, on the other hand, are often sustained movements with ambitious goals. They seek regime change or an entirely new constitutional order. </p>
<p>Take Venezuela, for example. There, millions have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelas-opposition-is-on-the-verge-of-collapse-86187">protesting the autocratic President Nicolás Maduro</a> for years, despite brutal suppression by police and the military – though the opposition has not yet succeeded in <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-power-struggle-plunges-nation-into-turmoil-3-essential-reads-110419">ousting him</a>. Even Chile, a relatively stable democracy, in 2019 faced <a href="https://theconversation.com/chiles-political-crisis-is-another-brutal-legacy-of-long-dead-dictator-pinochet-126305">massive anti-inequality demonstrations</a> demanding, among other things, that the country rewrite its dictatorship-era constitution.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342272/original/file-20200616-23221-1cq3etv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-government demonstrator shouts at police officers during a protest on March 10, 2020 in Caracas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-anti-maduro-demonstrator-shouts-to-venezuelan-national-news-photo/1206472319?adppopup=true">Edilzon Gamez/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Today’s U.S. demonstrations call to mind this kind of Latin American anti-authoritarian movement. </p>
<p>Americans’ famed faith in democracy has been eroding under Trump, a leader who, as a recent article in the <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-freedom-house-survey-for-2019-the-leaderless-struggle-for-democracy/">Journal of Democracy</a> noted, is “increasingly willing to break down institutional safeguards and disregard the rights of critics and minorities.” There is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/13/voter-suppression-2020-democracy-america">growing concern that voter suppression</a>, especially <a href="https://theconversation.com/georgia-election-fight-shows-that-black-voter-suppression-a-southern-tradition-still-flourishes-105263">targeting minority voters</a>, will undermine the 2020 election. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-study-george-floyd-protests-overwhelming-support-biden-2020-6">An ongoing study</a> by sociologist <a href="http://www.drfisher.umd.edu/">Dana Fisher</a> from the University of Maryland found that of hundreds of protesters in multiple cities, “people participating in the recent protests are extremely dissatisfied with the state of democracy.” Just 4% of respondents said they were “satisfied with democracy,” the author reported.</p>
<p>And these demonstrations are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/06/floyd-protests-are-broadest-us-history-are-spreading-white-small-town-america/">spreading across the country</a>, say protest researchers <a href="http://www.history.pitt.edu/people/lara-putnam">Lara Putnam</a>, <a href="https://polisci.uconn.edu/person/jeremy-pressman/">Jeremy Pressman</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/erica-chenoweth/">Erica Chenoweth</a> – including into small, largely white towns with deeply conservative politics. In terms of nationwide participation, they have eclipsed the women’s marches of January 2017. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342273/original/file-20200616-23221-12qtfpq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Florida state troopers at a rally in response to the recent death of George Floyd in Miami, Florida on May 31, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestor-holding-a-no-justice-no-peace-sign-shouts-at-news-photo/1216620141?adppopup=true">Ricardo Arduengo/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Undemocratic tendencies</h2>
<p>For Latin Americans, much about the United States has become familiar since Trump took office that January. </p>
<p>We recognize the <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/executive-overreach-imperial-presidency-congress-must-reclaim-proper-place-constitutional-order/">strongman president</a>, the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/70041/barr-ignores-settled-justice-department-policies-in-run-up-to-2020-elections/">politicizing of democratic institutions like the Justice Department</a>, the open political corruption, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/supreme-court-wisconsin/609631/">partisanship on the Supreme Court</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-warning-from-latin-america-trump-is-opening-the-door-to-military-rule-73592">president’s reverence for military leaders</a>. As if to complete the Latin Americanization of this once archetypal democracy, Trump even deployed <a href="https://theconversation.com/militias-evaluate-beliefs-action-as-president-threatens-soldiers-in-the-streets-140123">troops to suppress civilian protesters</a> – something that’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-the-president-really-order-the-military-to-occupy-us-cities-and-states-139844">almost never done in the United States</a>.</p>
<p>Washington has historically had few qualms, however, about using its military to influence Latin American politics and society. From the 1960s through the 1980s, authoritarian military governments ruled Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and beyond, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/truth-justice-and-declassification-secret-archives-show-us-helped-argentine-military-wage-dirty-war-that-killed-30-000-115611">overt and covert U.S. support</a>.</p>
<p>Democracy retook Latin America by the last quarter of the 20th century, but the region’s recovery from authoritarianism is far from finished. My research on <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=QZrcxXwAAAAJ#d=gs_md_cita-d&u=%2Fcitations%3Fview_op%3Dview_citation%26hl%3Den%26user%3DQZrcxXwAAAAJ%26citation_for_view%3DQZrcxXwAAAAJ%3AZph67rFs4hoC%26tzom%3D240">civil-military</a> relations is part of a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/armies-and-politics-in-latin-america/3FD7A02CCC080A1DE135870787376094">large body</a> of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422176?seq=1">academic literature</a> showing that military forces remain a latent presence <a href="http://www.cedla.uva.nl/50_publications/pdf/cuadernos/30-Cuadernos_Working_Paper-Dirk_Kruijt.pdf">behind Latin America’s democratically elected governments</a>. The scholar <a href="http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/%7Ealexroni/IPD%202015%20readings/IPD%202015_9/Gender%20and%20Militarism%20May-Pack-2014-web.pdf">Cynthia Enloe calls this the “ideology of militarism.”</a></p>
<p>From <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">Nicaragua</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-an-election-wont-topple-venezuelas-maduro-89332">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-is-not-venezuela-even-if-its-president-does-want-to-stay-in-power-forever-93253">Bolivia</a>, many elected governments in the region have devolved into essentially authoritarian regimes. Their populist leaders use quasi-constitutional methods like plebiscites, voter suppression and constitutional amendments to strengthen their power. </p>
<p>These undemocratic tendencies explain Latin America’s regular, sustained waves of massive anti-authoritarian protests. </p>
<p>In a similar way, Trump’s undemocratic tendencies explain some of the energy driving these young, multiracial crowds on American streets today. According to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/us/george-floyd-white-protesters.html?smid=em-share">University of Maryland researcher Dana Fisher</a>, 45% of white protesters surveyed said Trump motivated them to march, compared to 32% of black people. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=376&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342274/original/file-20200616-23276-110dt6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anti-racist protest in Los Angeles on June 14, 2020. Rarely has the US seen massive, sustained, nationwide protests.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protesters-gather-on-hollywood-boulevard-near-the-famous-news-photo/1249740821?adppopup=true">Mario Tama/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Police violence</h2>
<p>Police brutality is another underlying shared feature between American and Latin American protest movements.</p>
<p>As Black Americans have long recognized, police brutality is an instrument of authoritarian repression. In some Latin American countries, police routinely execute those <a href="https://theconversation.com/caught-between-police-and-gangs-rio-de-janeiro-residents-are-dying-in-the-line-of-fire-83016">they determine to be gang members</a>, drug traffickers or common criminals and <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-will-send-migrants-to-el-salvador-a-country-that-cant-protect-its-own-people-124475">face no consequences</a>. We call it police vigilantism.</p>
<p>Brazil is home to one of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/brazilian-police-show-high-use-of-deadly-force-1415664824">the world’s most lethal police forces</a>. Last year, police in the state of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51220364">Rio de Janeiro</a> killed a record 1,810 people. The victims are predominantly young black and brown men from poor neighborhoods. </p>
<p>In comparison, local police in the United States – which has about 100 million more people than Brazil – <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-2019/">killed 1,004 people nationwide in 2019</a>, according to a Washington Post analysis. Half of them were people of color aged 18 to 44. Most were male. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=61%2C0%2C8181%2C5487&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/342270/original/file-20200616-23261-imlvda.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">New Yorkers filled the streets in support of Black Trans Lives Matter and George Floyd on June 14, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thousands-fill-the-streets-in-support-of-black-trans-lives-news-photo/1219978820?adppopup=true">Michael Noble Jr./Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The raw numbers may be lower, but I’m struck by the similarity of the victims and the rationale behind the killings – as well as the impunity that usually follows police shootings.</p>
<p>I believe it is the overlap of continued police violence with the broader authoritarian creep in the U.S. that explains this unusual mass protest movement. Millions of Americans are taking to the streets for the same reasons as their Latin American counterparts – to fight for their lives, and for their democracy.</p>
<p>[<em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139932/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lilian Bobea a mandate holder at the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of people to self-determination. </span></em></p>Unrest in the US looks familiar to Latin Americans, who are accustomed to resisting undemocratic governments – and to their protest movements being met with violent suppression.Lilian Bobea, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Fitchburg State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1386922020-05-27T12:21:51Z2020-05-27T12:21:51ZHow leadership in various countries has affected COVID-19 response effectiveness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336512/original/file-20200520-152327-4a89vf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5457%2C3633&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Germany led the way with its early response to the coronavirus crisis.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wearing-face-masks-who-said-they-did-not-mind-being-news-photo/1221330962?adppopup=true">Getty Images / Sean Gallup</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 has put political leaders and health care systems worldwide to the test. Although lockdowns are the common approach, some countries have opted for less stringent measures. </p>
<p><a href="https://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/programs/team/">As scientists</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=o-pB1IMAAAAJ&hl=en">public policy experts</a>, we have spent years analyzing how countries prepare and respond to pandemics. We believe this is certain: The policy and communication choices that national leaders make has a measurable impact on the effectiveness of pandemic response.</p>
<h2>Some countries respond with science</h2>
<p>In particular, Germany and New Zealand have handled the crisis effectively. Both countries have not wavered from a science-based approach and strong, centralized messaging.</p>
<p>Germany discovered its <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/why-germany-has-a-low-covid-19-mortality-rate-2020-4">first cases on Jan. 27</a>. At the time, the country’s health minister considered COVID-19 a low threat; still, Charité University Hospital in Berlin began developing a test. Within a month, new test kits were available – and Germany’s labs had already <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/germany-coronavirus-death-rate.html">stocked up</a>. </p>
<p>By mid-March, the country had <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m1395">closed schools and retail businesses</a>. Testing was swiftly rolled out, and within approximately two weeks, Germany was processing more than <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32193299">100,000 tests per week</a>. Around this same time period, the United States had tested approximately <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-testing-numbers/607714/">5,000 people</a> and did not reach numbers similar to Germany until <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-testing-us-uk-korea-italy">several weeks later</a>. Chancellor Angela Merkel led Germany’s coordinated response, which included social distancing policies along with the early and wide-scale testing. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336526/original/file-20200520-152302-1rwn5b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=478&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Hamm, Germany, a boy stands in front of a graffiti featuring a nurse as Superwoman. Germany is widely credited for its rapid response to COVID-19.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/boy-stands-in-front-of-a-graffiti-painted-by-artist-kai-news-photo/1209475434?adppopup=true">Getty Images / Ina Fassbender</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Not everything went smoothly. In many instances, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/05/germanys-devolved-logic-is-helping-it-win-the-coronavirus-race">lower-level health services</a> still had autonomy; this led to a degree of discontinuity in policy implementation across states. Yet most Germans <a href="https://www.bmj.com/content/369/bmj.m1395">voluntarily adhered</a> to the policies set forth by the national government. Now Germany is moving to lift restrictions.</p>
<p>New Zealand, led by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, responded with a slogan: “<a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2020/03/14/1083045/we-must-go-hard-and-we-must-go-early">We must go hard and we must go early</a>.” In mid-February, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-newzealand/new-zealand-extends-ban-on-china-arrivals-no-curbs-yet-for-other-nations-idUSKCN20I046">travelers from China</a> were banned. </p>
<p>On March 23 – a month after its first case – New Zealand committed to a total elimination strategy and implemented a strict national lockdown despite having only <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(20)31097-7.pdf">102 COVID-19 cases and no recorded deaths</a>. Schools were closed. So were nonessential businesses. Social gatherings were banned. A 14-day self-isolation period was required for <a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2020/03/14/1083045/we-must-go-hard-and-we-must-go-early">anyone entering the country</a>, with a few Pacific Island exceptions. </p>
<p>With a population of just under 5 million, New Zealand has already tested more than <a href="https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-novel-coronavirus/covid-19-current-situation/covid-19-current-cases/covid-19-testing-rates-ethnicity-and-dhb">175,000 potentially infected</a> people – approximately 4% of its population. It is now expanding the program. </p>
<p>Like Germany, the country has emphasized science, leadership and consistent messaging. Prime Minister Ardern builds public trust through regular appearances on social media, including posts <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-52189013/jacinda-ardern-tooth-fairy-and-easter-bunny-are-essential-workers">aimed at children</a>. As of May 9, the country had <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(20)31097-7.pdf">fewer than 1,500 confirmed cases and 20 deaths</a> from COVID-19.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336530/original/file-20200520-152284-w39cy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A burial takes place at a cemetery in Manaus, Brazil. The grave area hosts suspected and confirmed victims of the pandemic.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/aerial-picture-showing-a-burial-taking-place-at-an-area-news-photo/1210677694?adppopup=true">Getty Images / Michael Dantas</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Instead of hand-washing, a hands-off approach</h2>
<p>Brazil and Nicaragua have taken a decidedly different approach. Leaders of both countries have adopted a “hands-off” policy – in some cases, even discouraging citizens from following public health measures taken in other countries.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31095-3">On Feb. 25</a>, Brazil recorded its first case. Since then, the country has reported more than 300,000 cases and 20,000 deaths – the third largest outbreak in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia. </p>
<p>Over these months, President Jair Bolsonaro has said the virus is not a threat, calling it a “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/bolsonaro-called-biggest-threat-brazil-coronavirus-response-200509054352022.html">little flu</a>.” He has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/bolsonaro-called-biggest-threat-brazil-coronavirus-response-200509054352022.html">encouraged defiance of</a> social distancing measures put in place by governors. </p>
<p>Brazil has many advantages over its neighbors for an effective pandemic response: <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.30.20047662v1.full.pdf">universal health coverage</a>, a large community-based primary care delivery system, and experience responding to the Zika health crisis in 2015. </p>
<p>But the lack of leadership from Bolsonaro have led some to label him as the “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31095-3">biggest threat</a>” to the country’s ability to fight the SARS-CoV-2. His continued attacks on <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazil-jair-bolsonaros-strategy-of-chaos-hinders-coronavirus-response-136590">scientists, universities and experts</a>, along with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/activist-farmers-in-brazil-feed-the-hungry-and-aid-the-sick-as-president-downplays-coronavirus-crisis-136914">lack of organized federal response</a>, have disrupted efforts to control the pandemic. An Imperial College of London <a href="https://mrc-ide.github.io/covid19-short-term-forecasts/index.html">study</a> showed Brazil with the highest rate of transmission of the 48 countries examined. </p>
<p>Nicaragua has also failed to acknowledge the dangers of this virus. President Daniel Ortega, an <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-year-after-nicaraguan-uprising-ortega-is-back-in-control-113991">authoritarian leader who has remained in office despite term limits and sustained popular protests</a> demanding his resignation, is resisting travel restrictions while <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/10/nicaragua-reckless-covid-19-response">encouraging schools and businesses</a> to stay open. He discourages the <a href="https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article241706736.html">use of masks</a>, even by health care workers. </p>
<p>With his wife and vice president, Rosario Murillo, Ortega has suggested that citizens attend church and go to the beach; they even organized a huge parade <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/rosario-murillo-convoca-caminata-amor-en-tiempos-del-covid-19/">called “Love Against COVID-19”</a> on March 14. The ruling couple, however, are noticeably absent for many of these activities, at which social distancing is impossible. </p>
<p>In a country of more than 6 million, Nicaragua reported <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">25 confirmed cases and eight deaths</a> from COVID-19 as of May 15. But many experts suspect the true number of infections is much higher, both because of minimal testing – the government only allows <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/nueva-orden-del-minsa-hacer-solo-50-pruebas-diarias-de-covid-19/">50 tests per day</a> – and because many COVID-19 deaths are classified as “pneumonia.” Since January 2020, pneumonia deaths in Nicaragua have reportedly been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-nicaragua/nicaragua-reports-more-pneumonia-deaths-some-tied-to-covid-19-idUSKBN22V0CZ">increasing</a>. But there is little government transparency in Nicaragua, so the data is difficult to confirm. </p>
<h2>Lessons for the US</h2>
<p>Reliance on science and centralized messaging help countries move faster to safely lift restrictions. Confusing and mixed messages, coupled with distrust of scientific experts, lets the virus spread. In the U.S., messaging is confusing and <a href="https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2766033">decentralized</a> and defers to state governments for the majority of policy development. This decentralization has led to vastly different actions by governors. Georgia and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/texas-coronavirus-cases.html">Texas reopened as cases continued to increase</a>, while Washington and <a href="https://www.kdrv.com/content/news/Governor-Brown-extends-coronavirus-state-of-emergency-through-July-570145731.html">Oregon extend lockdowns</a> well into the summer. </p>
<p>A coordinated, science-driven, national-level strategy is vital to an effective response. But at the moment, the U.S. federal government has communicated more like Brazil and Nicaragua, rather than Germany and New Zealand. The examples we highlight here are a warning to all of us. </p>
<p>[<em>Get facts about coronavirus and the latest research.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-facts">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Countries across the globe responded differently to the pandemic, and results show a difference in effectiveness as well.Christine Crudo Blackburn, Deputy Director, Pandemic & Biosecurity Policy Program, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M UniversityLeslie Ruyle, Associate Research Scientist and Assistant Director Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1383562020-05-18T10:57:28Z2020-05-18T10:57:28ZVenezuela failed raid: US has a history of using mercenaries to undermine other regimes<p>Members of the Venezuelan opposition have been accused of conspiring with an American private military company, Silvercorp USA, to invade Venezuela and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/05/venezuela-detains-two-americans-allegedly-involved-in-failed-raid-to-remove-maduro">overthrow the government of Nicolás Maduro</a>. </p>
<p>In early May, the Venezuelan military intercepted a group of dissidents and American mercenaries. The Venezuelan military said it killed eight of the insurgents and captured <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/12/venezuela-arrests-botched-maduro-kidnap-attempt">many others</a>. It also <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/05/the-invasion-of-venezuela-brought-to-you-by-silvercorp-usa/">arrested</a> two men it claims are former US Special Forces soldiers. No evidence has surfaced to link the US government to the recent attempted invasion – and it has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-venezuela-invasion-attempt/2020/05/05/8b4d64ec-8ee7-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html">denied responsibility</a> for the incident.</p>
<p>Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan opposition leader, has also denied involvement in the thwarted coup attempt. Some of his advisers who were allegedly involved in planning the mission <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/guaido-advisers-quit-bungled-venezuela-raid-200511200002059.html">have resigned</a>.</p>
<p>The Washington Post subsequently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-the-attachments-to-the-general-services-agreement-between-the-venezuelan-opposition-and-silvercorp/e67f401f-8730-4f66-af53-6a9549b88f94/?no_nav=true&p9w22b2p=b2p22p9w00098">published</a> an agreement between members of the Venezuelan opposition and Silvercorp, including <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/07/the-venezuela-silvercorp-usa-saga-keeps-getting-weirder/">signatures</a> of two of Guaidó’s advisers, though not Guaidó, and the chief executive of Silvercorp. The US$1.5 million (£1.2 million) contract outlined Silvercorp’s role in the invasion. One of the detained Silvercorp mercenaries made a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p23nt9Lsm-Y&feature=youtu.be">televised confession</a> (possibly under duress) that he was hired to capture Maduro and bring him to the US. </p>
<p>The incident has worsened relations between the US and Venezuela, which were already tense. In March 2020, the US charged Maduro with “<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-former-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism">narco-terrorism</a>” and offered a US$15m reward for his capture. The Trump administration has also previously <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/03/us-mulls-military-options-in-venezuela-trump-maduro-guaido/">considered military options</a> to remove Maduro from power. </p>
<p>These events in Venezuela echo past US secret sponsorship of private armies to overthrow governments elsewhere. The US has an extended <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745337036/outsourced-empire/">history of sponsoring insurgents and mercenaries</a> to undermine unwanted foreign regimes. </p>
<h2>From Guatemala to Indonesia</h2>
<p>In 1954 the US supported ex-Guatemalan military officer Carlos Castillo Armas in his efforts to overthrow Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz. Armas was the leader of a guerilla army that was trained by <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674019300">the CIA</a> of Guatemalan to invade from Honduras and Nicaragua. The CIA also hired a US company called <a href="https://www.utdallas.edu/library/specialcollections/hac/cataam/Leeker/history/">Civil Air Transport</a> to bomb Guatemala. Arbenz resigned under pressure and went into exile. Armas became president of a new authoritarian regime. </p>
<p>Similarly, President Dwight Eisenhower authorised the CIA to subvert the Sukarno government in Indonesia in 1957-58. The <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/feet-fire">CIA supported</a> local insurgent factions to carry out guerrilla attacks and also hired mercenary airline companies for logistics and combat missions. </p>
<p>The American role was exposed in 1958 when the Indonesian authorities downed the aeroplane of Allen Pope, a contractor for Civil Air Transport, the company that had been involved in Guatemala. The US government tried to deny involvement, stating Pope was a “soldier of fortune” motivated by profit. But the <a href="https://thenewpress.com/books/subversion-foreign-policy">US later quietly withdrew its plans</a> for the forced removal of Sukarno. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/335072/original/file-20200514-77267-1kwl1nw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Allen Pope on trial in Jakarta in 1959.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allen_Lawrence_Pope#/media/File:Allen_Pope.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Bay of Pigs and Nicaragua</h2>
<p>In 1961 the CIA tried to overthrow Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba by organising an invasion of Cuban dissidents and mercenary forces in a notorious incident known as the Bay of Pigs. According to <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d481">US government documents</a>, the CIA sponsored Cuban exiles that opposed Castro to “avoid any appearance of US intervention”. <a href="https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB564-CIA-Releases-Controversial-Bay-of-Pigs-History/">The CIA trained</a> a Cuban insurgent force called Brigade 2506 and also hired mercenary airline companies for airborne attacks. Castro’s military defeated the US-sponsored invasion. </p>
<p>During the 1980s, the US also secretly hired mercenary forces to support the Contra insurgency against the socialist Sandanista government of Nicaragua. The CIA mobilised mercenaries to <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Reagan-Versus-The-Sandinistas-The-Undeclared-War-On-Nicaragua/Walker-Williams-Kornbluh-Gold/p/book/9780367285104">sabotage oil refineries and Nicaraguan ports</a>. Later, the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/70">International Court of Justice ruled against the US</a> for employing mercenaries to place underwater mines in Nicaraguan ports. The CIA <a href="https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit/mode/2up">also asked a company</a> called Keenie Meenie Services to conduct “sabotage operations for the resistance” against the Sandanista government. </p>
<p>In October 1986, <a href="https://aadl.org/node/244995">Eugene Hasenfus</a>, a pilot hired by the CIA, was captured when the Nicaraguan military shot down his plane. His confessions exposed secret US arms shipments to the Contras and also helped unravel the <a href="https://www.abebooks.co.uk/9780862325756/David-Goliath-Washingtons-Against-Nicaragua-0862325757/plp">Iran-Contra scandal</a>, which revealed secret weapons sales to Iran in order to fund the Contras in Nicaragua in violation of US law. </p>
<h2>Irregular war on terror</h2>
<p>More recently the US has renewed its commitment to what it calls <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510">“irregular warfare”</a>. This includes supporting <a href="https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf">insurgents, militias and mercenaries</a> to weaken unwanted governments, as well as in its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/aug/30/roundupreviews5">counter-terrorism</a> efforts. </p>
<p>The US has covertly supported private armed forces in countries across the Middle East in the “war on terror”. For example, in 2001 the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no4/War_on_Terror_9.htm">CIA and Special Forces paid warlord factions</a> to help remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Before the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/11/usa.iraq2">US also supported militias</a> fighting against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The US secretly trained <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/middleeast/cia-arming-syrian-rebels.html">insurgents</a> in attempts to oust President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. </p>
<p>Of course, an extensive record of supporting insurgents and mercenary forces is not evidence that the US was involved in the recent events in Venezuela. But it does demonstrate that there are precedents for such activities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Thomson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>US denies backing failed raid to remove Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro – but it has a long history of sponsoring private armies elsewhere.Andrew Thomson, Lecturer, Politics and International Studies, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243852019-10-09T16:50:28Z2019-10-09T16:50:28ZThe Latin American left isn’t dead yet<p>Argentina, Bolivia and <a href="https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/elecciones-dicen-encuestas-cara-octubre.html">Uruguay</a> will all hold presidential elections in October. And, for now, leftists are <a href="https://www.as-coa.org/content/guide-2019-latin-american-elections/argentina">strong contenders</a> in all three countries. </p>
<p>This is a somewhat unexpected development. Beginning in 2015, <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2016/12/09/right-turn">conservatives toppled</a> major leftist strongholds, including in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. The socially progressive Latin American left was <a href="https://aulablog.net/2019/01/09/a-right-turn-in-latin-america/">declared dead</a> <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/pink-tide-latin-america-chavez-morales-capitalism-socialism/">many times over</a>. </p>
<p>But the left-leaning populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-was-elected-to-transform-mexico-can-he-do-it-99176">victory in Mexico</a> in July 2018 showed that Latin American political winds don’t all blow in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mexicos-left-turn-and-the-road-to-uncertainty-106847">same direction</a>.</p>
<p>So what can be learned from the failures and successes of Latin America’s leftist parties and governments in the very recent past?</p>
<h2>Latin America’s ‘left turn’</h2>
<p>About two-thirds of all Latin Americans lived under some form of leftist government <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/book/1866">by 2010</a> – a “pink tide” that washed over the region following the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998. </p>
<p>Only a few countries – notably Colombia and Mexico – remained under conservative political leadership during this period.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296464/original/file-20191010-188792-1ysbkxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=943&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay have elections in October.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock.com/The Conversation</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Academics conventionally grouped this <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/welfare-and-party-politics-in-latin-america/BFE6B43ED35B5CB02919279F5620AB73">Latin American left</a> into <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=eKOwSqYH5rcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=uruguay+social+democratic+left&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiBl7LNpY_lAhXQl-AKHaIlB7QQ6AEwAHoECAEQAg#v=onepage&q=uruguay%20social%20democratic%20left&f=false">two camps</a>. </p>
<p>There was the moderate “social democratic” left of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, which embraced an agenda of egalitarianism while accepting the basic precepts of market economics. </p>
<p>This group was generally contrasted with the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=3IVjDgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT5&ots=8jhwLduGbl&sig=eLyxmkw3j55zS5nuIfqGGkj6WI8#v=onepage&q&f=false">more radical “populist” left</a> that ran Venezuela, <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2016/00000048/00000004/art00003">Bolivia</a>, Nicaragua and Ecuador. These governments shared the moderate left’s commitment to progressive social change but had bolder aims: an alternative to market economics and profound changes to political institutions. </p>
<p>Such groupings did little to predict these countries’ divergent fates.</p>
<p>In a few places, leftist governments have remained popular, vibrant and electorally competitive after over a decade in power – namely <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bolivia/2018-02-14/key-evo-morales-political-longevity">Bolivia and Uruguay</a>. </p>
<p>But by 2015, <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/bolsonaro-and-brazils-illiberal-backlash/">Brazil</a>, <a href="https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Venezuela/Smilde%20Current%20History--final.pdf">Venezuela</a> and <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2018/07/25/nicaragua-view-left">Nicaragua</a> had all become political and economic catastrophes. <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/party-vibrancy-and-democracy-in-latin-america-9780190870041?cc=us&lang=en&">Chile’s leftist government</a> sharply declined in popularity. </p>
<h2>The conformist temptation</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ob2gBJoAAAAJ&hl=en">political science research</a> identifies some shared weaknesses of the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=d7yzgzQAAAAJ&hl=en">Latin American left</a>.</p>
<p>The first lesson comes from the Workers Party, which governed Brazil between 2003 and 2016. </p>
<p>Like many progressive parties, the Workers Party’s founding leaders were idealistic – committed to <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300050745/workers-party-and-democratization-brazil">upending Brazilian politics as usual</a>. </p>
<p>Under the Workers Party, Brazil experienced a massive <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11186-019-09351-7">expansion of social citizenship rights</a>. By 2008, Brazilian President Lula da Silva was arguably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-brazil-tilts-rightward-lulas-leftist-legacy-of-lifting-the-poor-is-at-risk-65939">world’s most popular president</a>.</p>
<p>But the Workers Party became <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/transformation-workers-party-brazil-19892009?format=PB&isbn=9780521733007">detached from the social movements</a> it once championed. Deeply immersed in the normal – even <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-brazil-is-winning-its-fight-against-corruption-71968">corrupt</a> – give-and-take of Brazilian politics, the party came to be molded by the flawed system it sought to change.</p>
<p>We call this pitfall the “conformist temptation.” </p>
<p>The Workers Party rule ended with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/impeachment-culture-wars-and-the-politics-of-identity-in-brazil-59436">2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff</a>, Lula’s hand-picked successor. Although Rousseff herself <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-brazilian-president-dilma-rousseffs-real-crime-59363">faced no corruption charges</a>, the Workers Party left power associated with corruption scandals, campaign finance violations and economic mismanagement – the exact problems it had promised to fix.</p>
<p>Chile’s Socialist Party met a similar fate. </p>
<p>Under Presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, moderate leftists who governed Chile almost uninterrupted from 2001 to 2018, the party <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/18/chile-just-elected-a-billionaire-president-these-are-the-4-things-you-need-to-know/">distanced itself from its supporters in social movements</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011, students and teachers began <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/08/student-protests-in-chile/100125/">protesting</a> Chile’s low levels of public education funding and <a href="https://www.borgenmagazine.com/economic-inequality-in-chile/">high inequality</a>. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1866802X1600800305">youth protest movement</a> grew, exposing Chileans’ disappointment at the Socialists’ limited progress on social reforms. </p>
<p>These divisions on the left <a href="https://theconversation.com/chile-heads-into-presidential-runoff-with-a-transformed-political-landscape-86453">allowed Chile’s strong right wing to win</a> Chile’s 2018 presidential election.</p>
<h2>The autocratic temptation</h2>
<p>Crises in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador result from a different fatal flaw. </p>
<p>In these three countries, leftist leaders succumbed to what we call the “autocratic temptation” – the idea that a charismatic leader or popular political movement not only can speak for an <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/latin-americas-authoritarian-drift-the-threat-from-the-populist-left/">entire nation</a> but that they can <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-is-not-venezuela-even-if-its-president-does-want-to-stay-in-power-forever-93253">do so forever</a>.</p>
<p>Like many authoritarian leaders, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega have lost touch with their constituents. When leaders become too insulated, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-dictators-dilemma-9780190228552?cc=us&lang=en&">research shows</a>, safeguards against corruption and irresponsible public policies weaken. </p>
<p>Authoritarian leaders are less likely to change course when things go wrong. </p>
<p>The consequences may be devastating – like Maduro’s egregious failure to adjust Venezuela’s exchange rate policies during its descent into economic crisis and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/venezuelas-crisis-in-5-charts/2019/01/26/97af60a6-20c4-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html">hyperinflation</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Weyland-24-3.pdf">Authoritarian leadership</a> has degraded democracy in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador in other ways, too. <a href="https://theconversation.com/ecuadors-populist-electoral-victory-for-moreno-shows-erosion-of-democracy-75157">Checks and balances on presidential authority</a> have been weakened and press freedoms restricted. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">electoral process was manipulated</a>.</p>
<p>The autocratic temptation to lionize a charismatic founding leader weakens the governing political party, too, by making it extremely difficult for new leaders to emerge and carry forward the party’s long-term transformative agenda.</p>
<p>In Nicaragua and Venezuela, that has meant that <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaraguans-try-to-topple-a-dictator-again-98123">autocrats have clung to power</a> despite popular demand that they leave.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://aulablog.net/2018/02/02/ecuador-referendum-marks-critical-juncture-for-moreno-and-correa/">Ecuador</a>, the current and former presidents – Lenín Moreno and Rafael Correa – are engaged in a bitter dispute. Protests have rocked Ecuador over Moreno’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49955695">economic policy shifts</a> away from Correa’s agenda.</p>
<h2>Leftist exceptions</h2>
<p>So what explains the resilience of the left in <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/when-movements-become-parties/F06BEE9DEA9BA4E7DCFBD9A87266FAB8#fndtn-information">Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-party-activism-survives/93C5584DB63DF0A80B51F3EEB68BC8E9">Uruguay</a>, where leftist parties have reduced <a href="http://www.santiagoanria.com/data.html">inequality</a> and made tremendous progress toward <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/delegative-democracy-revisited-more-inclusion-less-liberalism-in-bolivia/">social and political inclusion</a>? Left-wing candidates are polling well in both countries’ <a href="http://www.startribune.com/evo-morales-not-trending-among-bolivia-s-youth-ahead-of-vote/562382812">presidential races</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296075/original/file-20191008-128681-1cs7t1u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Argentine presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez and running mate, former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, at a campaign rally, Aug. 7, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://pictures.reuters.com/CS.aspx?VP3=SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZSUWZX3IE&SMLS=1&RW=1920&RH=996#/SearchResult&VBID=2C0BXZSUWZX3IE&SMLS=1&RW=1920&RH=996&POPUPPN=8&POPUPIID=2C0BF1MYIRFG1">Reuters/Agustin Marcarian</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In our assessment, what sets Bolivia and Uruguay apart is the strength of the ties between the leftist parties and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/when-movements-become-parties/F06BEE9DEA9BA4E7DCFBD9A87266FAB8#fndtn-information">allied social movements</a> there. That has encouraged the accountability and responsiveness lacking in Venezuela, Brazil and Chile. </p>
<p>Civil society in Bolivia and Uruguay also retained its capacity for independent mobilization, constraining any possible slide into autocracy or unbridled ambition. </p>
<p>That may explain why Bolivia has so far <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bolivia/2018-02-14/key-evo-morales-political-longevity">avoided the worst social and economic consequences of the autocratic temptation</a> – despite its charismatic indigenous president, Evo Morales, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-is-not-venezuela-even-if-its-president-does-want-to-stay-in-power-forever-93253">eliminating term limits and consolidating power</a> over the past 14 years. </p>
<p>In Argentina the left’s possible comeback has more to do with conservative president Mauricio Macri’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/10/argentina-economic-crisis-imf-debt-default">economic mismanagement</a>. But the center-left ticket leading Argentina’s presidential race has also succeeded because the candidates formed a broad national coalition – one that includes an array of social movements, from labor unions to feminist groups.</p>
<p>The Latin American left has some life in it yet.</p>
<p>[ <em>You respect facts and expertise. So do The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=yourespect">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124385/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Progressives are leading in the presidential elections of Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, bucking the region’s recent rightward trend. But there are lessons in the failures of leftists past.Santiago Anria, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Latin American Studies, Dickinson CollegeKenneth M. Roberts, Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government and Director, Latin American Studies Program, Cornell UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215252019-09-06T11:14:05Z2019-09-06T11:14:05ZHow climate change is driving emigration from Central America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291186/original/file-20190905-175663-5sdx69.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A farmer carries firewood during the dry season in Nicaragua, one of the Central American countries affected by a recent drought.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ciat/6887922896/in/photolist-pR68Ea-gch1rZ-buEpvj-bHzbdr-gch5hU-SaSJT1-Rtctoq-Jo7ZpV-uMre5E-uQ4mKR-HdPNfB-tSKaLW-LyHeez-HwK7aY-LrMzsF-c4NTDj-25QT5HB-2dEB31M-7usyGC-Ydykff-YdykdG">Neil Palmer for CIAT/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Clouds of dust rose behind the wheels of the pickup truck as we hurtled over the back road in Palo Verde, El Salvador. When we got to the stone-paved part of the road, the driver slowed as the truck heaved up and down with the uneven terrain. Riding in the back bed of the truck, Ruben (not his real name) and I talked while we held on tight, sitting on sacks of dried beans that he was taking to market. </p>
<p>“It doesn’t come out right,” he said, “it just doesn’t pay anymore to work the land. I take out a loan for seed, and then I can’t count on making it back to pay off my debt.”</p>
<p>Ruben told me then, for the first time, that he planned to save up his money to migrate out of El Salvador. His story is playing out across Central America among many migrants and would-be migrants.</p>
<p>When I spoke with Ruben, it was 2017, nearly 20 years after I had first spent time in his community, a coffee cooperative in El Salvador’s central highlands founded in the 1990s. Over those two decades, the cooperative’s hopes and dreams of a sustainable livelihood producing coffee for a global market have been dashed. </p>
<p>Rising global temperatures, the spread of crop disease and extreme weather events have made coffee harvests <a href="https://www.nri.org/publications/working-paper-series/4-coffee-and-climate-change/file">unreliable</a> in places like El Salvador. On top of that, <a href="https://asu.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/market-shocks-and-climate-variability-the-coffee-crisis-in-mexico">market prices</a> are unpredictable.</p>
<p>In the back of the pickup truck that day, we talked about gangs too. There was increasing criminal activity in the town nearby, and some young people in the town were being harassed and recruited. But this was a relatively new issue for the community, layered on top of the persistent problem of the ecological crisis. </p>
<p>As a cultural anthropologist who studies factors of displacement in El Salvador, I see how Ruben’s situation is reflective of a much broader global phenomenon of people leaving their homes, directly or indirectly due to climate change and the degradation of their local ecosystem. And as environmental conditions are projected to get worse under current trends, this raises unresolved legal questions on the status and security of people like Ruben and his family. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/290579/original/file-20190902-175710-1mwipmm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This man lives in the Dry Corridor on the Pacific Coast of Central America, an area that has suffered high rates of poverty and malnutrition.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/breadfortheworld/8203342813/in/photolist-au4agR-bfCkgP-9pNrrL-au499H-9pNrvd-bfCfQP-au6PiN-au4a2p-YSf2Kt-9pNsd1-bbdGKa-dx41hN-duUh24-25eZ6X8-2aAW1gh-wAFkB5-Q5S6Xi-QvPJQk-PUDqLn-NRk9vk-NNxeUG-PUCR5V-NRjYDg-NNvoRJ-PUCFtF-PvYQTu-PRSDnY-FkJJrS-2gqysPq-2gqyqJy-2gqyAgA-2gqykzf-GGxMaV-2gqywC8-2gqyqvt-2gqyc9T-2gq6k9W-2gpssPj-2gps6Q9-2gpssHY-2gprxLK-2gprV9a-2gprxFj-2gprxCt-2gpj78u-2gpjuu9-2gpjusa-2gpjuhA-2gpebTx-2g8GcGZ">Todd Post/Bread for the World Institute</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Land and livelihood</h2>
<p>Migration from Central America has gotten a lot of <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2017/12/07/rise-in-u-s-immigrants-from-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras-outpaces-growth-from-elsewhere/">attention</a> these days, including the famous migrant <a href="https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/root-migration-climate-change-caravan-central-america">caravans</a>. But much of it focuses on the way migrants from this region – especially El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras – are driven out by <a href="https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/33/3/34/2797909">gang violence</a>, <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/04/the-cost-of-systemic-corruption-in-honduras-migration-north/">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nicaragua">political upheaval</a>.</p>
<p>These factors are <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/understanding-and-estimating-displacement-in-the-northern-triangle-of-central-america">important</a> and require a response from the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/claims-from-central-america.html">international community</a>. But displacement <a href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/08072019/climate-change-migration-honduras-drought-crop-failure-farming-deforestation-guatemala-trump">driven by climate change</a> is significant too.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/eDrEpj_sHBI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The migrant exodus from Central America includes many people impacted by climate change, although other factors play a part as well.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The link between environmental instability and emigration from the region became apparent in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Earthquakes and hurricanes, especially <a href="http://hurricanescience.net/history/storms/1990s/mitch/">Hurricane Mitch</a> in 1998 and its aftermath, were ravaging parts of Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. </p>
<p>Many people from El Salvador and Honduras lived in the U.S. at the time, and the Bush administration granted them <a href="https://cmsny.org/publications/jmhs-tps-elsalvador-honduras-haiti/">Temporary Protected Status</a>. In this way, the government of the United States recognized the inhumanity of sending people back to places struggling with ecological disaster.</p>
<p>In the years since those events, both rapid-onset and long-term environmental crises continue to <a href="http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/20181213-slow-onset-intro.pdf">displace people</a> from their homes worldwide. Studies show that displacement often happens indirectly through the impact of climate change on <a href="https://www.nri.org/publications/working-paper-series/4-coffee-and-climate-change/file">agricultural livelihoods</a>, with some areas pressured more than others. But some are more dramatic: Both Honduras and Nicaragua are among the top 10 countries <a href="https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202019_2.pdf">most impacted by extreme weather events</a> between 1998 and 2017. </p>
<p>Since 2014, a serious drought has decimated crops in Central America’s so-called <a href="http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/dry-corridor/en/">dry corridor</a> along the Pacific Coast. By impacting smallholder farmers in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-drought/salvadoran-farmers-lament-brutal-drought-hope-for-recovery-idUSKBN1KG2RE">El Salvador</a>, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/central-america-drying-farmers-face-choice-pray-rain-or-leave-n1027346">Guatemala and Honduras</a>, this drought helps to drive <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/sprclimat/v_3a140_3ay_3a2017_3ai_3a3_3ad_3a10.1007_5fs10584-016-1863-2.htm">higher levels</a> of migration from the region. </p>
<p>Coffee production, a critical support for these countries’ economies, is especially vulnerable and sensitive to weather variations. A recent <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/coffee-rust-battle-intensifies/">outbreak of coffee leaf rust</a> in the region was likely <a href="https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/may-19-2014-usaid-texas-am-invest-5-million-combat-coffee-rust-crisis">exacerbated by climate change</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://time.com/5346110/guatemala-coffee-escape-migration/">fallout</a> from that plague combines with the recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralamerica-immigration-coffee/coffee-slump-reaps-bitter-harvest-for-central-american-migrants-idUSKCN1TS2QB">collapse in global coffee prices</a> to spur desperate farmers to give up. </p>
<h2>Compounding factor</h2>
<p>These trends have led experts at the World Bank to claim that around <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/983921522304806221/pdf/124724-BRI-PUBLIC-NEWSERIES-Groundswell-note-PN3.pdf">2 million people</a> are likely to be displaced from Central America by the year 2050 due to factors related to climate change. Of course, it’s hard to tease out the “push factor” of climate change from all of the other reasons that people need to leave. And unfortunately, these phenomena interact and tend to exacerbate each other.</p>
<p>Scholars are working hard to assess the scale of the problem and study ways people can <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0088463">adapt</a>. But the problem is challenging. The number of displaced could be even higher – up to almost <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/983921522304806221/pdf/124724-BRI-PUBLIC-NEWSERIES-Groundswell-note-PN3.pdf">4 million</a> – if regional development does not shift to more <a href="https://ccafs.cgiar.org/news/central-americas-climate-smart-agriculture-strategy-contains-key-recommendations-ccafs-future#.XWUp8pNKgWo">climate-friendly and inclusive models</a> of agriculture. </p>
<p>People who emigrate from Central America may not always fully realize the role climate change plays in their movement, or think of it as the final trigger given all the other reasons they have to flee. But they know that the crops fail too often, and it’s harder to get clean water than it used to be.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Xem9EvvkJSc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Environmental factors are playing more and more of a role in Central Americans’ decisions to leave home.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Seeking a protected status</h2>
<p>Ruben recently contacted me to ask for a reference to a good immigration lawyer. He and his daughter are now in the United States and have an upcoming hearing to determine their status. </p>
<p>Just as he predicted a few years ago, Ruben couldn’t make a living in El Salvador. But he may find it hard to live in the U.S. too, given the mismatch between refugee law and current factors causing displacement.</p>
<p>For several years now, scholars and legal advocates have been asking <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/peopletrafficking/romer">how to respond</a> to people displaced by environmental conditions. Do <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328261364_Possible_Framework_for_Climate_Change_IDP's_Disaster_and_Development_Induced_Displacement_and_Resettlement_Models_and_their_Integration">existing models</a> of humanitarian response and resettlement work for this new population? Could such persons be recognized as in need of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2008.00290.x">protection under international law</a>, similar to political refugees? </p>
<p>Among the most complicated political questions is who should step up to deal with the harms of climate change, considering that wealthier countries pollute more but are often shielded from the worst effects. How can <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/nzjel20&id=112&men_tab=srchresults">responsibility be assigned</a>, and more importantly, what is to be done? </p>
<p>In the absence of coordinated action on the part of the global community to mitigate ecological instability and recognize the plight of displaced people, there’s a risk of what some have called “<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1041261">climate apartheid</a>.” In this scenario – climate change combined with closed borders and few migration pathways – millions of people would be forced to choose between increasingly insecure livelihoods and the perils of unauthorized migration. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miranda Cady Hallett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Poverty and violence are often cited as the reasons people emigrate from Central America, but factors such as drought, exacerbated by climate change, are driving people to leave too.Miranda Cady Hallett, Associate Professor of Anthropology and Human Rights Center Research Fellow, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1180932019-07-16T11:21:40Z2019-07-16T11:21:40ZWhen migrants go home, they bring back money, skills and ideas that can change a country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284126/original/file-20190715-173355-f32jhk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Between 1990 to 2015, nearly half of all migrants worldwide went back to their country of birth, whether by choice or by force.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/376411762?src=TlTS6yMNp_oevIHbyu0gTg-1-4&studio=1&size=vector_eps">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Escaping violence, war, poverty and environmental disaster, more people than ever are <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/18/international-migrants-and-remittances-continue-to-grow-as-people-search-for-better-opportunities-new-report-finds">migrating worldwide</a>. Some <a href="https://www.iom.int/global-migration-trends">258 million people</a> – 3.4% of the global population – live outside their country of birth. </p>
<p>In 1970, <a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf">about 2% of the world’s 3.7 billion people</a> lived abroad. Historically, those immigrants would have settled where they landed, raised families and joined a new society. </p>
<p>Today, however, more migrants are <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/1/116">returning home</a>, whether by choice or by force. Between 1990 to 2015, nearly half of all migrants worldwide <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/1/116">went back to their country of birth</a>. </p>
<p>Migrants come home different than when they left, studies show. They are <a href="http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/171/17122051006.pdf">wealthier</a>, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5353851/">multilingual</a> and <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeedeveco/v_3a95_3ay_3a2011_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a58-67.htm">more educated</a> than most in their local community. Migrants also have more <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9442.00158">work experience</a> than people who have never lived abroad, as well as <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5353851/">bigger social networks and novel technical abilities</a> acquired in foreign schools and jobs.</p>
<p>As a result, their homecomings are a kind of “brain gain” that benefit not just a migrant’s family but also the community – even their country.</p>
<h2>Agents of change</h2>
<p>After lengthy stays in Western European and North America, for example, migrants from Mali have been shown to bring back <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejcecon/v_3a42_3ay_3a2014_3ai_3a3_3ap_3a630-651.htm">democratic political norms</a> that contribute to higher electoral participation. They also demand more integrity from government officials, which encourages political accountability. </p>
<p>Researchers in Cape Verde have documented similar <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1093/wber/lhr009">improvements in political accountability and transparency</a> in communities with relatively more return migrants. </p>
<p>Migration doesn’t always engender positive changes. Filipinos returning from stints in the Middle East, for example, <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejea/8/2/article-p245_6.xml?lang=en">are frequently less supportive of democracy when they get home</a>. And the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ms-13-is-a-street-gang-not-a-drug-cartel-and-the-difference-matters-92702">Los Angeles street gang MS-13</a> took root in Central America <a href="https://theconversation.com/central-american-gangs-like-ms-13-were-born-out-of-failed-anti-crime-policies-76554">after the U.S. deported hundreds of its members</a> to El Salvador in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>Along with economists José Bucheli and Matías Fontenla, I have studied the impact of return migration on Mexico. Today, <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-mexicans-are-leaving-the-us-than-coming-across-the-border-51296">more Mexicans are leaving the U.S. than going to it</a>.</p>
<p>Our research builds on a <a href="http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/171/17122051006.pdf">2011 study</a> that Mexican households with at one least return migrant reported higher access to disposable income and funds for investment, as well as better access to clean water, dependable electricity, better-quality housing and education.</p>
<p>With data analysis and in-person interviews in Guanajuato state, we determined that migrants returning to Mexico actually improve <a href="http://www.benjaminjameswaddell.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Waddell-The-Mexican-Dream.pdf">living conditions for many others in their communities</a>, too. Return migrants tap into the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/return-migration">new skills</a> they’ve acquired abroad – like fluent English – to <a href="https://usmex-today-podcast.simplecast.com/episodes/return-migration-and-economic-developme-e9TXQGtc">promote local economic development</a>, creating jobs, increasing wealth and demanding more government accountability. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284120/original/file-20190715-173342-1ozlayc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many call centers in Latin America, like the Firstkontact Center in Tijuana, employ U.S. deportees who can provide English-language customer service for American companies, Aug. 13, 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mexico-Dialing-Deportees/50f0fe4b80cd4562ace0c536c1eed1d8/11/0">AP Photo/Alex Cossio</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One return migrant I met in 2011 said he tried to run his tortilla stand “like my bosses ran their businesses back in the U.S.” </p>
<p>“I open every day at the same time, I pay attention to quality control and I always make the customer my priority,” he said.</p>
<p>Several other Mexicans who’d lived in the U.S. told me they now expected more of public officials. They expressed disgust, for example, at the <a href="https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/mexico/">corruption of the Mexican police</a>, who can be bribed out of ticketing drivers.</p>
<p>“I’ve seen how things can work differently and I’m now determined to contribute to a better Mexico,” one man told me.</p>
<p>The presence of return migrants actually <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X18304443">reduces the likelihood of violence</a> in Mexico, our research shows. There, when migrants come home, they inject their hometowns with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/americas/mexico-inequality-violence-security.html">much-needed social and human capital</a>. That creates a kind of local revival that leads crime to drop.</p>
<h2>Juan Aguilar: The entrepreneurial deportee</h2>
<p>The next phase of my research on return migration is focused on Nicaragua. </p>
<p>Between the Somoza dictatorship of the 1970s, the revolution that ousted his regime, the civil war of the 1980s and, most recently, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">political strife of Daniel Ortega’s presidency</a>, waves of people from all social classes have <a href="https://theconversation.com/bloody-uprising-in-nicaragua-could-trigger-the-next-central-american-refugee-crisis-99924">fled Nicaragua</a> in recent decades. </p>
<p>I have interviewed more than 70 Nicaraguans who’ve since returned home. Their personal stories are varied, but they share a common denominator: Drawing on their experiences abroad, they are changing Nicaragua.</p>
<p>“I grew up in LA. And now I live here, in a country I never knew,” Juan Aguilar, an imposing man with a fading teardrop tattoo near his left eye and the letters “L.A.” inked under his baseball cap, told me in unaccented English. </p>
<p>Aguilar was carried into the U.S. on foot by his mom at the age of 2. In 2010, he was deported for dealing drugs and gang activity. </p>
<p>“I was devastated at first. I wanted to go back,” he said over cappuccino at Managua’s Casa del Café in March 2018. “But I’m happy here now. I wouldn’t go back even if I had the chance.”</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=612&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=769&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=769&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284152/original/file-20190715-173329-1jokke0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=769&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Juan Aguilar in Managua, shortly after being deported.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Juan Aguilar</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Juan and his partner, Sarah, own five call centers in Managua that provide customer service for U.S. health care providers, student loan companies and other lucrative businesses. </p>
<p>The call centers employ more than 100 people, more than half of whom are U.S. deportees who speak English, the most <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/which-languages-are-most-widely-spoken/">widely spoken language in the world</a>.</p>
<p>“We try to give people the benefit of the doubt,” he said of their brushes with the law. </p>
<p>Even doctors work at Juan and Sarah’s call centers. There, they can make up to US$1,000 a month – twice what <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2010/01/29/nacionales/14629-maestros-y-medicos-en-alianza-por-salario">they’d make in Nicaragua’s crumbling public hospitals</a>. </p>
<p>I asked Juan what explained his seemingly unlikely success story as an entrepreneur.</p>
<p>“English,” he said. “And the fact that I know how to run a business. Those are things I learned in the States.”</p>
<h2>Piero Bergman, the CEO</h2>
<p>Piero Bergman and his family left <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19735631">civil war in Nicaragua</a> during the 1980s for Boca Raton, Florida. As upper-class Nicaraguans, they arrived to the United States with visas in hand.</p>
<p>When Bergman returned to Nicaragua in the late 1990s after decades in the telecommunications industry, he came back with a business idea: cyber cafes.</p>
<p>“I was traveling a lot, 60-something countries a year,” he told me. “I used to go to internet cafes frequently, particularly in Argentina.” </p>
<p>In Buenos Aires, internet cafes dotted the streets. Managua, Bergman’s hometown, had none.</p>
<p>Bergman launched a chain of cybercafes in Managua, bringing publicly accessible internet to the Central American country.</p>
<p>“The thing took off, and we put them up nationwide,” he said. Eventually, Bergman’s company was providing IP services to over 1,500 internet cafes across the country. </p>
<p>After in-home internet undercut Piero’s businesses, he shifted his focus to digital security. Today, Piero is the <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/piero-bergman-78b78790">president of Intelligent Solutions</a>, a Nicaraguan electronic security company with more than 100 employees. </p>
<p>Bergman attributes his success to the time he spent living and traveling abroad. </p>
<p>“I came down here with a different mindset and ideas about how to do things,” he said.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Deportees and other migrants return home wealthier, more educated and with more work experience than people who never left. This ‘brain gain’ benefits the whole community, financially and politically.Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1195512019-07-03T20:26:59Z2019-07-03T20:26:59ZFrom dealing drugs to selling tortillas: the surprising future of former gang members<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282225/original/file-20190702-126396-13lqh14.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C0%2C1985%2C1326&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The tortilla business can become an unexpected way out for former gang members.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/27801935@N04/15104893001">Cibelle Estrelinha/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Becoming a gang member is often assumed to imply few long-term life opportunities beyond dying or being imprisoned. In most of the world, however, this only concerns a minority of gang members, with the majority tending to <a href="http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SAVE_paper_Decker_Pyrooz.pdf">“mature out” out of their gang</a>, and becoming (more or less) upstanding members of society.</p>
<p>Indeed, a striking finding of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnologue-et-membre-de-gang-une-experience-nicaragueenne-116446">my longitudinal research in Nicaragua</a> is that many former gang members can actively thrive directly as a result of their gang-related experiences, to the extent that we can talk about there being clear dividends.</p>
<h2>Only gang leaders thrive</h2>
<p>In their book <a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/551/55117/freakonomics/9780141019017.html"><em>Freakonomics</em></a>, Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner famously highlight how the benefits of being a member of a drug-dealing gang are often quite limited. In particular, the authors describe how the overwhelming majority of those involved in the US drug trade earn less than the minimum wage, with only gang leaders receiving anything in the way of substantial material returns.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/focaal/2017/78/focaal780109.xml">this is not necessarily the case everywhere</a>, there is no doubt that the material benefits of drug dealing can often be unevenly distributed.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/SczRw4MG8Zg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In a scene from the film <em>Scarface</em> (1983), gang leader Tony Montana enjoys the profits of his drug-dealing business before going ‘legit’.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time, being a member of a drug gang can also provide individuals with more intangible benefits drawing from street-experience or specific skills and knowledge inherent to the “job”. These can potentially have more important consequences for post-drug dealing trajectories than any putative material returns.</p>
<p>However, the long-term benefits are highly variable, as my research shows through the contrasting trajectories of Milton and Bismarck, two former members of a drug-dealing gang in the <em>barrio</em> Luis Fanor Hernández, the poor neighbourhood in Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, where I carry out my work.</p>
<h2>Selling crack on a bicycle</h2>
<p>Between 2010 and 2011, Milton was a crack dealer, selling drugs in a concealed manner to avoid attracting attention. As he explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I wouldn’t sell on the streets but would only sell to regular clients and … deliver drugs to them directly, whenever they wanted it instead of having them come to the <em>barrio</em> … I had a good number of clients, who would text me whenever they wanted some crack, which I’d then deliver to them on my bicycle.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Milton was a successful dealer but he did not save much money, preferring to spend conspicuously. He ceased drug dealing in 2011 after the drug trade in Luis Fanor Hernández collapsed due to the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2017.1334546">local wholesaler’s arrest</a>. Finding himself out of work, he decided to start a tortilla-making business instead.</p>
<h2>“Everybody likes tortillas”</h2>
<blockquote>
<p>“Why a tortilla-making business, you ask? Well, my mother was a tortillera – you know, a tortilla-maker – but she was getting old and wanted to give it up, so I told her, why don’t you let me take over?”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Milton went on to explain how normally tortilleras would make their tortillas early in the morning, but by the time they go out to sell them they would be all stale and cold, and “nobody likes a cold tortilla”. He had an idea that would enable him to sell fresh, steaming-hot tortillas:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I thought to myself, ‘Why don’t I do like I did with drugs, get people to text me when they want tortillas, and I’d then make them and deliver them straight away?’”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Milton therefore confidently approached local businesses with samples of his tortillas, and told people that if they wanted fresh, hot tortillas, they should just text him.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“At first only a few people did so, but word got around, and pretty quickly I was getting more orders than I could cope with.”</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A success story</h2>
<p>These were the days when rapid-food delivery companies were in their infancy worldwide. In Nicaragua such services were unknown, so this new way of producing and delivering tortillas was a game changer. Milton’s business expanded rapidly, to the extent that he had to hire five people to make tortillas and invest in a motorcycle for deliveries.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=947&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1190&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1190&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282207/original/file-20190702-126350-1gbuys9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1190&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A delivery motor-bike parked in front of a tortilla restaurant in Mexico.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://search.creativecommons.org/photos/52d68bea-0ec8-4c71-b412-ee957a2af700">digiyesica/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now producing around 3,000 tortillas a day, Milton’s business is extremely successful, and completely dominates the tortilla market in Luis Fanor Hernández and its surroundings.</p>
<p>In 2016, it provided him with a weekly profit of almost US$200, more than twice <a href="http://www.bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/sector_real/mercado_laboral/3-3B06.htm">Nicaragua’s monthly median wage</a>, and about 80% of what he used to make as a drug dealer.</p>
<p>This success is directly due to Milton’s having drawn on his drug-dealing experience to structure his new business. In particular, the use of mobile technology and the “just in time” delivery enabled him to gain an edge on existing tortilla sellers. Normally this field of economic activity has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/09/13/smoke-from-tortilla-making-in-central-america">traditional means of operating</a> and low profit margins. But Milton established the basis for an exceptionally profitable mode of operation.</p>
<h2>Bismarck, the real-estate baron</h2>
<p>At the same time, the knowledge and skills learned in gangs are not always useful or deployable in a sustainable manner. The case of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276416636202">Bismarck</a>, who dealt drugs in <em>barrio</em> Luis Fanor Hernández between 2000 and 2006, is a case in point.</p>
<p>Unlike Milton, Bismarck saved a significant proportion of his drug-dealing profits. He had much less of a conspicuously consuming lifestyle, and would regularly invest in real estate, buying houses to rent out and building an inexpensive hostel in Luis Fanor Hernández.</p>
<p>When he stopped dealing drugs, these properties ensured that he continued to enjoy a comfortable monthly revenue, albeit equivalent to about 55% of what he had earned as a drug dealer, something that Bismarck professed himself to be more than happy with insofar as “being a businessman was much less dangerous than being a drug dealer”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/X3ycXy2K-v4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">In Colombia, tour operators guide tourists around Pablo Escobar’s famous properties. But real-estate can be risky.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A risky venture</h2>
<p>Unlike other property owners in the neighbourhood, Bismarck was successful at obtaining prompt rental payment because he drew on his gang experience to intimidate, threaten and sometimes enact violence against his renters.</p>
<p>This proved to be something of a double-edged sword, as within a few years, Bismarck lost all of his property portfolio except for his own home, due to the very reason that had made his real estate business initially successful. Some of his houses were expropriated by renters, themselves former gang members, who banded up to intimidate and beat up Bismarck. His hostel was burned down by a group of ex-military men staying there who did not take well to being threatened when they failed to pay their rent.</p>
<p>Bismarck’s post-drug dealing trajectory thus contrasts strongly with Milton’s, and highlights how the skills and knowledge gained through having been a gang member can have different consequences and variable outcomes. Not all gang-related skills and knowledge are always beneficial, and their dividends depend very much on the way and field of activity within which they are deployed.</p>
<p>But knowing that the gang member experience is not necessarily always negative and can sometimes potentially lead to more positive outcomes is clearly important in relation to developing coherent policies and opportunities for former gang members that will harness their undoubted vitality and allow them to maximise their post-gang contribution to society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119551/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Rodgers has received funding from the European Research Council (<a href="https://erc.europa.eu">https://erc.europa.eu</a>) for a project on “Gangs, Gangsters, and Ganglands: Towards a Global Comparative Ethnography” (GANGS) within the context of the ERC Advanced Grant scheme (EU 787935).</span></em></p>Being part of a gang may increase the chance of dying young, but when gang members leave their old lives behind, they can find that their street smarts come in handy.Dennis Rodgers, Research Professor, Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1139912019-04-17T10:55:09Z2019-04-17T10:55:09ZOne year after Nicaraguan uprising, Ortega is back in control<p>One year ago, Nicaragua’s government was on the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nicaragua">verge of collapse</a>.</p>
<p>Protests against President Daniel Ortega <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaraguans-try-to-topple-a-dictator-again-98123">exploded nationwide on April 19, 2018</a> after the government quietly passed a tax on retirees’ pension checks. Demonstrators barricaded highways and main roads, paralyzing Nicaragua’s economy.</p>
<p>By May 2018, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-protest-analysis/nicaraguas-unlikely-opposition-faces-rocky-road-to-defeat-ortega-idUSKBN1JK11Y">70% of Nicaraguans</a> wanted Ortega – who has <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelan-oil-fueled-the-rise-and-fall-of-nicaraguas-ortega-regime-100507">grown astonishingly rich</a> ruling Central America’s largest country – to resign. </p>
<p>“This is not a dialogue,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NXcz-ItgWI">student activist Lesther Alemán told Ortega</a> during a <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/lesther-aleman-speaks-on-the-future-of-nicaraguan-resistance/">May 2018 televised negotiation with the government</a>. “This table is to negotiate your exit, and you know it very well because the people have demanded it.”</p>
<p>Today, President Daniel Ortega is back in control. Alemán and hundreds of other opposition leaders fled the country. And <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/09/24/nicaragua-costa-rica-migrantes/">at least 50,000 Nicaraguans</a>, including <a href="https://www.univision.com/noticias/america-latina/periodistas-exiliados-de-nicaragua-el-reto-de-informar-y-sobrevivir-con-muy-poco">dozens of reporters</a>, have escaped to neighboring countries. </p>
<p>But for a few flare-ups of protest – all quickly and violently quashed – Nicaragua’s “<a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/04/tropical-spring-land-lakes-volcanoes/">tropical spring</a>” has lost its momentum. What happened?</p>
<h2>Ortega’s electoral authoritarianism</h2>
<p>I am an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Waddell">American scholar</a> who has researched Nicaraguan politics for years. When the <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/06/why-people-migrate-a-plea-for-empathy-from-nicaragua/">political chaos forced my family and me to abandon Managua in June 2018</a>, I felt fairly <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/benjamin-waddell-495208/articles">certain</a> that Ortega’s days were numbered. </p>
<p>In a democratic society, I might have been right. Since 1985, 70 percent of all democratically elected Latin American presidents who faced similarly sustained street protests were <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaraguans-try-to-topple-a-dictator-again-98123">ultimately removed from office</a>.</p>
<p>Ortega has defied these odds by becoming the kind of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/nicaragua-return-caudillismo">strongman leader he rebelled against</a> as a hero of Nicaragua’s 1979 <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sandinista">Sandinista Revolution</a>. Using <a href="https://www.apnews.com/e3ecb467c67d4217bb0244823e824160">calculated repression</a> to crush dissent and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ai_fCZ9slAc">anti-imperialist rhetoric</a> to deflect blame, Ortega has actually strengthened his grip on power.</p>
<p>This is Ortega’s third consecutive term as president and fifth time governing Nicaragua. He first came to power in the 1980s as head of the Sandinistas’ post-revolution ruling junta and, in 1985, was elected president. </p>
<p>In 1990 Ortega <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/27/world/turnover-in-nicaragua-aristocratic-democrat-violeta-barrios-de-chamorro.html">lost to Violeta Chamorro</a>, who ushered in 16 years of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/23/world/scourge-and-sometime-victim-of-the-sandinistas-jose-arnoldo-aleman-lacayo.html">conservative government</a> in left-leaning Nicaragua. Ortega returned to office in 2007. </p>
<p>Since then, Ortega has systematically <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/reelection-continuity-and-hyper-presidentialism-in-latin-america/">concentrated power in the executive branch</a>, stacking the <a href="https://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/scons1/default.asp">supreme court</a> with <a href="https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/opinion/Cuando-el-Poder-Ejecutivo-controla-al-Poder-Judicial-20181219-0017.html">party loyalists</a>, cracking down on <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/15/ortega-continues-suffocate-protests-press-nicaragua/">press freedom</a> and, in 2014, abolishing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/01/nicaragua-scraps-presidential-term-limits-201412951043190534.html">presidential term limits</a>.</p>
<p>In 2016, Ortega <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Nicaraguas-Daniel-Ortega-Takes-Office-for-3rd-Consecutive-Term-20170110-0006.html">won his third consecutive term</a> with over 70% of the vote and made his wife, Rosario Murillo, his vice president. But just <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/opinion/nicaraguas-electoral-farce.html">30% of the Nicaraguan electorate turned out</a> that year – the first sign that Ortega’s popularity was waning. </p>
<p>Fifteen months later, thousands of anti-government demonstrations had nearly toppled his regime. </p>
<h2>‘They wanted me dead or alive’</h2>
<p>Ortega has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/10/daniel-ortegas-reality-check/">mobilized all the power of the Nicaraguan state</a> – a government <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0098">he built from scratch in his mold</a> – to survive.</p>
<p>The regime has sent riot police and pro-government paramilitaries to beat, shoot, terrorize and arrest protesters. Some political prisoners <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-prisoners/hundreds-of-prisoners-released-in-nicaragua-before-protests-anniversary-idUSKCN1RS2FZ">have been released</a>, but <a href="https://correspondenciadeprensa.com/2019/02/02/nicaragua-represion-imparable-se-eleva-a-767-la-cifra-de-presos-politicos-confidencial/">hundreds are still in jail</a>. There, say dissidents, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nicaragua#235c65">they have been tortured with waterboarding, electric shocks and sexual assault</a>. Many report being forced to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/americas/nicaragua">record self-incriminating videos</a>.</p>
<p>After 20-year-old Lesther Alemán confronted Ortega on national TV last May, death threats poured in, forcing him into hiding and, eventually, exile. Alemán contends that the government <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Articulo66/videos/l%C3%A9ster-alem%C3%A1n-denuncia-que-ortega-puso-precio-a-su-cabeza/2370886746296310/">offered US$50,000 dollars for his capture</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/269597/original/file-20190416-147522-fl6qrw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lesther Aleman confronts Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega at a televised negotiation on May 16, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Nicaragua-Dialogue/b4b23313020a4ba1b904380010a808cf/6/0">AP Photo/Alfredo Zuniga</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“They wanted me dead or alive,” he told me recently from his new home in the United States. “That was a before and after moment. Since then, nothing has been the same.” </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/483464-elecciones-nicaragua-crisis-encuesta-cid-gallup/">majority of Nicaraguans agree</a>. According to a Cid Gallup poll conducted in January, 74% say life has worsened over the past year, 66% disapprove of the government and 54% want Nicaragua’s next presidential election moved up from 2021 to this year. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/483464-elecciones-nicaragua-crisis-encuesta-cid-gallup/">Only 25% of respondants</a> align themselves with Ortega’s Sandinista party. </p>
<h2>An American scapegoat</h2>
<p>Still, the numbers show, Ortega retains remnants of his base. </p>
<p>Like his Venezuelan ally Nicolas Maduro, who <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuela-crisis-trump-threats-to-maduro-evoke-bloody-history-of-us-intervention-in-latin-america-111169">blames the U.S. for his country’s economic and humanitarian crisis</a>, Ortega has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/10/daniel-ortegas-reality-check/">rallied supporters</a> by blaming United States for the popular uprising against him.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/rdshycM468c?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A mariachi song called ‘Daniel Stays’ – a sign that many Nicaraguans remain loyal to Ortega.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“The United States has poisoned our work through intervention, that’s where the root of the problem lies,” <a href="https://twitter.com/teleSURtv/status/1021940383834615808/photo/1">Ortega told the Venezuelan TV channel Telesur in July</a>.</p>
<p>Ortega’s claims appeal to deep anti-American sentiment resulting from the United States’ <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/americas/article/nicaragua-living-in-the-shadow-of-the-eagle-fourth-edition-by-thomas-w-walker-boulder-westview-press-2003-pp-xiv-238-illustrations-notes-bibliography-index-7500-cloth-2500-paper/CE3D980EFA9279E467B129405F43F279">repeated interference</a> in Nicaragua’s political affairs. These include a U.S. military occupation from 1912 to 1933 and, in the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s clandestine financing of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/17/world/an-iran-contra-guide-what-happened-and-when.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=15C226726BFDD37DDDDDB772B257DAFC&gwt=pay">bloody rebellion against Ortega himself</a>. </p>
<p>Many people I interviewed believed that Nicaragua’s revolt reflects Trump administration plotting – not popular outrage at a corrupt and distant government. </p>
<p>“Why should we trust the United States?” a longtime Sandinista party member asked me during last April’s demonstrations.</p>
<h2>US development aid</h2>
<p>There’s no evidence of direct U.S. involvement in Nicaragua’s crisis.</p>
<p>Since it began, the Trump administration has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1918">punished Ortega’s government for curbing civil liberties</a> by severely <a href="https://havanatimes.org/?p=145740">limiting its access to international financial markets</a>, and sanctioned members of his administration, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-46367041">including his wife</a>. </p>
<p>For years, the United States Agency for International Development has also <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/05/laying-groundwork-insurrection-closer-look-u-s-role-nicaraguas-social-unrest/">invested moderately</a> in the country to “bolster <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/nicaragua">democratic governance and expand educational opportunities</a>.” Between 2015 and 2018 Nicaraguan civil society groups received <a href="https://results.usaid.gov/results">$92 million in development aid</a> – roughly equivalent to the aid sent to neighboring Central American countries. The National Endowment for Democracy – a private nonprofit foundation with <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/01/what-s-the-national-endowment-for-democracy.html">close ties to the Department of State</a> – has <a href="https://www.ned.org/">spent an additional $4.1 million</a> to strengthen democratic institutions in Nicaragua since 2014. </p>
<p>U.S.-funded projects include the civics workshop that Jeancarlo López, an engineering student turned <a href="https://www.24matins.es/topnews/america/estudiantes-forman-coalicion-de-cara-a-dialogo-con-el-gobierno-de-nicaragua-68343">dissident</a>, took in 2017 at the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/ipadenic/">Center for Development and Democracy</a>.</p>
<p>“The things we learned were the basic things you should learn in school about human rights and democracy”, he said.</p>
<p>Despite Ortega’s continued rule, exiled dissident Lesther Alemán <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/el-ano-que-no-dejo-de-marcar-abril/">remains hopeful</a> that Nicaragua’s opposition will triumph. </p>
<p>“Ortega labeled us terrorists,” he said. “But the truth is hard to hide.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A massive protest movement exploded across Nicaragua in April 2018, threatening to topple the country’s authoritarian regime. What happened to Central America’s ‘tropical spring?’Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142212019-04-02T19:58:25Z2019-04-02T19:58:25ZWhat gangs tell us about the world we live in<p>In a speech delivered on March 28, 2019, at a political rally in Grand Rapids, Mich., US president Donald Trump dramatically described gang members as <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GorMdb8k-Mg">“some of the sickest, most demented, most vicious people in the world”</a>. His address doubled-down on previous statements, including a May 2018 White House press conference during which he infamously claimed that gang members <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/trump-animals-ms-13-gangs.html">“aren’t people, these are animals”</a>.</p>
<p>Trump uses such emotionally charged rhetoric about gangs to try to justify everything from the building of a wall along the US-Mexico border (to keep them out) to negatively portraying Latino immigrants more generally (insofar as he mostly refers to the Central American gang MS-13).</p>
<p>Histrionic visions of gangs as fundamentally embodying violence, brutality and danger are by no means new. Indeed, they are extremely commonplace among the general public, politicians, law-enforcement officials and other authorities. Such representations serve specific purposes and political agendas, but they also obscure the fundamentally revealing nature of gangs and what they have to say about our societies.</p>
<h2>Chaos, anarchy, destruction and stereotypes</h2>
<p>Frequently depicted as an almost pathological form of brutality in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-47653884">media</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Brighton-Rock-Graham-Greene/dp/0099478471">novels</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0317248/">films</a>, throughout the world gangs are associated with anarchic destruction and chaos. The most obvious case is in <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01590.x">contemporary Central America</a>, where gangs, known as <em>maras</em> or <em>pandillas</em>, are widely perceived as key actors within a contemporary panorama of rampant criminality characterised by levels of violence often surpassing those of the revolutionary conflicts that affected the region during the 1970s and 1980s.</p>
<p>The region’s gangs have been described by law enforcement officials, journalists and others as a critical security threat, a <a href="https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=597">“new urban insurgency”</a> that aims to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-america-caribbean/2005-05-01/how-street-gangs-took-central-america">“take over Central America”</a>. The policy response in recent years has been brutally repressive, to the extent that it is no exaggeration to talk of Central American nations leading a veritable <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010609343298">“war on gangs”</a>.</p>
<p>Such alarmist constructions of gangs have been criticised as <a href="https://books.google.ch/books?id=eH6JDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT148&lpg=PT148&dq=Reporting+Urban+Violence+and+Gangs+Mathew+Charles&source=bl&ots=o7DuaESqj8&sig=ACfU3U2gno3FrwMZiZo0WvAU-3qWK-TgRg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj198C6g5bhAhUVxMQBHVuTCVoQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false">hype and stereotyping</a>, both in Central America and beyond. They remain widespread, however, in particular because gangs serve as convenient scapegoats for authorities and justify forms of control and intervention, including the direct promotion of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/095624780401600202">urban segregation</a>.</p>
<p>Another reason for the persistence of such stereotypical depictions is gangs’ ubiquity. They’re arguably one of a small number of truly global phenomena, found in almost <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/global-gangs">every society across time and space</a>.</p>
<h2>A political role during the Roman Empire</h2>
<p>The Roman historian Titus Livius, known as Livy, for example discussed the critical political role played by gangs during the Roman Republican era in his famous 1st century BC history of Rome, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Ab-urbe-condita-libri-Latin/dp/B0038ONK3E"><em>Ab Urbe Condita</em></a>. He described how politicians would draw on rival gangs to establish power bases, mobilise supporters, and disrupt the activities of opponents, something that was also a feature of novelist Robert Fabbri’s <a href="http://www.robertfabbri.com/books/the-crossroads-brotherhood-trilogy/">“Crossroads Brotherhood Trilogy”</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=931&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1170&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1170&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266817/original/file-20190401-177163-v173fq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1170&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Robert Fabbri wrote about gangs during the Roman Empire.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More than 100 years of research have noted the existence of gangs in countries as disparate as the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/life-in-the-gang/F9DAC96DA6999EEB1C9A42EDFA70F69A">United States</a>, <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/sacq/article/view/101434">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo6161597.html">South Africa</a>, <a href="https://www.companhiadasletras.com.br/detalhe.php?codigo=14423">Brazil</a>, <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/wolf-mano-dura">El Salvador</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/living-in-the-shadow-of-death-gangs-violence-and-social-order-in-urban-nicaragua-19962002/4DF2EFF5663289AACBC6538C126A8E30">Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235297000147">China</a>, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1466138111432035">India</a>, <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/J%C3%A9tais-chef-gang-Marie-H%C3%A9l%C3%A8ne-BACQU%C3%89/dp/2707157872">France</a> and the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/urban-legends-9780198728610?cc=ch&lang=en&">United Kingdom</a>, among others.</p>
<h2>Gangs as revealing social institutions</h2>
<p>In part because of their ubiquity, gangs are inherently revealing social institutions. As the American sociologist Frederic Thrasher put it in his <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/G/bo5968347.html">pioneering 1927 study of gangs in Chicago</a>, they are in many ways “life, rough and untamed, [and therefore] rich in elemental social processes significant to the student of society and human nature”.</p>
<p>Gangs are associated with a range of fundamental human activities, including the exercise of power, capital accumulation, socialisation, identity formation, territorial control, resistance and the articulation of gender relations. Indeed, such processes are often observable in a much more direct and unmediated manner through the lens of gangs.</p>
<p>To this extent, gangs can plausibly be said to constitute particularly insightful “bellwether” institutions, highlighting broader social trends. While Thrasher’s study offered extensive information about the minutiae of Chicago gangs, it also shed light on the political economy of Chicago and of American society more broadly. His investigation pointed to a relationship between the emergence of gangs and the existence of disenfranchised – often immigrant – communities, and thereby drew attention to the rising levels of inequality that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25053897.pdf">characterised American society in the 1920s and 1930s</a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The ‘Peaky Blinders’ series depicts the life of a Birmingham gang in the early 20th century in the United Kingdom and the underlying social and political issues of the time.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gangs are not only an autonomous social phenomena, with complex internal dynamics, but they are also an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenon">epiphenomena</a> – meaning that they fundamentally reflect and are shaped by broader social structures. Gangs thus are windows onto the changing nature of society. For example, Sudhir Venkatesh’s study of the <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/231172?journalCode=ajs">economic activities of a street gang in 1980s Chicago</a> highlighted how its move from collective forms of drug selling to more individual dealing practices were linked to the rise of <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reaganomics.asp">Reaganomics</a> and the consequent increased individualisation of American society.</p>
<p>Understanding gangs is crucial if we want to get to grips with broader social dynamics. In particular, the way gangs evolve can signal specific societal shifts. For example, when a gang becomes more violent or when its activities become more exclusive, these are often signs of broader forms of repression and discrimination against certain groups within society. The fact that Central American gangs have become increasingly brutal and have moved from vigilante actions to extortion and drug dealing can be associated with the ever-increasingly <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0308275X06066577">oligarchic and segregated nature of societies in the region</a>.</p>
<h2>A volatile phenomenon</h2>
<p>The volatility of gangs means that any investigation must inevitably approach the question of what accounts for their emergence, spread, evolution and decline in a manner that avoids rigid <a href="http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/katz/pubs/TheCriminologistsGang.pdf">typologies and categorisations</a>.</p>
<p>For example, we need to question what we mean by the term <em>gang</em>. The word is not only loaded, it is also used in a highly variable manner, applied to social phenomena that include organised crime, prison-based associations and even informal groups of youths on street corners that engage in “anti-social” behaviour. They can also swiftly shift form: today’s youth gang might become a drug-dealing organisation tomorrow, and a political militia the day after.</p>
<p>We therefore need an expansive definition that allows us to encompass these different forms and iterations. We must go beyond focusing only on the organisational dynamics or gang membership, and consider their environments and structural circumstances, including the way they connect to other social actors such as <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374230029">organised crime</a>, <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520285712/the-killing-consensus">the police</a>, <a href="https://www.uncpress.org/book/9780807857748/drugs-and-democracy-in-rio-de-janeiro/">politicians</a> or <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100190880">business elites and entrepreneurs</a>, among others.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption"><em>Bronx-Barbès</em> (2000), by Eliane De Latour, depicted the dreams and aspirations of gangsters in contemporary Côte d'Ivoire.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More than 100 years of research around the world have highlighted how gangs are a phenomenon that can vary enormously in form and consequences. Yet the overwhelming majority of studies are focused on a single gang or location, and as a result have generated little in the way of generalisable insights. Comparison is an obvious way to determine what kinds of gang dynamics might be general and which ones could be specific to particular places, and for this reason is at the core of the recently initiated <a href="http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/research/centresandprogrammes/ccdp/ccdp-research/clusters-and-projects-1/gangs-gangsters-and-ganglands-to.html">GANGS project</a>, which over the course of the next five years will explore the dynamics of gangs in Nicaragua, South Africa, and France.</p>
<p>This project will seek to answer questions such as how and why gangs emerge and evolve in particular ways? Under what kinds of urban and political conditions? Why do individuals join and leave gangs, and how does it impact on their life possibilities? </p>
<p>Answering these questions across all three contexts will hopefully not only help us to understand gangs from a more global perspective, but also more generally to better apprehend the underlying nature of the world in which we live.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dennis Rodgers has received funding from the European Research Council (<a href="https://erc.europa.eu">https://erc.europa.eu</a>) for a project on “Gangs, Gangsters, and Ganglands: Towards a Global Comparative Ethnography” (GANGS) within the context of the ERC Advanced Grant scheme (EU 787935).</span></em></p>Imaginaries of gangs as inherent forms of brutal anarchy promote particular political agendas and obscure the ways gangs can reveal the underlying dynamics of the contexts within which they emerge.Dennis Rodgers, Research Professor, Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1083612018-12-11T08:29:22Z2018-12-11T08:29:22ZNicaragua: Jeremy Corbyn must end his silence over the country’s repressive regime<p>The Nicaraguan government began a brutal crackdown in April which has left at least <a href="http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/223.asp">325 dead</a>. Protests against social security reforms were violently put down, but the repression only fanned the flames of dissent. As more protesters came onto the streets, the government reacted with yet more force. Paramilitary groups were formed to suppress the demonstrations and the protesters’ road blocks which sprang up across the country.</p>
<p>Amnesty International reports that most of the victims of the crisis have died “at the hands of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR4392132018ENGLISH.PDF">state agents</a>”. According to the UN’s human rights office, the evidence “strongly indicates” that the repression is being carried out “with the acquiescence of high-level state authorities and the national police, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-45341578">often in a joint and coordinated manner</a>”.</p>
<p>Despite this international consensus, and Jeremy Corbyn’s decades of support for the Nicaragua solidarity movement, the Labour leader has said nothing at all about Nicaragua since the violence began. Meanwhile, a number of senior figures within Labour have been <a href="https://twitter.com/TobyStHill/status/1068368846975893505">criticised</a> for their apparent support for the Nicaraguan regime.</p>
<p>In early December, the Latin America 18 Conference took place in London. <a href="https://www.facebook.com/LabourFriendsofProgressiveLatinAmerica/videos/1956298754459572/">Jeremy Corbyn</a> sent a video message of support to the event. Dan Carden, <a href="https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/new-shadow-intl-development-condemns-trumps-reactionary-agenda">Labour’s shadow secretary for international development</a>, told the audience that Donald Trump has no right to support “regime change” in Nicaragua.</p>
<p>Carden’s perspective – that the violence in Nicaragua is the result of a failed US-backed right-wing coup – was shared by all speakers on Nicaragua at the conference. This is the Nicaraguan government’s view, and apparently it was the only acceptable one. A group of Nicaraguan feminists was <a href="https://twitter.com/xilo_clarke/status/1069230673079267328">thrown out</a> of the event for holding up a banner that was critical of the Nicaraguan regime.</p>
<h2>On the wrong side</h2>
<p>In May, shadow foreign secretary, <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-05-01/140020/">Emily Thornberry</a>, did ask the Foreign Office about Nicaragua. She was told that the UK government was “concerned” about the repression. But Labour’s involvement in the conference follows a series of incidents in <a href="https://www.oxfordmail.co.uk/news/16998338.mayor-warned-nicaraguan-meeting-would-damage-oxfords-reputation/">Oxford</a>, <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/wales/2018-10-29/wales-nicaragua-eluned-morgan-sandanistas/">Wales</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/bridiewittonLDR/status/1067107542101311494">Lewisham</a>, London, where local Labour leaders have faced criticism for their links with the Nicaraguan regime. After the Lewisham incident, Amnesty International UK expressed concern about the <a href="https://www.newsshopper.co.uk/news/17257029.lewisham-mayor-under-fire-for-meeting-with-nicaraguan-ambassador/">“whitewashing”</a> of human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Labour MP <a href="https://twitter.com/DerbyChrisW/status/1065150582476939265">Chris Williamson</a> is a <a href="https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:77862-abordan-la-situacion-de-nicaragua-en-el-taller-sobre-realidad-latinoamericana">particularly vocal</a> supporter of the Nicaraguan government. He regularly meets with Nicaragua’s ambassador, Guisell Morales-Echaverry, who has played a lead role in defending the Nicaraguan government’s actions in the UK.</p>
<p>In contrast, the Scottish government has made a <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/usvvqa56qvfhamg/Scottish%20Government's%20Solidarity%20with%20Nicaragua(1).pdf">robust statement</a> on the crisis, stating “we are shocked by this needless loss of life and the disproportionate response of the Nicaraguan authorities”. The British ambassador to Nicaragua has also called on the Nicaraguan authorities to “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-from-british-ambassador-to-costa-rica-and-nicaragua-ross-denny-in-regard-to-nicaraguas-situation">put an end to the violence</a> and exercise their responsibility to protect peaceful protesters”.</p>
<p>Labour’s support has its roots in the solidarity networks of the 1980s. In 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) led a popular movement that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship that had ruled Nicaragua for more than four decades. During the 1980s, the Sandinista government relied on solidarity groups in the UK and elsewhere in their struggle against a US-funded proxy war that left at least <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/02/27/us-war-by-proxy-at-an-end/770483d0-c355-4288-8819-9b0dcc928aee/?utm_term=.a2b3a950e300">30,000 dead</a>.</p>
<p>In 2007, to the delight of many in the solidarity movement, FSLN leader and former president Daniel Ortega returned to power. Ortega has rolled out social programmes funded by <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/the-right-to-know-about-albanisa/">Venezuelan aid</a>, but he has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/07/nicaragua-president-daniel-ortega-reelected-landslide-vote-rigging">eroded Nicaragua’s democratic structures</a>: overturning a constitutional prohibition on reelection and depriving opposition candidates of their right to stand. Despite this, and allegations of <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ortega-faces-sex-abuse-case-from-his-stepdaughter-1156496.html">sexual abuse</a> of his stepdaughter Zoilamérica Ortega, Ortega’s government has continued to receive support from overseas.</p>
<p>Ortega’s supporters see the current crisis as a replay of the David and Goliath struggle of the 1980s. They suggest that Nicaragua is once again the victim of US intervention. But if Corbyn and others think history is simply repeating itself in Nicaragua, they need to look again.</p>
<h2>A conspiracy?</h2>
<p>The Nicaraguan government asks us to believe that the current violence is the result of a conspiracy involving <a href="https://nuevaya.com.ni/julio-cesar-paz-varela-el-socio-narcotraficante-del-terrorista-felix-maradiaga/">Colombian</a> and <a href="https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:77749-presentan-a-cabecilla-de-grupo-delincuencial-viper-">Mexican drug traffickers</a>, terrorism, organised crime, the US and the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RlS_Xs6777M">European Union</a>.</p>
<p>It claims that this conspiracy has been coordinated by opposition political parties within Nicaragua, particularly the <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/ortega-regime-incriminates-university-and-mrs-leaders-for-terrorism/">Sandinista Renewal Movement</a> (MRS). But the MRS has an eighth of the support of the UK Liberal Democrats and is in no position to engineer a coup.</p>
<p>The same is true of the other opposition parties. A September 2018 poll showed that none of them commanded more than <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/cid-gallup-61-exige-renuncia-de-ortega-murillo/">4% of the vote</a> in Nicaragua. Since April, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/nicaragua-protesters-killed-mother-day-march-180531051309371.html">hundreds of thousands</a> of people have faced down riot police in the country’s streets. It’s not credible to suggest that opposition political parties persuaded these protesters to give up their lives when they can’t even persuade Nicaraguans to give them their votes.</p>
<p>Others on the international left don’t share Corbyn’s reticence about Nicaragua. <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2018/7/27/chomsky_criticizes_autocratic_nicaraguan_government_urges">Noam Chomsky</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gq_MDimz_ro">Pablo Iglesias</a> of Podemos in Spain, and former Uruguayan President <a href="https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2018/07/18/jose-mujica-tambien-critica-a-daniel-ortega-por-la-violencia-en-nicaragua-quienes-ayer-fueron-revolucionarios-perdieron-el-sentido/">José Mujica</a> have all spoken out against Ortega.</p>
<p>In June, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-46017566/nicaragua-arson-attack-kills-six-members-of-the-same-family">paramilitaries linked to the government killed an entire family</a> because, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/world/americas/nicaragua-peace-talks-violence.html">a survivor told local news reporters</a>, they refused to let government forces use their roof for sniper attacks on protesters. The paramilitaries <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/world/americas/nicaragua-peace-talks-violence.html">burnt the house down</a> and stood guard so the victims couldn’t escape. Six people – grandparents, parents and children aged two and five months – died. The head of the Organisation of American States, Luis Almagro, called it a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-44510106">crime against humanity</a>. </p>
<p>But none of this has provoked a response from the Labour leader. Since April, Jeremy Corbyn has used Twitter to express solidarity with the people of 30 different countries. Nicaragua is not one of them. If Corbyn and others within Labour think that the Nicaraguan government is still worthy of their support, then they need to look more closely at the evidence. A condemnation of this violence is long overdue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108361/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hilary Francis has previously received funding from the British Academy, the AHRC, ESRC and the NERC. She has taken part in demonstrations and other voluntary campaigning work related to human rights in Nicaragua.</span></em></p>Hundreds have died in a government crackdown in the Central American country, and Labour’s reaction is worrying.Hilary Francis, Vice Chancellor's Research Fellow in Global Challenges, Northumbria University, NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1021542018-10-15T10:29:33Z2018-10-15T10:29:33ZMigrant money could be keeping Nicaragua’s uprising alive<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/las-remesas-podrian-mantener-viva-a-la-insurgencia-en-nicaragua-105102"><em>Leer en español</em></a>.</p>
<p>Protesting is now <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/29/america/1538186460_718736.html">illegal in Nicaragua</a>, according to President Daniel Ortega.</p>
<p>The Central American country has been embroiled in deadly <a href="https://theconversation.com/outrage-at-state-violence-puts-nicaraguas-president-on-notice-95547">political turmoil for months</a>. Demonstrations that <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/22/604762080/violent-unrest-continues-in-nicaragua-over-social-security-reforms">began</a> in April against an unpopular social security reform quickly transformed into a broader movement aimed at ousting Ortega, Nicaragua’s authoritarian president.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/187.asp">Up to</a> <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/asociacion-de-derechos-humanos-en-nicaragua-se-retira-por-amenazas-articulo-804512">450</a> people have since been killed, including a 16-year-old boy <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/un-muerto-tras-ataque-a-marcha-por-los-presos-politicos/">caught in the crossfire</a> between government forces and demonstrators on Sept. 23. </p>
<p>The growing number of protesters arrested and charged with terrorism led the <a href="http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/187.asp">Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a> to call on Ortega to <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/cidh-gobierno-debe-suprimir-detenciones-ilegales/">stop what they called his government’s illegal detentions</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, the president in late September <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/09/29/america/1538186460_718736.html">banned</a> protests entirely. Thity-eight Nicaraguans were arrested on Oct. 14 for <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/orteguismo-aumenta-represion-y-detiene-a-38-manifestantes/">planning to march against</a> their government.</p>
<h2>Ortega’s rise to power</h2>
<p>Ortega, a former revolutionary leftist who ruled Nicaragua in the 1980s, returned to office in 2007. Over the past 11 years, he has grown ever more <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/26/riots-threaten-nicaraguas-autocratic-president">autocratic</a>, abolishing presidential term limits, enriching his family and restricting civil liberties.</p>
<p>The common wisdom is that Ortega enjoyed such a long and, until now, uncontested reign because Nicaragua’s <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NI">economy boomed under his stewardship</a>, in part due to cheap and plentiful oil supplied by Hugo Chávez. </p>
<p>According to this theory, the growth allowed his government to pay for extensive <a href="https://elfaro.net/es/201609/centroamerica/19243/Daniel-Ortega-cosecha-votos-de-los-programas-sociales-que-sembr%C3%B3.htm">anti-poverty programs</a>, earning him widespread popularity in the Western Hemisphere’s <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_nu.html">second-poorest country</a> – until the economy began to stagnate last year. </p>
<p>But that’s not the whole story behind Ortega’s long rise and sudden unpopularity. </p>
<p>While Nicaragua has prospered financially under his leadership, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Waddell">my research finds that</a> migrants living in Costa Rica, the U.S. and Spain also greatly boosted the domestic economy by sending home millions of dollars each year. </p>
<p>Roughly 16 percent of the country’s population lives abroad. Their remittances, which last year totaled US$1.4 billion, have fueled consumption and tempered political pressure on Ortega’s government to reduce poverty.</p>
<p>Now, Nicaragua’s influential diaspora has <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2018/08/27/nicaraguas-diaspora-activists-bear-a-double-burden/">turned its attention</a> to the resistance against Ortega. </p>
<p>In a time when conflict and disaster are forcing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/europe/a-mass-migration-crisis-and-it-may-yet-get-worse.html">even more people around the world to flee their homelands</a>, these findings from Nicaragua underscore the central role that migrants can play in today’s globalized political economy.</p>
<h2>Migration as an escape valve</h2>
<p>Nicaraguans began migrating in significant numbers during Ortega’s first term, in the late 1980s. </p>
<p>The country was ravaged by <a href="http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2687">civil war and burdened by debt</a>. In 1989, Ortega’s socialist government was forced to undertake a series of austerity measures that left <a href="http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2000/Dijkstra.PDF">14 percent of Nicaraguans unemployed</a>. </p>
<p>Subsequent governments enacted even harsher budget cuts, further driving up unemployment and pushing hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25765217?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">to seek work in neighboring Costa Rica</a>. </p>
<p>Today an estimated 500,000 Nicaraguans <a href="https://www.nacion.com/economia/agro/decreto-dara-nueva-prorroga-para-legalizar-trabajadores-migrantes/J5YCWI7HLNGMNIRJRYSEZN66RU/story/">live in Costa Rica</a>, and more are fleeing the country’s political chaos ever day.</p>
<p>Another <a href="http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/15/hispanics-of-nicaraguan-origin-in-the-united-states-2013/">222,000 Nicaraguans live in the United States</a>, <a href="https://www.panamaamerica.com.pa/nacion/80-mil-nicaraguenses-en-panama-1071535">80,000 in Panama</a> and <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/04/23/america/1524494946_561490.html">an estimated 30,000 in Spain</a>. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2017 – the first decade of Ortega’s current administration – total migrant remittances to Nicaragua totaled <a href="https://www.bcn.gob.ni/estadisticas/sector_externo/remesas/index.php">$12.5 billion</a>. </p>
<p>That’s more than 10 percent of Nicaragua’s annual gross domestic product, on average, and in many years substantially more than <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/nicaragua/foreign-direct-investment">total foreign direct investment in the country</a>. </p>
<p>Remittances also dwarf the <a href="https://confidencial.atavist.com/los-petrodlares-de-venezuela918v4">roughly $3.7 billion in oil aid</a> that Venezuela sent to Nicaragua during the same period.</p>
<h2>Remittances took the pressure off Ortega</h2>
<p>Ortega’s government indirectly benefited from this flood of foreign cash. </p>
<p>Migrant money helped poor Nicaraguans make ends meet and allowed <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jebusi/v77y2015icp42-59.html">consumers</a> to keep pace with the <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NI">expanding national economy</a> – greatly reducing <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259512263_Migrants%27_Remittances_and_Economic_Voting_in_the_Mexican_Countryside">demand on</a> Ortega’s government to reduce poverty and unemployment. </p>
<p>Still, Nicaragua remains very poor. About <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/cuestionan-datos-oficiales-pobreza/">40 percent of citizens</a> survive on less than $2.50 a day. </p>
<p><iframe id="9I1F3" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9I1F3/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As the director of Nicaragua’s Jesuit Migration Network, Lea Montes, explains, remittances keep <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2017/11/05/suplemento/la-prensa-domingo/2325318-los-tres-caminos-del-migrante-nicaraguense">many families housed and fed</a>.</p>
<p>As she points out, “It costs a family of four about $400 a month to get by, but the minimum wage is only $177 a month here.”</p>
<h2>Juana the florist</h2>
<p>Take the case of 70-year-old Juana Jiménez, a single mother who in the mid-1990s received a U.S. work visa – her “gift from God” – and worked as a florist in Miami for nearly 20 years. </p>
<p>The $200 to $300 a month that Jiménez sent home covered medical expenses for her son Erik, who was born with severe disabilities, and saw her family through Nicaragua’s leanest post-revolutionary years.</p>
<p>Remittances, in both Nicaragua and other developing countries, have <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5096">social benefits</a> beyond keeping individual households out of poverty. Research shows that in such countries they have contributed to <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/DoRemittancesPromoteFinancialDevelopment.pdf">reductions in poverty</a>, helped increase access to health care and <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeedeveco/v_3a97_3ay_3a2012_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a156-165.htm">improved school attendance</a> by freeing children from the need to work.</p>
<p>Rather than complement government programs in those places, however, research shows that all to often, migrant remittances actually replace them. </p>
<p>For example, scholars <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233576307_Exit_Without_Leaving_Political_Disengagement_in_High_Migration_Municipalities_in_Mexico">Gary Goodman and Jonathan T. Hiskey</a> have found that, in Mexico, local governments often reduce their expenditures in areas that consistently receive remittances from abroad.</p>
<p>And as remittances increase, electoral participation in democratic countries with high migration tends to <a href="http://www.roygermano.com/uploads/4/5/0/2/45027125/germano2013.pdf">decline</a>. Rather than lobby public officials to upgrade their health clinic, say, or pave a road, citizens may look to the relatively well-off diaspora for solutions.</p>
<p>For a decade, the dual domestic impacts of international migration – economic growth and diminished citizen pressure – proved a winning combination for Ortega. </p>
<p>But then his government responded to April’s uprising with deadly repression.</p>
<h2>Remittances and dictators</h2>
<p>Nicaraguan migrants did not trigger the protests against Ortega, nor are they the reason the demonstrations grew and strengthened.</p>
<p>But, today, my research shows, they are now helping to keep this pro-democracy movement alive by <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/the-caravan-across-europe-to-denounce-whats-happening-in-nicaragua/">informing the international community</a>, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/NicasAutoconvocadosExtranjero/?hc_ref=ARTYcUFJCrcCzptG6pnxBRqCFUB67fgIRinvil2nn-z9hJvg6yewheDWIUDKOoodrws">creating international advocacy networks</a>, housing refugees and <a href="https://www.gofundme.com/nicaraguaprotest">channeling funds to anti-Ortega groups</a>. </p>
<p>It is too soon to know precisely how critical, or how financially substantial, migrant support has been to Nicaragua’s insurgency. </p>
<p>But studies done in other countries show that migrants from authoritarian countries frequently <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12382">fund protests against dictators</a>.</p>
<p>According to political scientist Idean Salehyan, an expert in <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100235990">transnational rebellions</a>, more than 50 percent of all national uprisings after World War II – including those in Cuba, Ireland, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – were spearheaded by insurgents abroad.</p>
<p>That’s because migrants do not just change their home countries financially. They also influence the way local residents think.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/239002/original/file-20181002-85611-1ldgb1b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nicaraguan expats protesting the Ortega government outside the Organization of American States headquarters in Washington on June 4, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://binaryapi.ap.org/5a927309f2844f4882debd3ff0e0b666/preview/AP18155615449559.jpg?wm=api&ver=0">AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Having connections with migrants living in more developed countries <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X10001270">can encourage local children to stay in school</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11150-009-9080-7">improve access to health care</a> and <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414009331733">seed support for democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the influx of ideas and mindsets acquired abroad, known as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2011.521361">social remittances</a>, can transform domestic politics. </p>
<p>At first, the mass exodus of Nicaraguans aided Ortega in his quest to amass power and wealth. </p>
<p>Now, those same migrants may contribute to his overthrow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102154/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nicaraguan migrants send over US$1 billion home each year. This money has played a changing role in domestic politics – first boosting the Ortega regime and, now, sustaining the uprising against him.Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/980582018-08-30T21:53:13Z2018-08-30T21:53:13ZWater access may be more important than electricity for sub-Saharan Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230093/original/file-20180731-136667-nsa66y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Access to water -- not electricity -- can have larger gains for health and well-being. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly two decades, the United States has strongly pushed for the electrification of rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa to raise the standard of living. It has carried out these goals via the USAID’s <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica">Power Africa</a> and the World Bank, and under the UN Sustainable Development Goal on Energy (SDG7).</p>
<p>And yet, it remains unclear whether electrification can actually improve living standards in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>As researchers, we have previously documented the positive effects of electrification schemes. Still, we think that money earmarked for rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa might be better spent elsewhere. </p>
<p>Providing people with clean drinking water and sanitation infrastructure may do more to improve living standards than providing them with electricity. </p>
<p>In addition, water and sanitation provisions are generally less expensive than rural electrification. They could improve many more lives at the same cost. </p>
<h2>Power versus water</h2>
<p>The electrification of <a href="https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0305750X1200215X/1-s2.0-S0305750X1200215X-main.pdf?_tid=0a28df19-47bd-4c7a-ac34-33bcb456c96e&acdnat=1529075395_a0426ba350b42321fdd77e693b77cea8">low-density rural areas in Nicaragua</a>, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2717483">Guatemala</a> and <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.7.3078">KwaZulu-Natal</a> has increased the number of working women. Rural electrification substantially <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1093/wber/lhv057">increased household living standards in India</a></p>
<p>However, South Asian rural electrification schemes often <a href="https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRURELECT/Resources/full_doc.pdf">did not reach the poor</a>. Similarly, in <a href="https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/04/15/ghanas-rural-electrification-programme-is-insane-world-bank-official/">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-electricity-changes-lives-a-rwandan-case-study-91018">Rwanda</a>, economic opportunities were not obviously increased. In Ghana, electricity remains <a href="https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/61277/1/Thesis_2016-Anthony_Amoah_CORRECTED.pdf">prohibitively expensive for newly connected rural households</a>. In Rwanda, <a href="http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp6195.pdf">grid electrification did not result in significant new income generation in rural areas</a>.</p>
<p>While there is some potential for off-grid solar energy to <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/how-can-solar-energy-help-indias-farmers/">improve agricultural productivity in Africa</a>, very small-scale solar provisions are unlikely to do so. </p>
<p>Solar provisions may be commercially viable, but <a href="https://www.pv-tech.org/news/bill-gates-solar-is-not-the-energy-solution-africa-needs">they are not necessarily the most cost-effective source of clean energy</a>. A home installation in sub-Saharan Africa may <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2006/solar-power-cheap-energy-source-africa">cost US$500-1,000, far above what most rural households can pay</a>.</p>
<h2>Dirty drinking water</h2>
<p>Electrification of rural areas may not be the most cost-effective way of improving health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>In sub-Saharan Africa, <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica">two out of three people lack access to electricity</a>, but <a href="http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/africa.shtml">40 per cent do not have clean drinking water</a> and <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sanitation">70 per cent lack adequate sanitation</a>.</p>
<p>The burden of <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/251181468140658232/pdf/364010PAPER0Gl101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf">waterborne childhood diseases is great</a>. <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/global/diarrhea-burden.html">One in nine children under age five dies every year in sub-Saharan Africa</a>. Diarrhea from dirty drinking water is the second major cause of death, after malaria. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wsh0404.pdf">Drilling wells, disinfecting water and providing sealed sewerage services</a> improve population health remarkably. A reduction in the incidence of childhood diarrhea lowers the likelihood of childhood stunting (impaired growth and development), being underweight and susceptibility to other disease.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-is-failing-to-close-the-gap-on-providing-water-and-sanitation-58820">Africa is failing to close the gap on providing water and sanitation</a>
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<p>Water and sanitation provisions might save or improve many more lives for the same cost as either grid or solar electricity.</p>
<h2>Soft power and local politics</h2>
<p>The push for electricity may be more about soft power than it is about empowerment. </p>
<p>The World Bank and the UN agencies aim to pre-empt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/05/china-africa-aid-investment-fear">Chinese control over strategic infrastructure in Africa</a>. Household water pipes and improved sanitation do not hold the same strategic importance as electricity. But these international taxpayer-financed infrastructure investments may not reflect <a href="https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/article/chinese-presence-africa-pure-economic-geopolitics">the population’s priorities</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-foreign-investment-is-no-easy-fix-for-africas-energy-needs-94049">Why foreign investment is no easy fix for Africa's energy needs</a>
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<p>It may also be influenced by the local political economy. As part of a post-civil war peace dividend, the rural electrification plan in Guatemala connected Indigenous households. </p>
<p>Electrification increased the amount of time Indigenous women spent earning money outside of the home. Still, the real winners may have been the two privately owned electricity companies, which received <a href="https://www.esc-pau.fr/ppp/documents/featured_projects/guatemala.pdf">US$650 from the government for each new household connection</a>. </p>
<p>The willingness of African governments to engage in electricity projects may depend on potential gains realized by key players in state-owned enterprises or government. These considerations can easily be hidden behind a humanitarian veneer. </p>
<h2>Your tax dollars at work</h2>
<p>International taxpayer-supported investments in rural areas in Africa should prioritize infrastructure that will result in the greatest improvement in living standards for a given outlay. In many remote rural areas, this may not be electrification.</p>
<p>As a member of the United Nations, Canada contributes taxpayer money to the loans and grants provided to the governments of developing countries, often at below-market interest rates. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-kenya-about-whats-holding-back-solar-technology-in-africa-64185">Lessons from Kenya about what’s holding back solar technology in Africa</a>
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<p>But the fixed costs of grid electrification are very high. Local economic activities may never pay enough to support the full cost of providing even a minimal level of grid electricity service. Governments and international <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w22292">taxpayers may need to continuously subsidize electricity provision to rural households</a>. Even when electrification is solar, <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/factsreports/4222#abstract">the need for subsidies may remain</a>.</p>
<p>International taxpayers could have instead contributed that same tax dollar to a more effective intervention.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Providing people with clean drinking water and sanitation is less expensive than grid electrification and it could improve more lives.Louise Grogan, Professor, University of GuelphTselmuun Tserenkhuu, PhD student, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014032018-08-23T15:38:40Z2018-08-23T15:38:40ZNicaragua crisis: how democracy dies in the era of fake news<p>For decades, Central America was mostly sidelined as far as global news was concerned. That all looked set to change with the advent of digital media, which initially promised to put previously marginalised voices on the world stage. But instead, the age of social media and fake news might have ushered in something much worse than obscurity: an entanglement of news and rumour that’s dividing populations, spilling blood on the streets, and transforming the relationship between politics and information for the worse.</p>
<p>Nowhere is this playing out more starkly than in <a href="https://theconversation.com/bloody-uprising-in-nicaragua-could-trigger-the-next-central-american-refugee-crisis-99924">Nicaragua</a>, which is facing a crisis the like of which the country hasn’t seen in many years.</p>
<p>Things started to go wrong when the Nicaraguan government introduced a controversial welfare reform package on April 16 2018. <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nicaragua-protests/nicaragua-cancels-planned-welfare-overhaul-in-bid-to-end-protests-idUKKBN1HT0XP">Mass protests soon flared up</a>, and as people took to the streets, they set up barricades, severely restricting movement around the country and clashing with state security forces. The people on the barricades aren’t just protesting the welfare reforms; they have also repeatedly called for <a href="https://theconversation.com/venezuelan-oil-fueled-the-rise-and-fall-of-nicaraguas-ortega-regime-100507">Daniel Ortega</a>, president since 2007, to be removed from office.</p>
<p>The situation quickly turned violent, and months of unrest have followed. Although exact numbers are hard to ascertain, the protests have seen <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-19/nicaraguan-economy-in-free-fall-as-hundreds-killed-in-protests">hundreds of people</a> killed. Equally as tragically, the protests have begun to tear society apart, turning friends and families against each other.</p>
<p>The Nicaraguan crisis is in many ways a crisis of polarisation. This is not just a story about who is right or wrong; it’s a lesson in how the changing relationship of citizens with information has allowed artificially polarised views to become entrenched, transforming the way political arguments are controlled and deployed. With both sides in Nicaragua becoming increasingly ambivalent towards the information they receive, the country may already have no way out of its social and political crisis – and it could be a canary in the mine for democracy around the world.</p>
<h2>Information overload</h2>
<p>In the “old” media landscape of even just a few years ago, the public was able to collectively develop ways of <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/527594/summary?casa_token=ybY-WwAiXlEAAAAA:dHmRSiJBV4lR2SA7swCZnqOcp2ixTssqFV8_DoM8AssYm2wDdIWtlV-81JQ3EvaE88v9llU">identifying bias</a> and distinguish truth from lies and propaganda. But today that’s much harder – not just because of the volume of information, but also because <a href="https://qz.com/1201454/facebook-users-are-trying-to-trick-the-news-feed-algorithm/">algorithmic curation</a> makes it increasingly difficult for laypeople to develop strategies that successfully identify bias.</p>
<p>Technological advancements have further disrupted these strategies. Even the knowledge that video and audio can be edited helps fuel an overactive suspicion of information, with viewers and listeners always on alert for any attempt to distort or misinform. As explained by <a href="https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/04/10/26025092/the-dystopian-future-of-fake-news-is-being-developed-in-seattle">Ira Kemelmacher-Shlizermam</a>, professor at the University of Washington’s School of Computer Science:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people know this technology exists, they will become more sceptical […] if people know fake news exists, fake videos exist, fake photos exist, then everyone is more sceptical in what they read and see.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While a certain amount of scepticism is useful when deciding what sources to trust, the level of ambivalence, distrust and cynicism on display today is something else. Thanks to the sheer volume of information with which users are now inundated, compounded by skewed algorithms and bellicose Trumpian rhetoric railing against fake news, readers and viewers are increasingly unable to discern that which demands scepticism from that which doesn’t. The net result is a terminal sense of ambivalence.</p>
<h2>All against all</h2>
<p>While both sides in Nicaragua accuse each other of <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Nicaragua-Rejects-Partial-OAS-Report-Slams-Fake-News-20180622-0021.html">manipulating</a> and faking videos or photos, neither has produced much in the way of evidence to support this. But that’s beside the point: on a fundamental level the fake news era has already changed people’s relationship with information.</p>
<p>Inundated with claims that nothing can be trusted and that all sources of information are compromised, news consumers can only fall back on what they already consider reliable sources. They dismiss all competing stories as fake, or at least untrustworthy; they seek out information that reinforces our position, and become less and less able to accept nuance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-check-if-youre-in-a-news-echo-chamber-and-what-to-do-about-it-69999">How to check if you're in a news echo chamber – and what to do about it</a>
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<p>In a place like Nicaragua, where a <a href="https://theconversation.com/outrage-at-state-violence-puts-nicaraguas-president-on-notice-95547">highly complex and political situation</a> is underpinned by layers upon layers of history, colonialism, imperialism and solidarity, this scepticism and ambivalence towards information leaves all sides so entrenched in their own narratives that dialogue is all but impossible.</p>
<p>Truth, of course, has always been a difficult thing to obtain in moments of conflict and violence, and with so many factions seemingly at play in Nicaragua over the last four months it has become increasingly difficult simply to see what’s happening. Every last report, story, or rumour has been taken up by one side or the other and folded into their stockpile of “evidence”. In these circumstances, there will be no meaningful dialogue, there will be no end to the violence, there will be no justice, and there can be no outcome bar the collapse of the country.</p>
<p>The sociologist and philosopher <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Individualized-Society-Zygmunt-Bauman/dp/074562507X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1533816788&sr=1-1&keywords=The+individualized+society">Zygmunt Bauman</a> wrote that democracy is about constant questioning. When we lose our ability to question information appropriately and instead navigate by false dichotomies, democracy withers and dies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101403/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Doug Specht does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When different sides in a violent political crisis become ever more entrenched, democracy quickly starts to wither.Doug Specht, Senior Lecturer in Media and Communications, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1005072018-08-21T10:33:15Z2018-08-21T10:33:15ZVenezuelan oil fueled the rise and fall of Nicaragua’s Ortega regime<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/petroleo-venezolano-provoca-el-auge-y-caida-del-regimen-de-ortega-en-nicaragua-101940">Leer en español</a></em>.</p>
<p>The downfall of Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega has been <a href="https://nacla.org/news/2018/07/25/nicaragua-view-left">dizzyingly fast</a>. </p>
<p>In January 2018, he had the <a href="https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/nicaragua/368452/daniel-ortega-popularidad-presidente-latinoamericano">highest approval rating of any Central American president</a>, at <a href="https://www.tn8.tv/nacionales/443603-presidente-daniel-ortega-mejor-evaluado-america-latina/">54 percent</a>. Today, Nicaraguans are calling for <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2018/07/18/5b4f9174e5fdea94188b45c3.html">Ortega’s resignation</a>.</p>
<p>Ortega, a former Sandinista rebel who previously ruled Nicaragua in the 1980s, first showed signs of weakness in early April, when students protested his mismanagement of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/11/nicaragua-rainforest-fire-costa-rica">massive forest fire</a> in Nicaragua’s biggest nature reserve. </p>
<p>By April 19, hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans, including <a href="https://www.latercera.com/mundo/noticia/excomandante-la-revolucion-sandinista-daniel-ortega-peor-somoza-asesinatos-una-represion-brutal/215798/">former Ortega supporters</a>, joined the demonstrations, after his government rammed through an unpopular social security reform. </p>
<p>Since then, <a href="https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/124.asp">police officers and pro-government forces</a> have killed more than 450 protesters and injured at least 2,500. </p>
<p>In an echo of Nicaragua’s past, foreign money has contributed to the country’s current unrest. In the 1970s, the U.S. supported the regime of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/1986/jun/28/usa.marktran">Gen. Anastasio Somoza</a> – a brutal dictator who was eventually overthrown by <a href="https://web.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discovery_eng/timeline/">Ortega and his revolutionary peers in 1979’s Sandinista Revolution</a>. </p>
<p>This time, it’s not the U.S. that’s supporting an unpopular Nicaraguan dictator, it’s Venezuela. </p>
<h2>Oil diplomacy from Venezuela</h2>
<p>I am a former Nicaraguan resident, who was recently forced out of the country by violence. I am also a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Waddell">scholar</a> of Latin America’s political economy. And my research in Nicaragua suggests that Venezuelan oil money helps explain Ortega’s rise – and his current fall.</p>
<p>Ortega <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/1">was re-elected to the presidency in 2007</a> after two decades out of power. At the time, he was one of <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2011/11/04latinamerica">many left-leaning leaders</a> in the region. </p>
<p>Venezuela, then led by the socialist leader Hugo Chávez, immediately began <a href="https://confidencial.atavist.com/los-petrodlares-de-venezuela918v4">sending billions of dollars worth of cheap oil</a> – its biggest export and most valuable commodity – to Nicaragua. According to <a href="https://nestoravendano.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/la-economia-de-nicaragua-esta-en-juego-en-venezuela/">Nicaraguan economist Adolfo Acevedo</a>, between 2007 and 2016, Venezuela shipped US$3.7 billion in oil to Nicaragua.</p>
<p>“Oil diplomacy” was standard practice in Venezuela at the time. In the early 2000s, Venezuela was one of Latin America’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2017&locations=ZJ-CL&start=2007&year_low_desc=true">richest countries</a>. Chávez used his economic brawn to support allies in Cuba, Argentina, Ecuador and Brazil by sending them <a href="https://www.libertaddigital.com/economia/chavez-regala-53000-millones-de-dolares-a-sus-aliados-mientras-arruina-venezuela-1276382056/">financial aid and cheap crude</a>.</p>
<p>Venezuela offered the Ortega regime unusually favorable terms of trade. His government paid 50 percent of the cost of each shipment within 90 days of receipt. The remainder was due within 23 years and financed at 2 percent interest. </p>
<p>This cheap fuel was distributed at market prices by Nicaragua’s government gas company, DNP. The government’s nice profit margin helped spur a period of <a href="http://www.bancomundial.org/es/country/nicaragua/overview">remarkable economic growth in Nicaragua</a>. </p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2016, Ortega’s government spent nearly 40 percent of oil proceeds to bolster <a href="https://nacla.org/node/6313">ambitious social welfare programs</a>, including micro-financing for small businesses, food for the hungry and subsidized housing for the poor. </p>
<p>These initiatives contributed to <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Nicaragua-Succeeds-in-Slashing-Poverty-Rates-Inequality-20170705-0031.html">significant poverty reductions across Nicaragua</a>, earning <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/gracias-dios-al-comandante/">Ortega and his Sandinista party</a> widespread popular support.</p>
<p>Between 2007 and 2017, Nicaragua’s gross domestic product <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=NI">grew at an average of 4.1 percent a year</a>. The boom peaked in 2012, with a stunning 6.4 percent growth in GDP. </p>
<p>The year before, Venezuela had sent a record $557 million in oil to Nicaragua – the equivalent of 6 percent of the Central American country’s <a href="https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=NI">total gross domestic product</a>. </p>
<h2>Ortega’s oil wealth</h2>
<p>Beyond jump-starting the Nicaraguan economy, Venezuelan oil also directly benefited the Ortega family. </p>
<p>DNP, Nicaragua’s national oil distributor, is managed by Ortega’s daughter-in-law, <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/06/01/economia/2428449-albanisa-y-la-dnp-tras-importacion-de-fuel-oil-para-la-generacion-electrica">Yadira Leets Marín</a>.</p>
<p>According to investigative <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/the-right-to-know-about-albanisa/">reporting by the Nicaraguan newspaper Confidencial</a>, the 60 percent of earnings from Venezuelan oil sales not spent on social programs – roughly $2.4 billion – was channeled through a Venezuelan-Nicaraguan private joint venture called <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/daniel-inc-how-nicaraguas-ortega-financed-a-political-dynasty">Albanisa</a>, run by President Ortega’s son, Rafael Ortega.</p>
<p>The funds were invested in shadowy private businesses controlled by the Ortega family, including a wind energy project, an oil refinery, an airline, a cellphone company, a hotel, gas stations, luxury condominiums and a fish farm. </p>
<p>There is no public accounting of Albanisa’s investments or profits. But according to Albanisa’s former deputy manager, Rodrigo Obragon, who <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/daniel-inc-how-nicaraguas-ortega-financed-a-political-dynasty">spoke with Univision in May</a>, President “Ortega used Albanisa to buy everybody off in a way never seen before in the history of Nicaragua.” </p>
<p>Ortega’s personal wealth is unconfirmed. But reliable sources, including the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/nicaraguas-leftist-ortega-embraces-businessand-authoritarianism-1478251804">Wall Street Journal</a>, say that his family has amassed one of the <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2009/1014/p06s01-woam.html">largest fortunes in the country</a>.</p>
<h2>An uphill battle</h2>
<p>Ortega’s landmark social programs, coupled with the lucrative business ventures that allowed him to buy support, made him the most powerful Nicaraguan leader since Somoza. </p>
<p>During his 11 years in office, Ortega has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/01/nicaragua-scraps-presidential-term-limits-201412951043190534.html">abolished presidential term limits</a>, installed his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/world/americas/nicaragua-daniel-ortega-rosario-murillo-house-of-cards.html">wife as vice president</a> and <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/26/riots-threaten-nicaraguas-autocratic-president">banned opposition parties from running in elections</a>. </p>
<p>In late 2015, plummeting global oil prices sent Venezuela’s mismanaged economy into recession, and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">into a full-on collapse</a>. </p>
<p>Chávez’s successor, President Nicolás Maduro, was forced to cut back on oil diplomacy. As a result, in 2017 and 2018 his government sent no oil shipments at all to Nicaragua.</p>
<p>In effect, Ortega had to <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/cobro-plan-techo-causa-inconformidad/">cut his landmark anti-poverty programs</a>, <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/01/31/politica/2369533-daniel-ortega-manda-reformas-leyes-que-afectan-la-tarifa-y-el-subsidio-energetico">eliminate subsidies on public utilities</a> and raise gas <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2017/10/02/economia/2306541-gasolinazo-provoca-alzas-en-serie-en-varios-sectores-de-nicaragua">prices at the pump</a>. </p>
<p>Support for his regime <a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/464323-cid-gallup-ortega-pierde-apoyo/">eroded quickly</a> after that.</p>
<p>Like the dictator he helped oust three decades ago, Ortega has relied on foreign money to buy his way through challenges. Now that Venezuelan money has dried up, he’s got little left to offer his people – one more reason, protesters say, Ortega’s time is up.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cheap Venezuelan oil boosted Nicaragua’s economy and funded President Daniel Ortega’s many anti-poverty programs. With Venezuela in crisis, the oil has dried up – as has support for Ortega’s regime.Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/999242018-07-20T10:36:37Z2018-07-20T10:36:37ZBloody uprising in Nicaragua could trigger the next Central American refugee crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228297/original/file-20180718-142411-15qe06i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Militias guard a barricade after police and pro-government militias stormed a rebel-held neighborhood in Masaya, Nicaragua, on July 17, 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Nicaragua-Unrest/35156768a79c41da9cdf81cb1e827da6/4/0">AP Photo/Cristibal Venegas</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Central American migrants have long been at the center of what consecutive U.S. administrations have called the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/crisis-border-numbers/">immigration “crisis.”</a></p>
<p>Each year, thousands of Central Americans are caught attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border unlawfully. According to the <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/crisis-border-not-numbers">Migration Policy Institute</a>, the vast majority are asylum-seekers from <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles-fy2017">Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador</a>, <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/understanding-central-american-refugee-crisis">fleeing</a> the region’s brutal gang violence and <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-central-america-gangs-like-ms-13-are-bad-but-corrupt-politicians-may-be-worse-86113">societal chaos</a>.</p>
<p>Typically, only a tiny fraction of migrants come to the U.S. from the neighboring Central American nation of Nicaragua. Their numbers are so small that Nicaraguans are rarely even mentioned in <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions">Customs and Border Protection</a> reports. </p>
<p>But Nicaragua has been in turmoil for months, as an uprising against the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista party grows ever bloodier. Last weekend, three college students were killed during a 15-hour <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/ortega-ataco-con-sana-la-unan-pese-a-%E2%80%A8negociacion-de-estudiantes/">clash at a church on the campus of the National University of Nicaragua</a>, in Managua, which had been occupied by anti-government protesters since April. </p>
<p>At least 350 people have been killed so far, <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/07/19/nacionales/2450465-los-numeros-rojos-de-la-crisis-en-nicaragua">most at the hands of pro-government forces</a>.</p>
<p>This violence may prompt many Nicaraguans to start fleeing their country soon, too.</p>
<h2>Central America’s ‘safest country’</h2>
<p>Nicaragua, home to approximately 6.2 million people, is one of the <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/LAC/chronic_poverty_overview.pdf">poorest</a> countries in the Western Hemisphere. </p>
<p>But it has largely avoided the widespread crime and instability that for decades has dogged this corner of the world. Nicaragua’s 2017 homicide rate of <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2017-homicide-round-up/">seven killings per 100,000</a> was the lowest in Central America. </p>
<p>Neighboring El Salvador’s murder rate was <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/04/11/latin-americas-homicide-epidemic">60 per 100,000 in 2017</a>, and Honduras’s was 43 per 100,000. </p>
<p>When Nicaraguans migrate, typically they are seeking better-paying jobs. </p>
<p>Rather than travel all the way to the United States, economic migrants from Nicaragua mostly head to <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-nicaragua-no-migrants-20140830-story.html">neighboring Costa Rica</a>, the stablest and most prosperous country in Central America. An estimated 500,000 Nicaraguans currently live and work in Costa Rica. </p>
<h2>Nicaragua in flames</h2>
<p>This migration pattern may soon change. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1215">My research on violence in Central America</a> reveals that the destabilizing conditions that have historically prompted many Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Hondurans to flee are now taking root in Nicaragua.</p>
<p>Since April, the government of Daniel Ortega has been trying to crush a nationwide protest movement that <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">demands his resignation</a>. </p>
<p>Demonstrations <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/violence-protests-nicaragua-leave-dead-55126320">first erupted</a> in Nicaragua on April 16, 2018, after the government announced social security reforms that would raise costs for retirees and workers. Police soon <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/world/americas/nicaragua-uprising-protesters.html">cracked down on protesters</a>. Students took to the streets. </p>
<p>Within days, <a href="https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1A6-4s-QqWSNKKm3vXDkqrdxM38Plyxnq&usp=sharing">tens of thousands of Nicaraguans</a> were protesting in cities and towns nationwide.</p>
<p>In response, the regime dispatched <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/nicaragua-violence-soars-doubts-responsible-dwindle/">police clad in riot gear, hired henchmen and state-sponsored paramilitary groups</a> to put down the protests. So far, these pro-Ortega forces have killed hundreds of people and wounded more than 2,100, according to the nonprofit <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/10/nicaragua-senior-officials-responsible-abuse">Human Rights Watch</a>.</p>
<h2>Outsourcing violence</h2>
<p>In its attempt to suppress the uprising, Ortega’s government has supplemented its police forces with groups of armed partisans, vigilantes and death squads.</p>
<p>According to the <a href="http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2018/113.asp">Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</a>, which visited the country in May, the regime outsourced protest-repression duties to informal armed groups associated with the state. These so-called “para-police” – formed by citizens allied with Ortega’s Sandinista Party – work in <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/los-escuadrones-de-la-muerte-de-ortega/">coordination with the police</a>.</p>
<p>Outsourcing state violence is not a novel tactic. In <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/nicaragua-parapolice-groups-turn-criminal/">Venezuela</a>, the authoritarian government of Nicolás Maduro has also armed militant supporters and supported criminal gangs willing to “defend” the regime. </p>
<p>During Central America’s civil war period, in the 1980s, the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador also <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00132.x">used paramilitaries, vigilantes and groups of sympathizers</a> to suppress protests and punish dissidence. </p>
<p>In Guatemala, the army mobilized hundreds of thousands of people in civilian “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/18/world/guatemala-mobilizes-700000-civilians-in-local-patrols.html">self-defense</a>” patrols to fight guerrillas who opposed the country’s military dictatorship. El Salvador’s government built <a href="http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/warpeace.pdf">wartime death squads</a> responsible for bloody massacres against civilians, or anyone assumed to support the anti-regime insurgency.</p>
<p>As the post-war <a href="http://www.odhag.org.gt/html/Default.htm">truth and justice commissions</a> in both countries would later <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Report_of_the_Joint_Group_for_the_Invest.html?id=cb4qHAAACAAJ">document</a>, many of these armed factions survived the end of the conflicts. </p>
<p>By the late 1990s, death squads and paramilitaries were using their government connections and expertise to prey on the Central American population and <a href="http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/warpeace.pdf">infiltrate these countries’</a> new criminal justice institutions. </p>
<p>People often associated crime in Central America with gangs like MS-13. But my <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-016-9631-9">research</a> shows that the foundations for the region’s current criminal violence were laid decades ago, when Central American governments armed thugs and deployed them against their own people. </p>
<p>Outsourcing state violence may temporarily quash popular dissent. But it creates the conditions for more violence – not just political violence but criminal violence, too.</p>
<h2>Creating the conditions for rampant crime</h2>
<p>Nicaragua managed to avoid such post-war chaos in large part because of <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/01/12/what-explains-nicaragua-surprisingly-low-murder-rate/GTL3T5Ps1KwbbOdUMgB26I/story.html">institutional reforms</a> undertaken in the 1990s after the Sandinista revolution. </p>
<p>The Sandinista rebels <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=0ahUKEwj61d6I7qvcAhWIAHwKHcj3BJAQFgiAATAO&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.washingtonpost.com%2Farchive%2Fpolitics%2F1978%2F10%2F15%2Frebels-train-to-overthrow-somoza%2Fb2a78bc4-1a64-465a-83cd-82876f955606%2F&usg=AOvVaw3c9ZSNjaWrtZ5W6JBeWXs5">overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979</a> and dismantled the country’s infamously brutal National Guard. However, they emerged from the revolution with firm control over the new police and army.</p>
<p>After the Sandinistas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/27/world/turnover-in-nicaragua-sandinistas-loss-to-be-felt-by-other-leftist-movements.html">lost</a> power in the 1990 presidential election, the new government of Violeta Chamorro undertook a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00132.x">complex set of reforms</a> that, among other changes, established clear boundaries between law enforcement, the army and political parties in Nicaragua. </p>
<p>Those reforms strengthened the Nicaraguan state such that non-state forces could no longer violently confront – or substitute – government institutions.</p>
<p>The separation between politics and security forces began to erode when Daniel Ortega – who had previously ruled the country during the revolutionary 1980s – was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/08/1">re-elected</a> in 2006.</p>
<p>As he <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/16/unchecked-demise-of-nicaraguan-democracy-pub-74761">accumulated power</a>, ultimately abolishing term limits to run for a third term, Ortega and his Sandinista party systematically undermined Nicaragua’s independent <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/maltrato-corrupcion-la-pn/">law enforcement</a> institutions. </p>
<h2>Dismantling Nicaragua’s strong state</h2>
<p>Those institutions had kept Nicaraguans relatively safe for over a decade. </p>
<p>Even as criminal organizations, death squads and, increasingly, street gangs were fueling <a href="https://www.unodc.org/gsh/">record levels of violence elsewhere in Central America</a>, Nicaragua’s murder rate in the early 2010s was similar to Costa Rica’s. </p>
<p>Evidence suggests that organized crime groups and drug cartels are now <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/nicaragua-claims-no-cartel-presence-but-past-cases-tell-a-different-story/">operating in Nicaragua</a>, too, taking advantage of the ongoing chaos there to deepen and expand their networks. </p>
<p>This also follows a pattern I’ve seen before in the region. After Honduras’ 2009 coup, <a href="https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/echoes-2009-honduras-again-approaches-chaos/">political unrest</a> laid the groundwork for collusion between the state and organized crime groups. </p>
<p>Already, many Nicaraguan youths have begun <a href="https://www.univision.com/noticias/america-latina/en-medio-de-la-represion-jovenes-huyen-de-nicaragua-a-costa-rica-por-veredas-para-salvar-el-pellejo">flocking to the Costa Rican border</a>, fleeing the paramilitary onslaught. </p>
<p>But Costa Rica has long wanted to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-anti-immigrant-attitudes-violence-and-nationalism-in-costa-rica-73899">close</a> its borders to Nicaraguan economic migrants. As Nicaragua’s crisis deepens, it will surely tighten border security. </p>
<p>Soon enough, it is likely that many more Nicaraguans will join other Central Americans on their long northward trek, seeking refuge over the U.S. border from unrelenting violence in their home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>José Miguel Cruz receives funding from the Open Society Foundations.</span></em></p>Nicaragua has exploded in violence since mass protests began against President Daniel Ortega in April, with hundreds dead and thousands wounded. Amid such chaos, criminal violence is likely to follow.Jose Miguel Cruz, Director of Research, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/981232018-06-18T16:40:15Z2018-06-18T16:40:15ZNicaraguans try to topple a dictator — again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222663/original/file-20180611-191978-ovz19w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nicaragua, which overthrew its last violent dictator in 1979, is the only Latin American country since Cuba to stage a successful revolution. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Alfredo Zuniga</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-intenta-derrocar-a-un-dictador-de-nuevo-99729"><em>Leer en español</em></a>.</p>
<p>After months of near-constant protest in Nicaragua, at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44779257">300 people are dead</a>, including four police officers, 1,000 people are injured, and President Daniel Ortega – an authoritarian leader who once seemed invincible – is on his last legs.</p>
<p>Citizens first took to the streets of Managua in <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/04/tropical-spring-land-lakes-volcanoes/">early April</a> after Ortega’s government was slow to respond to a massive forest fire inside Indio Maiz, the nation’s second-largest nature reserve. When the government quietly decided to tax retirees’ pension checks and increase employers’ insurance costs a week later, nationwide <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44398673">marches gained steam</a>. </p>
<p>Police soon began <a href="https://globalnews.ca/video/4159175/student-protesters-dead-in-nicaragua-as-clashes-with-police-continue">killing protesters</a>. What started as targeted, loosely organized protests quickly transformed into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/nicaragua-protests-threaten-an-authoritarian-regime-that-looked-like-it-might-never-fall-95776">movement</a>. The goal: to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/world/americas/nicaragua-uprising-protesters.html">remove President Daniel Ortega</a> and his family from power.</p>
<h2>Nicaragua vs. Goliath</h2>
<p>Can Nicaragua, Latin America’s <a href="http://www.humanosphere.org/basics/2016/12/nicaraguas-economy-is-growing-but-the-poor-may-be-falling-behind/">second poorest country</a>, bring down its mighty regime by simply refusing to leave the streets? Local history suggests it can.</p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benjamin_Waddell">Latin American scholar currently based in Managua, Nicaragua</a>. My research on the ground suggests that presidents in this region who are challenged by mass protests fall much more frequently than one might suspect. </p>
<p>Most elected leaders in Latin America, a heavily democratic region, finish their terms. <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0192512115604904">According to Christopher Martinez</a>, a political science professor at Chile’s Temuco Catholic University, just 16 percent of South American presidents have resigned or been impeached since 1979. </p>
<p>However, that changes when leaders earn the ire of their citizens. Between 1985 and 2011, fully 70 percent of South American leaders who faced mass street protests <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23040829">were ultimately removed from office</a>.</p>
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<p>Nicaraguan protesters face a genuine Goliath in Daniel Ortega. In the only country since Cuba to orchestrate a <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/230097">successful armed revolution</a> in Latin America, Ortega – a former Sandinista guerrilla who helped Nicaragua oust dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979 – is a giant.</p>
<p>Ortega has been the most powerful person in Nicaragua for nearly 40 years and president for 16 of them. While out of office, from 1990 to 2006, Ortega effectively controlled the country as a powerful Sandinista delegate in the National Assembly. </p>
<p>Even when the Sandinistas were in the minority, Ortega could still bring the country to a halt by organizing mass protests, as he did countless times between <a href="http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3418">1990 and 2006</a>. This irony is surely not lost on today’s anti-Ortega protesters.</p>
<p>But, as author Malcolm Gladwell writes in his latest book “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/books/david-and-goliath-by-malcolm-gladwell.html">David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants</a>,” “Giants are not what we think they are. The same qualities that appear to give them strength are often the source of great weakness.” </p>
<p>In other words, dictators are not toppled, they trip over their own feet. In Ortega’s case, his greatest strength – his sheer audacity – has now fostered dangerous complacency. </p>
<h2>How to topple a dictator</h2>
<p>Latin America scholar Kathryn Hochstetler <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20434009">offers</a> a basic formula for predicting whether Latin American presidents will fall to mass protest. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=762&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/222664/original/file-20180611-191947-j8tocs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=958&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ortega has dominated Nicaraguan politics for 40 years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Alfredo Zuniga</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If street protesters have the support of the legislature but there is no bloody crackdown, she says, a president’s odds of surviving are high. That’s how former Nicaraguan president Enrique Bolaños, who governed Nicaragua from 2002 to 2007, managed to stay in office <a href="https://www.latinnews.com/component/k2/item/2124-nicaragua--protests-take-bola%C3%B1os-administration-to-the-brink.html">despite protesters’ calls for his resignation</a>.</p>
<p>When leaders opt to use force against peaceful protesters, it seems, they enter a dangerous path. Since the early 1990s, almost every Latin American president who came to power in a free and fair election but later used violence to quell street uprisings was soon ousted. </p>
<p>The exception is in Venezuela. President Hugo Chávez went on to rule for 11 years after using deadly force against protesters during a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/the-big-picture/2018/02/hugo-chavez-coup-happened-180207062954307.html">2002 coup attempt</a>. </p>
<p>His successor, Nicolas Maduro, has remained in office despite <a href="https://www.observatoriodeconflictos.org.ve/sin-categoria/venezuela-6-729-protestas-y-157-fallecidos-desde-el-1-de-abril-de-2017">killing 163 protesters in 2017</a>, though I would argue that by the time Maduro came to power <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/venezuela/report-venezuela/">Venezuela was no longer a true democracy</a>.</p>
<h2>Dictators, ¡que se vayan!</h2>
<p>In a region with a <a href="http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/democracies-and-dictatorships-latin-america">history of violent dictators</a>, state repression sparks citizens’ anger. </p>
<p>Nicaragua has seen major political conflict. The Sandinista rebels staged a seven-year insurrection in 1979 to free the country from military rule. An 11-year civil war between the Sandinista government and <a href="https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-nicaragua.php">U.S.-backed Contras</a> followed. </p>
<p>At this point, there’s clearly <a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/464323-cid-gallup-ortega-pierde-apoyo/">little tolerance</a> for more bloodshed. Protesters’ resolve is likely hardened by the fact that most of the dead are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/31/world/americas/nicaragua-protests-killings.html">young students</a>.</p>
<p>Isolated by decades of power, Ortega seems to have underestimated the degree to which <a href="https://www.cenidh.org/recursos/57/">state violence and repression</a> would bring together factions that he had so adeptly divided for so long. Today, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-44283106">students</a>, <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/ortega-principal-responsable-violacion-derechos-humanos/">human rights groups</a>, <a href="http://www.nicaraguadigital.com/cosep-ortega-debe-irse-lo-mas-pronto-posible/">the business sector</a> and the <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/05/12/america/1526083994_942099.html">Catholic Church</a> are united behind the goal of removing the president from office. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2018/05/13/5af87a04e5fdea52458b467d.html">The military</a> has publicly said that it will not leave the barracks to repress citizens. If the generals stick to their word, I believe Ortega’s days are numbered.</p>
<h2>A fast fall from grace</h2>
<p>Ortega’s fall from grace has come remarkably fast. </p>
<p>At the 27th anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution in 2006, Ortega rode a white horse into frenzied crowds on the Plaza de La Paz in downtown Managua. Later that year he would be narrowly <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6117704.stm">re-elected as Nicaragua’s president</a>.</p>
<p>In the years to follow, the government began placing <a href="https://cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/nicaragua/love-him-or-hate-him-few-doubt-ortegas-political-skill/">massive billboards and posters featuring Ortega’s image around the country</a>. The president centralized power in the executive branch, took control of Nicaragua’s National Assembly and Supreme Court, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/01/nicaragua-scraps-presidential-term-limits-201412951043190534.html">abolished term limits</a>, and in 2017, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/07/nicaragua-elects-worlds-first-husband-and-wife-pair-as-president/">appointed his wife</a> as Nicaragua’s vice president.</p>
<p>Ortega was re-elected in 2016 for his third term with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/07/nicaragua-president-daniel-ortega-reelected-landslide-vote-rigging">72 percent of the vote</a>. But only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/07/nicaragua-president-daniel-ortega-reelected-landslide-vote-rigging">30 percent of Nicaragua’s population voted</a> in that year’s presidential election, and opposition parties alleged fraud.</p>
<p>Perhaps his legitimacy was already in question back then. Now, Ortega’s demise seems as inevitable as his rise to power once did.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98123/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Waddell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History shows that Latin American presidents usually don’t last long after they use violence to repress mass protests. Is Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega the next to fall?Benjamin Waddell, Associate Professor of Sociology, Fort Lewis CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/957762018-05-02T10:40:45Z2018-05-02T10:40:45ZNicaragua protests threaten an authoritarian regime that looked like it might never fall<p><a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/violence-protests-nicaragua-leave-dead-55126320">More than a month</a> of protests in Nicaragua have now left <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nicaraguas-army-urges-end-violence-protests-continue-55139232">at least 60 people dead</a>. President Daniel Ortega, whose government once seemed unshakable, faces <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/world/americas/nicaragua-students-protest.html">ongoing demands for his ouster</a>.</p>
<p>Demonstrations first erupted on April 16 after the government announced social security reforms that would raise costs for retirees and workers. A <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/19/departamentales/2406199-antimotines-reprimen-protestas-en-masaya-contra-reformas-al-inss">police crackdown on protesters</a> merely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/world/americas/nicaragua-uprising-protesters.html">fanned the flames</a>. Within days, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans were taking to the streets daily to protest in cities and towns <a href="https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1A6-4s-QqWSNKKm3vXDkqrdxM38Plyxnq&usp=sharing">nationwide</a>.</p>
<p>Ortega, <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/nicaragua-return-caudillismo">a former leftist revolutionary</a>, <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Nicaragua_Navigating_the_Politics_of_Democracy">has moved to the right since his 2006 election</a>. He has also centralized his power, controlling the media, restricting opposition and giving government jobs to family and friends. His wife, Rosario Murillo, was Ortega’s running mate in 2016 and is now Nicaragua’s vice president. </p>
<p>In 2014, Ortega <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-26146038">abolished term limits for the presidency</a>, with the blessing of a National Assembly stacked with loyalists.</p>
<p>As scholars of social conflict and regime change in Latin America, we know that authoritarian governments’ survival depends on <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/422435">controlling institutions</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=1PlRlcgQdpMC&dq=bueno+de+mesquita+logic+of+political+survival&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s">maintaining alliances</a> with powerful forces like the military, the Church and the elite class. Nicaragua’s protest movement has imperiled Ortega’s carefully constructed coalition – perhaps fatally.</p>
<h2>Ortega then and now</h2>
<p>Ortega first came to power in 1979 after Nicaragua’s Sandinista <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_end_and_the_beginning.html?id=QZUWAAAAYAAJ">revolution overthrew dictator</a> Anastasio Somoza.</p>
<p>Back then, Ortega’s rise hinged on <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0822974797">creating a broad coalition</a>. With the support of traditional opposition parties, many business elites, students and peasants, his Sandinista National Liberation Front moved from marginal guerrilla group to ruling party. </p>
<p>The Sandinista government <a href="https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1588267989">stayed in power for 10 years</a>, creating a socialist economy, undertaking land reform and wealth redistribution. </p>
<p>Ortega returned to power by winning elections in 2006 – this time with a new, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2010.00099.x">right-leaning</a> platform that <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs41603-017-0005-6">espoused traditional Christian values</a> and pro-business economic policies.</p>
<p>Ortega had rocky relations with the Catholic Church <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ye9ECQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">during the revolution</a>. But since 2006 he <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/20788575">has embraced both Catholic bishops and evangelical groups</a>. Beyond religious rhetoric, he has maintained Nicaragua’s <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0094582X08326020">abortion ban</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2015.00290.x">sought to control LGBTQ activism</a>.</p>
<p>The business elite <a href="https://www.univision.com/univision-news/latin-america/nicaragua-reborn">likewise struck a new bargain</a> with <a href="http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/152/15253710006.pdf">Ortega when he was elected</a> in 2006. In the 1980s, Ortega worked to <a href="https://www.uncpress.org/book/9780807844564/capitalists-and-revolution-in-nicaragua/">seize private enterprises</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=GNFRMO4QYQ8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">redistribute farmland</a>. Now, he works with business leaders to set Nicaragua’s economic policy and labor conditions. In turn, they have supported his regime.</p>
<p>For a while, this coalition held. Until recently, Ortega’s opposition was <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2016.1256284">fragmented and weak</a>. Since 2007, there have been few <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2016/03/30/politica/2010156-un-ano-de-miercoles-de-protesta">protests</a>, which were usually met with <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2016/12/15/brutal-repression-protests-against-nicaragua-canal/">violent repression</a>.</p>
<h2>Fractured coalition</h2>
<p>Ortega’s unilateral announcement of the social security reforms on April 16 – a decision he made <a href="https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/461429-cosep-apelara-reformas-inss/">without consulting</a> Nicaragua’s business community – ruptured the business side of this pact. </p>
<p>By April 20, the major business associations <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/20/economia/2407132-cosep-amcham-y-conimipyme-llaman-trabajador-marchar-el-lunes-contra-reforma-la-seguridad-social">were calling on workers</a> to protest the reforms.</p>
<p>Police repression and the perceived injustice of the social security reforms drove the Church <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/29/suplemento/la-prensa-domingo/2411543-estos-son-los-rostros-de-las-protestas-de-abril">away from Ortega</a>, too. </p>
<p>First, Managua Bishop <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/monsenor-baez-su-causa-es-justa-y-la-iglesia-los-apoya/">Silvio Baéz said that</a> the protesters’ cause was “just” and offered the Cathedral in Managua as a refuge for student protesters. Soon, the bishop was publicly <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/25/nacionales/2409593-monsenor-silvio-baez-el-objeto-del-dialogo-es-la-democratizacion">calling for negotiation and</a> “democratization” in Nicaragua.</p>
<p>Ortega’s coalition has crumbled. In contrast to the spontaneous protests, this government is so unpopular that it <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/30/nacionales/2411994-gobierno-usa-transporte-publico-para-movilizar-a-sus-simpatizantes-a-marcha-oficialista">has to bus supporters</a> into Managua to stage pro-regime counterdemonstrations. </p>
<h2>Losing the military brass</h2>
<p>Suddenly, Nicaragua seems to be <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nicaragua-on-the-brink-once-again">on the brink of momentous change</a>. What happens next depends heavily on Nicaragua’s security forces. </p>
<p>Numerous studies confirm that autocratic leaders <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/authoritarianism-9780190880200">can survive mass protest movements</a> only if <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3301_pp007-044_Stephan_Chenoweth.pdf">police and the military</a> are willing to <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2012/00000044/00000002/art00003">continually repress citizens</a>. </p>
<p>In neighboring Honduras, the right-wing president Juan Orlando Hernández, for example, has stayed in power through deadly demonstrations against his government largely because <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/02/us-silent-as-honduras-protesters-killed-in-post-election-violence">security forces have suppressed protests</a>.</p>
<p>When the armed forces <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983">refuse orders</a>, dictators can fall. The 2011 Tahrir Square protests toppled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak within weeks, once the military <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2012/00000044/00000002/art00002">abandoned his regime</a>.</p>
<p>Since 2007, Ortega has <a href="http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/5081">worked hard to make Nicaragua’s security forces</a> <a href="http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/4802">personally loyal to him</a>. He has <a href="http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/5330">offered</a> military and police officers promotions, political positions and business opportunities. </p>
<p>These efforts partially succeeded. The police <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/26/nacionales/2409883-policia-nacional-permitio-a-paramilitares-realizar-arrestos-arbitrarios-durante-las-protestas">have actively</a> <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/19/departamentales/2406199-antimotines-reprimen-protestas-en-masaya-contra-reformas-al-inss">stifled dissent in Nicaragua</a>, beating and arresting protesters. They also cooperate with the Sandinista youth wing as a <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2017/07/20/politica/2266403-criticas-a-la-nueva-juventud-sandinista">kind of paramilitary force</a>. </p>
<p>As April’s protests expanded, Ortega appeared on television <a href="https://www.univision.com/noticias/america-latina/nicaragua-gobierno-dice-que-busca-el-dialogo-mientras-envia-al-ejercito-a-controlar-las-protestas-que-dejan-10-muertos">flanked by</a> police commissioner Aminta Granera and military commander General Julio César Áviles, demonstrating that he would use military force to stay in power if necessary.</p>
<p>But neither the police nor soldiers seem keen to shed more blood. Some law enforcement officers <a href="https://www.laprensa.com.ni/2018/04/21/nacionales/2407691-policias-retenidos-por-negarse-reprimir-manifestantes">were actually arrested</a> in April for refusing orders to crack down on anti-regime marches. Then, on April 21, as massive protests roiled central Managua, police violence suddenly and completely ceased – a sign that police commissioner <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/ortega-decide-la-salida-de-granera/">Granera issued an order to stand down</a>. </p>
<p>On May 12, after a deadly flareup between demonstrators and security forces, the military <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nicaraguas-army-urges-end-violence-protests-continue-55139232">called for violence to end</a> and expressed solidarity with the families of protest victims. </p>
<h2>Legacy of the revolution</h2>
<p>This resistance to violence is not surprising given the history of Nicaragua’s security forces. </p>
<p>During the 1979 revolution, President Somoza’s National Guard <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1981/09/27/nicaragua-and-the-sins-of-somoza/aefecab9-6ce9-494d-89dd-2b33967f2389/">met the Sandinistas’ popular uprising with murderous repression</a>. It was Sandinista troops who helped sweep away the dictator and his predatory security apparatus. </p>
<p>Over time, these revolutionary forces <a href="http://www.resdal.org/caeef-resdal/assets/nicaragua---analisis-nicaragua.pdf">took on a professional, nonpartisan and apolitical identity</a>. Today, Nicaragua’s police and the military <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00132.x">are considered</a> among the <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/why-is-nicaraguas-homicide-rate-so-far-below-that-of-its-central-american-neighbors/">most effective</a> in Central America.</p>
<p>Somoza’s legacy looms large in Nicaragua. In our assessment, today’s military is far more likely to countenance Ortega’s ouster than to murder Nicaraguan citizens in his defense. </p>
<p>To stay in office peacefully, Ortega will have to <a href="https://confidencial.com.ni/aumenta-represion-oficial-en-municipios-de-nicaragua/">negotiate</a> his way back into the good graces of the Catholic Church and business leaders – something he has expressed willingness to do. </p>
<p>This is a wily president, though. He has dominated Nicaragua’s political life and consolidated so much power for so long, however, that he can offer numerous concessions without losing much control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95776/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Seth Mosinger received funding from the Herb F. York Global Security Fellowship at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) to conduct fieldwork in Nicaragua from 2015-2016.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai M. Thaler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For 11 years, Daniel Ortega’s regime has been unshakable. But Nicaragua’s autocratic leader is vulnerable after weeks of deadly protest. Now, some citizens are calling for him to resign.Kai M. Thaler, Ph.D. in Government, Harvard UniversityEric Seth Mosinger, Visiting Assistant Professor, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.