tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/oromia-92117/articlesOromia – The Conversation2024-02-20T10:25:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234902024-02-20T10:25:22Z2024-02-20T10:25:22ZEthiopia’s peace pacts with the Oromo Liberation Front have failed: here’s what was missing<p>Two attempts have been made over the past six years to broker peace between the Ethiopian government and the armed rebel group Oromo Liberation Front. The armed group was formed half a century ago with the goal of carving out an independent state for Oromia, the country’s largest regional state.</p>
<p>Both attempts at brokering peace – in <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/6133/">2018</a> and again in <a href="https://addisstandard.com/newsalert-govt-ola-second-talks-in-tanzania-end-without-agreement-again/#:%7E:text=The%20OLA%20in%20its%20part,insurmountable%20security%20and%20political%20challenges.%E2%80%9D">2023</a> – ended in failure and a <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">return to violence</a>.</p>
<p>Oromia is Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">largest and most populous</a> region. The Oromo Liberation Front has sought autonomy for the region since the group <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602085350/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html">emerged</a> in 1973. It was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition in 1991. Since then, the Oromo Liberation Front has continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 following the abrupt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-protests">resignation</a> of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. At the time the country was reeling from widespread unrest, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">particularly in the Oromia and Amhara</a> regions. Among Abiy’s surprise reforms was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/5/ethiopia-removes-olf-onlf-and-ginbot-7-from-terror-list">amnesty</a> for numerous outlawed rebel groups harboured by Eritrea that were waging war on government. </p>
<p>The most prominent of these was the Oromo Liberation Front, which had been based in neighbouring Eritrea. Subsequently, the Oromo Liberation Front announced a ceasefire, made a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and later entered Ethiopia. </p>
<p>However, the details of the peace agreement were not made public and there was no clarity on its legal grounds. The peace agreement soon failed to deliver the expected outcome of peace, amid <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">renewed violence</a>. </p>
<p>I am a political scholar of Ethiopia with an interest in the country’s federal governance and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361708000_The_extra_constitutionality_of_election_postponement_in_Ethiopia_amidst_COVID-19_pandemic">constitution</a>. My 2022 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370692256_The_causes_and_consequences_of_the_2018_failed_peace_agreement_between_the_Oromo_Liberation_Front_and_the_Ethiopian_government">research paper</a> examined the main reasons for the failure of the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>I found that the most notable reasons were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>there was no signed pact, which meant that there was no clear plan</p></li>
<li><p>the presence of competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of political will from both sides</p></li>
<li><p>the absence of a democratic ethos among both parties. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many peace agreements between the Oromo Liberation Front and Ethiopia had been concluded since the early <a href="https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/irbc/1993/en/93314">1990s</a> but did not bring the required stability. They were not durable because they did not address the factors at the core of their dispute. It is my view that these reasons also played a big part in the failure of the subsequent rounds of peace talks in 2018 and 2023. </p>
<p>A lasting peace can only be achieved when conflicting parties are willing to address the fundamental problems that trigger Ethiopia’s political challenges. </p>
<h2>A failed peace pact</h2>
<p>The first signs of failure came in September 2018, when more than 60 non-Oromo civilians were <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">killed</a> in Oromia region on the outskirts of western Addis Ababa. This alarmed many Ethiopians because it occurred shortly after the agreement was made.</p>
<p>Later, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/10/07/charges-state-that-hachalus-assassins-were-part-of-olf-shane-anti-government-plot/">Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer, was assassinated</a> in Addis Ababa. The government claimed that the assassination was part of the Oromo Liberation Front’s anti-government plot. This heightened the tension between the front and the Ethiopian government. On 23 June 2018, there was also an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45678760">assassination attempt targeting Abiy</a>.</p>
<p>From here on mutual suspicions overshadowed the peace agreement. It eventually collapsed for the following reasons.</p>
<p><strong>No signed document:</strong> A clear roadmap is central to post-conflict recovery and a pillar of any peace agreement. The 2018 Asmara peace agreement was reached without a written signed accord. </p>
<p>In August 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in response to Abiy’s request for dialogue with armed groups. This led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/7/ethiopia-signs-deal-with-oromo-rebels-to-end-hostilities">7 August 2018</a> peace agreement to halt hostilities and restore peace and stability.</p>
<p>The deal was short-lived. Conflicting reports about what was agreed were traded between government and the Oromo Liberation Front. The absence of a signed peace agreement made the environment more volatile. </p>
<p><strong>Competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front:</strong> The emergence of new factions has historically been the party’s weak point. Less than eight months after returning to Ethiopia, one Oromo Liberation Front faction and the army wing released a statement stating that the Oromo Liberation Army had separated from the front. </p>
<p>Over time, the Oromo Liberation Front has splintered into at least eight different groups. These include the Oromo Liberation Army, the Oromo Liberation Front, a secret grouping known as Abba Torbe and Oromo Democratic Front, which denounces the use of violence. </p>
<p>The extent to which the Oromo Liberation Front controls its armed wing is <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">unclear</a>. <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">According</a> to the Life and Peace Institute, an international peacebuilding lobby, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is difficult for the government to identify OLF combatants…there is no clear definition between members, fighters and supporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divisions within the Oromo political elite and the history of competition among the Oromo opposition forces point to the failed peace effort.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of political goodwill:</strong> It appears that although the moment might have appeared ripe for a peace agreement in 2018, neither party was ready for such an agreement. The government tried to exercise strong control from the centre and was reluctant to manage conflict peacefully with the Oromo Liberation Front.</p>
<p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides. The absence of a democratic ethos on both sides also weakened the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>Unclear demands:</strong> The Oromo Liberation Front’s political options have not been clear and consistent. It’s <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo">not clear at any given time</a> whether their demand is substantial autonomy for the Oromo people within an Ethiopian federation or an independent sovereign Oromo state. The strategy swings wildly between a political solution and an armed struggle.</p>
<h2>Difficult environment to pursue peace</h2>
<p>Following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, the internal political intricacies of Ethiopia drastically deteriorated. The democratic reform and euphoria brought by Abiy Ahmed, which included him winning the 2019 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-nobel-war.html">Nobel peace prize</a>, soon faded.</p>
<p>One of the factors that made Ethiopia less stable after the peace agreement was the postponement of elections, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to delay the election was considered a power grab and an unconstitutional term extension. It was rejected by most opposition parties and it led to the war with the Tigray regional government. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has since descended into civil war with ethnically motivated killings, religious conflict and displacement throughout the country. These constraints weaken the Ethiopian government’s ability to implement any peace agreement. It’s the setting in which a new round of peace talks in Tanzania was also doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marew Abebe Salemot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides.Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer of Federalism, Debark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2229282024-02-18T07:07:33Z2024-02-18T07:07:33ZOromia makes up a third of Ethiopia’s landmass and is key to its fortunes: expert unpacks its significance<p><em>Ethiopia’s largest and most populous region, Oromia, has been in the news following reports of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings for ransom</a>. The region is <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">no stranger to war and strife</a>. Its people have long fought against political marginalisation. But the region is more than just the site of conflict.</em></p>
<p><em>We asked <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/gov/yimeni-bizuneh-getachew.aspx">Bizuneh Yimenu</a>, who’s researched the region for over a decade and studied its significance in the context of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">Ethiopian federalism</a>, to explain Oromia, its people and its economic and political importance.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the general overview of Oromia?</h2>
<p>Situated in the heart of Ethiopia, Oromia isn’t just a geographical entity but a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory. </p>
<p>It is the largest of Ethiopia’s 12 regions and covers a vast area. At over <a href="http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/oromia.html">350,000 square kilometres</a>, it’s larger than Côte d'Ivoire or Italy. </p>
<p>The region spans Ethiopia’s central, western and southern parts. Oromia makes up <a href="https://epo.acleddata.com/oromia/">34% of Ethiopia’s landmass</a>. It shares borders with all other Ethiopian regions except Tigray, in the country’s north. It shares international boundary lines with Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. </p>
<p>Its capital is Finfinne, also known as Addis Ababa – which is additionally Ethiopia’s capital and the headquarters of the African Union. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Oromia’s diverse geography includes highlands, lowlands, forests and fertile plains. This contributes to its agricultural richness.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ethiopianreview.com/pdf/001/Cen2007_firstdraft(1).pdf#page=91">the last census</a>, over 60 ethnic groups live in the region. </p>
<p>Oromia has a population of about <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">40 million</a> people, about 38% of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.citypopulation.de/en/ethiopia/cities/">105 million</a>. There are also Oromo communities in Kenya and Somalia.</p>
<h2>What is Oromia’s cultural and economic significance?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">Oromo</a>, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, speak Afaan Oromo, one of the <a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-languages-are-spoken-in-africa.html">five most spoken African languages</a>. Oromo traditions and customary practices have endured for centuries. </p>
<p>Oromia is known for its traditional democratic governance system, <a href="https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=utk_socopubs">the Geda system</a>, in which power is transferred peacefully every eight years. It regulates the community’s political, economic, social and religious activities. In 2016, Unesco recognised the system as an <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164">intangible cultural heritage</a>.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect</a>
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<p>Economically, Oromia is one of Ethiopia’s breadbaskets. The region’s crop production accounts for about <a href="https://www.unicef.org/ethiopia/media/6511/file/Oromia%20regional%20brief.pdf#page=1">50% of total national production</a>. A <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/cea/5991#tocto1n5">majority</a> of residents work in the agricultural sector.</p>
<p>The region’s fertile soil supports crops like coffee, teff, maize and barley, which are popular for domestic consumption and export. </p>
<p>Outside agriculture, the region has many factories and industries that produce textile and garments, leather products, chemicals, construction materials and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p>Oromia is additionally a <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/37159/">source</a> of export minerals, <a href="https://oromiatours.com/Nature-and-Map.html#:%7E:text=Oromia%20hosts%20many%20of%20Ethiopia%27s%20more%20alluring%20natural,gold%20and%20platinum%20to%20iron%20ore%20and%20limestone.">ranging from gold and platinum to iron ore and limestone</a>. In the 2021-2022 financial year, Oromia generated <a href="https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6686-ethiopia-oromia-earns-usd-324-million-from-mining">US$324 million</a> from mining. </p>
<p>The capital, Addis Ababa, is a hub for domestic and international travel, and connected to economically essential cities in other regions, like Diredawa and Hawassa.</p>
<p>International highways, such as the Ethio-Djibouti road, the main route for Ethiopia’s foreign trade, intersect Oromia. This road is the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa">lifeblood of the country’s economy</a>. It enables the movement of goods to and from the port of Djibouti, connecting <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-quest-for-access-to-the-sea-success-rests-on-good-relations-with-its-neighbours-219621">landlocked Ethiopia</a> to global markets.</p>
<h2>What role has Oromia played in Ethiopia’s political development?</h2>
<p>Oromia holds substantial political importance within Ethiopia. As the largest and most populous region, it often sets the tone for national discourse and policymaking.</p>
<p>Its political influence in Ethiopia can be traced to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790544">the 1960s when Oromo nationalism</a> emerged due to subjugation and a lack of autonomy. This movement pushed Ethiopia’s transition from <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-federalism-why-ethiopia-uses-this-system-of-government-and-why-its-not-perfect-217217">a centralised unitary system to a federal one</a>. </p>
<p>In 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protests in the region</a> to push for greater autonomy and political representation helped drive political change. In 2018, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/12/13/2018-for-ethiopias-oromos-power-pain-protests-review/">Abiy Ahmed</a>, an Oromo, became Ethiopia’s prime minister. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by a Tigray-dominated government for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">27 years</a>. Tigrayans make up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>Abiy’s appointment symbolised a significant step towards addressing the grievances of the Oromo people. </p>
<p>Overall, the political dynamics within Oromia have consistently been at the forefront of discussions surrounding federalism, identity and governance in Ethiopia. </p>
<h2>What are some of the challenges specific to the region?</h2>
<p>Despite its cultural richness and economic importance, Oromia faces challenges that have hindered its development and stability. </p>
<p>One challenge is the prevalence of conflict and tension. This includes <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/oromo-rebels-accuse-ethiopian-forces-attacks-following-peace-talks-2023-05-17/">the war between</a> the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/11/08/ethiopia-oromo-liberation-army-ola-the-other-group-fighting-federal-forces/">Oromo Liberation Army</a>, a rebel group, and the Ethiopian government. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">'Ethiopia's other conflict': what's driving the violence in Oromia?</a>
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<p>Oromia has also suffered from <a href="https://addisstandard.com/news-tragic-ambush-by-armed-men-claims-13-lives-in-horo-guduru-wollega-oromia-region/">cross-border attacks launched by the Fano militia</a>, a rebel group operating in neighbouring Amhara. The attack is part of the militia’s agenda of expanding Amhara territory.</p>
<p>Additionally, the regional government has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/ethiopia">allegations of human rights abuses</a>. It has been accused of extrajudicial killings and the unlawful detention of opposition leaders.</p>
<p>In recent months, there has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/23/im-scared-to-leave-addis-ababa-ethiopias-oromia-region-gripped-by-kidnapping-pandemic">a rise in kidnappings blamed on Oromo Liberation Army rebels</a>. This has exacerbated grievances and contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty.</p>
<p>The underlying causes of conflict in Oromia are deeply rooted and complex. They stem from a combination of:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>historical injustices</p></li>
<li><p>marginalisation under previous regimes</p></li>
<li><p>ethnic tensions</p></li>
<li><p>competition over resources. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Resolving these issues requires a comprehensive approach emphasising dialogue, reconciliation and inclusive governance.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen?</h2>
<p>Two things are needed to address Oromia’s challenges effectively. </p>
<p>First, immediate attention should be given to the region’s security. This can be ensured through a peace deal with the Oromo Liberation Army. Previous rounds of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ethiopia-talks-with-rebel-group-ola-end-without-deal">peace talks held in Tanzania between the rebel group and the national government</a> have ended without agreement. </p>
<p>Both the government and the Oromo Liberation Army have <a href="https://x.com/OdaaTarbiiWBO/status/1650255474502008832?s=20">expressed a readiness</a> to resolve their differences through dialogue.</p>
<p>Second, it’s essential that regional and national stakeholders, and the international community collaborate. Initiatives focused on promoting peace and reconciliation should be prioritised to foster a more inclusive future for all residents of the region. Considering Oromia’s significance to Ethiopia, its stability should be a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Oromia is a cultural, economic and political powerhouse. It significantly shapes Ethiopia’s identity and trajectory.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126262023-09-06T13:18:16Z2023-09-06T13:18:16ZEthiopia’s Amhara people are being portrayed as the enemy: the dangerous history of ethnic politics<p>The Ethiopian government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/aug/04/ethiopia-declares-a-state-of-emergency-in-amhara-amid-increasing-violence">declared a state of emergency</a> on 4 August 2023 and sent the military into the Amhara region to engage the Fano, a local armed militia. Some suggested that Ethiopia <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/15/ethiopia-risks-sliding-into-another-civil-war">risked slipping into another civil war</a>.</p>
<p>It is only 10 months since <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-03/ethiopia-tigray-peace-deal-ends-two-year-war/101611324">the end of a civil war</a> in which around 600,000 Ethiopians were killed, <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-01-27/ethiopias-forgotten-war-is-the-deadliest-of-the-21st-century-with-around-600000-civilian-deaths.html">making it the deadliest war of the 21st century</a>.</p>
<p>The conflict was mainly between the federal government, led by the Oromo-dominated Prosperity Party, and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the party it succeeded in 2018. When the TPLF entered the Amhara region, committing <a href="https://editorials.voa.gov/a/tplf-must-be-held-accountable-for-atrocites-in-amhara/6477256.html">atrocities against civilians</a> and taking over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tigrayan-forces-take-control-ethiopian-town-lalibela-un-world-heritage-site-2021-08-05/">towns</a>, the Fano worked with government forces to maintain local stability. With their support, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was able to push the TPLF back to Tigray.</p>
<p>During and after the war, massacres and mass displacement of Amhara occurred in the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/ethiopia-over-50-ethnic-amhara-killed-in-attack-on-village-by-armed-group/">Oromia</a> region, the <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/2/23/fear-runs-deep-after-ethnic-violence-in-western-Ethiopia">Benshangul Gumuz</a> region and other regions of Ethiopia. There were numerous <a href="https://www.amharaamerica.org/_files/ugd/e494ca_0403f104b0584c18b351291d33cfea45.pdf">reports of</a> rapes, arbitrary arrests, abductions, forced evictions and people being <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ethiopia-horrific-massacre-400-ethnic-amhara-must-be-investigated-immediately">burned alive</a>. </p>
<p>One independent account <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that Orthodox Christians, seen as synonymous with Amhara, were </p>
<blockquote>
<p>chopped with machetes, stabbed with spears, cut down with scythes, beaten with bats and stoned to death.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>A <a href="https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf">peace agreement</a> between the TPLF and the government in November 2022 brought relative calm to Tigray and other regions. But the Amhara were left out of the agreement and continue to be targeted even by <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">government forces</a>. </p>
<p>This is the context in which Amhara’s Fano militia rejected the federal government order <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/why-are-amhara-militias-fighting-to-keep-their-weapons-it-all-boils-down-to-lack-of-protection/">to surrender their weapons</a> and be integrated into the police and federal army. </p>
<p>The government response was to bombard Amhara towns with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-amhara-arrests-emergency-d9e07bd51061c75e8436849085cd888e">drones</a> and heavy artillery. There have also been mass <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/14/lawyers-and-witnesses-say-ethiopian-police-have-ar/">arrests</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cwlw3xz047jt/ethiopia?pinned_post_locator=urn:asset:6ea0c1ab-627f-4f55-9a80-938a4ac4fa2f&pinned_post_asset_id=64e44b1647bc945c1788d203&pinned_post_type=share#:%7E:text=The%20whereabouts%20of%20opposition%20Ethiopian%20lawmaker%20Christian%20Tadele%2C,in%20the%20capital%2C%20Addis%20Ababa%2C%20earlier%20this%20month.">detentions</a> of Amhara leaders. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://staffportal.curtin.edu.au/staff/profile/view/yirga-gelaw-woldeyes-b922d208/">scholar</a> of history, human rights and decolonisation in Africa with a keen interest in Ethiopia. The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, <a href="https://www.resetdoc.org/story/identity-violence-abiy-ahmed-amhara-genocide-denial/">unchallenged</a>, for almost 50 years. What has changed now is that the rhetoric has shifted towards widespread, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">government-sanctioned</a> violence. </p>
<p>Article 2 of the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">UN Genocide Convention</a> defines genocide as acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Following widespread attacks on Amharas in 2021, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission <a href="https://ehrc.org/download/violence-human-rights-violations-following-musician-hachalu-hundessas-assassination-investigative-report/">warned</a> of “the risk of atrocity crimes, including genocide”. In February 2023, a US-based <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/about-us">charity</a> focused on genocide prevention <a href="https://www.lemkininstitute.com/statements-new-page/statement-on-ongoing-ethnic-massacres-of-the-amhara-people-in-the-oromia-region-of-ethiopia">reported</a> that “all Oromia armed forces are conducting what appears to be a systematic policy of erasing the Amhara presence” in two administrative zones.</p>
<p>It is important to shine a light on what is happening and unpack the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44873804">decades-long project</a> of ethnic politics that has allowed the Amhara to be targeted. </p>
<h2>The history of ethnic politics in Ethiopia</h2>
<p>Ethiopia has a long history of ethnic harmony. Historically, Ethiopian rulers came from different regions and were often of mixed lineage. For instance, King Menelik II (1844-1913) came from Amhara and Oromo ancestry. King Yohannes IV (1837-1889) was from Tigray. The Oromo king Mikael (1850-1918) ruled over the Amhara region of Wollo. His son, King Eyasu, inherited Menelik’s throne. </p>
<p>The last monarch, Emperor Haile Selassie, had Amhara and Oromo parents, as does Abiy himself. Until recently, mixing among ethnic groups wasn’t considered controversial. Indeed, it was Ethiopia’s ability to unite across ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries that defeated Italy’s attempt at colonisation at <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-of-adwa-an-ethiopian-victory-that-ran-against-the-current-of-colonialism-132360">the Battle of Adwa</a> in 1896.</p>
<p>When the fascist Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini invaded and occupied Ethiopia from 1935 to 1942 <a href="https://tassew.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/origin-of-tribalisation-of-ethiopian-politics-from-fascism-to-fascism-by-prof-aleme-eshete/">dividing the country</a> along ethnic lines took centre stage. It was carried out along plans <a href="https://archive.org/details/abyssinia-the-powder-barrel">devised</a> earlier by the Austrian Nazi Roman Prochazka to portray the Amhara as the enemy of all other ethnic groups. </p>
<p>After the expulsion of Italy, Haile Selassie sent Ethiopians from diverse ethnic groups overseas for higher education. During the 1960s <a href="https://arsof-history.org/articles/v4n4_1960s_page_1.html">decade of revolutions</a>, students formed the Ethiopian Student Movement to remove the monarchy. Two ideological positions of nation building <a href="https://jacobin.com/2019/12/ethiopian-student-movement-bahru-zewde-abiy-ahmed-1974-revolution">emerged</a>: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The first viewed the monarchy as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2021.1974698">class-based</a> feudal system that should be destroyed. It saw ethnic politics as a hindrance to achieving a socialist republic. </p></li>
<li><p>The second adopted the <a href="https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1929/03/18.htm">Stalinist approach</a> that defined cultural and linguistic groups within a country as nations. They saw the monarchy as an ethnic-based, colonial power.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Members from the first group created an alliance with the Derg, a committee of military officers, which overthrew Haile Selassie in 1974 but refused to create a civilian government. It ruled through dictatorship, destroying the monarchy and anyone <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/204000/afr250101978en.pdf">who opposed its power</a>.</p>
<p>The student groups who viewed the monarchy as an ethnic-based colonial power formed the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41931375">Tigray People’s Liberation Front</a>. The two combined, organised other ethnic allies, and removed the Derg from power in 1991. The TPLF led a transitional government which approved the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the adoption of the current constitution.</p>
<p>This set the stage for 27 years of <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401">autocratic rule</a> in which the Amhara <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/463/5505401?login=false">were cast as the oppressor</a> of all ethnic groups and the TPLF placed itself at the centre of the liberation of all Ethiopians.</p>
<h2>The Amhara as national enemy</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s 80-plus ethnolinguistic communities were framed as sovereign “nations” under the 1995 <a href="http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/etovpia.pdf#page=3">constitution</a> ostensibly to rectify “historically unjust relationships”. </p>
<p>Although the Ethiopian monarchy was established in Tigray and many Tigrayan (and, indeed, Oromo, Amhara and mixed) emperors ruled the country, the TPLF singled out the Amhara as the monarchical oppressor of all ethnic nations. This was partly convenient because Ethiopian emperors, regardless of ethnic origin, used Amharic as the language of their court. </p>
<p>Ethnic politics was enshrined in law. Once the TPLF came to power, all citizens were required to have ID cards stating their ethnicity. Individuals from mixed backgrounds must choose an ethnic identity. Regional states created their own constitutions, borders, flags and anthems. As Ethiopian historian Yohannes Gedamu <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1311288/ethiopia-amhara-persecution-stands-in-way-of-abiy-ahmed-reform-agenda/">notes</a>, many constitutions state that “the ownership of the region” is based on ethnicity, resulting in cases where</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Amharas in various regional states are now considered settlers in their own country. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Amharic speaking people of the Amhara region and beyond have lived in Ethiopia for thousands of years, as evidenced by the millions of manuscripts written in their ancient language of Ge’ez, which is the basis of Amharic and Tigrinya. Their almost millennium-old rock churches, imbued with Ethiopian Orthodox architecture and artwork, speak to the Amhara’s ongoing connection to the land.</p>
<p>Labelling an indigenous group of people as “settlers” allows those perpetrating violence to co-opt the language of decolonisation to justify murder. The Amhara are labelled as <a href="https://bilisummaa.com/settler-colonial-neftenga-safaris-abyssinia-is-structural-not-an-event/"><em>neftegna</em></a>, which means a monarchical soldier, despite the monarchy being an institution led by kings from mixed ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Even if one believes that the Amhara were monarchical oppressors, the monarchy was destroyed almost 50 years ago and the Amhara have been excluded from power ever since. The thesis that they are oppressors does not correlate with reality.</p>
<h2>Heading towards genocide</h2>
<p>The federal government has strengthened its ties to its former enemy, the TPLF. The defence minister, Abraham Belay, announced that the Ethiopian army would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-aims-end-illegal-administration-disputed-territory-2023-08-22/">dismantle</a> the Amhara administration in Wolkaite, a contested region between Tigray and Amhara.</p>
<p>In August 2023, Oromia state government representatives travelled to Tigray to <a href="https://twitter.com/HeranTigray/status/1694441667317633471">declare</a> war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The war we just started [on the Amhara] is a major war. Right now, this group we are fighting wants to impose one religion, one country, and one language by force on all of us. We have reached the moment that Tigrayans and Oromos must join forces, along other Ethiopians, to defeat this force so that Ethiopia can prosper.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, Amhara has no power to do that. </p>
<p>Ethiopia can draw a lesson from Rwanda. Similar demonisation of the Tutsi by Hutu genocide agitators led to genocide 30 years ago in which 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathisers were killed. The Tutsi were described as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/25166069221084855#fn3-25166069221084855">foreigners</a> who had links with long-dead Belgian colonialism. ID cards listing ethnicity were used to identify the victims.</p>
<p>Since the demonisation of the Amhara has been built into constitutions, government policy and dehumanising nation-building rhetoric, it has filtered down to people who previously lived together in harmony. </p>
<p>This is the consequence of ethnic politics in Ethiopia. Without more attention and action from the media and global actors, Ethiopia could be heading towards a Rwandan-style genocide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212626/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rhetoric that presents the Amhara people as a national enemy has gone on, unchallenged, for far too long.Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, Senior Lecturer, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956012022-12-08T13:38:39Z2022-12-08T13:38:39ZAbiy Ahmed gained power in Ethiopia with the help of young people – four years later he’s silencing them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/498761/original/file-20221203-16-gyawnf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopians celebrate Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's Nobel Peace Prize win in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Abiy Ahmed took power as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018, he was the <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-new-ethiopian-leader-abiy-ahmed-youngest-in-africa-sparks-hope-of/">youngest head of government</a> in Africa. </p>
<p>At 42, he represented a stark contrast to <a href="https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-has-been-cameroons-president-for-40-years-and-he-might-win-office-yet-again-194856">many ageing African leaders</a> who had been in position for decades. These leaders often stake their claim to power by referring to their victories in revolutionary wars many decades back. </p>
<p>Before Abiy’s entry, Ethiopia had been governed by the same party for 27 years – the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. This was a coalition of parties established by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1991. The party claimed legitimacy by pointing to its victory in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia/Socialist-Ethiopia-1974-91">civil war in 1991</a>. </p>
<p>It took mass protests from the youth – and an elite split within the government – to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">overthrow this regime</a>.</p>
<p>After rising to power, Abiy replaced the old ruling party with the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/03/12/ethiopian-pm-abiy-calls-for-peace-at-launch-of-party-s-first-congress//">Prosperity Party</a>. This, along with his relative youthfulness, was seen as a break with the past. </p>
<p>The hope was that this change would bring the political and economic inclusion of young people in Ethiopia. This category includes those aged 15 to 29, who make up <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Fact_Sheet_Developing_Ethiopias_Youth_Jul_2017.pdf">28%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">122 million</a>. </p>
<p>This group at the time experienced high unemployment levels and political marginalisation. Little has changed since then.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<p>My co-researchers and I have been <a href="https://www.cmi.no/projects/2177-nfr-youth-in-africa">investigating</a> regime-youth interactions in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe since 2019. By exploring these interactions and the major policies addressing young people, we aim to see whether state policies empower the youth or keep them on the margins.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, we <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">identified</a> two major policy responses to the youth. The first was job creation. The second was political representation through youth-specific representative bodies. </p>
<p>We found that while these responses are officially meant to address economic and political marginalisation, they have instead been used to repress or co-opt the youth. </p>
<p>We argue that regime strategies towards the youth in Ethiopia – as in the other countries in our study – are part of the “menu” of authoritarian strategies for incumbents to hold on to power. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>Our research in the four countries started with the question: are youth agency and regime policy leading to empowerment, or to suppression and old patterns of subordination? </p>
<p>The question was particularly intriguing in the context of Ethiopia, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">youth-dominated protests</a> were instrumental in bringing Abiy to power. </p>
<p>Recognising this, Abiy and his allies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics">promised to address</a> the demands of the youth for inclusion. This naturally created high expectations. </p>
<p>But more than four years after this promise, the situation for Ethiopia’s large youth population looks bleak. It’s <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-fractured-after-two-years-of-war-4007368">arguably even more so</a> than before. A two-year war in the country’s northern region of Tigray reinforced ethnic divisions and created a humanitarian crisis. Unemployment rates are still high and the youth are still being mobilised for political ends.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Employment schemes, such as the <a href="https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/995_2017-ethiopian-youth-revolving-fund-establishment.pdf">Youth Revolving Fund</a> and <a href="https://jobscommission.gov.et/who-we-are/">Job Creation Commission</a>, have been used as mechanisms to silence and co-opt the youth. Youth protest movements have either been co-opted into the established party machinery or turned into militarised vigilante groups. These became instrumental in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethnic-violence-in-tigray-has-echoes-of-ethiopias-tragic-past-150403">2020 war in Tigray</a>. </p>
<h2>Co-option</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7829-neglect-control-and-co-optation-major-features-of-ethiopian-youth-policy-since-1991">case study of the Youth Revolving Fund</a> shows that this government scheme failed to create sustainable job opportunities and improve livelihoods. </p>
<p>Introduced at the height of the youth-dominated protest in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dj-EKYZ8AA">2017</a>, the scheme was used to pacify the youth. Consequently, it lacked sufficient capacity and skills training components. Loans were made without proper guarantees for repayment, preventing money from revolving and becoming available to fund new youth projects. </p>
<p>Our study of regime-youth interactions in Oromia and Amhara – the most populous regional states in Ethiopia and home to the youth protests – revealed that the government resorted to co-opting and repressing young people. </p>
<p>In Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state, material co-option was seen in the distribution of credit, land, rights over resources and even condominium housing. </p>
<p>In Amhara, in north-west Ethiopia, rhetorical co-option was used. The worldview dominant among protesters was ostensibly adopted so as to get their support. Abiy appeared to castigate the country’s federal system and emphasise “national unity”. </p>
<p>We also observed institutional co-option: bringing activists and opposition leaders into government. </p>
<h2>Repression</h2>
<p>While the immediate post-2018 period saw a decline in repressive tactics, it resumed as the youth <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">started to challenge</a> the Abiy regime. </p>
<p>The Prosperity Party considers Oromia its home base – Abiy is considered an Oromo leader. The party was, therefore, less likely to tolerate dissent in the region. This, coupled with an active insurgency from the Oromo Liberation Army, made Oromia youth exceptionally vulnerable to repression. Arbitrary mass arrests and a crude counter-insurgency resulted in severe human rights violations. </p>
<p>In Amhara, the government resorted to repression as youth protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/05/villagers-massacred-western-ethiopia-says-state-appointed-body">returned</a> in 2019. </p>
<p>The government relaxed the use of force as it needed the Amhara youth following the outbreak of war in Tigray in 2020. Repression resumed when the government felt the initial threat from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had been reversed.</p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Co-option and repression weakened and fragmented the youth movements responsible for the anti-government protests of 2014-2018 in Ethiopia. </p>
<p>The war in Tigray – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/cease-fire-agreed-to-stop-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/a-63640781">currently on pause</a> – also resulted in the heavy militarisation of the youth, especially in the Amhara region. </p>
<p>Our research demonstrates that governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can nonetheless resort to authoritarian tactics to neutralise dissent from the same movements. In authoritarian contexts, translating protest gains into genuine political (and economic) gains is an uphill battle. </p>
<p>The alternative is to think strategically about young people’s potential to achieve the “prosperity” the ruling party promises. </p>
<p>We also found that youth employment schemes can be turned into instruments to silence the youth.</p>
<p>Deeper analyses of youth-specific policies should be contextually grounded to reveal possible authoritarian uses beyond official objectives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195601/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lovise Aalen receives funding from the Norglobal programme at Research Council of Norway (project no. 288489). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amanuel Tesfaye is an associate researcher under the Youth in Africa project, currently writing on regime-youth interactions in post-2018 Ethiopia.</span></em></p>Governments coming to power riding a wave of youth protests can employ authoritarian tactics to silence dissent from the same movements.Lovise Aalen, Senior Researcher, Political Science, Chr. Michelsen InstituteAmanuel Tesfaye, Lecturer, Addis Ababa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922522022-10-16T07:51:53Z2022-10-16T07:51:53ZTigray has resisted Ethiopia’s far greater military might for two years – here’s why neither side is giving in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489408/original/file-20221012-20-g31ivm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in the UK demonstrate against Ethiopia's Tigray war in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war started on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">4 November 2020</a>. For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. </p>
<p>Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">121 million</a>. Yet, it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who has <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">written extensively</a> on the cultures of nationalism in the region, I have studied the deep and complex roots of this conflict. I believe that understanding its history is key to comprehending how Tigray has developed the resolve to hold off a far greater military might than its own.</p>
<p>Neither the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea nor those of Tigray accept the principles of compromise, peaceful coexistence or equal partnership. According to their political cultures, winners take all. It’s zero-sum politics.</p>
<h2>The war today</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian National Defence Force <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">captured Mekelle</a>, Tigray’s capital city, on 28 November 2020. The Ethiopian army was helped by Eritrean and Amhara military forces. </p>
<p>Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, congratulated his army and allied forces for what looked like a quick victory. </p>
<p>However, the Tigrayan Defence Force made a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">tactical retreat</a>. Its troops moved to rural areas and used guerrilla operations supported by war veterans. This strategy demonstrated Tigray’s effective fighting force, which was first developed in the 1970s.</p>
<p>As a result, eight months after the start of the war, Tigrayan troops returned to their capital. The Ethiopian army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">retreated</a> from Mekelle and other cities.</p>
<p>Tigrayan troops then invaded the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, and almost made it into Finfinnee (<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tigrayan-forces-advance-toward-ethiopian-capital/av-59712725">Addis Ababa</a>) in November 2021. However, they soon retreated to their region.</p>
<p>Since then, Tigrayan forces have controlled and administered most of Tigray. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war has been <a href="https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=305544#p1331271">devastating</a> for Tigrayans. They have faced mass killings, military bombardment, rape, looting and the destruction of property. The conflict has denied them access to food, electricity, telecommunications, medicine, banking services and other necessities. </p>
<p>Yet they support the Tigray Defence Force. To understand why requires a deeper reading of Ethiopia’s history.</p>
<h2>A complex history</h2>
<p>Two Amhara emperors and one Tigrayan emperor laid the foundation of the modern imperial state of Ethiopia. The first emperor of Abyssinia/Ethiopia was Tewodros (1855-1868). He was followed by Yohannes IV (1872-1889) of Tigray and then Menelik II (1889-1913). </p>
<p>Under Menelik II, the Amhara state elite replaced Tigray’s leaders. They made Tigrayan society a junior partner in building the Ethiopian empire. </p>
<p>But Tigrayan nationalists believe their society was the foundation of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<p>In the last decades of the 1800s, the Ethiopian empire <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">expanded</a> from its northern core of Tigray and Amhara by colonising the Oromo and other ethnonational groups. </p>
<p>It established slavery, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery) and the colonial land-holding system by taking the land of conquered people. </p>
<p>The nafxanya (gun-carrying settlers) elite – led by the Amhara – dislodged the Tigrayan elite from Ethiopian state power. Tigray was pushed to the periphery of an Amhara-dominated society. This created <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">political rivalry</a> between the two groups. </p>
<p>The status and living conditions of the Tigrayan elite and people deteriorated. This, along with several wars in the region, aggravated political, economic and social problems. </p>
<p>Accumulated grievances and many forms of resistance produced the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. It aimed to <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a-political-history-of-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-1975-1">liberate Tigrayans</a> from Amhara-led governments. This helped develop Tigrayan nationalism. </p>
<h2>Tigray’s two nationalisms</h2>
<p>Tigrayans maintain two forms of nationalism. </p>
<p>The first promotes Tigrayan autonomy, self-reliance and development. </p>
<p>The second is Tigrayan Ethiopianism. This theoretically maintains Ethiopia’s current geopolitical boundary, with its decentralised political structures where different population groups have some autonomy. </p>
<p>After building military power in the 1980s, Tigrayan elite <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Cultural-Capital-and-Prospects-for-Democracy-in-Botswana-and-Ethiopia/Jalata/p/book/9780367786373">dominated</a> other ethnonational groups, particularly the Oromo, the empire’s largest ethnonational group. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2018, the Tigrayan elite <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-war-in-tigray-150147">controlled</a> state power and the political economy. The Tigrayan elite created a pseudo-democracy. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was the mover and shaker of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The Oromo expressed their collective grievances with this political arrangement through the struggles of the Oromo Liberation Front. The Qeerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) movement got involved between 2014 and 2018. This eventually <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">dislodged Tigrayan leadership</a> from Ethiopian central power in 2018. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Abiy was a member of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, a subsidiary political party of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The Tigrayan Front, alongside its allied organisations, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/28/abiy-ahmed-elected-as-chairman-of-ethiopias-ruling-coalition">elected Abiy</a> as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018. He later turned on his support base. </p>
<p>Once he came to power, Abiy and his allies believed they wouldn’t stay in control if they did not destroy Tigrayan and Oromo nationalists. These were symbolised by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo youth movement. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum politics</h2>
<p>Tigrayan and Amhara elites express and practice Ethiopianism differently.</p>
<p>The Amhara elite dominated Ethiopia from 1889 to 1991. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front overthrew them in 1991. </p>
<p>The wealth and experience Tigrayan elite accumulated over nearly three decades increased their national organisational capacity. This has helped them in the current war. </p>
<p>The Oromo have rejected the dominance and tyranny of both these groups. They have carried out their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">liberation struggle</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy and his Amhara collaborators are fighting Tigrayans, Oromos and others to control Ethiopian state power. Their winning the war in Tigray and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">Oromia</a> would allow the Abiy regime to continue a modified version of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 policy. </p>
<p>For Tigrayans, losing this battle would be equivalent to losing political power and returning to victimisation, poverty and the threat of annihilation. </p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Given their complicated political history, reconciling the central government and the Tigrayan regional government is challenging. Even if these two groups negotiate a peace deal, conflict will continue if the Oromo are left out of the process. </p>
<p>If Tigray and Oromia’s political problems aren’t correctly understood and resolved, conflicts will continue until the collapse of the Ethiopian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leaders at the centre of the Ethio-Tigray war don’t believe in equal partnership. In their political cultures, winners take all.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870352022-07-20T13:56:51Z2022-07-20T13:56:51Z‘Ethiopia’s other conflict’: what’s driving the violence in Oromia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474614/original/file-20220718-16-r6d178.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oromo women protest against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed over violence in their homeland in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Mayhew via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2020 an outbreak of violence in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">Ethiopia’s Tigray region</a> captured worldwide attention. The conflict was between Tigrayan forces and the forces of the Ethiopian government and its allies. </p>
<p>Since then, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been under <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/abiy-walks-fine-line-in-possible-peace-talks-in-ethiopia-20220619">increasing global pressure</a> to negotiate with Tigrayan officials to stop the carnage in the region. </p>
<p>Even before fighting broke out in Tigray, though, the government had established military command posts in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state. Oromo people were <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protesting</a> and calling for self-determination. </p>
<p>In Oromia’s latest wave of violence in June 2022, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2022/6/25/whats-behind-the-recent-ethnic-violence-in-ethiopia">Al Jazeera</a>, the <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/more-than-200-feared-dead-in-ethiopia-massacre/">New York Times</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-gunmen-killed-338-people-oromiya-region-june-2022-06-30/">Reuters</a> reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Oromo Liberation Army in Wallaga, Oromia.</p>
<p>These news reports labelled all the victims Amharas, members of Ethiopia’s second-largest ethno-national group. The Oromo are the largest. </p>
<p>As a scholar of Ethiopian politics and society, I’ve <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">researched and written extensively</a> on the Oromo movement, and identified the historical forces that have shaped its current politics. </p>
<p>My understanding – taking into account the history of oppression of the Oromo in Ethiopia and numerous reports by rights groups of attacks against the community – is that the violence in Oromia is mainly driven by the federal government and its agents. The <a href="https://olacommunique.com/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> is responding to state terrorism and gross human rights violations.</p>
<p>Oromo voices are <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/oromo/">not represented</a> in the Ethiopian government, the global system or the media. The federal government and its allies, particularly Amhara elites and forces, blame the Oromo movement for the violence. This is a <a href="https://borkena.com/2022/06/24/creeping-genocide-in-ethiopia-dawit-w-giorgis/">strategy</a> to delegitimise the Oromo struggle for self-determination. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-in-ethiopia-why-answering-the-question-will-be-a-challenge-160872">Genocide in Ethiopia? Why answering the question will be a challenge</a>
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<h2>Oromo identity</h2>
<p>The Oromo <a href="https://www.unrepresentedunitednations.org/en/unrepresented-united-nations-directory/oromo-en">consider themselves a nation</a>. They are estimated to make up between 35% and 50% of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population">115 million people</a>. An exact figure is difficult to come by as the government doesn’t provide this data. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has about 80 ethno-national groups. The Amhara make up about 27% of the population. Their language, culture, history and religion have dominated other ethno-national groups. Their warlords and leaders have dominated Ethiopia’s political economy for almost 150 years. </p>
<p>Despite their numbers, the Oromo consider themselves colonial subjects. This is because, like other subjugated ethno-national groups, they have been denied access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. </p>
<p>Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) warlords <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Ethiopia-Dependent-Colonial-Northeast/dp/093241558X">colonised</a> Oromia. The region was then incorporated into Abyssinia (the Ethiopian Empire) in the late 19th century. </p>
<p>Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, established a form of colonialism that settled Amhara, Tigrayan and other ethnic soldiers in Oromia. Most Oromos were reduced to serfs, providing free labour and tax revenue.</p>
<p>The colonial government claimed about three-quarters of Oromo lands for its officials and soldiers. It granted the remaining quarter to Oromo collaborators.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, to oppose political, economic and cultural marginalisation, Oromo nationalists created the Oromo Liberation Front. Its military wing is the Oromo Liberation Army. They wanted national self-determination and democracy, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">participated</a> in the failed revolutions of 1974, 1991 and 2018. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian state has continued to subject the Oromo people to violence and human rights violations. Successive Ethiopian governments have <a href="https://www.scirp.org/pdf/SM20110100003_59514457.pdf">caused</a> deep social, political, cultural and economic crises in Oromo society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<h2>Drivers of violence</h2>
<p>The government and the Oromo Liberation Front have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/new-killings-in-ethiopias-oromia">blamed each other</a> for the latest outbreak of violence in Oromia, particularly in Wallaga.</p>
<p>A sub-group of the Oromo, the Macha, live in Wallaga. They have been targets of the Ethiopian government and expansionist Amharas, who <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X2UIvv6Jac">claim</a> to be the original owners of the region. </p>
<p>During the famine of the 1970s, desperate Tigrayans, Amharas and Oromos from elsewhere settled in Wallaga. Amhara expansionists began to call all these people Amharas to justify their claim to the territory.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Ahmed has <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/23/the-peace-that-delivered-total-war-against-tigray/">taken the side</a> of Amhara expansionists. </p>
<p>Ahmed came to power in 2018 mainly because of the Oromo struggle but later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">turned against</a> the movement. His vision is of a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">centralised state</a> rather than self-determination for Ethiopia’s different groups. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">Eritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire</a>
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<p>The state’s <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/oromia-and-ethiopia-state-formation-and-ethnonational-conflict-1868-2004/oclc/938275015?referer=di&ht=edition">ideology</a> of “Ethiopianism” has been used to justify the subordination of the Oromo and other colonised peoples. It has empowered the class that dominates the bureaucracy, army, culture, Orthodox Christianity and Ethiopian colonial-political economy.</p>
<p>The Oromo Liberation Army, which has been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-race-and-ethnicity-kenya-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-16cef83f823be6f0d485d9e8eddd4792">outlawed and labelled a terror group</a>, asserts that the government has created a clandestine security structure that <a href="https://olacommunique.com/2022/06/20/the-abiy-regimes-militia-are-responsible-for-the-tole-massacre-of-west-wollega/">masquerades</a> as the Oromo army. It says this structure is responsible for the latest attack and those before it.</p>
<p>Between December 2018 and December 2019, in southern Oromia, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/29/ethiopias-security-forces-accused-of-torture-evictions-and-killings-report">government soldiers</a> displaced 80,000 Oromos and detained more than 10,000. </p>
<p>An Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/ethiopia-rape-extrajudicial-executions-homes-set-alight-in-security-operations-in-amhara-and-oromia/">report</a> found that state soldiers executed 52 people over this period on suspicion that they supported the Oromo Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The government additionally took incarcerated Oromos through mandatory training for several months. These detainees were trained on the constitution and the history of the Oromo people. These “lessons” were intended to get the detainees to abandon the quest for nationalism.</p>
<p>A July 2022 Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/ethiopias-other-conflict">report</a> termed the government’s actions in western Oromia “abusive”. It documented communication shutdowns, executions and arbitrary detentions. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The global community must pressure the Ethiopian government to reach peace with the Oromo Liberation Army. However, this will only be successful if a neutral body mediates on behalf of the United Nations. </p>
<p>Ahmed’s government is willing to negotiate with the Tigrayan defence forces mainly because of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-giving-talks-chance">pressure</a> from global powers. However, it refuses to reconcile with the Oromo Liberation Front and is determined to solve a political problem militarily. </p>
<p>Ethiopia cannot be at peace without an independent reconciliation body that solves the Oromo political problem fairly and democratically.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia’s largest region is pushing for self-determination - it hasn’t gone down well with Abiy Ahmed’s vision of a centralised state.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647142021-07-20T14:42:30Z2021-07-20T14:42:30ZAs Ethiopia and Tigray face tough options, the West needs to be even-handed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412109/original/file-20210720-17-1jukg29.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrives to cast his vote during the country's parliamentary elections in Beshasha, Oromia, in June.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>War broke out in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/19/ethiopia-says-its-forces-closing-in-on-tigray-capital">Tigray in November 2020</a>, pitting the Ethiopian National Defence Force alongside Eritrea against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. </p>
<p>The conflict has caused <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">colossal damage </a> to human life, economy and the nation’s social fabric. Following the government’s recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/ethiopian-government-agrees-immediate-ceasefire-in-tigray">declaration of a unilateral ceasefire</a> the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has declared a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/29/world/tigray-ethiopia">victory</a>. </p>
<p>After two weeks of relative calm, another round of war <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-14/ethiopia-s-tigray-conflict-deepens-as-abiy-s-cease-fire-fails">is on the horizon</a>. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front is claiming that it’s determined to “liberate” Tigray from the “occupation” of the Amhara and federal forces. For its part, the government has also declared that it will <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-s-abiy-vows-to-crush-tigray-fighters-3478012">vanquish</a> Tigrayan forces once and for all. </p>
<p>TPLF is emboldened by the support of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-official-warns-washington-will-not-stand-by-face-horrors-tigray-2021-06-29/">international community</a>. But it is already clear from how both sides are regrouping themselves that the second wave of war will open another – and perhaps more devastating – chapter in this tragic saga. The question is: what is the end game?</p>
<p>Several factors could be in play in charting out the next phase. This includes a constitutional arrangement which gives Tigray the right to self-determination including cessation – becoming an independent country. But they might have not achieved unanimity in the Tigrayan camp on this yet.</p>
<p>Another element that could influence the outcome is the continued palpable animosity between individual politicians in both isles. This could get in the way of any dialogue.</p>
<p>And lastly, many Tigrayans see themselves as an integral part – indeed a founding part – of Ethiopia. </p>
<p>So how could the future unfold?</p>
<h2>Secession</h2>
<p>The first possible scenario is secession. In his interview with The New York Times Debretsion Gebremichael, the Vice President of Tigrayan Regional State, cast doubt on Tigray’s future as a part of Ethiopia. He claimed that “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/africa/tigray-leader-interview-ethiopia.html">the trust has been broken completely</a>”. </p>
<p>If the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front opts for this, it will have to get over several hurdles. The first is internal. It’s not clear all the members of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front leadership would endorse secession because there are some moderates among them. Influential figures – including the commander of rebel forces Tsadkan Gebretensae, and perhaps, Debretsion himself – might see this war as a means of finding a more favourable settlement for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front within Ethiopia rather than secession. </p>
<p>Secondly, Tigrayans pride themselves on being the birthplace of Ethiopia’s statehood, religion and civilisation. This would make walking away from the federation hard.</p>
<p>The third hurdle is political and economic. </p>
<p>Politically, if Tigray seceded it would be landlocked. It would also be surrounded by hostile nations in the north (Eritrea) and south (Ethiopia). It could, conceivably, open a corridor through Sudan to connect with more friendly countries. But, in the long run, Sudan would benefit more from a strong relationship with Ethiopia given the country’s resources. </p>
<p>The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front has made it clear that it is determined to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-amhara-region-vows-go-offensive-new-phase-civil-war-looms-2021-07-14/">reclaim disputed territory</a> in the west - which is fertile farmland - from Amhara regional forces. This might have to do with ensuring food security as a stepping stone for secession. However, the reclaiming process would be contentious, and possibly even bloody, if it happens at all, because the regional government of Amhara is as determined to retain it. </p>
<p>The West seems to be on their side for now. But, for one, it is not clear for how long the support from the West will last. For another, the disintegration of the federation that makes up Ethiopia might not be the best outcome for the West because it could have a catastrophic impact on the region. Full-blown political chaos in <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/81417/ethiopia-eritrea-somalia-djibouti-the-constant-instability-in-the-horn-of-africa/">an already volatile Horn of Africa</a> means that the region would become fertile ground for extremist groups. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, cessation is an extreme scenario, but it is not far-fetched. </p>
<h2>Controlling the centre</h2>
<p>Controlling the centre of power in Ethiopia might be another bridge that’s too far for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which, they might think, can be realised through Western <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/27/us-official-condemns-violence-in-tigray-warns-of-new-sanctions">support</a>. This is rooted in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19332646">West’s historical alliance</a> with former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The intellectual legacy and the diplomatic network he left behind has proven to be very beneficial to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front in garnering support from the West. </p>
<p>It is becoming <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/152370">increasingly clear</a> that Western powers want the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front as part of Ethiopia’s future. It is not clear, however, if they envisage this within Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy’s administration or without it. </p>
<p>But at what cost? </p>
<p>If the West is determined to resurrect its trusted client to control the centre of Ethiopian politics it could unleash other ethno-federalist forces – especially in Oromia – who might be willing to forge an alliance with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. In addition, former satellite groups embedded in each ethnic group could be reactivated, increasing tension and possibility of conflict.</p>
<p>Another related risk is if the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front comes back riding on foreign support. This could create a sense of resentment. Abiy Ahmed, is still popular in some regions, including in parts of Oromia, Amhara region and the capital Addis Ababa. The recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/10/prosperity-party-declared-winners-of-ethiopian-election">elections </a>, however imperfect, are a testament to the fact he has the popular mandate. </p>
<p>However, the government in Addis Ababa remains vulnerable despite winning the elections. This war has been riddled with miscalculations and blunders on both sides. The government promised to end the military campaign in weeks. It hasn’t done so.</p>
<h2>A constructive option – dialogue</h2>
<p>Violence has brought tremendous loss. People need peace, security and a return to normal life. </p>
<p>It would, therefore, be wise for both sides to pursue a more fruitful direction.</p>
<p>Both parties need to commit to a ceasefire. This should start with putting an end to branding each other as “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/28/ethiopia-tigray-war-amhara-abiy-ahmed-expansionism/">expansionist</a>” or “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnLD9QB01kA">terrorist</a>. Such narratives create excuses for violence”. </p>
<p>A settlement only happens when politicians put their egos aside and heed the plight of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/194a494a-e596-4dbe-a21e-f7e9d8daed92">suffering people</a> – the big losers in this tragic war. </p>
<p>This should lead to dialogue as to how to reconfigure the union of the nation. More importantly, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front would be wise to reinvent itself as an opposition party that leads a peaceful struggle. The only choice should not be between either taking the control of the government or leading the whole nation to an endless abyss. The voice of Tigrayans need to be represented - Ethiopia without Tigrayans is not complete. Leaders of the central government should do away with dehumanising rhetoric.</p>
<p>For its part, instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Girma is affiliated with International Bible Advocacy Centre (IBAC).</span></em></p>Instead of fanning the flames, the West needs to be even-handed in bringing the warring sides to the table.Mohammed Girma, Visiting Lecturer, University of RoehamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1614402021-06-07T15:11:14Z2021-06-07T15:11:14ZWhy young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/404490/original/file-20210604-19-wmm67h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A queue of eager voters in Hawassa, Ethiopia, during the Sidama referendum in November 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael Tewelde/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Young people have been <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/80/321/519/10549">key drivers of social and political change</a> in Ethiopia going back to the closing decades of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Solomonid-dynasty">imperial era</a>. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, university students played a crucial role in the massive protests that led to the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime. A <a href="http://memory.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et_01_07.html">military regime</a> was installed in its place.</p>
<p>Subsequently, an armed rebellion against the military regime – known as the Derg – was powered by young combatants. Most leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – including prime minister-to-be Meles Zenawi – left university to join the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249608704221">armed struggle</a> that overthrew the Derg in 1991. </p>
<p>These young people grew to be the country’s governing elite as part of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, who would themselves be <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopia-imposes-state-of-emergency-as-unrest-intensifies/2016/10/10/7825391e-8ee9-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_story.html?utm_term=.4c90400fa9f3">challenged</a> in the mid-2010s by a new crop of youths. This led once again to a change in the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-ruling-party-chooses-abiy-ahmed-to-lead-the-party/a-43161198">balance of power</a> in Addis Ababa with the rise of Abiy Ahmed in 2018.</p>
<p>We are involved in a multi-year <a href="https://www.york.ac.uk/igdc/research/democratisation-ethno-federalism-ethiopia/">research project</a> to document young Ethiopians’ concerns about institutions and governance. Our focus is on young people between the ages of 20 to 35 years in Oromia and Sidama. These have been centres of popular protests since 2015. This project brings together young people and members of parliament in conversations about the effectiveness of the country’s representative institutions. A key question we asked was how institutions might be reformed to include and represent young people better. </p>
<p>Under its federal structure, Ethiopia has <a href="https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Ethiopia_Regions.html">10 regional</a> parliaments, known as regional councils. At federal level is the house of people’s representatives, made up of 547 directly elected MPs. The young people we spoke to said parliaments in Ethiopia had not lived up to their promise. They needed to be legitimate, representative, inclusive and vibrant enough to make better decisions and lead to better outcomes.</p>
<p>These views matter in a country where over <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-can-convert-its-youth-bulge-from-a-political-problem-into-an-opportunity-75312">70%</a> of the population is under the age of 30. Elections are scheduled for late June 2021. Initially scheduled for August 2020, they were delayed twice. The reasons given were logistical challenges and the conflict in Tigray, which was in part sparked by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57094394">delayed polls</a>.</p>
<h2>Simmering discontent</h2>
<p>The 2020 <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/ethiopia-0">Afrobarometer</a> survey found that 53% of Ethiopians believed the government was managing the economy badly. In addition, 62% believed the government was doing a bad or very bad job of creating new jobs. Nearly 60% of people believed young people’s needs were not being addressed. Over the <a href="https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=ETB&to=USD">last five years</a>, the Ethiopian currency has halved in value against the US dollar, raising the cost of living. </p>
<p>Unresolved historical grievances over the <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/01/10/ethiopias-federation-needs-reviving-not-reconfiguring/">distribution of power</a> between the central state and federal regions and a heavy-handed state response have heightened <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36940906">instability</a> in the country. Two recent popular protest movements – in Oromia and Sidama – point to this dissatisfaction.</p>
<p>Protests in Oromia were triggered by the 2014 <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/unrest-in-ethiopia-ultimate-warning-shot">expansion</a> of Addis Ababa city boundaries into neighbouring Oromia region. This had the potential to displace farmers and undermine local land rights. </p>
<p>The government plan was soon cancelled but protests led by young men and women – most of them students – continued. <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/twofold-crisis-in-ethiopia-elites-and-street/">In 2018</a> the protesters forced out prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2018/08/01/riding-the-wave-of-populism/">paving the way</a> for prime minister Abiy Ahmed.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Driving reform: youths and parliaments in Oromia.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the south of the country, the Sidama have long agitated for <a href="https://www.eajournals.org/journals/global-journal-of-politics-and-law-research-gjplr/vol-7-issue-7-november-2019/the-quest-for-regional-statehood-and-its-practicability-under-the-post-1991-ethiopian-federation-the-discontents-and-experience-of-sidama-nation/">statehood</a>. The quest developed fresh <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/20/ethiopia-at-least-17-killed-in-violence-over-sidama-autonomy">momentum</a> after the 2018 reforms. A popular movement driven by an informal activist group called <em>Ejjetto</em> led to autonomy through a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/11/23/sidama-referendum-over-98-vote-yes-for-ethiopia-s-10th-regional-state/">2019 referendum</a>.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Youths and parliaments in Sidama.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Youth exclusion</h2>
<p>Trust in Ethiopian parliaments is the second lowest of all institutions in the country. Some 47% of Afrobarometer respondents trusted the house of people’s representatives “just a little” or “not at all”. Similarly, 22% of young people (ages 18-35) didn’t trust parliament at all and 27% trusted it just a little. Some 71% of young people thought that at least some MPs were corrupt. </p>
<p>We held focus groups with 30 young people from around Oromia and the Sidama Regions, over several days in August 2019 and 2020. Our aim was to establish how young people perceived their role in Ethiopian society, and how they felt about the institutions that represented them. </p>
<p>Parliaments – particularly regional parliaments – are one of the most important institutions where citizens can raise their issues and deliberate on policy through their elected representatives. </p>
<p>But young people have generally been excluded from participation at both the national and regional levels. As a result, they argued that these institutions suffer a lack of legitimacy, inclusiveness and representativeness and are broadly distrusted by the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/countries/ethiopia-0">public</a>.</p>
<p>Many young people in both regions said that they did not trust members of the regional bodies to represent their interests or to voice their demands. The youths said they were not consulted when laws were enacted, including those which directly affected their lives.</p>
<p>Youth movements are demanding greater inclusion. They suggested that quota systems would give young people their own representatives and a say in their governance. These young people want more democracy, not less, and would like to see free and fair elections. </p>
<p>For young people in Ethiopia, the government has refused to listen for too long – but history shows that their demands can only go unaddressed for so long.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Beardsworth receives funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) and the UKRI. This project was funded by the Global Research Network on People and Parliaments, which receives funding from the UKRI and GCRF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This project was funded by the Global Research Network on People and Parliaments, which receives funding from the UKRI and GCRF</span></em></p>Ethiopian history shows that the demands of its young people can’t go unaddressed for long.Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the WitwatersrandAssefa Fiseha, Professor, Center for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa UniversityHenok Kebede, Lecturer, School of Law, Hawassa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.