tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/oromo-liberation-front-62427/articlesOromo Liberation Front – The Conversation2024-02-20T10:25:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2234902024-02-20T10:25:22Z2024-02-20T10:25:22ZEthiopia’s peace pacts with the Oromo Liberation Front have failed: here’s what was missing<p>Two attempts have been made over the past six years to broker peace between the Ethiopian government and the armed rebel group Oromo Liberation Front. The armed group was formed half a century ago with the goal of carving out an independent state for Oromia, the country’s largest regional state.</p>
<p>Both attempts at brokering peace – in <a href="https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/6133/">2018</a> and again in <a href="https://addisstandard.com/newsalert-govt-ola-second-talks-in-tanzania-end-without-agreement-again/#:%7E:text=The%20OLA%20in%20its%20part,insurmountable%20security%20and%20political%20challenges.%E2%80%9D">2023</a> – ended in failure and a <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">return to violence</a>.</p>
<p>Oromia is Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Oromo">largest and most populous</a> region. The Oromo Liberation Front has sought autonomy for the region since the group <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230602085350/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html">emerged</a> in 1973. It was briefly part of a transitional government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition in 1991. Since then, the Oromo Liberation Front has continued to wage a low-level armed struggle against the government. </p>
<p>Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rose to power in 2018 following the abrupt <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/15/ethiopia-prime-minister-hailemariam-desalegn-resigns-after-mass-protests">resignation</a> of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. At the time the country was reeling from widespread unrest, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-in-countrys-history">particularly in the Oromia and Amhara</a> regions. Among Abiy’s surprise reforms was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/5/ethiopia-removes-olf-onlf-and-ginbot-7-from-terror-list">amnesty</a> for numerous outlawed rebel groups harboured by Eritrea that were waging war on government. </p>
<p>The most prominent of these was the Oromo Liberation Front, which had been based in neighbouring Eritrea. Subsequently, the Oromo Liberation Front announced a ceasefire, made a peace agreement with the Ethiopian government in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and later entered Ethiopia. </p>
<p>However, the details of the peace agreement were not made public and there was no clarity on its legal grounds. The peace agreement soon failed to deliver the expected outcome of peace, amid <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">renewed violence</a>. </p>
<p>I am a political scholar of Ethiopia with an interest in the country’s federal governance and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361708000_The_extra_constitutionality_of_election_postponement_in_Ethiopia_amidst_COVID-19_pandemic">constitution</a>. My 2022 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370692256_The_causes_and_consequences_of_the_2018_failed_peace_agreement_between_the_Oromo_Liberation_Front_and_the_Ethiopian_government">research paper</a> examined the main reasons for the failure of the 2018 peace agreement. </p>
<p>I found that the most notable reasons were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>there was no signed pact, which meant that there was no clear plan</p></li>
<li><p>the presence of competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of political will from both sides</p></li>
<li><p>the absence of a democratic ethos among both parties. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Many peace agreements between the Oromo Liberation Front and Ethiopia had been concluded since the early <a href="https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/irbc/1993/en/93314">1990s</a> but did not bring the required stability. They were not durable because they did not address the factors at the core of their dispute. It is my view that these reasons also played a big part in the failure of the subsequent rounds of peace talks in 2018 and 2023. </p>
<p>A lasting peace can only be achieved when conflicting parties are willing to address the fundamental problems that trigger Ethiopia’s political challenges. </p>
<h2>A failed peace pact</h2>
<p>The first signs of failure came in September 2018, when more than 60 non-Oromo civilians were <a href="https://borkena.com/2018/09/16/oromo-ethno-nationalists-massacred-at-least-60-ethiopians/">killed</a> in Oromia region on the outskirts of western Addis Ababa. This alarmed many Ethiopians because it occurred shortly after the agreement was made.</p>
<p>Later, <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/10/07/charges-state-that-hachalus-assassins-were-part-of-olf-shane-anti-government-plot/">Hachalu Hundessa, a popular Oromo singer, was assassinated</a> in Addis Ababa. The government claimed that the assassination was part of the Oromo Liberation Front’s anti-government plot. This heightened the tension between the front and the Ethiopian government. On 23 June 2018, there was also an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45678760">assassination attempt targeting Abiy</a>.</p>
<p>From here on mutual suspicions overshadowed the peace agreement. It eventually collapsed for the following reasons.</p>
<p><strong>No signed document:</strong> A clear roadmap is central to post-conflict recovery and a pillar of any peace agreement. The 2018 Asmara peace agreement was reached without a written signed accord. </p>
<p>In August 2018, the Oromo Liberation Front leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire in response to Abiy’s request for dialogue with armed groups. This led to the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/8/7/ethiopia-signs-deal-with-oromo-rebels-to-end-hostilities">7 August 2018</a> peace agreement to halt hostilities and restore peace and stability.</p>
<p>The deal was short-lived. Conflicting reports about what was agreed were traded between government and the Oromo Liberation Front. The absence of a signed peace agreement made the environment more volatile. </p>
<p><strong>Competing factions within the Oromo Liberation Front:</strong> The emergence of new factions has historically been the party’s weak point. Less than eight months after returning to Ethiopia, one Oromo Liberation Front faction and the army wing released a statement stating that the Oromo Liberation Army had separated from the front. </p>
<p>Over time, the Oromo Liberation Front has splintered into at least eight different groups. These include the Oromo Liberation Army, the Oromo Liberation Front, a secret grouping known as Abba Torbe and Oromo Democratic Front, which denounces the use of violence. </p>
<p>The extent to which the Oromo Liberation Front controls its armed wing is <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">unclear</a>. <a href="https://docslib.org/doc/984072/report-of-a-home-office-fact-finding-mission-ethiopia-the-political-situation">According</a> to the Life and Peace Institute, an international peacebuilding lobby, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is difficult for the government to identify OLF combatants…there is no clear definition between members, fighters and supporters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divisions within the Oromo political elite and the history of competition among the Oromo opposition forces point to the failed peace effort.</p>
<p><strong>Lack of political goodwill:</strong> It appears that although the moment might have appeared ripe for a peace agreement in 2018, neither party was ready for such an agreement. The government tried to exercise strong control from the centre and was reluctant to manage conflict peacefully with the Oromo Liberation Front.</p>
<p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides. The absence of a democratic ethos on both sides also weakened the agreement.</p>
<p><strong>Unclear demands:</strong> The Oromo Liberation Front’s political options have not been clear and consistent. It’s <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/3360-exploring-new-political-alternatives-for-the-oromo">not clear at any given time</a> whether their demand is substantial autonomy for the Oromo people within an Ethiopian federation or an independent sovereign Oromo state. The strategy swings wildly between a political solution and an armed struggle.</p>
<h2>Difficult environment to pursue peace</h2>
<p>Following the 2018 Asmara peace agreement, the internal political intricacies of Ethiopia drastically deteriorated. The democratic reform and euphoria brought by Abiy Ahmed, which included him winning the 2019 <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-nobel-war.html">Nobel peace prize</a>, soon faded.</p>
<p>One of the factors that made Ethiopia less stable after the peace agreement was the postponement of elections, partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s decision to delay the election was considered a power grab and an unconstitutional term extension. It was rejected by most opposition parties and it led to the war with the Tigray regional government. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has since descended into civil war with ethnically motivated killings, religious conflict and displacement throughout the country. These constraints weaken the Ethiopian government’s ability to implement any peace agreement. It’s the setting in which a new round of peace talks in Tanzania was also doomed to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marew Abebe Salemot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The peace agreement was short-lived largely due to the absence of open and genuine commitments by both sides.Marew Abebe Salemot, Lecturer of Federalism, Debark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922522022-10-16T07:51:53Z2022-10-16T07:51:53ZTigray has resisted Ethiopia’s far greater military might for two years – here’s why neither side is giving in<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489408/original/file-20221012-20-g31ivm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters in the UK demonstrate against Ethiopia's Tigray war in October 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mike Kemp/In Pictures via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/tigray-has-resisted-ethiopias-far-greater-military-might-for-two-years-heres-why-neither-side-is-giving-in-192252&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war started on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">4 November 2020</a>. For almost two years, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea – along with Amhara regional forces and militia – have waged war against Tigray’s regional government and society. </p>
<p>Tigray is a tiny ethnonational group that makes up about <a href="https://www.atlasofhumanity.com/tigray">6%</a> of Ethiopia’s population of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/">121 million</a>. Yet, it has been able to hold off well-armed military forces.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who has <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">written extensively</a> on the cultures of nationalism in the region, I have studied the deep and complex roots of this conflict. I believe that understanding its history is key to comprehending how Tigray has developed the resolve to hold off a far greater military might than its own.</p>
<p>Neither the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea nor those of Tigray accept the principles of compromise, peaceful coexistence or equal partnership. According to their political cultures, winners take all. It’s zero-sum politics.</p>
<h2>The war today</h2>
<p>The Ethiopian National Defence Force <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">captured Mekelle</a>, Tigray’s capital city, on 28 November 2020. The Ethiopian army was helped by Eritrean and Amhara military forces. </p>
<p>Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, congratulated his army and allied forces for what looked like a quick victory. </p>
<p>However, the Tigrayan Defence Force made a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/battle-mekelle-and-its-implications-ethiopia">tactical retreat</a>. Its troops moved to rural areas and used guerrilla operations supported by war veterans. This strategy demonstrated Tigray’s effective fighting force, which was first developed in the 1970s.</p>
<p>As a result, eight months after the start of the war, Tigrayan troops returned to their capital. The Ethiopian army <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">retreated</a> from Mekelle and other cities.</p>
<p>Tigrayan troops then invaded the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, and almost made it into Finfinnee (<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tigrayan-forces-advance-toward-ethiopian-capital/av-59712725">Addis Ababa</a>) in November 2021. However, they soon retreated to their region.</p>
<p>Since then, Tigrayan forces have controlled and administered most of Tigray. </p>
<iframe title="The regions of Ethiopia" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-yEyyR" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/yEyyR/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ethio-Tigray war has been <a href="https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=305544#p1331271">devastating</a> for Tigrayans. They have faced mass killings, military bombardment, rape, looting and the destruction of property. The conflict has denied them access to food, electricity, telecommunications, medicine, banking services and other necessities. </p>
<p>Yet they support the Tigray Defence Force. To understand why requires a deeper reading of Ethiopia’s history.</p>
<h2>A complex history</h2>
<p>Two Amhara emperors and one Tigrayan emperor laid the foundation of the modern imperial state of Ethiopia. The first emperor of Abyssinia/Ethiopia was Tewodros (1855-1868). He was followed by Yohannes IV (1872-1889) of Tigray and then Menelik II (1889-1913). </p>
<p>Under Menelik II, the Amhara state elite replaced Tigray’s leaders. They made Tigrayan society a junior partner in building the Ethiopian empire. </p>
<p>But Tigrayan nationalists believe their society was the foundation of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-risks-wiping-out-centuries-of-the-worlds-history-179829">Ethiopia's war in Tigray risks wiping out centuries of the world's history</a>
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<p>In the last decades of the 1800s, the Ethiopian empire <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">expanded</a> from its northern core of Tigray and Amhara by colonising the Oromo and other ethnonational groups. </p>
<p>It established slavery, the nafxanya-gabbar system (semi-slavery) and the colonial land-holding system by taking the land of conquered people. </p>
<p>The nafxanya (gun-carrying settlers) elite – led by the Amhara – dislodged the Tigrayan elite from Ethiopian state power. Tigray was pushed to the periphery of an Amhara-dominated society. This created <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/isbn/9781685855772/html?lang=en">political rivalry</a> between the two groups. </p>
<p>The status and living conditions of the Tigrayan elite and people deteriorated. This, along with several wars in the region, aggravated political, economic and social problems. </p>
<p>Accumulated grievances and many forms of resistance produced the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 1975. It aimed to <a href="https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/a-political-history-of-the-tigray-peoples-liberation-front-1975-1">liberate Tigrayans</a> from Amhara-led governments. This helped develop Tigrayan nationalism. </p>
<h2>Tigray’s two nationalisms</h2>
<p>Tigrayans maintain two forms of nationalism. </p>
<p>The first promotes Tigrayan autonomy, self-reliance and development. </p>
<p>The second is Tigrayan Ethiopianism. This theoretically maintains Ethiopia’s current geopolitical boundary, with its decentralised political structures where different population groups have some autonomy. </p>
<p>After building military power in the 1980s, Tigrayan elite <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Cultural-Capital-and-Prospects-for-Democracy-in-Botswana-and-Ethiopia/Jalata/p/book/9780367786373">dominated</a> other ethnonational groups, particularly the Oromo, the empire’s largest ethnonational group. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2018, the Tigrayan elite <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-lies-behind-the-war-in-tigray-150147">controlled</a> state power and the political economy. The Tigrayan elite created a pseudo-democracy. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was the mover and shaker of the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The Oromo expressed their collective grievances with this political arrangement through the struggles of the Oromo Liberation Front. The Qeerroo/Qarree (Oromo youth) movement got involved between 2014 and 2018. This eventually <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">dislodged Tigrayan leadership</a> from Ethiopian central power in 2018. </p>
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<p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-young-ethiopians-in-oromia-and-sidama-fought-for-change-161440">Why young Ethiopians in Oromia and Sidama fought for change</a>
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<p>Abiy was a member of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation, a subsidiary political party of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The Tigrayan Front, alongside its allied organisations, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/28/abiy-ahmed-elected-as-chairman-of-ethiopias-ruling-coalition">elected Abiy</a> as Ethiopia’s prime minister in April 2018. He later turned on his support base. </p>
<p>Once he came to power, Abiy and his allies believed they wouldn’t stay in control if they did not destroy Tigrayan and Oromo nationalists. These were symbolised by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo youth movement. </p>
<h2>Zero-sum politics</h2>
<p>Tigrayan and Amhara elites express and practice Ethiopianism differently.</p>
<p>The Amhara elite dominated Ethiopia from 1889 to 1991. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front overthrew them in 1991. </p>
<p>The wealth and experience Tigrayan elite accumulated over nearly three decades increased their national organisational capacity. This has helped them in the current war. </p>
<p>The Oromo have rejected the dominance and tyranny of both these groups. They have carried out their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">liberation struggle</a>.</p>
<p>Abiy and his Amhara collaborators are fighting Tigrayans, Oromos and others to control Ethiopian state power. Their winning the war in Tigray and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-other-conflict-whats-driving-the-violence-in-oromia-187035">Oromia</a> would allow the Abiy regime to continue a modified version of Ethiopia’s pre-1991 policy. </p>
<p>For Tigrayans, losing this battle would be equivalent to losing political power and returning to victimisation, poverty and the threat of annihilation. </p>
<h2>Uncertain future</h2>
<p>Given their complicated political history, reconciling the central government and the Tigrayan regional government is challenging. Even if these two groups negotiate a peace deal, conflict will continue if the Oromo are left out of the process. </p>
<p>If Tigray and Oromia’s political problems aren’t correctly understood and resolved, conflicts will continue until the collapse of the Ethiopian state.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Leaders at the centre of the Ethio-Tigray war don’t believe in equal partnership. In their political cultures, winners take all.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870352022-07-20T13:56:51Z2022-07-20T13:56:51Z‘Ethiopia’s other conflict’: what’s driving the violence in Oromia?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474614/original/file-20220718-16-r6d178.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Oromo women protest against Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed over violence in their homeland in 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keith Mayhew via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2020 an outbreak of violence in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified">Ethiopia’s Tigray region</a> captured worldwide attention. The conflict was between Tigrayan forces and the forces of the Ethiopian government and its allies. </p>
<p>Since then, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been under <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/abiy-walks-fine-line-in-possible-peace-talks-in-ethiopia-20220619">increasing global pressure</a> to negotiate with Tigrayan officials to stop the carnage in the region. </p>
<p>Even before fighting broke out in Tigray, though, the government had established military command posts in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest state. Oromo people were <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-oromo-protests-mark-a-change-in-ethiopias-political-landscape-63779">protesting</a> and calling for self-determination. </p>
<p>In Oromia’s latest wave of violence in June 2022, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2022/6/25/whats-behind-the-recent-ethnic-violence-in-ethiopia">Al Jazeera</a>, the <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/more-than-200-feared-dead-in-ethiopia-massacre/">New York Times</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-gunmen-killed-338-people-oromiya-region-june-2022-06-30/">Reuters</a> reported that hundreds of people had been killed by the Oromo Liberation Army in Wallaga, Oromia.</p>
<p>These news reports labelled all the victims Amharas, members of Ethiopia’s second-largest ethno-national group. The Oromo are the largest. </p>
<p>As a scholar of Ethiopian politics and society, I’ve <a href="https://works.bepress.com/asafa_jalata/">researched and written extensively</a> on the Oromo movement, and identified the historical forces that have shaped its current politics. </p>
<p>My understanding – taking into account the history of oppression of the Oromo in Ethiopia and numerous reports by rights groups of attacks against the community – is that the violence in Oromia is mainly driven by the federal government and its agents. The <a href="https://olacommunique.com/">Oromo Liberation Army</a> is responding to state terrorism and gross human rights violations.</p>
<p>Oromo voices are <a href="https://minorityrights.org/minorities/oromo/">not represented</a> in the Ethiopian government, the global system or the media. The federal government and its allies, particularly Amhara elites and forces, blame the Oromo movement for the violence. This is a <a href="https://borkena.com/2022/06/24/creeping-genocide-in-ethiopia-dawit-w-giorgis/">strategy</a> to delegitimise the Oromo struggle for self-determination. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/genocide-in-ethiopia-why-answering-the-question-will-be-a-challenge-160872">Genocide in Ethiopia? Why answering the question will be a challenge</a>
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<h2>Oromo identity</h2>
<p>The Oromo <a href="https://www.unrepresentedunitednations.org/en/unrepresented-united-nations-directory/oromo-en">consider themselves a nation</a>. They are estimated to make up between 35% and 50% of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population">115 million people</a>. An exact figure is difficult to come by as the government doesn’t provide this data. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has about 80 ethno-national groups. The Amhara make up about 27% of the population. Their language, culture, history and religion have dominated other ethno-national groups. Their warlords and leaders have dominated Ethiopia’s political economy for almost 150 years. </p>
<p>Despite their numbers, the Oromo consider themselves colonial subjects. This is because, like other subjugated ethno-national groups, they have been denied access to their country’s political, economic and cultural resources. </p>
<p>Habasha (Amhara-Tigray) warlords <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Invention-Ethiopia-Dependent-Colonial-Northeast/dp/093241558X">colonised</a> Oromia. The region was then incorporated into Abyssinia (the Ethiopian Empire) in the late 19th century. </p>
<p>Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, established a form of colonialism that settled Amhara, Tigrayan and other ethnic soldiers in Oromia. Most Oromos were reduced to serfs, providing free labour and tax revenue.</p>
<p>The colonial government claimed about three-quarters of Oromo lands for its officials and soldiers. It granted the remaining quarter to Oromo collaborators.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, to oppose political, economic and cultural marginalisation, Oromo nationalists created the Oromo Liberation Front. Its military wing is the Oromo Liberation Army. They wanted national self-determination and democracy, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill">participated</a> in the failed revolutions of 1974, 1991 and 2018. </p>
<p>The Ethiopian state has continued to subject the Oromo people to violence and human rights violations. Successive Ethiopian governments have <a href="https://www.scirp.org/pdf/SM20110100003_59514457.pdf">caused</a> deep social, political, cultural and economic crises in Oromo society.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopians-are-losing-faith-in-abiys-promises-for-peace-126440">Why Ethiopians are losing faith in Abiy's promises for peace</a>
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<h2>Drivers of violence</h2>
<p>The government and the Oromo Liberation Front have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/new-killings-in-ethiopias-oromia">blamed each other</a> for the latest outbreak of violence in Oromia, particularly in Wallaga.</p>
<p>A sub-group of the Oromo, the Macha, live in Wallaga. They have been targets of the Ethiopian government and expansionist Amharas, who <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2X2UIvv6Jac">claim</a> to be the original owners of the region. </p>
<p>During the famine of the 1970s, desperate Tigrayans, Amharas and Oromos from elsewhere settled in Wallaga. Amhara expansionists began to call all these people Amharas to justify their claim to the territory.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Ahmed has <a href="https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/01/23/the-peace-that-delivered-total-war-against-tigray/">taken the side</a> of Amhara expansionists. </p>
<p>Ahmed came to power in 2018 mainly because of the Oromo struggle but later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-oromos-insight-idUSKCN1N7108">turned against</a> the movement. His vision is of a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/7/abiys-efforts-to-unify-ethiopia-could-lead-to-its-disintegration">centralised state</a> rather than self-determination for Ethiopia’s different groups. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-is-involved-in-tigray-to-boost-its-stature-why-the-strategy-could-backfire-175591">Eritrea is involved in Tigray to boost its stature. Why the strategy could backfire</a>
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<p>The state’s <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/oromia-and-ethiopia-state-formation-and-ethnonational-conflict-1868-2004/oclc/938275015?referer=di&ht=edition">ideology</a> of “Ethiopianism” has been used to justify the subordination of the Oromo and other colonised peoples. It has empowered the class that dominates the bureaucracy, army, culture, Orthodox Christianity and Ethiopian colonial-political economy.</p>
<p>The Oromo Liberation Army, which has been <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-race-and-ethnicity-kenya-ethiopia-abiy-ahmed-16cef83f823be6f0d485d9e8eddd4792">outlawed and labelled a terror group</a>, asserts that the government has created a clandestine security structure that <a href="https://olacommunique.com/2022/06/20/the-abiy-regimes-militia-are-responsible-for-the-tole-massacre-of-west-wollega/">masquerades</a> as the Oromo army. It says this structure is responsible for the latest attack and those before it.</p>
<p>Between December 2018 and December 2019, in southern Oromia, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/29/ethiopias-security-forces-accused-of-torture-evictions-and-killings-report">government soldiers</a> displaced 80,000 Oromos and detained more than 10,000. </p>
<p>An Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/ethiopia-rape-extrajudicial-executions-homes-set-alight-in-security-operations-in-amhara-and-oromia/">report</a> found that state soldiers executed 52 people over this period on suspicion that they supported the Oromo Liberation Army. </p>
<p>The government additionally took incarcerated Oromos through mandatory training for several months. These detainees were trained on the constitution and the history of the Oromo people. These “lessons” were intended to get the detainees to abandon the quest for nationalism.</p>
<p>A July 2022 Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/ethiopias-other-conflict">report</a> termed the government’s actions in western Oromia “abusive”. It documented communication shutdowns, executions and arbitrary detentions. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>The global community must pressure the Ethiopian government to reach peace with the Oromo Liberation Army. However, this will only be successful if a neutral body mediates on behalf of the United Nations. </p>
<p>Ahmed’s government is willing to negotiate with the Tigrayan defence forces mainly because of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-giving-talks-chance">pressure</a> from global powers. However, it refuses to reconcile with the Oromo Liberation Front and is determined to solve a political problem militarily. </p>
<p>Ethiopia cannot be at peace without an independent reconciliation body that solves the Oromo political problem fairly and democratically.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asafa Jalata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethiopia’s largest region is pushing for self-determination - it hasn’t gone down well with Abiy Ahmed’s vision of a centralised state.Asafa Jalata, Professor of Sociology and Global and Africana Studies, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1067882018-12-06T13:40:53Z2018-12-06T13:40:53ZAbiy’s big steps shouldn’t obscure undercurrents in Ethiopia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247696/original/file-20181128-32197-1wwj3qq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of the Ethiophian Oromo Liberation Front hold a protest in front of the Chancellery in Berlin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Wolfgang Kumm</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Positive headlines about Ethiopia have been frequent since the country’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took over in early April. </p>
<p>One of the biggest steps he’s taken has been the <a href="https://theconversation.com/eritrea-and-ethiopia-have-made-peace-how-it-happened-and-what-next-99683">rapprochement with Eritrea</a>, which ended the longstanding conflict between the two countries. He agreed to adhere to a border ruling that gave disputed territories to Eritrea, ending a cold war that had raged between the two countries since 2000. On 11 September, the land border between the two countries was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-border-opens.html">reopened</a>. </p>
<p>Abiy also invited armed opposition groups, including the <a href="http://oromoliberationfront.org/english/">Oromo Liberation Front</a> and Ginbot 7 <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/09/09/ethiopia-govt-welcomes-leadership-of-ginbot-7-back-home/">G7</a> – which were declared terrorist organisations under the former leaders – back home. And in October, Abiy gave women in Ethiopia a big boost when he appointed the country’s <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-president-sahle-work-zewde-female-woman-gender-equality-feminism-a8602566.html">first female president</a>. He also gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ethiopias-new-cabinet-fits-into-ahmeds-reform-agenda-105231">half of all cabinet posts to women</a>. </p>
<p>The global media – as well as ordinary Ethiopians – have been positive about the country’s improved political gender representation as well as its focus on regional peace and on reducing ethnic tensions domestically. </p>
<p>But this shouldn’t obscure the fact that <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-ethnic-violence-is-destabilising-ethiopias-reform-gains-103928">ethnic tensions remain rife</a> on the ground, and could flare up at any point. There are three disturbing trends in Ethiopia: tensions within the ruling party as well as a lack of a formal road map to outline where it’s taking the country; continued ethnic tensions; and the lack of transparency around the deals done with insurgent groups.</p>
<h2>Weak points</h2>
<p>One of the biggest concerns is that the state’s capacity to maintain the rule of law and guarantee security is degenerating.</p>
<p>A number of factors are contributing to this. Firstly the ruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Party, has been embedded in institutions running the security services for a long time. The lower echelons of these services are confused and bewildered as the new order takes hold. They have no clear direction from the top.</p>
<p>In addition, law enforcement agencies at federal and regional levels seem unresponsive to local ethnic strife. This is troubling given that the country has been <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-president-sahle-work-zewde-female-woman-gender-equality-feminism-a8602566.html">hit by a new wave of ethnic conflicts</a>. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre report for Ethiopia, the total number of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tops-global-list-highest-internal-displacement-2018">internally displaced</a> people is nearly 1.4 million – and rising. </p>
<p>Ethnic tensions continue to pose a threat to major cities like Addis Ababa. At the same time former rebel groups have <a href="http://www.ebc.et/web/news-en/-/-olf-should-disarm-its-fighters-that-are-not-disarmed-yet-government">resisted calls to disarm</a> their soldiers. The circulation and trade of armaments are visible and worrisome in many cities.</p>
<p>Another big threat is the fact that the ruling party doesn’t seem to have a formal road map which tracks the country’s next steps. As a senior party member from Southern Ethiopia put it to one of us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are not quite sure where the country is heading to.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A close watch</h2>
<p>The looming uncertainty placed massive expectations on the recent <a href="https://ethiopianembassy.be/en/2018/10/03/much-awaited-eprdf-11th-congress-begins-today/">11th party congress</a> that was held in Hawassa. The congress concluded <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/06/c_129966277.htm">without making any remarkable decisions</a>. </p>
<p>Another big area of concern is the lack of transparency over the exact terms of the various agreements with former rebel organisations. This lack of information has led to conspiracy theories circulating about the terms on which insurgent groups have been demobilised.</p>
<p>Lastly, there is tension between Abiy’s attempts to create a sense of identity beyond ethnicities while at the same time attempting to accommodate several of the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/managing-ethiopia-political-crisis-180205113035729.html">ethno-nationalist agendas</a> of certain constituencies. </p>
<p>Amid the rise of regional and international jubilation over Abiy’s rise friends of Ethiopia, international institutions, and global powers like the US should carefully watch these trends and their possible negative consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There have been positive changes in Ethiopia but major challenges, including ethnic tensions, remain.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesYeshitila Wondemeneh Bekele, Assistant professor, Hawassa UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1068812018-11-14T09:00:12Z2018-11-14T09:00:12ZSanctions are being lifted against Eritrea. Here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/245332/original/file-20181113-194503-z44yzi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rapprochement between Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrea's President Isaias Afwerki has changed the dynamics in the region. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/STRINGER</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Nations Security Council is <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSKCN1NH2C2?fbclid=IwAR0QTcwmqV08AQft11WIYhf6asD8ommfa0jRg5EcrRG0gjG_7AU9FmYJWUs">about to lift an arms embargo and targeted sanctions</a> against Eritrea. UN Security Council <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1907%282009%29">resolution 1907</a>, which was passed in 2009, noted that the Eritrean government was backing Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia government as well as other movements attempting to undermine the Ethiopian state. </p>
<p>The sanctions were <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2023%282011%29">strengthened</a> over the years, particularly following Eritrea’s refusal to resolve its border dispute with Djibouti in 2011.</p>
<p>The Eritrean government has routinely denied allegations that it armed these groups. To bolster its case it has pointed to the assessment of long-time ally, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, who <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-sanctions-pure-bullying-herman-cohen/">declared</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>All accusations against Eritrea regarding alleged assistance to the Islamist terrorist group Al-Shabaab in Somalia have never been substantiated.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Security Council established an expert monitoring group to report on the evidence of Eritrean activities. Over the years it has produced extensive reports, running into hundreds of pages. These gave the council plenty of reasons to ratchet up its isolation of the country.</p>
<p>So what’s changed? There have been three fundamental shifts. First, evidence that Eritrea is supporting Al-Shabaab has becoming increasingly thin. Second, the country is no longer as isolated as it used to be. Finally, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has changed the region’s dynamics.</p>
<h2>The evidence</h2>
<p>The monitoring group’s <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433">2011 report</a> was particularly important in presenting the case of Eritrean involvement in Somalia and its backing for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The experts obtained what the monitors described as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>firm evidence of Eritrean support for armed opposition groups throughout the region, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan. Support for these groups also involves Eritrean diplomatic, intelligence and PFDJ-affiliated networks in Kenya, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The monitors went on to say that the: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Government of Eritrea acknowledges that it maintains relationships with Somali armed opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab, but characterises these linkages as political (and, in one particular case, as “humanitarian”), while denying that it provides any military, material or financial support. Evidence and testimony obtained by the Monitoring Group, including records of financial payments, interviews with eyewitnesses and data relating to maritime and aviation movements, all indicate that Eritrean support for Somali armed opposition groups is not limited to the political or humanitarian dimensions. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The monitors’ description of training facilities was said to be based largely, but not exclusively, on interviews with more than 100 former members of six armed opposition groups, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Al-Shabaab</p></li>
<li><p>Hisb’ul Islam/Somali Islamic Front</p></li>
<li><p>Hisb’ul Islam / ARS Asmara</p></li>
<li><p>Ogaden National Liberation Front </p></li>
<li><p>Oromo Liberation Front, and </p></li>
<li><p>Front Pour le Restauration de la Démocratie </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/28/eritrea-planned-ethopia-bomb-attack">an appendix</a> to the report the experts provided details that backed their conclusions. These including photographs of the groups undergoing training and details of a planned attack by the Oromo Liberation Front on the African Union Summit in 2011.</p>
<h2>What did sanctions do?</h2>
<p>The sanctions were always <a href="https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751/resolutions?page=1">limited in their scope</a>. They sought to halt weapons supplies and to impede key government officials’ travel plans and economic interests.</p>
<p>Eritrea complained that the sanctions resulted in real harm to its <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/10/06/eritrea-outlines-economic-injuries-caused-by-un-sanctions/">economic interests</a>. In reality, however, the impact was weak. </p>
<p>Eritrea managed to use its network of contacts among the diaspora around the world to evade most of their effects. They were nevertheless an irritant, suggesting as they did that the government was a pariah state. </p>
<p>This, together with the government’s record of human rights abuses, resulted in scathing findings by the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIEritrea/Pages/commissioninquiryonhrinEritrea.aspx">UN Commission on Human Rights</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the lifting</h2>
<p>There are three reasons for the ending of sanctions. </p>
<p>Firstly, the UN <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/security-council-intention-review-eritrea-sanctions/">accepted some years ago</a> that there is no longer evidence of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab.</p>
<p>Secondly, Eritrea has broken out of international isolation. It is now a key ally of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in their war in Yemen. Eritrea provides <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44500455">bases from which both operate</a>.</p>
<p>Europe, too, has embraced the Eritrean government. This is an attempt <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/eritrea/tackling-root-causes-human-trafficking-and-smuggling-eritrea-need-empirically">to halt the flow </a> of Eritrean refugees across the Mediterranean and into Italy. </p>
<p>Thirdly, and most importantly, there has been a reconciliation between the formerly warring parties in the Horn of Africa. The breakthrough came from an initiative by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed, who ended hostilities with his neighbour. His visit to the Eritrean capital, Asmara, in June received a huge <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/ethiopia-pm-abiy-ahmed-eritrea-landmark-visit-180708083000438.html">popular welcome</a>. </p>
<p>This was followed by visits by Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki to Addis Ababa and finally to a <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/11/10/eritrea-ethiopia-pledge-to-respect-somalia-s-sovereignty/">tripartite meeting</a> between the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.</p>
<p>In the past Somalia and Ethiopia were – along with Djibouti – the main proponents of sanctions against Eritrea. Now that they’ve reconciled, international support for UN sanctions has evaporated.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The Eritrean government is likely to celebrate the lifting of sanctions as a major achievement. But their problems will not be at an end. </p>
<p>Unlike neighbouring Ethiopia, the Eritrean government has not introduced a programme of democratic reforms or improved its human rights. The opening of the border with Ethiopia has resulted in thousands of Eritreans streaming out of the country. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-eritrean-refugee-influx-dg-echo-unhcr-nrc-echo-daily-flash-26-september">Up to 500</a> are crossing daily into Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Nor will all pressure on the Eritrean government end. The US continues to list Eritrea as among <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2018USCIRFAR.pdf">the worst states</a> for religious persecution. As a result, Washington will continue to deny visas to a range of senior Eritrean government officials. Other nations, such as the Netherlands, may also maintain a range of measures. </p>
<p>In the long run, however, the response of the Eritrean public will determine just how significant a moment this will be for President Afwerki and his government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106881/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Martin Plaut is affiliated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London</span></em></p>The lifting of UN Sanctions is unlikely to end internal and external pressure for reform and greater democracy in Eritrea.Martin Plaut, Senior Research Fellow, Horn of Africa and Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.