tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/peace-deals-32848/articlesPeace deals – The Conversation2023-08-15T14:08:27Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113552023-08-15T14:08:27Z2023-08-15T14:08:27ZSouth Sudan is gearing up for its first election – 3 things it must get right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542338/original/file-20230811-21-9migfb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan President Salva Kiir (left) and Vice President Riek Machar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Louis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of South Sudan have not exercised the right to choose their leaders since the referendum that secured <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/new-nation-born">independence from Sudan in 2011</a>. Instead, they have suffered through cycles of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudans-12-years-of-independence-triumphs-and-challenges/a-66151967">violent conflict</a> that have prevented the democratic transfer of power. </p>
<p>South Sudan descended into violent conflict less than three years after independence. It signed its first <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf">peace agreement in 2015</a>. This collapsed in less than a year and was followed by another wave of violence. The 2015 peace agreement was resuscitated in <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018</a> with hope it would lead to a newly elected government in February 2023. </p>
<p>After failing to fully implement the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, the signatories <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15219.doc.htm">extended its term for 24 months</a> to allow for better preparation for elections in December 2024. The elections, however, may be extended again. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luka-Kuol-2">studied</a> constitution-making, security governance and post-conflict transitions. I also served as a minister in the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan National Government of Unity in 2005. In my view, postponing polls has become a currency in South Sudan, making a democratic transition through elections an elusive quest. However, it’s possible to hold elections if there is political will. </p>
<p>A recent public opinion survey showed that the majority of South Sudanese <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf#page=11">are opposed to any further delays</a> to elections. Church leaders and civil society organisations have also <a href="https://cityreviewss.com/no-more-extension-the-church-adds-voice-in-call-for-general-election/">called</a> for elections. These sentiments indicate that the South Sudanese are tired of a status quo where the ruling elite clings to political power through endless power-sharing arrangements rather than through the ballot. </p>
<p>Three key things are needed for a credible poll: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>electoral laws to guide the process</p></li>
<li><p>voter registration and constituency boundaries</p></li>
<li><p>a safe environment to vote in.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Providing what’s needed</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">major political and logistical challenges</a> in the way of an election in South Sudan. Resolving them will require hard choices and difficult trade-offs. </p>
<p><strong>Electoral laws:</strong> one of the big issues in the political reforms process is whether the elections will be conducted under a permanent constitution – which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">still being drafted</a> – or the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011">current constitution</a>. A permanent constitution is one of the prerequisites for the conduct of election under the 2018 peace deal. However, tying a permanent constitution to the conduct of elections was unrealistic. Permanent constitution-making takes time. It requires the effective participation of citizens, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home areas. </p>
<p>Also, the permanent constitution should be ratified by an elected parliament. Not the current handpicked 650 members of the national legislature who are part of South Sudan’s elite power-sharing arrangements. </p>
<p>The amended <a href="https://www.fd.uc.pt/g7+/pdfs/South_Sudan.pdf">2011 transitional constitution</a>, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SS/south-sudan-the-national-elections-act-no.-39-of/view">2012 elections Act</a> and the <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018 revitalised peace agreement</a> can provide the basis for laws to guide the 2024 elections. </p>
<p><strong>Voter registration:</strong> another necessary condition for the conduct of elections is a population census. This is important for voter registration and the drawing of constituency boundaries. However, it would be ideal to conduct such a census when there is relative stability, and displaced persons and refugees can return to their homelands. </p>
<p>A population census will take time, though. So how can South Sudan register voters and draw boundaries without one? Political elites need to make the <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">strategic decision</a> to either use the 2010 constituency boundaries, population estimates or voter registration data. Given rapid demographic shifts – <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/">40%</a> of the country’s population has been forcefully displaced – projections based on the <a href="http://ssnbs.microdatahub.com/index.php/catalog/6/study-description">2008 census</a> could be used to reflect these changes. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ssnbss.org/">National Bureau of Statistics</a> and other research centres, such as the public policy think-tank <a href="https://www.suddinstitute.org/">Sudd Institute</a>, could objectively make population projections. Combined, these data sets can provide reasonable estimates for voter registration and drawing boundaries for constituencies.</p>
<p><strong>Security, and political and civic space:</strong> violent conflict still plagues South Sudan. Should elections be held when there is greater security? Or be organised under the current conditions in the hope that they will produce a legitimate government that promotes peace? A <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf">public perceptions survey</a> found that despite the fear of violence, the majority of South Sudanese want elections. Creating a minimum safe and secure environment, which includes political and civic space for elections, is within the reach of political elites. Especially with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-begins-unifying-ex-rebels-and-army-3932544#:%7E:text=South%20Sudan's%20unity%20government%20has,to%20transition%20to%20professional%20soldiers.">unification and deployment of security forces</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s going right</h2>
<p>South Sudan has put in motion two major laws that could help conduct elections.</p>
<p>The first is the progressive <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/elections-act-2012-amendment-bill-tabled-before-parliament">National Elections Bill</a>. It proposes a mixed system that allows geographical representation, as well as special <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=14">parliamentary quota seats</a> for political parties and marginalised groups, such as women, persons with disabilities and the youth. This is aimed at ensuring inclusivity. It also reduces the risk of a single party holding a monopoly of power.</p>
<p>The elections bill has the potential to achieve political stability that rests on the distribution of power and resources to constituencies, as in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-illustrates-both-the-promise-as-well-as-the-pitfalls-of-devolution-96729">case of Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>The second law is the newly amended <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/parliament-passes-political-parties-act-2012-amendment-bill-2022">Political Parties Act</a>. Elections are only as credible as the parties that contest them. The amended law provides mechanisms for regulating political parties. It aims to ensure internal democratic governance and accountability in party constitutions. However, its implementation remains a challenge. For instance, the Political Parties Council hasn’t been formed, affecting the registration of political parties. </p>
<p>Most of South Sudan’s political parties are at the embryonic stage with limited or no political experience and resources. Investing in building their institutional capacities and governance will be as urgent as funding the elections. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>South Sudan is at a crossroad. Its ruling elites have to decide between continuing on the <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/12/13/elite-capture-and-popular-participation-in-south-sudans-constitution-making">endless power-sharing path</a> or heed to the demands of the people and embrace elections for state legitimacy and democratic transition.</p>
<p>The latter provides citizens with hope of a better South Sudan governed by elected leaders. Yet, political elites are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=23">becoming increasingly calculating and transactional</a> in meeting the minimum conditions for holding elections. </p>
<p>Providing funding for the elections, and related institutions and activities will test political commitment to the poll. The <a href="https://mofp.gov.ss/doc/MinisterofFinancandPlanning-BudgetSpeechFY2023_2024.pdf">2023-2024 budget</a> – expected to be an elections budget – failed to allocate resources for the poll. </p>
<p>The challenges facing the 2024 elections can be surmounted by collective political will. This is currently in short supply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luka Kuol is affiliated with the Abyei Community Action for Development and the Rift Vally Institute.</span></em></p>The political elite have held on to power through power-sharing arrangements rather than the ballot. How will that change?Luka Kuol, Adjunct Professor, University of JubaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2062992023-05-28T08:25:08Z2023-05-28T08:25:08ZWhat makes peace talks successful? The 4 factors that matter<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528036/original/file-20230524-15-o7zx4n.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peace talks that seek to end armed conflicts are underway in several African countries. Because very few conflicts are resolved on the battlefield, negotiations are fundamental. But they often fail. And even when an agreement is concluded, it doesn’t always last. </p>
<p>So what are the factors that lead to successful peace talks? </p>
<p>To start, negotiating peace is complex. If it wasn’t, conflicts would be resolved more quickly and peace would last longer. Recognising this complexity is essential. </p>
<p>Significant expertise has been developed in the field of peace mediation over the past decades. The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/107-au-mediation-support-unit">African Union</a> and the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/mediation-support">United Nations</a> have set up mediation teams. Several specialised non-governmental organisations have been created, like the South Africa-based organisation <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/work/peacemaking/">Accord</a> and the Switzerland-based <a href="https://hdcentre.org/about/">Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</a>. </p>
<p>These actors, along with regional powers and other states, often roll out several peace initiatives simultaneously. This can be helpful to deal with the complexity of armed conflicts. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/persons/philipp-kastner/publications/">international law and peace scholar</a>, I have analysed many different peace negotiations and agreements. There have been some great successes in Africa, such as the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MZ_921004_MozambiqueGeneralPeaceAgreement.pdf">1992 peace agreement</a> that ended the 16-year long civil war in Mozambique. </p>
<p>But there have also been spectacular failures, like in Sierra Leone, where fighting flared up just after the conclusion of a <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SL_990707_LomePeaceAgreement.pdf">comprehensive agreement in 1999</a>. And there are several ongoing conflicts that urgently require a peaceful resolution, for example in <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/jeddah-agreement-welcomed-but-also-met-with-scepticism-in-sudan">Sudan</a>, the <a href="https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/HRC/51/59&Lang=E">Central African Republic</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">Democratic Republic of Congo</a>. </p>
<p>Based on my research, I would argue that there are four key factors that make (or break) mediation efforts. These include a sustained commitment from several actors to building peace; serious efforts to develop trust and listen to grievances; an attunement to timing; and an acceptance of peace as a process. </p>
<h2>Building peace</h2>
<p>First, peace has a better chance when war is attacked from several sides. Multiple mediation processes can facilitate the inclusion of different stakeholders, such as civil society actors. This is crucial, precisely because more inclusive processes <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781786610256/Conflict-Intervention-and-Transformation-Theory-and-Practice">increase the chances</a> of durable peace. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, it can be problematic when too many actors are involved. In <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-the-longer-the-conflict-lasts-the-higher-the-risk-of-a-regional-war-204931">Sudan’s ongoing conflict</a>, this has led to a <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Third-Party-Mediation-in-Sudan-and-South-Sudan-Digital.pdf">piecemeal approach</a> and to <a href="https://peacerep.org/publication/third-party-mediation-in-sudan-and-south-sudan-longer-term-trends/">unhelpful competition</a> between different regional and international actors who often pursue their own interests. </p>
<p>Second, the organisation or the specific mediator in question must be trusted by the parties. A good example of this is the Catholic Community of Sant-Egidio, which facilitated the <a href="https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/34180/langID/en/Dossier-Mozambique-and-the-Community-of-Sant-Egidio.html">conclusion of the peace agreement</a> in Mozambique. </p>
<p>Building trust and listening to grievances is important. This helps find creative solutions that give guarantees to all the parties and allow them to imagine a common future.</p>
<p>But contrary to ordinary understandings of mediation, peace mediators don’t have to be perfectly neutral and unbiased. Blaise Compaoré, the former president of Burkina Faso, mediated the 2007 negotiations between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the rebellious Forces Nouvelles, which Compaoré had <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2003-1-page-71.htm">overtly supported</a>. In the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CI_070304_Accord%20Politique%20de%20Ouagadougou%20%28French%29.pdf">agreement</a> that followed, the parties made Compaoré an arbitrator in the implementation phase. In other words, a mediator can be an insider who has close relationships with one of the parties.</p>
<p>A third factor for successful peace talks is timing. Since negotiations typically take place in the shadow of military gains and losses, it’s often assumed that it only makes sense to start negotiations when both sides believe that they can gain more from negotiating than from fighting. </p>
<p>But waiting for the “ripe moment” to start high-level negotiations is problematic. It can prolong a conflict unnecessarily and lead to extreme suffering. In Sudan – where the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have been fighting each other since mid-April 2023 – more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-1-mln-people-displaced-by-sudan-crisis-un-refugee-agency-2023-05-19/">one million people</a> have already been displaced. And in the Ethiopian region of Tigray, a <a href="https://addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AU-led-Ethiopia-Peace-Agreement.pdf">ceasefire agreement</a> was concluded in November 2022, but only after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/11/joy-and-grief-as-tigray-reconnects-to-the-world">hundreds of thousands of people</a> had been killed over two years of conflict.</p>
<p>Therefore, peace actors should constantly search for entry points to create opportunities for building peace instead of waiting for the perfect conditions. They can convince the conflict parties that negotiations are not zero-sum games and don’t automatically lead to painful compromises. </p>
<p>Fourth, how “peace” is understood plays a major role. It’s often thought that no fighting means peace, and that an agreement will end violence and suffering almost instantly. This is rarely true. An agreement is only one small step in an often long process.</p>
<p>Moreover, while a ceasefire is always desirable because it means less violence and less suffering, it’s not absolutely necessary to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/peace-talks-ukraine-russias-red-lines-unchanged-2022-03-30/">negotiate substantive issues</a>. Many negotiations, from <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-War">Bosnia</a> to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20319583">Colombia</a>, have been held while fighting continued, and yet a substantive peace agreement was eventually concluded. </p>
<p>And it can be alright to agree to disagree: not everything can or needs to be resolved in the same deal. Some root causes of conflict, like the historical marginalisation of minority groups or of certain regions, can be difficult to tackle. But it’s possible to put in place measures and mechanisms to envisage improvements. </p>
<p>Partial agreements can be a good option, even if this approach obviously takes time. In Senegal, for example, it’s only earlier this year, after decades of conflict and many years of mediation, that one of the factions of the rebellious Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance <a href="https://hdcentre.org/news/une-faction-du-mfdc-signe-la-cessation-des-hostilites-avec-le-gouvernement-du-senegal-et-depose-definitivement-les-armes/">agreed to lay down its weapons</a>. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s vital to do more to prevent armed conflicts in the first place. Continuously <a href="https://www.sipri.org/news/2023/world-military-expenditure-reaches-new-record-high-european-spending-surges-0">rising military expenditures</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/arms-control/">few restrictions</a> on weapons sales mean that weapons are easily available in many places. The international community should, therefore, urgently make more efforts to halt the massive production and circulation of weapons. </p>
<p>And although every conflict has its own dynamics, poverty, global inequalities and exploitation are always significant factors. Tackling these issues isn’t straightforward, but it would help prevent and resolve armed conflicts, and would pay off in the long run. </p>
<p>Peace is a process, and it requires significant commitment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An agreement to end conflict is only one small step in an often long process.Philipp Kastner, Senior Lecturer in International Law, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023232023-03-22T16:46:24Z2023-03-22T16:46:24ZThe view from Moscow and Beijing: What peace in Ukraine and a post-conflict world look like to Xi and Putin<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/516998/original/file-20230322-20-cdc6b4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C847%2C7200%2C4083&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opening the doors to Russia and China's perception.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-president-xi-jinping-arrives-at-the-grand-kremlin-news-photo/1248945771?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just a few days after being <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-international-criminal-courts-indictment-of-putin-has-symbolic-importance-202111">branded a war criminal</a> in an international arrest warrant, Russian President Vladimir Putin was talking peace with his most important ally, Chinese president Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>The setting <a href="https://apnews.com/article/xi-putin-russia-china-summit-06b296bc6b1c0c73634ed6329d9d2015">for the get-together</a> was the late-15th-century Faceted Chamber, the ornate throne room of Muscovite grand princes and czars. The main topics of discussion were fittingly grandiose: How should hostilities in Ukraine end? And after the war is over, how should the international security system be reshaped?</p>
<p>The reaction of many in the West to the proposals put forward by China and discussed with Russia has been notably suspicious of intentions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?c5062702/secretary-blinken-chinese-president-xi-visit-moscow">warned the world</a> not to be “fooled by any tactical move by Russia, supported by China … to freeze the war on its own terms.”</p>
<p>Such sentiment is understandable. Putin launched a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-178512">brutal, unprovoked war</a> in Ukraine. Amid the heightened emotional environment of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-ukraine-group-sabotaged-pipelines-intelligence-suggests-nyt-2023-03-08/">missile attacks on civilians</a>, horrific atrocities against ordinary citizens and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64985009">deportation of children from Ukraine</a>, even a cool evaluation of ways to end the fighting, declare a cease-fire, and begin talks by the belligerents has led to <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/western-advocates-of-appeasement-need-a-crash-course-in-putinology/">accusations of appeasement</a>. And the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">peace plan</a> put forward by China on Feb. 24, 2023, and discussed with Putin during a March 20-22 meeting in Moscow has been criticized as overly vague and lacking concrete suggestions. </p>
<p>In such circumstances, it can be difficult to consider what the interest of the other side might actually be in bringing the killing to an end, and their sincerity of any purported efforts to do so.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/emeritus/rgsuny.html">a historian</a>, I ask, what does the world look like from the other side? How has the run-up to the war and the war itself been understood by Russia and China? And what do Xi and Putin envision a post-conflict world to look like?</p>
<h2>Playing by the rules – but whose?</h2>
<p>The rulers of both Russia and China see the West-dominated “<a href="http://atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/strategic-context-the-rules-based-international-system/">rules-based international order</a>” – a system that has dominated geopolitics since the end of the Second World War – as designed to uphold the global hegemony of the United States.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two men are seen in the background flanked by giant China and Russian flags. Chandeliers hang overhead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/517018/original/file-20230322-399-vhvyus.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with China’s President Xi Jinping at the Kremlin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-meets-with-chinas-news-photo/1248940335?adppopup=true">Pavel Byrkin/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The two men’s stated preference is for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/19/it-is-now-time-to-focus-on-multilateral-order/">a multilateral system</a>, one which would most probably result in a number of regional hegemons. This would include, to be sure, China and Russia holding sway in their own neighborhoods.</p>
<p>Xi put the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20230320/208baba76dc14ed78d308bfa32b9d4e2/c.html">matter rather gently</a> during his Moscow trip: “The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others, no model of governance is universal, and no single country should dictate the international order. The common interest of all humankind is in a world that is united and peaceful, rather than divided and volatile.”</p>
<p>Reflecting his more street tough style, Putin <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/70743">was more blunt</a>. Russia and China “have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain ‘rules’ serving the needs of the ‘golden billion,’” he said, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/11/21/1134445639/russia-putin-conspiracy-theory-golden-billion">referencing a theory</a> that holds that the billion people in the richest countries of the world consume the greatest portion of the world’s resources.</p>
<p>Continuing in this vein, Putin said the “crisis in Ukraine” was an example of the West trying to “retain its international dominance and preserve the unipolar world order” while splitting “the common Eurasian space into a network of ‘exclusive clubs’ and military blocs that would serve to contain our countries’ development and harm their interests.”</p>
<h2>China as peacemaker?</h2>
<p>Beijing appears intent to play the role of negotiator-in-chief in this transition to a multipolar world order.</p>
<p>After its success shouldering aside the United States and <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-left-out-china-iran-on-top-latest-deal-saudi-arabia-sign-times">brokering a rapprochement</a> between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has turned its attention to Ukraine.</p>
<p>With its <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">peace proposal on Ukraine</a>, China has deftly established certain principles to which other nations would eagerly subscribe. </p>
<p>“The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries must be effectively upheld. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members of the international community,” holds the first principle in language that would be hard to object to.</p>
<p>But those anodyne sentences point in two directions at once. Upholding sovereignty appears, at first, to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">aimed at Russia a year after</a> it had so clearly violated the sovereignty of neighboring Ukraine. But the principle also can be read to include the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/taiwan-china-relations-80761">conflict over Taiwan</a>, which is recognized by Beijing and some other states as a part of China. It is perhaps no accident that the plan’s wording comes as the U.S., which officially recognizes the position that Taiwan and mainland China are one country, has toughened its stance, vowing to <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">defend the island</a> should it be invaded.
To Beijing, the United States appears intent on turning a rival, China, into an enemy.</p>
<p>Nations, China asserts, have the right to enhance their security but not at the expense of others. This principle echoes directly one of Putin’s most frequently expressed reasons for the conflict with Ukraine: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-ukraine-conflict-is-a-war-of-narratives-and-putins-is-crumbling-192811">expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe</a> and the alliance’s promise to expand further by <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm">admitting Georgia and Ukraine</a>. In Putin’s view, such NATO encroachment is an existential threat to Russia’s security interests.</p>
<p>But the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">Chinese plan also</a> rejects Putin’s <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-the-2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/?utm_campaign=wp_the_daily_202&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_daily202">nuclear saber-rattling</a>: “The threat or use of nuclear weapons should be opposed.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Chinese strongly insist on the need for an immediate cease-fire and the start of negotiations, a call that Washington <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/blinken-xi-putin-diplomatic-cover-russia-war-crimes">vehemently rejected as a concession</a> that amounted to “diplomatic cover for Russia to continue to commit” war crimes. </p>
<h2>What will Russia settle for?</h2>
<p>Russia’s aims in the Ukraine war are simple enough to dissect, though they have been reduced after the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-ukraine-war-ukraines-surprising-resistance-rise-wartime/story?id=97255342">effective Ukrainian resistance</a> to the initial invasion. </p>
<p>Instead of taking over all of Ukraine, and perhaps setting up a puppet government, Moscow has been forced to accept limited territorial gains in the Donbas and the coastal crescent linking both the region and Russia with Crimea. Reduced though they are, such Russian goals are completely unacceptable to Ukraine and to the Western alliance – and, indeed, to all countries that accept that principle that international borders cannot be legitimately changed unilaterally by military force.</p>
<p>Although not clearly spelled out, this principle is even contained in the very first sentence of the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html">Chinese peace plan</a>: “Universally recognized international law, including the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, must be strictly observed.”</p>
<p>That notwithstanding, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/21/putin-welcomes-chinas-controversial-proposals-for-peace-in-ukraine">Putin has welcomed</a> the intervention of China and the plan in general terms.</p>
<h2>Rival global ambitions</h2>
<p>So what’s in this for Beijing, given that to many, the peace plan is already a non-starter?</p>
<p>The conflict in Ukraine is not only devastating to the two belligerents involved, but <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-has-exposed-the-folly-and-unintended-consequences-of-armed-missionaries-197609">destabilizing for states</a> around the world. In the short run, China may be benefiting from the war because it consumes attention and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3318508/us-sends-ukraine-400-million-in-military-equipment/">armaments from the West</a> and diverts its gaze from East Asia. The U.S. “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/">pivot to the east</a>” – a planned refocusing from the Obama administration onward aimed at countering the perceived threat of China – has stalled.</p>
<p>But there is an argument that Xi is most concerned with China’s renewal of economic development, which would rely on less confrontational relations with Europe and the United States. Stability, both domestically and internationally, works to China’s economic advantage as a major producer and exporter of industrial goods. And Beijing is mindful that a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/06/economy/china-two-sessions-lowest-gdp-target-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html">slump in foreign demand and investment</a> is hitting the country’s economic prospects.</p>
<p>As such, Beijing’s new role as peacemaker – whether in the Middle East or Eastern Europe – may indeed be sincere. Further, Xi may be the only person on the globe able to persuade Putin to think seriously about a way out of war.</p>
<p>Standing in the way of peace, however, is not only the current intransigence of Russia and Ukraine. The United States’ long-held foreign policy aim of maintaining its “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-myth-of-the-indispensable-nation/">indispensable nation</a>” status runs counter to Russia and China’s ambition to end American global dominance.</p>
<p>It presents two, seemingly insurmountable, rival ambitions.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This article was amended on Mar. 24, 2023 to clarify the U.S.’s position on the “One China” policy.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The setting was grand, so too was the plan. But behind the peace plan put forward by China and welcomed by Russia, is the question, what do both nations seek?Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977802023-02-24T13:13:57Z2023-02-24T13:13:57ZAll wars eventually end – here are 3 situations that will lead Russia and Ukraine to make peace<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512033/original/file-20230223-572-ddjdj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=489%2C47%2C6827%2C5191&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Ukrainian woman touches the grave of her husband, a soldier killed by Russian troops in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1468851592/photo/daily-life-in-lviv-as-war-reaches-first-anniversary.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=0SH4jmSpMN6SBaCEu7QzmStd3NRMUqfcRa2hVwZ7_AU=">Sean Gallup/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been a year since Russia first launched a full invasion of Ukraine, and, right now, peace seems impossible.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-ukraine-must-accept-realities-there-be-peace-2022-12-13/">Peace talks between</a> the two countries have launched, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/world/europe/ukraine-russia-peace-talks.html">and then faltered</a>, multiple times.</p>
<p>In February 2023, a senior Ukrainian official said that peace talks are “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/11/russia-ukraine-war-latest-updates/">out of the question</a>” – without Ukraine’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-russian-military-action-will-stop-moment-if-ukraine-meets-2022-03-07/">reclaiming its territory</a> that Russia overtook 2022. </p>
<p>All wars end, however, and research shows that <a href="https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/How-Wars-End-HCSS-2022.pdf">almost half end in some type of agreement</a> to stop the fighting. The others end in victory for one side or when, for a variety of reasons, the fighting simply peters out. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.sandiego.edu/news/biography.php?profile_id=2091">a scholar</a> of peace and conflict, I have 20 years of experience working to help people establish and maintain peace after conflict.</p>
<p>As Ukraine readies to enter its second year of a widespread war with Russia, I think it is useful to consider how wars end and what conditions need to be in place before the war between Russia and Ukraine might draw to a close.</p>
<p>Here are three key points that help assess the possibility of whether a war might end. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two rows of soldiers in green outfits and helmets hold rifles all pointed in the same direction." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512034/original/file-20230223-2933-o2vv7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian National Guard soldiers undergo combat training outside of Kyiv in February 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1247404437/photo/ukraine-war-before-anniversary-start-of-war.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=wcVgTDCh5-f7SojjZ6186C-BnbBiGBGPasbIKvzk26w=">Kay Nietfeld/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>1. A shared idea of the future</h2>
<p>The first question is whether opposing groups at war agree about what it will take for war to end – be it land, money or political control. </p>
<p>Fighting in a war is part of a wider bargaining process. Victories on the battlefield allow the winning aggressor to demand more, while defeats may mean those losing ground have to settle for less. </p>
<p>Once both sides have a clear sense of the fighting’s likely outcome, additional negotiations – or more fighting – become less important. And because <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic">war is so costly</a>, it is normally better to accept even part of an envisioned peace agreement than continue to fight. </p>
<p>At the moment, Russian and Ukraine appear to have differing opinions about the war’s likely outcome. Ukrainian forces made progress in September 2022 when they <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/09/29/1125278321/ukraine-offensive-russia-borshchova-kharkiv-oblast">retook two Ukrainian regions</a> – Kharkiv and Kherson – that Russia had occupied. So Ukraine is likely to believe that it can make more advances if it keeps on fighting. </p>
<p>Conversely, Russia successfully halted a wider <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/12/31/1145981036/war-against-ukraine-has-left-russia-isolated-and-struggling-with-more-tumult-ahe">collapse of its forces</a> and appears to be in a stronger position militarily heading into the spring <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-rebound-moscow-recovered-military-setbacks">than it was in the fall of 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>2. If war costs overtake costs of peace</h2>
<p>Beliefs in the costs of war and the costs of peace also matter. </p>
<p>If the <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/summary">costs of war</a> – including human lives, money or more intangible qualities, such as prestige – are low, one side might keep fighting for its goals. </p>
<p>The human and economic costs of this war are <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/2/19/russia-ukraine-live-news-west-unwilling-to-discuss-peace-efforts">very high for both Russia</a> and Ukraine, although they are <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/madelinehalpert/2022/05/04/russias-invasion-has-cost-ukraine-up-to-600-billion-study-suggests/?sh=12f769bd2dda">clearly much higher for Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Russian attacks in Ukraine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/10/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-casualties-deaths.html">killed at least 40,000 Ukrainian civilians</a> in the first year of this conflict, and more than <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-ballooning-costs-of-the-ukraine-war/">13 million Ukrainians</a> have had to flee their homes – about half have left the country altogether. </p>
<p>Upwards of 100,000 Ukrainian and Russian soldiers <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63580372">have also died</a> in the fighting war. </p>
<p>These losses should help create incentives for Ukraine to go along with some kind of agreement to stop the fighting. </p>
<p>However, the costs of peace are also still very high for both sides. </p>
<p>It is possible that that Russian President Vladimir Putin would lose power, and might <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ultra-patriots-may-try-overthrow-putin-over-ukraine-russian-mp-2023-2">even lose his life</a>, if he is seen to be capitulating to Ukraine. </p>
<p>For Ukraine, peace might require relinquishment of part of its recognized, sovereign territory. It would also require Ukrainian people to make peace with an enemy whose wartime strategy has been to carry out the deliberate, targeted “<a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/war-termination-and-escalation-in-ukraine/">brutalization of the Ukrainian people</a>.” </p>
<h2>3. Whether peace can be enforced</h2>
<p>When opposing groups reach an agreement in other types of conflicts – such as an agreement to end a labor union strike, for instance – there is typically a government in place to help enforce its agreement. </p>
<p>Enforcing peace agreements between different countries is far more difficult because there is no global government to enforce them. </p>
<p>This creates what war and peace researchers call a commitment problem. Without a way to enforce an agreement, how can one side trust the other side to live up to the commitments it made to stop fighting?</p>
<p>In smaller conflicts, the United Nations could serve as a credible, if imperfect, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800510">enforcer of a peace agreement</a> – <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1813&context=ilj&sei-redir=1">as it did in Kosovo</a> after the war there ended in 1999. </p>
<p>Given that Russia has nuclear weapons and considerable political power as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, these options are not feasible in the case of Ukraine. Neither the U.N. nor any other group or country is powerful enough to force Russia to fulfill commitments it might make as part of a peace agreement.</p>
<p>Without a solid way to enforce the terms of a peace agreement, there is little incentive for either warring party to agree to one. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wears a blue and yellow flag draped over her shoulders ad stands in front of rows of pairs of shoes." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/512054/original/file-20230223-22-eo8onv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian designer Margarita Chala stands next to shoes in Prague symbolizing war crimes in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1247164013/photo/topshot-czech-ukraine-war-protest.jpg?s=612x612&w=gi&k=20&c=R-CrRGTExtSXZlp8jtXwfBHbBzzuRzGa4Tihf6hq3G0=">Michal Cizek/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What might change between Russian and Ukraine</h2>
<p>Based on the answers to these three questions, I don’t think it’s very likely that there will soon be productive peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.</p>
<p>But there are three main issues that could change this dynamic. </p>
<p>First, the Ukrainian offensive in the fall of 2022 revealed a host of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/04/russia-army-retreating-kherson-ukraine/">weaknesses within the Russian military</a>. If the Russian military continues to falter, it would create incentives for Russia to negotiate some kind of peace agreement or cease-fire. </p>
<p>Second, Ukrainian people have suffered almost <a href="https://gppi.net/2022/05/23/why-is-russia-being-so-brutal-in-ukraine">unimaginable attacks</a> and losses in 2022. The suffering of the Ukrainians appears to have hardened their <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-defiant-as-putins-terror-bombing-plunges-cities-into-darkness/">resolve and willingness to defend their country</a>. However, I think that it would not be surprising if Ukrainians eventually prefer to end the fighting – even with an undesirable peace agreement. </p>
<p>Third, public polling in Russia is difficult to conduct because of a range of factors, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-enlisting-hundreds-of-thousands-of-men-to-fight-against-ukraine-but-public-support-for-putin-is-falling-191158">including many Russians’ concern</a> about criticizing Putin and the government.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/">Putin’s popularity appears to have remained high</a> during the war. But if Russia were to lose the war, it could place Putin in immediate danger of being overthrown either by a popular uprising or in a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/putin-coup-russian-regime/">palace coup</a>. </p>
<p>It is not possible to predict which of these dynamics might lead to peace negotiations. In every war, however, unforeseen developments unfold that allow progress toward eventual peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197780/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Blum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Questions about whether warring parties agree about how the war will end and the costs of war or peace are all key factors to help assess when a conflict might end.Andrew Blum, Executive Director and Professor of Practice at Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace, University of San DiegoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913512022-10-02T08:41:52Z2022-10-02T08:41:52ZBurundi’s Gatumba massacre offers a window into the past and future of the DRC conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486859/original/file-20220927-18-9tkhfy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Men hold up protest signs in front of the coffins of DRC refugees killed in August 2004 in Gatumba, Burundi. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly three decades, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in violence. Millions of people have been killed and an <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-future-of-the-drc/">estimated 5.6 million</a> others displaced by civil wars, local feuds and cross-border conflicts. The neighbouring countries of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda have been locked into this ongoing cycle, too.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">The First Congo War</a> began in 1996, with a coalition of the DRC’s neighbours supporting a rebel group that toppled the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Laurent Kabila was installed as head of state in 1997. A year later, however, a bloodier war began amid violent jostling for power and influence.</p>
<p>In December 2002, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/17/congo">peace deal</a> was signed. The DRC got a national army and new constitution. Democratic elections were held in 2006, the country’s first in more than 40 years. </p>
<p>But the violence soon resumed. Consolidating peace efforts across the vast territory proved difficult. Since then, the Congo has received tens of billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and hosts one of the largest <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco">United Nations peacekeeping missions</a>.</p>
<p>Various studies have fronted several reasons for the persistence of war in the Congo. These include <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/congos-peace-miracle-or-mirage">flaws</a> in the 2002 peace deal, a Congolese elite that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-un-is-under-attack-in-eastern-congo-but-drc-elites-are-also-to-blame-for-the-violence-187861">benefits from the chaos</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africa/2010-drc-mapping-report">ethnic intolerance</a>. </p>
<p>The events that have shaped the DRC mean different things to different actors. The fact that sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country has over <a href="https://minorityrights.org/country/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/">250 ethnic groups</a> gives a sense of the complexity of its plight.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Chris-Davey-9/research">My research</a> adds to debate on the factors driving the violence. I focused on the narratives of Banyamulenge soldiers. The Banyamulenge are a sub-group of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group, and originally come from the province of South Kivu in eastern DRC.</p>
<p>They are an important constituency to consider because their experiences offer a window into past and current Congolese conflicts. </p>
<p>They illustrate how violence in the Congo multiplies across borders, blurs the lines between victim and perpetrator, and is used to win a place in government rather than to overthrow it. </p>
<p>From my research, I believe that to stop the cycle of violence, the DRC and its regional allies need a new status quo that doesn’t reward rebellion but decreases its appeal. Politics that facilitates peaceful livelihoods is essential.</p>
<h2>Tracing the pattern</h2>
<p>In August 2004, 166 members of the <a href="https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2071779/ACCORD_DR+Congo_Situation+of+Banyamulenge.pdf">Congolese Banyamulenge community</a> were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/burundi/2004/0904/index.htm">killed in Gatumba</a>, a small town in Burundi near its border with DRC. They were at a UN-protected refugee camp. </p>
<p>The killings were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3564358.stm">perpetrated</a> by a group of armed rebels, many of them from the Forces for National Liberation, a Burundian Hutu militia group. The group claimed their Banyamulenge victims were planning a new war in the Congo.</p>
<p>I <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">spoke to</a> survivors of the 2004 massacre. Most felt that the attack wasn’t a one-off event, but part of a pattern of mobilising anti-Tutsi violence. </p>
<p>This began before Gatumba and persists into the present day. </p>
<p>An <a href="https://commons.clarku.edu/gatumba/">archive of Gatumba survivor accounts</a> that I was involved in curating attests to this ongoing persecution and the wider dysfunctions of the region. These include the lack of robust democracy or transparent governance, and high levels of insecurity. </p>
<p>Like most participants in Congolese conflicts, the rebels and refugees involved in the Gatumba massacre regularly crossed the DRC’s border. The Banyamulenge refugees fled to Burundi to escape turmoil in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drcsouth-kivu-jun-2004-situation-report-and-recommendations">South Kivu in 2004</a>. The Forces for National Liberation moved between DRC and Burundi to recruit, fight and cooperate with armed groups in both countries. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-drcs-colonial-legacy-forged-a-nexus-between-ethnicity-territory-and-conflict-153469">How DRC's colonial legacy forged a nexus between ethnicity, territory and conflict</a>
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<p>The DRC’s borders are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/103/412/359/81797?redirectedFrom=fulltext">porous</a>, with the central government too weak to control its eastern region or its boundaries. DRC borders nine countries: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.</p>
<p>These porous borders have allowed armed groups – like the Ugandan <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358533.2011.542297">Allied Democratic Front</a> and Congolese-Tutsi <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">March 23 Movement</a> – to use the DRC as a base and battlefield, connecting civil conflicts across borders.</p>
<h2>Beyond ethnic conflict</h2>
<p>Gatumba was a border refugee camp. Hutu rebels found an easy target in Banyamulenge refugees, whom they associated with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jul/11/congo.rorycarroll">Tutsi rebels</a> behind the violence in the DRC. </p>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation deployed religious-flavoured anti-Tutsi rhetoric to motivate their political base. But there’s rarely a straight line between politics and ethnicity. The Hutu rebels <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971605100202">were in political competition</a> against other Hutu-labelled militias and parties. </p>
<p>Contemporary rebel groups, too, act in multiple directions as they destabilise border areas, displacing and killing civilians. </p>
<p>The March 23 Movement, for instance, provides anti-Tutsi fodder for extremist politicians across the DRC. These politicians benefit from promoting <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2078578">discrimination and hate speech</a>, and fuelling <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">protests</a> against the UN mission. The movement’s use of force has <a href="https://chrispdavey.blogspot.com/2022/06/m23-memory-remains.html">hardened lines</a> between Tutsis and other Congolese. </p>
<h2>Illegal violence to legitimate power</h2>
<p>The Forces for National Liberation, like other rebel groups, committed atrocities to improve its bargaining position in peace talks. </p>
<p>By 2004, other Burundian rebels had cut a peace deal with the Burundi government to become politicians and army officers. The Forces for National Liberation was marginalised. It, therefore, stopped trying to overthrow the state and focused on killing civilians, hoping to use the threat of terrorism to negotiate its way into power. It worked. </p>
<p>Agathon Rwasa, the leader of the Forces for National Liberation, signed a deal. He now leads <a href="https://apnews.com/article/africa-kenya-burundi-agathon-rwasa-b10afc3bb09daf8e4b87782b057fb56d">Burundi’s opposition party</a> in parliament and has not gone to trial for any crimes.</p>
<p>This elevation of a guerrilla into government is not unique to Burundi. </p>
<p>Rebel groups in the DRC typically aren’t looking to overthrow the state. Instead, they’re <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/98/3/873/6581695?redirectedFrom=fulltext">using rebellion</a> to prove themselves a threat. They then sue for <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/recycling-rebels-demobilization-congo">limited peace</a> and an improved position either in DRC or in neighbouring countries like Burundi or Uganda. </p>
<p>As one Gatumba survivor observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the reward for killing people is a promotion in our country. </p>
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<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>It’s been 18 years since the Gatumba massacre. Groups like the <a href="https://www.gatumbasurvivors.org/">Banyamulenge Gatumba Refugee Survivors Foundation</a> are <a href="https://www.wishtv.com/news/hundreds-gather-for-18th-anniversary-of-the-gatumba-massacre/">working internationally</a> to pursue accountability and justice. Yet, addressing their own community’s past and current involvement in DRC’s multi-directional violence is largely taboo. </p>
<p>Until a broader sense of the past is more widely shared among Congolese groups, rebels will flit across borders, civilians will be both victims and perpetrators, and groups will purchase political power with demonstrations of violent disruption.</p>
<p>Interstate collaboration between the DRC and Burundi governments for justice in Gatumba would be a first step towards building a future without impunity.</p>
<p><em>Ezra Schrader, a research assistant at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies with the Gatumba Survivors Project, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher P. Davey works for Clark University.</span></em></p>Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is used to win a place in government, not to overthrow it. And it keeps working.Christopher P. Davey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640872021-07-08T04:26:34Z2021-07-08T04:26:34ZOn the brink of disaster: how decades of progress in Afghanistan could be wiped out in short order<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410267/original/file-20210708-26673-u74jm9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Militiamen join Afghan security forces during a gathering in Kabul last month. Together, they are trying to stem the tide of the latest Taliban gains.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rahmat Gul/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Afghanistan is teetering on the brink of an almost unimaginable disaster. The withdrawal of US and allied forces, scheduled by President Joe Biden to be completed by September 11, threatens to precipitate the unravelling of the most pro-Western government in Southwest Asia. </p>
<p>It also endangers the entire framework of the Afghan state that has been built up since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. </p>
<p>Should this occur, the most likely <a href="https://www.cis.org.au/publications/occasional-papers/afghanistan-on-the-brink-of-an-abyss/">results</a> would be the establishment of a theocratic regime in Kabul, the collapse of swathes of the country into a civil war (with a distinctly transnational dimension), and attempts by millions of refugees to flee the country. </p>
<p>In May 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/14/clinton-to-afghan-women-we-will-not-abandon-you/">pledged</a> to a visiting delegation of Afghan women that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will not abandon you. We will stand with you always. </p>
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<p>Yet abandoning the Afghans who relied on such commitments is exactly what the US has now done. When pressed about his approach last week, Biden angrily <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/biden-afghanistan.html">cut off a questioner</a> by saying “I want to talk about happy things”. </p>
<p>Afghans at this point are finding it very hard to identify happy things to discuss.</p>
<h2>Why the psychology of the public matters</h2>
<p>The mass psychology of the Afghan public will be key in determining how events evolve in the country. And this is something American political leaders have shown little sign of understanding. </p>
<p>When regimes change in Afghanistan – as with the collapse of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan/Civil-war-communist-phase-1978-92">communist regime in April 1992</a> or the Taliban regime in November 2001 – it is typically because key players deem it prudent to shift away from powerholders whose power appears to be decaying. </p>
<p>While the Afghan government has left many people disappointed and disaffected – it is over-centralised, debilitated by patronage networks, and often extractive in character – the Taliban are anything but popular among Afghans. A careful 2019 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation found 85% of respondents had <a href="https://theconversation.com/lasting-peace-in-afghanistan-now-relies-on-the-taliban-standing-by-its-word-this-has-many-afghans-concerned-132756">no sympathy</a> at all for the Taliban. </p>
<p>But in Afghanistan, it does not pay to be on the losing side. And there is a grave danger that a spreading perception the Taliban are poised to take over could lead to that very outcome by triggering a cascade of defections from the government and army. </p>
<p>With dozens of districts falling to the Taliban in late June and early July, this could happen quickly. US intelligence estimates that it could take <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-afghanistan-intelligence.html?searchResultPosition=9">two or three years</a> for the country to fall under Taliban control appear dangerously sanguine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/faces-of-those-america-is-leaving-behind-in-afghanistan-160137">Faces of those America is leaving behind in Afghanistan</a>
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<h2>A total abandonment of the Afghan people</h2>
<p>Immediate responsibility for this tragic situation lies with the US. The bulk of foreign forces were actually withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The US thereafter played a much smaller, but absolutely critical, role in supporting the Afghan government. </p>
<p>The US did this in three ways: by providing air power to complement ground operations carried out by the Afghan army, by supplying intelligence, and most importantly, by steadying the nerves of vulnerable Afghans who accepted the US as a true partner in confronting brutal practitioners of terror, such as the Taliban and Islamic State. </p>
<p>This US approach was sustainable and relatively inexpensive. And while it did not hold out the prospect of a “Berlin 1945”-style victory, it did serve to avoid the consequences of a catastrophic defeat. </p>
<p>All this came unstuck under the Trump administration, which bypassed the Afghan government and signed a deal with the Taliban on February 29, 2020. This was called the “<a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Agreement for the Bringing of Peace to Afghanistan</a>”.</p>
<p>In reality, it was simply an exit deal for the US. And it killed off the prospects of meaningful negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban – allegedly its main <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/16/long-suffering-afghanistan-this-is-peace-deal-worth-trying/">dividend</a> – by giving the Taliban all they really wanted at the very outset of what was supposed to be a “peace process”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protecting-education-should-be-at-the-centre-of-peace-negotiations-in-afghanistan-161769">Protecting education should be at the centre of peace negotiations in Afghanistan</a>
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<p>The Taliban – hardly able to believe their luck – simply <a href="https://tolonews.com/opinion-168815">escalated their attacks</a> on democracy advocates, civil society actors, and the media. </p>
<p>Biden’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/14/us/politics/biden-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal.htm">decision</a> to adopt the Trump approach as his own amounted to a dagger in the heart for those Afghans who had hoped the new US administration would show more judgement and sensitivity than the old.</p>
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<h2>Pakistan’s intervention now key</h2>
<p>While immediate responsibility for the current debacle lies with the Trump and Biden administrations, Pakistan is even more to blame. The Pakistan government had godfathered the Taliban in the first place and <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429333149-2/pakistan-dangerous-game-seth-jones">resumed its support for the group</a> when US attention drifted to Iraq in 2003. </p>
<p>The dangers to which this gave rise were obvious. In a leaked November 2009 cable, the US ambassador to Afghanistan, retired Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry, <a href="http://goodtimesweb.org/overseas-war/2014/nyt-eikenberry-nov-6-2009.pdf">wrote</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>More troops won’t end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain. Pakistan will remain the single greatest source of Afghan instability so long as the border sanctuaries remain, and Pakistan regards its strategic interests as best served by a weak neighbour. […] Until this sanctuary problem is fully addressed, the gains from sending additional forces may be fleeting. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Despite compelling advice, even from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/opinion/to-win-afghanistan-get-tough-on-pakistan.html">former Pakistan ambassador to the US</a>, as to how dangerous the sanctuary problem was for US objectives in Afghanistan, successive US presidents shrank from addressing it directly. Instead, they allowed the problem to fester.</p>
<p>If the situation in Afghanistan is to be salvaged, this will require more than just promises of support or offers of money. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-the-afghan-peace-talks-to-succeed-a-ceasefire-is-the-next-and-perhaps-toughest-step-forward-152610">For the Afghan peace talks to succeed, a ceasefire is the next — and perhaps toughest — step forward</a>
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<p>Almost the only tool that remains to address the psychological despair in Afghanistan is immense and effective pressure on Pakistan to strike at Taliban sanctuaries, ammunition supplies, and logistics systems on Pakistani soil. </p>
<p>Being a sovereign state involves not just rights, but also duties. One is to prevent one’s territory from being used to mount attacks on other states. </p>
<p>Reportedly, the Pakistan army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, and intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, recently <a href="https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistani-army-warns-of-blowback-in-crackdown-on-afghan-taliban/31338249.html?fbclid=IwAR27cONjC7XMO1k1AwI5tbroOayhkgEOc4i1umn3JBp5thJLMF4_jHFBaI0">briefed lawmakers</a> in Pakistan that “well-trained Afghan Taliban militants were present across Pakistan” and that the army “could launch an offensive against the group immediately”. </p>
<p>If the Pakistan army can “launch an offensive” against the Taliban “immediately”, the US and its allies should immediately pressure it to do so. But one wonders whether the Biden administration has the gumption to demand this.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164087/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Maley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In Afghanistan, it does not pay to be on the losing side. There is a danger that a spreading perception the Taliban are poised to take over could trigger a wave of government and army defections.William Maley, Emeritus Professor, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1443352020-08-26T14:50:17Z2020-08-26T14:50:17ZAfghanistan’s peace process is stalled. Can the Taliban be trusted to hold up their end of the deal?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354171/original/file-20200821-14-18y60ng.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C138%2C2804%2C1725&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Afghan security personnel inspect the rubble of Afghanistan's intelligence services building after a car bomb blast claimed by the Taliban killed at least 11 people, July 13, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-security-personnel-inspect-the-site-of-a-car-bomb-news-photo/1226604830?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Five months after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-us-and-taliban-sign-accord-afghanistan-must-prepare-for-peace-132303">United States signed an historic accord with the Taliban</a> – the Islamic militant group that sheltered al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden after the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html">Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks</a> – Afghanistan’s peace process is faltering.</p>
<p>Peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban were a condition of the U.S.-Taliban deal, which ended America’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/09/world/middleeast/afghanistan-war-cost.html">deadly and costly</a> 19-year war there but did not resolve the Taliban’s organized military campaign to unseat the Afghan government and rule the country under strict Islamic law. The two sides are supposed to debate a comprehensive ceasefire and discuss what the Taliban’s role in governing Afghanistan should be, among other topics.</p>
<p>Talks were originally expected to begin in Doha, Qatar, in March. But the Taliban’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/world/asia/afghan-taliban-violence-airstrikes.html">continued attacks on Afghan forces</a> made that impossible. After a brief ceasefire and the release of 5,000 Taliban detainees from Afghan prisons, talks were rescheduled for Aug. 17. But then the Afghan government <a href="http://reporterly.net/live/newsfeed/monday-august-17-2020/sediqqi-taliban-yet-to-release-all-security-forces-prisoners/">refused to release</a> its last 320 Taliban prisoners unless the Taliban released more Afghan soldiers from its prisons. </p>
<p>The delayed talks are the latest hurdle in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan after decades of war. I’ve been <a href="https://www.facebook.com/centerforafghanistanstudies/photos/a.288509564550421/3159100990824583/">tracking the progress</a> of the U.S.-Taliban accord, in my capacity as <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies</a> at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. My analysis finds that implementation of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Trump administration’s agreement</a> has largely stalled.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5266%2C3489&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Afghan soldier in fatigues guards a checkpoint, with snow-capped mountains and an Afghan flag in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5266%2C3489&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354166/original/file-20200821-22-pd7tmg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">An Afghan soldier stands guard north of Kabul, April 8, 2020. Violence rose after February’s Taliban-US accord.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan/17df3c066b004e98946e91d7f7e95497/129/0">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul, File</a></span>
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<h2>What’s in the US-Taliban accord?</h2>
<p>The four-part agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban committed the U.S. to withdraw most of its soldiers from Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/26/politics/us-troops-afghanistan/index.html">which it is doing</a>. In exchange, the Taliban provided assurances that Afghanistan would no longer be used as a base from which to wage attacks against the U.S. and its allies. It also agreed to engage with the Afghan government. </p>
<p>But the promises made by the Taliban to meet those goals were vague and very difficult to verify. </p>
<p>Based on publicly available information, I find the Taliban has met only one of the seven conditions stipulated in its peace accord with the U.S.: <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/05/26/afghan-government-releases-hundreds-of-taliban-prisoners-as-part-of-peace-deal-with-us/">releasing 1,000 Afghan prisoners</a>. Of those, only <a href="https://tolonews.com/farakhabar/farakhabar-khalilzads-visit-kabul-discussed">261 were Afghan soldiers</a>; the government is now saying the Taliban must release more soldiers before it will enter talks.</p>
<p>The remaining six conditions in the U.S.-Taliban deal essentially demand, in various ways, that the Taliban sever all ties with militant organizations, especially al-Qaida. <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/368972-2001-03-23-afghanistan-taliban-holding-firm-on.html">Al-Qaida has long provided funds</a> for the Taliban’s insurgency in Afghanistan. In September 2001, just before the 9/11 attacks, it helped the Taliban assassinate a strong Afghan resistance leader, Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded Taliban detainees walk in a single-file line after being released from prison." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354167/original/file-20200821-24-9gspks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taliban prisoners are released from Afghanistan’s Bagram Prison, May 26, 2020, in preparation for talks with the Islamic insurgent group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Afghanistan/cba6dd56b5d44292b1eed4767f2d06d2/44/0">AP Photo/ Rahmat Gul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Broken promises</h2>
<p>So far, international and domestic observers of the Afghan peace process have not been able to confirm that the Taliban has severed its relationship with al-Qaida. Nor has the Taliban provided any proof of doing so. </p>
<p>According to a May 2020 <a href="https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/415">United Nations report</a>, the Taliban met with al-Qaida repeatedly in 2019 and early 2020 to coordinate “operational planning, training and the provision by the Taliban of safe havens for al-Qaida members inside Afghanistan.” </p>
<p>Since the U.S.-Taliban accord, violence levels in Afghanistan have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-violence.html">actually increased</a>. Some Taliban fighters have insisted they will continue their jihad “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-war.html">until an Islamic system is established</a>,” leading to concerns that the organization is not actually committed to peace. </p>
<p>Peace deals generally have enforcement mechanisms that hold each side accountable for their pledges. That is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/false-promise-peace-afghanistan">not the case with the U.S.-Taliban deal</a>. </p>
<p>No enforcement mechanisms are outlined in the deal. It contains no provisions for what will happen if the Taliban breaks their promises, beyond the U.S. pausing its troop withdrawal. The Qataris, who <a href="https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/qatar-host-intra-afghan-peace-talks">hosted the U.S.-Taliban talks and are now hosting the Afghanistan peace negotiations</a>, have no official power to pressure the Taliban into compliance. </p>
<p>Mutual distrust means the delayed talks could collapse entirely. </p>
<p>However, stabilizing Afghanistan is important to the United States, where President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-historic-step-achieve-peace-afghanistan-bring-troops-home/">promised</a> to “bring our troops home.” Russia and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-russia-china-and-pakistan-joint-statement-on-peace-in-afghanistan/">neighboring countries</a> like China, India and Taliban’s long-time and strongest supporter Pakistan, too, support the peace process. </p>
<p>As such, the Taliban and Afghan government will likely meet – eventually. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The Afghan president, several other government officials and the Afghan public sit listening in a large assembly, wearing masks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354170/original/file-20200821-14-cpf72b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, left, at a public assembly to discuss the future of Afghanistan’s peace talks, Aug. 7. 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghani-president-ashram-ghani-and-abdullah-abdullah-head-news-photo/1227946907?adppopup=true">HPC /Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Hope and doubt</h2>
<p>The Taliban does not accept Afghanistan’s internationally recognized government, which took power after the Taliban’s regime was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/17/afghanistan.terrorism10">toppled by the 2001 U.S. invasion</a> and has since stood for three elections. That’s why the Afghan government was not a party to the U.S.-Taliban agreement. Instead, the February 2020 deal merely committed the Taliban to engaging in direct negotiations with the Afghans. </p>
<p>Some U.S. government officials and former diplomats <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/484964-cheney-house-republicans-express-serious-concerns-with-us-taliban-deal">sharply criticized</a> the concession to exclude Afghanistan’s government from talks with the U.S. and the Taliban about the future of the country. </p>
<p>“This deal is a surrender,” wrote the longtime U.S. diplomat and ambassador to Afghanistan under President Obama, Ryan Crocker, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/i-was-ambassador-to-afghanistan-this-deal-is-a-surrender/2019/01/29/8700ed68-2409-11e9-ad53-824486280311_story.html">in The Washington Post</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p><a href="http://heartofasia.af/peace-talks-instilled-hopes-in-afghans/">Polling shows</a> the Afghan people <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-taliban-truce-begins-feeding-hope-of-a-peaceful-more-prosperous-afghanistan-127772">were willing to make some compromises for peace</a>. But <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/no-guarantees-afghan-women-draft-u-s-taliban-deal-n1140471">many question</a> whether the Taliban can be held accountable for what they’ve promised. They also fear losing the <a href="https://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/">meaningful achievements that came out of international engagement in Afghanistan</a>, such as women’s empowerment, increased freedom of speech and a more vibrant press.</p>
<p>Those rights – hard-won with American and Afghan blood – will be among the issues negotiated if and when the Taliban and Afghan government meet. Since 2001, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf">2,219</a> U.S. troops and <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/civilian-deaths-afghan-conflict-2018-highest-recorded-level-%E2%80%93-un-report">exponentially more Afghan civilians</a> and soldiers lost their lives battling the Taliban. For Afghans, the fight continues to this day. </p>
<p>The stakes of Afghanistan’s delayed peace talks are extremely high. Failure, said President Ashraf Ghani recently, is “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/14/ashraf-ghani-afghans-their-international-partners-have-paid-costs-now-were-taking-risk-peace/?variant=1">not an option</a>.”</p>
<p><em>This story has been updated. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-peace-talks-begin-but-will-the-taliban-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-146081">latest version can be found here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144335/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai worked in the Afghan government from 2002 to 2007 in different capacities. His last position was as scheduling manager for then-President Hamid Karzai.</span></em></p>In February, the US signed an historic accord with the Taliban to end the Afghanistan War. Now violence in the country is up and peace talks with the government are delayed yet again.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1226962019-08-30T13:12:57Z2019-08-30T13:12:57ZColombia’s peace process under stress: 6 essential reads<p>Three years after negotiating a landmark peace agreement with the Colombian government, a top commander of the now defunct FARC guerrilla group has called for “<a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/08/29/actualidad/1567065255_850419.html">a new stage in the armed struggle</a>.”</p>
<p>In a 32-minute online video posted Aug. 29, FARC second-in-command Iván Márquez appeared with other rebels in fatigues to announce that their dissident FARC faction would renew its insurgency.</p>
<p>“The state has not fulfilled its most important obligations,” Márquez said, saying the group aims to install a new government in Colombia that will support peace.</p>
<p>He does not represent all former FARC guerrillas. The FARC’s top commander, Rodrigo Londoño, who briefly ran for president last year, <a href="https://twitter.com/TimoFARC/status/1167044800954142720">tweeted</a> that “more than 90% of ex-guerrillas remain committed to the peace process.” </p>
<p>“War cannot be the destiny of this country,” <a href="https://twitter.com/TimoFARC/status/1167112444050845696">he wrote</a>.</p>
<p>How did Colombia’s fragile peace unravel? These six stories will bring you up to date on the complicated peace process that ended the Western Hemisphere’s longest-running conflict.</p>
<h2>1. A model agreement</h2>
<p>Peace talks with the FARC guerrillas began in 2012. In September 2015, President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader Rodrigo Londoño announced that they had developed a plan to end a 52-year conflict that had killed 220,000 Colombians and displaced 7 million.</p>
<p>The deal was “<a href="https://theconversation.com/could-the-peace-deal-in-colombia-be-a-model-for-other-conflicts-48564">precedent-setting in several ways</a>,” wrote professors Jennifer Lynn McCoy and Jelena Subotic.</p>
<p>The two sides agreed to use “new forms of restorative justice” to reach peace while “also holding perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable.” Colombia was the first conflict zone in the world to bring victims to the negotiating table. </p>
<p>In exchange for laying down their weapons, FARC leaders determined not to have committed human rights violations during their armed struggle would be given amnesty and the right to run for office. </p>
<p>But guerrillas accused of “grave human rights crimes … like sexual crimes, kidnapping, torture, forced displacement and extrajudicial killing” would be tried by a special new wartime justice system, wrote McCoy and Subotic.</p>
<h2>2. Colombia votes no</h2>
<p>The final FARC accords, signed on Sept. 26, 2016, had to be approved by the Colombian people. That referendum – the “peace plebiscite” – would divide the nation.</p>
<p>The allure of reconciliation in a war-torn nation was clear. But some people simply could not conceive of making a deal with the rebels who had killed their friends and family. </p>
<p>A well-organized “no” campaign, run by a powerful and hardline former president, formed to turn other Colombians against the deal. </p>
<p>Michael Weintraub, an associate professor at Bogotá’s University of the Andes, <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombias-peace-plebiscite-the-case-for-yes-and-the-case-for-no-66325">summarized the “No” camp’s argument</a> like this: The deal “provides too many concessions to the FARC, essentially rewarding terrorism and human rights violations.”</p>
<p>Still, as Colombians prepared to vote on Oct. 2, 2016, polling suggested that they would cast their ballots for peace. </p>
<h2>3. The ‘No’ vote wins</h2>
<p>The pollsters were wrong. </p>
<p>Just over half of Colombian voters – 50.24% – opposed the government’s agreement with the FARC guerrillas. </p>
<p>“A cloud of uncertainty descended on Colombia,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-nobel-prize-help-or-hurt-colombias-peace-process-66729">wrote Oscar Palma</a>, a professor at the University of Rosario, in Bogotá, shortly after the vote. “There was no Plan B for a rejection of the agreement.”</p>
<p>Then, five days later, President Santos won a surprise Nobel Peace Prize for his failed peace accord.</p>
<p>Analysts wondered if the Nobel could revive Santos’ failed efforts to end Colombia’s civil conflict.</p>
<p>“It is up to the president to take advantage of this moment,” Palma wrote.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Santos took his rejected peace accord to the Colombian Senate, which approved it in a marathon 13-hour session on Nov. 29, 2016.</p>
<h2>4. Peace makes progress</h2>
<p>The accord showed immediate results. </p>
<p>Nearly 7,000 FARC fighters laid down their weapons and joined government retraining camps. The FARC rebranded as a political party. Violence dropped markedly in 2017, Colombia’s safest year since 1975.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257276/original/file-20190205-86195-1v1k4yt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Santos and FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño after signing Colombia’s historic peace treaty on Sept. 26, 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://ustv-mrs-prod.ap.org/c252dad242cd4409b95ba59533955502/components/secured/main.jpg?response-cache-control=No-cache&response-content-disposition=attachment%3Bfilename%3DAP_16273806278437.jpg&Expires=1544041737&Signature=CRwY1BLXm99DQCoQbAgLsWlliS52a0f1A5K4FpAUWiewT20lQOEJ0z70Unmd9vQ">AP Photo/Desmond Boylan</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But half of the country still opposed the agreement. And the Santos government struggled to hold up its end of the ambitious deal, <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-makes-strides-in-colombia-but-the-battle-is-far-from-won-83601">according to Fabio Andres Diaz</a>, writing 10 months after the accord was signed.</p>
<p>“From underfunded mental health care for ex-combatants to setbacks in passing the laws necessary to activate components of the peace deal, the process has been fraught,” Diaz said.</p>
<p>The government’s lack of follow through raised concerns early that the FARC guerrillas would lose faith.</p>
<p>“There are already reports that demobilized fighters are being recruited by other armed groups,” Diaz warned.</p>
<h2>5. Duque’s election</h2>
<p>The powerful political forces that derailed the peace referendum hadn’t disappeared with the signing of the accord. They continued to criticize the deal, agitating for a “corrected” agreement that would more harshly punish FARC militants.</p>
<p>In July 2018, one of the peace accord’s biggest opponents, Iván Duque, was elected president of Colombia. </p>
<p>Duque, a conservative, felt the 2016 FARC accord was “too lenient and should be renegotiated,” Diaz <a href="https://theconversation.com/colombia-elects-a-conservative-who-promises-to-correct-its-peace-accord-98273">wrote following the Colombian election</a>. He was the only candidate in the 2018 presidential election who did not support the FARC accords. </p>
<p>“Reneging on the deal risks restarting the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere,” warned Diaz.</p>
<h2>6. Unraveling a fragile peace</h2>
<p>Duque has fulfilled his campaign promise to dismantle Colombia’s peace agreement since taking office in August 2018.</p>
<p>Though the courts have largely blocked his efforts to send FARC guerrillas to jail, the president has found many <a href="https://theconversation.com/violence-climbs-in-colombia-as-president-chips-away-at-landmark-peace-deal-with-farc-guerrillas-115112">other ways to weaken the deal</a>, says Diaz.</p>
<p>Duque has appointed “No” campaign loyalists to lead the agencies tasked with implementing the Colombia peace deal, underfunded their budgets and broken promises to boost economic investment in rural areas. His administration also sought to imprison some high-level FARC commanders on drug trafficking charges.</p>
<p>“Under Duque’s leadership, the government’s progress on fulfilling its commitments to peace has slowed to nearly a standstill,” Diaz says.</p>
<p>One-third of the peace deal’s 578 provisions have not even begun to be implemented, according to Notre Dame University’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.</p>
<p>As a result, trust between the FARC and the government has deteriorated, Diaz says. A May 2019 Gallup poll found that 55% of Colombians doubted that the government would fulfill its commitments. </p>
<p>By June, an estimated 1,700 former FARC guerrillas had joined one of Colombia’s many other active militant groups. </p>
<p>Political violence in Colombia rose sharply in 2018, with hundreds of activists and several former FARC fighters assassinated. Saying he feared for his life, FARC commander Iván Márquez went into hiding last August. </p>
<p>He has now returned to public view – and, it appears, to armed rebellion.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Dissidents in Colombia’s FARC guerrillas are threatening to renew armed struggle three years after signing a landmark peace deal. Here, experts explain the history of Colombia’s fragile peace process.Catesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/933382018-03-19T16:06:28Z2018-03-19T16:06:28ZTrump believes he can make an Israeli-Palestinian deal. Don’t hold your breath<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210652/original/file-20180315-104694-1657y7t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Palestinian laborers work at a construction site in an Israeli settlement near Jerusalem in 2017. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Oded Balilty</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, U.S. presidents have been unable to broker a long-term settlement between Israel and Palestine. Deal-maker Donald Trump would like to accomplish what his predecessors could not in this area, and administration officials say the plan will be unveiled soon. </p>
<p>Could Trump succeed?</p>
<p>I’m <a href="https://www.umass.edu/spp/people/faculty/david-mednicoff">a scholar</a> who teaches about the high stakes of Middle East conflict. I think we should look beyond obvious obstacles to consider why Trump may believe he can achieve a deal. However, past failures and present Palestinian-Israeli hostility suggest that skepticism about an agreement remains warranted.</p>
<h2>The basic obstacles to peace</h2>
<p>The barriers to an Israeli-Palestinian agreement are numerous. </p>
<p>On the Israeli side, a deal would be unpopular among <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel/israels-right-wing-has-grand-plans-for-trump-era-idUSKBN1531YK">Israelis</a> <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Public-opinion-poll-No-Palestinian-state-in-five-years-501329">on the political right</a> and require tremendous change. For example, Israel’s military and security position would be entirely different if it disengaged from much of the West Bank. And Israeli governments have faced relatively <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-process-always-fails">low political costs to leaving the conflict unresolved</a>. </p>
<p>Israeli leaders have established massive security measures in the West Bank, restricted contact between Israelis and Palestinians through the <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/feb/13/ron-johnson/border-fence-israel-cut-illegal-immigration-99-per/">border wall</a> and allowed politically influential Israeli settlers to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-settlements/israel-planning-15000-more-settlement-homes-in-jerusalem-idUSKBN17U1OS">expand settlements</a>. All of this cements Israeli de facto control over internationally recognized <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/middleeast/settlements-explainer/index.html">Palestinian land</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, its economic and military strength and regional strategic importance to the West put Israel under little pressure to address the conflict.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Palestinian <a href="https://thearabweekly.com/looming-transition-palestinian-leadership">leadership is aging, fragmented</a> between Gaza and the West Bank and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-leaders-health/aging-and-ailing-who-will-succeed-current-palestinian-leaders-idUSKBN1AP1K8">losing credibility</a> among its people. Few Palestinians believe that <a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/1/22/7324107/palestinian-abbas-peace-process">the U.S.-led negotiating process can deliver a fair agreement</a>. Palestinian leaders may consider negotiations less useful than building <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/12/08/the-world-should-respond-to-trumps-jerusalem-declaration-with-sanctions-on-israel/">broader international pressure</a> to raise the cost to Israel of maintaining the status quo. </p>
<p>Even before Trump, the U.S. was <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/oslo-revisited-has-us-ever-been-honest-broker-419354388">viewed by many Palestinians as a dishonest broker</a>. Thus, Palestinian leaders have little reason to prioritize negotiations that seem stacked against them, over a longer diplomatic game in which American power may become weaker. This is especially so, given that Palestinians may think that <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/6-58-million-each-palestinians-claim-theyll-be-as-numerous-as-jews-in-historical-palestine-next-year">their growing population will supplant Israeli Jews over time</a> and, in turn, increase their international bargaining power.</p>
<p>These are among the obstacles that <a href="http://www.mepc.org/israeli-palestinian-conflict-has-us-failed-0">diplomats faced in recent years</a> when trying to make progress toward a solution. </p>
<p>The result is an enduring impasse that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/opinion/israel-70th-anniversary.html">may endanger the democratic nature of Israel</a> and the basic rights of Palestinians. Long-term subjugation of an occupied population <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/">threatens Israeli democracy</a> by encouraging further militarization and discrimination in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Palestinians live with a lack of economic opportunities and basic <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-idf-demanding-palestinians-personal-details-at-west-bank-checpoints-1.5883906">freedom of movement</a>.</p>
<p>Given these dynamics, some <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestine-israel-two-state-solution-dead-says-peace-architect-marwan-muasher-1961898659">knowledgeable experts argue</a> that a <a href="https://theconversation.com/its-too-late-for-a-two-state-solution-in-israel-palestine-48803">two-state solution is dead</a>. </p>
<p>Why then would the Trump administration raise hopes that its inexperienced foreign policy team can succeed where others have failed?</p>
<h2>Why Trump might be acting</h2>
<p>Trump may well believe that present conditions and his willpower can move the Palestinian-Israeli conflict toward resolution. </p>
<p>His likely rationale is that his good relationship with Israel’s government might align with the strategic interest of key Arab states to push Palestinians into a credible, if unfavorable, deal.</p>
<p>Trump appears to have <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/trump-and-netanyahu-bromance-blossoms-scandal-ridden-leaders-reaffirm-their-831464">strong rapport</a> with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Even if <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/case-4000-what-next-benjamin-netanyahu-corruption-inquiry-seeks-answers-827884">Netanyahu’s legal problems</a> neutralize his power, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/middleeast/israeli-jerusalem-west-bank.html">Israel’s more rightward-looking political forces are pleased</a> both with the Trump administration’s recent plan to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and their close ties with <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-why-is-u-s-ambassador-david-friedman-trolling-for-right-wing-israel-1.5829552">some in his administration</a>. They may therefore be willing to consider a peace plan proposed by this White House. </p>
<p>Moreover, Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner both enjoy a warm relationship <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/29/jared-kushner-saudi-arabia-244291">with Saudi Arabia</a>. Saudi Arabia, in turn, has been <a href="http://www.mepc.org/commentary/saudi-arabia-and-egypt-forge-closer-ties">working closely</a> with Egypt in regional politics. Thus, the two most populous and influential Arab states are cooperating closely with the U.S. </p>
<p>Trump insiders can point to several developments that present an unusual opportunity for a settlement. </p>
<p>First is <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/art-the-peace-deal-what-can-be-done-israel-palestine-22951">the respect hawkish Israelis hold</a> for the Trump administration. Second is the strong U.S. coordination with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who <a href="http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-arab%E2%80%93israeli-alliance">might themselves wish to step up ties to Israel</a> in a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/25/middleeast/israel-saudi-relations/index.html">broader effort to combat Iran</a>. Third is the possible economic benefit to both Israel and Palestine of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/how-a-saudi-israeli-alliance-could-benefit-the-palestinians/546248/">increased regional cooperation</a>. That would happen if the barrier that the Palestinian problem represents to clearer Arab-Israeli ties were removed. Indeed, the White House has suggested that Palestinians are unlikely to get foreign aid <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/nearly-finished-us-peace-plan-wont-call-for-two-state-solution-report/">if they don’t join new peace talks</a>.</p>
<p>Trump may anticipate a deal that would allow Israel to keep many key settlements in the West Bank and establish embassies with key Arab states, in exchange for some version of an independent Palestinian state. The latter would likely be a patchwork of Palestinian lands to allow Jewish settlements to be integrated into Israel.</p>
<p>The White House may contend that a deal is possible based on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/us/politics/trump-middle-east-peace-plan.html">its proposed detailed approaches to key issues</a> in the conflict, including humanitarian aid for Gaza and national status for Palestinians, backed by generous financial commitments by the Saudis and other Gulf and Western states to the new state.</p>
<h2>So why won’t it work?</h2>
<p>In the end, though, a Palestinian-Israeli deal is unlikely for two key reasons. </p>
<p>First is the Trump administration’s deficits in diplomacy. This presidency’s disregard for foreign policy expertise is illustrated by Trump’s use of inexperienced aides like Kushner and by his cuts to State Department funding. Add to that State Department instability caused by the replacement of Secretary Rex Tillerson with Mike Pompeo, a military and CIA man with limited experience in diplomacy and <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/03/mike-pompeo-has-a-problem-with-islam.html">likely mistrust of political Islamists</a>, such as the Hamas group that rules in Gaza.</p>
<p>The U.S.’ current disadvantage in global diplomacy may matter little on the Israeli side. But it is likely to make work harder with Palestinians and other Arabs who remain concerned about Palestinian rights. This was illustrated recently in the strong negative reactions to Trump’s Jerusalem embassy move, which <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/trump-jerusalem-move-blunder-consequences-171213115706262.html">is widely regarded outside of Israel as a major blunder</a> that has angered Arabs.</p>
<p>There is a second key reason to be skeptical of a possible Palestine-Israel pact any time soon. A two-state deal remains the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-state-solution-still-the-most-popular-option-among-israelis-and-palestinians/">popular, and only clear, arrangement</a> that could give both sides security and self-determination. Both sides must agree on such a deal and sell it to their people for it to stick. But decades of Israeli security control over the West Bank and decreasing Israeli-Palestinian contact make this unlikely.</p>
<p>Palestinians see Israelis mainly as coercive overlords who control central aspects of their lives in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/occupied/checkpoint">humiliating ways</a>. Israelis have little direct contact with Palestinians, other than during their mandatory military service. This facilitates images of Palestinians as mainly <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-the-west-bank-a-violent-storm-is-brewing/">violent agitators</a>. The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/opinions/israel-settlements">growing integration of West Bank settlements into Israeli society</a> makes it much harder for them be to dismantled in a peace deal.</p>
<p>Trump and his allies in Cairo and Riyadh may think they can make an offer that Israelis and Palestinians can’t refuse. Yet leaders on each side remain accountable to diverse – and divided – voters. </p>
<p>The parties on the ground have had reasons to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/the-real-reason-the-israel-palestine-peace-process-always-fails">refuse U.S.-brokered deals</a> in the past. Though people who care about peace and justice in the Middle East may wish otherwise, I doubt that Trump has found a new way to change this entrenched dynamic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/93338/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Trump administration may believe they have the key to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement – when others have failed. But it ignores how Israelis and Palestinians feel about such an agreement.David Mednicoff, Director, Middle Eastern Studies, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671072016-11-07T16:55:54Z2016-11-07T16:55:54ZPeace deals are supposed to bring harmony – but too often they ignore sexual minority groups<p>The recent referendum in Colombia was expected to end the 60-year conflict between the government and and the leftist guerrilla group, the Marxist Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia (FARC).</p>
<p>But as well as surprising the world, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/02/colombia-referendum-rejects-peace-deal-with-farc">voters’ shock decision</a> to refuse the deal also highlighted a frequently overlooked issue. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and Intersex (LGBTQI) communities are frequently the losers of peace processes.</p>
<p>Colombia’s 2016 <a href="http://www.c-r.org/downloads/NOREF_CR_Report_Colombia%20Innovations_final.pdf">peace agreement</a> seemed to stretch beyond all others in recognising LGBTQI rights. Colombian activists were signatories to the agreement, and the pact itself encouraged sexual minorities to participate in politics.</p>
<p>Yet the referendum on the pact failed. While it failed for a number of reasons, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/americas/colombian-opposition-to-peace-deal-feeds-off-gay-rights-backlash.html?_r=0">staunch opposition</a> from conservatives to rights seen as “sexually liberal” figured in the story. </p>
<p>This is no major surprise. Rights for sexual minority groups are among the most divisive political issues confronting many states today. Civil war and peace processes, however, are particularly perilous. The harrowing plight of Syria’s gay and lesbian community in Islamic State-controlled areas is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/13/the-islamic-states-shocking-war-on-homosexuals/">well documented</a>. </p>
<p>During the transition from conflict to peace, LGBTQI communities continue to experience harassment and discrimination. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14754835.2016.1246956">Research</a> demonstrates how these citizens are commonly subjected to violence in societies emerging from conflict. From the use of corrective rape against lesbians in post-apartheid <a href="https://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/06/24/jhuman.hut004.full">South Africa</a> to the targeting of gay and lesbian people in post-agreement <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12146/abstract;jsessionid=54DD3D060DFAA9DC42A97218753D56D5.f01t04">Northern Ireland</a>, violence of this kind is pervasive in peace process societies. </p>
<p>Peace processes impact on LGBTQI populations in numerous forms that are rarely acknowledged. A key factor is how contemporary civil war is understood and dealt with by policymakers. Civil war is seen to be the result of intractable conflicts between ethnic, religious or nationalist groups. Peace, according to this logic, entails guaranteeing representation for these groups in political institutions. In Lebanon, for example, a 50/50 Christian/Muslim quota system is applied for parliamentary seats and public jobs. A similar system is <a href="https://theconversation.com/lebanese-style-power-sharing-isnt-the-solution-to-the-syrian-impasse-51055">mooted for Syria</a>. </p>
<p>These peace pacts are widely criticised for entrenching sectarianism and excluding non-ethnic groups. A growing body of <a href="http://www.politicalsettlements.org/about/how/themes/gender/">scholars and policymakers</a> note, for example, how peace processes sideline gender equality. As a result, a number of initiatives have been created to promote gender equality after conflict. The UN Security Council’s <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/">Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security</a> is a landmark proposal, affirming the importance of women’s equal participation in the promotion of peace. Some agreements reserve parliamentary seats for women.</p>
<p>A small number of agreements mention LGBTQI issues. In South Africa’s transition from apartheid, a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation was written into the equality clause of the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/why-protect-rights-gays-and-lesbians">constitution</a>. Nepal’s postwar constitution provides formal legal safeguards and Northern Ireland’s <a href="http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20Agreement.pdf">Good Friday Agreement</a> ensures that public authorities are legally obliged to promote good practice for sexual minority groups and to involve them in consultation processes.</p>
<h2>Pride and prejudice</h2>
<p>Rare as these limited protections are, they do not always translate into long-term benefits. The Northern Irish peace process is particularly revealing. Since the signing of the 1998 agreement, <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/most-homophobic-hate-crimes-in-northern-ireland-not-reported-28482266.html">records</a> show increasing levels of homophobic attacks in the region. In fact, according to some commentators, <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/gay-rights-in-northern-ireland-a-war-by-other-means/">homophobia has now replaced sectarianism</a> as the major expression of societal hate.</p>
<p>Minority sexual rights are a major line of political division between Irish nationalists and UK unionists. Sinn Féin – the main nationalist party – tabled five motions in support of <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/most-homophobic-hate-crimes-in-northern-ireland-not-reported-28482266.html">same sex marriage legislation</a> for the parliament to vote on. On each occasion, the DUP – the main unionist party – used their communal veto to stop it.</p>
<p>LGBTQI rights represent <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/gay-rights-in-northern-ireland-a-war-by-other-means/">“war by other means”</a> in peace process Northern Ireland. They are entangled with the struggle for ethnic rights around which the peace process revolves. Irish nationalist parties support gay and lesbian rights because they see it as compatible with the advancement of the equality agenda for the nationalist community. Unionist parties resist such rights as they view them as a Trojan horse deployed by nationalists to attack unionists. And the LGBTQI community are the main losers. </p>
<p>A fundamental problem of peace processes is that they tend to reward religious and nationalist hardliners. Policymakers identify these strongmen as key players to fashion peace agreements. Such warlords have little reason to advance the interests of sexual minorities. Their only goal is to defend the narrow ethnic interests of their community. At worst, nationalist and religious parties take an uncompromising position. Homosexuality and lesbianism is framed as sinful or a threat to the purity of the nation symbolically imagined as the heterosexual family. </p>
<p>What can be done? One answer is to include LGBTQI rights in all peace agreements. As seen in the Colombian and Northern Irish examples, this can provide ammunition for those who oppose peace terms. While not a perfect solution, the inclusion of LGBTQI rights within peace agreements is still an important step. Constitutional rights makes states accountable to sexual minorities. </p>
<p>A more comprehensive approach is required to recognise the specific impact of peace processes on LGBTQI communities. Work is needed to provide advice, training and support for the government, judiciary, and security forces to embed rights throughout public institutions. More importantly, we need to consult with and support activists in postwar societies. Rather than mere victims, LGBTQI movements are powerful actors in challenging discrimination and in making the case for rights.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Nagle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflict resolution across the world frequently leaves LGBT citizens behind.John Nagle, Lecturer in Sociology, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.