tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/peacebuilding-18215/articlesPeacebuilding – The Conversation2024-03-05T12:12:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244092024-03-05T12:12:14Z2024-03-05T12:12:14ZCrisis in Abyei: South Sudan must act and stop violence between Dinka groups<p>Abyei – a territory roughly the size of Jamaica – is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">contested</a> by two countries, Sudan and South Sudan. Abyei, which covers just over 10,000km², is under <a href="https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/UNMIS/Fact%20Sheets/FS-abyeiprotocol.pdf#page=1">special administrative status</a> following the terms of a 2005 peace agreement between the two countries.</p>
<p>The disagreement has led to increasingly violent inter-communal tensions. Although the roots of these stretch back decades, they present a complex challenge, particularly in a context where the state lacks the capacity to enforce the rule of law impartially. But, in my view, the South Sudanese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/persons/jan-pospisil/publications/">researched</a> the political and security situation in Sudan and South Sudan for more than two decades and, as representatives from all sides confirm, the heart of the current conflict lies in overlapping territorial claims. </p>
<h2>Important region</h2>
<p>Abyei is both geographically and culturally significant.</p>
<p>It’s strategically positioned in a resource-rich and fertile area between Sudan and South Sudan that is also important for its transport links. Abyei is a bustling regional trading hub. Although there is only one producing oilfield in Abyei and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/1102/Oil-rich-Abyei-Time-to-update-the-shorthand-for-Sudan-s-flashpoint-border-town">production is declining</a>, the region is thought to have vast untapped resources. </p>
<p>Abyei is deeply embedded in the history of the Ngok Dinka community, who are among the northernmost Dinka populations. The Dinka represent the predominant ethnolinguistic group in South Sudan, a country that emerged as the world’s newest nation in 2011. </p>
<p>Abyei’s ownership is also contested by the Arabic Misseriya from the north, indigenous to the current Sudanese territory.</p>
<p>These contestations have resulted in the region being plagued by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/clashes-in-disputed-african-region-of-abyei/7460780.html">recurrent conflicts</a>, marking a history of turmoil in Abyei dating back more than a century. </p>
<h2>Efforts at resolution</h2>
<p>In an effort to resolve the dispute over <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040526_Protocol%20between%20GoS%20and%20SPLM%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20Abyei%20Conflict.pdf">Abyei’s sovereignty</a>, negotiations held between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement that began in 2002 proposed a referendum to decide if Abyei should become part of Sudan or South Sudan. Such a referendum would have been held in parallel with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum on Abyei, however, has yet to happen. This is largely due to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union">disagreements</a> over voter eligibility. The nomadic lifestyle of the Misseriya groups has also complicated matters.</p>
<p>To address recurrent tensions, the <a href="https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate">United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</a> was established in 2011. It was tasked with maintaining peace in the contested region. Over a decade later, however, little has changed.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">2022</a>, contestations over Abyei have been complicated by <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/02/09/acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state">renewed clashes</a> between the Ngok and another Dinka sub-group, the Twic Dinka, from the south. </p>
<p><strong>Map of Abyei</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-UD8WK" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/UD8WK/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ngok Dinka assert their rights to the whole territory of what is known as the “Abyei Box”. This is the current internationally recognised form of Abyei, which was established based on the findings of the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/boundary-demarcation-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement">Abyei Boundary Commission</a>. The commission was formed from the North-South peace talks of the mid-2000s. </p>
<p>Conversely, the Twic Dinka argue that their ancestral lands extend further north to the River Kiir, suggesting a natural demarcation line between their territory and that of the Ngok Dinka. The Twic contend that the Ngok Dinka’s presence south of the river had been a result of displacement caused by historic hostilities with the Misseriya during <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05430.6?seq=1">Sudan’s civil war in the 1980s and 1990s</a>.</p>
<h2>The drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/12/south-sudan-president-signs-peace-deal-with-rebel-leader">conclusion of the South Sudanese civil war in 2018</a> and the formation of a power-sharing government, tensions escalated in the Abyei region. This was partly due to grievances from Twic politicians who felt overlooked for significant roles in the national government and also in the state government of Warrap, where Twic county falls. Income from the bustling Aneek market in south Abyei was seen as a potential remedy for these grievances. </p>
<p>However, when the Abyei administration began land demarcation efforts in February 2022, conflict erupted. This resulted in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">several deaths and the destruction of Aneek market</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the area has remained tense, with outbreaks of violence involving organised assaults or clashes between armed youth factions.</p>
<p>This situation has been further exacerbated by the involvement of Bul Nuer militias. </p>
<p>One faction of militias was displaced from their native Mayom county in Unity State, in South Sudan’s north, by intense flooding. They eventually settled in Twic county, in Warrap state, in areas close to the Abyei border. </p>
<p>Concurrently, political disputes between other factions of Bul Nuer militias with the local government of Mayom county escalated to violent clashes. This forced the militias to flee Unity State. They, too, settled in Twic county.</p>
<p>This complicated an <a href="https://www.sudanspost.com/gai-machiek-i-am-not-a-rebel-and-not-involved-in-abyei-attacks/#google_vignette">already tense situation</a>.</p>
<p>To address the escalating violence in Twic county and Abyei, South Sudan President Salva Kiir <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-orders-expulsion-of-nuer-spiritual-leader-from-warrap">ordered the expulsion</a> of Bul Nuer militia members from Warrap state, and their resettlement in other states outside Warrap and Abyei. However, the implementation of this decree has faced significant challenges. </p>
<p>Since settling in Twic county in 2022, many Bul Nuer families have formed marital alliances with Twic families, integrating them into the community. This integration led to widespread protests from the Twic against Kiir’s decree. As a result, the Bul Nuer militias have remained in the area. </p>
<p>The presence of these militias has fuelled distrust among the Ngok community. </p>
<p>This tension boiled over in early February 2024 when minor altercations involving Ngok, Twic and Bul Nuer youths escalated into a larger conflict, resulting in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146007">loss of more than 50 lives</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these deep-seated inter-communal tensions, with roots stretching back decades, presents a complex challenge particularly in a context where the state lacks capacity to enforce laws impartially. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Despite these difficulties, the South Sudandese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term. </p>
<p>One significant area of ambiguity that has contributed to ongoing disputes is the undefined border status between Twic and Abyei. </p>
<p>The government’s strategy has been to avoid making definitive statements regarding this border. This is in an effort to prevent alienating any community and to curb conflict escalation. </p>
<p>However, considering the intensification of tensions over the past two years, it may be prudent to reconsider this approach and seek a more definitive resolution to the border issue. Clarifying the border between Twic county and Abyei could significantly undermine the influence of political myths and propaganda used to raise ethnic distrust.</p>
<p>Initiating political dialogue that involves both Ngok and Twic leaders, as well as engaging with the youth who have been both instigators and casualties of the conflict, could facilitate this process of demystification. </p>
<p>While achieving a long-term resolution to the conflict around Abyei amid <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">socio-economic challenges</a> remains an elusive goal, adopting pragmatic approaches to manage the current conflict is essential for maintaining peace in the region. Such efforts would help lay the groundwork for long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, a programme funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. He is Associate Professor at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations.</span></em></p>Overlapping territorial claims continue to fuel conflict in Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor, Research, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178622023-12-12T13:24:00Z2023-12-12T13:24:00ZIsraelis and Palestinians warring over a homeland is far from unique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563731/original/file-20231205-25-889iop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The golden Dome of the Rock Islamic shrine, a holy site for Muslims, stands close to the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest site, in an aerial view of Jerusalem's Old City. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-golden-dome-of-the-rock-islamic-shrine-dominates-the-news-photo/55972333?adppopup=true">David Silverman/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ongoing horrors unfolding in Israel and Gaza have deep-rooted origins that stem from a complex and contested question: Who has rights to the same territory? </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=HPHREV0AAAAJ&hl=en">scholar of international affairs</a>, as well as territory and nationalism. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24480555">Territory has been a central cause of conflict throughout history</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Israelis and Palestinians both claim the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-10-20/israel-gaza-how-big-maps-california">same swath of land</a> as their own. Each group has its own historical narratives, its own names for the territory – Israel or Palestine, depending on whom you ask – and many people from each group <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/18080002/israel-palestine-conflict-history-overview-map">believe strongly</a> that sharing the land is impossible. </p>
<p>Palestinians and Israelis also look to this same land as a way to define their identities and protect their futures. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A fence divides rural, arid land, with trees and grass all around, and small mountains in the distance." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=380&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563733/original/file-20231205-23-6idb0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A fence on Israel’s border with Gaza is seen on Nov. 24, 2023, during a temporary humanitarian truce between Hamas and Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-photo-shows-a-fence-seen-from-israels-border-with-gaza-news-photo/1801721901?adppopup=true">Chen Junqing/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The benefits of controlling territory</h2>
<p><a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123837/the-geography-of-ethnic-violence">Virtually every country serves as a designated homeland</a> to many of its citizens – a place that is tied to people’s ancestries, cultural histories and legends. </p>
<p>The idea of a homeland is kept alive as each generation tries to teach children about the significance of the land they inhabit or come from.</p>
<p>Controlling territory and claiming it as a homeland is vital for people for a number of reasons. First, it helps ensure a stable supply of essential items like food, water and shelter. It can help provide security against external threats, like hostile neighbors. It also fosters a sense of identity and belonging within a community. </p>
<p>When people control their own territory, it helps them form and maintain a government and preserve their culture, shaping their values and ways of life.</p>
<p>Controlling territory can also affect people’s social status, help create new economic opportunities and improve their psychological well-being. </p>
<p>In many cultures, peoples’ identities are literally attached to territory in their names. In Europe, many aristocrats are named for the lands they controlled, as in “von Bismarck,” in Germany, or “York,” a region in England. </p>
<p>This differs from middle- or working-class people, who are traditionally named for their professions – like Hunter, Smith and Taylor. </p>
<p>At its most basic level, <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/38/3/7/12099/Grounds-for-War-The-Evolution-of-Territorial">territorial control is about survival and reproduction</a>, and it has influenced human behavior in other ways. Disputes over who controls or has the legal right to a territory has consistently fueled wars. </p>
<h2>Fighting over territory isn’t rare</h2>
<p>Seen from the perspective of territorial conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from unique. Consider the ongoing war over which government should control parts of Ukraine, for example. </p>
<p>One of the most contentious territorial disputes in history involved Alsace-Lorraine, a region that was once part of the German empire in the late 1870s. Both France and Germany had cultural and historical ties to the region, leading to frequent conflicts and changes in sovereignty until World War II, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/Alsace-Lorraine">after which it legally became part of France</a>. </p>
<p>After World War II ended in 1945, Germany and France’s joint commitment to rebuilding Europe bound their destinies economically and politically. Leaders in Europe, joined by a vision for unity, peace and the imperative to prevent another world war, played a crucial role in transforming Europe. Historical foes became close allies, marking the start of a unified European identity.</p>
<p>Had you asked people in the 1920s and 1930s whether Franco-German coexistence and peace would have been possible, they would have likely said no.</p>
<h2>The divide over Northern Ireland</h2>
<p>Northern Ireland’s dueling Protestants and Roman Catholics would have given an even more emphatic “no” if asked during much of the 20th century whether they could live together peacefully. This conflict, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/The-Troubles-Northern-Ireland-history">known as the Troubles</a>, began with <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/irish-partition/">Great Britain’s partition of Ireland</a> from itself in 1921. Northern Ireland, however, remained part of Great Britain. </p>
<p>Fighting over what should happen with Northern Ireland fully erupted in the late 1960s and continued until the 1990s. </p>
<p>At its core, the conflict involved competing national identities and allegiances between the predominantly Protestant unionists, who wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom, and the mainly Catholic nationalists, who wanted a united Ireland. <a href="https://www.history.com/news/the-troubles-northern-ireland">Protests and marches, car bombings,</a> riots, sectarian attacks and revenge killings marked this explosive period, resulting in the <a href="https://www.lancaster.ac.uk/troubledgeogs/chap10.htm#:%7E:text=The%20violence%20led%20to%20over,of%20the%20conflict%20are%20controversial">deaths of more than 3,500 people</a>.</p>
<p>Yet in 1998, the Troubles came to an end when both sides signed the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-61968177">Good Friday Agreement,</a> keeping Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom but giving residents there the chance to have either British or Irish citizenship, or both. No one prior to 1998 would have imagined this agreement would create the opportunity for reconciliation and peace. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Three men wear dark suits and smile, together holding a white document and looking at the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563756/original/file-20231205-19-y7hu0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=561&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">British Prime Minister Tony Blair, right, U.S. Sen. George Mitchell, center, and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern smile on April 10, 1998, after they signed the Good Friday Agreement, ending the conflict over Northern Ireland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-picture-of-british-prime-minister-tony-blair-us-news-photo/80561700?adppopup=true">Dan Chung/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Similarities across the conflicts</h2>
<p>Just as happened in Europe after World War II and in Northern Ireland in the 1990s, Israelis and Palestinians would also need to find a renewed commitment to dialogue, diplomacy and international cooperation in order to make lasting peace. </p>
<p>But the region has a history of conflict dating back centuries, with both sides experiencing immense suffering and loss. This history creates a deeply rooted mistrust that hampers efforts to find a common understanding that each group of people has long ties to the land. </p>
<p>Contestation over the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/jerusalem-middle-east-lifestyle-government-and-politics-43d4cab031c28da0abf98d694dd169ac">city of Jerusalem</a> is not simply a city-planning problem, as it encompasses major holy sites from the three Abrahamic traditions. It is home to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest place for Muslims worldwide, and the Western Wall, part of the holiest site for Jews globally. </p>
<p>The Church of the Holy Sepulchre, or Church of the Resurrection, is also in Jerusalem. It’s the holiest site for Christians who believe this is where Jesus was crucified, entombed and later resurrected. This helps explain why Jews, Muslims and Christians all feel as if they have a vital stake in who controls Jerusalem. </p>
<h2>Unraveling pain and loss</h2>
<p>There was a time, including <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo">in the 1990s</a>, when <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjRnfybh_mCAxXfGFkFHRVGD08QFnoECBYQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.britannica.com%2Ftopic%2Ftwo-state-solution&usg=AOvVaw0Wru6PyBCkPBbb1v4liw1i&opi=89978449">Israeli and Palestinian political leaders</a> discussed a two-state solution, with a shared capital in Jerusalem, as a way out of the conflict and into a common future. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiDwuuLh_mCAxWuElkFHf76AUY4ChAWegQIAxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pewresearch.org%2Fshort-reads%2F2023%2F09%2F26%2Fisraelis-have-grown-more-skeptical-of-a-two-state-solution%2F&usg=AOvVaw16rmnbo9updobQX0IwGbzy&opi=89978449">No longer</a>.</p>
<p>The current violence in Gaza and Israel – and escalating <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/2023/12/2/23984104/west-bank-israel-palestine-settler-violence">conflict over the West Bank</a> – only deepens the entrenched homeland narratives on both sides, with each side fearing the survival of their homeland is at stake in any potential compromise.</p>
<p>It will take years – or even generations – to unravel the pain and loss that each side is experiencing in the current war.</p>
<p>Unless Palestinians and Israelis can find a way to detach the disputed land from their identities, there are no straightforward solutions. This is what happened in Alsace-Lorraine and Northern Ireland – but it’s not clear that such a transformation in thinking will take place anytime soon in the Middle East.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the tragedy of deep attachment to a homeland territory lies in the fact that while it can create a sense of belonging for one group, it too often comes at the expense of another.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monica Duffy Toft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflicts over the Alsace-Lorraine region and Northern Ireland offer examples of how territory is often at the center of a conflict − and what is necessary to pave the path to peace.Monica Duffy Toft, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2162052023-11-27T14:01:41Z2023-11-27T14:01:41ZRwanda’s troops in Mozambique have done well to protect civilians – the factors at play<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda">Rwanda</a>’s involvement in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ipi-pub-ppp-rwanda.pdf#page=1">peacekeeping operations</a> for the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) has increased since 2004. </p>
<p>The relatively small east African nation is Africa’s most active troop-contributing country and the fourth most active worldwide. It has <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors">nearly 6,000 soldiers and police</a> committed to UN peacekeeping missions.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, Rwanda has deployed its army independently of the UN or AU. In 2020, it sent 1,000 troops to fight anti-government rebels in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a>. A year later, it sent soldiers to deal with jihadist militants in northern Mozambique, and now has <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/military-intervention-has-not-stopped-mozambique-jihadist-conflict">2,500 troops</a> there. </p>
<p>These two missions aim to confront and eliminate armed enemies of the host state. The operations – which aren’t under the UN and AU protocols – raise questions about the conduct of Rwanda’s army and its counterinsurgency doctrine. Specifically when it comes to avoiding civilian casualties. </p>
<p>Traditional peacekeeping missions have a <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/improving-peacekeeping-and-civilian-protection/">disappointing record</a> on protecting innocent bystanders. UN and AU forces have been <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/united-nations-peacekeeping-forces-expelled-mali-drc-somalia-africa-by-adekeye-adebajo-2023-10">criticised</a> for being risk averse and under-resourced in preventing crimes and violence against civilians. </p>
<p>In 2015, Rwanda was one of several countries arguing that the UN should do more to defend civilians in conflict. It sponsored a set of recommendations eventually codified as the <a href="https://r2pasiapacific.org/files/2942/2018_kigali_principles.pdf">Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians</a>. They identified various shortfalls that handicap many peacekeeping missions. </p>
<p>I’m a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=ncVlZRkAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">conflict researcher</a> who has examined Rwanda’s military intervention in Mozambique. In a recent <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">paper</a>, I used the deployment to evaluate the Rwandan army’s commitment to protecting civilians.</p>
<p>The Mozambique mission is independent of the UN and AU. Therefore, the Rwandan military is less subject to the monitoring that guards against excessive force and abusive practices. As an offensive counterterrorism operation, the mission is also potentially more aggressive and violent than peacekeeping. </p>
<p>Conventional wisdom would predict that an <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/death-solves-all-problems-the-authoritarian-counterinsurgency-toolkit/">authoritarian government</a> like Rwanda’s would be heavy-handed in putting down an insurrection. But my findings suggest that’s not so in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Mozambique campaign is unlike the disaster across Rwanda’s border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There, Rwanda’s army stands <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">accused</a> of backing the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">M23 rebels</a> who have committed war crimes and accelerated a humanitarian crisis.</p>
<h2>The Mozambique mission</h2>
<p>The province of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique had been struggling with a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/303-stemming-insurrection-mozambiques-cabo-delgado">vicious jihadist insurgency</a> since <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2020.1789271">2017</a>. Efforts by Mozambique’s security forces and foreign mercenaries failed to stop decapitations, village burnings and attacks on government forces and infrastructure. </p>
<p>When militants threatened <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGB6c-gn5Fw&themeRefresh=1">oil and gas development projects</a> that once promised to lift Mozambique out of poverty, President <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_mozambique-rwanda-armies-retake-key-jihadist-held-town/6209325.html">Felipe Nyusi turned to Rwanda for help in 2021</a>. The Rwandan Defence Forces began to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2022.2132046">attack</a> Islamic State-aligned militants. </p>
<p>Yet, the Rwandan army has balanced the pursuit of insurgents and the protection of the population. Operations to annihilate insurgents often kill and injure civilians as well. Strategies that focus narrowly on protecting civilians, on the other hand, tend to make <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2022.1995680">counterinsurgent forces gun shy</a>. </p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My study</a> suggests how Rwanda has been able to hold down civilian casualties while battling insurgents. The Rwandan army was in Mozambique nearly a year before inflicting its first recorded <a href="https://www.caboligado.com/reports/cabo-ligado-weekly-27-june-3-july-2022">civilian fatality</a> – a single curfew breaker in a tense recovered town.</p>
<p>First, Rwandan troops actively patrol and interact with the community to collect information about the local people and the insurgents who threaten them. Rwandan soldiers benefit from their knowledge of Swahili, which enables them to communicate directly with the locals. It helps them tell friend from foe.</p>
<p>The second factor is restraint: a more disciplined use of firepower. As the experience of western armies in Iraq and <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/146/1/44/27133/Limiting-Civilian-Casualties-as-Part-of-a-Winning">Afghanistan</a> has shown, maintaining restraint under the persistent threat of ambush isn’t easy. It comes with some risk too. </p>
<p>Other conditions likely contributed to <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/rwandas-military-intervention-in-mozambique-raises-eyebrows/a-58957275">Rwanda’s early success</a> in Mozambique. The insurgents don’t use suicide tactics, for instance. And at least <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/08/insurgents-strike-cabo-delgado-with-remote-controlled-ieds/">until recently</a> they have lacked sophisticated explosives. </p>
<p>Also, portions of the affected area in Cabo Delgado were largely abandoned when the Rwandans arrived. This helped in sorting insurgents from innocents. </p>
<p>Still, these considerations shouldn’t discount the Rwandan army’s achievements. Its record in the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic-rwanda/b191-rwandas-growing-role-central-african-republic">Central African Republic</a> is also consistent with its conduct in Mozambique. There as well, Rwandan forces have attained impressive battlefield results without inflicting substantial civilian harm. </p>
<h2>Rwanda in DRC</h2>
<p>The story is different in the DRC. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/central-africa%E2%80%99s-strategic-balance-crumbling-206022">A case has been made</a> that Rwanda’s destabilising activities there are motivated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">strategic interests</a> that don’t apply in Mozambique or the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>This doesn’t explain the mentality of rank-and-file soldiers, though. The army’s record in Mozambique and the DRC suggests instead that Rwandan battlefield behaviour may be conditioned by cognitive framing and service culture. </p>
<p>Studies of the way foreign armies approach missions in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon have found that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306393">culture and framing</a> often shape how troops perceive their environment, interpret threats and understand their role.</p>
<p>Fighting in eastern DRC may be perceived differently by Rwandan soldiers because it’s so intimately tied to the traumas of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994">1994 genocide</a>. They may worry about spillover violence affecting stability in Rwanda, or about ethnic discord tearing the army itself apart. </p>
<p><a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/48/111176/Soldiers-Dilemma-Foreign-Military-Training-and">Armed forces elsewhere</a> have demonstrated a tendency to prize their own cohesion above human rights concerns in high-stress scenarios.</p>
<h2>The civilian factor</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400?src=">My research</a> suggests the Rwandan army’s actions in Mozambique have been consistent with the core promises of the Kigali Principles. </p>
<p>In response to <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/mozambique/winning-peace-mozambiques-embattled-north">persistent militant raids</a>, Rwandan troops in Cabo Delgado have conducted pursuits across district boundaries. Troops have gone further afield at Maputo’s request. </p>
<p>The presence of Rwanda’s soldiers has also helped to curb the mistreatment of local inhabitants by Mozambique’s police and armed forces. These forces have a history of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad687-amid-increasing-insecurity-mozambicans-fault-police-for-corruption-lack-of-professionalism/">corruption</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/04/mozambique-security-forces-abusing-suspected-insurgents">abuse</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamist insurgency in Mozambique, however, has yet to be defeated. A long-term solution will require more fundamental political and social measures, as well as reform of Mozambique’s security services. </p>
<p>Rwandan army operations have demonstrated what a competent African force can do when properly resourced and committed to the mission. It also suggests that soldiers are more effective when empowered to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDsIPgJGKQU">exercise discretion</a> in applying force.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ralph Shield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rwandan forces have been able to keep civilian casualties low in Cabo Delgado despite carrying out a counterterrorism operation.Ralph Shield, Conflict researcher, US Naval War CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172172023-11-26T08:40:58Z2023-11-26T08:40:58ZWhat is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect<p><a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0CQBBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Elazar,+federalism&ots=7_EoePhxVm&sig=vtSyxjKaMi8qqzhyHsk9Oj_OIrU#v=onepage&q=Elazar%2C%20federalism&f=false">Federalism</a> is a system of government where power is shared between a central authority and smaller regional governments. </p>
<p>Many countries adopt federalism to manage ethnic diversity within their borders and help promote unity. There are <a href="https://forumfed.org/countries/">25 federal countries globally</a>, representing 40% of the world’s population. </p>
<p>Federalism allows regions to govern some of their affairs – such as decisions regarding education or working languages – while being part of the larger country. </p>
<p>Ethiopia adopted federalism in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four major parties – came to power. This followed 17 years of insurgencies to depose the Derg, a communist military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1991.</p>
<p>The primary aim of Ethiopian federalism is to accommodate the country’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-ethiopia-18551991/C0852BA84C34071333C899ACC8F1C863">diverse ethnic groups</a>. Before 1991, Ethiopia had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">centralised unitary government</a> that suppressed diversity. It restricted ethnic groups from using their languages in official settings and schools. </p>
<p>Ethiopian federalism grants ethnic groups the <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">right to self-determination</a>. An ethnic group can form its own region or become an independent country. This approach has drawn both praise and criticism. </p>
<p>Some academics view it as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/524968">novel approach</a> to resolving conflicts and preventing state disintegration. It’s impossible to forge unity without the voluntary alliance and assurance of the right to self-determination. Others <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-law/article/abs/ethiopias-leap-in-the-dark-federalism-and-selfdetermination-in-the-new-constitution/A05454ABA30C4C79F78DD7397FF91BED">argue that it worsens tensions</a> and could eventually lead to disintegration. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">studied</a> Ethiopian politics for more than a decade, with a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjac039">focus</a> on <a href="https://kar.kent.ac.uk/92367/">the implementation of federalism</a>. After more than 30 years, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated. </p>
<p>In my view, federalism remains the best approach for Ethiopia. It allows for cultural and language freedoms. It enables self-rule at regional levels, and has contributed to economic growth. The system, however, is not without its drawbacks. An increase in democratic space would allow more voices to be heard.</p>
<h2>How Ethiopian federalism works</h2>
<p>Ethiopia’s approach to federalism is bold <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjad015">compared to other highly diverse African</a> federal states. Nigeria, for instance, has avoided constitutional recognition of ethnic diversity. <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=13">Article 39 of Ethiopia’s federal constitution</a>, adopted in 1995, explicitly acknowledges the country’s ethnic diversity.</p>
<p>Ethiopia is a federation comprising nations and nationalities, each possessing sovereignty as defined in <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=4">Article 8 of the constitution</a>. Nations and nationalities with defined territorial homelands have the right to establish their own regions or even seek independence. </p>
<p>There are 12 regions in the country, each with <a href="https://www.ethiopianembassy.be/wp-content/uploads/Constitution-of-the-FDRE.pdf#page=20">extensive authority</a>. This includes policymaking, constitution making, choosing a working language, and maintaining regional police and civil services.</p>
<p>However, the exercise of these powers has been constrained by <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ijgr/28/5/article-p972_972.xml">the dominance of the party system</a>. </p>
<p>Between 1991 and 2019, the EPRDF tightly controlled regional governments. It <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">suppressed any demands for self-rule</a>. The coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018 helped open up the political space. The prime minister established the Prosperity Party by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-50515636">merging three of the parties that made up the EPRDF</a>, as well as its smaller affiliates. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front refused to amalgamate. </p>
<p>Abiy addressed some of the demands from various ethnic groups for <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">regional status</a>. He created three <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/ethiopia-creates-a-12th-regional-state-/7168313.html">additional regions</a> between 2019 and 2023.</p>
<p>The working of Ethiopian federalism, however, depends on the party system. Party norms often supersede constitutional principles. Internal party crises tend to lead to government instability and potential conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray war</a> between 2020 and 2022 is a stark example. It originated from tensions between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the federal government. Disagreement was triggered by <a href="https://doi.org/10.14321/nortafristud.21.2.011v">the dissolution of the EPRDF</a>.</p>
<h2>Major benefits</h2>
<p>Ethiopian federalism has had three major benefits. </p>
<p>First, it allows for language and cultural freedom. The country’s 80 ethnic groups fought long and hard to secure their rights to culture, language and identity. More than <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096221097663#tab-contributors">57 of Ethiopia’s 80 languages</a> are used as mediums of instruction in schools. </p>
<p>Second, the system has allowed many <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">ethnic groups to exercise self-rule</a> in areas where they constitute the majority. Ethnic minorities are also entitled to form local governments, such as district administrations. </p>
<p>Third, the federal system has contributed to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview#:%7E:text=Ethiopia%20aims%20to%20reach%20lower-middle-income%20status%20by%202025.,one%20of%20the%20highest%20rates%20in%20the%20world.">country’s economic growth</a> and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580">relative stability</a>. It achieved this by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.2020">decentralising power and resources</a> to regions and local governments.</p>
<h2>Key challenges</h2>
<p>One of the primary challenges of Ethiopian federalism lies in its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2015.1124580">inability to entirely resolve conflicts</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts – for instance in the western region of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/world/africa/ethiopia-ethnic-killings.html">Benishangul-Gumuz</a> and in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/01/ethiopia-ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce">western Tigray</a> – are instigated partly by the system’s attempt to empower a particular ethnic group in an area. This has created divisions between empowered groups and others. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://ethiopia.iom.int/news/more-438-million-people-displaced-ethiopia-more-half-due-conflict-new-iom-report">recent report</a> by the International Organization for Migration found that more than half of the 4.4 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia left their homes due to conflict. </p>
<p>A second challenge is the gap between the constitution and the practice of political rights. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221097663">Certain ethnic groups have not exercised their rights</a> due to political repression. </p>
<p>Since Abiy assumed power in 2018, ethnic groups’ demands for regions has increased. The government addressed some of these demands, but repression of certain requests has led to grievances and conflicts. Some ethnic groups are too small to have their own region. </p>
<p>A third challenge is the dominance of the ruling party and the lack of democracy. The tendency of party norms to undermine constitutional principles casts a shadow on the federal system. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>While federalism may exist in form, it struggles to operate effectively without democracy and a multiparty system.</p>
<p>In a democratic system, the rule of law and protection of individual rights complement federalism by ensuring respect for citizen rights. A multiparty system would include diverse voices in decision-making and help protect minorities. Following these principles would help build peace and unity in a country as ethnically diverse as Ethiopia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bizuneh Yimenu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After more than 30 years of federalism, ethnic conflict in Ethiopia hasn’t been resolved – but neither has the country disintegrated.Bizuneh Yimenu, Teaching Fellow, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2143932023-09-29T12:31:48Z2023-09-29T12:31:48ZSouth Africa has one of the strongest navies in Africa: its strengths and weaknesses<p><em>The deaths of three members of the South African Navy (<a href="http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Home.aspx">SA Navy</a>) <a href="http://www.dod.mil.za/media/statements/Pages/SANavyIncidentKommetjie.aspx">on 20 September 2023</a>, when a freak wave swept them off the deck of the submarine SAS Manthatisi, has put the spotlight on the organisation and its work. André Wessels is a military historian; his latest <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">book</a> is A Century of South African Naval History: The South African Navy and its Predecessors 1922-2022. The Conversation Africa asked him for insights.</em></p>
<h2>How big is South Africa’s navy? How does it compare?</h2>
<p>The South African Navy has always been one of the strongest naval forces in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>Egypt has the <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">strongest navy in Africa</a>, and Algeria is the second strongest as it has been steadily building <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/algeria/navy-modernization.htm">up its</a> naval forces. The Moroccan navy is also strong, as is the Nigerian navy, which has acquired <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/nigerian-navy-commissions-large-number-of-new-vessels/">a large number of naval vessels</a>, mostly patrol ships and smaller patrol craft. </p>
<p>Thanks to its submarine capabilities, the SA Navy can be regarded as one of the strongest on the continent. However, with its present ten “major” warships, the SA Navy is not in the same league as, for example, Brazil (about 100 ships), Russia (550), India (250) and China (600).</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">sources</a> that are in the public domain, the SA Navy at the moment has three submarines, four frigates, one multi-mission inshore patrol vessel (with another to be commissioned in the near future, and a third under construction), one survey ship (with a new one under construction), one combat support ship, and a number of smaller craft (most of them in reserve). In terms of its number of warships, this is the smallest that the navy has been since the mid-1950s.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/money-has-little-to-do-with-why-south-africas-military-is-failing-to-do-its-job-81216">Money has little to do with why South Africa's military is failing to do its job</a>
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<p>Severe financial restrictions have put its capabilities under strain. For example, it has had to curtail anti-piracy patrols (<a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/operation-copper-extension-to-cost-r154-million/">“Operation Copper”</a>) in the Mozambique Channel due to the unavailability of ships.</p>
<h2>Can it protect the country’s territorial waters?</h2>
<p>Submarines provide South Africa with a crucial deterrent potential. And the navy can also do patrol work with its surface vessels (if they are able to go to sea). But it has a limited anti-submarine warfare capability, and is not able to project much power across long distances. </p>
<p>The government needs to gradually increase defence spending from the present less than 1% of GDP to at least 1.8%, which is what countries globally on average spend on defence. That will enable the navy to increase training opportunities, send more ships out to sea, and perhaps even acquire much-needed larger offshore patrol vessels.</p>
<p>South Africa is a maritime state, given that all its borders are on the ocean bar its northern one. The country needs a small but well-equipped navy that can defend it, underpin its diplomatic efforts, and assist other state departments in various ways.</p>
<h2>What’s its role?</h2>
<p>Geographically South Africa is a large <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/peninsula/">peninsula</a> on the strategic Cape sea route. Some <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">90% of its trade</a> flows through its harbours. The navy must assist in ensuring the integrity of the country as an independent state, by patrolling its territorial waters and acting as a deterrent against foreign military aggression and maritime crime. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">core business</a> is “to fight at sea”, with its official mission “to win at sea”. Its <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/#:%7E:text=In%20accordance%20with%20the%20SA,well%2Dtrained%20and%20disciplined%20navy.">vision</a> is</p>
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<p>The navy can also play a role in humanitarian relief operations, search-and-rescue operations and <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">peace support operations</a>. </p>
<p>In the course of its history, the SA Navy has performed these and many other tasks. For example, in 1993 it facilitated the <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/bosnia/726/">sending of a mobile hospital and relief supplies</a> to Bosnia-Herzegovina, by <a href="https://giftofthegivers.org/">Gift of the Givers</a>, the disaster response NGO. The navy has also helped provide food and medical aid to countries ravaged by conflict or drought, for example when the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg took supplies to Bangladesh <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">in 1991</a>. The navy has also <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/final-voyage-for-veteran-ship-20011010">rescued the crew members</a> of many yachts that have been caught in storms or were in need of other assistance off the South African coast and elsewhere, for example during the 2014 Cape-to-Rio Transatlantic Yacht Race. </p>
<p>The navy is also responsible for hydrographic survey work along the South African coast. It maps the ocean floor so that reliable charts can be drawn up, making it safe for merchant and other ships to sail along the coast and visit ports. </p>
<p>In addition, the navy has an important diplomatic role in sending warships (<a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027">“grey diplomats”</a>) on flag-showing visits to other countries. </p>
<p>But under <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/only-one-of-sa-navys-four-frigates-operational-no-submarines-serviceable/">financial constraints</a>, the navy has been hard-pressed to fulfil its obligations. For example, it has for several years not been able to take part in flag-showing visits to other countries because of the unavailability of ships. In general, less time has also been spent at sea. </p>
<h2>What is the history of the SA Navy?</h2>
<p>The navy can trace its history back to <a href="https://naledi.co.za/product/a-century-of-south-african-naval-history/">1 April 1922</a>, when the SA Naval Service was established. This became the Seaward Defence Force in 1939 when the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">Second World War</a> broke out, and the SA Naval Forces in 1942. It played a <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">small but important role</a> in the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany, patrolling the South African coastal waters. It also sent warships to the Mediterranean and Far Eastern war zones.</p>
<p>On 1 January 1951, the Naval Forces were renamed the SA Navy. In accordance with the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230376366_5">Simon’s Town Agreement</a> (1955), the navy <a href="https://sanavymuseum.co.za/2022/03/30/the-south-african-navy-a-very-brief-history/">acquired</a> the Simon’s Town Naval Base from Britain (1957), and was strengthened by the acquisition of a number of destroyers, frigates, patrol boats and minesweepers, and later also a replenishment ship (1967) and three submarines (1970-1971). </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-military-is-set-for-personnel-reforms-why-it-matters-178064">South Africa's military is set for personnel reforms. Why it matters</a>
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<p>But by then, the ruling National Party’s apartheid policy had led to South Africa’s growing international isolation. The United Nations’ <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/south_africa/un-arms-embargo-on-south-africa">mandatory arms embargo</a> against the country (1977) had obvious detrimental consequences for the then South African Defence Force (SADF), and in particular the navy. For example, it did not receive the submarines and frigates that it had ordered from France.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the navy <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC146027#page=5">assisted the other arms of the defence force</a>, in particular the SA Army’s Special Forces, during the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/namibian-struggle-independence-1966-1990-historical-background">Namibian war of independence</a>, which spilled over into Angola. The navy’s submarines and strike craft, as well as other ships, assisted the South African Special Forces <a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080013-8.pdf">in operations</a> “behind enemy lines”.</p>
<p>The end of this conflict in 1989, and of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">freedom struggle in South Africa in 1994</a>, led to a new dawn. On the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346383?seq=4">eve of the 1994 elections</a> the SADF was renamed the SA National Defence Force (SANDF). </p>
<p>In due course the navy was transformed into a navy of and for all the people of South Africa. All cultural groups, as well as an increasing number of women, would henceforth be represented in the navy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214393/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>André Wessels in the years c 2012-2017 received funding from the NRF, but at the moment no longer receives any funds from the NRF. </span></em></p>South Africa is a large peninsula on the strategic Cape sea route. Some 90% of its trade flows through its harbours. The navy defends the country’s sovereignty and national interests.André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138722023-09-27T13:57:00Z2023-09-27T13:57:00ZSomali piracy, once an unsolvable security threat, has almost completely stopped. Here’s why<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/somali-piracy-once-an-unsolvable-security-threat-has-almost-completely-stopped-heres-why-213872&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>In 2011, pirates carried out <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">212 attacks</a> in a vast area spanning Somali waters, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, actions that the World Bank said cost the world economy <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6b9570fe-2f52-546f-af4b-605e4ebf04e6">US$18 billion a year</a>.</p>
<p>Armed pirates hijacked ships as far away as 1,000 nautical miles from the Somali coast. They held the ships and crews for ransom. The World Bank estimates that Somali pirates received <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-piracy-off-the-horn-of-africa">more than US$400 million</a> in ransom payments between 2005 and 2012.</p>
<p>The piracy problem appeared unsolvable. Anti-piracy naval missions undertaken by the world’s most formidable navies, and self-protection measures adopted by the shipping industry, didn’t seem to work. It was, therefore, generally held that the solution lay ashore: major state-building in Somalia to remove the root causes of piracy. </p>
<p>The only problem was that no one was willing to undertake such a mission in the wake of America’s failures in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/11/23/142699506/u-s-easing-out-of-nation-building-business">Afghanistan and Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>And then there was an astonishing turnaround. The number of attacks fell to 10 in 2012 and only <a href="https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures">two ships were hijacked</a> between 2013 and 2023. </p>
<p>For three decades, I have conducted research on international diplomacy, military strategy, use of force and peacebuilding. Together with a colleague specialising in military strategy, I <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">analysed the Somali piracy case</a>. Academics and practitioners agree that four factors interacted to stop the pirates:</p>
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<li><p>the conduct and coordination of several anti-piracy naval operations by the world’s most capable navies, including all <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council</a>: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China</p></li>
<li><p>the implementation of costly self-protection measures, not least the use of armed guards, by most flag states and shipping owners</p></li>
<li><p>development of a comprehensive legal toolbox enabling pirate prosecution and imprisonment</p></li>
<li><p>regional capacity-building making it possible to imprison pirates regionally and in Somalia.</p></li>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/lift-for-maritime-sector-in-kenya-and-djibouti-after-fall-in-piracy-128073">Lift for maritime sector in Kenya and Djibouti after fall in piracy</a>
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<p>The surprising thing is not that the four measures on their own proved sufficient to stop Somali piracy. What makes the Somali case special is the international community’s ability to agree to them and pay for their implementation. </p>
<p>The Somali case is important because it’s one of the few success stories in recent years where the use of limited force contributed to a sustainable outcome. Further, Somali pirates were stopped even though the conditions onshore in Somalia didn’t improve in any major way.</p>
<h2>Collective action</h2>
<p>Theoretically, the international community’s collective effort shouldn’t have happened because safety from piracy is a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2021/12/Global-Public-Goods-Chin-basics">costly public good</a>. </p>
<p>This means that it’s very expensive to provide but no one can be prevented from enjoying it once it has been produced. The result is a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/collective-action">collective action problem</a> that’s rarely overcome in international politics. Most actors prefer to free-ride rather than contribute to the production of the public good. </p>
<p>With respect to Somali piracy, all states and shipping owners had an incentive to leave it to others to solve the problem for them. The implementation of the four factors was very expensive for the states contributing to naval operations, and for shipowners who had to pay for self-protection measures, including hiring of armed guards.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2227356">Our study</a> sought to understand how and why the collective action problem was overcome. The hope was to learn something that could help with overcoming similar problems in the future.</p>
<h2>What worked</h2>
<p>We found that three factors explain why the amount of free-riding was minimised in the Somali case. </p>
<p>The first was that the Somali pirates attacked ships belonging to all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all the major shipping companies. This induced France to take the lead in military action against the pirates. The US subsequently led with respect to formulating a comprehensive strategy to implement the four factors presented earlier. </p>
<p>The involvement of European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) in the anti-piracy naval operations made it hard for member states not to contribute. A total of 18 member states contributed ships. China and Russia supported the American-led strategy and launched their own naval operations because their ships were attacked as well.</p>
<p>Second, the US established an institution, the Contact Group on Somali Piracy, tailor-made to formulate and implement a broad anti-piracy strategy. The US handpicked who would lead various working groups so that it contained all the actors – state and non-state – that were required to implement the necessary measures. These actors provided the expertise and the material resources required to implement the four factors presented earlier.</p>
<p>Third, the Somalia federal government and federal member states cooperated closely with anti-piracy efforts. They allowed the use of force against pirates in its national waters and on land. Somali authorities also cooperated with respect to the construction and running of pirate prisons paid for by international donors. This made it possible to overcome the piracy problem without engaging in the major state-building operation that had generally been viewed as a necessary condition for success when the piracy problem peaked in 2011.</p>
<h2>Shared interests</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this success story will be hard to replicate. Somali piracy aligned great power, as well as private sector, regional and local state interests to an unusual degree. This is, for example, not the case in the <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-06/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-2.php">Gulf of Guinea</a> off the west African coast. Here, local states are less cooperative with respect to tackling piracy than Somali governmental actors were. </p>
<p>It’s also not the case with respect to tackling the <a href="https://africacenter.org/in-focus/africa-crisis-coups/">coups in west Africa</a>, where Russia, the three western members of the UN Security Council and regional states have conflicting interests. </p>
<p>It was the high degree of shared interests among the many actors involved that made the Somali anti-piracy campaign so effective.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Viggo Jakobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The success of the Somali case illustrates what a high degree of shared interests among international actors can achieve.Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate professor, Royal Danish Defence CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2123032023-09-27T13:55:54Z2023-09-27T13:55:54ZLagos building collapses: we used machine learning to show where and why they happen<p>Building collapses have become a major <a href="https://estateintel.com/lagos-state-has-seen-an-alarming-rate-of-1-building-collapse-every-two-months-in-the-last-6-months">menace</a> in Lagos, Nigeria. Lagos is the business hub of the country and has its largest seaport and airport. With an estimated population of <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1308467/population-of-lagos-nigeria/">15.4 million</a>, it is the largest city in sub-Saharan Africa and the second largest in Africa after Cairo.</p>
<p>The city has two distinct geographical areas: <a href="https://lagosstate.gov.ng/about-lagos/#:%7E:text=It%20consists%20of%20five%20Local,with%20the%20City%20of%20Lagos">Lagos Island</a> and Lagos Mainland, connected by <a href="https://www.ice.org.uk/what-is-civil-engineering/what-do-civil-engineers-do/third-mainland-bridge-lagos">three bridges</a>. Lagos Island is the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIcPNQydUG0">historical nucleus</a> of the city. This area is renowned for its eclectic mix of architectural styles, a blend of modern skyscrapers, remnants of colonial-era structures and bustling traditional markets. It serves as the <a href="https://lagosstate.gov.ng/about-lagos/#:%7E:text=It%20consists%20of%20five%20Local,with%20the%20City%20of%20Lagos">centre of the city’s financial, entertainment and corporate activities</a>. Ikoyi, Victoria Island and Lekki are popularly regarded as an extension of Lagos Island.</p>
<p>Lagos Mainland has residential areas, markets and industrial zones. </p>
<p>There have been numerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-buildings-keep-collapsing-in-lagos-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-113928">building collapses</a> in both areas. </p>
<p>Using machine learning techniques, we built a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15623599.2023.2222966">model</a> that ranked the factors affecting building construction collapses in order of relevance. We also modelled the number of casualties by location. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/knowing-what-leads-to-building-collapses-can-help-make-african-cities-safer-118423">Knowing what leads to building collapses can help make African cities safer</a>
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<p>The study classified causes of building collapses into human factors, natural disasters and unspecified causes. Human factors included sub-standard material, structural defects, onsite changes of plan, bad supervision, demolition processes, non-adherence to building standards and regulations, lack of geotechnical information, poor maintenance, construction defects and overload. </p>
<p>Based on our results we made two findings.</p>
<p>First, location was the most relevant factor contributing to building collapses in Lagos. We found that more buildings collapsed on the island than on the mainland. </p>
<p>Second, building collapses on the mainland had a higher number of casualties than those on the island. </p>
<p>Based on our findings, we recommended proper onsite geotechnical inspection before the start of construction in both locations.</p>
<h2>Building the model</h2>
<p>Our study showcased the applicability of supervised machine learning models for a range of purposes. Supervised machine learning models are algorithms that learn from labelled data, where the input (features) and corresponding desired output (labels or targets) are provided. These models are trained to recognise patterns and relationships in the data, allowing them to make predictions or classifications on new, unseen data. </p>
<p>Our study provided a comprehensive analysis of building collapse statistics in Lagos from 2000 to 2021. The buildings ranged from bungalows to multi-storey buildings and skyscrapers.</p>
<p>On average, <a href="https://estateintel.com/lagos-state-has-seen-an-alarming-rate-of-1-building-collapse-every-two-months-in-the-last-6-months">four buildings collapse</a> each year, resulting in approximately 31 casualties annually. </p>
<p>The highest number of collapses occurred in 2011, with 10 buildings involved, followed by 2000 and 2006, with nine each. The peak casualty count, 140, occurred in 2014. It was concentrated in the Ikotun-Egbe area of the Lagos mainland.</p>
<h2>The differences</h2>
<p>Our model suggested that the higher number of collapses on the island was due to the soil there. The island soil’s geotechnical properties give it poorer capacity to bear building loads. </p>
<p>We identified three factors for the higher number of deaths from building collapses on the mainland:</p>
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<li><p>Many landowners in the mainland area ignored soil tests because they assumed it was safe to build there, given the area’s reputation of having soil that could bear heavier building loads.</p></li>
<li><p>The height of the building. </p></li>
<li><p>The quality of materials used. </p></li>
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<h2>To prevent future collapses and casualties</h2>
<p>Our study emphasised the importance of understanding the causes of building collapses in Lagos, and the potential of machine learning algorithms for prediction.</p>
<p>We made a number of recommendations.</p>
<p>First, that it is important to carry out basic soil investigation using the right professionals and building engineers to ascertain the geological properties or bearing capacity of the soil.</p>
<p>This information would clearly identify the type of building that the soil can support.</p>
<p>Second, assigning the right job to the right professional is paramount. For instance, the job of a civil engineer should not be assigned to an architect. </p>
<p>Third, eradication of substandard materials is key to a durable structure. </p>
<p>Fourth, many property owners add extra floors and extensions to maximise profit. Yet the higher the building, the deeper the foundation. Geotechnical properties of the soil will determine the choice and quality of the foundation. In addition, location should determine the choice of a building foundation.</p>
<p>Last, there should be policies in place to enhance proper onsite geotechnical inspection. </p>
<p>We also recommend the use of machine learning for predicting building collapses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olushina Olawale Awe receives funding from FAPESP Brazil. He is affiliated with Statistics Learning Laboratory, UFBA as a research team leader. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emmanuel Oluwaseyi Atofarati does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An AI model shows that building collapses in Lagos are location specific, and soil testing can help to check them.Olushina Olawale Awe, Professor of Statistics, Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA)Emmanuel Oluwaseyi Atofarati, PhD Candidate, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2129792023-09-26T13:44:03Z2023-09-26T13:44:03ZEnvironmental disasters and climate change force people to cross borders, but they’re not recognised as refugees – they should be<p>As our planet warms, we’re experiencing <a href="https://www.c2es.org/content/extreme-weather-and-climate-change/">more frequent</a> and severe weather events, rising sea levels, prolonged droughts and altered ecosystems. These environmental shifts directly affect people’s livelihoods by destroying crops and depleting water sources. They make once-inhabitable areas uninhabitable. </p>
<p>In response to these challenges, many individuals and communities have no choice but to abandon their homes and seek safety elsewhere. The vast majority will remain within their country borders – it’s predicted that by 2050 up to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/10/27/climate-change-could-further-impact-africa-s-recovery-pushing-86-million-africans-to-migrate-within-their-own-countries">86 million Africans</a> will migrate within their own countries due to weather shocks. But some will cross borders, triggering the need for international protection. </p>
<p>The challenge, however, is that people crossing borders due to weather don’t qualify as refugees under key laws and conventions. This displacement could be due to sudden-onset events, such as volcanic eruptions or flooding, which may pose an immediate threat to life. Or it could be due to slow-onset events, such as desertification or rising sea levels, which may eventually make life untenable. </p>
<p>It’s hard to say exactly how many people this affects because it’s a <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/">complex topic</a>. However, we do know that cross-border migration affects <a href="https://www.savethechildren.net/news/drought-and-conflict-drive-highest-number-somalis-kenya-refugee-camps-decade">tens of thousands of people</a> every year. For instance <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/horn-africa-drought-enters-sixth-failed-rainy-season-unhcr-calls-urgent-assistance">drought conditions</a> in 2022, exacerbated by political insecurity and instability, forced at least 180,000 refugees from Somalia and South Sudan into parts of Kenya and Ethiopia.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367965451_African_Shifts_The_Africa_Climate_Mobility_Report_Addressing_Climate-Forced_Migration_Displacement#page=85">predicted</a> that the number of people displaced due to weather shifts or disasters will reach as many as 1.2 million people by 2050. This figure will depend on how changes in the climate unfold. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-will-force-up-to-113m-people-to-relocate-within-africa-by-2050-new-report-193633">Climate change will force up to 113m people to relocate within Africa by 2050 - new report</a>
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<p>Without refugee status, those forced to move across borders due to weather events may not receive valuable support. Depending on the individual country, support can include the right to live and work, access to health or education services and the right to move freely. </p>
<p>I study the legal protection of asylum seekers, refugees, migrants and internally displaced people in Africa. I recommend that international laws and conventions be amended to explicitly include people forced by weather shocks to move across borders. They need full refugee protection. </p>
<h2>Lack of protection</h2>
<p>A variety of laws ensure refugees’ basic human rights are protected. The core of “refugee law” is constituted by the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention">1951 Geneva Refugee Convention</a> – a United Nations multilateral treaty that defines who a refugee is – and its 1967 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-relating-status-refugees">New York Protocol</a>. Refugees in Africa are also protected by the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted-assembly-heads">1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention</a>. </p>
<p>These laws provide them with a safe haven, access to fair asylum procedures and protection from discrimination. The domestic laws of many African countries incorporate these international principles. This offers legal safeguards and support to refugees, helping them seek safety and rebuild their lives.</p>
<p>As I mention in a <a href="https://www.academia.edu/79451051/Climate_induced_displacement_in_the_Sahel_A_question_of_classification">recent study</a>, the challenge with the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html">Refugee Convention</a> is that it rules out people who are “victims of famine or natural disaster” unless they also have a “well‑founded fear of persecution”. For instance, people fleeing Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985 due to drought would be considered refugees because they also feared persecution by the Mengistu Haile Mariam-led military dictatorship (Derg) which was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf">deliberately restricting food supplies</a> in parts of the country. </p>
<p>The United Nations agency mandated to aid and protect refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR), follows the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/afr/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html">definition</a> provided by the Refugee Convention. As does the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/who-we-are/global-compact-refugees">Global Compact on Refugees</a>, a UN-driven blueprint for governments, international organisations and other stakeholders.</p>
<p>This means that people forcibly displaced only by environmental disasters are not entitled to refugee status, although deserving of temporary protection. </p>
<p>Within Africa, there’s a debate about whether the 1969 <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa">Organisation for the African Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention</a> originally included people displaced by natural disasters in its definition of “refugees”. Some practitioners believe it does, though this <a href="https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2022-05/climate-induced-displacement-in-the-sahel-classification-918.pdf">stance</a> appears limited to human-made disasters.</p>
<p>When it comes to domestic laws, as of now, there’s no African country that recognises people fleeing natural disasters as a “refugee”. </p>
<p>There is, however, some movement. People fleeing environmental disasters are increasingly being recognised by international organisations. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-commits-climate-action-africa-protect-displaced-populations-and-foster">UNHCR</a> recognises them as a vulnerable category of persons to be protected. It has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-commits-climate-action-africa-protect-displaced-populations-and-foster">raised awareness</a> of climate change as a driver of displacement and the need to address protection for people displaced in the context of disasters. UNHCR is also <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/5975e6cf7.pdf">working on</a> addressing legal gaps related to cross-border disaster-displacement. </p>
<p>But there’s still more to be done.</p>
<h2>What needs to change</h2>
<p>People displaced by adverse weather developments should be given more than temporary protection. This will require changes to international regulations and national laws. </p>
<p>For instance, a protocol regarding climate-induced displacement should be added to the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted-assembly-heads">1969 OAU convention</a> so that displaced people who cross international borders are legally covered.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Without refugee status people aren’t able to receive valuable support, like the right to live and work in a country.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131002023-09-26T13:42:16Z2023-09-26T13:42:16ZThe family home in South African townships is contested – why occupation, inheritance and history are clashing with laws<p>During apartheid, black South Africans could not own land – and therefore their homes – in what were classified as “white” cities. In racially segregated townships, living in “family houses” and passing them on depended officially on a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA02586568_844#page=5">range of permits</a>. These were usually to rent from state authorities, but in some cases confusingly to build or buy a house without owning the plot underneath it, which was owned by the state.</p>
<p>A crucial measure in undoing apartheid was transferring ownership of township houses to their long-term residents. <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/AJA02586568_844#page=8">In 1986</a>, a few years before apartheid’s end, the law changed to enable outright ownership for black people in urban areas. Subsequently, processes for transfer on a large scale were established.</p>
<p>This massive redistribution of public housing stock, alongside legal change, involved hundreds of thousands of homes. Township houses were now assets. The promise was improved security, rights, and inclusion in the property market.</p>
<p>But change did not necessarily give families greater security. Some family members benefited while others were left vulnerable. That is because the transfers – and the legal definitions of property and inheritance – do not account for how many people understand their homes: collective and cross-generational, available to an extended lineage.</p>
<p>This has led to confusion and heartache for hundreds of thousands of people. That confusion, I showed <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/479/219/6132108">in a paper in 2021</a>, extended to encounters with state administration, which can become the stage on which family disputes are played out.</p>
<p>As I argued in another <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02587203.2019.1632737">paper</a>, with Tshenolo Masha, these understandings of home and kinship warrant legal recognition – indeed, constitutional recognition – as urban custom. Various state officials have taken seriously the collective ownership of family houses, as a matter of customary norms and practice, through administration and court judgments. But they face the rigid limits of existing law.</p>
<p>The family house is central but effectively legally invisible, leaving many people uncertain about what it even means to own or inherit.</p>
<h2>Collective home but individual property</h2>
<p>For many residents, family houses belong collectively to multi-generational lineages. Often, a group of siblings is at the core – the children of an earlier, typically male, household head. Family members might build extra structures on the site to live in. Or they might come and go, but the home is a place to return to. The family house is defended as customary, drawing parallels with the rural homestead.</p>
<p>By the end of apartheid <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>, regulation was patchy at best, but the occupancy permits were understood to affirm group entitlement because they listed family members, not just the householder.</p>
<p>In statutory law, at stake is an asset with one or more named owners – an indivisible plot or <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/dra1937172/">“erf” of land</a> that includes its built structures. Owners can sell, or they can evict; other occupants have no legal right to stop them. When family houses were transferred, one person was generally registered as owner.</p>
<p>In some cases, the allocation to the registered householder was automatic. In others, there were hearings, but even here residents found their ideas of home and ownership marginalised. A family member would come forward as family “representative” and “custodian” of the collective home. But that representative would typically become the sole titleholder.</p>
<p>In many cases, relatives were unaware that this had happened, or even that an application for title had been made.</p>
<h2>Inheritance: an added layer of complexity</h2>
<p>Inheritance has added another layer to the problem.</p>
<p>Under apartheid there were separate inheritance rules for black people without wills. These were finally struck down by the Constitutional Court in <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/27.html">2000</a> and <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/17.html">2004</a>. Magistrates’ courts were replaced by the dedicated inheritance office, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/master/">Master of the High Court</a>. Inheritance by the eldest son was replaced by rules for all South Africans, prioritising spouses and children in nuclear families.</p>
<p>Once again, essential redress had the effect of narrowing which relationships would be recognised. When a custodian died, wider family members first discovered that they were not collective owners; then they realised they would not even inherit.</p>
<p>The family house is not a static idea in fights over the home. Warring parties may draw on both customary and legal concepts, sometimes at the same time. Among families that approach the state – and many do not – some subsequently drop out of official process. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/479/219/6132108">no simple consensus</a> about who gets what or about how this should be decided.</p>
<h2>Efforts to resolve the issue</h2>
<p>The family house is contested, yet it is key to arguments about what is fair – based not just on who owns, but on the nature of ownership.</p>
<p>State officials have repeatedly tried to make the system more responsive. In Gauteng province, where Johannesburg is located, housing tribunals were set up in the late 1990s to decide ownership and to broker family house rights agreements. They were intended to prevent custodians from selling houses or evicting relatives. But it turned out that they held no legal water: from the point of view of deeds registration, custodians’ <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/479/219/6132108">ownership was unrestricted</a>. </p>
<p>In the Master’s Office, where inheritance is administered, kin complain that their family home somehow became the property of one relative. In Johannesburg, officials <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/120/479/219/6132108">try to explain the law</a>, while where appropriate querying how title came to be acquired.</p>
<p>What they cannot do, though, is change the rules.</p>
<p>The courts, too, have highlighted problems with rigid law and procedure. In a 2004 Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/17.html">decision on inheritance</a>, a dissenting judge warned that customary understandings of home and custodianship risked being sidelined by standardisation.</p>
<p>More recently in 2018, automatically upgrading householders to owners was <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2018/42.html">declared unconstitutional</a>.
Men were usually documented as householders under apartheid, and gender discrimination was extended by giving them exclusive property rights. </p>
<p>Other judgments recognise the spirit of collective belonging and access, and they stop individuals from taking the house out of the families’ hands by inheritance or sale. But they cannot make legislation, so they send the question of who owns the house back to a tribunal.</p>
<p>Once again, solutions are restricted to workarounds.</p>
<h2>Towards legal recognition</h2>
<p>In 2022, the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2022/441.html#_ftnref78">Shomang judgment</a> in the North Gauteng High Court called for legally recognising the family house. </p>
<p>A sufficiently flexible notion of family title would be challenging to work out, and doubtless the basis for countless disputes. Surviving spouses need as much protection as the siblings in a lineage. But it would enable administrators and judges to mediate disputes in terms recognisable to the families involved. And to offer more than ad hoc workarounds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxim Bolt's research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. </span></em></p>The transfer of township rental houses to inhabitants did not necessarily give families greater security. “Family houses” were frequently acquired by individuals.Maxim Bolt, Associate Professor of Development Studies, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113652023-09-21T13:27:43Z2023-09-21T13:27:43ZZulu land dispute: Ingonyama Trust furore highlights the problem of insecure land tenure for millions of South Africans in rural areas<p>The recent <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-04-the-battle-between-the-zulu-king-and-his-prime-minister-over-the-ingonyama-trust-is-likely-to-divide-kzn-voters-in-2024/">fallout</a> between the Zulu king, Misuzulu, and his now late traditional prime minister, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, over the running of the Ingonyama Trust highlights a pervasive problem in South Africa: insecure land tenure in rural areas. </p>
<p>The Ingonyama Trust administers about a third of the land in KwaZulu-Natal province. Buthelezi insinuated that the king – or those around him – wanted to corruptly sell the land for profit. He also questioned the competence of the board chairperson appointed by the king. The king denied the charge, saying the board would <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-04-the-battle-between-the-zulu-king-and-his-prime-minister-over-the-ingonyama-trust-is-likely-to-divide-kzn-voters-in-2024/">“never allow the sale of the land”</a>.</p>
<p>But the legally questionable practices of the Ingonyama Trust, such as charging people rent on land they own communally, and its unilateral decision-making about communally owned land, reflect the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-african-communitys-win-against-mining-company-matters-107746">insecurity of land tenure</a> for millions of rural South Africans. </p>
<p>Land disputes arise when the principles at the core of <a href="https://ci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/content_migration/health_uct_ac_za/533/files/living%2520customary%2520law%2520and%2520families%2520in%2520South%2520Africa.pdf">customary law</a> are breached. The breach can be by the state or by the representatives appointed by the communities to manage or administer the land on their behalf and for their collective benefit.</p>
<p>Constitutional <a href="https://scholar.ufs.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11660/12130">land reform measures</a> are intended to provide security of land tenure to all land holders equally. All laws, including customary law, are subject to the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/saconstitution-web-eng.pdf">constitution</a>. Any law, rule or conduct found to be inconsistent with constitutional principles of human dignity, equality and freedom is invalid. </p>
<p>In areas run by traditional leaders, land is owned collectively, in line with <a href="https://ci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/content_migration/health_uct_ac_za/533/files/living%2520customary%2520law%2520and%2520families%2520in%2520South%2520Africa.pdf">customary law</a>. South African law <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2010/10.html">recognises</a> the application of living customary law, in accordance with the constitution.</p>
<p>Customary communal land tenure comes with inherent rights for land holders. They include collective ownership rights, equal benefit from the land and natural resources, and decision-making authority. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/customary-land-governance-holds-in-ghana-but-times-are-changing-and-not-for-the-better-205497">Customary land governance holds in Ghana. But times are changing and not for the better</a>
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<p>My <a href="https://scholar.ufs.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11660/12130">research</a> areas include issues of rural land tenure, custodianship and property law. </p>
<p>In my view, the Ingonyama Trust has misconstrued <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/CCR/2011/4.pdf">customary communal land tenure</a>. Its dual application of both trust law and traditional customary law causes confusion. It’s not clear what the property rights of communal land holders are. Applying both sets of laws also blurs the limitations on the powers of the trust and traditional representatives. </p>
<p>Such misconstructions of customary law are often intertwined with corrupt practices and power mongering. These misconstructions preserve certain individuals’ powers and interests at the expense of the greater community. This occurs when understandings of individual private property ownership are applied to customary communal land tenure in a way that diminishes the need for communal consent and consultation.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24566755">Living customary law</a> – which is developed over time by the community, is specific to that community, and occurs through collective practice and decision-making in accordance with shared values and rules – is then supplanted by misapplications. These misconstructions can originate from various sources, such as statutory regulations, distorted common law beliefs, and patriarchal traditional leadership practices that masquerade as customary law. </p>
<p>The result is insecure tenure for rural land occupants. The Ingonyama Trust epitomises these problems.</p>
<h2>How customary communal land tenure works</h2>
<p>Customary <a href="https://www.academia.edu/37320502/Land_reform_political_instability_and_commercial%20_agriculture_in_South_Africa_An_assessment">communal land tenure</a> is found in communities that have a genealogical or ancestral connection to that land. Some are beneficiaries of the government’s <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1727-37812014000200004">land restitution programme</a>. They collectively hold all property rights to their land. </p>
<p>Living customary law gives them, collectively, the power to hold individual community members and leaders or representatives accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties to the community.</p>
<p>Often a statutory entity is created, such as a trust or association, that regulates the way the land is managed. For example, some communities in the <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform#:%7E:text=The%20Act%20makes%20provision%20for%20the%20restitution%20of%20rights%20in,and%20a%20Land%20Claims%20Court.">land restitution programme</a> are members of an association in terms of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/communal-property-associations-act">Communal Property Associations Act</a>. </p>
<p>Such communities elect representatives who manage the administration of the association and have fiduciary responsibilities in terms of the act. Associations are governed by their constitution and the Communal Property Associations Act. Similarly, the Ingonyama Trust is governed by traditional customary law and the statutory trust framework. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/customary-and-religious-laws-are-impeding-progress-towards-womens-health-in-nigeria-154221">Customary and religious laws are impeding progress towards women's health in Nigeria</a>
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<p>Both forms of communal land holding are distinguishable from private property ownership, which confers registered ownership rights on individuals. Private ownership is primarily governed by the common law. It gives the land owner autonomous decision-making powers with few limitations. The owner has extensive unilateral decision-making authority in respect of their privately owned land. They can, for example, transfer ownership, dispose of, or encumber their property (without consultation).</p>
<h2>The Ingonyama Trust and its tenure challenges</h2>
<p>The Ingonyama Trust was <a href="http://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/">established in 1994</a> by the then KwaZulu Government to administer all land it held. It is a corporate entity and administers 2.8 million hectares of the land in KwaZulu-Natal. The territory was once administered by the erstwhile KwaZulu homeland. This followed <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02582473.2021.1909116">a deal hammered out earlier</a> to entice Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party to take part in the elections that ended apartheid. The province is a stronghold of the party.</p>
<p>The Zulu monarch is the sole trustee, even though the land is <a href="http://www.ingonyamatrust.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Ingonyama-Trust-Act-as-amended.pdf">owned by the Zulu people</a>. The king represents the people and the land must be managed for their benefit and welfare. </p>
<p>The trust is plagued with disputes for not involving the community in its business transactions. There has been little evidence of collective benefit for the community. </p>
<p>The disputes expose unequal profit from trust assets, privileging a select few, instead of all the communal land holders equally. To sum up crisply: the trust has treated communal land like privately owned land.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-south-african-communitys-win-against-mining-company-matters-107746">Why South African community's win against mining company matters</a>
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<p>In 2022, the Supreme Court of Appeal <a href="https://lrc.org.za/24-august-2022-supreme-court-of-appeal-dismisses-ingonyama-trust-board-application-for-leave-to-appeal/">directed</a> the Ingonyama Trust to cease letting trust land to the land beneficiaries to whom the land belonged. It was ordered to repay the rent.</p>
<p>In 2017, <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP_report.pdf">a panel appointed by parliament to review post-apartheid legislation</a> recommended that the trust be amended or repealed. </p>
<p>However, such criticism is perceived by some as a slight against the king and is met with social and political resistance. The <a href="https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv02898.htm">Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa</a> contends that the Ingonyama Trust cannot be repealed, amended or dissolved without the king’s approval – in accordance with customary law. </p>
<h2>Traditional rule versus democracy</h2>
<p>The misapplication of tenure under the Ingonyama Trust exemplifies structural conflict between trust tenure and customary traditional rule. </p>
<p>The trust applies a form of traditional despotic rule that can be at odds with democratic principles enshrined in the constitution. Under traditional despotic rule or authoritarian rule, customary law is interpreted in a way that naturally limits the need for community consultation, consent and participation in all decision-making related to the land from the “subjects”. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-courts-and-lawmakers-have-failed-the-ideal-of-cultural-diversity-91508">South Africa's courts and lawmakers have failed the ideal of cultural diversity</a>
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<p>This despotic rule is also at odds with trust tenure and the communal landholding rights of rural communities. The extent to which the community is able to equally use and enjoy their land, and the economic benefits accruing from it for collective social and economic progress, should be the yardstick against which communal land tenure is measured, and land rights clarified and protected.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthea-lee September-Van Huffel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Land disputes arise when the fundamental principles of customary law are breached. The breach can be at the hands of the state or its representatives.Anthea-lee September-Van Huffel, Lecturer, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2134122023-09-20T13:20:17Z2023-09-20T13:20:17ZSuicide in Ghana: society expects men to be providers – new study explores this pressure<p>Suicide is a complex behaviour that is widely regarded as a significant public health issue across the globe. It is influenced by psychiatric, psychological, biological, social, cultural, economic and existential factors. In most countries, the rate of male suicides is between <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0706743718766052">3 and 7.5 times</a> higher than that of females even though suicide ideation (thoughts) and attempts are <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241564779">more frequent</a> for females. </p>
<p>The World Health Organization <a href="https://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/ghana-suicide">reported</a> in 2020 that approximately 1,993 suicides occurred in Ghana annually. A report in Ghana on suicide attempt trends over four years also <a href="https://www.ug.edu.gh/news/prof-akotia-advocates-change-attitudes-towards-suicide">revealed</a> that 707 suicide attempts occurred in 2018, 880 in 2019, 777 in 2020 and 417 as of June 2021. </p>
<p>Studies continue to reveal a disproportionately high number of males in both suicide and attempted suicide in Ghana. Suicidal behaviour in Ghana is a predominantly <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953610007471?via%3Dihub">male problem</a> – which is one reason it’s of interest to me as a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Johnny-Andoh-Arthur">psychologist who studies</a> men’s mental health. </p>
<p>I undertook a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17482631.2023.2225935">study</a> that focused on the way loss of job and income influenced relationships with close family members prior to suicide. This is not to suggest that loss of income or job is the only cause of men’s suicide in Ghana. Other <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953610007471?via%3Dihub">studies</a> have highlighted chronic illness, substance use, interpersonal conflict and loss, marital challenges, economic difficulties, perceived shame, and mental illness as other contributing factors. </p>
<p>My study used a qualitative research approach, interviewing 21 close relatives and friends of nine men who had all suffered some economic challenges in ways that affected their relationships with family members. All nine had died by suicide. </p>
<p>Even though these men lived in social settings that valued mutual support and reciprocal obligations, some of them suffered abandonment during their economic difficulties. Even those who could depend on spouses in their situation appeared to find that dependency emasculating.</p>
<h2>Men and suicide</h2>
<p>The term <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9560163/">gender paradox</a> in relation to suicide describes the observation where females have higher rates of suicidal thoughts and behaviour than males, yet mortality from suicide is typically lower for females compared to males.</p>
<p>Biologically, it is suggested that <a href="https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/24101-testosterone">testosterone</a>, which is linked to impulsivity and aggression, is about ten times higher in males than in females. Thus the likelihood for males to engage in risky behaviours including aggression towards themselves is linked to high testosterone levels. </p>
<p>The high male suicide rate is also connected to gender stereotypes and <a href="https://www.psychiatrist.com/jcp/depression/suicide/suicide-men/">role socialisation</a>. Society expects certain things of men. </p>
<p>The patriarchal nature of most societies in Africa makes being economically independent a key social expectation of being a man. Men are expected to be employed, with a regular income, and to start a family. </p>
<h2>Family support in Ghana</h2>
<p>My study highlighted Ghana’s extended family system. This system encourages support and care for one another, belonging and seeking help in times of adversity. The study found that the deceased men had perceived being a burden, loss of respect, social abandonment and anxiety when faced with crises like job losses and financial difficulties. The relative of one of the deceased stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I even got angry the day this incident (suicide) happened. People even said we have been starving him, etc, etc. For Christ sake, he was 27 years. Must I keep on taking care of him? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A friend of another deceased person said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>His relatives visited him a lot when he was doing well in business but they stopped visiting when his problems started. </p>
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<p>Thus a dysfunctional, transactional social system existed around them. The implicit rule appeared to be that the victims were as valuable as their ability to provide for others and be economically independent.</p>
<p>The finding aligns with an earlier <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-47852-0_10">study</a> in Ghana that shows that the motivation for male suicides is not that men seek to reject their social responsibilities. Instead, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>it is an intense sense of personal responsibility towards meeting prescribed social norms and roles associated with gender. </p>
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<p>My study also found that even though it was possible for some of the men to depend on their wealthier wives during economic difficulty, doing so created distress. Depending on their wives and seeing them assume hitherto <a href="https://theconversation.com/women-occupy-very-few-academic-jobs-in-ghana-culture-and-societys-expectations-are-to-blame-200307">“male” roles</a> were seen as emasculating. </p>
<p>A spouse illustrated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>He felt that due to the problems he was going through, there were some responsibilities I was not supposed to do as a wife that I was doing and all of those thing got him worried. </p>
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<p>Where they were intent to live as <a href="https://theconversation.com/death-and-mourning-in-ghana-how-gender-shapes-the-rituals-of-the-akan-people-212398">benevolent patriachs</a> in line with internalised masculine codes, their economic predicament constrained the men’s social roles and created distress. </p>
<p>As another spouse explained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Things were not going so well with his job, it got to the extent that he could not help people the way he wanted to, and he was worried. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Men as providers</h2>
<p>The findings of this study highlight the patriachal system that defines men partly in terms of their capacity to provide materially for others. Men who strictly adhere to such <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-parenting-in-ghana-shapes-sexist-stereotypes-51823">male norms</a> may struggle to adjust when they have to depend on others, including their spouses. The extended family system should support such men emotionally and materially, but some family members chose to abandon them. </p>
<p>Public education is vital to change unhealthy gender norms that affect men in social and economic adversity. It will enable men to learn effective ways of coping and alternative <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-fathers-in-ghana-are-expanding-the-meaning-of-manhood-153807">ways of being men</a>. Education will also help change societal notions of who a man is and foster more support in times of adversity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johnny Andoh-Arthur does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Suicide in Ghana is regarded as taboo for most families.Johnny Andoh-Arthur, Senior Lecturer, Psychology, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2137372023-09-20T08:43:58Z2023-09-20T08:43:58ZAU and G20: membership will give Africa more say on global issues – if it speaks with one voice<p>After seven years of advocating for full membership, the African Union (AU) <a href="https://apnews.com/article/g20-membership-africa-economy-india-ae58459261bc2722b54da422debc5b83">will join</a> the Group of 20 “<a href="https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/about_g20/G20_Background_Brief.pdf#page=2">most important industrialised and developing economies</a>”. It becomes the second regional bloc to join the group after the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-g20_en">27-member European Union (EU)</a>.</p>
<p>The G20 was <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/#overview">established</a> after the 1999 Asian financial crisis as an informal grouping of ministers of finance and central bank governors. It grew out of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-g7-who-are-its-members-what-does-it-do-2022-10-11/">G7</a>, which was formed in 1975 to deal with another complex global financial and economic crisis. </p>
<p>Since 2008, the G20 has met at the level of heads of state and government. Its agenda has been broadened beyond finance and economics to include, among other issues, climate change, disaster risk reduction and health.</p>
<p>The G20 is currently made up of 19 member states (including South Africa) plus the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/country-profiles_en">EU</a>. <a href="https://www.g20.org/en/about-g20/">These members</a> collectively account for about 85% of global economic output, more than 75% of global trade and about two-thirds of the world population. The AU’s 55 member states, on the other hand, bring only about <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/02/africa-global-growth-economics-worldwide-gdp/">3%</a> of global economic output, <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/09/african-union-g20-world-leaders/">but a population of 1.4 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Based on my <a href="https://uni-leipzig.academia.edu/UlfEngel/">research</a> on the <a href="https://brill.com/display/serial/YBAU">AU</a>, and my experience as an adviser to the <a href="https://au.int/en/commission">African Union Commission</a> (the AU’s secretariat) for 18 years, my view is that membership of the G20 is an important complement to the union’s existing multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships.</p>
<p>The AU hopes to use its G20 membership to give member states <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/g20-admit-african-union-permanent-member-new-delhi-summit-draft-declaration-2023-09-09/">a greater voice</a> on key global issues and to make a stronger contribution to the ongoing renegotiation of the global order. But a major challenge will be to find a structured way to arrive at common African positions and speak on behalf of member states.</p>
<h2>Strategic partnership</h2>
<p>The AU has developed its external relations primarily through <a href="https://au.int/en/partnerships">multilateral and bilateral strategic partnerships</a>. </p>
<p>Multilaterally, strategic partnerships with the United Nations and the EU are of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/11/african-union-eu-un-partnership-project-launched-support-au-peace-support">key importance</a> (the League of Arab States plays less of a role). Bilaterally, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey are currently considered key strategic partners. And last year, the African Union Commission participated in the <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/#:%7E:text=Delegations%20from%20all%2049%20invited,private%20sector%20attended%20the%20summit.">United States-Africa Leaders summit</a>. </p>
<p>There is no routine process through which states are categorised as strategic partners. And to date the AU has struggled to develop a coherent policy for managing these partnerships. However, being a full member of the G20 now opens up the possibility to take <a href="https://x.com/AUC_MoussaFaki/status/1700423181104816554?s=20">collective African positions</a> on strategic questions to the global table. </p>
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<p>The continental concerns it can raise include debt relief, trade integration, financing the management of climate change and public health management.</p>
<h2>The African Union and the global order</h2>
<p>However, in the major global policymaking forums, member states of the AU don’t speak with one voice. This holds true for the UN General Assembly (as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">African vote on Russia’s war against Ukraine</a> demonstrates). And often also for the so-called A3 – the three African non-permanent members of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members">UN Security Council</a> (Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique).</p>
<p>Yet, in a limited number of policy fields, the AU has managed to come up with what it refers to as “common positions”. These have been created and legitimised in different ways, and have a mostly diffuse legal binding effect on member states.</p>
<p>The most prominent of these common positions is the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/africas-quest-for-reform-of-the-united-nations-security-council/#:%7E:text=In%202005%2C%20the%20AU%20adopted,have%20strong%20representation%20in%201963.">2005 Ezulwini consensus on reform of the UN Security Council</a> to increase African representation in the council and provide the continent with two permanent seats with veto rights. But there are also common positions on other important global questions. These include <a href="https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/common-african-positions-on-global-issues">mining, the post-2015 development agenda and asset recovery from illicit financial flows</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pan-africanism-remains-a-dream-four-key-issues-the-african-union-must-tackle-199791">Pan-Africanism remains a dream: four key issues the African Union must tackle</a>
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<p>The African Union Commission needs a clear definition of what “common positions” are, and how they can be achieved politically and domesticated legally by member states. </p>
<p>To develop more common positions, the 55 AU member states would have to delegate more state sovereignty to the union. There are some lessons from the EU’s experience. The EU has developed more than 300 common positions. These have been adopted by the EU Council and approved by the EU Parliament. In these cases, the union’s member states have ceded real sovereignty to the EU Commission.</p>
<p>It will be interesting to see how the AU will prepare African positions to be tabled to the G20. They will likely be prepared by the continental body’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pages/specialised-technical-committees-stcs-0">ministerial specialised technical committees</a>. In the G20 realm, I expect the committee on finance, monetary affairs, economic planning and integration to play a strong role. This will likely be in cooperation with the technical committee on economic development, tourism, trade, industry and mining.</p>
<p>However, the legal way in which member states can express their agreement or disagreement with common positions needs to be defined. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Membership in the G20 represents a great opportunity. But Africa’s attempts to speak with one voice must be strengthened. And coordination processes must be created at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors, among others. These will ensure that the AU makes use of its membership in a global negotiating and decision-making platform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213737/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ulf Engel receives research funding from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research for a project on African non-military conflict intervention practices (ANCIP, 2022-2026), and the German Research Council for a research project on inter-regionalism between ECOWAS, the AU and the EU on peace and security in the Sahel region (2020-2023).</span></em></p>The African Union’s membership in the G20 is an important complement to existing strategic partnerships.Ulf Engel, Professor, Institute of African Studies, University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112182023-09-19T13:24:27Z2023-09-19T13:24:27ZSouth Africa’s smallholder vegetable farmers aren’t getting the finance they need: this is what it should look like<p>Fresh efforts are being made to increase the share of black ownership in South Africa’s agricultural sector. This follows decades of missteps and badly designed interventions that have failed to significantly change the ownership patterns in the sector.</p>
<p>The latest plan – known as the <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/220607Agriculture_and_Agro-processing_Master_Plan_Signed.pdf">agriculture and agro-processing master plan</a> – aims to provide, among others, comprehensive farmer assistance, development finance, agricultural research and development and extension services. </p>
<p>It also aims to increase the share of black ownership and the contribution of small-scale producers in the country by 2030.</p>
<p>The master plan has been signed by government and representatives from various businesses and civil society organisations within the agricultural sector. It is the first multi-stakeholder strategic plan in the country. Its aim is to promote transformation in agriculture and agro-processing sectors affected by apartheid. </p>
<p>However, farming is a capital and resource intensive business, which requires access to sufficient finance. In a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/650189832232f1281216cb5b/1694599558497/Vegetables+Working+Paper_OXFAM_13092023%5B12%5D.pdf">recent study</a> we looked at the funding challenges facing smallholder farmers in the vegetables value chain. A smallholder farmer is someone engaged in agricultural activities on a small scale, generally farming less than 10 hectares of land, selling part of their crop and farming for subsistence. </p>
<p>The study provides valuable insights that could help inform the implementation of the masterplan. For example, one of the main findings is that there is an urgent need for government to provide “patient” finance – such as longer repayment periods – to allow farmers to build capabilities, accumulate returns and be profitable. The current problem with government funding is that it’s limited in both scale and scope and provided on a piecemeal basis.</p>
<p>This is not to suggest that there is no financing available for farmers. What’s in contention is whether what’s available helps farmers enter, expand and grow.</p>
<h2>How financing is offered affects who gets to farm</h2>
<p>Farming needs substantial investment in on-farm infrastructure and equipment. This includes fencing, farming tools, tractors, boreholes and pumps, irrigation systems, shade nets and greenhouse tunnels. </p>
<p>Research by <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/650189832232f1281216cb5b/1694599558497/Vegetables+Working+Paper_OXFAM_13092023%5B12%5D.pdf">the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development</a> found that it can cost a farmer between R2.5 million and R3 million (around US$159,000) to install an irrigation system and greenhouse tunnels on a 5-hectare farm. These are substantial investments for smallholder farmers. </p>
<p>Short repayment periods mean that farmers are required to pay back their loans sometimes before they have even become profitable. </p>
<p>The issue of financing is particularly concerning given that smallholder farmers are self-financed or have limited access to debt finance.</p>
<p>As one farmer put it:</p>
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<p>The problem why farmers are collapsing and exiting the vegetable farming business is because farmers get a loan to start farming and they make losses in the first years which means that they can’t re-pay the loan, so they start selling farm assets to repay the loan.</p>
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<p>This is counterproductive. If a farm goes under, all the funding and non-financial support previously provided to get the enterprise started is lost.</p>
<p>Patient funding is the answer. Patient financing in agriculture is financing and support that’s made on a longer-term basis and that recognises the extended time frames and risks associated with agricultural cycles and the time it takes for the farmer to become profitable. </p>
<p>The lack of patient financing also stands in the way of farmers being able to access reliable and consistent markets, such as supermarkets. Supermarkets have stringent requirements which often entail farmers needing to invest further in their farms. The investment required can be in the form of infrastructure such as packhouses, pack sheds, cold rooms, proper financial statements, and refrigerated trucks to deliver to the stores. </p>
<p>Government support does not cover weather and climate change related risks. These are increasingly affecting smallholder farmers who still practise open field farming. </p>
<p>Many farmers also complained of complicated application forms and bureaucratic application processes to obtain finance. Often small farmers don’t have all the requirements stipulated on the forms, such as bookkeeping. This limits their chances of getting access to finance. There is also a lack of assistance from the department on how applicants can fill out the forms when they encounter difficulties. </p>
<p>As one farmer suggested: </p>
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<p>The challenge with government support is that it comes and helps in piecemeal and they don’t go all the way. Also, government does not come to visit the farm to check and evaluate or monitor progress.</p>
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<h2>What needs to done</h2>
<p>Government needs to provide patient finance to allow farmers to build capabilities, accumulate returns and be profitable. </p>
<p>This will safeguard the participation of smallholder farmers by allowing them to access more reliable and consistent markets. It will also benefit consumers through better quality produce and avoid potential food shortages in the wake of high inflation and the energy crisis in South Africa. </p>
<p>Having the agriculture and agro-processing master plan in place is helpful. But it needs to be put into practice properly. If smallholder farmers are its focus, then more emphasis needs to be placed on providing them with access to finance, to equip them with the tools to achieve better production.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karissa Moothoo Padayachie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Financing is available to farmers. What’s in contention is whether what’s available helps farmers enter the industry, expand and grow.Karissa Moothoo Padayachie, Researcher for the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2138772023-09-19T11:52:50Z2023-09-19T11:52:50ZSouth Africa’s destructive storm surges: geoscientist reveals the 3 factors that drove them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549052/original/file-20230919-27-26ykei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tidal surges can cause enormous damage.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Martha van der Westhuizen/500px</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>A series of powerful tidal surges <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/battered-coastal-areas-begin-mop-up-operations-after-spring-tide-damage-20230918">battered</a> coastal areas in South Africa’s Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces over the weekend of 16 September. <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/spring-tide-damage-woman-dies-after-waves-crash-into-george-car-park-another-dangerous-surge-expected-20230917">One person died</a>; cars, homes and businesses were damaged. The Conversation Africa asked Jasper Knight, a geoscientist who researches coastal processes, to explain what happened.</em></p>
<h2>What drove the flooding?</h2>
<p>A critical combination of three factors resulted in this significant flooding. First, a storm surge associated with low-pressure weather systems coming onshore. These happen very commonly but often don’t result in high amounts of flooding by themselves. </p>
<p>Second, low-pressure cells often result in strong onshore winds, and these can whip up the sea surface and create big waves which can potentially run further inland, especially when the sea surface is raised.</p>
<p>Third, the coincidence of the storm with the period of high tide (a monthly event) and equinoctial high-high tide (a seasonal event). It is this combination that is the cause here, not these individual factors in isolation.</p>
<h2>What is a storm surge?</h2>
<p>This is where the level of the sea surface near the coast is temporarily raised up and results in flooding along that coastal stretch. Storm surges are caused by a low pressure (cyclone) weather system approaching the coastline from the ocean. Low pressure causes the sea surface to bulge upwards below the centre or eye of the cyclone, and the magnitude of this disturbance is related to the severity of the low pressure system – the deeper the low pressure cell, the higher the elevation of the sea surface. This is usually on the order of tens of centimetres to one metre or so. </p>
<p>As the cyclone approaches land, the water surface along the coast rises.</p>
<h2>What is a spring tide?</h2>
<p>Despite their name, <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/springtide.html">spring tides</a> are regular occurrences throughout the year. They take place when the sun, Earth and moon are in alignment, and this happens once every (lunar) month. In addition, there are also times of the year, around the <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/equinox/">equinoxes</a>, where spring tides are higher than average. </p>
<p>We are very near the spring (vernal) equinox in the southern hemisphere (which is on or about 22 September). This is a period when the sun is aligned overhead of Earth’s equator and so exerts a bigger tidal force on the oceans. This may have been a contributing factor to the higher water levels around the coast.</p>
<h2>Were people sufficiently warned?</h2>
<p>Tidal patterns are highly predictable and this data is widely available for ports or harbours along the coast. In this case, the South African Weather Service issued <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/saturdays-weather-damaging-winds-waves-and-a-storm-surge-warning-for-the-coast-20230915">a warning</a>. This information is particularly useful for boaters, fishermen and other coastal users. Weather patterns are also fairly predictable, which is what weather forecasting is all about, so we know when a big storm may be approaching. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-science-of-weather-forecasting-what-it-takes-and-why-its-so-hard-to-get-right-175740">The science of weather forecasting: what it takes and why it’s so hard to get right</a>
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<p>However, the net result of all of these factors in combination is less predictable: although low-lying coastal areas are vulnerable to flooding, forecasters may not know exactly when or how high.</p>
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<p>The other issue here is not just areas being covered by water but also the speed at which the water waves are moving, which is a factor in their destructiveness. </p>
<h2>What kind of emergency measures could be put in place?</h2>
<p>Local communities need to be warned more clearly and effectively if there is a threat of a storm surge and of coastal flooding. People and assets (like cars, anything that is moveable) should be moved from the area or kept inside. People tend to want to go to the sea to watch the waves but this puts them at more risk. Roads should be closed off where possible to keep people safe and away from the area. Floodwater management through using sandbags and similar actions should be undertaken.</p>
<p>Exactly the same measures used in places like <a href="https://www.floridadisaster.org/planprepare/">Florida in the US</a> for reducing hurricane risk should be used in South Africa, such as boarding up windows, keeping assets indoors, evacuating people from high risk areas, and moving furniture in houses to the first floor to reduce flood impacts.</p>
<p>Storm surges – and <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/chapter-4-sea-level-rise-and-implications-for-low-lying-islands-coasts-and-communities/">sea levels rising in future</a> – are not going to go away so we need to be prepared for them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jasper Knight does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Local communities need to be warned more clearly and effectively if there is a threat of a storm surge and of coastal flooding.Jasper Knight, Professor of Physical Geography, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121182023-09-18T14:25:31Z2023-09-18T14:25:31ZCorruption in South Africa: would paying whistleblowers help?<p>Whistleblowing is an important tool in fighting corruption. In South Africa, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202204/state-capture-commission-report-part-iv-vol-iv.pdf">commission of inquiry into state capture</a> recommended that the government should provide financial rewards for whistleblowers who report corruption. </p>
<p>The issue was in the headlines again following the <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-babita-deokaran-six-accused-plead-guilty-to-murder-of-whistleblower-20230822">sentencing of six men</a> for the 2021 murder of prominent whistleblower Babita Deokaran. </p>
<p>The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development invited public comments on a <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/20230629-Whistleblower-Protection-Regime.pdf">discussion paper</a> on proposed reforms for whistleblower protection. It proposes that whistleblowers should be given legal assistance and that a fund be created to support those who suffer severe financial hardship for reporting corruption. This fund will be financed by a levy on all employees’ salaries, similar to the <a href="https://www.sars.gov.za/types-of-tax/unemployment-insurance-fund/#:%7E:text=How%20much%20do%20you%20need,employer">Unemployment Insurance Fund levy</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whistleblowers-are-key-to-fighting-corruption-in-south-africa-it-shouldnt-be-at-their-peril-168134">Whistleblowers are key to fighting corruption in South Africa. It shouldn't be at their peril</a>
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<p>I am a <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3317-9057">legal scholar</a> with a research interest in public sector corruption and municipal governance. I presented papers at international conferences in <a href="https://urbanlaw.wixsite.com/iculc2023/schedule-1">May</a> and <a href="http://jurisdiversitas.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html">June</a> 2023 on whistleblower protection and money incentives.</p>
<p>In my view, whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support – which may or may not include rewards as well. But rewarding whistleblowers has potential costs as well as benefits. It should not be seen as the silver bullet that will stop corruption. Lawmakers need to be aware of possible weaknesses of money reward systems, so they can build in safeguards when developing legislation.</p>
<h2>Rewarding whistleblowers</h2>
<p>Three ways to support whistleblowers are financial support, compensation and money rewards. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16549716.2022.2140494">Financial support</a> means covering the reasonable expenses a person incurs when reporting corruption. They can be legal expenses, or expenses for accommodation and travel to court proceedings.</p>
<p>Compensation is meant to make up for the losses they suffer from retaliatory actions such as unfair dismissals or defamation. </p>
<p>The third option is more controversial. Money rewards or incentives are payments made on top of compensation and financial support. The idea is to reward whistleblowers financially for being good citizens.</p>
<p>Globally, only <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">about 22 countries</a> use money incentives for whistleblowing. One possible reason there are so few could be a lack of clear evidence as to whether reward systems contribute much to fighting corruption.</p>
<p>Money rewards <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">are commonly</a> used:</p>
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<li><p>to “buy” useful information from the whistleblower (this is done in Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, and Pakistan)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information given leads to a successful penalty or recovery of funds (Canada, Ghana, Hungary, Republic of Korea, Montenegro, Nigeria, Slovakia, the UK and the US)</p></li>
<li><p>when the information is instrumental to institute criminal proceedings (Ghana, Slovakia and Ukraine)</p></li>
<li><p>when whistleblowers are able to recover funds through legal action on behalf of the state (the US). </p></li>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-corporate-whistleblowers-dont-get-enough-protection-what-needs-to-change-201006">South Africa's corporate whistleblowers don't get enough protection: what needs to change</a>
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<p>In South Africa, individuals can <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1977-051.pdf#page=7">institute private prosecutions</a>, but are entitled to recover only their expenses involved in the prosecution if they are successful. They don’t receive a reward.</p>
<p>The US and Ghana use more than one model. This may be to provide for some flexibility depending on the type of offence concerned, the information provided and the overall interests of justice.</p>
<p>The South African government could also offer non-monetary incentives for whistleblowers. These might include national awards such as the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-baobab-0#:%7E:text=The%20Order%20of%20the%20Baobab%20is%20awarded%20to%20South%20African,is%20awarded%20for%20exceptional%20service">Order of the Baobab</a> or the <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/national-orders/order-luthuli-0">Order of Luthuli</a> for service to democracy. </p>
<p>The City of Cape Town recently <a href="https://www.capetown.gov.za/Media-and-news/Cape%20Town%20announces%20Civic%20Honours%20recipients">announced</a> that it would award the Mayor’s Medal to Athol Williams, a state capture whistleblower, for his dedication and sacrifice to South Africa. </p>
<h2>The case for financial rewards</h2>
<p>There are a number of benefits to rewards.</p>
<p>The first is that money incentives lead to an <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf">increase in the number of whistleblowing reports</a>. However, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">some studies</a> emphasise that there’s no guarantee the number of successful prosecutions will increase too.</p>
<p>Secondly, whistleblower reports can save state resources which would otherwise be spent on investigations. Criminal investigations can be fast tracked if people come forward with evidence to support their allegations. </p>
<p>Thirdly, money incentives can increase public awareness of corruption and whistleblowing, if there’s media coverage. This could counteract the stigma that whistleblowers are snitches.</p>
<p>Lastly, money rewards can help disrupt the activities of organised crime networks. Governments can fuel distrust among accomplices by offering rewards to the first self-reporting offender. In South Korea, for example, money incentives were useful in <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf#page=4">weakening cartels</a> that monopolised the sugar market in the early 2000s.</p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>One danger is that money rewards could lead to an increase in unreliable reports. That would increase the workload of the government and use state resources fruitlessly. A possible counter measure could be to introduce stiff penalties for frivolous and malicious reports.</p>
<p>In some countries, such as Ghana, money rewards are only given to people who report corruption to specified government institutions. Usually, though, whistleblowers are expected to first report within their institutions. The downside is that they could wait until the corrupt activities are serious enough to warrant reporting externally. Rewards could thus undermine internal reporting channels. </p>
<p>Where people have an opportunity to get a substantial monetary reward, a “lottery mindset” might set in. People might report simply to get their hands on a reward. That could create distrust in the work environment and the functionality of the institution might suffer.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/corruption-in-south-africa-whistleblower-protection-law-is-being-reformed-but-it-may-not-go-far-enough-209916">Corruption in South Africa: whistleblower protection law is being reformed - but it may not go far enough</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Lastly, money rewards could <a href="https://www.academia.edu/download/58344623/Whistleblower-Reward-and-Systems-Implementation-Effects-on-Whistleblowing-in-Organisations.pdf">commoditise whistleblowing</a>. People might no longer blow the whistle out of public service. This might encourage certain criminal activities such as cyber hacking and breaches of privacy to get information that could be traded for these rewards. </p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>First of all, South African lawmakers should review current laws. Some existing provisions could be slightly adapted to provide for rewards. For example, the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/national-environmental-management-act">National Environmental Management Act</a> already provides for whistleblowers to receive a reward where their information is instrumental to the imposition of a fine. The police also regularly provide <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/n-west-police-offer-reward-information-police-murder">financial rewards</a> to informants.</p>
<p>Lawmakers should carefully weigh up the pros and cons of whistleblower rewards in the fight against corruption. But whistleblowers should get both support and compensation. No one should be penalised for being a good citizen. Whistleblower rewards can save state resources, but care should be taken to ensure they don’t create new opportunities for malfeasance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johandri Wright receives funding from the National Research Foundation and the University of the Western Cape. </span></em></p>Whistleblowers should be entitled to financial support. But that has potential costs as well as benefits.Johandri Wright, Postdoctoral Fellow, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127092023-09-17T05:37:21Z2023-09-17T05:37:21ZYoweri Museveni: ageing Uganda president rides on the memory of his past heroics<p>President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni – Africa’s fourth-longest-serving head of state in 2023 – has cemented his place in history. He brought an end to two tyrannies: in 1979 his militia helped to oust Idi Amin’s famously bloody regime; and in the 1980s his army won a guerrilla campaign against the brutal government of Milton Obote. When his men <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html">marched into Kampala</a> in 1986, Museveni became the first leader of a popular insurrection to oust a sitting African government. </p>
<p>In recent years, media and public attention has focused on Museveni’s rough handling of political opponents and the deterioration of human rights under his watch. A <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/12/uganda-president-son-yoweri-museveni-muhoozi-kainerugaba-accused-sponsoring-violence-icc">petition</a> before the International Criminal Court accuses him of sponsoring violence and abusing critics. Leading dissidents <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/04/my-children-ask-what-happened-to-me-ugandan-author-kakwenza-rukirabashaija-on-torture-exile-and-why-he-keeps-fighting">bear the scars of abuse</a> inflicted by agents of the state.</p>
<p>For many Ugandans, however, Museveni remains essential. The president’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2236848">claim to power</a> rests in large part on history, on the hold with which the country’s dark past grips the citizens of the present. The inhumanity of the 1970s and early 1980s – the casual and unpredictable <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/government-work-in-idi-amins-uganda/E50AE1D0990CE0E8657A78DFE0C4CE43#article">brutality</a> of Amin’s government, the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr590421985en.pdf">mass killings</a> of Obote’s regime – have passed out of the living memory of most Ugandans. Museveni’s government has had to create routines and institutions that remind Ugandans of their recent history. Keeping the politically instructive memory of the dark past vividly alive has been his enduring achievement.</p>
<h2>The politics of salvation</h2>
<p>Yoweri Museveni was born in 1944 in Ankole, an ancestral kingdom in south-western Uganda. His father was a member of the clan of noblemen; his mother was a born-again Christian, a <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Sowing_the_Mustard_Seed/et_SDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1">convert of the East African Revival</a>. Revivalists were renowned for <a href="https://derekrpetersondotcom.files.wordpress.com/2021/12/global-anglicanism-peterson-revival-ms.pdf">their loud professions of rectitude</a> and for their wilful disobedience towards traditional authorities. </p>
<p>By 1966 Museveni had broken with the Revival. At the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania he spent time in the company of Mozambican revolutionaries and toured the zones they had liberated from Portuguese control.</p>
<p>It was in politics, not religion, that the young Museveni sought to author other people’s salvation. He first came to diplomats’ notice in January 1973, when the American embassy in Nairobi received <a href="https://twitter.com/Unseen_Archive/status/1696709580518989980">a five-page manifesto</a> from the “Front for National Salvation”, called Fronasa. In it the young Museveni blamed Ugandan dictator Idi Amin – who had come to power in 1971 – for “stupid government, falling trade, rising prices” and the killing of at least 83,000 people. Fronasa’s objective was a “mass armed struggle”. </p>
<p>Within a few weeks Fronasa’s hideout in eastern Uganda had been raided by Amin’s soldiers. For years thereafter Museveni was to live in Tanzania, working as a teacher in a government school while financing Fronasa’s activities from his modest salary.</p>
<p>That is one of the themes of Museveni’s early political career: the distance between the lofty goals which he set out to achieve and the scarcity of the means with which he worked. </p>
<h2>The ‘black Che Guevara’</h2>
<p>In 1978 Museveni and a small band of militiamen joined the Tanzanian army as it invaded Uganda. By the time the Amin regime collapsed in April 1979, Museveni had 9,000 volunteers under his command. Many were from his home territory in the south-west.</p>
<p>His success as a recruiter earned Museveni a position of importance – minister of defence – in the fragile new government that took power in Kampala after Amin’s ouster. The British diplomat who worked closely with him <a href="https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11527430">thought Museveni to be</a> a “tall, spare, intense man”, the “most effective member of the present Uganda government”. </p>
<p>In December 1980 Ugandans went to the polls to vote in a new government. It was the first election in Uganda since independence in 1962. Museveni stood for the presidency as the leader of a new party, called the Uganda Patriotic Movement. But it was Milton Obote – who had been ousted by General Amin in 1971 – who won the election and returned to the presidency. </p>
<p>Convinced that Obote’s new government would wreck Uganda, Museveni mobilised his followers and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3876207?seq=1">launched a struggle</a> to oust his regime from power. There followed a long guerrilla war, fought between Museveni’s band of militants and the brutal, incompetent military of Obote’s government. Museveni’s militia called themselves the National Resistance Army. </p>
<p>At the outset they numbered 41 men, and had 27 guns between them. Nonetheless, they were convinced that they had the high ground. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272297?scroll=top&needAccess=true&role=tab/">In a 1981 tract</a> Museveni argued that Obote was creating an </p>
<blockquote>
<p>enclave economy [with] night-clubs, neon lights, tourist hotels or shiny office blocks … surrounded by a sea of backwardness. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It was revolutionaries’ role, in his view, to “revive the moral standards that had once characterised Uganda”. Museveni promised to create a “Directorate of Moral Guidance” that would “promote a general revival of values in society”. He insisted on a careful discipline among his cadres: his soldiers were to pay for food they received from peasant farmers; and soldiers’ rectitude about alcohol and other indulgences was widely admired.</p>
<p>Obote’s government waged a war of extermination against Museveni’s supporters, especially in Luweero, the region just to the north of Kampala which was the National Resistance Army’s base. A British journalist embedded with Museveni’s group reported that government soldiers had murdered thousands of innocent civilians. He compared Obote’s regime to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr590421985en.pdf">published a report in 1985</a> describing state-sponsored murder, torture and other abuses of human rights. </p>
<p>Obote was overthrown in 1985 by his own generals. In January 1986 National Resistance Army militiamen marched into Kampala and formed a new government, with Museveni as president. Commentators sometimes referred to Museveni as the “<a href="https://www.newspapers.com/image/257801107/?terms=museveni%20che%20guevara&match=1">black Che Guevara</a>”.</p>
<h2>Commemorating the Bush War</h2>
<p>The awful violence of the Bush War, as it is called, made Museveni’s new government seem essential. After Museveni came to power his government set out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1288959">commemorate the events of their revolution</a>. The remains of people who had been killed by Obote’s army were put on display, and the skulls were lined up neatly for viewers to appraise. </p>
<p>Today the memory of the Bush War remains a key part of the liturgy of public life. Every 9 June government celebrates <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/all-set-for-heroes-day-celebrations-govt-4262360">Heroes Day</a>, marking the day when a group of Museveni’s comrades were executed by Obote’s malign government. Museveni periodically <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/04/yoweri-museveni-begins-six-day-trek-through-uganda-jungle">tours Luweero</a>, where the Bush War was largely fought. In September this year he <a href="https://twitter.com/KagutaMuseveni/status/1700259640989094277">celebrated his 79th birthday at Katonga</a>, scene of a key battle of the Bush War. His daughter, the film-maker Natasha Karugire, recently released <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@isaiah60films">an eight-part movie</a> documenting Museveni’s rise to power. There is a <a href="https://twitter.com/NRAArchives">new book</a>, too, produced by Museveni’s admirers. It is entitled The Titanic Story of The People’s Protracted War in Uganda. </p>
<p>In 1996 the country’s political system was opened up, and since then Museveni has won national elections six times: in 1996, when he defeated Paulo Ssemogerere; in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016, when he defeated the medical doctor Kiiza Besigye; and in 2021, when he defeated the young musician Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu), winning 59% of the vote. </p>
<p>All were marred by intimidation and by accusations of electoral malpractice. In 2021 government banned Bobi Wine’s rallies, using the COVID pandemic to justify the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2023.2235661">suppression of political opposition</a>. </p>
<p>Today, more than at any time in history, the memory of the old heroism grows dim. More than three quarters of Uganda’s population has been born since 1986, when Museveni came to power. Most of the 41 comrades who launched the Bush War have <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-s-childhood-friend-goes-to-rest-1537066">died or retired</a>. The president’s son, Muhoozi, is increasingly prominent in public life, and there is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/30/uganda-president-museveni-kainerugaba-succession-crisis-political-dynasty/?tpcc=recirc_latest062921">talk</a> that in the next election he will succeed his father as candidate for the presidency.</p>
<p>And yet, as the electoral results suggest, the founding story of Museveni’s government remains persuasive for a great many people. During the COVID pandemic he <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/africa/uganda-president-work-out-video-intl-scli/index.html">made an exercise video</a>, sweating out 30 push-ups for the camera while instructing his viewers on the virtues of clean living. Here the “black Che Guevara” could be seen again: physically vigorous, full of direction for his people.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Derek R. Peterson receives funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. </span></em></p>The founding story of Museveni’s government remains persuasive for a great many people 37 years later.Derek R. Peterson, Professor of History and African Studies, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2135462023-09-15T19:21:11Z2023-09-15T19:21:11ZLibya dam collapse: engineering expert raises questions about management<p><em>More than <a href="https://apnews.com/article/libya-floods-derna-storm-daniel-mass-graves-21b1a195d261a642e12dac13f0d19431">11,000</a> people have been killed and tens of thousands are missing following the catastrophic collapse of <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/acaps-thematic-report-libya-update-impact-storm-daniel-derna-district-15-september-2023">two dams</a> in the eastern Libyan city of Derna. The dam collapse came after an extreme storm, Storm Daniel, slammed into the north African country. The Conversation Africa’s Moina Spooner asked water resources and engineering expert Nadhir Al-Ansari, who has researched the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1001627916000020">design</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342270305_Dam_Safety_General_Considerations">safety</a> of dams, to provide insights into the disaster.</em></p>
<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/libya-dam-collapse-engineering-expert-raises-questions-about-management-213546&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<h2>How does extreme weather affect the stability of dams?</h2>
<p>Dams are usually built to withstand heavy rainfall or drought. The design and construction of a dam takes into consideration all possible effects. All factors, including the type of building materials, the design of the foundation and the stability of a dam, as well as expected floods and earthquakes and even military action, are taken into consideration when planning a dam.</p>
<p>Aside from how the dam is constructed, there should be safety provisions in place. For instance, in cases of storms, the engineers should release the water to ensure that a dam’s maximum carrying capacity is not exceeded.</p>
<p>In the Libyan case, I believe that the management of the dams was not good. The engineer responsible for the dam should have made sure the water did not exceed the dam’s upper carrying capacity. When he noticed that a huge volume of water was entering the reservoir he should have released large quantities of water to keep its level lower than the upper limit. </p>
<p>Research shows that the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342270305_Dam_Safety_General_Considerations">main causes of dam failure</a> are foundation problems (40%), inadequate spillway (23%), poor construction (12%) and uneven settlement (10%). A site for a dam will not always be level because dams are built in mountain areas, but the designers must take that into consideration. The dam design must suit the topography. Among the rarer causes of dam failures are acts of war (3%), defective material (2%) and earthquakes (1%). </p>
<p>In Libya’s case, bad management appears to have been the cause of the dam’s collapse.</p>
<h2>Could this tragedy have been avoided?</h2>
<p>Yes, if the responsible people operating the dams had opened the gates to release water. When those responsible for the water management of the dam ignore heavy rainfall then one can expect such disasters to occur. </p>
<p>Dam managers should also know each dam’s catchment area and how much rainfall is forecast. This requires coordination between meteorologists and the staff responsible for the management of dams. When heavy rainfall is expected, the meteorology department should inform dam managers who can then make arrangements for the release of water to keep it within the dam’s operational limits. This is the usual practice in all the dams I’ve <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?dswid=-6381&pid=diva2%3A1370665">studied in Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>In this case, there must have been a breakdown in communication between meteorological department and engineers managing the dams.</p>
<h2>How do engineers and authorities typically monitor the structural integrity of dams?</h2>
<p>Dams should have a regular inspection programme that takes into consideration all parts of the dam. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342270305_Dam_Safety_General_Considerations">All countries</a> with dams, whether in the US, Iraq or Sweden, have regular inspections. There should be instruments for monitoring cracks in a dam’s walls and any changes in its structure. Once identified, they must be attended to immediately. </p>
<p>In Libya’s case, if they had opened the sluice gates to keep water within the dam’s carrying capacity, the collapse of the dams would have caused less damage.</p>
<h2>Are there emerging technologies or innovations to improve safety?</h2>
<p>There are a number of models and techniques and each dam has its own model or technique that the designer suggests. Planning for extreme weather events is usually done at the design stage of the dam. The designer is meant to give a thorough report on the stability of the dam against various factors, including weather. </p>
<p>Different scenarios are given according to the water level in the reservoir of the dam to prevent dam failure. The government concerned should know what to do in case of dam failure, guided by the design information. For instance, in <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10706-020-01355-w">my study</a> of Iraq’s Mosul dam, which took place after the dam was constructed, I suggested that a protection dam be built downstream to secure the safety of the downstream area and its population. Safety steps can be taken even after construction of the dam.</p>
<p>The other safety measures relate to housing and other developments in areas downstream. In Libya’s case, there was poor planning. The areas downstream from the dams should not have been used <a href="https://apnews.com/article/libya-floods-derna-storm-daniel-11c33a12418149f761fe79a47ea7289c">for housing</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the dam failure in Libya could have been prevented, or at least the losses could have been minimised, if the engineers on site had released the water from the reservoir once the storm started.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213546/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nadhir Al-Ansari does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dams are usually built to withstand heavy rainfall or drought.Nadhir Al-Ansari, Professor, Luleå University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2135862023-09-14T18:02:01Z2023-09-14T18:02:01ZSouth Africa’s court system has been abused by powerful people: five ways to stop it<p>After a battle of about four years to secure the removal of South Africa’s public protector, Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane, the country’s parliament finally delivered the coup de grace in early September. Parliamentarians voted <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/committee-section-194-enquiry">to impeach her</a> just a month before her term was due to end. President Cyril Ramaphosa subsequently <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-removes-advocate-mkhwebane-office">removed her from office</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the public protector’s troubles landed up <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2023/25media.pdf">in court</a>, with numerous <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2019/29.html">judgments</a> going against her.</p>
<p>But why did it take so long? And what lessons can be learnt from the drawn-out process that sapped resources (financial and other) and left a key institution, the <a href="https://www.pprotect.org/">Office of the Public Protector</a>, unable to thoroughly exercise its duties as a constitutionally established institution to protect democracy? The office has the power to investigate, report on and remedy improper conduct in all state affairs. </p>
<p>The reason it took so long is that Mkhwebane used a strategy that’s referred to as the <a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/stalingrad-defense/">Stalingrad defence</a>. This involves wearing down the plaintiff by tenaciously fighting anything by whatever means possible and appealing every judgment made. The approach is named after the city in the then Soviet Union which was besieged by the Germans in the second world war. The Soviet forces held off the Germans for five months. Although this was achieved at great human cost, it bought Moscow time.</p>
<p>The public protector isn’t the first to have turned to this tactic to ward off the legal – or other – consequences of their actions. The other high profile example in South Africa is the former president Jacob Zuma’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-10-zumas-stalingrad-defence-disintegrates-after-judges-quash-latest-legal-gambit-in-scathing-judgment/">19-year battle</a> to avoid a case being heard around allegations of bribery.</p>
<p>How can this strategy of <a href="https://bregmans.co.za/2022/03/25/dealing-with-a-vexatious-litigant/#:%7E:text=In%20such%20circumstances%2C%20the%20Vexatious,legal%20proceedings%20against%20another%20person.">vexatious litigation</a> be allowed to continue unabated? Who should be held accountable for this waste of money, resources and time? It is not only, in these instances, the former president and former public protector who are to blame. They were aided and abetted in their abuse of the law by contentious lawyers, over-cautious parliamentarians and judges lacking courage.</p>
<p>A public outcry ensued when a member of parliament claimed that the costs of all the hopeless or useless legal challenges by the advocate to prevent her removal amounted to R160 million (almost US$8.5 million) in total. How can things be allowed to escalate to this extent? </p>
<p>Drawing on my almost three decades of legal experience, I have identified five possible ways to reduce the chances of rich and powerful people abusing the court system and wasting precious resources.</p>
<h2>The players</h2>
<p>Former Constitutional Court Justice Edwin Cameron recently <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/422425/justice-edwin-cameron-on-zuma-and-art-of-the-stalingrad-defence-tactic">identified</a> four parties who are to blame: unscrupulous clients and lawyers, the professional association now called the <a href="https://lpc.org.za/">Legal Practice Council</a>, and lastly judges themselves.</p>
<p>I agree that each of these groups has something to answer for. </p>
<p><strong>Unscrupulous clients:</strong> Powerful politicians show no concern about dipping into the public coffers to pay for the legal games they play. While the constitution protects the right to be defended in section 34, the principle and value of equality under and before the law is as important. But I would argue that those who have the backing of the state have a massive advantage over ordinary citizens.</p>
<p><strong>Unscrupulous lawyers:</strong> There have been numerous instances of lawyers using delaying tactics and flouting court procedures. </p>
<p><strong>The <a href="https://lpc.org.za/">Legal Practice Council</a>:</strong> Judge Cameron <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/422425/justice-edwin-cameron-on-zuma-and-art-of-the-stalingrad-defence-tactic.">stated </a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>it has displayed lax oversight and is not asking for explanations as to why lawyers are adopting these delaying practices.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>No high profile action has been taken against lawyers who facilitate vexatious litigation.</p>
<p><strong>The judges:</strong> This is probably the most contentious claim. Yet there have been instances when a judge has appeared to be blind to the fact that <a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/when-judges-dont-understand-the-stalingrad-defence">certain tactics were being used cynically</a>. </p>
<p>In my view this could be because <a href="https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-02-17-malema-shores-up-zumas-attack-on-the-judiciary/">unprecedented attacks</a> on the judiciary in recent years are paying off. They are leading to over-cautious and overly deferent judgments that err on the side of the other branches of government in what is a clear misunderstanding of the principle of separation of powers.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>While protecting the rights of the litigants, it’s also necessary to rein in the abuse. </p>
<p>This can be done in several ways.</p>
<p>Firstly, the <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/branches/stateattorney.html">State Attorney</a> should determine guidelines for what is – or is not – permissible and what the state will – and will not – fund. </p>
<p>Secondly, as part of these guidelines the State Attorney may refuse to fund any legal costs in a matter where the court has awarded costs against the public official who is litigating. Such a ruling by a court follows when the court has determined that the litigation was so obviously without sound basis in fact or in law that it must be characterised as “abuse of court process” and or even “vexatious”. </p>
<p>A cost order by a court generally requires the offending litigant to pay a relatively minor percentage of the costs. A more forceful measure would be for the State Attorney to refuse to pay all or part of the balance of the cost order where the offending litigant is a public official and has been found to have abused the court and its processes.</p>
<p>Thirdly, punitive cost orders could be used by the courts to make litigants feel the financial burden of their misuse of the legal system. If a court wants to show its displeasure about a defendant’s conduct during a trial, it may order the defendant to pay attorney and client costs, which are punitive. </p>
<p>Fourthly, measures could be taken to protect journalists and human rights defenders against <a href="https://www.schindlers.co.za/news/a-south-african-perspective-on-slapp-suits/">SLAPP</a> cases. SLAPP suits (strategic litigation against public participation) are used by wealthy litigants and their legal teams to financially and emotionally exhaust opponents, regardless of the merits of their cause. In July, the European Parliament <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230904IPR04620/media-freedom-act-protecting-editorial-decisions-from-political-interference">adopted</a> a range of measures to protect journalists and human rights defenders against such cases.</p>
<p>Fifth, there’s the possibility of imposing personal cost orders against legal representatives to <a href="https://www.derebus.org.za/liability-for-refunds-of-legal-fees-disbursements-or-personal-costs-orders/">penalise their errant behaviour</a>. </p>
<p>Courts have awarded these orders for gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part of legal practitioners including abuse of process and the dilatory and obstructive conduct of legal practitioners. Examples of intentional conduct that have been sanctioned includes conduct that results in an abuse of process, litigating recklessly, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-court-finds-mpofu-sought-to-mislead-it-in-ramaphosa-private-prosecution-litigation-20230912">misleading the court</a>, dilatory tactics, pursuing a hopeless case, and frivolous and vexatious litigation.</p>
<p>Liability for punitive cost orders against vexatious litigants or costs out of legal practitioners’ pockets would surely make them think twice before using Stalingrad strategies and malicious SLAPP suits.</p>
<p><em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gary-pienaar-10275549/?originalSubdomain=za">Advocate Gary Pienaar</a>, senior research manager in the Developmental, Capable and Ethical State research division at the HSRC, contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Narnia Bohler-Muller receives funding from government and independent funders for her research projects at the Human Sciences Research Council.
She was shortlisted for the position of Public Protector in the year that Adv Busi Mkhwebane was appointed.</span></em></p>Awarding punitive costs against legal practitioners would make them think twice about facilitating delaying tactics and malicious lawsuits.Narnia Bohler-Muller, Divisional Executive, Developmental, Capable and Ethical State research division, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126272023-09-14T13:36:49Z2023-09-14T13:36:49ZKenya: Ongata Rongai boom town destroyed two vital rivers – new study flags a major health risk<p>Over the past 10 years, Ongata Rongai, a satellite town on the edge of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, has experienced uncontrolled development and exponential population growth. Because of its appealing location close to the city, it’s <a href="http://www.citypopulation.de/en/kenya/riftvalley/kajiado/3414__ongata_rongai/">jumped from</a> just under 40,000 residents in 2009 to a population of over 172,000 in 2019. The most recent <a href="http://www.citypopulation.de/en/kenya/riftvalley/kajiado/3414__ongata_rongai/">census data</a> showed a high annual population growth rate of 16%. </p>
<p>The rapid increase in population, and accompanying development of residential buildings, has led to huge pressure on the environment, including its waterways.</p>
<p>There are two main rivers flowing through Ongata Rongai: the Mbagathi River and the Kandisi-Kiserian River. These rivers are important historically and, to an extent, today. People fish in them, use them to wash their clothes and collect water from them to use at home. Children and adults swim and bathe in them. Pastoralists water their livestock here and graze animals along the riverbanks. They were also the place where neighbouring clans would meet or where the Agikuyu community would come to pray at the towering <em>mugumo</em> (fig) trees. Indigenous plants growing on the riverbanks were harvested to make medicines. </p>
<p>I carried out <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1164881/full">a study</a> which examined how Rongai’s growth has affected the riparian (river) environment and surrounding communities. </p>
<p>What I found was a severely degraded riparian environment and frustrated residents. Ongata Rongai is not special. It can be seen as a microcosm of a wider issue: that of rapid urban development at the expense of the environment. </p>
<p>Environments like this are <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30778691/">common</a> wherever urban populations are growing faster than resources and plans can keep up. The municipality has a responsibility to act on what’s known about the health of its land, people and animals.</p>
<h2>Drivers of pollution</h2>
<p>I carried out my study using archival materials, interviews and focus group discussions. </p>
<p>Ongata Rongai was, until fairly recently, a savannah with few or no permanent structures. It is now a densely populated urban area, no longer peripheral to but a part of the Nairobi metropolitan area. </p>
<p>This rapid development has happened without services keeping pace, including mains sewerage, solid waste disposal, piped safe water, or any sewage treatment plant. The main problem of the rivers today, cited by everyone I spoke to, was that of sewage. Untreated sewage is pumped into or flows into the rivers daily, primarily from low-cost and poorly constructed apartment buildings belonging to wealthy business people.</p>
<p>Another cause of degradation is people’s disconnection from the environment. Interviewees discussed how the proliferation of Christianity had a disconnecting effect, and traditional knowledge was forgotten. Few people retain knowledge about plants. And if the environment holds no meaning, people don’t see the consequences of throwing trash into the river.</p>
<h2>Impacts of the pollution</h2>
<p>The pollution makes the rivers almost unusable and hazardous. But there’s a lack of alternatives. </p>
<p>People use the river water for farming, laundry, bathing and other purposes, out of necessity or convenience. Climate change has reduced rainfall and created unpredictability, forcing livestock herders to depend on the polluted rivers – which are sometimes just trickles. </p>
<p>The poor state of the rivers and their surrounding environment leads to health challenges for both people and animals. Livestock often refuse to drink the river water. Children playing and swimming in it get ill and crops wither and die. </p>
<p>People are very aware of water safety and are wary of using river water. As one farmer in Rongai told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The problem with this river is, it is filthy. You see, if you use it to water your vegetables in your garden, even you are eating that filth. If you harvest these vegetables right now, you go and cook them, you are eating that filth. And it’s not even just us, it’s the animals too who have to drink that water. So those who are pouring the raw sewage into the river, can they just think about it and stop?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another farmer told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These days if you wash in the river you find your skin dries up … as if you have an illness … and if you keep washing there, you’ll get typhoid.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>There was extreme frustration with structural-level actors including local government and agencies. The residents I spoke to lamented corrupt government bodies and the lack of enforcement of existing environmental regulations. They felt hopeless as individuals without functioning institutions for environmental protection. </p>
<p>The situation is a typical example of how the health of people, animals and the environment is connected. Wildlife, livestock and a surge in human population have come together, putting pressure on a fragile ecosystem and environment. Without healthy rivers, there will be a dangerous knock-on effect on human and animal health. </p>
<p>The Rongai Rivers are one example of the rapid destruction of urban rivers globally. There’s been much <a href="https://scienceafrica.co.ke/2023/02/24/kenya-new-commission-to-spearhead-cleanliness-of-nairobi-rivers-launched/">talk</a> of regenerating riparian and green spaces in Nairobi and in other African cities. But the time for talking is over. People and governments must act to save these vital spaces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivia Howland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Rongai’s rapid development has happened without services keeping pace, and the rivers have paid the price.Olivia Howland, Research Fellow in Social Science and Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131322023-09-14T13:36:14Z2023-09-14T13:36:14ZSouth Africa can’t crack the inequality curse. Why, and what can be done<p><em>South Africa is ranked <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099125303072236903/p1649270c02a1f06b0a3ae02e57eadd7a82">one of the most unequal societies in the world</a>. The Conversation Africa spoke to Imraan Valodia, the Director of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, about inequality in South Africa.</em></p>
<h2>Has income inequality got worse in the last 20 years?</h2>
<p>According to the most <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099125303072236903/p1649270c02a1f06b0a3ae02e57eadd7a82">recent data</a>, South Africa has the highest income inequality in the world, with a Gini coefficient of around 0.67. The Gini coefficient is a widely used statistical measure of how income is distributed in the population of a country. It takes a value between 0 and 1. A coefficient of 1 indicates perfect inequality – where one individual in a country would earn all the income in that country. Conversely, a coefficient of 0 is an indicator of perfect equality, where the income of the country is distributed perfectly equally among all its citizens. </p>
<p>South Africa’s Gini is exceptionally high. A number of other African countries have high Ginis too. For example, Namibia’s is 0.59, Zambia’s 0.57 and Mozambique’s 0.54. </p>
<p>Countries in Europe, especially Scandinavian countries, have much lower Ginis. They range between 0.24 and 0.27. Among the developed countries, the US has a high level of inequality with a Gini of 0.41. </p>
<p>China’s is 0.38 and India’s is 0.35. Russia’s is similarly relatively low at 0.37. Brazil, like South Africa, has a much higher level of inequality at 0.53. </p>
<p>In South Africa, <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099125303072236903/p1649270c02a1f06b0a3ae02e57eadd7a82">the evidence</a> suggests that income inequality has risen in the post-apartheid period, though it has fluctuated.</p>
<p>What is clear is that levels of inequality are not decreasing.</p>
<h2>What’s driving the trend?</h2>
<p>There are a number of drivers.</p>
<p>First, the fact that large numbers of South Africans are <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2023.pdf">unemployed</a> and report no or very low incomes. According to the latest Quarterly Labour Force Survey, the rate of unemployment in South Africa, in June 2023, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2023.pdf">was estimated</a> to be 32.6%. But this doesn’t include people who have given up trying to find work. (The internationally accepted definition of unemployment requires people who are classified as unemployed to be searching for work.) If we include these discouraged workers, the unemployment rate increases to 44.1%. </p>
<p>There are about <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2023.pdf">40.7 million</a> people in South Africa between the ages of 15 and 64 – this is the group that could potentially work. Those who are not able to work, because they’re at school, or ill, or for some other reason, are estimated to number 13.2 million. That leaves 27.5 million people. Of these, only 16.4 million are working. </p>
<p>Of the 16.4 million, only 11.3 million are employed in the formal sector, where income tends to be higher. </p>
<p>These figures make it clear that the economy is just not able to generate sufficient numbers of employment opportunities.</p>
<p>The second driver is that, among those who are employed, many earn very low wages. Of those who do have work, about 3 million people subsist in the informal economy, where incomes are very low. Another 900,000 people work in agriculture and about 1 million as domestic workers, where incomes are very low.</p>
<p>Even in the formal sector, wages, especially for non-unionised workers, tend to be <a href="http://new.nedlac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NMW-Report-Draft-CoP-FINAL1.pdf">extremely low</a>. </p>
<p>And third, the incomes at the top end of the income distribution are very high. It’s more difficult to provide reliable statistics on this, because incomes for rich households tend to come from a variety of sources. One way to get a sense of this is to look at household expenditure – a good proxy for incomes. Unfortunately, South Africa’s income and expenditure survey is now quite dated. But what’s available <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-19/Report-03-10-192017.pdf">shows</a> that the richest 10% of South African households are responsible for some 52% of all expenditure. The poorest 10% of households contribute only 0.8% of all expenditure.</p>
<h2>Is South Africa an outlier?</h2>
<p>Yes. However, there are probably many countries that have higher levels of inequality – we just don’t have the data for them. So, while people often say South Africa has the highest Gini in the world, it would be more accurate to say that South Africa has the highest Gini among countries that have data on income inequality.</p>
<p>South Africa’s data is generally very good, reliable and independent. </p>
<h2>What steps have been taken? Why didn’t they work?</h2>
<p>The major intervention in post-apartheid South Africa was to address inequality in terms of race. This is, of course, extremely important. Among other steps, government introduced the Employment Equity Act to address race-based discrimination in employment, and various measures to address ownership by race. There is controversy about some of the measures. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that they have been very <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/871137/pdf">successful</a> in changing the patterns of inequality in South Africa.</p>
<p>However, not enough has been done – race-based inequality is still a real problem. In general, high income South African households, irrespective of race, have done well over the last three decades, which is why inequality has remained stubbornly high. </p>
<h2>What steps should be taken now?</h2>
<p>I don’t think there is any one policy that would address the issue. Some focus on the labour market and argue that employment is not growing because of labour protections. But I think this is incorrect and does not deal with the nuance of the country’s political and economic situation.</p>
<p>I think we should rather be thinking about how to direct the benefits of economic growth and redistribution policies to benefit those at the bottom end. This could involve, for example, raising incomes at the bottom, creating new opportunities and employment for those who don’t have them, and ensuring that the benefits of growth do not disproportionately benefit those at the top end of the income distribution.</p>
<h2>What is the difference between income inequality and wealth inequality?</h2>
<p>Income inequality measures only a portion of the real inequality in South Africa. Measuring inequality in wealth gives a more complete picture of how unequal a society is. Income is only one factor that determines wealth. Wealth also includes inheritance, earnings from assets and so on. </p>
<p>The broad picture is that in South Africa wealth inequality is much worse than <a href="https://www.wits.ac.za/scis/research-projects/wealth-inequality/working-papers-and-research-output/">income inequality</a>. Some striking statistics are that the top 0.01% of people – just 3,500 individuals – own about 15% of all of the wealth in South Africa. The top 0.1% own 25% of the wealth. The net wealth of the top 1% is R17.8 million (about US$944,000). In contrast, the bottom 50% have a negative wealth position (they have more liabilities than they do assets) of R16,000 (around US$850).</p>
<p><em>This article is part of a media partnership between Wits University’s Southern Centre for Inequality Studies and The Conversation Africa for the Annual Inequality Lecture given by Professor Branko Milanovic, titled “Recent changes in the global income distribution and their political implications”. You can watch him deliver the lecture <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAproYSlaMA">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Imraan Valodia and the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies receive funding from a number of local and international foundations that support academic research. </span></em></p>Efforts have been made to change the patterns of inequality in South Africa. But not enough has been done. Race-based inequality is still a real problem.Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor: Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director Southern Centre for Inequality Studies., University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127102023-09-13T13:09:11Z2023-09-13T13:09:11ZKenyans don’t trust the courts - the main factors behind this trend<p>The international reputation of the Kenyan judiciary is <a href="https://verfassungsblog.de/the-bbi-judgment-and-the-invention-of-kenya/">running high</a> following a raft of judicial reforms brought on by the 2010 constitution. The reforms, displays of judicial independence, and largely positive personal experiences might lead one to expect that public trust in the courts has increased. But among the Kenyan public it has not.</p>
<p>High-profile Supreme Court judgments have showcased a newfound judicial independence. The most notable include the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-supreme-court-nullifies-uhuru-kenya-s-re-election-orders-fresh-vote-1372638">nullification</a> of a presidential result in 2017, the rejection of government efforts to force through <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-s-supreme-court-declares-bbi-unconstitutional-3766868">constitutional changes</a> in 2021 and <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001467772/supreme-court-gays-and-lesbians-have-a-right-of-association">confirmation</a> in 2023 of the rights of LGBTIQ+ people to form associations. </p>
<p>Personal experience of the courts is also largely positive. In March 2023 I commissioned Trends and Insights For Africa, a market research company based in Nairobi, to add questions on the Kenyan judiciary to a nationally representative face-to-face <a href="https://www.tifaresearch.com/azimio-protests-other-opposition-issues-2023-national-survey-post-post-election-issues/">survey</a>. </p>
<p>It revealed that 18.7% of respondents reported having been involved in a case in a Kenyan court room. Of these, 43.4% rated the experience as very positive, 25.1% as quite positive. Neutral responses made up 11.9%; 6.3% were quite negative; and 11.9% were very negative. Of the overall sample, 12.8% had a positive personal experience of the courts, and only 3.4% a negative one.</p>
<p>Public perceptions of the Kenyan judiciary have been tracked for nearly 20 years. According to 2021 data from the independent research network Afrobarometer, 16.9% of Kenyans had <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-9-data-2023/">no trust</a> in this key institution, up from 11.4% in <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-resource/kenya-round-2-data-2003/">2003</a>. The only time that public trust was clearly lower was in 2008. This followed the 2007 election and post-election crisis, which drew attention to a <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/EJC10308">perceived lack of judicial independence</a>.</p>
<p>More worryingly still, a majority of respondents in my March 2023 poll thought that Supreme Court judges were very often or sometimes bribed (58.1%) or intimidated (59.4%) to give a verdict unsupported by the evidence. There was hardly any distinction between public perceptions of the Supreme Court, High Court and magistrates.</p>
<p>This confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role. For example, the fact that the Kenyan opposition <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">did not trust the courts</a> in 2007 led them to protest about the election on the streets, rather than bring a petition. It sparked the country’s worst crisis. </p>
<p>I am a <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/lynch/">political scientist</a> who has studied Kenya for 20 years. My current research focuses on the critical role of the judiciary, which is relatively understudied. </p>
<h2>What shapes perceptions</h2>
<p>It’s important to try to understand the confidence crisis.</p>
<p>Despite reforms there are still regular reports of judicial bias and <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/chief-justice-koome-cites-corruption-in-case-backlog-110117/">corruption</a>. There are also interactions that <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">suggest</a> a “cosy relationship” between the judiciary and the political elite. This casts a shadow over the whole judiciary. </p>
<p>Public perception reports must also be considered in context. The year 2003 was a time of great optimism in Kenya. It followed the landslide victory of Mwai Kibaki over the party that had ruled the country since independence. Kenyans were the <a href="http://www.gilanifoundation.com/homepage/eoy/2002_EoY02comment.pdf">most optimistic citizens in the world</a> at the end of 2002. Public confidence in other key institutions – including the president, parliament, electoral commission, police, and army – was higher in 2003 than any subsequent round of the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/kenya/">Afrobarometer</a>. </p>
<p>Optimism soon turned to pessimism and finally <a href="https://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/Reports/Waki_Report.pdf">deadly violence</a> following the disputed election of 2007. A new constitution in 2010 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11103008">failed to provide “quick fixes”</a>. Governance and socio-economic problems persist. </p>
<p>Scholars and the international observers have high regard for the Supreme Court’s 2017 presidential petition ruling and subsequent bold decisions. But public opinion in Kenya is divided. My March 2023 poll asked people whether there was a Supreme Court case that they disagreed with. Ordinary citizens cited exactly those cases that have been internationally lauded: 47.4% referred to the gay rights of association case (freshly concluded in February 2023); 21.2% cited the 2022 presidential petition, 8.6% the 2017 petition, and 5% the 2013 petition. </p>
<p>People’s views on these cases differ depending on their own views and interests, the opinion leaders they listen to, and their expectations of how a court should behave. For example, of the 26.3% of respondents who said they were dissatisfied with the way the Supreme Court handled the 2022 presidential petition, 43.8% said one of the reasons was that the decision was not based on evidence or was biased; 11.3% cited outside interference or coercion and 32.8% bribery. And 18.2% said that they were annoyed because the court didn’t nullify the election. </p>
<p>However, 24% said that they were dissatisfied because the court was rushed or had insufficient time and 10% because the ruling used rude or dismissive language. Those who cited time issues or language as one of the reasons for their dissatisfaction were a minority but they remind us of how public perceptions are informed not only by the substance of rulings, but by how judges behave.</p>
<p>It also means that acts that have attracted public criticism – such as the chief justice and deputy chief justice <a href="https://www.pulselive.co.ke/news/local/ahmednasir-criticises-how-martha-koome-received-president-ruto-in-parliament/6dtt40t">lining up alongside politicians</a> to welcome President William Ruto to the opening of parliament in September 2022 – have helped to reinforce popular perceptions of a judiciary that is biased or liable to being bribed or intimidated. </p>
<h2>The role of the media</h2>
<p>High profile and highly divisive cases, such as presidential petitions, receive much traditional media coverage of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JK0GTl4WbI8">proceedings</a> and associated <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/azimio-responds-to-supreme-courts-full-judgment-on-presidential-election-petition-n306468">allegations of injustice</a>. This coverage places the Supreme Court in an almost impossible situation, earning the public ire of either the opposition (for example, the 2022 petition) or the government (for example, the 2023 gay rights association case). </p>
<p>At the same time, an increasing number of Kenyans gain their political news from social media either <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2023.2232160?src=&fbclid=IwAR2l_o889e75LO1rc3gM33RufPbpn69mFglO0yQvKdOdhdWgjd1C-zKbyrA">directly or indirectly</a> by sharing online stories offline. Traditional media are relatively careful about what they say about ongoing cases or judges – lest they be held in contempt of court or be sued for libel. Discussions on social media are not as regulated. It has become commonplace for opinion leaders of different political persuasions to <a href="https://twitter.com/makaumutua/status/1569342163573415936">publicly attack</a> the judiciary. </p>
<p>The allegations range from those likely to have some basis to misinformation. Views in 2023 are likely coloured by the failure of reforms to bring significant socio-economic change, and by a cost-of-living crisis. In this situation, negative information is more likely to resonate. </p>
<p>This interplay of factors helps to explain why public trust in the courts is lower than in 2003 after years of reform and investment, improved judicial independence and largely positive personal experiences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gabrielle Lynch received funding from the University of Warwick Policy Support Fund. </span></em></p>Kenya’s confidence crisis is a problem because people need to believe the judiciary is acting independently if it is to play its role.Gabrielle Lynch, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124922023-09-13T10:55:07Z2023-09-13T10:55:07ZAddis Ababa faces growing climate change risks like heat, drought and floods, study warns<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545484/original/file-20230830-19-8bq04m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5000%2C3315&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">About 70% of people in Addis Ababa live in informal settlements that are vulnerable to climate change. Amanuel Sileshi/AFP/</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/muslim-devotees-gather-at-meskel-square-to-break-their-fast-news-photo/1240330823?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital city, will likely face increased heatwaves, droughts and severe flooding over the next 67 years. These changes will pose risks to public health and infrastructure. They’ll also be felt most acutely by the city’s most vulnerable residents: those living in informal settlements. </p>
<p>Addis Ababa is one of the fastest-growing cities in Africa, and its current metropolitan population of about 5.4 million is projected to reach close to <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/addis-ababa-population">9 million</a> by 2035.</p>
<p>This increase in the city’s population will be absorbed by informal settlements, the prime destination for most migrants. And informal settlements are characterised by poor or non-existent infrastructure, and face the twin challenges of worsening climate change and poor urban environmental policy.</p>
<p>To investigate the city’s vulnerability to climate change, researchers at <a href="https://www.climatepolicylab.org/">Tufts University</a> and the <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/">Woodwell Climate Research Center</a> analysed flood risk and temperature data for different time periods, projecting from the past to the future.</p>
<p>We predicted that the city’s extreme daily maximum temperatures would increase by about <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">1.7°C over the period 2040-2060</a>, compared with 2000–2020. An increase of 1.7°C would result in a <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aab827">rise</a> in the frequency, duration, and intensity of heatwaves. In addition, higher temperatures contribute to increased water vapour and transpiration. This will <a href="https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf#page=16">threaten</a> health, ecosystems, infrastructure, livelihoods, and food supplies.</p>
<p>Certain southern neighbourhoods, such as <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">Akaki-Kaliti, Bole and Nifas Silk-Lafto</a>, have experienced notably higher temperatures, especially during the warm season from March to May. And, looking to the future, temperature projections for <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">Nifas Silk-Lafto suggest an average temperature increase to 26.21°C between 2040 and 2060, and further increase to 27.78°C from 2070 to 2090</a> and <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">27.78°C from 2070 to 2090</a>. </p>
<p>For the warm-season months of March, April, and May, a temperature increase of 1.8°C is projected. This suggests that the peak temperature for the hottest day of the year will rise by an average of 1.8°C compared to recent data. From 2000 to 2020 the average temperature in the Nifas Silk-Lafto sub-city was 24.70°C. </p>
<p>Increases in temperatures of this magnitude will lead to public health challenges such as increased malaria risks, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups like the elderly, children, and women.</p>
<h2>More droughts</h2>
<p>Over the past two decades, Addis Ababa has endured an average of three months of extreme drought yearly. Using the <a href="https://www.droughtmanagement.info/palmer-drought-severity-index-pdsi/">Palmer Drought Severity Index</a> to assess temperature and precipitation data in a geographical area, our analysis suggests that extreme drought events will become more frequent between 2040 and 2060. The city is expected to experience an additional 1.6 months of extreme drought annually, a 53% increase compared with 2000-2020. </p>
<p>This rising frequency of droughts, along with the city’s growing population, is intensifying water insecurity. Groundwater reserves for drought emergencies are already being <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tqem.21512">depleted</a>. </p>
<p>These droughts will affect health, hydroelectric energy production and urban agriculture. </p>
<h2>Flooding</h2>
<p>Too much rainfall, particularly if it occurs within a short period of time in an urban area, leads to flooding. Flooding poses a significant environmental risk to Addis Ababa, especially because the city has developed around three primary rivers. </p>
<p>Climate change will increase water-related challenges by affecting the flow of rivers and the replenishment of groundwater. </p>
<p>Currently, <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">67%</a> of the population in Addis lives in flood prone areas. The parts of the city that are most at risk include central Addis, which has the greatest density of impervious surfaces like tarmac and concrete. These contribute to flood risk because water can’t seep into the ground.</p>
<p>Other <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">parts of the city that are at risk</a> include the southern half – where the slope is relatively flatter, so water doesn’t flow away – and the Nifas Silk-Lafto region, where considerable development has taken place in the floodplain. </p>
<p>Several factors will add to the flooding challenge. The city has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214581819301843">inadequate sewerage infrastructure</a> and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jfr3.12629">weak drainage systems</a> which are often obstructed by solid waste. </p>
<h2>The impact</h2>
<p>The effects on the city’s residents will be substantial. </p>
<p>Health is just one example. </p>
<p>Our data show that average temperatures in the city will make year-round <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2003489#:%7E:text=This%20model%20suggests%20a%20temperature,climate%20change%20on%20malaria%20transmission">malaria transmission</a> a risk. There will have to be sustained policy measures to deal with the risk.</p>
<p>Older adults and pregnant women are particularly vulnerable to the health impacts of climate change. The elderly are more <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/climate-change/impact-climate-change-rights-older-persons">sensitive</a> to heat and pollution due to existing health conditions, limited mobility, and compromised immune systems. Pregnant women face <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0015028222003831">risks</a> from thermal variations and mosquito-borne illnesses like malaria and Zika. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-will-cause-more-african-children-to-die-from-hot-weather-188609">Climate change will cause more African children to die from hot weather</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Many urban residents will be prone to increasing floods. Already <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">10%</a> of the city’s newly developed areas are within a 100-year floodplain, threatening lives and infrastructures.</p>
<p>People living in informal settlements are particularly at risk – that’s about <a href="https://unhabitat.org/ethiopia-addis-ababa-urban-profile">70%</a> of Addis Ababa’s residents. These settlements crop up in limited and unused spaces, such as riverbanks. They are at a higher <a href="https://gsdrc.org/topic-guides/urban-governance/key-policy-challenges/informal-settlements/">risk</a> of flood impact, and the risk is growing.</p>
<p>Our data shows that currently the percentage difference in vulnerability between formal and informal settlements is <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">0.6%</a>. The figure illustrates the extent to which buildings within formal and informal settlements would be affected by flooding events. It is expected to rise to <a href="https://www.woodwellclimate.org/climate-risk-assessment-addis-ababa-ethiopia/">1.3% by 2050 and 1.6% by 2080</a>. </p>
<h2>Policy recommendations</h2>
<p>There’s an urgent need for policies that can rise to these challenges. We suggest:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the government should establish a climate adaptation and resilience office, to integrate <a href="https://www.c2es.org/document/what-is-climate-resilience-and-why-does-it-matter/">climate resilience</a> into <a href="https://theconversation.com/cape-towns-climate-strategy-isnt-perfect-but-every-african-city-should-have-one-149287">urban planning</a></p></li>
<li><p>an independent body should then assess policies in practice</p></li>
<li><p>a water management strategy to ensure equitable access and sustainable <a href="https://waterfdn.org/sustainable-water-management-swm-profile/#:%7E:text=Sustainable%20water%20management%20means%20using,those%20needs%20in%20the%20future.">use of water</a></p></li>
<li><p>the city should invest in <a href="https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/nature-and-biodiversity/green-infrastructure_en">green infrastructure</a> </p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/global-climate-finance-leaves-out-cities-fixing-it-is-critical-to-battling-climate-change-194375">Global climate finance leaves out cities: fixing it is critical to battling climate change</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<ul>
<li><p>upgrading infrastructure and improving waste management</p></li>
<li><p>public awareness campaigns and <a href="https://www.unesco.org/en/climate-change/education#:%7E:text=Education%20is%20crucial%20to%20promote,act%20as%20agents%20of%20change.">school</a> education on climate change impacts</p></li>
<li><p>developing mechanisms for effective <a href="https://coastadapt.com.au/how-to-pages/collaboration-and-partnerships-climate-change-adaptation">collaboration</a> among government departments, non-governmental organisations and international agencies.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abay Yimere does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Climate change is putting pressure on Ethiopia’s largest city, Addis Ababa, and exposing people to disease and natural disasters.Abay Yimere, Postdoctoral Scholar in International Environment and Resource Policy, The Fletcher School, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122772023-09-12T14:15:03Z2023-09-12T14:15:03ZJihadist groups threaten the conservation of a key west African world heritage site - new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/547012/original/file-20230907-19-qmm5ol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C16%2C5367%2C4177&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An African antelope at the Mekrou river in the W National Park, Niger.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kob-bovidae-w-national-park-mekrou-river-niger-africa-news-photo/492759701?adppopup=true">DeAgostini/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger share a biosphere reserve known as the <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/749">WAP complex (W-Arly-Pendjari)</a>, which spreads across the borders of the three countries. The first part of this 3 million hectare <a href="https://en.unesco.org/mab">Unesco</a> world heritage site was declared in 1996 and it was extended in 2002. It’s intended to protect species that are highly threatened in the region, including elephants and cheetahs, as well as important <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/fr/ramsar/">wetlands</a>.</p>
<p>The three states signed an agreement in 2008 to manage the reserve’s natural resources together, for the purposes of local, national and regional development. </p>
<p>The territory has been afflicted by violence and insecurity for some ten years. This trouble has spilled over from the “three borders” area shared by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where armed Islamist groups have been operating. </p>
<p>Due to the steady encroachment of non-state armed groups, the conflict is threatening to engulf the reserve. Forest resources are being <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">plundered</a> and people who live near the protected areas are being displaced.</p>
<p>As part of a study of causes of migration in and from the region, I <a href="https://nai.uu.se/news-and-events/news/2022-10-14-counter-terrorism-has-to-be-transborder-and-address-root-causes.html">investigated</a> the local impact of armed groups, focusing on <a href="https://en.unesco.org/biosphere/africa/w-transboundary">W Park</a>, part of the WAP complex. I interviewed local people about the implications of poaching activities and the use of violence in forest reserves.</p>
<p>My opinion is that an “economy of armed groups”, which can be called a “jihadism of protected areas”, is being set up. It is dangerously disrupting environmental protection.</p>
<p>The armed groups have opened trafficking routes and launched attacks on local communities. They have taken over activities such as gold panning, hunting and fishing and targeted forest eco-guards. All this has had a direct impact on people and led to deteriorating social conditions. Authorities need to coordinate national responses to safeguard the reserve and restore social cohesion among local communities.</p>
<h2>Serious threat to protected forest areas</h2>
<p>The transboundary area came under multiple pressures decades ago, such as harvesting wood, hunting, poaching, fishing, collecting medicinal plants and illegal mining. The level of exploitation was threatening the ecosystems. In response, the countries adopted a regional approach to coordinate national policies. Local people were to participate in the common management of resources. This approach was outlined in the 2000 <a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/TAPOA.pdf">Tapoa Declaration</a> and again in 2008.</p>
<p>But another form of pressure has also grown. Today, armed groups seriously <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2222">threaten</a> the future of the reserve, its conservation and the sustainability of its activities and development. They have “colonised” this natural geographical area, living inside the remote uncontrolled protected areas and exploiting resources. <a href="https://apanews.net/2023/06/10/benin-deploys-3000-troops-in-the-north-to-fight-terrorism/">They often commit abuses on unprotected populations</a>. </p>
<p>The armed groups are not the sole causes of this current situation. Based on my field research in the region over the years, I argue that it is also the result of the political management by the three states.</p>
<p>Contributing to the political and social instability are:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>land grabs in the areas surrounding protected forest areas</p></li>
<li><p>a pastoralism crisis which increases competition with crop farmers</p></li>
<li><p>inconsistency in the distribution and regulation of forest resources between local residents and state representatives </p></li>
<li><p>a poorly integrated approach to the biosphere. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>War entrepreneurship</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Katiba Ansar-ul Islam and the Katiba Serma have been the two <a href="https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/National-Parks.pdf">armed groups most visible in northern Benin, south-eastern Burkina Faso and western Niger</a>. A kind of “war entrepreneurship” is being set up. It <a href="https://www.afrik21.africa/en/benin-impact-of-the-massacre-of-5-rangers-in-the-w-national-park-in-northern-benin/">draws</a> on natural resources (wood, rare plants, illegal fishing, gold panning), but also causes forced migration in already vulnerable populations. Protected areas have become sanctuaries for recruiting local fighters and planning attacks. According to most of the people I interviewed, the armed groups also consider the forest eco-guards as predators who have oppressed the local populations since the colonial era. Some guards have been killed, others recruited into the armed groups.</p>
<p>The armed groups rely on income from forest products exploitation, illegally extracted gold and <em>zakat</em> – taxes demanded from locals. They also force local people to pledge allegiance to their cause and make them move from their places to remote areas such as the protected reserves. There, migrants also exploit the natural resources. </p>
<p>What has developed is a parallel political economy in areas controlled by armed groups. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Among the initiatives to combat non-state armed groups, our policy report suggested the following solutions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>make forest villages inaccessible to two-wheeled motorcycles, the main means of transport for armed groups</p></li>
<li><p>set up forest tunnels or corridors where people can hide when under threat </p></li>
<li><p>re-adopt an integrated and inclusive approach to forest ecology, animal protection and cross-border security </p></li>
<li><p>strengthen social cohesion between communities in Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger by defusing the driving factors of insurgency and restoring mutual trust.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Papa Sow receives funding from the Nordic Africa institute, Uppsala, Sweden. </span></em></p>Trans-border collaboration is required to recover protected areas that transverse Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin Republic from armed groups.Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087752023-09-12T14:14:28Z2023-09-12T14:14:28ZPresident Hassan is the face of Tanzania’s reform agenda. But she needs to carry the country with her<p>After two years in power, President Samia Suluhu Hassan has <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-getting-a-political-remake-as-president-hassan-eyes-the-2025-polls-177761">consolidated</a> her political base, opened up the media space and increased the number of women in public appointments. </p>
<p>But Tanzania is not yet out of the woods. Years of failed accountability created the conditions for the rise of authoritarianism and the worrying absence of strong constitutional safeguards. The continued absence of these safeguards means that the risk of a backwards slide remains. </p>
<p>In a 2022-2023 <a href="https://app.box.com/s/kvaopljsjpqo8fch3srwtye51xl9ztsz">report</a> produced for the <a href="https://strategiclitigation.org/">Center for Strategic Litigation</a>, a not-for-profit organisation based in Tanzania, we reviewed the main developments in Tanzania’s civic space. </p>
<p>The report covers six areas: political trends; media and access to information; rights and civil society; economic governance; Zanzibar’s governance; and performance in East Africa. </p>
<p>In this article, we unpack the findings in some of these areas. </p>
<p>The report finds that current reform efforts aren’t sustainable because they lack popular participation and grounding in any legal or constitutional safeguards. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kxptJf0AAAAJ&hl=en">political science scholar</a>, I have been studying Tanzania’s politics in the last 10 years. We conclude in our report that Tanzania is yet to develop the resiliency necessary to fight any future assault on its fledgling democracy should it occur, given the country’s weak constitutional order.</p>
<h2>The big drivers</h2>
<p>The report’s main sources are the Center for Strategic Litigation’s monthly updates on politics, the media and civil society as well as public finance management and economic governance.</p>
<p>We reviewed materials published in the official, private and social media. We also conducted interviews with officials and political, private and civil society actors and observers.</p>
<p><strong>Political trends</strong></p>
<p>President Hassan has <a href="https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-getting-a-political-remake-as-president-hassan-eyes-the-2025-polls-177761">asserted her authority</a> over Tanzania’s ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi, abandoned some of the worst anti-democratic practices of her predecessor, and established her credentials to lead the country for the remainder of her term. </p>
<p>She used her party’s elections in 2022 to sideline her predecessor’s loyalists and consolidate her own power base. This base may be sufficient to pull through transformative and far reaching changes such as electoral reforms and ultimately a new constitution.</p>
<p>But to do this she needs to have a definite timeline for a new constitution. </p>
<p><strong>Media space</strong></p>
<p>Tanzanian media houses <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/oped/press-freedom-old-challenges-remain-despite-new-tone-3803278">acknowledge</a> the improvements in state-media relations during the last two years. They also note, however, that the old threats to media freedom in Tanzania persist. Journalists and media workers continue to face threats against their safety, intimidation and arbitrary arrest.</p>
<p><strong>Civil rights</strong></p>
<p>Civil liberties remain threatened. The criminal justice system continues to abuse the rule of law in the absence of legal safeguards for most of these liberties. </p>
<p>In December 2021, Hassan <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/why-police-reforms-in-tanzania-were-innevitable-3887248">noted</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>some police officers take bribes, use excessive force in carrying out their duties, and use offensive language. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.repoa.or.tz/?publication=repoa-annual-report-2021">REPOA and Afrobarometer survey</a>, nearly a quarter of Tanzanians (23%) consider that all or most of the police are involved in corruption.</p>
<p>For many years, Maasai communities have conflicted with the state over residence and grazing rights in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area. These areas have been leased for hunting by a company associated with the Emirati royal family. In 2022, both conflicts <a href="https://theconversation.com/evicting-people-from-tanzanias-ngorongoro-conservation-area-is-a-bad-idea-there-are-alternatives-177547">re-erupted</a> and led to confrontations and prosecutions. Affected communities have filed several cases concerning rights abuses in the East African Court of Justice and the High Court of Tanzania.</p>
<p>The president has deftly played the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/magazine/samia-leading-women-in-her-first-year-of-gender-agenda-3753080">gender card</a>, increasing the proportion of women at ministerial, regional and district commissioner levels. Critics, however, have pointed out that she focuses on <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/-tanzania-why-youth-unemployment-is-still-the-elephant-in-the-room--2725016">promoting women</a> from within “the system”. They dismiss her efforts as political rewards for loyalists. </p>
<p><strong>Economic governance</strong></p>
<p>The business environment continues to discourage investors with its bureaucracy, risks and corruption. This is despite initiatives such as the ambitious five-year <a href="https://www.tro.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FYDP-III-English.pdf">industrialisation policy</a>.</p>
<p>Theft, fraud and corruption are among the main concerns of businesses, according to the 2023 <a href="https://www.allianz.com/en/press/news/studies/230117_Allianz-Risk-Barometer-2023.html">Allianz Risk Barometer</a>. The steady empowerment of state agencies in productive areas that should arguably be the reserve of the private sector also remain a concern for Tanzania’s nascent private sector. These sectors include banking, clearing and forwarding, and water and air transport.</p>
<p>State agencies run companies in all major productive sectors. </p>
<p>The country’s industrial policy also sets it at odds with <a href="https://unfccc.int/most-requested/key-aspects-of-the-paris-agreement">the 2015 Paris Agreement</a> to reduce carbon emissions. The <a href="https://www.tro.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/FYDP-III-English.pdf#page=45">policy</a> promotes fossil fuels over carbon emission reductions.</p>
<p>In recent years, Tanzania has become a <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coal/tanzania-coal/">serious coal producer and exporter</a>. The government’s commitment to the US$6 billion Uganda-Tanzania East African Crude Oil Pipeline <a href="https://eacop.com/#">project</a> is a case in point. The project has been <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/hrw-uganda-oil-pipeline-devastates-thousands/7174124.html">challenged</a> on social, environmental and climate change grounds. The state has <a href="https://www.autoreportafrica.com/ugandan-students-arrested-during-protests-against-eacop-project/">widely harassed</a> Ugandan activists for calling for transparency and accountability over the project.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Many of the reforms initiated by Hassan are solely on presidential writ.</p>
<p>Efforts at reconciliation with citizens and independent civil society remain absent. This is partly attributed to the continued presence of limiting legislation governing civil society. So far the Tanzanian state has made no indication of willingness to open up the civic space.</p>
<p>The restriction of civil rights is also a reflection of the inherent weaknesses of the civil society in mobilising a viable constituency and engaging proactively with the state to shape and influence ongoing democratic reform efforts. </p>
<p>At the heart of this is the need to build strong infrastructure for dialogue among civil society, the state, political actors, the private sector and Tanzania’s development partners. </p>
<p>Achieving sustainable reforms will not be possible without constitutional reforms to provide for effective participation and accountability of the state towards the citizens. Constitutional powers <a href="https://www.aprm-au.org/thematic-areas-2/">have been abused</a> to give credence to the autocratic trends witnessed over the last decade. </p>
<p>The ongoing engagement with the opposition will prove valuable only if it leads to critical legislative reforms of the political parties, elections and <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/tanzania-democracy-foreign-policy-corruption-politics-samia-magufuli/">other relevant laws</a>.</p>
<p>While the president remains the face of the reform agenda, she needs to carry her lieutenants and the country with her.</p>
<p><em>Brian Cooksey and Deus Valentine of the Center for Strategic Litigation participated in compiling this report.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208775/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicodemus Minde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Current reforms in Tanzania lack popular participation and legal safeguards.Nicodemus Minde, Adjunct Lecturer, United States International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2126742023-09-10T10:13:49Z2023-09-10T10:13:49ZAU peacekeepers are leaving Somalia: what needs to happen to keep the peace<p>The phased withdrawal of the <a href="https://atmis-au.org/">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis)</a> began earlier this year and is <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2628">scheduled</a> to end in December 2024. </p>
<p>The withdrawal of African Union (AU) peacekeepers poses risks for Somalia. For one, it may reduce the pressure on al-Shabaab at a crucial time during the Somali government’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-plans-eliminate-al-shabaab-months-analysts-sceptical-2023-08-18/">latest offensive</a>. These risks cannot be completely eliminated but there are important steps the Somali authorities and the AU must take before the mission’s exit.</p>
<p>The withdrawal of the AU troops hands a battlefield and propaganda advantage to al-Shabaab. Beyond that, it reduces support for Somali forces trying to wage an offensive. There is also a risk that Somali forces garrisoned in former AU operating bases might be particularly vulnerable to al-Shabaab attack.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://amisom-au.org">AU Mission in Somalia</a> arrived in Mogadishu in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Peace-Somalia-Analysis-2007-2017/dp/0198851677/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">March 2007</a>, eventually growing to a force of over 22,000 personnel by 2014. From December 2017, the force was gradually downsized. In 2022 it was renamed a transitional force, a signal that the AU was entering the last phase of its military deployment in Somalia. </p>
<p>In the next drawdown <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2687">phase</a>, 3,000 out of 17,500 peacekeepers should depart by the end of September.</p>
<p>To ensure a smooth departure, the Somali authorities and AU forces must accomplish several key tasks. Somalia must reform and strengthen its internal security. The AU must coordinate with Somali forces and partner with the United Nations to handle the difficult logistics of the exiting troops. If they both succeed, then it’s worth speculating about what is likely to happen after the AU peacekeepers leave.</p>
<h2>Somalia’s key tasks</h2>
<p>For the Somali authorities, the key political challenge is to finalise the structure of their national security architecture. This has been stuck in draft form since 2017 and was recently revised. <a href="https://heritageinstitute.org/security-sector-reform-in-somlia-challenges-and-opportunities/publications/">It is crucial</a> that the type and numbers of forces, as well as command and control, and financial relationships are clear and agreeable to both the federal government and federal member states. It will be impossible to conduct successful offensive campaigns unless the Somali federal and regional authorities are on the same page.</p>
<p>Second, Somalia and its regions must recruit more security personnel, principally soldiers for the Somali National Army as well as federal and local police officers. The stated goals are about 23,000 deployable soldiers and 32,000 police officers. This was formally recognised in UN Security Council resolutions in <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2628">2022</a> and <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2687">2023</a>. But winning a war takes more than just fielding new, inexperienced personnel. The Somali army still lacks the supporting equipment, field mentoring, infrastructure and governing institutions it needs.</p>
<p>Finally, the Somali authorities must make significant progress in the war against al-Shabaab before the AU force leaves. President Hassan Sheikh’s goal of defeating al-Shabaab in <a href="https://twitter.com/HarunMaruf/status/1692306866573852795?s=20">five months</a> is wildly optimistic. It’s also counterproductive because it frames the current offensive campaign as a sprint rather than the marathon it really is. For over a decade, the central military problem has not been ejecting al-Shabaab from settlements, it has been holding them afterwards and delivering a real peace dividend to the local population.</p>
<h2>The AU’s key tasks</h2>
<p>The AU has its own list of difficult tasks to ensure a smooth, phased withdrawal of peacekeepers.</p>
<p>Having withdrawn 2,000 <a href="https://atmis-au.org/au-transition-mission-in-somalia-concludes-phase-one-of-troop-drawdown-hands-over-final-two-forward-operating-bases/">troops</a> in June, the AU’s immediate task is to identify and withdraw the next 3,000 by the end of September 2023. The soldiers will probably be drawn from across all the mission’s sectors and troop-contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda).</p>
<p>Second, the AU must work with <a href="https://unsos.unmissions.org/">the UN Support Office in Somalia</a> to ensure that the logistics go smoothly. The <a href="https://youtu.be/gis-DUfMZ-o">logistical challenges</a> are considerable and will involve many vehicles and aircraft moving troops and equipment. The largest portion of this activity will involve the handover of <a href="https://youtu.be/PSBHvFnMoU8?si=JvBIsWBqk43cpupl">forward operating bases</a> from the AU to the Somali security forces, and perhaps the closure of some bases. These will be particularly vulnerable to al-Shabaab attack after the handovers.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, the AU transitional force must continue to <a href="https://atmis-au.org/atmis-troops-to-continue-supporting-somali-forces-in-ongoing-offensive-against-al-shabaab/">support the Somali Army’s offensive operations</a>, currently underway on two fronts in central and southern Somalia.</p>
<p>Finally, the AU force must maintain its regular operations while preparing for the third drawdown of troops, scheduled for June 2024.</p>
<h2>What next after the AU transitional force?</h2>
<p>Assuming the transition of security responsibilities to the Somali authorities sticks to the official plan, then the AU force’s mandate will end by 2025. But this does not necessarily mean the end of international forces in Somalia. Security assistance programmes and operations by the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2020-07-14-us-policy-somalia-williams.pdf">United States</a>, <a href="https://heritageinstitute.org/security-sector-reform-in-somlia-challenges-and-opportunities/publications/">Turkey</a>, the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/sipri-background-papers/european-union-training-mission-somalia-assessment">European Union</a>, and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-support-to-somalias-security-transition#:%7E:text=In%202021%2F2022%2C%20the%20UK,trained%20over%202000%20SNA%20soldiers.">United Kingdom</a> are unlikely to end abruptly when the AU force exits. If nothing else, an international security presence will remain in and around Mogadishu to protect the diplomatic community.</p>
<p>Nor will Somalia’s neighbours reduce their forces to zero. Indeed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-neighbours-launch-new-operations-against-al-shabaab-militants-2023-02-01/">earlier this year</a>, Somalia’s neighbours agreed to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-s-neighbors-to-send-additional-troops-to-fight-al-shabab-/6986748.html">provide additional troops</a> to help the federal government fight al-Shabaab, a clear signal of what the period after the AU force might entail. So far, however, this commitment doesn’t appear to have been implemented.</p>
<p>The Somali federal government is hence likely to enter into bilateral security agreements with its neighbours. It is also probable that Somalia will ask Uganda to retain a security force in and around Mogadishu. This makes practical sense because Ugandan troops have over 16 years of experience fighting al-Shabaab. It would be very difficult for any other foreign country to replicate that. In this scenario, Burundi might be the only country whose troops leave Somalia when the mandate of the AU transitional force ends. If so, this would not represent a major strategic change in the dynamics of this long war.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul D. Williams has previously received funding from the George Washington University to conduct research on Somalia. </span></em></p>A rapid exit of AU troops from Somalia could hand a battlefield and propaganda advantage to al-Shabaab.Paul D. Williams, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.