tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/pyongyang-35828/articlesPyongyang – The Conversation2023-04-28T14:32:36Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2046282023-04-28T14:32:36Z2023-04-28T14:32:36ZUS-Korea summit: Joe Biden’s ‘American Pie’ won’t include stationing nuclear weapons on the peninsula<p>The <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2023/04/28/2003798776">rendition</a> of Don McLean’s classic pop song American Pie by Yoon Suk Yeol may have dominated the headlines as the South Korean president enjoyed dinner at the White House with Joe Biden – Yoon is, reportedly, a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/27/1172613834/yoon-suk-yeol-south-korea-president-united-states-visit-biden-musk">devotee of “<em>noraebang</em>”, Korean karaoke</a>. But the frivolity of the moment was a break from the deadly serious purpose of his six-day visit to the US: how to combat the growing regional threat from China and North Korea.</p>
<p>The key takeaway from the visit was what has been dubbed the “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Washington Declaration</a>” aimed at bolstering the two countries’ defence alliance in the region. </p>
<p>It is clear from the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf">latest assessment</a> released by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence that the threat from China and North Korea is seen as critical. The report highlights China’s increasing foreign policy assertiveness and its growing military power. It concludes that: “China is reorienting its nuclear posture for strategic rivalry with the United States because its leaders have concluded that their current capabilities are insufficient.” </p>
<p>The report also forecasts that this year China will increase pressure on Taiwan and ramp up its military presence in the South China Sea. </p>
<p>On North Korea, the report says Pyongyang is “using its nuclear-capable missile programme to try to establish strategic dominance over South Korea and US forces in the region”.</p>
<p>In Seoul, meanwhile, the South Korean political elite is particularly concerned at North Korea’s aggressive posturing on its nuclear ambitions and believes Pyongyang is getting closer to a genuine intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. This would threaten the continental US and reduces the credibility of Washington’s <a href="https://features.csis.org/north-korea-extended-deterrence/">doctrine of extended deterrence</a>. This holds that Washington’s commitment to use – if necessary – its nuclear arsenal to deter North Korea from attacking the South means that Seoul has no need for its own nuclear capability.</p>
<p>In January Yoon told South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo that he feared that the status quo of extended deterrence <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230102002500315">was no longer sufficient</a>. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>What we call extended deterrence was also the US telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything, but now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that. The US government also understands that to some degree.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Washington Declaration aims to address this. Biden and Yoon agreed on a range of measures to <a href="https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-the-us-rok-summit-means-for-security-on-the-korean-peninsula/">enhance nuclear deterrence on the Korean peninsula</a>. These include the establishment of a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)</a> to help “plan for nuclear contingencies and cooperate on the Alliance’s approach to nuclear deterrence”.</p>
<p>But, while committing to consultation over “any possible nuclear weapons employment on the Korean Peninsula” the US retains the sole right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. </p>
<p>In July 2022, Seoul set up a “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2022/07/south-korea-to-forge-new-strategic-command-to-counter-north-korean-threats/#">strategic command</a>” that controls a so-called “precision strike” system for responding to attacks to North Korea. This will now be integrated with the <a href="https://www.usfk.mil/About/CFC/">US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC)</a>. The new agreement <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/">also sets out that</a> the two countries will engage in “joint execution and planning for ROK conventional support to US nuclear operations … on the Korean Peninsula”.</p>
<p>This goes at least some way towards the “joint nuclear exercises” that Yoon called for at the time of their <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/">first summit in May 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>More visible US presence on peninsula</h2>
<p>An issue raised in public discourse by politicians and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/whats-needed-to-put-nukes-in-s-korea-its-time-to-start-planning-new-report-says/">experts</a> prior to the summit was the idea of Washington deploying nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula – something that would mitigate the need for Seoul to develop its own nuclear deterrent. Under the heading: “More visible US strategic asset deployment”, the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/fact-sheet-republic-of-korea-state-visit-to-the-united-states/">new agreement commits to</a> “enhancing the deployment of US strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula, in particular US nuclear-capable platforms”. </p>
<p>The words “more visible” are significant here because normally the location and deployment of sea-based nuclear deterrents is kept strictly secret. Biden clarified this in a joint press conference, saying: “we’re not going to be stationing nuclear weapons on – on the peninsula, but we will have visits to – port visits of nuclear submarines and things like that. We are not walking away from that”.</p>
<p>Yoon told reporters at the press conference that he and Biden agreed that the response to a nuclear attack from North Korea would involve the use of “full force of the alliance including the United States’ nuclear weapons. But Biden stopped short of a public commitment to this, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/26/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-in-joint-press-conference-2">instead declaring that</a> "a nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies or partisans … is unacceptable and will result in the end of whatever regime, were it to take such an action”.</p>
<p>This was a big success for Yoon’s administration. In terms of nuclear consultation, joint exercises, strategic planning and command, he secured about as much as he could have expected from any US president. Whether this will be enough to placate those in South Korea who want a homegrown nuclear capability remains to be seen and will very much depend on what North Korea does next. In spite of the close relationship between Washington and Seoul, engagement on security issues with North Korea remains an urgent priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Korea Foundation.</span></em></p>The US and South Korea are significantly beefing up security arrangements in the face of the perceived growing threat from China and North Korea.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2002122023-02-27T17:15:23Z2023-02-27T17:15:23ZKim Jong-un purges: why North Korea is such a dangerous place to be successful in politics<p>North Korea celebrated the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army in February. As it showed off 12 of its massive intercontinental ballistic missile in a military parade, expert Korea-watchers spotted there appear to have been some <a href="https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-military-promotions-appear-to-underscore-north-koreas-focus-on-missiles">significant changes</a> in the country’s military and political hierarchy.</p>
<p>Choe Ryong-hae, the chairman of the standing committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, was reportedly the only member of the politburo presidium not in attendance. But the Workers’ Party of Korea (North Korea’s sole and ruling political party) <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/kim-jong-un-tightens-grip-on-power-with-purge-of-party-officials-7bd0tcvk7">has reportedly recently replaced</a> five of the 12 officials in the party secretariat and seven of the 17-member politburo. This is according to <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/infoNK/leadership/party/">South Korea’s unification ministry</a>, which exists to promote the reunification of the two countries.</p>
<p>Two officials whose careers are reportedly on the rise are Song Yong-gon (a member of the Worker’s Party central committee and previously the commander of the 9th Corps of the Korean People’s Army) and <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/15/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-Korean-Peoples-Army/20230215172854432.html">Choe Kil-ryong</a>, until now commander of the 2nd Army Corps. The pair have been promoted as commanders of the new units for two classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>The promotions appear to confirm Pyongyang’s focus on long-range missiles which have become central element in Pyongyang’s nuclear testing regime. In recent months, North Korea has tested two Hwasong-class missiles – intercontinental ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 15,000km, capable of <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/north-korea-claims-it-successfully-tested-a-hwasong-17-icbm/">reaching the continental United States</a>. </p>
<p>The wider context of the reported purges is characterised by rising tension on the Korean peninsula. The <a href="https://www.38north.org/2023/01/north-korea-makes-a-still-more-conservative-turn-at-party-plenum/">Workers’ Party plenum in Pyongyang</a> in December 2022 emphasised a hardline policy towards South Korea, including the possibility of preemptive nuclear strikes. South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ef4d3f20-72db-4e0e-82b6-eb36ecfc4c84">has indicated</a> that Seoul won’t hesitate to retaliate and could develop its own nuclear capability.</p>
<p>At the same time, the Kim regime is facing severe domestic crises due to its weak economy, exacerbated by the challenges of COVID and harsh international sanctions. Food insecurity in the North was recently <a href="https://www.38north.org/2023/01/food-insecurity-in-north-korea-is-at-its-worst-since-the-1990s-famine/">described by a US thinktank</a> as “at its worst since the country’s famine in the 1990s”.</p>
<h2>Consolidating power</h2>
<p>North Korea’s political system gives absolute power to the leader, which is both a strength and a vulnerability. Kim Jong-un, who came to power in 2011 shortly after the death of his father Kim Jong-il, has had to constantly struggle to prevent the emergence of alternative centres of power. Unlike his father, Kim had only a short time to prepare for leadership and was (and remains, at 39) quite young in a culture that reveres elders. His first few years were particularly dangerous for him. </p>
<p>At the third party conference in September 2010, Kim Jong-il replaced 78% of the politburo. This was seemingly to formally establish his third son as heir apparent and to put in place “guardians” for the young Kim such as his uncle <a href="https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/kim-family/jang-song-thaek/">Jang Song-thaek</a> and senior military figure <a href="https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/leadership-biographies/gen-ri-yong-ho/">Vice-Marshal Ri Yong-ho</a>.</p>
<p>Kim Jong-un replaced his father in December 2011 and, at the party conference the following April, 42% of the politburo was replaced, followed by another 13% <a href="https://www.38north.org/2021/07/north-koreas-party-personnel-shuffles-a-reality-check/">removed at the 2013 party plenum</a>. It was reported that some in the top leadership – including <a href="https://www.38north.org/2014/01/amansourov012214/">members of Kim’s own family</a> – were scheming against him.</p>
<h2>A dangerous family</h2>
<p>These purges continued to create a climate of fear in Pyongyang. In 2012, the vice minister of the army, Kim Chol, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/9630509/North-Korean-army-minister-executed-with-mortar-round.html">was executed</a> “for reportedly drinking and carousing during the official mourning period after Kim Jong-il’s death”. </p>
<p>A similar fate befell Ri Yong-ho, one of senior team which had guided Kim Jong-un as he was preparing for leadership and by then the chief of staff of the North Korean military. Ri was removed from his positions and is <a href="http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/11/113_190937.html">believed to have been executed</a> amid rumours of <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2012/07/what-was-behind-ri-yong-hos-departure/">disagreement over economic policy</a>. </p>
<p>But the most prominent victim of the early consolidation of Kim’s rule was his uncle and former mentor. Jang Song-thaek was the second most powerful person in North Korea until his execution in 2013 (lurid reports of either being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/06/story-kim-jong-un-uncle-fed-dogs-made-up">torn to pieces by dogs</a> or <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/12/13/north-korea-execute_n_4437788.html">executed by machine gun</a> have never been confirmed).</p>
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<p>Jang, who was accused of being part of a bureaucratic clique engaged in <em>sedo</em> (<a href="https://www.globalasia.org/v9no1/cover/the-execution-of-jang-song-thaek-consolidating-power-pyongyang-style_chang-hyun-jung">lust for power</a>) may have become a real threat to Kim due to his close relations with the Chinese government and his efforts to consolidate control over key elements of the economy. </p>
<p>On February 13 2017, Kim Jong-un’s half-brother Kim <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/17/north-korea-leader-not-long">Jong-nam</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/01/how-north-korea-got-away-with-the-assassination-of-kim-jong-nam">was murdered</a> in an assassination which made international headlines. He had been in exile for some time in Macau after falling from grace, which he claimed was due to his advocacy of political reform.</p>
<p>He was exposed to VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport by two women – one Indonesian and one Vietnamese – who claimed they had been asked to play a prank and had no idea of the identity of their target. This was another sign of the intense power struggle within the Kim family itself. </p>
<h2>Violent reshuffles</h2>
<p>These fairly regular purges of North Korea’s elite are partly to fend off alleged coup plots, but <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/54/3/73/118352/Who-Is-Purged-Determinants-of-Elite-Purges-in?redirectedFrom=fulltext">studies of Pyongyang’s leadership</a> show that they are also a key mechanism to maintain control over the bureaucracy, a system also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure">effectively used by Kim Jong-il</a> . </p>
<p>In an absolute dictatorship, it is an important mechanism to inoculate the leadership from responsibility for policy failure by blaming others. An absolute leader who demands complete allegiance and unquestioning loyalty from his population cannot be seen to accept responsibility for any of his government’s mistakes, especially when they result – as they have recently – in hardship for so many in the North. </p>
<p>For Kim Jong-un, as with his predecessors in the North Korean leadership, a <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/54/3/73/118352/Who-Is-Purged-Determinants-of-Elite-Purges-in?redirectedFrom=fulltext">purge is a political tool</a> similar to a reshuffle in Downing Street. Expect to read of more while the “Respected Comrade” remains in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Korean Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies. </span></em></p>People who get too close to the seat of power in North Korea, including the Supreme Leader’s relatives, have a way of ending up dead.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/833872017-09-06T12:10:19Z2017-09-06T12:10:19ZBeware the cult of ‘tech fixing’ – it’s why America is eyeing the nuclear button<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184906/original/file-20170906-9862-iddu2f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'I will attack and I might like that.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/intercontinental-ballistic-missile-icbm-rocket-collect-688481440?src=boUUxc7YDSjMrLJgIEmDwg-1-2">Quality Stock Arts</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With even Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b4d37d7e-91d8-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0">now warning</a> of global catastrophe from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-trump-is-bluffing-on-north-korea-the-results-could-be-catastrophic-82340">recent tensions</a> in Korea, we are in arguably the worst period of nuclear brinkmanship since the end of the Cold War. It is partly thanks to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/04/annihilating-north-korea-create-more-problems-than-solves-trump-us-right-nuclear-taboo">strand of thinking</a> among the American right that a nuclear attack on Pyongyang would succeed where decades of diplomacy has failed. </p>
<p>Welcome to the cult of the “technological fix”. It is the conviction that social and political problems can be side-stepped by clever engineering. The same logic finds its way into many recent initiatives. It helps explain why Donald Trump <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/us-commissions-first-prototypes-for-controversial-border-wall-a3624491.html">continues to</a> pursue a 1,000 mile wall with Mexico as the answer to America’s problem with illegal immigrants, for example. </p>
<p>Technological fixes are nothing new, of course. Controlling the flow of populations with physical obstructions lay behind the medieval <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/great-wall-of-china">Great Wall of China</a> and <a href="http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/places/hadrians-wall/history/">Hadrian’s Wall</a> in England in the second century. The layout of 19th century Paris was <a href="https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/becoming-modern/avant-garde-france/second-empire/a/haussmann-the-demolisher-and-the-creation-of-modern-paris">transformed</a> with broad avenues to prevent mobs from barricading the streets. In the 1880s, streetcar manufacturers experimented with automatic doors to make joyriding impossible.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184907/original/file-20170906-9202-ncxfzg.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Great Wall of China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/ISSArt/iss_art2.php">NASA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 20th century, technological fixes were packaged and given the name by one tireless promoter, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/21/obituaries/21weinberg.html?mcubz=0">Alvin M Weinberg</a>. Weinberg was a reactor designer during the wartime <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Manhattan-Project">Manhattan Project</a>, the Allies’ bid to be first to create an atomic bomb. He went on to become director of a <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s-qyvnSvSpUC&pg=PA251&lpg=PA251&dq=sean+johnston+weinberg&source=bl&ots=bdw5tSlsCI&sig=pgOV_Ubr9qSmNJJSRoKECO9x5kU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi36cnYzI7WAhVFLVAKHafgArAQ6AEISDAJ#v=onepage&q&f=false">national laboratory</a> exploring applications of nuclear energy. </p>
<h2>Science supreme</h2>
<p>Imagining a world transformed by nuclear power, Weinberg became convinced that technological innovation was the best way of dealing with any social issue. Well placed to gain the ear of engineering peers and American policymakers, he <a href="http://science.sciencemag.org/content/157/3792/1026">invented</a> a durable term for this confident new environment: Big Science.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184909/original/file-20170906-9823-11d36ks.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Weinberg.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Alvin_Weinberg.jpg#/media/File:Alvin_Weinberg.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>For Weinberg, conventional problem solving through education, law enforcement and moral guidance was slow and ineffective. Convert such issues into technological problems to be solved by engineers, he argued. The Hiroshima bomb had dodged the need for political negotiation, he claimed, stabilising international relations in the process.</p>
<p>In the wall-building stakes, Weinberg was Trump’s fellow traveller. He petitioned the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/lyndonbjohnson">Johnson administration</a> to build a wall between North and South Vietnam, though privately admitted shortly after that his scheme was “very amateurish”. He also <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=y5WjYgMc7eEC&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=weinberg+bresee&source=bl&ots=Ck9DuOLjW9&sig=vB9BcEYloFWnlsVwjrhRiy0715c&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi-o8uNzo7WAhUIJ1AKHRtICyYQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=weinberg%20bresee&f=false">promoted</a> the idea of funding air conditioners in slum districts, arguing they would literally cool down tensions during the hot summer months to avoid urban riots. </p>
<p>This too was left on the drawing board, but other <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WAgAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=weinberg+%22social+engineering%22&source=bl&ots=M1KDpNfg6f&sig=bmmDJYRrAhJ6g_wiwLC5AFpMdDU&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwju9Oizyo7WAhUCJ1AKHbQ3AaE4ChDoAQgsMAE#v=onepage&q=weinberg%20%22social%20engineering%22&f=false">less provocative</a> ideas gained traction. He shared road safety campaigner Ralph Nader’s observation that car seatbelts were more effective than traffic laws or driver education for reducing fatalities. He <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SbNAfWWdNQsC&pg=PA292&lpg=PA292&dq=air-conditioners+weinberg&source=bl&ots=HteFUeXN0H&sig=a0qD4CYwBfaPVv4_tHTwEiqLMNI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiplOWMz47WAhXRL1AKHTTWB70Q6AEIOzAE#v=onepage&q=air-conditioners%20weinberg&f=false">claimed</a> that intra-uterine contraceptive devices like the coil meant birth control was no longer “a desperately complicated social problem”. He pushed cigarette filters as an easier way to reduce the harms of smoking than persuading users to quit. </p>
<h2>The cult of the tech fix</h2>
<p>Weinberg’s faith in engineers is even more widespread today. His championing of the likes of cigarette filters anticipated the way we value technological fixes for improving individuals – particularly their health and well-being. </p>
<p>To address our cultural preoccupation with weight control, for example, why have diet plans or exercise regimes when there are low-calorie sugar substitutes, over-the-counter appetite suppressants, gastric bands and liposuction? And if you eat healthily and exercise anyway, don’t worry: there are wearable technologies to monitor, cajole and regiment us further. </p>
<p>When Apple <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szrsfeyLzyg">came up with</a> “there’s an app for that” to promote software-based tech fixes, it epitomised Silicon Valley’s reinvention of Weinberg dogma as <a href="http://www.techrepublic.com/article/silicon-valleys-solutionism-issues-appear-to-be-scaling/">solutionism</a>. Where Weinberg promoted societal benefits, now it had become about personal empowerment for the “me” generation. </p>
<p>The message is that if you’re deficient in willpower, attention and consistency, it’s okay – a consumer engineering fix is only a few clicks away. And the future promises to be still brighter. Say hello to <a href="https://theconversation.com/genome-editing-poses-ethical-problems-that-we-cannot-ignore-39466">genetic engineering</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-science-drugs-and-tech-pushing-our-brains-to-new-limits-65281">nootropics</a> and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/elon-musk-neuralink-brain-computer-startup-a7916891.html">implantable microchips</a>. </p>
<p>Weinberg’s agenda also endures at the policy level. To address terrorism, we have locks on cockpit doors, metal detectors, surveillance monitoring, bomb-sniffing devices and body scanners at airports. We seem to prefer such responses to anything so socio-political as negotiation or education. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184913/original/file-20170906-9202-1fjvnhx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Step this way, sir.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/passenger-passing-through-security-check-airport-322320815?src=6xjXqpERpY3MVbQn21mNGQ-1-28">Monkey Business Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Environmental concerns are another favourite. <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-you-might-be-driving-electric-sooner-than-you-think-71896">Electric motors</a> promise more cars on the road with less air pollution. Oil-digesting microbes <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-microbes-helped-clean-bp-s-oil-spill/">promise to</a> clean up oil spills. Plastic packaging <a href="http://www.tikp.co.uk/knowledge/material-functionality/uv-resistance/the-effects-of-ultraviolet-light-on-polymeric-materials/">that degrades in sunlight</a> could make litter disappear without clean-up campaigns. </p>
<p>Geo-engineering could even deal with climate change overall – limiting <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/geoengineering-technology-could-cool-the-planet-2017-7">temperature rise</a>, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/geo-engineering-technology-climate-change-environment-climeworks-carbon-dioxide-chemicals-dimming-a7860356.html">carbon dioxide levels</a> or both. Life can continue as usual, we are told again and again. </p>
<h2>Downsides</h2>
<p>For all this confidence and hubris, we need to pay more heed to the drawbacks. Critics have long argued that technological fixes overlook deeper problems. Weinberg himself conceded they can look like “band-aids”, but believed they were still worthwhile while a better solution was being sought. </p>
<p>Yet this risks settling for the band-aid. We might become so pleased with electric cars that we stop worrying about the continued proliferation of roads, sedentary lifestyles and social segregation. If Trump’s wall reduces illegal immigration, progressive Americans might lose interest in helping Mexico to become prosperous. </p>
<p>An even deeper concern is with placing problem solving in the hands of narrowly trained technical experts. Take the coil, for example: unlike condoms or the pill, where users make a daily choice, intra-uterine devices are a one-off insertion under a doctor’s authority. The flip-side of relying on engineering cures may be a passive and powerless public. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/184915/original/file-20170906-9871-1d1d9gu.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">That 2016 feeling.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Donald_Trump_supporters_in_Maryland_(29638831625).jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Weinberg never used the term “technocracy”, yet he <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-009-2207-5_10">did acknowledge</a> that some technological solutions were incompatible with liberal democracy. Ironically, of course, it is exactly such frustrations that helped usher the current American president into office. </p>
<p>None of this is to say technological fixes are always wrong; more that they can be overly seductive. We need to recognise when they seem too good to be true, and consider them cautiously. That way we can steal back some of that democratic thunder before it’s too late – starting, one would hope, by avoiding nuclear war in Korea.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Johnston has received funding for this research from the British Academy grant number SG132088</span></em></p>What do intercontinental missiles and Apple’s app store have in common? Alvin M Weinberg.Sean F. Johnston, Professor of Science, Technology and Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/805832017-07-05T20:11:08Z2017-07-05T20:11:08Z4 things to know about North and South Korea<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/176959/original/file-20170705-21675-xudwrd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People watch news of missile test on a public TV screen in North Korea.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jon Chol Jin</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Professor Ji-Young Lee of American University answers four questions to help put issues related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities into context.</em></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Why is there a North and a South Korea?</strong></p>
<p>Before there was a South and North Korea, the peninsula was ruled as a dynasty known as Chosŏn, which existed for more than five centuries, until 1910. This period, during which an independent Korea had diplomatic <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/chinas-hegemony/9780231179744">relations with China and Japan</a>, ended with imperial Japan’s annexation of the peninsula. Japan’s colonial rule lasted 35 years.</p>
<p>When Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, the Korean peninsula was split into two zones of occupation – the U.S.-controlled South Korea and the Soviet-controlled North Korea. Amid the growing Cold War tensions between Moscow and Washington, in 1948, two separate governments were established in Pyongyang and Seoul. Kim Il-Sung, leader of North Korea, was a former guerrilla <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-real-north-korea-9780199390038?cc=us&lang=en&">who fought under Chinese and Russian command</a>. <a href="http://www.uhpress.hawaii.edu/p-8995-9780824831684.aspx">Syngman Rhee</a>, a Princeton University-educated staunch anti-communist, became the first leader of South Korea.</p>
<p>In an attempt to unify the Korean peninsula under his communist regime, <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5740.html">Kim Il-Sung invaded the South</a> in June 1950 with Soviet aid. This brought South Korea and the United States, backed by United Nations, to fight against the newly founded People’s Republic of China and North Korea. An armistice agreement ended hostilities in the Korean War in 1953. Technically speaking, however, the two Koreas are still at war.</p>
<p><strong>Beyond the political divide, are Koreans in the North and South all that culturally different? If so, how?</strong></p>
<p>Koreans in the South and North have led separate lives for almost 70 years. Korean history and a collective memory of having been a unified, independent state for over a millennium, however, are a powerful reminder to Koreans that they have shared identity, culture and language. </p>
<p>For example, in both Koreas the history of having resisted Japanese colonialism is an important source of nationalism. Both North and South Korean students learn about the <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-real-north-korea-9780199390038?cc=us&lang=en&">1919 March 1 Independence Movement</a> in school.</p>
<p>Consider, too, the Korean language. About 54 percent of North Korean defectors in South Korea say that they have <a href="http://www.nkrf.re.kr/nkrf/archive/archive_01/kolas/kolasView.do?key=70048046&kind=DAS&q2=">no major difficulty understanding</a> Korean used in South Korea. Only 1 percent responded that they cannot understand it at all. </p>
<p>However, the divergent politics of North and South Korea have shaped differences in Koreans’ outlook on life and the world since the split. South Korea’s vibrant democracy is a result of the mass movement of students, intellectuals and middle-class citizens. In <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0109.xml">North Korea</a>, the state propaganda and ideology of Juche, or “self-reliance,” were used to consolidate the Kim family’s one-man rule, while reproducing a certain mode of thinking designed to help the regime survive.</p>
<p><strong>What have we learned from North Korean defectors who settled in South Korea?</strong></p>
<p>As of September 2016, an estimated 29,830 North Korean defectors are <a href="http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3892">living in South Korea.</a> From them, we’ve learned the details of people’s everyday life in one of the world’s most closed societies. For example, despite crackdowns, more North Koreans are now watching South Korean TV dramas. </p>
<p>In North Korea, repression, surveillance and punishment are pervasive features of social life. The state relies heavily on coercion and terror as a means of sustaining the regime.</p>
<p>Still, not all North Koreans are interested in defecting. According to <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/marching-through-suffering/9780231171342">anthropologist Sandra Fahy</a>, interviewees said they left the North reluctantly driven primarily by famine and economic reasons, rather than political reasons. A majority of them missed home in the North. </p>
<p>However, Thae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to the South in 2016, believes that Kim Jong-un’s North Korea could face a popular uprising or elite defection as North Koreans have increasingly become <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTvNBfdjuJI">disillusioned with the regime.</a></p>
<p><strong>What is the history of U.S. relations with South Korea, and where do they stand now?</strong></p>
<p>The purpose of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has changed little since its formation in 1953. This has much to do with continuing threats from North Korea. </p>
<p>However, despite differences in their approach to North Korea, President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun took a major step toward transforming the Cold War alliance into a “<a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/07/joint-declaration-commemoration-60th-anniversary-alliance-between-republ">comprehensive strategic alliance</a>.” Under President Barack Obama and South Korean Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, many believed the U.S.-South Korea alliance was at its best. Under their leadership, Washington and Seoul agreed to expand the alliance’s scope to cover nontraditional threats, like terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other global challenges like piracy and epidemic disease, while coordinating and standing firm against North Korea’s provocations. </p>
<p>Now, with Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump as new presidents of South Korea and the United States, there is a greater degree of uncertainty. Among other things, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-we-may-terminate-us-south-korea-trade-agreement/2017/04/27/75ad1218-2bad-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.7220866a5910">Trump criticized</a> the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, while insisting Seoul pay for THAAD, a U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/asia/trump-south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-north-korea.html?_r=0">missile defense system deployed in South Korea</a>. Moon, whose parents fled the North during the Korean War, is likely to put inter-Korean reconciliation as one of his top priorities. This may collide with the current U.S. approach of imposing sanctions against North Korea. </p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-things-to-know-about-north-and-south-korea-77441">May 14, 2017</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/80583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ji-Young Lee received funding from the Academy of Korean Studies (Competitive Research Grant, 2013), for a book project on historical international order in Asia.</span></em></p>North and South Korea explained in four questions and answers.Ji-Young Lee, Assistant Professor, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/744942017-03-16T02:25:49Z2017-03-16T02:25:49ZNorth Korea and the dangers of Trump’s diplomacy-free Asia strategy<p>North Korea’s missile launches last week are an early warning that the Trump administration’s Asia strategy could end up triggering the world’s next major war.</p>
<p>Spurred by the launches, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is touring Japan, South Korea and China this week. But Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile activities are not Trump’s priority in Asia.</p>
<p>For Trump and “inner circle” advisers like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/23/stephen-bannons-nationalist-call-to-arms-annotated/">Steve Bannon</a>, the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-01-18-americas-international-role-trump-wickett-final2.pdf">top concern</a> is economic. Trump and his team see U.S. trade deficits, concentrated in Asia, as <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/trump-trade-deficit/509912/">draining America’s wealth</a> and threatening its <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-05/wsj-op-ed-peter-navarro-writes-deficits-could-put-us-national-security-jeopardy">national</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/07/business/economy-business/top-trump-adviser-outlines-aggressive-trade-policy-sees-deficit-threat-national-security/#.WMWXnfnys2w">security</a>. Trump claims he is out to redefine U.S. economic ties to Asia’s major economies.</p>
<p>Whatever this goal’s merits, from my experience at the National Security Council, on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and as a visiting scholar at Peking University, I believe it is dangerously flawed as a basis for U.S. Asia strategy. Asia today is more economically interdependent than any other part of the world. It also has serious security challenges. Besides competitive posturing on the Korean peninsula, these challenges include escalating disputes in the East and South China seas. </p>
<p>Yet there is no mechanism bringing America and its Asian allies together with China to manage these problems through multilateral diplomacy. </p>
<p>This raises risks that regional security challenges will turn into armed conflicts. The devastation that such conflicts would wreak on global welfare makes it imperative that Washington and major regional players create an effective security framework. I’m concerned that Trump’s strategy ignores this imperative. </p>
<h2>Trump and Asia’s diplomacy deficit</h2>
<p>Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs highlight the dangers flowing from Asia’s lack of a regional security mechanism. North Korea is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/world/asia/north-korea-claims-its-nuclear-arsenal-is-just-a-deterrent.html">chronically concerned</a> that its security is at <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-statement-idUSKCN0XN1XE">risk</a>. Consequently, it <a href="http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-future-strategy-and-doctrine">takes steps</a> to develop <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">nuclear and missile capabilities</a> that, from Pyongyang’s vantage, might keep America and its allies at bay. But Pyongyang’s quest for deterrence also <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">raises risks</a> that conventional conflict in Korea escalates to nuclear war. </p>
<p>In my assessment, Trump does not view conflict prevention in Korea as an urgent focus. Trumpian rhetoric emphasizes “radical <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-radical-islam/508331/">Islam</a>” and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/us/politics/stephen-bannon-cpac-speech.html?_r=0">illegal immigration</a> as immediate threats to Americans. Through this prism, war in Asia seems less directly dangerous. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-armed missiles could even be a useful lever to advance Trump’s real regional goals.</p>
<p>North Korean nuclear and missile tests give Trump openings to “reassure” <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201702120027.html">Japan</a> and <a href="http://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/10/13585524/donald-trump-phone-call-south-korea-park-geun-hye">South</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-south.html?_r=0">Korea</a>, in more fulsome terms than his campaign rhetoric suggested, of U.S. commitment to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-07/abe-gets-trump-backing-as-north-korea-warns-of-nuclear-disaster">their</a> <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/korea-missile-defense-china-trump.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&referer=https://t.co/e7YDIlyz89">security</a>. He has already done so directly and through <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/02/james-mattis-arrives-in-south-korea-japan-to-soothe-fears-over-trumps-foreign-policy.html">Defense</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/">Secretary</a> <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/04/national/politics-diplomacy/inada-says-hopes-mattis-visit-strengthens-regional-security-ties-south-korea/#.WMiPCfnys2x">James Mattis</a>. Last week, Trump deployed the first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units to South Korea, which can purportedly intercept North Korean warheads.</p>
<p>It appears Trump is playing on these moves to seek more <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/cdae8542-ed22-11e6-930f-061b01e23655">Japanese</a> and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2017-01-17/hyundai-highlights-us-spending-plan-before-trump-takes-oath">Korean</a> investment in the United States. He also wants understandings on <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-10/trump-vows-level-playing-field-for-u-s-japan-china-currency">currency</a> <a href="http://english.donga.com/Home/3/all/26/834470/1">valuation</a> and more balanced <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/052cf600-e95b-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539">bilateral</a> <a href="http://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-feeling-pressure-to-appease-trump-on-trade/3707669.html">trade</a>. </p>
<p>With China – a major economic partner, but not an ally – Trump aims to leverage U.S. military power and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/9892b7ae-d2f9-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51">other</a> <a href="http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-02-13/trump-unveil-passive-aggressive-currency-war-china">coercive</a> <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-eyes-new-tactic-to-press-china-1487034167">levers</a> to wrest <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/25/trade-trumps-national-security-in-trumps-worldview-thats-really-bad-news-for-china/?utm_term=.8f52d3af97f6">trade</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/technology/zte-china-fine.html?_r=0">and</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-10/trump-vows-level-playing-field-for-u-s-japan-china-currency">monetary</a> concessions. </p>
<p>To this end, Trump seeks to increase pressure on China by expanding America’s regional military posture. Pyongyang’s weapons tests create openings to do so. Already, Beijing worries that THAAD deployments to Asia could ultimately threaten <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-thaad-deployment-south-korea-means-china">China’s</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-06/explaining-thaad-and-why-it-so-bothers-china-quicktake-q-a">defensive</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm_term=.71b4ff6002f8">and</a> <a href="https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html">deterrent</a> <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/thaad-and-chinas-nuclear-second-strike-capability/">capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>But Trump’s strategy offers no solution to security problems associated with North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. </p>
<h2>Solving the North Korea problem</h2>
<p>As previous U.S. administrations have learned, there is no preventive military option against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Attacking them will trigger Seoul’s destruction by North Korean conventional artillery. </p>
<p>Saying the problem is China’s to solve won’t work, either. </p>
<p>Beijing is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-north-korea-relations-kim-jong-un.html">increasingly displeased</a> with North Korea’s nuclear and missile displays. But there are 30,000 U.S. soldiers in South Korea today. In such a setting, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8_NFOEfgBU">Beijing</a> will not accept U.S.-allied South Korea’s effective extension to China’s border. This could enable deployment of tens of thousands of U.S. troops to that border. Thus, Beijing will never press Pyongyang in ways that bring North Korea to the verge of collapse, no matter how much Washington wants it to.</p>
<p>If Trump wanted to solve the Korea problem, he would pursue what China <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml">proposed</a> last week: dual track diplomacy aimed at “denuclearizing the peninsula on the one hand and establishing a peace mechanism on the other.” Initially, this would entail “suspension for suspension.” Pyongyang would halt its weapons tests; Washington and Seoul would stop joint military exercises. </p>
<p>Parties could then negotiate more comprehensively. America and its allies would seek a Korea without nuclear weapons. For Pyongyang and Beijing, denuclearization would be joined with a regional <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml">“peace mechanism”</a> and a U.S.-North Korean peace treaty. </p>
<p>But the dual track would commit America to a cooperative approach to Asian security. And that would not help Trump pursue his economic goals. In a stable Asia, how would Trump leverage military power to extract economic concessions from allies or from China?</p>
<p>Barring major changes in Trump’s Asia strategy, North Korea will likely keep developing its strategic deterrent. This will continue <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/">raising risks</a> that conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula escalates rapidly to nuclear war. </p>
<p>China is reacting deliberately to what it sees as provocative U.S. policies. President Xi <a href="http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Xi-eyes-US-visit-as-Beijing-mends-fences">wants</a> a summit with Trump before July’s G20 summit. Chinese officials and analysts also say Xi wants to keep Sino-U.S. relations on a relatively even keel through this fall’s 19th Party Congress. The Congress will approve Xi’s second term as China’s top leader. Xi wants to be seen as a steady steward of Chinese interests in a global order still significantly influenced by Washington. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, China may not mind if Trump renegotiates America’s economic relationships in Asia – especially to the extent this happens at the expense of U.S. allies. But if Trump keeps building what China sees as a more robust and ultimately offensive regional military posture, Beijing will respond. </p>
<p>China will leverage its own economic and political ties to U.S. allies in Asia to constrain and undermine Trump’s strategy. Recently impeached South Korean President Park Geun-hye will probably be replaced by a progressive figure espousing engagement with Pyongyang and more multilateral regional security approaches. This could position Beijing to contain and ultimately reverse U.S. THAAD deployments. </p>
<p>Overall, Trump’s Asia strategy is unlikely to boost Sino-U.S. cooperation on regional security. Instead, it will almost certainly intensify Sino-U.S. security competition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74494/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Flynt L. Leverett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tensions in Asia may soon boil over. If U.S. leaders fail to seek pathways to peace, the consequences may be grim, warns former National Security Council member.Flynt L. Leverett, Professor of International Affairs and Asian Studies, Penn StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/704312017-02-13T07:57:42Z2017-02-13T07:57:42ZForget sanctions, reining in North Korea will need a whole new approach<p><em>North Korea’s increased nuclear sabre-rattling has the world on edge. With South Korea’s opposition party pushing for potential dialogue <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-south-korean-president-parks-political-demise-means-for-the-regions-geopolitics-74980">with the country’s authoritarian northern neighbour</a>, TC Global is resurfacing this relevant analysis, originally published in February 2017, of how to better deal with the country’s nuclear threat.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>North Korea has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-12/north-korea-fires-test-missile-in-challenge-to-donald-trump/8263560?WT.mc_id=newsmail&WT.tsrc=Newsmail">launched its first ballistic missile</a> since the start of Donald’s Trump’s presidency, just as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the US to shore up support for the alliance between the two countries. The move led to a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fa95ce76-f146-11e6-8758-6876151821a6">joint statement by the US and Japanese heads of state</a> condemning the missile test. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_In_detail.htm?No=125062&id=In">US has reportedly been reviewing</a> its policy on North Korea, and in his inaugural visit to East Asia earlier in February, US Defence Secretary James Mattis reassured allies that use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a220e68e-e900-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539">lead to an “overwhelming” response</a> from the US.</p>
<p>Clearly, all that has not deterred Pyongyang. The question now is what can be done in light of lessons from previous attempts to rein in the isolated state. </p>
<h2>How we got into this mess</h2>
<p>The UN Security Council <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-01/un-imposes-new-sanctions-on-north-korea/8081704">imposed new sanctions against North Korea</a> in late November 2016, following repeated missile and nuclear tests. But such sanctions have had little effect due to their loose execution, mainly by China. </p>
<p>The November resolution attempted to address some of the obvious loopholes in previous sanctions. Most notable was an attempt to cut North Korea’s coal exports by about half. This was an approach the international community <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal">tried with Iran</a>, with the same aim of curbing its nuclear ambitions. </p>
<p>Despite its lack of popularity in US domestic politics, the Iran deal is seen as a success case in diplomatic circles. At the very least, the international community was able to buy time before Iran became fully nuclear-armed. </p>
<p>North Korea’s situation is quite different. In the 20-plus years since the state’s nuclear ambitions became clear, very little progress has been made. North Korea is no longer attempting to create nuclear weapons – <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699">it has them</a>. </p>
<p>Experts have estimated that there could now be <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-north-korean-nuclear-threat-is-rising-1429745706">as many as 20 nuclear weapons in Pyongyang’s arsenal</a>. North Korea performed its <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699">fifth nuclear test in September 2016</a>, suggesting operational sophistication. </p>
<p>North Korea has also launched numerous missile tests to demonstrate that it can deliver a nuclear warhead as far as Hawaii or perhaps even the US mainland. The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-trump.html?emc=edit_ae_20170212&nl=todaysheadlines-asia&nlid=64524812&_r=0">intermediate-range ballistic missile launched on February 11</a> from near North Korea’s northwestern border with China flew <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38947451?ocid=global_bbccom_email_12022017_top+news+stories">almost 500km before falling into the sea</a>.</p>
<p>It seems that sanctions against North Korea have not worked. And all the while, the country’s impoverished people live under one of the most cruel dictators in the world. </p>
<h2>A series of compromises</h2>
<p>Fundamentally, the failed attempts to rein in Pyongyang boils to down to the inaction and compromise between the US and China. When President George W Bush made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000004021075/the-axis-of-evil-speech.html">his “axis of evil” speech in 2002</a>, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea looked as if they were more or less on the same stage in terms of the nuclear threat to the US and its allies. </p>
<p>The US went to war against Iraq, and made a epic diplomatic deal with Iran. The contrast is overwhelming compared to lack of focus and resolve when it comes to North Korea. </p>
<p>For China, North Korea is a troublesome neighbour. As China’s economy grows in size and sophistication, it has little to gain from relations with Pyongyang. But playing the “North Korea card” has something of strategic value to China. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-north-korea-nuclear-test-china-a7234811.html">idea that only China can control North Korea</a>, which is perhaps true, is very convenient for the former. China shares some of the US and broader international community’s about concern North Korea, but it never goes too far to try to make Pyongyang do the right thing.</p>
<p>China clearly sees benefit from the status quo. Until the North’s nuclear threat disappears, South Korea has to ask China to control North Korea. China, while it never works very hard on containing North Korea, strongly opposes the deployment of the US anti-missile system known as <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-china-idUSKBN15I0QC">THAAD in South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>And it <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-idUSKCN11M1H4">rightfully fears the sudden collapse of North Korea</a>, which will mean <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/what-happens-if-north-korea-collapses/">millions of refugees storming the border</a> shared by the two countries. The notion of a unified Korean peninsula that has military ties with the US is also something Beijing would do anything to avoid. </p>
<h2>Drastic moves needed</h2>
<p>Whether the latest missile test will garner a stronger response than the condemnation already meted out remains to be seen, but there are serious implications for failure to act and indecision regarding North Korea. </p>
<p>Put simply, the region faces the accumulation of security risk beyond justification. A nuclear-armed North Korea is now pressured into a corner, without any diplomatic conversation. This risk is not felt by the two most influential players in the region – the US and China – since they are the cause of this situation. But it is felt by the middle power nations of the region: Japan and South Korea. </p>
<p>This is not to say that Japan and South Korea must not carry some of the blame for the current situation. South Korea, in the mid 1990s <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/what-comes-after-kim-dae_b_264902.html">clearly underestimated the risk to come</a> from inaction, and lobbied against surgical strikes.</p>
<p>And Japan has used its pacifist constitution as an excuse to not even administer effective sanctions. The Japanese left strongly opposed the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/28/world/tokyo-lawmakers-pass-bill-to-improve-military-ties-with-us.html">National Emergency Legislation</a>, which was intended to logistically support US military operation on the Korean peninsula. </p>
<p>Both of these countries put up with US indecision, because they did not have a choice under the alliance, which is not a equal relationship. They also lacked the capability and political will to take action themselves.</p>
<p>What then can work to stop North Korea?</p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>Clearly both hawkish and dovish moves are necessary. On the hawkish side, a military buildup beyond what the US currently offers the region will probably become necessary. The ability to strike North Korean nuclear facilities and missile sites, upgraded intelligence, and perhaps even a nuclear deterrent of Japan and South Korea’s own may become necessary. </p>
<p>Developing nuclear capabilities has <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/yes-japan-could-build-nuclear-weapons-what-cost-18019">long been a taboo both in Japan and South Korea</a>, but it is steadily gathering acceptance and momentum.</p>
<p>These capabilities will be necessary to serve as deterrents on their own right. But, more importantly, they may draw out meaningful action from the US. </p>
<p>Before his election, Trump criticised the US’ Northeast Asian allies <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-28/those-free-rider-allies-are-paying-up">as “free riders”</a>. The introduction of more hawkish policies towards North Korea from Seoul and Tokyo may regain the confidence of the US and its public. </p>
<p>On the other side, what Pyongyang wants is assurance of its regime’s survival. In diplomatic terms, this may mean officially recognising the state. Negotiations to open diplomatic ties will probably have to include some kind of economic assistance as well. This will be critical for North Korea to start developing meaningful industry that it can use to earn foreign currency. </p>
<p>The international community, and especially East Asian nations, have suffered from the indecision about North Korea and its arms programmes. It’s time to move past false promises and programs. What’s needed now are not new sanctions but a whole new approach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/70431/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lully Miura receives funding from Ministry Of Foreign Affairs of Japan as a project member of Security Studies Unit at Policy Alternatives Research Institute, the University of Tokyo .</span></em></p>Sanctions and warnings have failed to stop Pyongyang’s belligerence.Lully Miura, Lecturer at Policy Alternatives Research Institute, University of TokyoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.