tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/royal-australian-navy-1088/articlesRoyal Australian Navy – The Conversation2024-02-21T03:28:42Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239802024-02-21T03:28:42Z2024-02-21T03:28:42ZAustralia wants navy boats with lots of weapons, but no crew. Will they run afoul of international law?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576937/original/file-20240221-20-kj0w1z.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1043%2C4151%2C2414&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2003326795/">Pierson Hawkins / US Navy</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Australian Navy is set to be transformed. On top of existing plans for nuclear submarines, the government yesterday announced a scheme for an “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/independent-analysis-navy-surface-combatant-fleet">enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet</a>” including six new “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/20/australian-navy-warship-surface-combatant-fleet-double-hunter-class-losv">optionally crewed</a>” vessels.</p>
<p>The advantages of these vessels, which can operate with or without a crew, are clear. They can operate for longer, with more stealth, and allow military personnel to avoid hostile environments. </p>
<p>Simple remote-controlled craft have been used since at least the 1920s, but increasingly sophisticated uncrewed vessels are becoming more common. Ukraine has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-how-uncrewed-boats-are-changing-the-way-wars-are-fought-at-sea-201606">used small uncrewed boats</a> against Russian targets in the Black Sea, the United States plans to <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/01/30/pentagon-puts-out-call-for-swarming-attack-drones-that-could-blunt-a-taiwan-invasion">build a swarm of sea drones</a> to protect Taiwan, and China is <a href="https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/december/13868-edex-2023-china-s-csic-promotes-jari-usv-a-in-egypt.html">developing its own devices</a>.</p>
<p>However, it is so far unclear how these vessels fit within existing international law. Unless their legal status becomes more clear, it may increase the risk of conflict with potentially serious consequences. </p>
<h2>What’s the problem with uncrewed vehicles?</h2>
<p>The key international treaty regulating the ocean – the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> – was negotiated in the 1970s and early 1980s, well before uncrewed vessels of the kind we see today were a realistic concern.</p>
<p>The convention balances the rights of coastal states with those of maritime powers by dividing the ocean into different zones, with different rules about what states can do in each zone. It’s a <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm">complicated system</a>, but in general, states have more control over the use of the ocean closer to their own coasts.</p>
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<p>Under the convention, foreign ships and vessels in waters close to the coasts of other states have certain navigational rights. These rights establish where ships can go in the ocean and what they can do when they are there. </p>
<p>Naval vessels also rely on these navigational rights to operate. In particular, where crucial sea lanes are very close to the coast – such as in the Malacca Strait between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia – ships or other vessels without navigational rights may not have a firm legal footing for passing through. </p>
<p>And in a crisis, it may not be feasible to avoid such waters by finding another route. If states had different views about what actions were permissible, it would increase the risk of conflict.</p>
<h2>What counts as a ‘ship’?</h2>
<p>So what does all this have to do with Australia’s “optionally crewed systems”? </p>
<p>The first problem is that the convention on the law of the sea gives navigational rights to “ships” and “vessels” without defining what they mean. There is an <a href="https://law.uq.edu.au/article/2020/10/international-law-and-uncrewed-maritime-vehicles">ongoing debate</a> about whether these categories include uncrewed devices, or whether having people on board is required to qualify for navigational rights. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A photo of a speedboat powering through the water with nobody aboard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576940/original/file-20240221-22-ye774b.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Vessels without a human crew can legally be ‘ships’, but whether they can be ‘warships’ is less clear.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://images.defence.gov.au/20220524ran8098978_273.jpg">Justin Brown / Commonwealth of Australia / Department of Defence</a></span>
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<p>In <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/3910649/06McKenzie-unpaginated.pdf">my view</a>, the more convincing argument is that uncrewed vessels like the ones Australia plans to purchase should count as ships and vessels. </p>
<p>The convention is designed to be the “constitution of the ocean”, with a very broad scope. This suggests we should also take a broad idea of what counts as a ship or vessel.</p>
<h2>What counts as a ‘warship’?</h2>
<p>However, uncrewed devices may face a more significant problem: can they be “warships”? This is a special legal category for vessels with the right to engage in belligerent activities – that is, engage in warfare and naval blockades. </p>
<p>Again, it is the lack of people on board that may cause issues. Unlike “ship” and “vessel”, the term “warship” is explicitly defined in the convention. </p>
<p>According to Article 29 of the convention, warships must be, among other things, under the command of a commissioned officer and manned by a crew under armed forces discipline. A plain reading of these requirements suggests that a vessel without people on board cannot be a warship and must stay out of conflict.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-has-unveiled-its-navy-of-the-future-will-it-solve-our-current-problems-or-just-create-new-ones-223846">The government has unveiled its Navy of the future. Will it solve our current problems – or just create new ones?</a>
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<p>However, the <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol99/iss1/27/">reason “warship” is defined this way</a> goes back to the 19th century, when states wanted to distinguish their own “warships” from the vessels of privateers. This is why the definition refers to the vessel being under command and with a crew that is part of the armed forces.</p>
<p>The point of the definition is to ensure the warship is controlled by a state. We should understand it as part of the effort by states to keep control of legally authorised violence, not an attempt to restrict certain rights to vessels with crews.</p>
<h2>The future of uncrewed vessels and the law</h2>
<p>How will this legal dilemma be resolved? The neatest solution – a revision to the convention to clarify the situation – is unlikely, because the political prospects of getting all 169 signatory states to agree to such a change are remote.</p>
<p>The stakes are high. The use of uncrewed vessels may plausibly lead to increased risk taking by states. It is easier to imagine the US sending a fleet of uncrewed vessels in a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/06/freedom-of-navigation-operation-china-us-maritime-law/">freedom of navigation operation</a> close to the Chinese coast than risking a crewed fleet. </p>
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<p>What can states do to reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict?</p>
<p>States like Australia that plan to adopt this technology should look to develop international law in other ways. They can do this by putting their views about what uncrewed vessels are permitted to do on the record. </p>
<p>In doing so, they will contribute to the development of customary international law. Making Australia’s position on these devices more transparent will help create a legal regime that can cope with technological change.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon McKenzie has received funding from the Australian Government’s Next Generation Technologies Fund through Trusted Autonomous Systems, a Defence Cooperative Research Centre. </span></em></p>The law of the sea says warships must have a crew. What does that mean for naval drones?Simon McKenzie, Lecturer in Law, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238462024-02-20T04:11:34Z2024-02-20T04:11:34ZThe government has unveiled its Navy of the future. Will it solve our current problems – or just create new ones?<p>Australia’s naval surface combatant fleet is in trouble. The eight <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/ffh">Anzac frigates</a> are <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/auditors-warn-the-navy-s-frigates-are-wearing-out-20190319-p515co">worn out</a> after three decades of Middle Eastern adventures and <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/workforce-crisis-threatens-to-put-two-more-anzac-frigates-out-of-service/news-story/adc8e4a1442831dd17e235389484c415">hard to crew</a>. The Anzac’s replacements, the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/12/21/australias-anti-submarine-frigate-program-sails-rough-seas/">much-criticised</a> <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/future/ffg">Hunter Class frigates</a>, are late – the first will not enter service until <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/department-defences-procurement-hunter-class-frigates">2032 or so</a>. </p>
<p>The project’s cost has also stunningly risen from <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-18/short-history-of-major-naval-shipbuilding-programs-in-australia/103477194">A$35 billion in 2018</a> to $45 billion a couple of years ago to now <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-19/naval-fleet-review-funding-hole-hunter-frigates/103486288">$65 billion</a>, even before actual ship construction starts. </p>
<p>Adding to the problems, the Navy now dislikes its 12 new <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-09/offshore-patrol-vessels-program-delay-costs-mount/101517060">offshore patrol vessels (OPVs)</a> currently being built; this seemingly simple project is also late, costly (<a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/major-projects-report/2022-23-major-projects-report">$3.7 billion</a> overall) and a “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-10-20/offshore-patrol-vessels-listed-project-concern">project of concern</a>”. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Navy’s three brand new Hobart Class destroyers surprisingly need <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/planning-well-advanced-for-air-warfare-destroyer-upgrade/news-story/656634c31b7a83b3caf56cf211d9577f">major, costly upgrades</a> that will take two to three years each. With luck, all three will be back in service by 2032. </p>
<p>These numbers are important as the Navy needs three ships in service to reliably maintain one ship deployed on distant operations for an extended period. Across most of the next decade, our current naval surface warship fleet will be able to dependably deploy only two, maybe three, warships simultaneously for extended periods. This is high-input cost for low-output usage.</p>
<h2>A consultant-driven solution</h2>
<p>That’s the problem. A review undertaken by <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-pays-former-us-defence-chiefs-7000-a-day-for-advice-20230427-p5d3lh.html">highly paid</a>, external consultants, led by a retired US Navy admiral, has now provided the solution. </p>
<p>The review <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/independent-analysis-navy-surface-combatant-fleet">released today</a> recommends keeping the three Hobart Class destroyers and six of the aged ANZAC frigates, building only six Hunter Class frigates and stopping the OPV program immediately at six ships. </p>
<p>The big surprise was the recommendation the Navy acquire at least seven – and “optimally” 11 – new general purpose frigates and six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs). The government agreed with both recommendations.</p>
<p>The new frigates will be a similar size to the Anzacs and effectively a half-size Hunter. Called “Tier 2” ships, they will be designed for anti-submarine warfare and used to secure seaborne trade routes, Australia’s northern maritime approaches and to escort the Navy’s amphibious ships. </p>
<p>They will have an air and missile defence capability and carry several anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Notably, the first three frigates will be built overseas – this will likely draw criticism. </p>
<p>The LOSVs will increase the Navy’s long-range strike capacity and appear to be similar to the US Navy’s planned large uncrewed surface vessels, which will enter service late this decade. </p>
<p>These vessels will mostly operate without a crew, though they may have a small crew embarked for short periods, such as when entering and leaving port or refuelling at sea. The LOSVs are expected to be lower-cost, long-endurance vessels able to carry anti-ship and land-attack missiles.</p>
<p>The review glosses over the serious inability of crewing the current 11-ship surface warship Navy, let alone a 26-vessel one. The Navy is already <a href="https://www.aap.com.au/news/defence-force-understaffed-by-thousands-in-tight-market/">about 900 people</a> short, equivalent to more than three Anzac ship crews, as it <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/slim-pickings-for-navy-as-it-struggles-to-recruit-20240105-p5evdx">struggles to meet its recruitment goals</a>. </p>
<p>The Department of Defence, however, <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2023/June/ADF-Retention">considers the problem</a> more one of retention than recruitment and is taking steps to slow the personnel loss rate, but it has much ground to make up before it can grow into a much larger force. </p>
<p>The review merely recognised the challenge and simply hoped for the best.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-much-anticipated-defence-review-is-here-so-what-does-it-say-and-what-does-it-mean-for-australia-204267">The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?</a>
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<h2>Implications of the review</h2>
<p>First, the good news. Much of the money for the new ships will be spent in Australia – not just on sheet metal hull construction, but also on electronics. </p>
<p>For example, the future of the world-leading <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-04-27/albanese-government-secure-leading-edge-defence-capability">radar technology company</a> recently purchased by the federal government, appears secure. </p>
<p>There are definite benefits in both creating a more skilled <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-02/ELSCF_Factsheets_Sovereign_Workforce.pdf">Australian workforce</a> and sustaining a sovereign, Australian naval shipbuilding industry. Critics will <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-16/naval-ship-building-in-australia-more-expensive-than-overseas/6395972">correctly argue</a> it’s more expensive than buying from overseas, but given tax claw-backs, maybe not that much. </p>
<p>Even so, the cost-benefit analysis will be hard to calculate – the decision over whether it’s good value for money needs to be a judgement call, not an analysis based on mathematics.</p>
<p>Second, the Albanese government came to office calling for much better “<a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/impactful-projection-long-range-strike-options-australia">impactful projection</a>” – that is, the ability to apply strategically meaningful military power at great distance from Australia’s shores using missiles. </p>
<p>The new frigates, however, will only carry some additional missiles – not many. As such, the government seems to have changed its earlier intentions and will instead focus more on the submarine threat to Australia’s trade routes. </p>
<p>The only nod to “impactful projection” in the review today is the building of six new LOSVs, each of which will be able to carry 32 missiles to sea. (One LOSV working with a Hobart Class frigate, however, will have around 88 missiles.) </p>
<p>Critics <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/rearming-the-royal-australian-navy/">will point to</a> the fact this is fewer than a single US Navy Arleigh Burke destroyer, which carries 96 missiles, and its larger Chinese counterpart, which carries 128. </p>
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<p>Third, the review does not call for renewing the Navy’s ageing Anzac flotilla quickly enough. Warship shortages will persist well into the next decade. This is bad news for the short term.</p>
<p>And lastly, the Navy will now have three major ship and submarine projects underway. The new plan to acquire an additional flotilla of frigates will take considerable time, soak up the country’s scarce ship-building workforce and be remarkably costly. </p>
<p>This will adversely impact the Navy operationally and the rest of the Department of Defence, Army and Air Force. As a result, we can likely expect cuts to the Army in the forthcoming budget. </p>
<p>Overall, the review is good for jobs in Adelaide and Perth and will make the Navy significantly larger over the long term. It will also partly placate some government critics who want to buy ships overseas, arguing this will mean faster delivery, and those <a href="https://www.andrewhastie.com.au/statement_marles_war_defence">who believe</a> the government needs “new money” added to currently planned defence budgets. </p>
<p>But the true cost impacts of the reform plan must await the budget. The plan will also take a long time to implement and has ignored the Navy’s chronic shortage of skilled personnel, which is surely most unwise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223846/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Layton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Royal Australian Navy is in a mess – money has been spent on buying warships that are not making the grade. A new review aims to turn that around.Peter Layton, Visiting Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179132023-12-20T19:06:44Z2023-12-20T19:06:44ZAustralia can no longer afford to ignore Russia’s expanding naval power in the Pacific<p>China’s expanding naval presence in the Pacific Ocean and the South and East China seas has become a major focus for Australia, the US and its allies. </p>
<p>Australia’s latest <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">strategic defence review</a>, for instance, was <a href="https://apnews.com/article/australia-defense-strategic-review-china-be313bcbd58e6793a8c85b79682c0e34">prompted</a>, in part, by the rapid modernisation of China’s military, as well as its increasing naval presence in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>According to the US Department of Defence’s most recent <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">annual report</a> to Congress, China’s navy has been strengthened with the addition of 30 new warships over the past 12 months. By 2030, the total number of ships is expected to increase to 435, up from the current 370.</p>
<p>But China is not the only potentially adversarial maritime power that is flexing its muscles in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia is becoming a cause for concern, too, even though the 2023 strategic review did not mention it. </p>
<p>My latest research project, <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/battle-reading-russian-pacific-fleet-2023-2030">Battle Reading the Russian Pacific Fleet 2023–2030</a>, recently commissioned and published by the Royal Australian Navy, shows how deeply the Russian military is investing in replenishing its ageing, Soviet-era Pacific Fleet. </p>
<p>Between 2022 and October 2023, for instance, it commissioned eight new warships and auxiliaries, including four nuclear-powered and conventional submarines. On December 11, two new nuclear-powered submarines formally <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/putin-commissions-two-nuclear-submarines-152432900.html">joined the fleet</a>, in addition to the conventional RFS Mozhaisk submarine, which <a href="https://tass.com/defense/1712845">entered service</a> last month. </p>
<p>These figures may not look as impressive as the new Chinese vessels mentioned above, but it’s important to recognise that the Russian Navy has the unique challenge of simultaneously addressing the needs of four fleets (in the Arctic and Pacific oceans and Black and Baltic seas), plus its Caspian Sea flotilla. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Russia’s war in Ukraine has not had a considerable impact on the Pacific Fleet’s ongoing modernisation or its various exercises and other activities. Between early 2022 and October 2023, for instance, the Pacific Fleet staged eight strategic-level naval exercises, in addition to numerous smaller-scale activities.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-the-asia-pacific-and-australia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390">Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia needs to take it seriously</a>
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<h2>Rebuilding its powerful navy, partnering with China</h2>
<p>In addition to rebuilding its once-powerful navy, the Russians are committing enormous resources to building up naval ties in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening their key maritime coalitions. </p>
<p>In recent months, for instance, a naval task group of the Pacific Fleet embarked on a tour across southeast and south Asia. This tour made international headlines, but was effectively overlooked by the Australian media.</p>
<p>The Russian warships <a href="https://seawaves.com/indonesian-navy-welcomes-russian-ships-in-surabaya/">spent four days</a> in Indonesia, then staged their first-ever joint naval exercises <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/7/russia-and-myanmar-start-first-maritime-exercises#:%7E:text=The%20first%20Myanmar%2DRussia%20Maritime,from%20November%207%20to%209.">with Myanmar</a> and another exercise <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/11/21/russia-holds-naval-drills-with-india-in-bay-of-bengal-a83170#:%7E:text=Russia%20said%20Tuesday%20it%20was,despite%20Moscow's%20offensive%20in%20Ukraine.">later with India</a>. The ships then <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/russia-warship-asia-bangladesh-myanmar-drills-1843130">visited Bangladesh</a> for the first time in 50 years, followed by stops in Thailand, <a href="https://www.khmertimeskh.com/501398184/russias-admiral-panteleyev-makes-first-sihanoukville-port-call-since-pandemic/">Cambodia</a>, <a href="https://vietnamnet.vn/en/two-russian-warships-dock-at-cam-ranh-port-for-vietnam-visit-2222176.html">Vietnam</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/RusEmbManila/status/1734173657466044544">Philippines</a>.</p>
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<p>The tour signals a widening of Russia’s scope in the region, though its most important naval partner remains China.</p>
<p>According to my findings, between 2005 and October 2023, the Russian and Chinese navies have taken part in at least 19 confirmed bilateral and trilateral (also involving friendly regional navies) exercises and three joint patrols. The most recent was <a href="https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/russian-warships-return-after-patrolling-13000-km-of-pacific-ocean-with-chinese-ships/#:%7E:text=Russian%20Warships%20Return%20After%20Patrolling%2013%2C000%20Km%20Of%20Pacific%20Ocean%20With%20Chinese%20Ships,-ByMI%20News&text=Vessels%20from%20Russia's%20Navy%20returned,West%20Coast%20of%20the%20US.">carried out</a> in mid-2023, when the Russian and Chinese joint task force was deployed to the north Pacific, not far from the Alaskan coast.</p>
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<h2>Implications for Australia and its allies</h2>
<p>Canberra’s preoccupation with China should not make us blind to other potential adversaries that could threaten our national security in the medium to long term. </p>
<p>According to my estimates, by the time the Royal Australian Navy commissions its first Hunter class frigate and the first Virginia-class, nuclear-powered attack submarine <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/11/13/heres-when-the-us-navy-plans-to-sell-subs-to-australia-under-aukus/">begins operations</a> in 2032, the replenished Russian Pacific Fleet would have a battle force of at least 45 core warships. </p>
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<p>This is expected to include 19 nuclear-powered and conventional submarines, supported by minor combat and auxiliary elements. Most of these units would be newly designed and built. </p>
<p>This clearly shows that if war someday breaks out in the Pacific, the Russian Pacific Fleet could present a formidable challenge to Australian and allied naval fleets in the western and northwestern Pacific, as well as the Arctic. </p>
<p>Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered platforms from the United States and United Kingdom suggests our intent to support and engage in long-range maritime operations with our allies, possibly as far as the northern Pacific and Arctic oceans.</p>
<p>And in times of crisis short of open war, Russia will also have more assets to support operations around Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean, extending its reach closer to the Royal Australian Navy’s areas of immediate concern. </p>
<p>Finally, the deepening naval cooperation between China and Russia could become a risk factor in its own right as the two countries seek to counter the AUKUS security pact. This is especially true with the possibility of expanded joint naval operations in the Pacific.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-aukus-russia-sees-a-potential-threat-and-an-opportunity-to-market-its-own-submarines-168374">After AUKUS, Russia sees a potential threat — and an opportunity to market its own submarines</a>
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<p>Despite the tyranny of distance between Australia and Russia, we are no longer irrelevant in Moscow’s strategic planning. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu <a href="https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/global-affairs/russia-accuses-west-of-threatening-stability-in-asiapacific-region/video/d2b1233cde7ab2f2721061e5c573fe66">made this clear</a> in recent remarks blasting AUKUS as a threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region.</p>
<p>This means Australia’s navy and its maritime ambitions are increasingly being viewed as a risk factor to the Kremlin. </p>
<p>During the Cold War confrontation in the Asia-Pacific, the Soviet Union’s naval power in the region was a primary point of strategic concern for Australia, the US and its allies. This is once again proving to be true. Canberra can’t afford to ignore these developments any longer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexey D Muraviev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By the time Australia has its first nuclear-powered attack submarine, Russia’s Pacific fleet will have grown to 45 warships.Alexey D Muraviev, Associate Professor of National Security and Strategic Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1194592019-07-02T01:25:10Z2019-07-02T01:25:10ZWith China’s swift rise as naval power, Australia needs to rethink how it defends itself<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282129/original/file-20190702-105200-1nxsxzj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">China has always had a formidable army, but only since 1996 has it begun to develop as a maritime power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wu Hong/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>As China grows more powerful and influential, our New Superpower series looks at what this means for the world – how China maintains its power, how it wields its power and how its power might be threatened. Read the rest of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/the-new-superpower-73080">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>Visiting Wellington in April 1996, I fell into conversation with a very wise and experienced New Zealand government official. We talked about the still-unfolding <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/06/21/us-and-china-nearly-came-to-blows-in-96/926d105f-1fd8-404c-9995-90984f86a613/?utm_term=.db42babd4680">Taiwan Straits crisis</a>, during which Washington had deployed a formidable array of naval power, including two aircraft carrier battle groups, to the waters around Taiwan. The aim was to compel China to abandon a series of missile firings near Taiwan intended to intimidate voters in forthcoming presidential elections.</p>
<p>In this, the Americans had clearly been successful, but my Kiwi friend was worried. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Success has consequences, and the consequences here are plain: the Chinese will now do whatever it takes to make sure the Americans can never do that to them again.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That remark sparked one of the trains of thought which led to the arguments in my new book, <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/how-defend-australia">How to Defend Australia</a>.</p>
<p>His remark has been proved right. China has always had a formidable army, but only since 1996 has it begun to develop as a maritime power, as well. In that time, it has made massive and, it seems, very effective investments in the air and naval forces required to fight at sea. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-naval-upgrade-may-not-be-enough-to-keep-pace-in-a-fast-changing-region-105044">Australia's naval upgrade may not be enough to keep pace in a fast-changing region</a>
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<p>Today, it is quite plainly the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html">world’s second maritime power</a>, behind only the United States. And it now threatens America’s maritime preponderance in the western Pacific, on which US strategic primacy in the region ultimately and absolutely depends.</p>
<p>This is a remarkable achievement in such a short time, with immense implications for the security of countries throughout the region, so it is important to be clear about how it has happened and what it means, including for our own defence. </p>
<p>This is especially important because China’s achievement has been largely misunderstood by traditional naval powers like America, Britain and Australia, whose approach to maritime strategy is markedly different from China’s.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282126/original/file-20190702-105176-1vfurb9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Was the visit last month by Chinese warship to Sydney Harbour a ‘reciprocal visit’, as Scott Morrison explained, or a show of force?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China’s ‘sea denial’ strategy</h2>
<p>When it comes to maritime strategy, traditional naval powers emphasise “<a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-australias-need-sea-control">sea control</a>” and power projection. This means their maritime forces are designed primarily to defend major platforms like aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, with which they aim to project power against distant adversaries. </p>
<p>China’s primary strategic aim has been the opposite. It has developed its naval forces to prevent adversaries – particularly the United States – from projecting power against China the way the Americans did in 1996. This is what naval strategists call “<a href="https://www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/china-shifts-pacific-waters-with-its-aircraft-carrier-trials-20110829-1jib4.html">sea denial</a>”, which boils down simply to the capacity to find and sink the other side’s ships. </p>
<p>In doing this, the Chinese have had three big advantages:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, they have been able to exploit inherent advantages of “sea denial” over “sea control”. Since the late 19th century, a whole range of systems, weapons and technologies - including radio, radar, aircraft, submarines, sea mines, torpedoes, guided missiles and space-based surveillance - have made it progressively easier to find and sink an adversary’s ships, and correspondingly harder to defend them.</p></li>
<li><p>Second, the Chinese were able to access an array of Soviet military technologies and develop them further as their own technological base expanded and deepened. </p></li>
<li><p>And third, they have had a lot of money to spend, without breaking the bank, thanks to their fast-growing economy.</p></li>
</ul>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-grip-on-power-is-absolute-but-there-are-new-threats-to-his-chinese-dream-118921">Xi Jinping's grip on power is absolute, but there are new threats to his 'Chinese dream'</a>
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<p>As a result, Beijing is now well-placed to prevent America doing again what it did in 1996. A US naval carrier approaching Taiwan today would be at serious risk of attack from China’s formidable ships, aircraft and submarines, as well as from its notorious, carrier-killer, land-based ballistic missiles. </p>
<p>So much so, in fact, that Washington would now be very unlikely to risk such an operation.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282127/original/file-20190702-105215-1p5bty9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s navy is now only second to the US in terms of strength.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Bianca De Marchi/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>America’s loss of military might</h2>
<p>This comes as a surprise to those who still believe that America’s military is unchallengeable. </p>
<p>Of course, it is still very powerful, with an unmatched capacity to deploy and sustain armed forces far from its own shores. But that doesn’t mean it can automatically defeat any adversary it faces, especially when that adversary enjoys the advantages of fighting on its home ground, as Russia would, for example, in a war over Ukraine or the Baltic states, or China would in east Asia. </p>
<p>And wiser heads in the US military establishment understand this all too well. The Pentagon’s recent <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/2002139210/-1/-1/1/DOD_INDO_PACIFIC_STRATEGY_REPORT_JUNE_2019.PDF">Indo-Pacific strategy report</a> concedes that China is “likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the onset of conflict” in east Asia.</p>
<p>In fact, that understates the problem. America has no credible military strategy to overcome China’s “early local advantages” to achieve the kind of swift, low-cost victory in a potential war at sea that everyone has taken for granted for so long.</p>
<p>The only serious attempt to develop such a strategy - the US military’s “<a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf">Air Sea Battle Concept</a>” - was abandoned soon after it was promulgated six years ago. The reality today is that America relies on the implicit threat of nuclear escalation, embodied in its refusal <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108002/-1/-1/1/DANGERS-OF-A-NO-FIRST-USE-POLICY.PDF">to rule out using nuclear weapons first</a>, to compel China to concede victory when US conventional forces cannot. </p>
<p>And how credible is that threat when China can retaliate against any nuclear attack with a nuclear counter-strike?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-strong-words-the-us-has-few-options-left-to-reverse-chinas-gains-in-the-south-china-sea-97089">Despite strong words, the US has few options left to reverse China's gains in the South China Sea</a>
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<p>This swift shift in Asia’s maritime strategic balance has profound implications for the region’s strategic future. It does not just undermine America’s ability to defend Taiwan from Chinese military pressure, it undermines the credibility of US security guarantees to all its allies in the western Pacific, including Australia. </p>
<p>And that, in turn, undermines the foundation of America’s strategic leadership in east Asia, and paves the way for China to take its place - just as China intends. </p>
<p>It is this major change in the regional military balance, along with China’s relative economic weight, which makes the rapid eclipse of the old US-led order in our region now so likely.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1047009969210576896"}"></div></p>
<h2>China’s new maritime challenge</h2>
<p>As this happens, however, China faces a new strategic challenge. Its cost-effective maritime denial strategy has been enough to undermine US regional primacy, but it will not be enough to take America’s place and establish dominance of its own in east Asia. </p>
<p>For that, it will need to be able to project its own military power across the vast expanse of the Asia-Pacific region. And that requires China to build its own carriers and amphibious forces – <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/">as it is now doing</a> – and expand its capabilities to defend them from future potential adversaries.</p>
<p>This poses a whole new problem for China because now the boot is on the other foot. China has been able to leverage the inherent advantages of “sea denial” over “sea control” to counter US power projection in the region, but future adversaries can do the same to thwart China’s own power projection. </p>
<p>And that has very important implications for Australia’s future defence strategies. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-china-us-tensions-on-the-rise-does-australia-need-a-new-defence-strategy-106515">With China-US tensions on the rise, does Australia need a new defence strategy?</a>
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</em>
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<p>The bad news is that we can no longer depend on America to ensure that a major power like China does not threaten us militarily in the decades ahead, or to defend us if one does. We must therefore explore – more seriously than we have ever done before – whether we can defend ourselves from a major Asian power.</p>
<p>It is a daunting task, but the good news, as I argue in my book, is that we can exploit the advantages of maritime denial over maritime control against China if it tries to project its power against us, or our close neighbours by sea. </p>
<p>By rigorously optimising our forces for a maritime denial strategy, we might be able to sustain an effective defence against a major power. That would come at a high price – <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-double-defence-spending-to-address-worsening-strategic-outlook/">much higher than we are paying for defence now</a> – but it is a price we could afford if we decided the risks we face in Asia in the future were high enough to justify it. </p>
<p>Are they? That’s the big defence debate we need to have now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119459/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hugh White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China’s naval strategy has been to prevent America from ever projecting its power by sea in the Asia-Pacific region again. Now that it’s worked, the region needs to take notice.Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1059842018-11-23T04:54:31Z2018-11-23T04:54:31ZBuilding our own warships is Australia’s path to the next industrial revolution<p>Naval defence procurement is very big business. <a href="https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/bae-systems-australia-signs-agreement-for-the-hunter-class-frigate-program">Nine Hunter-class frigates</a> will cost Australian taxpayers A$35 billion; the <a href="http://naval-group.com.au/what-we-do/sea-1000/">12 submarines</a> to replace the existing Collins-class subs at least A$50 billion. </p>
<p>Although both the frigates and submarines will be built by foreign companies – the frigates by Britain’s BAE, the subs by France’s Naval Group – part of the deal is that they build locally. </p>
<p>The federal government isn’t shy about spruiking the local economic benefits.
“We make no apologies for deciding to invest in Australian-built ships, creating Australian jobs and using Australian steel,” said Christopher Pyne, the then defence industry minster and now the defence minister, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-15/governments-89b-shipbuilding-project-at-high-risk-of-blowout/9762992">in May</a>.</p>
<p>There are critics. The Australian National Audit Office, for instance, has flagged the <a href="https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/naval-construction-programs-mobilisation">risks</a> of <a href="https://www.afr.com/news/extreme-risk-in-89b-navy-ship-building-plan-auditorgeneral-20180514-h101m0">cost blowouts</a> in a local build. These risks will need to be proactively managed. </p>
<p>But the local shipbuilding program does present a tremendous economic opportunity. It provides a platform to invigorate advanced manufacturing and ride the wave of the next industrial revolution. </p>
<p>We need to focus on how to maximise the benefits by leveraging the program to create competitive new industries and jobs.</p>
<h2>Mapping the manufacturing ecosystem</h2>
<p>Transitioning the Australian economy towards advanced manufacturing is not easy. It is tempting to simply import cheaper products. A good example can found in the renewable energy sector. With a few <a href="http://www.tindosolar.com.au/">exceptions</a>, the majority of solar panels and wind farm components are imported. This is a missed opportunity. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/on-windmills-and-warships-46071">On windmills and warships</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We can avoid making the same mistake in shipbuilding. Our research shows that building ships locally has huge flow-on effects, and can help underpin other advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>To facilitate this process, we have developed a <a href="https://thesis-5081.firebaseapp.com/#!/home">map of the advanced manufacturing ecosystem</a> in Australia. The aim is to help boost the visibility of Australian organisations capable of supplying components or services to these projects.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243202/original/file-20181031-76413-1tqz1if.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An emerging defence innovation ecosystem in Australia, with business, university, government and other key stakeholders.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This will assist in initiating partnerships. Several Australian <a href="https://www.redarc.com.au/defence">businesses</a> and <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/business/sa-business-journal/italian-frigates-contender-fincantieris-cash-to-float-flinders-boat/news-story/9cbcc55534361bf0c969ee84af715827">universities</a> have already begun to secure relationships with the international shipbuilders. More are in the pipeline. </p>
<h2>Industry opportunities</h2>
<p>Building ships presents many opportunities for Australian organisations. </p>
<p>In Australia, <a href="https://smallcaps.com.au/micro-x-uk-ministry-defence-airport-electronic-device-scanner/">X-ray and imaging products</a> are examples of complex products we have been able to competitively export. This technology is obviously relevant to medical imaging devices. It can also be applied to surveillance systems for the defence sector. </p>
<p>Conversely local manufacturers that develop capabilities in defence shipbuilding can leverage their expertise to supply to non-defence-related supply chains and for export.</p>
<p>Relevant technologies include <a href="https://indaily.com.au/news/business/2016/11/11/engineering-jobs-shape-sa-defence-future/">autonomous vehicles and systems</a>, <a href="https://www.rolls-royce.com/products-and-services/marine/about-marine/market-sectors/naval/gas-turbines.aspx">energy management</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/video/cyber-security">cyber-security</a>, <a href="https://shipbuildingknowledge.wordpress.com/category/metallurgy/">robust and maintainable materials</a>, <a href="https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/news/2017/01/23/tool-predict-acoustic-signatures-navy-vessels">acoustics</a> and <a href="https://www.naval-technology.com/features/digital-naval-shipyard/">digital technologies</a>. These technologies can have flow-on effects for advanced manufacturing in transport, renewables, health, space and information technology.</p>
<p>In these sectors, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-complexity-is-the-answer-to-pynes-innovation-problem-48730">complex</a> products is vital for competitiveness. </p>
<h2>Anchoring industry 4.0</h2>
<p>It is wrong to think advanced manufacturing is not viable in Australia. <a href="https://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/smmt_the-digitalisation-of-the-uk-auto-industry_kpmg-apr-2017.pdf">Britain</a> and <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Navigation/EN/Invest/industrie-4-0.html">Germany</a> are two economies with high labour costs, yet both have been able to sustain manufacturing sectors.</p>
<p>The success of advanced manufacturers in Europe is based on an approach called <a href="https://www.plattform-i40.de/I40/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publikation/acatech-i40-maturity-index.pdf?__blob=publicationFile">industry 4.0</a>. The “4” refers to the advent of the fourth industrial revolution since the 18th century – integrating information and communication technology in industrial production.</p>
<p>During a visit to European manufacturing sites we saw how this involved the use of <a href="https://defence.nridigital.com/global_defence_technology_feb18/inside_bae_systems_digital_naval_shipyard">robots</a>, <a href="https://www.assemblymag.com/articles/94445-bae-to-use-cobots-to-assemble-fighter-jets">cobots</a> (or collaborative robots), <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212827118302580">digital twins</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulMyFH1M5-4">driverless vehicles</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-the-next-industrial-revolution-spell-the-end-of-manufacturing-jobs-80779">Does the next industrial revolution spell the end of manufacturing jobs?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>Automation means that shipbuilding will not provide the sorts of jobs it did in the past. In Germany’s automotive industry, for example, human labour that cost <a href="https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Th-L6akYSZkJ:https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx%3FDocumentUid%3Dc06aa1a3-d355-4866-beda-9a3a8779ba6e+&cd=18&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au">40 euros an hour</a> has been replaced by robots that cost 5-8 euros an hour to operate – even cheaper than a Chinese worker. But other other jobs have been created, particularly in computing and engineering. There are now <a href="http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/GTAI/Industry-overviews/industry-overview-automotive-industry-en.pdf?v=15">100,000 more jobs</a> in Germany’s auto industry than <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/587576/number-employees-german-car-industry/">in 2010</a>.</p>
<p>Another feature of industry 4.0 is digitisation of the supply chain. Information about parts can be captured and used in new ways. When a component needs be serviced or replaced can now be predicted with high accuracy. This is important in any large ship, built to be operational for decades and using vast numbers of components from thousands of suppliers. It’s even more important in a naval ships, where a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/17/americas/argentina-missing-submarine-found-intl/index.html">breakdown</a> could be catastrophic. </p>
<p>Digital transformation will make our factories more competitive. Additionally, economic gains will come from defence procurement that encourages the local development of complex and competitive products. If done well, defence investment will make as powerful a contribution to the nation’s economic prosperity as its military security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Giselle Rampersad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia’s naval shipbuilding projects could anchor the future of advanced manufacturing in the national economy.Giselle Rampersad, Associate Professor in Innovation, Flinders UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/585882016-04-29T04:26:46Z2016-04-29T04:26:46ZWhat do we want from Australia’s new submarines?<p>The Australian government’s decision to spend A$50 billion to <a href="https://theconversation.com/french-company-dcns-wins-race-to-build-australias-next-submarine-fleet-experts-respond-58060">double its submarine fleet to 12</a> was based on a number of considerations about what the new submarines would be required to do.</p>
<p>In military parlance, the value of submarines can be discussed in terms of the missions they can carry out and the military effects they can create, such as:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Sea denial – the threat of attack by submarines can deny an adversary the use of a strategic area of the sea. An example is the exclusion zone that British submarines enforced around the Falklands Islands in the war with Argentina in 1982. </p></li>
<li><p>Maritime strike – the ability to attack and destroy enemy forces and capabilities.</p></li>
<li><p>Intelligence collection – which can take several forms, such as the gathering of technical information about the capabilities and operational practices of enemy forces, or information that indicates the current or future intentions of an adversary. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The missions</h2>
<p>Submarines carry out <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-does-australia-need-submarines-at-all-58575">various kinds of missions</a>, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Anti-surface warfare – attacking ships, either merchant shipping carrying supplies or naval ships. This has always been the primary role of most submarines. </p></li>
<li><p>Anti-submarine warfare – submarines can be employed to track and possibly attack other submarines, contributing to anti-submarine operations, which are likely to involve surface ships and maritime aircraft as well. Anti-submarine warfare demands a higher level of capability and proficiency than anti-surface warfare and not all submarines are capable of carrying out this role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Estimating the capability offered by submarines of a particular design is done through a combination of systems performance analysis and operations analysis.</p>
<p>Systems performance analysis models the submarine and its subsystems to estimate measures such as range, endurance, speed, stealth and sensor detection range. Operations analysis models what the submarine is can do to estimate its mission effectiveness.</p>
<p>The utility of submarines largely derives from stealth, uncertainty, persistent presence and firepower. In plain terms, a submarine can hang around, unseen, in places where other forces might not be able to go and inflict damage when required.</p>
<p>Sustained presence involves requirements for the endurance, the length of time that the presence of the submarine must be sustained, and the number of operational areas that need to be covered.</p>
<h2>The design</h2>
<p>There are a multitude of interconnected drivers in the design of a submarine. These drivers can be modelled starting with high-level requirements for sustained presence and the missions to be undertaken.</p>
<p>The drivers result in a design involving the synthesis and integration of many complex systems and subsystems. To provide a context for this, a Collins class submarine has about 500,000 parts to be assembled. This is about five times as many parts as a large commercial airliner and about three times as many as a frigate.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the important characteristics of submarines can be understood in terms of a few basic building blocks. These are the hull and the manoeuvring control systems, the propulsion system, power and energy, stealth, habitability and the combat system. </p>
<p>Generally the back half of a submarine is devoted to propulsion systems, which for a diesel-electric submarine means the diesel generators, the main electric motor and the electrical power conversion and control equipment.</p>
<p>The front half contains the control room where the sensor information is processed and the submarine is commanded, the crew’s living quarters and the weapon stowage. </p>
<p>Tanks containing fuel and fresh water are distributed around the submarine. The batteries are located along the bottom of the hull where they also act as ballast. </p>
<p>Diesel-electric submarines store electrical energy in a large set of batteries, which are recharged using a diesel generator. While fully submerged, traditional diesel-electric submarines use a battery-powered electric motor to turn the propeller.</p>
<p>Because there are few moving parts with electric drive, a diesel-electric submarine can be extremely quiet when running on batteries. </p>
<h2>Submerged</h2>
<p>The length of time a diesel-electric submarine can stay fully submerged is limited by the amount of energy that can be stored in the battery. The submerged endurance of a diesel-electric submarine while running on its battery depends on its speed for two reasons.</p>
<p>First, the hydrodynamic resistance to moving through water increases steeply as speed increases.</p>
<p>Second, the total amount of energy that can be extracted from a lead-acid battery reduces the faster it is discharged. This means that while a submarine might be able to stay submerged for a few days if it travels slowly, it could exhaust its battery in an hour or two travelling at maximum speed.</p>
<p>Understanding the power requirements of submarines and their interplay with stealth is a key determinant in the design of a submarine. There are two major components that affect the need for power.</p>
<p>One is the power required for propulsion, mentioned above. There is also the power required for the crew (including atmosphere control, victuals and garbage management), for data processing associated with the sensor and combat systems, the platform subsystems and delivery of weapons and countermeasures.</p>
<p>This second component is virtually independent of speed and is sometimes called the “hotel load”. </p>
<h2>Silent running</h2>
<p>The ability of a submarine to operate successfully hinges on its stealth. Stealth underpins survivability and mission success in high-threat environments.</p>
<p>Once a submarine is detected, its mission may be compromised and it is liable to be tracked and destroyed. The ability to remain underwater is paramount to submarine stealth and survivability.</p>
<p>The primary way to detect a submerged submarine is sonar (detection of underwater sound), leading to an ongoing endeavour to make submarines increasingly quieter and harder to detect. </p>
<p>There are two types of anti-submarine sonars: active and passive.</p>
<p>Passive sonar detects the noise radiated by the submarine. This is the most likely way a submerged submarine will be initially detected. The greatest attention must be given during design, and also in maintenance, to eliminating or controlling sources of noise on the submarine. </p>
<p>Active sonar transmits a pulse of sound and detects echoes from the submarine. This transmission can be intercepted by the submarine on its own sonar system, which alerts it to the presence of the threat. This gives it some information about the type, location and movement of the threat.</p>
<p>A submarine can generally detect active sonar at a greater range than the threat sonar can detect the submarine. This is because the sound only has to travel one way to get to the submarine, but has to be reflected and travel back to the threat sonar, losing more signal strength in the two-way round trip.</p>
<p>The control of noise includes addressing sources internal to the submarine as well as the noise generated by the flow of water over the hull and propeller. </p>
<h2>Why 12 submarines?</h2>
<p>A key measure of submarine capability is the level of presence that the fleet as a whole can sustain in operational areas. The level of presence depends on the availability of submarines for operations.</p>
<p>Every submarine goes through a cycle of availability and periods of maintenance. Once or twice during the life of a submarine it will be docked for a deep maintenance period lasting a year or more.</p>
<p>During deep maintenance, the pressure hull may be opened to allow access to major machinery to be repaired or upgraded. Major capability upgrades requiring new masts or sonar arrays may be carried out during deep maintenance. </p>
<p>In addition to the deep maintenance periods, there may be mid-cycle docking for extended, but lesser, maintenance lasting several months.</p>
<p>When a submarine emerges from a major maintenance period, it needs to spend some time working up at sea. During this time, its systems are tested and the crew complete drills and training before deploying on operations.</p>
<p>It is an inescapable fact that for any submarine fleet about half of the boats will be unavailable for operations at any time. The smaller the fleet, the more susceptible it is to fluctuations in availability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58588/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janis Cocking works for the Department of Defence </span></em></p>Australia’s new submarine fleet will be designed for a range of different missions in our challenging maritime environment.Janis Cocking, Chief of Science Strategy and Program Division, Defence Science and Technology OrganisationLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/573532016-04-10T20:01:42Z2016-04-10T20:01:42ZCould robot submarines replace the ageing Collins class?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117917/original/image-20160408-23932-9e1988.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Crewed submarines like the HMAS Rankin might become a thing of the past.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">United States Navy, Photographer's Mate 1st Class David A. Levy</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The decision to replace <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/submarines/ssg">Australia’s submarines</a> has been <a href="https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/august/1406815200/claire-corbett/australia%E2%80%99s-60-billion-submarine-dilemma">stalled for too long</a> by politicians afraid of the <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence/tick-for-collinsclass-submarines-lifts-budget-pressure/story-e6frg8yo-1226875214527">bad media about “dud subs”</a> the <a href="http://www.asc.com.au/en/Programs/Submarines/Collins-Class-Fleet/">Collins class</a> got last century. </p>
<p>Collins class subs deserved criticism in the 1990s. They did not meet Royal Australian Navy (RAN) specifications. But in this century, after much effort, they came good. Though they are <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-deep-water-where-now-for-the-collins-class-submarines-4702">expensive</a>, Collins class boats have “sunk” US Navy <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/10/12/1034222635806.html?oneclick=true">attack submarines</a>, <a href="http://aso.gov.au/titles/documentaries/submariners/clip2/">destroyers</a> and <a href="http://nation.time.com/2012/12/04/more-than-the-navys-numbers-could-be-sinking/">aircraft carriers</a> in exercises. </p>
<p>Now that the Collins class is up for replacement, we have an opportunity to reevaluate our requirements and see what technology might meet them. And just as drones are replacing crewed aircraft in many roles, some military thinkers assume the future of naval war will be increasingly autonomous. </p>
<p>The advantages of autonomy in submarines are similar to those of autonomy in aircraft. Taking the pilot out of the plane means you don’t have to provide oxygen, worry about g-forces or provide bathrooms and meals for long trips. </p>
<p>Taking 40 sailors and 20 torpedoes out of a submarine will do wonders for its range and stealth. Autonomous submarines could be a far cheaper option to meet the RAN’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements than crewed submarines. </p>
<p>Submarines do more than sink ships. Naval war is rare but ISR never stops. Before sinking the enemy you must find them and know what they look like. ISR was the original role of drones and remains their primary role today.</p>
<p>Last month, Boeing <a href="http://www.gizmag.com/boeing-echo-voyager/42272/">unveiled a prototype autonomous submarine</a> with long range and high endurance. It has a modular design and could perhaps be adapted to meet RAN ISR requirements. </p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Boeing is developing a long range autonomous submarine that could have military applications.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thus, rather than buy 12 crewed submarines to replace the Collins class, perhaps the project could be split into meeting the ISR requirement with autonomous submarines that can interoperate with a smaller number of crewed submarines that sink the enemy. </p>
<p>Future submarines might even be “carriers” for autonomous and semi-autonomous UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and UUVs (unmanned undersea vehicles). </p>
<h2>Keeping people on deck</h2>
<p>However, while there may be a role for autonomous submarines in the future of naval warfare, there are some significant limitations to what they can achieve today and in the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Most of today’s autonomous submarines have short ranges and are designed for very specific missions, such as mine sweeping. They are not designed to sail from Perth to Singapore or Hong Kong, sneak up on enemy ships and submarines and sink them with torpedoes.</p>
<p>Also, while drone aircraft can be controlled from a remote location, telepiloting is not an option for a long range sub at depth. </p>
<p>The very low frequency radio transceivers in Western Australia used by the Pentagon to signal “boomers” (nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines) in the Indian Ocean have very low transmission rates: only a few hundred bytes per second. </p>
<p>You cannot telepilot a submarine lying below a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-find-a-submarine-no-its-not-just-a-case-of-flicking-the-sonar-on-33343">thermocline</a> in Asian waters from Canberra like you can telepilot a drone flying in Afghanistan with high-bandwidth satellite links from Nevada. </p>
<p>Contemporary telepiloted semi-autonomous submarines are controlled by physical tethers, basically waterproof network cables, when they dive. This limits range to a few kilometres. </p>
<h2>Who’s the captain?</h2>
<p>To consider autonomy in the role of sinking the enemy, the RAN would likely want an “<a href="http://cimsec.org/lethal-autonomy-autonomous-unmanned-vehicles/16732">ethical governor</a>” to skipper the submarines. This involves a machine making life and death decisions: a “Terminator” as captain so to speak. </p>
<p>This would present a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/killer-robots">policy challenge</a> for government and a <a href="http://www.wired.com/2012/09/robot-autonomy/">trust issue</a> for the RAN. It would certainly attract <a href="http://stopkillerrobots.org">protest</a> and raise <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/04/09/mind-gap/lack-accountability-killer-robots">accountability</a> questions.</p>
<p>On the other hand, at periscope depth, you <em>can</em> telepilot a submarine. To help solve the chronic recruitment problems of the Collins class, the RAN connected them to the internet. If you have a satellite “dongle on the periscope” so the crew can email their loved ones, then theoretically you can telepilot the submarine as well. </p>
<p>That said, if you are sneaking up on an enemy sub and are deep below the waves, you can’t. </p>
<p>Even if you can telepilot, radio emissions directing the sub’s actions above the waves might give away its position to the enemy. Telepiloting is just not as stealthy as radio silence. And stealth is <em>critical</em> to a submarine in war. </p>
<p>Telepiloting also exposes the sub to the <a href="http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf">operational risks</a> of cyberwarfare and jamming.</p>
<p>There is great technological and political risk in the <a href="http://sea1000.gov.au/">Future Submarine Project</a>. I don’t think robot submarines can <em>replace</em> crewed submarines but they can <em>augment</em> them and, for some missions, shift risk from vital human crews to more expendable machines. </p>
<p>Ordering nothing but crewed submarines in 2016 might be a bad naval investment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sean Welsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Autonomous submarines might do for naval warfare what drones are doing for air warfare. So should Australia consider autonomous subs as a replacement for the Collins class?Sean Welsh, Doctoral Candidate in Robot Ethics, University of CanterburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/186702013-09-27T02:12:36Z2013-09-27T02:12:36ZShould operations to turn the boats around be kept secret?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/32036/original/fxzb3krs-1380240057.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There are operational naval reasons behind Scott Morrison's decision to put asylum seeker arrivals and 'turn backs' behind a shroud of secrecy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Scott Fisher</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Acting opposition leader Chris Bowen <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/no-reason-to-keep-turn-backs-secret-bowen/story-fn3dxiwe-1226726142072">said</a> in a doorstop interview earlier this week that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is absolutely no operational reason for the new minister of immigration not to be up front with the Australian people when a boat arrives and when a turn-back is attempted.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Unfortunately, this statement is not correct. Operation Sovereign Borders, a key plank of the Abbott government’s policy to stop asylum seeker arrivals by boat, is a military-led activity and there are operational reasons for information related to stopping the boats not being made public. </p>
<p>These relate to the modus operandi of the Special Forces (SF) in boarding refugee boats and using force as necessary to turn them around. However, these operational reasons are outweighed by other considerations.</p>
<h2>Australian Defence Force doctrine</h2>
<p>The SF is the element of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that will be used in enforcing a strong “turn around” policy. The crews of naval patrol boats are trained to board and search suspicious vessels but not to seize a vessel against possible violent resistance. </p>
<p>Under current ADF doctrine that’s a job for the SF. This is the probable reason why a senior army officer - Lieutenant-General Angus Campbell - with considerable experience in SF operations has been <a href="http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/tony-abbotts-border-general-angus-campbell-gets-new-rank/story-e6frfkp9-1226722795077">placed in command</a> of Operation Sovereign Borders.</p>
<p>SF operations are highly classified and SF personnel are never identified by name. This is the principle that will be applied with their employment in stopping the boats. It provides some operational reasons for not releasing details of the operations associated with turning back a refugee boat. </p>
<p>However, this is not to say that maintaining secrecy on these operations is either justified or achievable.</p>
<h2>Reasons for secrecy</h2>
<p>The government’s policy in maintaining secrecy on stopping the boats is likely to be motivated by the desire to avoid a reaction from the Australian public - particularly the asylum seeker lobby - and from other interested parties, notably Indonesia and the <a href="http://www.imo.org/Pages/home.aspx">International Maritime Organization</a> (IMO). Undoubtedly, Indonesia will be watching Australia’s operations closely for any <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-19/abbott-says-coalition-respects-indonesia-sovereignty-asylum/4968752">impact on its sovereignty</a>.</p>
<p>Operations to turn back the boats will also be subject to wider international scrutiny, particularly with regard to Australia’s obligations to ensure the safety of life at sea. The Howard government’s handling of the Tampa affair in 2001 and its attempts to “stop the boats” were strongly criticised at the IMO, the UN organisation with oversight of maritime safety and security.</p>
<p>These criticisms led to amendments to the International Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) Conventions, and to the promulgation of <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/432acb464.html">guidelines</a> on the treatment of persons rescued at sea.</p>
<p>These amendments and guidelines reinforced existing obligations for ship masters and countries to provide assistance to any person in distress at sea, regardless of the nationality or status of that person. There are high risks that Australia’s operations to stop the boats may run counter to these instruments, particularly in the likely circumstances that robust action to turn back the boats could lead to the disabling or sinking of a vessel, thereby threatening safety of life at sea.</p>
<p>It is also likely that the reasons for not releasing information on the operations are overshadowed by the deterrent value of the tactics being known. The people smugglers and asylum seekers may well be deterred by any publicity confirming a strong Australian response.</p>
<h2>Will secrecy be achievable?</h2>
<p>It is most unlikely that the policy of suppressing information will work. The refugees have mobile phones and will try to tell their version of operations before their phones are seized by SF personnel on boarding a vessel. The residents of Christmas Island will also have a fair idea of what is happening.</p>
<p>When the leaks about actual operations occur, the rumours may do more harm to Australia’s international image than the actual facts.</p>
<p>Lastly, there is the issue of possible legal action resulting from an incident at sea. This was the case after the Tampa affair and some of the subsequent incidents that involved loss of life. Ultimately, Australia’s actions in stopping the boats must be legally defensible and in accordance with both national and international law. This will be extremely difficult to achieve. Jurisdiction at sea is notoriously complex. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADFP/ADFP%2006.1.2.pdf">ADF doctrinal publication</a> dealing with maritime jurisdiction notes that the lesson for the ADF following the Tampa affair is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…the need for scrupulous attention to legality in planning and execution of operations to enforce the Migration Act.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Final thoughts</h2>
<p>Chris Bowen may have been wrong in claiming that there is absolutely no operational reason for suppressing information on turning back the boats. However, he is well justified in questioning the legitimacy and validity of the new government’s policy of secrecy, as revealed by immigration minister Scott Morrison.</p>
<p>Recent press reports suggest that after several “loose cannon” statements by government ministers, prime minister Tony Abbott is <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/button-up-abbott-to-keep-ministers-in-check-20130925-2uelx.html">tightening up</a> on the freedom of his ministers to make public statements. Morrison’s statement has been quoted as an example of a statement causing prime ministerial concern. </p>
<p>Given the obvious problems with the secrecy policy, this is not surprising.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Bateman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Acting opposition leader Chris Bowen said in a doorstop interview earlier this week that: There is absolutely no operational reason for the new minister of immigration not to be up front with the Australian…Sam Bateman, Professorial Fellow, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/24992011-07-31T21:09:51Z2011-07-31T21:09:51ZBeyond the Collins Class: what next for Australia’s submarines?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/2524/original/aapone-19930828000013654880-files-australia-military-submarine-original.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will a Team Australia approach get the job done? </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Federal Defence Minister Stephen Smith <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3274172.htm">has announced</a> an inquiry into the reliability of Australia’s six Collins Class submarines.</p>
<p>He also called for US assistance in building new submarines to replace the Collins fleet which is scheduled to be in service until 2025. But what are the options for Australia’s so-called Future Submarine? </p>
<p>And why does Australia need submarines in the first place? </p>
<p>Simply put, submarines are an ideal weapon if you’re looking to deny command of the sea to your opponents. </p>
<p>In the Second World War, German submarines very nearly won the Battle of the Atlantic by the simple strategy of trying to sink allied ships quicker than they could be replaced.</p>
<p>Some 3,500 ships were lost before the submarines were defeated, so it was a close run thing. On the other hand, United States Navy submarines were successful in strangling Japan’s trade routes. </p>
<p>There are other examples of submarines having a wholly disproportionate influence on the outcome of a conflict. In the <a href="http://silentseawolvesmsw.devhub.com/blog/463874-submarines-in-the-falklands-conflict/">Falklands War</a>, a small number of British submarines prevented the Argentinean Navy from re-supplying their forces by sea.</p>
<p>While the submarine is often seen as the apotheosis of aggressive warfare, it is also an invaluable element of <em>defensive</em> warfare, given its ability to take the fight right up to an aggressor, not only by direct attack, but also by covert surveillance or even by the implied threat that they just might be there.</p>
<h2>The Australian experience</h2>
<p>Australia has included submarines in its defence strategy, right from the creation of the <a href="http://www.navy.gov.au/History">Royal Australian Navy</a> (RAN) in 1911. Indeed, it’s worth reading the <a href="http://www.anzacsite.gov.au/5environment/submarines/ae2.html">story of</a> the submarine AE2 in the Dardenelles at the time of Gallipoli. </p>
<p>The RAN has operated submarines continuously since 1967 when the first of six British-built <a href="http://www.submarineinstitute.com/submarines-in-australia/The-RAN-Oberon-Class.html">Oberon Class submarines</a> entered service. </p>
<p>They were, in turn, replaced by the six Australian-built <a href="http://www.submarineinstitute.com/submarines-in-australia/The-Collins-Class.html">Collins Class submarines</a>, about which much has been said and written – both <a href="http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/collins-class-submarines-a-triumph/story-e6freo8c-1111116321177">good</a> and <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/national/reputation-of-collins-class-subs-takes-a-further-dive-20100210-nsd0.html">bad</a>.</p>
<p>In December 2007, the Government announced its intention to <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf#page=70">replace the Collins Class with 12 new submarines</a> which would be built in Adelaide.</p>
<p>So what is available?</p>
<p>Well, submarines can be divided into two main groups based on their propulsion type: nuclear and conventionally-powered. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_4IaNOZSDfI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<h2>Conventional propulsion</h2>
<p>Most conventionally-powered submarines are built around a diesel-electric propulsion system, where the submarine is propelled by an electric motor powered by variants of the traditional <a href="http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/electric/leadacid.html">lead-acid battery</a>. </p>
<p>These are big batteries: a conventional submarine can have up to four battery sections with a hundred cells in each and each cell weighing nearly a tonne.</p>
<p>These batteries are charged by diesel generators which, being “air breathing”, require the submarine to be surfaced or at periscope depth in order to operate.</p>
<p>This is the Achilles’ heel of the conventional submarine, as they are at their most vulnerable while at or near the surface (even when charging is taking place using a snorkel or <a href="http://www.u3.se/ENFolder/RunningModes/ENSnorting.aspx">snort mast</a>). This period is described as “indiscretion”. </p>
<p>Recent developments in conventional submarine propulsion technology have therefore focused on reducing the indiscretion rate by use of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air-independent_propulsion">air-independent propulsion</a> (AIP) such as fuel cells or closed cycle heat engines.</p>
<h2>Nuclear propulsion</h2>
<p>A nuclear-propelled submarine uses a <a href="http://www.whatisnuclear.com/articles/nucreactor.html">nuclear reactor</a> to generate steam, as occurs in a nuclear power station. </p>
<p>Unlike in a nuclear power station, however, the steam in a nuclear submarine is used to drive propulsion turbines as well as providing electrical power.</p>
<p>Modern nuclear cores will last the lifetime of the submarine – about 25 years – and as a result, the submarine can operate at high speed for unlimited periods without refuelling.</p>
<p>Nuclear submarines also provide enough electrical power to support a highly complex combat system, with extensive sensors and weapons systems, all controlled by highly sophisticated<a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/teamaustralia/data_management_system_tactical.htm"> tactical data management systems</a>. </p>
<p>From an operational perspective, this would seem to be an attractive option. But nuclear submarines and their support do not come cheap, and to be successful it would require the support of a currently non-existent Australian nuclear power industry.</p>
<p>The Defence Minister has clearly stated the replacement for Collins <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-26/smith-on-joint-strike-fighters/2811034">will not be nuclear-powered</a> and given the current political climate in relation to <a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/nuclear-energy">all things nuclear</a>, this position is unlikely to change, despite the <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/paralysed-by-our-anti-nuclear-hysteria/story-e6frg6ux-1226100028747">urgings of reporters such as Greg Sheridan</a> in the Weekend Australian and others. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/2525/original/4580522698_c6bc47640f_b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Royal Australian Navy/Flickr</span></span>
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<h2>The Australian submarine</h2>
<p>Unlike the earlier Oberon Class, the Collins Class submarines were designed to cater for uniquely Australian conditions, most notably the tropical waters in which they would operate and the large distances they would need to travel.</p>
<p>These submarines were also designed to have a highly-capable and therefore power-hungry combat system, broadly equivalent to the capability of a nuclear submarine. </p>
<p>This resulted in a very large submarine, which, when built, was the largest conventionally-powered submarine since the Second World War. </p>
<p>This unique solution to a unique set of requirements has resulted in the submarine being an orphan – only the RAN operates the Collins Class, which can be an uncomfortable experience when dealing with such a complex technology, since it denies the RAN the option of sharing experiences with other navies operating the same submarine.</p>
<p>This undoubtedly will be a consideration when looking at the replacement options. </p>
<h2>What can we do?</h2>
<p>Apart from Japan, few nations operating high-capability ocean-going submarines use such large conventional submarines. Most (e.g. USA, UK, France) have gone down the nuclear path. </p>
<p>Conventional submarines operated by friendly nations tend to be smaller and therefore more constrained in their operational range. </p>
<p>This stems from their traditional use closer to home than the RAN requires.</p>
<p>So what options do we have? Well, we could:</p>
<ul>
<li>Develop a new, large conventional submarine, probably unique to Australia, in conjunction with a foreign capability partner. </li>
<li>Acquire lower capability submarines from the range currently available from submarine-building nations such as France, Sweden, Spain, Germany, with as much modification for Australian conditions as the design will allow.</li>
<li>Develop a modernised version of the Collins in conjunction with the <a href="http://www.asc.com.au/aspx/home.aspx">original submarine designer</a>) and other capability partners.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Home advantage</h2>
<p>The Australian Government has stated that any such future submarine will be built in Adelaide, but that this does not necessarily mean that it will be built by ASC (formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation).</p>
<p>This is due to the government’s desire to ensure there is appropriate competition to keep costs down. </p>
<p>While this is a laudable aim, it may not be a practicable when considering such a major project. </p>
<p>It is worth noting there are (sensibly) only two military shipbuilders/assemblers in the UK – BAE Systems and Babcock International (and they are collaborating on the aircraft carrier project) while there are potentially five in Australia: ASC, BAE Systems, Thales, Forgacs and Austal.</p>
<p>Even in the US, the two submarine builders (General Dynamics Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman Newport News) are co-operating in a successful bid to keeps costs down and deliveries on schedule. </p>
<p>For Australia to succeed in building a new class of submarines it will need to pool the best expertise available and get started soon if in-service dates to replace Collins Class submarines are to be met. </p>
<p>If ever a project required a Team Australia approach, this is it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/2499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Thornton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Federal Defence Minister Stephen Smith has announced an inquiry into the reliability of Australia’s six Collins Class submarines. He also called for US assistance in building new submarines to replace…John Thornton, Division of Information Technology, Engineering and the Environment, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.